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February 26, 1975
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-R "The KGB in Asia: Society of Subversion," Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 January 1975. "Reflection on the Soviet Secret Police and Intelligence Services," by Lothar Metzl, Orbis, Fall, 1974. The attached survey from FEER finds the presence of the Soviet secret service in Asia to be "widespreand rapidly expanding," with the KGB paying particular attention to Chinese diplomats and to those who sympathize with Peking. According to FEER, long experience with Moscow intrigue has made governments in Europe -North America wary of the Russians. The Soviets, however, are a relatively new phenomenon in much of Asia, where they capitalize on popular sentiments against colonialism. The long section "Society of Subversion" consists of a brief history followed by a breezy account of selected KGB operatives and activities throughout Acia? rh; --,-,,.r Metzl's observations are being added to the FEER survey primarily to keep attention focused on John Barron's KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents. This 1974 book, while written for the general re er, nevert eless contains a wealth of factual material. And as Metzl puts it, "the KGB phenomenon is significant enough to qualify as an input in the process of making Western and especially US detente policy." 25X1A2g 25X1C10b 26 Feb 1975 lease 1999/~CI MAC RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 CPYRGHT 1 pT i 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 correspondents throughout Asia, the presence of the Russian secret service (KGB) in the region is revealed as widespread - and somewhat clumsy compared with the cloak-and-dagger activities of other foreign powers. The role of this sinister organisation is rapidly expanding in Asia and vast sums are being spent by the Kremlin on gathering information of all kinds, with special reference to China, as the bitter squabble with Peking continues. There is also a concerted masterminded by the KGB, to discredit the Chinese, drive , whether by siding with India in its frontier dispute with China, or by casting doubts on the integrity of the Peking leadership. reatest spy thriller writer of them all, John le Carre, the H g owever, in an exclusive, specially-commissioned introduction to this feature, takes.issue with some of these findings. Discussing the relative merits of two recent books, one on the KGB and the other a nest-fouling expose of the CIA, le Carre points out that the Russians play the secrecy game with greater discretion, and suggests that they do not publish what they know about. the US secret service because one day they might be fraternal services in liaison against the Chinese target, page 20. Cover by Morgan Chua; photo by Arthur Kan. In the twilight world of politics today, things are not what they seem, and even the faces of young radical idealists can be disguises for sinister forces and purposes. Singapore Foreign Minister Rajaratnam, speaking on the recent student unrest in the city-state, sees foreign manipulators behind the young men who ostensibly seem to want to mould the world closer to their heart's desire, page 10. After spending two years in a Calcutta jail, two young Americans, Anthony Fletcher and Richard Harcos, were due to appear before a court last week in what would be India's first-ever spy trial involving Westerners. The strange circumstances surrounding the arrest of the two and the case's top-level political implications have already aroused worldwide curiosity, page 18. Seoul's preoccupation with industrial growth has taken its toll of South Korea's farm sector. The bill for imported rice and grain is soaring, and achieving the target of food self-sufficiency by 1976 will be difficult, page 37. The textile recession is posing a major threat to Malaysia, which has encouraged an invasion of textile companies from. overseas. With export markets declining, the competition to stay in business is likely to be intense, page 35. European nations are on the defensive about imports from Japan. But their short-sighted attitude, at a time when European consumer goods are flooding into Tokyo, can only harm them, page 39. National unity remains one of the main priorities of leaders in China, and to ensure that the Communist Party maintains its authority, a new slogan has emerged: "The Party must control the Party," page 13. s America's friends in Asia will get less foreign aid this fiscal year. Congress has effectively halved the allocations of military and economic funds sought by the Ford Administration - and it could be worse next year, 30 Cantt2 s Regional Affairs Singapore: The foteign connection _ China: Shadow boxing for a sense of unity -13 Laos: A gentle brush-off from America _ 14 India: Two Americans on trial 18 The KGB in Asia - 20 Mightier than the sword_- 20 Society of subversion - 22 ing's no crime _26 S py Business Affairs Aid: Reducing the Asian commitment 30 Trade: Slow progress on preferences 31 Japan seeks a balance-39 Memos 32 Textiles: Malaysia's foreign fears 35 Agriculture: South Korea reviews its priorities.__.____37 Energy: Indian remedies 38 Investment 43 Stockmarkets 44 Selected market quotations ._A 5 Letter from Singapore 46 Regular Features Intelligence 5 Letters 6 Editorial 9 Traveller's Limericks 17 Richard Hughes 19 page . ppr ved ,For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00100430001-8 Approved For Relea 9/_Q1A-RD~P7~1194A000100430001-8 CPYRGHT sulaversi= OLEG SOLOVIEV has the unnerving habit of glowering across the rim of.his whisky glass and growling: "I suppose you think I'm an agent of the KGB?" Acquaintances can only mumble "hea- ven forbid" and change the subject. Soloviev is described on his visiting cards as the Southeast Asian correspon- dent of Soviet Radio and Television. He rents an expensive flat in Singapore (22P Tomlinson Road), drives an air- conditioned Toyota, speaks fluent Eng- lish and Chinese and travels the region without the film crews which encumber his Western colleagues. He confides to expatriates his hatred of the Chinese - "a crafty, untrustworthy race" - and tells stories of alleged atrocities during the Sino-Soviet clash at Chenpao Island in 1969. "When we went back to recover the bodies of our soldiers, the Chinese had gouged out their eyes." 'But KGB? If any cynical mind should harbour such a thought, the Russians have only themselves to blame. Over the past eleven years, 40 countries have expelled Soviet citizens accused of working for the KOMITET GOSU- DARSTVENNOY BEZOPASNOSTI, the Committee for Internal Security, whose tentacles spread out across the world. Russian diplomats, journalists and busi- ness representatives have all been caught, at one time or another, try- ing to pry secrets from foreign sour- ces, sometimes subtly, even brilliantly, but mostly crudely and inefficiently. . Not all KGB officers are spies. Some function as "agents of influence," pushing the Soviet point of view, while keeping an eye open for foreign recruits for the espionage network. At the height of the Cold War, these specialists maligned the United States and "West- ern imperialism", now their target is China, particularly in Asia. The cloak- and-dagger men follow suit, keeping a sharp watch on American activity, but switching their main attention to the Chinese. Their efforts are concentrated on monitoring the contacts and opera- tions of Chinese diplomats and those who sympathise with Peking. In a few sensitive areas, like Indonesia, the Rus- sians are said to inform on "Maoists" among the Overseas Chinese community to Government officials willing and eager to hear stories of Peking-inspired subver- sion. The Western world has grown inured to the tides of Moscow-mounted intri- gue. A succession of spy-scandals and expulsions has long prompted govern- ments all over Europe and the Americas, to lock up their secrets and regard the Russians with suspicion. Not so in Asia, where the Russians are a relatively new phenomena. The Soviet suppressions in Budapest and Prague may have tarnish- ed the image, but it is still nowhere as immediate or as bruising as recent me- mories of colonialism. Nor has the. KGB been anywhere near as successful or all- pervading as the American Central Intel- ligence Agency (CIA), rigging by-elec- tions in India and king-making in Laos, South Vietnam, Cambodia and South Korea. Russian espionage activity is small beer: compared with the massive, operations , mounted by the United States, but it is expanding steadily as the. Ugly American pulls back, winded, from the Asian periphery. . The KGB is a growing factor in Asian politics, especially in areas of potential change like the Indian subcontinent and Indochina. Even countries with strong autocratic regimes such as Indonesia, the Philippines and South Korea have an in-built instability with profitable pro- mise for future turmoil. It is time to look closely at this organisation and its agents who stand, vulture-like in the wings, awaiting the moment of chaos ... a i ? THE KGB grew out of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combat- ing Counter-revolution, Speculation and Sabotage (CHEKA). It was founded on December 20, 1917, by order of the Council of People's Commissars. The first director, FELIX DZERZHINSKY, was a Polish-born Russian who died peacefully in his bed in 1926. He was lucky. Four of his nine successors were liquidated as foreign spies. A statue to Dzerzhinsky, erected in 1961 by Khrushchev, stands in the square named after him, appropriately opposite, the KGB headquarters which back conveni- ently onto the Lubyanka Prison. The headquarters building was originally the head office of the former All-Russian Insurance Company;jt was extended af- ter World War II by a seven-storey an- nexe built by political prisoners and German prisoners of war. In the summer of 1972, a vast new building was opened on the Moscow ring-road, about seven miles from the centre, to house the for- eign operations of the KGB. Other small- er offices are scattered throughout the Soviet capital. The KGB is organised into seven direc- torates. Its operational staff is. believed to total 90,000, plus some 400,000 clerks and administrators. e two larg- est and most powerful direct rates con- trol the suppression of domestic dissent; their area of responsibility covers every- thing from expelling Solzh nitzyn to following-up the Soviet invasion of Cze- choslovakia. The chairman i a former telegraph operator called YU I VLADI- MIROVICH ANDROPOV., a tall, scho- larly man with a good knowledge of English who was awarded th Order of Lenin on. June 24, .1974, for his service to the State. President Podgorny, speaking for the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party, declared: "I should like on behalf of all the comrades here p esent cor- dially to congratulate you and fratar- nally embrace you, to wish you health and happiness and great success in your difficult but useful work." Comrade Andropov was Soviet Amb ssad.or in Budapest at the time of the Hungarian uprising; he is believed to lave been awarded his present post on the strength of his decisive action in seizing the dent leadership led by Imry agy,,and sending its members to their d aths. The First Directorate of the KGB con- centrates on foreign operatio s. It is di- vided into ten departments dealing with specific regions of the world. Number Six covers China, North Vie nam and North Korea. Number Seven handles the rest of Asia from Pakistan to Japan. Sub-sections control Soviet agents sent to live abroad under false identities, specialists who ferret out technical se- crets and a "Disinformation Depart- ment" designed to spread confusing pro- paganda through the enemy tanks. Bri- tish defector Kim Philby put out his "revelations" about his old--M.1 6 collea- gues.through this department. The KGB gets active assistance in the field from officers of the GL VNOYE RAZVEDYVATELNOY UP- RAVLENIYE (Gifu),. the S viet mili- tary intelligence service. All Russian mi- litary attaches are assumed to belong to the GRU, supported by other gents at- tached to embassies under le s obvious cover. The GRU was founded i 1920 to keep the Red Army better informed ?about its opponents following the disas- trous Bolshevik invasion of Poland. An extraordinarily potent organisation was built up during the next decad , only to be decimated by the Stalin urges of 1936-38 and discredited in the 1960s by the discovery that two senio GRU of- ficers,. colonels Popov and P rikovsky, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 were secretlAppt w/ d ,rft1 dsei$19"I1"A& ~CtA='RDP79-01194AGQG"@ 8GQQ1e&aining intel- ligence. KGB of racers took over the or- The. result is that although. KGB opera- ligence information in secret writing, ganisation in 1958 and some observers tions are widespread so widespread "Just as these men were engaged in. believe this virtually ended its career as that the British Government was forced criminal activities in the dark comer an autonomous unit. It is noted, to expel or bar 105 Russians from Lon- against the Chinese people, a red signal- ever, that some of the most spectacular don in 1970 - the payoff is believed to light zoomed to the sky over the Hsi- Soviet espionage coups in recent years be disappointing. With a few brilliant paho bridge followed by flares," the have been the work of the GRU exceptions, the Russians have pulled off NCNA account goes on. "Courageous A SPY must be able to work unde- tected..Once he becomes known, or "blown," to use the language of espion- age, his value in the field is sharply re- duced. The ubiquitous KGB infiltrates every Russian organisation. The journa- list offers a convenient camouflage; af- ter all, it is his job to ask searching questions. Philby works for a KGB subsi- diary of the Novosti Press Agency (the Tenth Division), which provides cover for many a Soviet spy. But an agent can be just as easily lodged in the office of Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, a Russian trading corporation, SOVEXPORT- FILM or, inevitably, the embassy. Defectors say the KGB men are the terror of other diplomats. Occasionally they are themselves ambassadors like PAUL STEPANOVITCH KUZNET- ZOV, who was appointed to Jakarta in 1972. Expelled for spying from Britain in 1952, he went on to Yugoslavia and was connected with the spy-ring which bugged President Tito's private office. Others prefer to be disguised as drivers or junior secretaries, although they often wield as much power as the ambassador himself. . Two months later a Soviet army heli- copter ran out of fuel and landed in a remote corner of Sinkiang. The three- man crew was promptly arrested by Chi- nese border-guards. They are still detain- ed in China. Their story was that they had lost their way on a mercy mission, but the Chinese insist the Russians were spying. The crew did not include a doc- tor, nor were they carrying any medical supplies. Peking alleged that certain equipment found on board the helicop- ter proved it was on an espionage mis- sion in a particularly sensitive area, not too far from the nuclear base at Lop Nor. These are the only two publicised long and 15-metre wide bridge, looked ^ ^ ^ cases of Russian spying in China for peared under the and then disa ound a ALEXANDR KAZNACHEEV, a KGB agent in Rangoon, gave a detailed pic- ture of Soviet intelligence operations after he defected to the United States in the late 1950s. The espionage headquar- ters in all Russian embassies is the closely-guarded Residence (Referentura), which combines the functions of coding room with conference room and filing section for highly-classified documents. The head. of KGB operations is known as "the Resident." Only a trusted handful have access to his domain, which is in- variably protected by a heavy steel door. Most ambassadors are not admit- ted. It is here that Russian agents meet, free of their routine cover, to make cod- ed reports and discuss operations. A CIA man once told 'a correspon- dent: "The Russians are intelligence animals. Every bit of informa- tion seems to be of use to them. You smoke a pipe, that goes into the file. And if somehow or other they can get their informa- tion by covert means, then it's all the more valuable. The KGB seem to despise overt analysis. For instance, weather bulletins. don't interest them if broadcast. But if they can steal a bulletin off the meteorologist's desk be- few notable coups in recent years, part- Chinese militiamen and Public Security ly because governments are thoroughly personnel rushed to the Hsipaho bridge alerted, but also because the bureaucra- from all around shouting "catch the tic structure of the KGB proves expen- spies." sive and ineffectual. At the same time, The Russians had run into a trap. Western experts admit that the calibre They immediately claimed diplomatic of the KGBagent is improving,as Russia immunity, as did the driver of the Vol- increases contact with the outside ga, First Secretary V. I. MARCHENKO, world; there is no dearth of money or an experienced Chinese-speaking diplo- James Bond-type gadgetry, 'nor, appar mat who was said to be the KGB Resi- ently, of foreign collaborators anxious dent in China. Also sitting in the car to be suborned financially, morally or were the wives of Marchenko and Seme- through ideological fervour. nov. All five, were promptly expelled ^ ^' . ^ from the country. "IT WAS the evening of January 15, 1974, when the streets in the Chinese capital were emptying. The grey, Soviet Volga car sped out of the Soviet Em- bassy into China. Winding through streets and lanes, it left the city and raced towards the northeastern out- skirts. Suddenly it pulled up at a dark place on the Peihuantung Road, about 4.5 kilometres from the city proper. Two people, one taller than the other, stole out of the car and moved towards the Hsipaho bridge 170 metres ahead, the tall person carrying a heavy travel- ling-bag in his hand. They stopped at the northeastern corner of the 30-metre p , r bridge one after the other ..." This is no extract from a second-rate spy novel. It is an official account by the New China News Agency (NCNA) of events leading up to the biggest recent spy-scandal in Peking.. The two men mentioned in the article were U: A. SEMENOV, Third. Secretary at the So- viet Embassy, and A. A. KOLOSOV, an interpreter in the Soviet Military At- tache's office. They were making furtive rendezvous with two Chinese . agents; one of them, LI HUNG- SHU, had been train- ed by the GRU and sent into China in June 1972. After calling out a pass- word, the Russians. were preparing to hand over a travel- ling-bag containing a standard spy-kit: a small, high-speed ra- dio transmitter capa- ble of whipping off a coded message be- fore it could be pin- pointed, frequency tables, operating instructions, developer for invisible ink, a forged border-pass fore anyone can broadcast it, the Rus- and money. Li Hung-shu was to hand several years. But KGB activity goes on continuously. The Embassy in Peking is as large and over-staffed as any other Soviet mission in an area of vital interest to Moscow; and if efforts to contact the Chinese are all too often frustrated, the Russians turn to the foreign. community in Peking. A nasty row blew up at an African cocktail party two years ago, when a Russian diplomat asked a Latin American "foreign expert," newly-arriv- ed in China, to help him get informa- tion. When the man indignantly refused the Russian shouted "We will kill you." He had. to be restrained by embarrassed colleagues. During October 1973, two Russians drove an embassy car into one. of the foreigners' compounds in eastern Peking and jumped out wielding a hammer and chisel. They cut the mail box off its pole and drove away with it. In November 1972, the Reuter cor- respondent, James Pringle, tried to get a cut-price ticket to Europe from Aero- flot. The Peking manager, ALEK- SANDR NICOLAEVICH VASILENKO, who works out of the Soviet Embassy, agreed that this could be arranged. Time passed and it appeared that there were "problems." Pringle had applied for an .exit permit in mid-December, but as the date approached and no ticket materia- lised he grew worried. He held several Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 sessions wun use rtcrouot manager try- Thai Special Branch from less obtrusive and arrested three men. 06e was a local HUNG-YAN, n interpreter d STEPAN ered as sea- , they were ng aimed at d that their an espionage documents ported this B operative, taught and China under k. EXANDER and yan in to Russian essman was visiting So- e Russians. But ship re- ong's busi- estricted, al- A KGB agent is an expensive investment.. He (or occasionally, she) must become fluent in at least one, language. If destin- ed to live abroad, posing as the citizen of his adopted country, he must do more than learn to blend into his back- ground by learning the customs and his- tory of the people he imitates; he must create an entirely new identity and live with it at all times. Even the agent ope- rating from the safe-keeping of his em- bassy has been through years of train- ing. Invariably he or she is of above- average IQ, put through an exacting course at one of the several KGB training schools in the Soviet Union, tested for reliability, courage and, above all, politi- cal dedication to the Moscow cause. The agent posing as a, journalist or working from within a trading organisation, must learn enough about his supposed trade (and of the kind of inquisitive questions he is liable to face from foreign col- leagues) to dispel suspicion. So it is a serious setback to the KGB when one of these agents is detected and expelled. In the immediate post-war period KGB operations, directed mainly. towards-West Europe and the Ameri- cas, were comparatively unsophisticat- ed. But so were the Western security services. Sensational leaks like the loss of nuclear secrets are part of history. Tightened security throughout the world led to the unmasking of increas- ing numbers of KGB agents. and the peo- ple they recruited. The culmination was the unprecedented expulsion of the Russians from London. Some of these spies have since surfac- ed elsewhere. It would be surprising if they had not in view of the investment involved. KGB men expelled from Britain have reappeared in Sri Lanka, Bangla- desh and Thailand. Their value has ob- viously depreciated, since the countries concerned are already forewarned. These countries, however, have hesitat- ed to expel the suspects. The Thais made half-hearted efforts to have VIKTOR VEKLENK.O declaied personna non grata soon after he arrived in Bangkok on May 29, 1972. He took up the post of Third Secretary in the Soviet Embassy eight months after his. expulsion from Britain.. Lately, there has been some sophisticated speculation that Veklenko is employed as a "red SPECIAL Branch officers burst into a utg t94 1 6$ i $dP' ttti'c& 1 9/02 :.CIA-RDP79-01194A0 G 3~0Q , ~O ber 3, as' enko calf rirl e or yet Bangkok became a Mainr. centre of the others warn U Soviet espionage immediately after di- of Chinese origin call the early-1950s. The Embassy was an POLIKAROV, both regis still-forbidden: areas of Southeast Asia. ship Khabarovsk. In fac Listed staff today number 25, but that KGB agents establishing r is deliberately. misleading. Soviet embas- with a blossoming spy-r sies employ no local people apart from China. Another Chinese, translators; cooks, maids and drivers are but never named, admitt all brought from Russia. The total is, eventual aim was to sprea therefore, more like 250, compared network throughout So with five Thais in their mission in Mos- Police claimed they foun proportion of the denizens, of any So- story; far from being an viet embassy work for the KGs or GRU man, he was a senior K (assisted from outside by journalists and once active in Japan, wh tial second only to the CiA. cover of a professorship at None of this has gone unnoticed in. ern University in Vladivost Peking, which periodically complains of Another KGB agent, A eastern Asia. The People's Daily recent- 1969 while posing as ma ly alleged that Soviet diplomats had . tendent supervising repair Thai, coast. The charges proved, on Kowloon. The Chinese bus examination, to be a rehash of frequent later contacted by other allegations in the Thai press, notably the reached Hongkong aboard have consistently condemned spying infiltration left open to (not only by the Russians) in Thailand. Efforts to open a consul The Nation named KAIR ILIA- kong have been continuo SHEV, Deputy Trade Director in Bang- by the British Government diplomat, Second Secretary ANATOLI ness and have never been , has also been mentioned as ships has been somewhat c the country a senior KGB officer. Similar accusations cent years. " v r__ . quota of Chinese-speaking - r Tass news agency renresentative_ ALEX the Thai Soviet THASOSyshi+j in J or- lion about China and recr pp g ?anicatinn and Aernflnt locally to carry on the Wear suspect, since total trade was only US$6 speaking perfect English, c million in 1973. The Soviet trade chin- ly (and vainly) at the REVi pound in Bangkok costs $50,000 a year "the current political situa and provides comfortable shelter for fif- chant liner, the Sovetsky S teen families. The outlay would seem disproportionate to the volume of busi- ness. The Thai authorities are alert to the dangers. In earlier days they were under pressure from the Americans to crack down on the Russians. But detente and the change to civilian Government have made the Special Branch a trifle more permissive. The last Soviet citizen was expelled from Thailand in September 1965. He was LEONID MAMURIN, a senior trade official. In 1960, the Tass correspondent, I. GARUCHIN,.and the assistant press attache, K. SAHAGA- ROV, were kicked out for spying. None of these men has apparently reappeared abroad, but changes of name (and some- times, it is said, of appearance) makes it -difficult to trace them. another discussion at the Embassy. The British correspondent was shown into a room he had never seen before and which he now believes was bugged. The Russian then ran through all the minor details previously discussed and said: "We can let you have the ticket, but we would like you to help us with some information." Pringle got up and walked pies entrust iting people There was led regular- w to discuss ion." A mer- jus, called at Hongkong in 1971 with eight crew members who turned out to be Soviet China-watchers from the D versity in Vladivostok; an more than the necessary s ashore. yan for nearly four mon him aboard the Soviet c Kavalerovo, en route to ship swung at anchor, presu ing instructions from M escorted by police launch the Russians have been in herrin~4'p eMtj 1 bP'tR 4 $ tTIOW-f~OP7910~P1NAvM WM_1-3'g --partment of Eastern Uni- other ships ,en to carry eleton crew. ver, hamper- r activities id Ho Hung= is, then put ntainer ship Vladivostok per protest- 10 days the nably await- iscow, until er 24, 1972, s, with the Since then re cautious. superinten- .t the begin- C PafR$ IT United Dockyards Ltd. They are VLADIMIR VASILIEVICH IVANOV and VYACHISLAV DMITRIEVICH PIKIN, both officials of the State trad- ing organisation, SUDOIMPORT. They lead a quiet and segregated life in flats reserved for foreigners within the dock- yard compound. ning of AY rov"-Fe qrvReIease 1999/09/02 :, CJA-RDP^79-01194A000a OO4 )O01 ,8,, 25X11C10 FEARS of defection haunt the KGB, if only because their activities so permeate the Russian presence abroad that any Russian seeking asylum (usually in the United States) is liable to betray an en- tire nest of agents and their foreign con- tacts. When EVGENI. SOROKIN, a young clerk at the Soviet Embassy in Vientiane, crashed his car in September 1972, and then sought asylum in the West, the Russians quietly withdrew 25% of their diplomatic staff from Laos. Since then the Russians have been build- provoke questions about' the size of their embassy. Staff now number more than 100, although the Soviet Union provides virtually no aid to Laos and conducts no trade at all. Observers believe. the Russians have one main mission: Apart from the ob- vious aim of keeping an eye on the dwindling US commitment and the do- mestic political scene, the Russians have chosen Laos as an important tilting ground in their struggle with China. "There is a ding-dong battle going on in the streets of Vientiane between the Russians and the Chinese," a diplomat told the REVIEW. "There is an open hostility you don't find between Rus- sian and Chinese diplomats in Europe." When the Russians laid on two big Antonov-12 transports to fly Pathet Lao troops and police into Vientiane last year, the Chinese promptly flew a Pa- thet Lao contingent to Luang Prabang aboard their own Illyushins. The re- sident Tass 'correspondent works part- time at the Ministry of Information and the official Agence Lao Presse carries an increasing number of Tass despatches. The Chinese, not to he outdone, have installed a representative of the New China News Agency with his own tele- printer: News of the recent air accord between China and Laos was carried by Agence Lao quoting NCNA. The Thai press tends to see spies un- der every bed, but a report in the Bang- kok Post naming VIATCHESLAV F. CHIRIAEV as "a very high Russian in- telligence officer" in Vientiane is not disputed by foreign observers. An Ame- rican book on the KGB by. John Barron lists the present Russian Ambassador to Laos, VALENTIN P. VDOVIN, as a KGB officer and alleges that he has pre- viously had espionage experience in France and French Africa. Approved For Release TROUBLE attracts spies" like flies to, a jampot and there, is,_trouble apleiTty these'days in Bangladesh. Hence the ap- pointment of ANDRE FOMIN as Soviet Ambassador.-and the presence of such experienced KGB officers as GEORGI ALEXANDROVICH KUZNETSOV, who went to. Britain in 1965 after three years in New York, only- to be expelled in the great spy purge of 1971. Kuznet- sov turned up as commercial attache in Dacca in early 1972. He now spoke fluent' Bengali as well as English and seemed more interested in contacting . the student community expand- ing trade. The Singapore Nanyang Siang Pau of June 27, 1973, had this to say: "In order to win over the Bangladesh Youth and Trade Union organisations, Russia des- patched. Kuznetsov to Bangladesh as a member of the Soviet Embassy to take charge of. these special duties. These duties included his being actively engag- ed in liaison work with the Bangladesh Youth and Trade Union organisations. His real task was to keep an eye on these organisations in order to prevent penetration from Maoist elements and other revolutionary organisations." Kuznetsov's ambassador is a former deputy, foreign minister of the Soviet Union, a member of the.Supreme Soviet and said to be in charge of policy-plan- ning in South and Southeast Asia. Sure- ly Dacca did not deserve- a diplomat who outranks his colleagues in New. Delhi and Jakarta? The answer is that the Soviet Union rightly regards Bangla- desh as a key spot in a troubled conti- nent. It is even something of a vacuum where the Russians have a head start, for once, over the Americans, but where China is beginning to win influence. The Soviet Union has been making the most of its early offers of aid (at one time there were two or three thou-' sand Russians doing salvage work in Chittagong), while lending a clandestine hand to help stamp out insurgency led by underground groups often drawing their political inspiration from Peking. Soviet helicopters in Bangladesh are re- ported to have flown support missions during May-June of 1972 for military forces chasing the "Maoists" in the , swampy Sunderbans and in the Chitta- post of deputy head of mission He . gong Hill tracts, where the actual fight- spent five or six years in China and is an ing was quietly conducted by the Indian acknowledged expert on Chinese affairs. Army. The rebels in this latter area were An active but unobtrusive press corps Mizos, condemned by Tass as "Chinese- includes representatives of Tass, Novosti trained." and of course, Soviet Radio and TV. The Nanyang Siang Pau concluded: "If Most of these men are professional the Soviet Union wishes to retain China-watchers led by YURI B. its full influence in Bangladesh, it SAVENKOV of Novosti, a gregarious, must continue to support all ele- squash-player who speaks good Manda- ments, with the assistance of such rin. His duties include keeping a check people as Kuznetsof. In this way on the Chinese newspapers, most of it can effectively prevent the Ban- them openly pro-Peking. gladesh people from relying too The Singapore-Soviet Shipping Com- heavily on the West and the Chi- pany (SOCIAL), incorporated early in nese People's Republic for future 1968, originally had two Russians on 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-O1194A06 .Oda 'Oo'ar{-$YURI KUB- "USING Singapore as a base, So- viet social-imperialism is.accelerat- .ing its infiltration of our country and 'others. Through its embassies, branches of the Moscow People's Sank and other. channels, Soviet revisionism is vigorously carrying out infiltration, expansion and espionage activities. In carrying out these secret activities, Soviet agents and ships, 'using all kinds of identification and. names as covers, are coming and go- ing continuously in increasing num- bers." That is what "The Voice of Malayan Revolution" broadcast in Chinese on April 6, 1974. The same sort of accusa- tions are made constantly by Peking, but are they really true? Our correspon- dents report that the Singapore Russians all keep a low profile. Some have actual- ly joined the Cricket Club. Since most of the Republic's citizens are Chinese, political sympathies lie closer to Peking than Moscow. The Russians tend to play down their line, at least in. conversation with Singaporeans. Diplomatic relations between Singa- pore and- the Soviet Union were not established until June 1968, nearly three years after the Republic opted out of Malaysia. That same year a joint ship- ping company was formed to facilitate direct trade and in 1969, Aeroflot began a thrice-weekly service between Moscow and Singapore. The Moscow Narodni Bank established a branch in 1971, and the following year Russian ships began using the repair facilities at Keppel Har- bour and other yards. Some 500 Rus- sian -ships now call at Singapore every year with so many sailors hungry for cameras and transistor radios that an en- terprising shopkeeper in High Street has put up a cyrillic signboard and employ- ed a Russian-speaking assistant. The new embassy site in select Cluny Road was purchased from the Chartered Bank for S$1.5 million (US$641,025). It covers an area of 268,000 sq. ,ft, with de luxe facilities like a swimming pool, sauna and tennis, volley and gorodki courts. The entire complex is believed to have cost $2.5 million. The most important inmate is a Ukrainian, VA- LENTIN PASENCHUK who holds the ?YUSHKIN (chairman) and a director, IGOR activities. He still deal c n it 4 ? 6*3OO1N8f ass, with.a , 0 ;~Fsa#pLsl6#9e1 m an 5 C wards, a rmer tngapore journalist, rious offence under Soviet law), but is sun ar y uent command of English. LIM BENG TEE, set up the Tri-Union so dramatically rehabilitated that he Tass correspondents oft n work in Company (Pte) Ltd with himself as boasts a comfortable Moscow apartment fields rce outride the scope of e. N ordinary managing director. A contract was sign- and a splendid suburban dacha where correspondent. SERGEI S RI came ed with SOCIAC ? to handle their Steve- foreigners are entertained with Scotch out to Southeast Asia in the mid-1960s, the doting in Singapore. The business ap- first Soviet journalist a credited to peared to prosper, with Lim soon able whisky and caviar. Louis has obviously Malaysia and Singapore. Ta fair and won the stamp of approval front some- to buy a $50,000 apartment and ride sophisticated, with American than English, one in the Soviet Government. These h he e looked tedd more Ameeric an Russian around in a chauffeur-driven Mercedes. days he is accorded the rare privilege of in his well-cut Ivy League uitings. He and 4s August being 1973, detained, imwiwas thoutarrested trial travelling abroad and writing for foreign paid several visits to the Philippines at a newspapers. As correspondent of the time when Russians were less welcome under the Internal Security Act: A London Evening News, he had a world police statement alleged he "was acting -scoop with first word of Khrushchev's there than they are today and probably in the interests of foreign intelligence downfall. prepared the ground for G egorovich. organisations through their business en- His activities and life-style arouse un- What is not generally know is that he terprise here." The Russian connection derstandable suspicion abroad. The wan, aner lso a S the Sol viev stexl rt, a foees c;f was never mentioned. The Internal Se- kindest critics accuse him of pushing So- of Singapore. he Solwo ken characters curity Department made it quite clear, viet propaganda into the international of SinHe worked in China the dur- however, that Lim was a Soviet spy. He press. The harshest say outright that Soviet he early fiat missions. as in ter for e was apparently recruited to pass on Victor Louis is an agent of Department Soetechnical ms. A few weeks ago news about China, using contacts all "A," whose many, covert tasks have in- for he called again in Si a ore, telling over the region and may also have. been cluded blackening the reputations of the foreign colleagues that he w2 collecting in a -position to provide the Russians dissident Russian writer, Alexander material for a book on the impact of the with the kind of inside information on Solzhenitzyn, and Stalin's daughter, Cultural Revolution outside China. Singapore politicians and personalities Svetlana Alliluyeva, who sought refuge Tass offices are notorious) over-staff- which go into those insatiable KGB fides in the United States in 1967. The au- ed. The British news agen , Reuters, "for later action." thor, John Barron says: "His job demon- keeps two correspondents in New Delhi A month after Lim 's arrest, a Russian. strably is to. sow confusion, plant lies, for the. whole of India, Bangladesh and shipping expert arrived in Kuala Lum-, peddle fraudulent or stolen manuscripts Sri Lanka. There are seven ass comes pur. He was ANATOLI LYKHO, de- and smear the reputations of dissenting pondents in India alone, alt g with re- scribed as a representative of the Soviet Soviet intellectuals ... " presentative- of Novosti, Pravda, Izves shipping line, SOVINFLOT. His assign- The ideological dispute with Peking tia, Trud, New Times and Soviet Radio ment was adviser to the Malaysian line, has faced Louis, and other specialists, and TV. Separate Tass office have been SYARIKAT ANGKATA LAUT, which with a bigger challenge. They must now established in Dacca and Colombo. The acts as agent for Soviet ships calling in do their utmost to discredit the Chinese agency's news service tern s far less Malaysian ports. He also had strong leadership by pushing the Soviet points comprehensive than Reuters or anything links with SoCIAC in Singapore. Lykho of view, hinting at divisions within put out by the rival America wire set has since remained something, of a vices. mystery. g' China and touching on sensitive issues -India has always had to priority His only public statement, in which cause alarm in Peking. That was with the KGB. The Indo-Sotiiet Treaty Malacca, in September 1973, was that the purpose behind Victor Louis' much- of 1971 opened the flood-gates to Rus- he intended studying port facilities in publicised "secret" visit to Taiwan in Sian infiltration. It has often been said Malaysia to help ship rubber direct to October 1968.. The results were gratify- that "there are no secrets in India," con- Russia. But his contacts with Malaysian ing. Did this mean that the Soviet GOv- shipping men is minimal and potential ernment was establishing tentative links ermm~gent the andnltsud of the 1 dis, Govt business contacts have difficulty even with the exiled Nationalists? Louis did has only its bcomgical bias, but it finding out where he lives. All that is not say, He was content to leave eddies h ay lately become, app rent that known is that he operates out of the of speculation in his wake before return- the treaty threatened intern security. Soviet Emba?sy in Kuala Lumpur. ing to the good life in Moscow. ? . Two years ago, Pravda assigned its chief foreign correspondent, V LADI THE DEZINFORMATSIYA, or Disin- MIR . GREGOROVICH, to the Philip - formation and the trade union ovement formation Department of the KGB, De- pines. It was an oddly obscure assign- were making it easy for the Russians to partment "A" of the First Directorate, ment for such an experienced journalist. infiltrate their agents. 25X1 C 1 O can organise anything from a demon- Small, bespectacled Gregorovich has It is common knowledge t at certain stration outside the US Embassy in New worked in Canada and the United Soviet journalists form an essential part Delhi, to leaking information, some of it States.. He speaks excellent Engli? and of .the KGB operations in India. Until accurate but usually highly suspect. The wields an expense account that allows recently they enjoyed complete free- Indian "rent-a-mob" business was exten- for ample entertaining around Manila, dom from police surveillance by driving sively used both by the Russians and the The Philippines do not yet enjoy diplo- around in cars with diplomat c number Americans during the early 1960s. It matic relations with the Soviet Union, Plates. Their claim for diplom tic immu- was directly controlled on the Russian but Gregorovich has acted as go-be- nity was only withdrawn after a heated side by a KGB specialist within the So- tween in the tortuous negotiations, din- lists debate are in the the most im mport nt c journa- viet Embassy. Leaks require rather more ing occasionally with President Marcos most portant "case offi- subtlety and here again journalists are at Malacallang, an honour ` -accorded informers. a vast army of a ents and invaluable. One of the best-known chan- few other resident correspondents. He mformers. Agents in the trade union nets for this delicate form of psychologi- rents a villa in the plush Makati suburb movement can paralyse the a onomy at cal cal warfare is. VITALI: YEVGENNE- of Dasmarinas village on the outskirts of will; others form a powerful lobby With- LUI. Manila and commutes regularly between in the Congress party to keep wavering The man known to the Western press there and Moscow: Whether he actually leadership pressing towards it declared as Victor Louis is a plausible, 46-year- writes much is a subject of keen specula- goal of socialism. old soft-spoken Russian, who was impri- tion among local Gregorovich-watchers, Covert activities are cleverly financed -toed during the 1950 r bl arket he without transferrm suspicio sly large rAl 0% A A, CPYRGHT Approved For sums to the Soviet Embassy. Soviet trading organisations channel their-ix- ports through private. firms instead . of the State 'Trading Corporation; The firms pay a -percentage commission direct to the Russians in India, a total estimated at running into millions of rupees a year. But as long as the Indian Government remains dependent on the Soviet Union for military and economic aid, the authorities prefer to ignore such lapses. In the opinion of many promin- ent Indians, the country. has become enmeshed. so closely with Russia that there is little hope of reversing the trend. 30001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 194A000100430001-8 ORRIS A Journal of World Affairs VOLUME XVIII FALL 1974 NUMBER 3 Reflections on the Quarter .......................... .......... 627 Strategic Adaptability ........................William R. Van Cleave and Roger W. Barnett 655 Flexible Response Options ........................ G. W. Rathjens 677 The Essence of Armed Futility ................ Donald R. Westervelt 689 Foreign Policy and the Strategic Balance .............. Colin S. Gray 706 The Deterrence Continuum ....................Robert H. Kupperman, Robert M. Behr and Thomas P. Jones, Jr. 728 Maneuver Instead of Mass: The Key to John M. Collins .750 Assured Stability .............................. Population Vulnerability: The Neglected Issue in Arms Limitation and the Conrad V. Chester Strategic Balance ........................... and Eugene P. Wigner 763 Lessons of the Strategic Bombing Survey for Contemporary Defense Policy ............... John A. Lauder 770 Violence at a Distance: Greece and the J Bowyer Bell 791 Cyprus Crisis ................................. Toward a Political Settlement in Vietnam: Assessing the First Eighteen Months of the Postwar Wars ....................... Allan E. Goodman 809 Bargaining Between Saigon and Washington: Dilemmas of Linkage Politics Daring War ............................... Lawrence E. Grinter 837 Peace in Vietnam and Laos: 1954, 1962, 1973 ........ Robert Randle 868 Marxist Humanism .............................. Oskar Gruenwald 888 Reflections on the Soviet Secret Police and Intelligence Services ........................ Lothar Metzl 917 Reviews: Deterring the Past .............................. Paul Seabury 931 Korean Communism: From Its Origins to Kim Il Sung's Monocracy ................... Rinn S. Shinn 935 Revolutionary Radicalism: A Psychoanalysis ........................ Arnold Beichman 943 Japan's Role in the East Asian Subsystem .... Donald G. McCloud 947 Books Received ................................................. 951 Contributors to this Issue ........................................ 965 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 194A000100430001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 REFLECTIONS ON THE SOVIET SECRET POLICE AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES C PY Thar Metzl WE are familiar with the theme that real detente with the Soviet Union cannot be achieved unless the Soviet system changes radically. One school holds that the Moscow regime's continuing commitment to Marxism-Leninism and its global aspi- rations places severe restrictions on Soviet detente policies. In essence, this is also the argument of Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, the exiled Soviet writer, who has pleaded with Soviet leaders to relinquish their obsolete and counterproductive state ideology. Another school maintains that the USSR is an expansionist power with goals similar to those of Czarist imperialism. Adopting this argument, the Chinese communists characterize Soviet leaders as social-imperialists and accuse them of having betrayed the revo- lution. A new and more narrowly gauged argument proceeds from an assessment of a Soviet core institution, the Komitet Gosudarst- vennoy Bezopastnosty (Committee for State Security), or KGB. Administratively assigned to the Council of Ministers ofthe USSR, the KGB is controlled by the leaders of the Communist Party. Its fundamental missions are to maintain a flexible but neverthe- less iron infrastructure of repressive social and political police controls at home, and to undermine the socio-political and structural integrity and stability of noncommunist governments abroad. That the withering away of the KGB is a prerequisite for a reliable relaxation of international tensions is one of the conclusions reached in John Barron's detailed, multisourced inves- tigative report, KGB: The Secret Work of Secret Soviet Abents.* In part, this report presents evidence to establish the KGB's paramountcy within the Soviet institutional system as the rulers' principal instrument of power." (p. 332.) The huge dimensions 14 of the domestic KGB apparatus are described along with its elite status and brutal methods of repression. Nevertheless, the argu- ment does not derive specifically from an evaluation of the role of the KGB in internal Soviet affairs. The major portion of the *KGB: The Secret Work of Secret Soviet Agents. By John Barron. Pleasantville, N.Y.: Reader's Digest Press (E. P. Dutton, distributors), 1974. 462 pp. $10.95. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 CPYRGHT assembled facts, case histories and statistical data assesse methodology and effectiveness of external KGB espi range , and covert political action operations through which Soil leaders endeavor "to shatter the status quo in foreign lands (p. 91.) The report takes the high-and rising-incidence", clandestine Soviet operators abroad as an important indicator;, of continuing intent, and finds that "there can be no real detenttr until this massive KGB aggression stops." (p. 334.) Barron.,sub' mits that massive governmental and public opinion pressure j, the West may persuade Soviet leaders to desist, in their owtV interest, from undermining detente through covert KGB ope ', Lions abroad. Such pressures, he suggests, may also lead to a' softening of repression (pp. 332-337). It is doubtful, howeverr that such pressures, if practical at all, will produce more thann tactical concessions to Western opinion. J. Soviet doctrine continues to perceive the KGB as an essential element of the Soviet state, second in significance only to the armed forces. In the postwar period, the highest leaders have., consistently expressed this policy view at every party congress, no matter how divided they were on other issues. On March 30, 1971, at the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress, Brezhnev followed the example set by Malenkov and Khrushchev in re-emphasizing "the important role played by the organs of state security in the struggle to safeguard Soviet society against hostile elements.'. and against the intrigues of imperialist intelligence services."' For obvious reasons, Brezhnev did not refer to the considerable, clandestine role played by the KGB on the international scene; but this role-and, to a certain extent, Barron's findings-has been confirmed in unofficial Soviet sources. Since 1964, there has- developed an extensive and probably KGB inspired, special Soviet literature that glamorizes the history of the institution as well; as selected espionage feats of Soviet agents during World War II and in the postwar period? This literature has been supple-` mented by occasional film versions. By way of policy, doctrine and,,. propaganda, the KGB appears firmly entrenched. Barron's investigative report is meant for the general reader but' its factual content should be of more than passing interest to policymakers engaged in structuring detente with Moscow: it indi "`24th Congress of the CPSU," Information Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 7-8 (Prague: Peace and Socialism Publishers; 1971), p. 98. 'Soviet Intelligence and Security Services, 1964-70: A Selected Bibliography of Soviet Publications, with Some Additional Titles from Other Sources, prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (Washington:, GPO, 1972). Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 CPYRGHT cates explicitly that the Soviet regime retains a considerable covert capability abroad for circumventing detente via the KGB. Implicitly, Barron's data on KGB repression within the USSR also agree with comments by Professor Hans J. Morgenthau, who noted the "negative impact of the domestic policies of the Soviet Union upon detente," and stated, "As long as the excesses of domestic brutality in the Soviet Union indicate the absence of ... a common [to East and West] moral framework, detente can only be limited and precarious."a The argument that Soviet ideology is a deterrent to real detente has been frequently countered by denying that the ideology is policy-related and by evaluating it as mere rhetoric and propa- ganda. The argument that real detente with Soviet imperialism is impossible is countered by the assumption that the regime's detente posture represents a genuine mellowing and not merely a change in tactics 4 Barron's institutional argument is also not immune to criticism. One could point out that he has taken the KGB out of its institutional context and neglects the repressive character of other Soviet institutions, e.g., the Communist Party, the mass organizations, the ideological and communications ap- paratus, and so forth. Likewise questionable is the implication that the KGB alone-rather than in conjunction with other fac- tors, such as Soviet military and political policies-is capable of undermining detente. Nevertheless, the essential thrust of Barron's institutional argu- ment remains valid. Whether or not the KGB is viewed within the total institutional context, whether it is a single anti-detente factor or only one of a series, the KGB phenomenon is significant enough to qualify as an input in the process of making Western and especially U.S. detente policy. It appears that this factor has not been adequately measured as yet. The academic community, for instance, has consistently shied away from the study of the internal and external role of the KGB.a There is no certainty 'Hans J. Morgenthau, "Detente: The Balance Sheet," New York Times, March 28 1974, p. 39. 1For a critique of this assumption, see Bertram D. Wolfe, "Some Problems of the Russo-American Detente," Address delivered at the 12th Slavic Conference, De- partment of History, Oklahoma State University, November 2, 1973. Unpublished manuscript. 'See Robert M. Slusser's review in Slavic Review, December 1973, pp. 825-828. Professor Slusser writes, "Despite its fundamental and universally recognized importance, the [Soviet] secret police continues to be the neglected stepchild of Soviet studies.... As far as the scholarly community of this country is concerned, the study of the secret police still seems to be regarded as somehow discreditable, marginal, or unfeasible." Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 CPYRGHT rr+ that the intelligence community has been less reluctant. Barron''s investigative report, therefore, is a first step in the right direction. One of its virtues is that it draws attention to the academic and policy research tasks still ahead. The dimensions. of the problem are large enough to justify a cooperative effort of scholars,: government estimators and investigative reporters of Barron's, ii On a small scale, Barron's report sets a precedent for the more broadly based cooperative effort required to produce a thorough. estimate of the KGB. The bulk of the data comes from knowledge: able Soviet defectors and from corroborative open-source research. In addition, the report credits otherwise unidentified Western: security services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, and to a lesser extent the Central Intelligence Agency, with providing information and advice (p:: xii). These contributions extend our knowledge, particularly of. some of the KGB's largely unknown structural and organizational aspects. The accounts of former KGB officers and agents are at., least equally revealing. Through them the report views the KGB.,, from within and exposes, inter alia, its priority targets and opera tional methods, the pressures and tensions under which its per; sonnel operate, and its close connections with top leaders of the: party. Limited as the governmental contributions are, they will give' rise to accusations that Barron is spreading Cold War propaganda.;: Soviet and other communist media are bound to turn his institu- tional argument around and claim that his report represents but, another of the many attempts by Western intelligence agencies..; to scuttle detente. As early as October 1973, an authoritative.: editorial in Kommunist warned that the supporters of the ColdT War had "regrouped their forces to hold up, distort and under- mine the positive process which has begun in the international: relaxation of tensions." On March 15, 1974, Brezhnev stated at; Alma-Ata that the Soviet leadership had expected all along that. detente efforts would meet "stubborn resistance from the most;. reactionary and aggressive circles of imperialism and of all politi- cal movements . . . interested in maintaining international tensions." Bourgeois media in particular were .being "actively, ?Kommunist, October 1973, translated in joint Publications Research Service., (JPRS) 60631, November 26, 1973, p. 13. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 CPYRGHT used to implement this counter offensive."7 The first deputy chief of the KGB, Semen Kuz'mich Tsvigun, accused Western intelli- gence services of increasingly sponsoring anti-Soviet propaganda .8 Although these statements may simply serve the regime to justify continuing repression and obstructionism in detente matters, they will certainly prompt Soviet media to brand Barron's report as propaganda. But is it? A few illustrations will show that his study on KGB operations in the Soviet Union is under-researched and understated rather than distorted and exaggerated. Chapter IV (pp. 70-90) de- lineates the complex organization and highlights the key opera- tional elements of KGB headquarters in Moscow. These include "domestic security" and "foreign intelligence" functions on the largest conceivable scale. In the West these functions are generally assigned to a variety of agencies in order to prevent the accumu- lation of too much power in a single institution-albeit not always successfully. To sharpen our perception of KGB super-centraliza- tion, Barron could have pointed to parallels between the KGB and its counterpart in Nazi Germany, the Main Office of State Security (Reichssicherheit Hauptamt, RSHA). The RSHA, headed by Himmler and staffed in the main by the SS, included both the Gestapo, the secret state police, and the Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst, SD) , the foreign espionage and subversion service .0 In the KGB the First Chief Directorate is responsible for espionage and subversion abroad. The Gestapo function is carried out by the Second and partly also by a new Fifth Chief Directorate. Through them, the KGB maintains its ubiquitous surveillance and control of the Soviet population as well as of all foreigners (diplomats, students, tourists) . The border police of the RSHA has its replica in the KGB's uniformed elite force of border guards. In some respects, the KGB is more centralized than was its German counterpart. The extensive sur- veillance of the Soviet armed forces is lodged in the powerful Armed Forces Directorate. A high-level Disinformation Direc- torate promotes and supervises KGB operations aiming at pollu- tion of the opinion-making process in the West. Among its specialties are the distribution of forged documents and fabri- cated intelligence as well as the organization of riots and demon- strations to manipulate public opinion (pp. 165, 166). Similarly, 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report, Soviet Union, March 18, 1974, p. R 15. 'Ibid., March 6, 1974, p. A 3. 'Jacques Delarue, Histoire de la Gestapo (Paris, 1962), pp. 609-613. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00100430001-8 CPYRGHT the KGB has institutionalized the function of preparing acts of; sabotage in peacetime and maintains a special unit for political. murder (Chapters VIII, XIII) . The KGB also shares with the RSHA some of its deficient ties, such as excessive bureaucratization, obsession with secrecy;! and rigid compartmentalization.1? Comparative analysis indicates:; that the KGB represents not, as Barron puts it, "a unique phe.. nomenon of this century" (p. 1) but rather a behavior pattern that "totalitarian" regimes have in common, regardless of their. ideological, political and other differences. This conclusion was_. forcefully expressed by Solzhenitsyn in his reply to Soviet criticism of his Gulag Archipelago. When Literaturnaya Gazeta accused him of having equated the entire Soviet people with fascist mur derers, Solzhenitsyn replied, "Just a little jiggling of the facts:'- Yes, I equate the Cheka-G.P.U.-N.K.V.D. murders with the Fascist murderers. But Literaturnaya Gazeta hauls in `all Soviet people' here in order to more conveniently hide our hangmen among them."" The dimensions of the KGB empire are not worked out with precision because Barron's report focuses almost exclusively on the Moscow KGB center. The Moscow center, however, while it is itself in charge of the largest Soviet republic, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), is an all-Union institu- tion and commands its counterpart KGB centers in the other republics of the USSR. Thus, there are fifteen powerful KGB centers among which the Moscow center is Primus inter pares. Below the other fourteen centers the KGB structure parallels that of the Communist Party's lesser organizations. It devolves from the fourteen republic central committees to their respective, large territorial (oblast, krai and okrug) committees, down to rural district party committees (raikoms), and in urban areas to town or city committees (gorkoms) .12 A recent Soviet source lists 6 krai, 144 oblast and 10 okrug (territorial) party committees, 780 major city party committees (gorkoms) , and 511 city district and 2,842 village (rural) party committees (raikoms).18 It can be 'Compare Barron, pp. 73-74, with Delarue, op. cit., pp. 314-315. "See text of Solzhenitsyn's statement, New York Times, January 19, 1974. The Cheka, GPU and NKVD are the predecessors of the KGB. "Peter Frank, "The CPSU Obkom First Secretary: A Profile," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 173. The all-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union also acts as the party in the RSFSR. "Kommunist, September 1973, translated in JPRS 60363, October 25, 1973, p. 29. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00100430001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 CPYRGHT fairly assumed from these figures that 940 major and 3,353 second- ary KGB centers are distributed throughout the Soviet Union. To these figures must be added the innumerable special KGB branches operating within the armed forces and civilian institutions. The number of KGB staff personnel deployed exclusively against the Soviet people certainly exceeds the strength of the Gestapo at its height in 1944, -when it ranged between 40,000 and 50,000.14 Barron's tentative figures-90,000 staff officers and 400,000 clerical workers, building guards, border guards and special troops-are probably on the conservative side, especially if one considers that the border guards alone are thought to number 300,000 (pp. 71, 85). The total political and functional weight of the KGB within the Soviet system likewise cannot be adequately measured in terms of the Moscow center alone. Barron points out that the all-Union KGB is represented on the Politburo and Central Committee of the CPSU (p. 11) but fails to mention similar patterns in the republics. The chairman of the important KGB of the Ukrainian republic, for instance, is a candidate member of the Politburo of the CP Ukraine. Republic KGB chiefs and deputy chiefs are regularly elected as deputies to the Supreme Soviets of their jurisdiction. Moreover, Chapter V (pp. 91-113) surveys the center's ability to extend its operational radius by inserting KGB officers into a variety of state mechanisms, ranging from the vast censorship apparatus to the administration of religious affairs, news agencies, the areas of foreign affairs and foreign trade, and so forth. It can also exploit a multitude of rigid and repressive social controls assigned to other agencies, e.g., with regard to the internal pass- port and work book system, travel controls, the draft, and mental institutions (pp. 96-99). Thus, the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs administers the labor camps but the selection of inmates is in the hands of the KGB. Clearly, one would need to apply a regional multiplication factor to arrive at the full extent of the KGB's interagency coordination, including its behind-the-scenes manipulation of the judicial process. In sum, Barron's investigation of the role played by the KGB in the USSR's internal affairs barely approximates but does not distort Soviet realities. Even in its rudimentary form it is corn- "Delarue, op. cit., p. 317. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 CPYRGHT patible with the official Soviet definition of the KGB's mission i.e., to "be the terror of all enemies of the Soviet state"-given.- to the Twenty-first CPSU Congress by Politburo member Aleks- andr N. Shelepin, who was then chairman of the KGB and is now head of the multi-million-member federation of Soviet trade Although the terror tactics of the KGB are subject to change,- Shelepin's strategic definition still holds. Barron shows how little it takes to be sent to prison, labor camps or mental institutions as an enemy of the Soviet state (pp. 107, 108). However, he does not deal adequately with the more elusive aspects of a huge secret police that can recruit collaborators, spies and informers practical- ly at will. Because the corruptive effect of the KGB on Soviet society in general and on the regime sponsoring this corruption in particular has a bearing on detente, this problem needs to be closely studied. Barron's expose of covert KGB operations abroad has more than. one counterpart in Soviet books and articles exposing Western intelligence services, but there is a significant difference. Barron's view does not represent an official position even though it may have been influenced by Western counterintelligence findings.. Soviet reports of this type represent the official Soviet view and are therefore beyond public criticism or challenge. Moreover, it is the KGB itself that frames and disseminates this view, generally over the signature of its chairman, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, or his first deputy, Tsvigun.16 Their pronouncements have the backing of the CPSU, for Andropov is a member of the Politburo and Tsvigun is a candidate member of the Central Committee.. Andropov, moreover, -was recently awarded the Order of Lenin. Barron's report calls for consideration by policymakers. The KGB, on the other hand, is authorized by Soviet policymakers to define the parameters of the subversive threat from abroad. While in the United States the time is past for such self-serving and justificatory procedures, the Brezhnev regime still follows them for 'Current Soviet Policies III, The Documentary Record of the Extraordinary 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 178. 'For example: Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, Speech at the 50th Anniversary of Soviet State Security Organs, Pravda, December 21, 1967. Semen Kuz-mich Tsvigun, "Ideological Diversion-a Tool of Imperialist Reaction," Kommunist, March 1972, pp. 109-118; "Revolutionary Vigilance Is an Integral Part of Soviet Man," PoIiticheskoye Samoobrazovaniye (Political Self-Education), February 1971, pp. 38-48. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 CPYRGHT a variety of reasons. KGB estimates enable the regime -to neutral- ize domestic dissenters as tools of external antagonists. They also enable it to negate Western demands for less restricted exchanges. In the final analysis, though, the estimative authority of the KGB derives from the general outlook of a leadership still committed to rule by secrecy and, therefore, prone to attribute secret con- spiracies to its partners in detente as well as to open opponents. The KGB is the institutional embodiment of this view. In the democratic West similar behavior patterns have tended to dissi- pate. In the USSR they are permanently rooted in the statutory and social obligations of the members of Soviet society. The 1952 statutes of the CPSU obligated a party member "to keep Party and state secrets and display political vigilance, keeping in mind that the vigilance of Communists is necessary on every sector, and in all circumstances. "17 The 1961 amendments to the statutes again made it a duty of every party member "to display vigilance to guard party and state secrets.""' "Political vigilance" is incum- bent not only on party members but on the entire population as "an absolute and most important condition for successful struggle against the subversive activities of the enemies of the Soviet state."19 These obligations undoubtedly create. greater receptivity to KGB allegations about Western conspiracies. In his Introduction to the Barron volume, Robert Conquest states that the book "implies the need for continual vigilance" against KGB operations in the West. Yet, as the KGB spearheads the perennial large-scale vigilance campaigns of the Soviet regime, it does not imply but implants fear and distrust of the West. To this political end generalizations and ideological constructs are often substituted for fact. Nonetheless, the facts assembled in Barron's report strongly suggest that the KGB creates far greater problems for nations in the West-developing as well as developed -than comparable Western intelligence services create. for the Soviet Union. Barron has acceptable figures to show that from the early 1960's on the Soviet regime has used the "normalization" of its relations with noncommunist countries to expand the presence and opera- tions of the KGB as well as the military intelligence agency of the 'Current Soviet Policies, The Documentary Record of the Nineteenth Party Congress, Statutes of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: Columbia University Press, .1953), p. 28. Jan Triska, editor, Soviet Communism: Programs and Rules (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962), pp. 158, 159. The cited amendment is still in force. '?Kommunist, ]February 1974, translated in JPRS 61776, April.17, 1974, pp. 162, 163. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 CPYRGHT Soviet General Staff. To support his statement that 50 to 80 pe. cent of Soviet diplomats abroad are undercover intelligence offi=' cers (p. 17), Appendix D reliably provides the names and careers of about 1,700 of them (pp. 379-415). In addition, the covert KGB presence abroad is augmented by the personnel of allied intelligence organizations from Eastern Europe, Cuba and North: Korea (pp. 141-163), and while Barron has no statistics on their, incidence he shows how effectively they can perform. Through: the intelligence service of North Korea, for instance, the KGB instigated-albeit unsuccessfully-guerrilla operations in Mexico, a country with which Moscow had "normal" relations (pp. 230 257). Incomplete as Barron's figures are, they are not likely to be challenged by the KGB. Nor have Soviet sources published simi- larly precise data to show that the presence of Western intelli- gence services has increased as dramatically in socialist countries- as has that of the KGB and its auxiliaries in noncommunist countries. In fact, KGB statements credit no Western intelligence presence in the Soviet Union whatsoever. Instead, they focus on the West's attempts to infiltrate "agents" from abroad in order to meet extensive intelligence requirements. These agents may come by "miniature helicopter or minisubmarine." Or, they may "show up through legal channels: with a diplomatic passport, as a tourist, or as a member of a scientific, commercial, or cultural delegation." In the main, however, their espionage efforts are evaluated as futile because of "the lack of a social base for the activities of imperialist intelligence in the Soviet Union." Accord- ing to the KGB, the recruitment of Soviet citizens by Western intelligence happens, but "not frequently."20 Barron's data on the enormous counterintelligence and surveil- lance capabilities of the KGB support its self-view. So does Mos- cow's low rate of expulsions of foreigners accused of espionage often on trumped-up charges at that. In the West, in contrast, expulsions of Soviet intelligence staff officers run high: 226 Soviet representatives were expelled during 1960-1970; in 1971 and 1972, 191 were expelled from five countries alone (pp. 27, 28). Over the long term these losses average out to roughly 20 to 25 per cent, leaving the KGB to operate at 75 to 80 per cent of capacity. Nonetheless, in quantitative terms, it seems fairly evident fOIbid., p. 160. The quoted statements appear in a review of Taynyy Front (The Secret Front), a recent book by KGB Deputy Chief Tsvigun (Moscow: Politizdat, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 CPYRGHT that the KGB's-potential in the West far outweighs whatever covert capabilities the "imperialists" may have in the Soviet Union. In qualitative terms,. the disparity becomes even more pro- nounced. Its direct bearing on detente devolves only in part from the proven professionalism of Soviet espionage operations. Barron points out correctly that the KGB continues to give first priority to acquiring documentary evidence of the military and political secrets of allies and adversaries, through classical agent operations. As a case in point, he describes the successful penetration of a highly guarded American communications center in France (pp. 199-239). On the other hand, he indicates that this traditionalist Soviet capability is offset by the technological apparatus for intel- ligence collection the United States has developed. In his opinion, this apparatus has not been matched by the Soviet Union. Whether or not this is so is difficult to judge on the basis of available infor- mation, especially given the intensity of the Soviet effort to catch up with Western military technology. In the perspective of Western detente politics the most dis- turbing feature of KGB operations is this: they aim persistently and frequently successfully at the recruitment or infiltration of agents in the center of governments which desire to improve their relations with the Soviet Union. Barron's evidence, though scat- tered throughout the report, shows that this is a long-term trend. Recent events in West Germany confirm that intelligence services in Eastern Europe replicate the KGB model. The KGB attacks its targets both in the Soviet Union and abroad. In a carefully staged deception and sex entrapment opera- tion, it attempted to blackmail the French ambassador to the Soviet . Union into collaboration, on the-mistaken-assumption that he would become one of General de Gaulle's most intimate advisers (pp. 118-140). President Nasser's chief confidant and intelligence adviser was recruited as a Soviet agent during the heyday of Egyptian-Soviet relations and so served until he was arrested by President Sadat in 1971 (pp.. 51-53, 58, 59, 61). President Nkrumah of Ghana was persuaded to let the KGB and allied secret services assume control of his domestic security and external intelligence operations until his overthrow by the mili- tary (pp. 252-254). Barron's reliably documented cases could have been augmented by a series of others, such as the account of Soviet agent Harold A. R. ("Kim") Philby, who at one time headed the Soviet desk of Great Britain's external intelligence service. Moreover, the KGB practice of recruiting or manipulating Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 CPYRGHT high government officials extends not only to Western govern- ments. Barron shows how the technique was applied in Castro's Cuba (pp. 147-152). Again, in September 1974, an apparently Soviet-backed anti-Tito conspiracy was uncovered in Yugoslavia. The circumstances surrounding the resignation of West Ger- man Chancellor Willy Brandt on May 6, 1974 strikingly underline the trend as well as its implications for detente. Brandt, the prime architect of East-West detente, resigned because one of his per- sonal advisers was exposed as an agent of the East German intelligence services. As such, he had served for several years on Brandt's personal staff. In view of the KGB's close relations with its East German counterpart, it must be assumed that the Moscow center received the fruits of this operation. It is highly probable also that the Soviet Politburo was kept informed and accepted the political risks involved in preference to calling the operation off. On the other side of the ledger, the KGB keeps exposures of its activities abroad concealed from the Soviet public, and has no comparable exposures to offer. In 1956, Khrushchev, in his secret speech to the Twentieth CPSU Congress, branded Politburo mem- ber and secret police chief Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria as an "agent of foreign intelligence.' '21 The accusation was not credible but served as an additional justification for Beria's execution. Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, who was executed in 1962 as a Western spy, did not belong to the innermost circle of the Soviet leadership. None- theless, the KGB has been obliged by the Brezhnev regime to keep the threat of foreign intelligence infiltration alive by pro- claiming that the current tactics of Western imperialism are primarily designed to use detente as a cover for ever-increasing ideological subversion operations. This construct permits, for example, the defamation of Soviet physicist and dissenter, Andrei S. Sakharov, as "a tool in the hands of the enemies of socialism and relaxation of international tension, who are manipulating his personality with professional skill."22 It is sufficiently loose and elastic to allow for its arbitrary application to any opponent of the regime: Today, when the principles of peaceful coexistence are being asserted, the main efforts of imperialist intelligence and other special services are aimed at achieving the so-called "erosion" of socialism. In fact, this means attempts at restoring in the socialist countries the capitalist order with the "Current Soviet Policies II, The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and Its Aftermath (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 184. "Kommunist, October 1973, translated in JPRS 60631, November 26, 1973, p. 12. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 CPYRGHT help of a "silent" counterrevolution. Reliance on the corruption of the Communist or any other revolutionary movement from within is now one of the most important trends in imperialist class The Chinese communists, meanwhile, credit the Soviet leader- ship itself-but not Western intelligence services-with the intro- duction of capitalist principles into the Soviet system. Objective Western observers fail to see any signs of a brewing capitalist counterrevolution. The Soviet regime raises the. specter of Western subversion in order to justify its stringent ideological protec- tionism. The CPSU's ideological apparatus and the academic com- munity have the task of identifying and exposing Western trends, concepts, publications and authors which are to be considered hostile to Soviet ideology. The KGB has the task of providing evidence of the alleged conspiracy. It must project the ominous image of a well-coordinated, well-financed psychological warfare campaign. It has been doing so by postulating a monolithic super- structure of governmental, private and academic institutions, such as, in the case of the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Information Agency, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and various research institutes concerned with Soviet affairs. With respect to the exploitation of religion and nationalism, a recent book exposes the subversive efforts of the Vatican, the Jehovah's Witnesses Society, "reactionary Muslim organizations," and obscure Russian Orthodox churches.24 Among the "ideological contraband" that religious centers abroad are trying to smuggle into the Soviet Union, its authors cite publica- tions of the Bible Society in London as well as copies of the Gospel According to John. The new book by the KGB's First Deputy Chairman, Tsvigun, exposes hitherto unknown nationalist groups in Moldavia and the Ukraine.25 Barron's report neglects this significant function of the KGB. A thorough investigation of the scope and impact of this sort of literature would seem useful. Even if its factual content is found to be minimal, an analysis of KGB propaganda may shed light on the extent to which the Soviet regime can win public support for its restrictive policies vis-A-vis dissenters and the influx of Western ideas. The first edition of Tsvigun's book- 200,000 copies-was reportedly sold out in a few days. "Kommunisf, February 1974, pp. 121-125. 'A. V. Belov and A. D. Shilkin, Diuersiya Bez Dinamita (Sabotage Without Dynamite) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1972). 'Daily Telegraph (London), April 18, 1974. Also see note 20. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8 CPYRGHT The disparity between the KGB and Western intelligence services is a reflection of leadership attitudes. In the United States,. domestic intelligence programs as well as covert action abroad, such as in Chile, have come under increasingly critical scrutiny, both by the public media and by the government. As regards the Soviet Union, although Barron may go too far in characterizing the KGB as "the primary executor of foreign policy" (p. 17), his report indicates that the Soviet regime has far greater confidence in the KGB's ability to manipulate international relations than it' has in its conventional diplomatic establishment. In the United States, similar Cold War attitudes have eroded and are likely to erode further in the wake of the Watergate scandals. In the Soviet Union, where the KGB is beyond criticism, reliance on the KGB apparatus abroad is likely to increase. Detente offers new opportunities for operational expansion and for the acquisi- tion of additional covert reserves. The fact that the CPSU's control of the international communist movement has been weak- ened should further strengthen the role of the highly centralized international KGB apparatus. On the whole, Barron's institutional argument cannot be dis- missed out of hand. Even if the new threats to international stability-inflation, energy and food shortages-seem to loom larger, the KGB still represents a highly disintegrative force. A thorough and broadly based review could project the risks as well as the countervailing factors more precisely than does Barron's otherwise commendable report. Soviet detente policies and the KGB system are likely to coexist and interact for the foreseeable future. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8