THE KGB IN ASIA: SOCIETY OF SUBVERSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 26, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-R
"The KGB in Asia: Society of Subversion," Far Eastern Economic Review,
3 January 1975.
"Reflection on the Soviet Secret Police and Intelligence Services," by
Lothar Metzl, Orbis, Fall, 1974.
The attached survey from FEER finds the presence of the Soviet secret
service in Asia to be "widespreand rapidly expanding," with the KGB paying
particular attention to Chinese diplomats and to those who sympathize with
Peking. According to FEER, long experience with Moscow intrigue has made
governments in Europe -North America wary of the Russians. The Soviets,
however, are a relatively new phenomenon in much of Asia, where they capitalize
on popular sentiments against colonialism.
The long section "Society of Subversion" consists of a brief history
followed by a breezy account of selected KGB operatives and activities
throughout Acia? rh; --,-,,.r
Metzl's observations are being added to the FEER survey primarily to keep
attention focused on John Barron's KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents.
This 1974 book, while written for the general re er, nevert eless contains a
wealth of factual material. And as Metzl puts it, "the KGB phenomenon is
significant enough to qualify as an input in the process of making Western and
especially US detente policy."
25X1A2g
25X1C10b
26 Feb 1975
lease 1999/~CI MAC RDP79-01194A000100430001-8
 CPYRGHT
1
pT i 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000100430001-8
correspondents throughout Asia, the presence of the Russian
secret service (KGB) in the region is revealed as widespread
- and somewhat clumsy compared with the cloak-and-dagger
activities of other foreign powers. The role of this sinister
organisation is rapidly expanding in Asia and vast sums are
being spent by the Kremlin on gathering information of
all kinds, with special reference to China, as the bitter
squabble with Peking continues. There is also a concerted
masterminded by the KGB, to discredit the Chinese,
drive
,
whether by siding with India in its frontier dispute with China,
or by casting doubts on the integrity of the Peking leadership.
reatest spy thriller writer of them all, John le Carre,
the
H
g
owever,
in an exclusive, specially-commissioned introduction to this feature, takes.issue with some
of these findings. Discussing the relative merits of two recent books, one on the KGB and
the other a nest-fouling expose of the CIA, le Carre points out that the Russians play the
secrecy game with greater discretion, and suggests that they do not publish what they
know about. the US secret service because one day they might be fraternal services in
liaison against the Chinese target, page 20.
Cover by Morgan Chua; photo by Arthur Kan.
In the twilight world of politics today, things are not
what they seem, and even the faces of young radical
idealists can be disguises for sinister forces and purposes.
Singapore Foreign Minister Rajaratnam, speaking on the
recent student unrest in the city-state, sees foreign
manipulators behind the young men who ostensibly seem
to want to mould the world closer to their heart's desire,
page 10.
After spending two years in a Calcutta jail, two young
Americans, Anthony Fletcher and Richard Harcos,
were due to appear before a court last week in what
would be India's first-ever spy trial involving Westerners.
The strange circumstances surrounding the arrest of the
two and the case's top-level political implications have
already aroused worldwide curiosity, page 18.
Seoul's preoccupation with industrial growth has taken
its toll of South Korea's farm sector. The bill for
imported rice and grain is soaring, and achieving the
target of food self-sufficiency by 1976 will be difficult,
page 37.
The textile recession is posing a major threat to Malaysia,
which has encouraged an invasion of textile companies
from. overseas. With export markets declining, the
competition to stay in business is likely to be intense,
page 35.
European nations are on the defensive about imports
from Japan. But their short-sighted attitude, at a time
when European consumer goods are flooding into
Tokyo, can only harm them, page 39.
National unity remains one of the main priorities of
leaders in China, and to ensure that the Communist
Party maintains its authority, a new slogan has emerged:
"The Party must control the Party," page 13.
s America's friends in Asia will get less foreign aid this
fiscal year. Congress has effectively halved the allocations
of military and economic funds sought by the Ford
Administration - and it could be worse next year,
30
Cantt2 s
Regional Affairs
Singapore: The foteign
connection _
China: Shadow boxing for
a sense of unity -13
Laos: A gentle brush-off
from America _ 14
India: Two Americans on
trial 18
The KGB in Asia - 20
Mightier than the sword_- 20
Society of subversion - 22
ing's no crime _26
S
py
Business Affairs
Aid: Reducing the Asian
commitment 30
Trade: Slow progress on
preferences 31
Japan seeks a balance-39
Memos 32
Textiles: Malaysia's foreign
fears 35
Agriculture: South Korea
reviews its priorities.__.____37
Energy: Indian remedies 38
Investment 43
Stockmarkets 44
Selected market quotations ._A 5
Letter from Singapore
46
Regular Features
Intelligence
5
Letters
6
Editorial
9
Traveller's Limericks
17
Richard Hughes
19
page .
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 Approved For Relea 9/_Q1A-RD~P7~1194A000100430001-8
CPYRGHT
sulaversi=
OLEG SOLOVIEV has the unnerving
habit of glowering across the rim of.his
whisky glass and growling: "I suppose
you think I'm an agent of the KGB?"
Acquaintances can only mumble "hea-
ven forbid" and change the subject.
Soloviev is described on his visiting
cards as the Southeast Asian correspon-
dent of Soviet Radio and Television. He
rents an expensive flat in Singapore
(22P Tomlinson Road), drives an air-
conditioned Toyota, speaks fluent Eng-
lish and Chinese and travels the region
without the film crews which encumber
his Western colleagues. He confides to
expatriates his hatred of the Chinese -
"a crafty, untrustworthy race" - and
tells stories of alleged atrocities during
the Sino-Soviet clash at Chenpao Island
in 1969.
"When we went back to recover the
bodies of our soldiers, the Chinese had
gouged out their eyes."
'But KGB? If any cynical mind should
harbour such a thought, the Russians
have only themselves to blame. Over the
past eleven years, 40 countries have
expelled Soviet citizens accused of
working for the KOMITET GOSU-
DARSTVENNOY BEZOPASNOSTI, the
Committee for Internal Security, whose
tentacles spread out across the world.
Russian diplomats, journalists and busi-
ness representatives have all been
caught, at one time or another, try-
ing to pry secrets from foreign sour-
ces, sometimes subtly, even brilliantly,
but mostly crudely and inefficiently.
. Not all KGB officers are spies. Some
function as "agents of influence,"
pushing the Soviet point of view, while
keeping an eye open for foreign recruits
for the espionage network. At the
height of the Cold War, these specialists
maligned the United States and "West-
ern imperialism", now their target is
China, particularly in Asia. The cloak-
and-dagger men follow suit, keeping a
sharp watch on American activity, but
switching their main attention to the
Chinese. Their efforts are concentrated
on monitoring the contacts and opera-
tions of Chinese diplomats and those
who sympathise with Peking. In a few
sensitive areas, like Indonesia, the Rus-
sians are said to inform on "Maoists"
among the Overseas Chinese community
to Government officials willing and eager
to hear stories of Peking-inspired subver-
sion.
The Western world has grown inured
to the tides of Moscow-mounted intri-
gue. A succession of spy-scandals and
expulsions has long prompted govern-
ments all over Europe and the Americas,
to lock up their secrets and regard the
Russians with suspicion. Not so in Asia,
where the Russians are a relatively new
phenomena. The Soviet suppressions in
Budapest and Prague may have tarnish-
ed the image, but it is still nowhere as
immediate or as bruising as recent me-
mories of colonialism. Nor has the. KGB
been anywhere near as successful or all-
pervading as the American Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA), rigging by-elec-
tions in India and king-making in Laos,
South Vietnam, Cambodia and South
Korea. Russian espionage activity is
small beer: compared with the massive,
operations , mounted by the United
States, but it is expanding steadily as
the. Ugly American pulls back, winded,
from the Asian periphery. .
The KGB is a growing factor in Asian
politics, especially in areas of potential
change like the Indian subcontinent and
Indochina. Even countries with strong
autocratic regimes such as Indonesia,
the Philippines and South Korea have an
in-built instability with profitable pro-
mise for future turmoil. It is time to
look closely at this organisation and its
agents who stand, vulture-like in the
wings, awaiting the moment of chaos ...
a i ?
THE KGB grew out of the All-Russian
Extraordinary Commission for Combat-
ing Counter-revolution, Speculation and
Sabotage (CHEKA). It was founded on
December 20, 1917, by order of the
Council of People's Commissars. The
first director, FELIX DZERZHINSKY,
was a Polish-born Russian who died
peacefully in his bed in 1926. He was
lucky. Four of his nine successors were
liquidated as foreign spies. A statue to
Dzerzhinsky, erected in 1961 by
Khrushchev, stands in the square named
after him, appropriately opposite, the
KGB headquarters which back conveni-
ently onto the Lubyanka Prison. The
headquarters building was originally the
head office of the former All-Russian
Insurance Company;jt was extended af-
ter World War II by a seven-storey an-
nexe built by political prisoners and
German prisoners of war. In the summer
of 1972, a vast new building was opened
on the Moscow ring-road, about seven
miles from the centre, to house the for-
eign operations of the KGB. Other small-
er offices are scattered throughout the
Soviet capital.
The KGB is organised into seven direc-
torates. Its operational staff is. believed
to total 90,000, plus some 400,000
clerks and administrators. e two larg-
est and most powerful direct rates con-
trol the suppression of domestic dissent;
their area of responsibility covers every-
thing from expelling Solzh nitzyn to
following-up the Soviet invasion of Cze-
choslovakia. The chairman i a former
telegraph operator called YU I VLADI-
MIROVICH ANDROPOV., a tall, scho-
larly man with a good knowledge of
English who was awarded th Order of
Lenin on. June 24, .1974, for his service
to the State.
President Podgorny, speaking for the
Politburo of the Soviet Communist
Party, declared: "I should like on behalf
of all the comrades here p esent cor-
dially to congratulate you and fratar-
nally embrace you, to wish you health
and happiness and great success in your
difficult but useful work." Comrade
Andropov was Soviet Amb ssad.or in
Budapest at the time of the Hungarian
uprising; he is believed to lave been
awarded his present post on the strength
of his decisive action in seizing the d.is:-i-
dent leadership led by Imry agy,,and
sending its members to their d aths.
The First Directorate of the KGB con-
centrates on foreign operatio s. It is di-
vided into ten departments dealing with
specific regions of the world. Number
Six covers China, North Vie nam and
North Korea. Number Seven handles
the rest of Asia from Pakistan to Japan.
Sub-sections control Soviet agents sent
to live abroad under false identities,
specialists who ferret out technical se-
crets and a "Disinformation Depart-
ment" designed to spread confusing pro-
paganda through the enemy tanks. Bri-
tish defector Kim Philby put out his
"revelations" about his old--M.1 6 collea-
gues.through this department.
The KGB gets active assistance in the
field from officers of the GL VNOYE
RAZVEDYVATELNOY UP-
RAVLENIYE (Gifu),. the S viet mili-
tary intelligence service. All Russian mi-
litary attaches are assumed to belong to
the GRU, supported by other gents at-
tached to embassies under le s obvious
cover. The GRU was founded i 1920 to
keep the Red Army better informed
?about its opponents following the disas-
trous Bolshevik invasion of Poland. An
extraordinarily potent organisation was
built up during the next decad , only to
be decimated by the Stalin urges of
1936-38 and discredited in the 1960s by
the discovery that two senio GRU of-
ficers,. colonels Popov and P rikovsky,
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 were secretlAppt w/ d ,rft1 dsei$19"I1"A& ~CtA='RDP79-01194AGQG"@ 8GQQ1e&aining intel-
ligence. KGB of racers took over the or- The. result is that although. KGB opera- ligence information in secret writing,
ganisation in 1958 and some observers tions are widespread so widespread "Just as these men were engaged in.
believe this virtually ended its career as that the British Government was forced criminal activities in the dark comer
an autonomous unit. It is noted,..how- to expel or bar 105 Russians from Lon- against the Chinese people, a red signal-
ever, that some of the most spectacular don in 1970 - the payoff is believed to light zoomed to the sky over the Hsi-
Soviet espionage coups in recent years be disappointing. With a few brilliant paho bridge followed by flares," the
have been the work of the GRU exceptions, the Russians have pulled off NCNA account goes on. "Courageous
A SPY must be able to work unde-
tected..Once he becomes known, or
"blown," to use the language of espion-
age, his value in the field is sharply re-
duced. The ubiquitous KGB infiltrates
every Russian organisation. The journa-
list offers a convenient camouflage; af-
ter all, it is his job to ask searching
questions. Philby works for a KGB subsi-
diary of the Novosti Press Agency (the
Tenth Division), which provides cover
for many a Soviet spy. But an agent can
be just as easily lodged in the office of
Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, a Russian
trading corporation, SOVEXPORT-
FILM or, inevitably, the embassy.
Defectors say the KGB men are the
terror of other diplomats. Occasionally
they are themselves ambassadors like
PAUL STEPANOVITCH KUZNET-
ZOV, who was appointed to Jakarta in
1972. Expelled for spying from Britain
in 1952, he went on to Yugoslavia
and was connected with the spy-ring
which bugged President Tito's private
office. Others prefer to be disguised as
drivers or junior secretaries, although
they often wield as much power as the
ambassador himself. .
Two months later a Soviet army heli-
copter ran out of fuel and landed in a
remote corner of Sinkiang. The three-
man crew was promptly arrested by Chi-
nese border-guards. They are still detain-
ed in China. Their story was that they
had lost their way on a mercy mission,
but the Chinese insist the Russians were
spying. The crew did not include a doc-
tor, nor were they carrying any medical
supplies. Peking alleged that certain
equipment found on board the helicop-
ter proved it was on an espionage mis-
sion in a particularly sensitive area, not
too far from the nuclear base at Lop
Nor.
These are the only two publicised
long and 15-metre wide bridge, looked
^ ^ ^ cases of Russian spying in China for
peared under the
and then disa
ound
a
ALEXANDR KAZNACHEEV, a KGB
agent in Rangoon, gave a detailed pic-
ture of Soviet intelligence operations
after he defected to the United States in
the late 1950s. The espionage headquar-
ters in all Russian embassies is the
closely-guarded Residence (Referentura),
which combines the functions of coding
room with conference room and filing
section for highly-classified documents.
The head. of KGB operations is known as
"the Resident." Only a trusted handful
have access to his domain, which is in-
variably protected by a heavy steel
door. Most ambassadors are not admit-
ted. It is here that Russian agents meet,
free of their routine cover, to make cod-
ed reports and discuss operations.
A CIA man once told 'a correspon-
dent: "The Russians are intelligence
animals. Every bit of informa-
tion seems to be of use to them.
You smoke a pipe, that goes into
the file. And if somehow or
other they can get their informa-
tion by covert means, then it's
all the more valuable. The KGB
seem to despise overt analysis.
For instance, weather bulletins.
don't interest them if broadcast.
But if they can steal a bulletin
off the meteorologist's desk be-
few notable coups in recent years, part- Chinese militiamen and Public Security
ly because governments are thoroughly personnel rushed to the Hsipaho bridge
alerted, but also because the bureaucra- from all around shouting "catch the
tic structure of the KGB proves expen- spies."
sive and ineffectual. At the same time, The Russians had run into a trap.
Western experts admit that the calibre They immediately claimed diplomatic
of the KGBagent is improving,as Russia immunity, as did the driver of the Vol-
increases contact with the outside ga, First Secretary V. I. MARCHENKO,
world; there is no dearth of money or an experienced Chinese-speaking diplo-
James Bond-type gadgetry, 'nor, appar mat who was said to be the KGB Resi-
ently, of foreign collaborators anxious dent in China. Also sitting in the car
to be suborned financially, morally or were the wives of Marchenko and Seme-
through ideological fervour. nov. All five, were promptly expelled
^ ^' . ^ from the country.
"IT WAS the evening of January 15,
1974, when the streets in the Chinese
capital were emptying. The grey, Soviet
Volga car sped out of the Soviet Em-
bassy into China. Winding through
streets and lanes, it left the city and
raced towards the northeastern out-
skirts. Suddenly it pulled up at a dark
place on the Peihuantung Road, about
4.5 kilometres from the city proper.
Two people, one taller than the other,
stole out of the car and moved towards
the Hsipaho bridge 170 metres ahead,
the tall person carrying a heavy travel-
ling-bag in his hand. They stopped at
the northeastern corner of the 30-metre
p
,
r
bridge one after the other ..."
This is no extract from a second-rate
spy novel. It is an official account by
the New China News Agency (NCNA) of
events leading up to the biggest recent
spy-scandal in Peking.. The two men
mentioned in the article were U: A.
SEMENOV, Third. Secretary at the So-
viet Embassy, and A. A. KOLOSOV, an
interpreter in the Soviet Military At-
tache's office. They were making furtive
rendezvous with two
Chinese . agents; one
of them, LI HUNG-
SHU, had been train-
ed by the GRU and
sent into China in
June 1972. After
calling out a pass-
word, the Russians.
were preparing to
hand over a travel-
ling-bag containing a
standard spy-kit: a
small, high-speed ra-
dio transmitter capa-
ble of whipping off a
coded message be-
fore it could be pin-
pointed, frequency
tables, operating instructions, developer
for invisible ink, a forged border-pass
fore anyone can broadcast it, the Rus- and money. Li Hung-shu was to hand
several years. But KGB activity goes on
continuously. The Embassy in Peking is
as large and over-staffed as any other
Soviet mission in an area of vital interest
to Moscow; and if efforts to contact the
Chinese are all too often frustrated, the
Russians turn to the foreign. community
in Peking. A nasty row blew up at an
African cocktail party two years ago,
when a Russian diplomat asked a Latin
American "foreign expert," newly-arriv-
ed in China, to help him get informa-
tion. When the man indignantly refused
the Russian shouted "We will kill you."
He had. to be restrained by embarrassed
colleagues. During October 1973, two
Russians drove an embassy car into one.
of the foreigners' compounds in eastern
Peking and jumped out wielding a
hammer and chisel. They cut the mail
box off its pole and drove away with
it.
In November 1972, the Reuter cor-
respondent, James Pringle, tried to get a
cut-price ticket to Europe from Aero-
flot. The Peking manager, ALEK-
SANDR NICOLAEVICH VASILENKO,
who works out of the Soviet Embassy,
agreed that this could be arranged. Time
passed and it appeared that there were
"problems." Pringle had applied for an
.exit permit in mid-December, but as the
date approached and no ticket materia-
lised he grew worried. He held several
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 sessions wun use rtcrouot manager try- Thai Special Branch from less obtrusive and arrested three men. 06e was a local
HUNG-YAN,
n interpreter
d STEPAN
ered as sea-
, they were
ng aimed at
d that their
an espionage
documents
ported this
B operative,
taught and
China under
k.
EXANDER
and yan in
to Russian
essman was
visiting So-
e Russians.
But ship re-
ong's busi-
estricted, al-
A KGB agent is an expensive investment..
He (or occasionally, she) must become
fluent in at least one, language. If destin-
ed to live abroad, posing as the citizen
of his adopted country, he must do
more than learn to blend into his back-
ground by learning the customs and his-
tory of the people he imitates; he must
create an entirely new identity and live
with it at all times. Even the agent ope-
rating from the safe-keeping of his em-
bassy has been through years of train-
ing. Invariably he or she is of above-
average IQ, put through an exacting
course at one of the several KGB training
schools in the Soviet Union, tested for
reliability, courage and, above all, politi-
cal dedication to the Moscow cause. The
agent posing as a, journalist or working
from within a trading organisation, must
learn enough about his supposed trade
(and of the kind of inquisitive questions
he is liable to face from foreign col-
leagues) to dispel suspicion.
So it is a serious setback to the KGB
when one of these agents is detected
and expelled. In the immediate post-war
period KGB operations, directed mainly.
towards-West Europe and the Ameri-
cas, were comparatively unsophisticat-
ed. But so were the Western security
services. Sensational leaks like the loss
of nuclear secrets are part of history.
Tightened security throughout the
world led to the unmasking of increas-
ing numbers of KGB agents. and the peo-
ple they recruited. The culmination was
the unprecedented expulsion of the
Russians from London.
Some of these spies have since surfac-
ed elsewhere. It would be surprising if
they had not in view of the investment
involved. KGB men expelled from Britain
have reappeared in Sri Lanka, Bangla-
desh and Thailand. Their value has ob-
viously depreciated, since the countries
concerned are already forewarned.
These countries, however, have hesitat-
ed to expel the suspects.
The Thais made half-hearted efforts
to have VIKTOR VEKLENK.O declaied
personna non grata soon after he arrived
in Bangkok on May 29, 1972. He took
up the post of Third Secretary in the
Soviet Embassy eight months after his.
expulsion from Britain.. Lately, there has
been some sophisticated speculation
that Veklenko is employed as a "red SPECIAL Branch officers burst into a
utg t94 1 6$ i $dP' ttti'c& 1 9/02 :.CIA-RDP79-01194A0 G 3~0Q , ~O
ber 3, as' enko calf rirl e or yet Bangkok became a Mainr. centre of the others warn U
Soviet espionage immediately after di- of Chinese origin call
the early-1950s. The Embassy was an POLIKAROV, both regis
still-forbidden: areas of Southeast Asia. ship Khabarovsk. In fac
Listed staff today number 25, but that KGB agents establishing r
is deliberately. misleading. Soviet embas- with a blossoming spy-r
sies employ no local people apart from China. Another Chinese,
translators; cooks, maids and drivers are but never named, admitt
all brought from Russia. The total is, eventual aim was to sprea
therefore, more like 250, compared network throughout So
with five Thais in their mission in Mos- Police claimed they foun
proportion of the denizens, of any So- story; far from being an
viet embassy work for the KGs or GRU man, he was a senior K
(assisted from outside by journalists and once active in Japan, wh
tial second only to the CiA. cover of a professorship at
None of this has gone unnoticed in. ern University in Vladivost
Peking, which periodically complains of Another KGB agent, A
eastern Asia. The People's Daily recent- 1969 while posing as ma
ly alleged that Soviet diplomats had . tendent supervising repair
Thai, coast. The charges proved, on Kowloon. The Chinese bus
examination, to be a rehash of frequent later contacted by other
allegations in the Thai press, notably the reached Hongkong aboard
have consistently condemned spying infiltration left open to
(not only by the Russians) in Thailand. Efforts to open a consul
The Nation named KAIR ILIA- kong have been continuo
SHEV, Deputy Trade Director in Bang- by the British Government
diplomat, Second Secretary ANATOLI ness and have never been
, has also been mentioned as ships has been somewhat c
the country
a senior KGB officer. Similar accusations cent years.
" v r__ .
quota of Chinese-speaking
- r
Tass news agency renresentative_ ALEX
the Thai Soviet THASOSyshi+j in J or- lion about China and recr
pp g
?anicatinn and Aernflnt locally to carry on the Wear
suspect, since total trade was only US$6 speaking perfect English, c
million in 1973. The Soviet trade chin- ly (and vainly) at the REVi
pound in Bangkok costs $50,000 a year "the current political situa
and provides comfortable shelter for fif- chant liner, the Sovetsky S
teen families. The outlay would seem
disproportionate to the volume of busi-
ness.
The Thai authorities are alert to the
dangers. In earlier days they were under
pressure from the Americans to crack
down on the Russians. But detente and
the change to civilian Government have
made the Special Branch a trifle more
permissive. The last Soviet citizen was
expelled from Thailand in September
1965. He was LEONID MAMURIN, a
senior trade official. In 1960, the Tass
correspondent, I. GARUCHIN,.and the
assistant press attache, K. SAHAGA-
ROV, were kicked out for spying. None
of these men has apparently reappeared
abroad, but changes of name (and some-
times, it is said, of appearance) makes it
-difficult to trace them.
another discussion at the Embassy. The
British correspondent was shown into a
room he had never seen before and
which he now believes was bugged. The
Russian then ran through all the minor
details previously discussed and said:
"We can let you have the ticket, but we
would like you to help us with some
information." Pringle got up and walked
pies entrust
iting people
There was
led regular-
w to discuss
ion." A mer-
jus, called at
Hongkong in 1971 with eight crew
members who turned out to be Soviet
China-watchers from the D
versity in Vladivostok; an
more than the necessary s
ashore.
yan for nearly four mon
him aboard the Soviet c
Kavalerovo, en route to
ship swung at anchor, presu
ing instructions from M
escorted by police launch
the Russians have been in
herrin~4'p eMtj 1 bP'tR 4 $ tTIOW-f~OP7910~P1NAvM WM_1-3'g
--partment of
Eastern Uni-
other ships
,en to carry
eleton crew.
ver, hamper-
r activities
id Ho Hung=
is, then put
ntainer ship
Vladivostok
per protest-
10 days the
nably await-
iscow, until
er 24, 1972,
s, with the
Since then
re cautious.
superinten-
.t the begin-
 C PafR$ IT
United Dockyards Ltd. They are
VLADIMIR VASILIEVICH IVANOV
and VYACHISLAV DMITRIEVICH
PIKIN, both officials of the State trad-
ing organisation, SUDOIMPORT. They
lead a quiet and segregated life in flats
reserved for foreigners within the dock-
yard compound.
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25X11C10
FEARS of defection haunt the KGB, if
only because their activities so permeate
the Russian presence abroad that any
Russian seeking asylum (usually in the
United States) is liable to betray an en-
tire nest of agents and their foreign con-
tacts. When EVGENI. SOROKIN, a
young clerk at the Soviet Embassy in
Vientiane, crashed his car in September
1972, and then sought asylum in the
West, the Russians quietly withdrew
25% of their diplomatic staff from Laos.
Since then the Russians have been build-
provoke questions about' the size of
their embassy. Staff now number more
than 100, although the Soviet Union
provides virtually no aid to Laos and
conducts no trade at all.
Observers believe. the Russians have
one main mission: Apart from the ob-
vious aim of keeping an eye on the
dwindling US commitment and the do-
mestic political scene, the Russians have
chosen Laos as an important tilting
ground in their struggle with China.
"There is a ding-dong battle going on in
the streets of Vientiane between the
Russians and the Chinese," a diplomat
told the REVIEW. "There is an open
hostility you don't find between Rus-
sian and Chinese diplomats in Europe."
When the Russians laid on two big
Antonov-12 transports to fly Pathet Lao
troops and police into Vientiane last
year, the Chinese promptly flew a Pa-
thet Lao contingent to Luang Prabang
aboard their own Illyushins. The re-
sident Tass 'correspondent works part-
time at the Ministry of Information and
the official Agence Lao Presse carries an
increasing number of Tass despatches.
The Chinese, not to he outdone, have
installed a representative of the New
China News Agency with his own tele-
printer: News of the recent air accord
between China and Laos was carried by
Agence Lao quoting NCNA.
The Thai press tends to see spies un-
der every bed, but a report in the Bang-
kok Post naming VIATCHESLAV F.
CHIRIAEV as "a very high Russian in-
telligence officer" in Vientiane is not
disputed by foreign observers. An Ame-
rican book on the KGB by. John Barron
lists the present Russian Ambassador to
Laos, VALENTIN P. VDOVIN, as a
KGB officer and alleges that he has pre-
viously had espionage experience in
France and French Africa.
Approved For Release
TROUBLE attracts spies" like flies to, a
jampot and there, is,_trouble apleiTty
these'days in Bangladesh. Hence the ap-
pointment of ANDRE FOMIN as Soviet
Ambassador.-and the presence of such
experienced KGB officers as GEORGI
ALEXANDROVICH KUZNETSOV,
who went to. Britain in 1965 after three
years in New York, only- to be expelled
in the great spy purge of 1971. Kuznet-
sov turned up as commercial attache in
Dacca in early 1972. He now spoke
fluent' Bengali as well as English and
seemed more interested in contacting .
the student community than.in expand-
ing trade.
The Singapore Nanyang Siang Pau of
June 27, 1973, had this to say: "In order
to win over the Bangladesh Youth and
Trade Union organisations, Russia des-
patched. Kuznetsov to Bangladesh as a
member of the Soviet Embassy to take
charge of. these special duties. These
duties included his being actively engag-
ed in liaison work with the Bangladesh
Youth and Trade Union organisations.
His real task was to keep an eye on
these organisations in order to prevent
penetration from Maoist elements and
other revolutionary organisations."
Kuznetsov's ambassador is a former
deputy, foreign minister of the Soviet
Union, a member of the.Supreme Soviet
and said to be in charge of policy-plan-
ning in South and Southeast Asia. Sure-
ly Dacca did not deserve- a diplomat
who outranks his colleagues in New.
Delhi and Jakarta? The answer is that
the Soviet Union rightly regards Bangla-
desh as a key spot in a troubled conti-
nent. It is even something of a vacuum
where the Russians have a head start,
for once, over the Americans, but where
China is beginning to win influence.
The Soviet Union has been making
the most of its early offers of aid (at
one time there were two or three thou-'
sand Russians doing salvage work in
Chittagong), while lending a clandestine
hand to help stamp out insurgency led
by underground groups often drawing
their political inspiration from Peking.
Soviet helicopters in Bangladesh are re-
ported to have flown support missions
during May-June of 1972 for military
forces chasing the "Maoists" in the
,
swampy Sunderbans and in the Chitta- post of deputy head of mission
He
.
gong Hill tracts, where the actual fight- spent five or six years in China and is an
ing was quietly conducted by the Indian acknowledged expert on Chinese affairs.
Army. The rebels in this latter area were An active but unobtrusive press corps
Mizos, condemned by Tass as "Chinese- includes representatives of Tass, Novosti
trained." and of course, Soviet Radio and TV.
The Nanyang Siang Pau concluded: "If Most of these men are professional
the Soviet Union wishes to retain China-watchers led by YURI B.
its full influence in Bangladesh, it SAVENKOV of Novosti, a gregarious,
must continue to support all ele- squash-player who speaks good Manda-
ments, with the assistance of such rin. His duties include keeping a check
people as Kuznetsof. In this way on the Chinese newspapers, most of
it can effectively prevent the Ban- them openly pro-Peking.
gladesh people from relying too The Singapore-Soviet Shipping Com-
heavily on the West and the Chi- pany (SOCIAL), incorporated early in
nese People's Republic for future 1968, originally had two Russians on
1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-O1194A06 .Oda 'Oo'ar{-$YURI KUB-
"USING Singapore as a base, So-
viet social-imperialism is.accelerat-
.ing its infiltration of our country
and 'others. Through its embassies,
branches of the Moscow People's
Sank and other. channels, Soviet
revisionism is vigorously carrying
out infiltration, expansion and
espionage activities. In carrying out
these secret activities, Soviet agents and
ships, 'using all kinds of identification
and. names as covers, are coming and go-
ing continuously in increasing num-
bers."
That is what "The Voice of Malayan
Revolution" broadcast in Chinese on
April 6, 1974. The same sort of accusa-
tions are made constantly by Peking,
but are they really true? Our correspon-
dents report that the Singapore Russians
all keep a low profile. Some have actual-
ly joined the Cricket Club. Since most
of the Republic's citizens are Chinese,
political sympathies lie closer to Peking
than Moscow. The Russians tend to play
down their line, at least in. conversation
with Singaporeans.
Diplomatic relations between Singa-
pore and- the Soviet Union were not
established until June 1968, nearly
three years after the Republic opted out
of Malaysia. That same year a joint ship-
ping company was formed to facilitate
direct trade and in 1969, Aeroflot began
a thrice-weekly service between Moscow
and Singapore. The Moscow Narodni
Bank established a branch in 1971, and
the following year Russian ships began
using the repair facilities at Keppel Har-
bour and other yards. Some 500 Rus-
sian -ships now call at Singapore every
year with so many sailors hungry for
cameras and transistor radios that an en-
terprising shopkeeper in High Street has
put up a cyrillic signboard and employ-
ed a Russian-speaking assistant.
The new embassy site in select Cluny
Road was purchased from the Chartered
Bank for S$1.5 million (US$641,025).
It covers an area of 268,000 sq. ,ft, with
de luxe facilities like a swimming pool,
sauna and tennis, volley and gorodki
courts. The entire complex is believed
to have cost $2.5 million. The most
important inmate is a Ukrainian, VA-
LENTIN PASENCHUK
who holds the
 ?YUSHKIN (chairman) and a director,
IGOR activities. He still deal c n it 4 ? 6*3OO1N8f ass, with.a
, 0 ;~Fsa#pLsl6#9e1 m an 5 C
wards, a rmer tngapore journalist, rious offence under Soviet law), but is sun ar y uent command of English.
LIM BENG TEE, set up the Tri-Union so dramatically rehabilitated that he Tass correspondents oft n work in
Company (Pte) Ltd with himself as boasts a comfortable Moscow apartment fields rce outride the scope of e. N ordinary
managing director. A contract was sign- and a splendid suburban dacha where correspondent. SERGEI S RI came
ed with SOCIAC ? to handle their Steve- foreigners are entertained with Scotch out to Southeast Asia in the mid-1960s,
the
doting in Singapore. The business ap- first Soviet journalist a credited to
peared to prosper, with Lim soon able whisky and caviar. Louis has obviously Malaysia and Singapore. Ta fair and
won the stamp of approval front some-
to buy a $50,000 apartment and ride sophisticated, with American than English,
one in the Soviet Government. These h he e looked tedd more Ameeric an Russian
around in a chauffeur-driven Mercedes. days he is accorded the rare privilege of in his well-cut Ivy League uitings. He
and 4s August
being 1973, detained, imwiwas thoutarrested
trial travelling abroad and writing for foreign paid several visits to the Philippines at a
newspapers. As correspondent of the time when Russians were less welcome
under the Internal Security Act: A London Evening News, he had a world
police statement alleged he "was acting -scoop with first word of Khrushchev's there than they are today and probably
in the interests of foreign intelligence downfall. prepared the ground for G egorovich.
organisations through their business en- His activities and life-style arouse un- What is not generally know is that he
terprise here." The Russian connection derstandable suspicion abroad. The wan, aner lso a S the Sol viev stexl rt, a foees c;f was never mentioned. The Internal Se- kindest critics accuse him of pushing So- of Singapore. he Solwo ken characters
curity Department made it quite clear, viet propaganda into the international of SinHe worked in China
the
dur-
however, that Lim was a Soviet spy. He press. The harshest say outright that Soviet he early fiat missions. as in ter for e
was apparently recruited to pass on Victor Louis is an agent of Department Soetechnical ms. A few weeks ago news about China, using contacts all "A," whose many, covert tasks have in- for he called again in Si a ore, telling
over the region and may also have. been cluded blackening the reputations of the foreign colleagues that he w2 collecting
in a -position to provide the Russians dissident Russian writer, Alexander material for a book on the impact of the
with the kind of inside information on Solzhenitzyn, and Stalin's daughter, Cultural Revolution outside China.
Singapore politicians and personalities Svetlana Alliluyeva, who sought refuge Tass offices are notorious) over-staff-
which go into those insatiable KGB fides in the United States in 1967. The au- ed. The British news agen , Reuters,
"for later action." thor, John Barron says: "His job demon- keeps two correspondents in New Delhi
A month after Lim 's arrest, a Russian. strably is to. sow confusion, plant lies, for the. whole of India, Bangladesh and
shipping expert arrived in Kuala Lum-, peddle fraudulent or stolen manuscripts Sri Lanka. There are seven ass comes
pur. He was ANATOLI LYKHO, de- and smear the reputations of dissenting pondents in India alone, alt g with re-
scribed as a representative of the Soviet Soviet intellectuals ... " presentative- of Novosti, Pravda, Izves
shipping line, SOVINFLOT. His assign- The ideological dispute with Peking tia, Trud, New Times and Soviet Radio
ment was adviser to the Malaysian line, has faced Louis, and other specialists, and TV. Separate Tass office have been
SYARIKAT ANGKATA LAUT, which with a bigger challenge. They must now established in Dacca and Colombo. The
acts as agent for Soviet ships calling in do their utmost to discredit the Chinese agency's news service tern s far less
Malaysian ports. He also had strong leadership by pushing the Soviet points comprehensive than Reuters or anything
links with SoCIAC in Singapore. Lykho of view, hinting at divisions within put out by the rival America wire set
has since remained something, of a vices. mystery. g' China and touching on sensitive issues -India has always had to priority
His only public statement, in which cause alarm in Peking. That was with the KGB. The Indo-Sotiiet Treaty
Malacca, in September 1973, was that the purpose behind Victor Louis' much- of 1971 opened the flood-gates to Rus-
he intended studying port facilities in publicised "secret" visit to Taiwan in Sian infiltration. It has often been said
Malaysia to help ship rubber direct to October 1968.. The results were gratify- that "there are no secrets in India," con-
Russia. But his contacts with Malaysian ing. Did this mean that the Soviet GOv-
shipping men is minimal and potential ernment was establishing tentative links ermm~gent the andnltsud of the 1 dis, Govt
business contacts have difficulty even with the exiled Nationalists? Louis did has only its bcomgical bias, but it
finding out where he lives. All that is not say, He was content to leave eddies h ay lately become, app rent that
known is that he operates out of the of speculation in his wake before return- the treaty threatened intern security.
Soviet Emba?sy in Kuala Lumpur. ing to the good life in Moscow.
? . Two years ago, Pravda assigned its
chief foreign correspondent, V LADI
THE DEZINFORMATSIYA, or Disin- MIR . GREGOROVICH, to the Philip -
formation and the trade union ovement
formation Department of the KGB, De- pines. It was an oddly obscure assign- were making it easy for the Russians to
partment "A" of the First Directorate, ment for such an experienced journalist. infiltrate their agents. 25X1 C 1 O
can organise anything from a demon- Small, bespectacled Gregorovich has It is common knowledge t at certain
stration outside the US Embassy in New worked in Canada and the United Soviet journalists form an essential part
Delhi, to leaking information, some of it States.. He speaks excellent Engli? and of .the KGB operations in India. Until
accurate but usually highly suspect. The wields an expense account that allows recently they enjoyed complete free-
Indian "rent-a-mob" business was exten- for ample entertaining around Manila, dom from police surveillance by driving
sively used both by the Russians and the The Philippines do not yet enjoy diplo- around in cars with diplomat c number
Americans during the early 1960s. It matic relations with the Soviet Union, Plates. Their claim for diplom tic immu-
was directly controlled on the Russian but Gregorovich has acted as go-be- nity was only withdrawn after a heated
side by a KGB specialist within the So- tween in the tortuous negotiations, din- lists debate are in the the most im mport nt c journa-
viet Embassy. Leaks require rather more ing occasionally with President Marcos most portant "case offi-
subtlety and here again journalists are at Malacallang, an honour ` -accorded informers. a vast army of a ents and
invaluable. One of the best-known chan- few other resident correspondents. He mformers. Agents in the trade union
nets for this delicate form of psychologi- rents a villa in the plush Makati suburb movement can paralyse the a onomy at
cal
cal warfare is. VITALI: YEVGENNE- of Dasmarinas village on the outskirts of will; others form a powerful lobby With-
LUI. Manila and commutes regularly between in the Congress party to keep wavering
The man known to the Western press there and Moscow: Whether he actually leadership pressing towards it declared
as Victor Louis is a plausible, 46-year- writes much is a subject of keen specula- goal of socialism.
old soft-spoken Russian, who was impri- tion among local Gregorovich-watchers, Covert activities are cleverly financed
-toed during the 1950 r bl arket he without transferrm suspicio sly large
rAl 0% A A,
 CPYRGHT
Approved For
sums to the Soviet Embassy. Soviet
trading organisations channel their-ix-
ports through private. firms instead . of
the State 'Trading Corporation; The
firms pay a -percentage commission
direct to the Russians in India, a total
estimated at running into millions of
rupees a year. But as long as the Indian
Government remains dependent on the
Soviet Union for military and economic
aid, the authorities prefer to ignore such
lapses. In the opinion of many promin-
ent Indians, the country. has become
enmeshed. so closely with Russia that
there is little hope of reversing the
trend.
30001-8
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ORRIS
A Journal of World Affairs
VOLUME XVIII
FALL 1974
NUMBER 3
Reflections on the Quarter .......................... .......... 627
Strategic Adaptability ........................William R. Van Cleave
and Roger W. Barnett 655
Flexible Response Options ........................ G. W. Rathjens 677
The Essence of Armed Futility ................ Donald R. Westervelt 689
Foreign Policy and the Strategic Balance .............. Colin S. Gray 706
The Deterrence Continuum ....................Robert H. Kupperman,
Robert M. Behr and Thomas P. Jones, Jr. 728
Maneuver Instead of Mass: The Key to John M. Collins .750
Assured Stability ..............................
Population Vulnerability: The Neglected
Issue in Arms Limitation and the Conrad V. Chester
Strategic Balance ...........................
and Eugene P. Wigner 763
Lessons of the Strategic Bombing Survey
for Contemporary Defense Policy ............... John A. Lauder 770
Violence at a Distance: Greece and the J Bowyer Bell 791
Cyprus Crisis .................................
Toward a Political Settlement in Vietnam:
Assessing the First Eighteen Months
of the Postwar Wars ....................... Allan E. Goodman 809
Bargaining Between Saigon and Washington:
Dilemmas of Linkage Politics
Daring War ............................... Lawrence E. Grinter 837
Peace in Vietnam and Laos: 1954, 1962, 1973 ........ Robert Randle 868
Marxist Humanism .............................. Oskar Gruenwald 888
Reflections on the Soviet Secret Police
and Intelligence Services ........................ Lothar Metzl 917
Reviews:
Deterring the Past .............................. Paul Seabury 931
Korean Communism: From Its Origins to
Kim Il Sung's Monocracy ................... Rinn S. Shinn 935
Revolutionary Radicalism:
A Psychoanalysis ........................ Arnold Beichman 943
Japan's Role in the East Asian Subsystem .... Donald G. McCloud 947
Books Received ................................................. 951
Contributors to this Issue ........................................ 965
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REFLECTIONS ON THE SOVIET SECRET
POLICE AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
C PY Thar Metzl
WE are familiar with the theme that real detente with the
Soviet Union cannot be achieved unless the Soviet system
changes radically. One school holds that the Moscow regime's
continuing commitment to Marxism-Leninism and its global aspi-
rations places severe restrictions on Soviet detente policies. In
essence, this is also the argument of Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn,
the exiled Soviet writer, who has pleaded with Soviet leaders to
relinquish their obsolete and counterproductive state ideology.
Another school maintains that the USSR is an expansionist power
with goals similar to those of Czarist imperialism. Adopting this
argument, the Chinese communists characterize Soviet leaders as
social-imperialists and accuse them of having betrayed the revo-
lution.
A new and more narrowly gauged argument proceeds from
an assessment of a Soviet core institution, the Komitet Gosudarst-
vennoy Bezopastnosty (Committee for State Security), or KGB.
Administratively assigned to the Council of Ministers ofthe USSR,
the KGB is controlled by the leaders of the Communist Party.
Its fundamental missions are to maintain a flexible but neverthe-
less iron infrastructure of repressive social and political police
controls at home, and to undermine the socio-political and
structural integrity and stability of noncommunist governments
abroad. That the withering away of the KGB is a prerequisite
for a reliable relaxation of international tensions is one of the
conclusions reached in John Barron's detailed, multisourced inves-
tigative report, KGB: The Secret Work of Secret Soviet Abents.*
In part, this report presents evidence to establish the KGB's
paramountcy within the Soviet institutional system as the rulers'
principal instrument of power." (p. 332.) The huge dimensions
14 of the domestic KGB apparatus are described along with its elite
status and brutal methods of repression. Nevertheless, the argu-
ment does not derive specifically from an evaluation of the role
of the KGB in internal Soviet affairs. The major portion of the
*KGB: The Secret Work of Secret Soviet Agents. By John Barron. Pleasantville,
N.Y.: Reader's Digest Press (E. P. Dutton, distributors), 1974. 462 pp. $10.95.
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assembled facts, case histories and statistical data assesse
methodology and effectiveness of external KGB espi
range
,
and covert political action operations through which Soil
leaders endeavor "to shatter the status quo in foreign lands
(p. 91.) The report takes the high-and rising-incidence",
clandestine Soviet operators abroad as an important indicator;,
of continuing intent, and finds that "there can be no real detenttr
until this massive KGB aggression stops." (p. 334.) Barron.,sub'
mits that massive governmental and public opinion pressure j,
the West may persuade Soviet leaders to desist, in their owtV
interest, from undermining detente through covert KGB ope ',
Lions abroad. Such pressures, he suggests, may also lead to a'
softening of repression (pp. 332-337). It is doubtful, howeverr
that such pressures, if practical at all, will produce more thann
tactical concessions to Western opinion. J.
Soviet doctrine continues to perceive the KGB as an essential
element of the Soviet state, second in significance only to the
armed forces. In the postwar period, the highest leaders have.,
consistently expressed this policy view at every party congress, no
matter how divided they were on other issues. On March 30,
1971, at the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress, Brezhnev followed
the example set by Malenkov and Khrushchev in re-emphasizing
"the important role played by the organs of state security
in the struggle to safeguard Soviet society against hostile elements.'.
and against the intrigues of imperialist intelligence services."'
For obvious reasons, Brezhnev did not refer to the considerable,
clandestine role played by the KGB on the international scene;
but this role-and, to a certain extent, Barron's findings-has been
confirmed in unofficial Soviet sources. Since 1964, there has-
developed an extensive and probably KGB inspired, special Soviet
literature that glamorizes the history of the institution as well;
as selected espionage feats of Soviet agents during World War II
and in the postwar period? This literature has been supple-`
mented by occasional film versions. By way of policy, doctrine and,,.
propaganda, the KGB appears firmly entrenched.
Barron's investigative report is meant for the general reader but'
its factual content should be of more than passing interest to
policymakers engaged in structuring detente with Moscow: it indi
"`24th Congress of the CPSU," Information Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 7-8 (Prague:
Peace and Socialism Publishers; 1971), p. 98.
'Soviet Intelligence and Security Services, 1964-70: A Selected Bibliography of
Soviet Publications, with Some Additional Titles from Other Sources, prepared by
the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (Washington:, GPO,
1972).
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cates explicitly that the Soviet regime retains a considerable covert
capability abroad for circumventing detente via the KGB.
Implicitly, Barron's data on KGB repression within the USSR
also agree with comments by Professor Hans J. Morgenthau, who
noted the "negative impact of the domestic policies of the Soviet
Union upon detente," and stated, "As long as the excesses of
domestic brutality in the Soviet Union indicate the absence of
... a common [to East and West] moral framework, detente can
only be limited and precarious."a
The argument that Soviet ideology is a deterrent to real detente
has been frequently countered by denying that the ideology is
policy-related and by evaluating it as mere rhetoric and propa-
ganda. The argument that real detente with Soviet imperialism
is impossible is countered by the assumption that the regime's
detente posture represents a genuine mellowing and not merely
a change in tactics 4 Barron's institutional argument is also not
immune to criticism. One could point out that he has taken the
KGB out of its institutional context and neglects the repressive
character of other Soviet institutions, e.g., the Communist Party,
the mass organizations, the ideological and communications ap-
paratus, and so forth. Likewise questionable is the implication
that the KGB alone-rather than in conjunction with other fac-
tors, such as Soviet military and political policies-is capable of
undermining detente.
Nevertheless, the essential thrust of Barron's institutional argu-
ment remains valid. Whether or not the KGB is viewed within
the total institutional context, whether it is a single anti-detente
factor or only one of a series, the KGB phenomenon is significant
enough to qualify as an input in the process of making Western
and especially U.S. detente policy. It appears that this factor has
not been adequately measured as yet. The academic community,
for instance, has consistently shied away from the study of the
internal and external role of the KGB.a There is no certainty
'Hans J. Morgenthau, "Detente: The Balance Sheet," New York Times, March
28 1974, p. 39.
1For a critique of this assumption, see Bertram D. Wolfe, "Some Problems of the
Russo-American Detente," Address delivered at the 12th Slavic Conference, De-
partment of History, Oklahoma State University, November 2, 1973. Unpublished
manuscript.
'See Robert M. Slusser's review in Slavic Review, December 1973, pp. 825-828.
Professor Slusser writes, "Despite its fundamental and universally recognized
importance, the [Soviet] secret police continues to be the neglected stepchild of
Soviet studies.... As far as the scholarly community of this country is concerned,
the study of the secret police still seems to be regarded as somehow discreditable,
marginal, or unfeasible."
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rr+
that the intelligence community has been less reluctant. Barron''s
investigative report, therefore, is a first step in the right direction.
One of its virtues is that it draws attention to the academic and
policy research tasks still ahead. The dimensions. of the problem
are large enough to justify a cooperative effort of scholars,:
government estimators and investigative reporters of Barron's,
ii
On a small scale, Barron's report sets a precedent for the more
broadly based cooperative effort required to produce a thorough.
estimate of the KGB. The bulk of the data comes from knowledge:
able Soviet defectors and from corroborative open-source research.
In addition, the report credits otherwise unidentified Western:
security services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S.
Defense Intelligence Agency, and to a lesser extent the Central
Intelligence Agency, with providing information and advice (p::
xii). These contributions extend our knowledge, particularly of.
some of the KGB's largely unknown structural and organizational
aspects. The accounts of former KGB officers and agents are at.,
least equally revealing. Through them the report views the KGB.,,
from within and exposes, inter alia, its priority targets and opera
tional methods, the pressures and tensions under which its per;
sonnel operate, and its close connections with top leaders of the:
party.
Limited as the governmental contributions are, they will give'
rise to accusations that Barron is spreading Cold War propaganda.;:
Soviet and other communist media are bound to turn his institu-
tional argument around and claim that his report represents but,
another of the many attempts by Western intelligence agencies..;
to scuttle detente. As early as October 1973, an authoritative.:
editorial in Kommunist warned that the supporters of the ColdT
War had "regrouped their forces to hold up, distort and under-
mine the positive process which has begun in the international:
relaxation of tensions." On March 15, 1974, Brezhnev stated at;
Alma-Ata that the Soviet leadership had expected all along that.
detente efforts would meet "stubborn resistance from the most;.
reactionary and aggressive circles of imperialism and of all politi-
cal movements . . . interested in maintaining international
tensions." Bourgeois media in particular were .being "actively,
?Kommunist, October 1973, translated in joint Publications Research Service.,
(JPRS) 60631, November 26, 1973, p. 13.
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used to implement this counter offensive."7 The first deputy chief
of the KGB, Semen Kuz'mich Tsvigun, accused Western intelli-
gence services of increasingly sponsoring anti-Soviet propaganda .8
Although these statements may simply serve the regime to justify
continuing repression and obstructionism in detente matters, they
will certainly prompt Soviet media to brand Barron's report as
propaganda. But is it?
A few illustrations will show that his study on KGB operations
in the Soviet Union is under-researched and understated rather
than distorted and exaggerated. Chapter IV (pp. 70-90) de-
lineates the complex organization and highlights the key opera-
tional elements of KGB headquarters in Moscow. These include
"domestic security" and "foreign intelligence" functions on the
largest conceivable scale. In the West these functions are generally
assigned to a variety of agencies in order to prevent the accumu-
lation of too much power in a single institution-albeit not always
successfully. To sharpen our perception of KGB super-centraliza-
tion, Barron could have pointed to parallels between the KGB
and its counterpart in Nazi Germany, the Main Office of State
Security (Reichssicherheit Hauptamt, RSHA).
The RSHA, headed by Himmler and staffed in the main by
the SS, included both the Gestapo, the secret state police, and the
Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst, SD) , the foreign espionage
and subversion service .0 In the KGB the First Chief Directorate is
responsible for espionage and subversion abroad. The Gestapo
function is carried out by the Second and partly also by a new
Fifth Chief Directorate. Through them, the KGB maintains its
ubiquitous surveillance and control of the Soviet population as
well as of all foreigners (diplomats, students, tourists) . The
border police of the RSHA has its replica in the KGB's uniformed
elite force of border guards. In some respects, the KGB is more
centralized than was its German counterpart. The extensive sur-
veillance of the Soviet armed forces is lodged in the powerful
Armed Forces Directorate. A high-level Disinformation Direc-
torate promotes and supervises KGB operations aiming at pollu-
tion of the opinion-making process in the West. Among its
specialties are the distribution of forged documents and fabri-
cated intelligence as well as the organization of riots and demon-
strations to manipulate public opinion (pp. 165, 166). Similarly,
'Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report, Soviet Union,
March 18, 1974, p. R 15.
'Ibid., March 6, 1974, p. A 3.
'Jacques Delarue, Histoire de la Gestapo (Paris, 1962), pp. 609-613.
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the KGB has institutionalized the function of preparing acts of;
sabotage in peacetime and maintains a special unit for political.
murder (Chapters VIII, XIII) .
The KGB also shares with the RSHA some of its deficient
ties, such as excessive bureaucratization, obsession with secrecy;!
and rigid compartmentalization.1? Comparative analysis indicates:;
that the KGB represents not, as Barron puts it, "a unique phe..
nomenon of this century" (p. 1) but rather a behavior pattern
that "totalitarian" regimes have in common, regardless of their.
ideological, political and other differences. This conclusion was_. forcefully expressed by Solzhenitsyn in his reply to Soviet criticism
of his Gulag Archipelago. When Literaturnaya Gazeta accused
him of having equated the entire Soviet people with fascist mur
derers, Solzhenitsyn replied, "Just a little jiggling of the facts:'-
Yes, I equate the Cheka-G.P.U.-N.K.V.D. murders with the Fascist
murderers. But Literaturnaya Gazeta hauls in `all Soviet people'
here in order to more conveniently hide our hangmen among
them.""
The dimensions of the KGB empire are not worked out with
precision because Barron's report focuses almost exclusively on the
Moscow KGB center. The Moscow center, however, while it is
itself in charge of the largest Soviet republic, the Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), is an all-Union institu-
tion and commands its counterpart KGB centers in the other
republics of the USSR. Thus, there are fifteen powerful KGB
centers among which the Moscow center is Primus inter pares.
Below the other fourteen centers the KGB structure parallels that
of the Communist Party's lesser organizations. It devolves from
the fourteen republic central committees to their respective, large
territorial (oblast, krai and okrug) committees, down to rural
district party committees (raikoms), and in urban areas to town
or city committees (gorkoms) .12 A recent Soviet source lists 6
krai, 144 oblast and 10 okrug (territorial) party committees, 780
major city party committees (gorkoms) , and 511 city district and
2,842 village (rural) party committees (raikoms).18 It can be
'Compare Barron, pp. 73-74, with Delarue, op. cit., pp. 314-315.
"See text of Solzhenitsyn's statement, New York Times, January 19, 1974. The
Cheka, GPU and NKVD are the predecessors of the KGB.
"Peter Frank, "The CPSU Obkom First Secretary: A Profile," British Journal
of Political Science, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press,
1971), p. 173. The all-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union also acts as
the party in the RSFSR.
"Kommunist, September 1973, translated in JPRS 60363, October 25, 1973,
p. 29.
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fairly assumed from these figures that 940 major and 3,353 second-
ary KGB centers are distributed throughout the Soviet Union.
To these figures must be added the innumerable special KGB
branches operating within the armed forces and civilian
institutions.
The number of KGB staff personnel deployed exclusively
against the Soviet people certainly exceeds the strength of the
Gestapo at its height in 1944, -when it ranged between 40,000 and
50,000.14 Barron's tentative figures-90,000 staff officers and
400,000 clerical workers, building guards, border guards and
special troops-are probably on the conservative side, especially
if one considers that the border guards alone are thought to
number 300,000 (pp. 71, 85).
The total political and functional weight of the KGB within
the Soviet system likewise cannot be adequately measured in terms
of the Moscow center alone. Barron points out that the all-Union
KGB is represented on the Politburo and Central Committee of
the CPSU (p. 11) but fails to mention similar patterns in the
republics. The chairman of the important KGB of the Ukrainian
republic, for instance, is a candidate member of the Politburo of
the CP Ukraine. Republic KGB chiefs and deputy chiefs are
regularly elected as deputies to the Supreme Soviets of their
jurisdiction.
Moreover, Chapter V (pp. 91-113) surveys the center's ability
to extend its operational radius by inserting KGB officers into a
variety of state mechanisms, ranging from the vast censorship
apparatus to the administration of religious affairs, news agencies,
the areas of foreign affairs and foreign trade, and so forth. It can
also exploit a multitude of rigid and repressive social controls
assigned to other agencies, e.g., with regard to the internal pass-
port and work book system, travel controls, the draft, and mental
institutions (pp. 96-99). Thus, the Soviet Ministry of Internal
Affairs administers the labor camps but the selection of inmates is
in the hands of the KGB. Clearly, one would need to apply a
regional multiplication factor to arrive at the full extent of the
KGB's interagency coordination, including its behind-the-scenes
manipulation of the judicial process.
In sum, Barron's investigation of the role played by the KGB
in the USSR's internal affairs barely approximates but does not
distort Soviet realities. Even in its rudimentary form it is corn-
"Delarue, op. cit., p. 317.
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patible with the official Soviet definition of the KGB's mission
i.e., to "be the terror of all enemies of the Soviet state"-given.-
to the Twenty-first CPSU Congress by Politburo member Aleks-
andr N. Shelepin, who was then chairman of the KGB and is now
head of the multi-million-member federation of Soviet trade
unions.ls
Although the terror tactics of the KGB are subject to change,-
Shelepin's strategic definition still holds. Barron shows how little
it takes to be sent to prison, labor camps or mental institutions
as an enemy of the Soviet state (pp. 107, 108). However, he does
not deal adequately with the more elusive aspects of a huge secret
police that can recruit collaborators, spies and informers practical-
ly at will. Because the corruptive effect of the KGB on Soviet
society in general and on the regime sponsoring this corruption
in particular has a bearing on detente, this problem needs to be
closely studied.
Barron's expose of covert KGB operations abroad has more than.
one counterpart in Soviet books and articles exposing Western
intelligence services, but there is a significant difference. Barron's
view does not represent an official position even though it may
have been influenced by Western counterintelligence findings..
Soviet reports of this type represent the official Soviet view and
are therefore beyond public criticism or challenge. Moreover, it
is the KGB itself that frames and disseminates this view, generally
over the signature of its chairman, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov,
or his first deputy, Tsvigun.16 Their pronouncements have the
backing of the CPSU, for Andropov is a member of the Politburo
and Tsvigun is a candidate member of the Central Committee..
Andropov, moreover, -was recently awarded the Order of Lenin.
Barron's report calls for consideration by policymakers. The
KGB, on the other hand, is authorized by Soviet policymakers to
define the parameters of the subversive threat from abroad. While
in the United States the time is past for such self-serving and
justificatory procedures, the Brezhnev regime still follows them for
'Current Soviet Policies III, The Documentary Record of the Extraordinary
21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1960), p. 178.
'For example: Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, Speech at the 50th Anniversary
of Soviet State Security Organs, Pravda, December 21, 1967. Semen Kuz-mich
Tsvigun, "Ideological Diversion-a Tool of Imperialist Reaction," Kommunist,
March 1972, pp. 109-118; "Revolutionary Vigilance Is an Integral Part of Soviet
Man," PoIiticheskoye Samoobrazovaniye (Political Self-Education), February 1971,
pp. 38-48.
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a variety of reasons. KGB estimates enable the regime -to neutral-
ize domestic dissenters as tools of external antagonists. They also
enable it to negate Western demands for less restricted exchanges.
In the final analysis, though, the estimative authority of the KGB
derives from the general outlook of a leadership still committed
to rule by secrecy and, therefore, prone to attribute secret con-
spiracies to its partners in detente as well as to open opponents.
The KGB is the institutional embodiment of this view. In the
democratic West similar behavior patterns have tended to dissi-
pate. In the USSR they are permanently rooted in the statutory
and social obligations of the members of Soviet society. The 1952
statutes of the CPSU obligated a party member "to keep Party
and state secrets and display political vigilance, keeping in mind
that the vigilance of Communists is necessary on every sector, and
in all circumstances. "17 The 1961 amendments to the statutes
again made it a duty of every party member "to display vigilance
to guard party and state secrets.""' "Political vigilance" is incum-
bent not only on party members but on the entire population
as "an absolute and most important condition for successful
struggle against the subversive activities of the enemies of the
Soviet state."19 These obligations undoubtedly create. greater
receptivity to KGB allegations about Western conspiracies.
In his Introduction to the Barron volume, Robert Conquest
states that the book "implies the need for continual vigilance"
against KGB operations in the West. Yet, as the KGB spearheads
the perennial large-scale vigilance campaigns of the Soviet regime,
it does not imply but implants fear and distrust of the West. To
this political end generalizations and ideological constructs are
often substituted for fact. Nonetheless, the facts assembled in
Barron's report strongly suggest that the KGB creates far greater
problems for nations in the West-developing as well as developed
-than comparable Western intelligence services create. for the
Soviet Union.
Barron has acceptable figures to show that from the early 1960's
on the Soviet regime has used the "normalization" of its relations
with noncommunist countries to expand the presence and opera-
tions of the KGB as well as the military intelligence agency of the
'Current Soviet Policies, The Documentary Record of the Nineteenth Party
Congress, Statutes of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York:
Columbia University Press, .1953), p. 28.
Jan Triska, editor, Soviet Communism: Programs and Rules (San Francisco:
Chandler, 1962), pp. 158, 159. The cited amendment is still in force.
'?Kommunist, ]February 1974, translated in JPRS 61776, April.17, 1974, pp. 162,
163.
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Soviet General Staff. To support his statement that 50 to 80 pe.
cent of Soviet diplomats abroad are undercover intelligence offi='
cers (p. 17), Appendix D reliably provides the names and careers
of about 1,700 of them (pp. 379-415). In addition, the covert
KGB presence abroad is augmented by the personnel of allied
intelligence organizations from Eastern Europe, Cuba and North:
Korea (pp. 141-163), and while Barron has no statistics on their,
incidence he shows how effectively they can perform. Through:
the intelligence service of North Korea, for instance, the KGB
instigated-albeit unsuccessfully-guerrilla operations in Mexico,
a country with which Moscow had "normal" relations (pp. 230
257).
Incomplete as Barron's figures are, they are not likely to be
challenged by the KGB. Nor have Soviet sources published simi-
larly precise data to show that the presence of Western intelli-
gence services has increased as dramatically in socialist countries-
as has that of the KGB and its auxiliaries in noncommunist
countries. In fact, KGB statements credit no Western intelligence
presence in the Soviet Union whatsoever. Instead, they focus on
the West's attempts to infiltrate "agents" from abroad in order to
meet extensive intelligence requirements. These agents may come
by "miniature helicopter or minisubmarine." Or, they may "show
up through legal channels: with a diplomatic passport, as a
tourist, or as a member of a scientific, commercial, or cultural
delegation." In the main, however, their espionage efforts are
evaluated as futile because of "the lack of a social base for the
activities of imperialist intelligence in the Soviet Union." Accord-
ing to the KGB, the recruitment of Soviet citizens by Western
intelligence happens, but "not frequently."20
Barron's data on the enormous counterintelligence and surveil-
lance capabilities of the KGB support its self-view. So does Mos-
cow's low rate of expulsions of foreigners accused of espionage
often on trumped-up charges at that. In the West, in contrast,
expulsions of Soviet intelligence staff officers run high: 226 Soviet
representatives were expelled during 1960-1970; in 1971 and
1972, 191 were expelled from five countries alone (pp. 27, 28).
Over the long term these losses average out to roughly 20 to 25
per cent, leaving the KGB to operate at 75 to 80 per cent of
capacity. Nonetheless, in quantitative terms, it seems fairly evident
fOIbid., p. 160. The quoted statements appear in a review of Taynyy Front (The
Secret Front), a recent book by KGB Deputy Chief Tsvigun (Moscow: Politizdat,
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that the KGB's-potential in the West far outweighs whatever covert
capabilities the "imperialists" may have in the Soviet Union.
In qualitative terms,. the disparity becomes even more pro-
nounced. Its direct bearing on detente devolves only in part from
the proven professionalism of Soviet espionage operations. Barron
points out correctly that the KGB continues to give first priority
to acquiring documentary evidence of the military and political
secrets of allies and adversaries, through classical agent operations.
As a case in point, he describes the successful penetration of a
highly guarded American communications center in France (pp.
199-239). On the other hand, he indicates that this traditionalist
Soviet capability is offset by the technological apparatus for intel-
ligence collection the United States has developed. In his opinion,
this apparatus has not been matched by the Soviet Union. Whether
or not this is so is difficult to judge on the basis of available infor-
mation, especially given the intensity of the Soviet effort to catch
up with Western military technology.
In the perspective of Western detente politics the most dis-
turbing feature of KGB operations is this: they aim persistently
and frequently successfully at the recruitment or infiltration of
agents in the center of governments which desire to improve their
relations with the Soviet Union. Barron's evidence, though scat-
tered throughout the report, shows that this is a long-term trend.
Recent events in West Germany confirm that intelligence services
in Eastern Europe replicate the KGB model.
The KGB attacks its targets both in the Soviet Union and
abroad. In a carefully staged deception and sex entrapment opera-
tion, it attempted to blackmail the French ambassador to the
Soviet . Union into collaboration, on the-mistaken-assumption
that he would become one of General de Gaulle's most intimate
advisers (pp. 118-140). President Nasser's chief confidant and
intelligence adviser was recruited as a Soviet agent during the
heyday of Egyptian-Soviet relations and so served until he was
arrested by President Sadat in 1971 (pp.. 51-53, 58, 59, 61).
President Nkrumah of Ghana was persuaded to let the KGB and
allied secret services assume control of his domestic security and
external intelligence operations until his overthrow by the mili-
tary (pp. 252-254). Barron's reliably documented cases could
have been augmented by a series of others, such as the account
of Soviet agent Harold A. R. ("Kim") Philby, who at one time
headed the Soviet desk of Great Britain's external intelligence
service. Moreover, the KGB practice of recruiting or manipulating
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high government officials extends not only to Western govern-
ments. Barron shows how the technique was applied in Castro's
Cuba (pp. 147-152). Again, in September 1974, an apparently
Soviet-backed anti-Tito conspiracy was uncovered in Yugoslavia.
The circumstances surrounding the resignation of West Ger-
man Chancellor Willy Brandt on May 6, 1974 strikingly underline
the trend as well as its implications for detente. Brandt, the prime
architect of East-West detente, resigned because one of his per-
sonal advisers was exposed as an agent of the East German
intelligence services. As such, he had served for several years on
Brandt's personal staff. In view of the KGB's close relations with
its East German counterpart, it must be assumed that the Moscow
center received the fruits of this operation. It is highly probable
also that the Soviet Politburo was kept informed and accepted
the political risks involved in preference to calling the operation
off.
On the other side of the ledger, the KGB keeps exposures of
its activities abroad concealed from the Soviet public, and has no
comparable exposures to offer. In 1956, Khrushchev, in his secret
speech to the Twentieth CPSU Congress, branded Politburo mem-
ber and secret police chief Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria as an "agent
of foreign intelligence.' '21 The accusation was not credible but
served as an additional justification for Beria's execution. Colonel
Oleg Penkovsky, who was executed in 1962 as a Western spy, did
not belong to the innermost circle of the Soviet leadership. None-
theless, the KGB has been obliged by the Brezhnev regime to
keep the threat of foreign intelligence infiltration alive by pro-
claiming that the current tactics of Western imperialism are
primarily designed to use detente as a cover for ever-increasing
ideological subversion operations.
This construct permits, for example, the defamation of Soviet
physicist and dissenter, Andrei S. Sakharov, as "a tool in the
hands of the enemies of socialism and relaxation of international
tension, who are manipulating his personality with professional
skill."22 It is sufficiently loose and elastic to allow for its arbitrary
application to any opponent of the regime:
Today, when the principles of peaceful coexistence are being asserted,
the main efforts of imperialist intelligence and other special services are
aimed at achieving the so-called "erosion" of socialism. In fact, this means
attempts at restoring in the socialist countries the capitalist order with the
"Current Soviet Policies II, The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist
Party Congress and Its Aftermath (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 184.
"Kommunist, October 1973, translated in JPRS 60631, November 26, 1973,
p. 12.
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help of a "silent" counterrevolution. Reliance on the corruption of the
Communist or any other revolutionary movement from within is now one
of the most important trends in imperialist class strategy.ss
The Chinese communists, meanwhile, credit the Soviet leader-
ship itself-but not Western intelligence services-with the intro-
duction of capitalist principles into the Soviet system. Objective
Western observers fail to see any signs of a brewing capitalist
counterrevolution. The Soviet regime raises the. specter of Western
subversion in order to justify its stringent ideological protec-
tionism.
The CPSU's ideological apparatus and the academic com-
munity have the task of identifying and exposing Western trends,
concepts, publications and authors which are to be considered
hostile to Soviet ideology. The KGB has the task of providing
evidence of the alleged conspiracy. It must project the ominous
image of a well-coordinated, well-financed psychological warfare
campaign. It has been doing so by postulating a monolithic super-
structure of governmental, private and academic institutions, such
as, in the case of the United States, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the United States Information Agency, Radio Free
Europe, Radio Liberty, and various research institutes concerned
with Soviet affairs. With respect to the exploitation of religion
and nationalism, a recent book exposes the subversive efforts of
the Vatican, the Jehovah's Witnesses Society, "reactionary Muslim
organizations," and obscure Russian Orthodox churches.24 Among
the "ideological contraband" that religious centers abroad are
trying to smuggle into the Soviet Union, its authors cite publica-
tions of the Bible Society in London as well as copies of the
Gospel According to John. The new book by the KGB's First
Deputy Chairman, Tsvigun, exposes hitherto unknown nationalist
groups in Moldavia and the Ukraine.25
Barron's report neglects this significant function of the KGB.
A thorough investigation of the scope and impact of this sort
of literature would seem useful. Even if its factual content is
found to be minimal, an analysis of KGB propaganda may shed
light on the extent to which the Soviet regime can win public
support for its restrictive policies vis-A-vis dissenters and the
influx of Western ideas. The first edition of Tsvigun's book-
200,000 copies-was reportedly sold out in a few days.
"Kommunisf, February 1974, pp. 121-125.
'A. V. Belov and A. D. Shilkin, Diuersiya Bez Dinamita (Sabotage Without
Dynamite) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1972).
'Daily Telegraph (London), April 18, 1974. Also see note 20.
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The disparity between the KGB and Western intelligence
services is a reflection of leadership attitudes. In the United States,.
domestic intelligence programs as well as covert action abroad,
such as in Chile, have come under increasingly critical scrutiny,
both by the public media and by the government. As regards the
Soviet Union, although Barron may go too far in characterizing
the KGB as "the primary executor of foreign policy" (p. 17), his
report indicates that the Soviet regime has far greater confidence
in the KGB's ability to manipulate international relations than it'
has in its conventional diplomatic establishment. In the United
States, similar Cold War attitudes have eroded and are likely to
erode further in the wake of the Watergate scandals. In the
Soviet Union, where the KGB is beyond criticism, reliance on
the KGB apparatus abroad is likely to increase. Detente offers
new opportunities for operational expansion and for the acquisi-
tion of additional covert reserves. The fact that the CPSU's
control of the international communist movement has been weak-
ened should further strengthen the role of the highly centralized
international KGB apparatus.
On the whole, Barron's institutional argument cannot be dis-
missed out of hand. Even if the new threats to international
stability-inflation, energy and food shortages-seem to loom
larger, the KGB still represents a highly disintegrative force. A
thorough and broadly based review could project the risks as well
as the countervailing factors more precisely than does Barron's
otherwise commendable report. Soviet detente policies and the
KGB system are likely to coexist and interact for the foreseeable
future.
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