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January 16, 1975
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100440001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100440001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00100440001-7 CPYRGHT December 21, 1974, 9 When the balloon goes up 10 The French reconnection 11 Vorster can see it 12 Make more room at the top 13 The long distance runners Britain 17 Mind your manners, Harold-or the lords may play up; Economic debate; Chief whip; Shrewrs? bury pickets; Children's bill: Coliseum strikrr T'he World 25 International Report: Smith's three cards against the Africans' ace; Greece; Who's lVhs in black Rhodesia; China; Germany; France; Italy Aggression; Poland and Russia; Ireland; Egypt; Hongkong and China; Malta; Brazil, Canada 40 Portugal: It's not lost yet 43 American Survey: France, the odd man in; Aid; Ambassadors; New Jersey; Shoppers' new worlds; Americans abroad; Walter Lipamann; Ringing in the Buycentennial 51 Europe: Will France now renegotiate with the EEC on energy?; Wilson and Europe; Sugar; Australia; Employment; Germany and Britain; Britain's just not trying; Capital movements; Transport; Farms; Insurance Business 61 This Week: Hark the Opec angels 65 Towards the siege economy 67 Grow on regardless 68 Sweet politics 73 International: Is gold just any old metal^.;. Italy; French nuclear programme: The recover, will be a little late next year, Japan; Bougainville 83 Britain: They've turned the price cone into a bipsses' compact; Unemployment; Steel; North Sett oil; !forth Sea jnhs; Tares; Bread 91 Investment: Should British Leyland have mote worker-shareholders?; . Crown Agents; Union Corporation; Oldham Estates; Internationai Property Development; Le Nickel % World Shares and Money Books 99 Samuel Johnson; HG Wells; Francis Galion; Nw-v-ell Froude; Dr Reynolds Hole; Caroline Lawns Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00100440001-7 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00010044000$FtYIRGHT It's not lost yet General Fabiao, who is. the chief' of staff of Portugal's army, puts the genuine puzzlement of many Portu- guese succinctly: For almost half a century the Portuguese people suffered under a fierce despotism that deprived them of all their liberties, without the governments of friendly countries feeling very disturbed. . . . Now that by our own efforts we free ourselves and break the chains that once bound us, there appears a whole movement, on almost a world scale, anxious about our future, frightened that we might fall into a dictatorship of the proletariat that will rob us of the freedom we have only now attained. General Fabiao did not mention the other main cause for. concern among Nato countries, Portugal's strategic position in western Europe, but he has a point. It seems unfair to carp about the occasional departure from demo- cratic norms when Portugal is, after all, gearing itself up for its first free elec- tion in 40 years. The United States has apparently decided to stop carping: last weekend the Americans announced an aid programme for Portugal which, though modest in scale, is a major de- parture from the attitude of anxious disapproval they have shown ever since the moderate President Spinola was made to resign in September. But the disturbing fact is that Portugal's future is much likelier to be decided by the outcome of two other power struggles now under way, in the army and the trade unions, than in the election for a constituent assembly due to take place in March. It is premature to talk of an immedi- ate communist takeover. The Communist party started off with a considerable tactical advantage after the April coup as the only organised underground opposition to the old Salazar-Caetano dictatorship. The Communist-dominated trade union federation, Intersindical, took firm control of the existing workers' organisations and set about unionising the rest of the labour movement. In addition, .the Commu- nists encouraged the Socialist and Popular Democratic parties, their present coalition partners, to join them in an amorphous organisation called the Portuguese Democratic Movement, which proceeded to take over four- fifths of all Portuguese local councils. en, too a e, e Popular Democrats withdrew from the Movement, alleging that it was under Communist control, the Communists were left in full command of the councils. It also seems fairly clear that power over the press and broadcasting services has passed from editors and proprietors to unions of journalists, more often than not under Communist leadership. On December 5th all the, Socialist journalists resigned from the nominally independent television ser- vice, on the ground that programmes were censored to favour Communists. Despite their early successes, how- ever, the Communists seem to have made little headway in the country as a whole. Their support in opinion polls has hovered between 15 and 18 per cent, although the vast reserve of uncommitted votes makes any firm prediction impossible. Traditional anti- communism runs so deep in the country- side, particularly among smallholders in the north, that the Portuguese Demo- cratic Movement has now been launched on a new career, as a political party in its own right, designed to attract voters who night otherwise shy away from the hammer and sickle. The Communists' anxiety about the possible outcome of the March elec- tion has made them concentrate on strengthening their position outside the party system. Their trump card is un- doubtedly their control of the unions, and the power this gives them to slow down inflation or let it rip. For that reason alone both the Socialists and the Popular Democrats insist they have no alterna- tive to continuing their coalition with the Communists after the election. But meanwhile both of them are trying to set up rival trade union organisations of their own. The Socialists claim sup- port from 18 unions, compared with the Communists' 22, but most of them are in small industries. Anyway, the Socialists' advance seems to have been largely made by their own left wing, which, together with maoist and other extreme-left parties, has been exploiting discontent about the wage-restraint policy followed by the Communists. The Popular Democrats have so far only an embryonic union organisation; they reckon it will take three or four e price of moderation o unless the Socialists and opular mocrats change their line, it 1 oks as the Communists will still be in the overnment after March. But at price. f they continue to preach wage re traint, ey stand to lose much of their hold ver the unions to less resp nsible arties. And the Socialists and opular emocrats are using the threat f their thdrawal from the goverment which inevitably bring about its fall, as po erful moderating influen a over he C mmunists. Indeed, the ec nomic Ian hose publication .is expec ed any ay n w stops very far short, ac ording o firs reports, of laying the foun ations f a s ialist society. Tr , the plan is said to inclu a pro- sal for the nationalisation f key ndus ies, including oil .and stee . True, t att cks the 20 or 30 famili s that have dominated much of Po ugal's und; ev'.oped indus~r ial bas . But along icie tale state sector it ap arently pr p ses to set up a competitive private secto based on principles tha would war any capitalist's heart: n inter- venti n to rescue lame ducks; the re- orga 'cation and amalgamat on of small scale firms into effectiv com- petiti e units; and an open oor to forei investment. These ideas re one good test of the government' inten- tions. If they have been watere down when the plan finally appears, or left out a together, that will show wh ch way thew d is blowing. Communists can hardly b happy with he plan as it was described to'your corre pondent. Yet their leader, Senhor Cun al, is all reasonableness. " We can conti ue to co-operate with th bour- geois parties for as long as is n cessary to c nsolidate the freedom e won on_ ril 25th. And we must co operate afte ards." Marxism, it seems should live ide by side with capitali m -after all. ut that hardly squares wi h what Senh r Cunhal has to say a out the dicta orship of the proletariat: Di atorship is the role of a class. n Britain bo geois democracy is the dictator ip of the bo geoisie. Dictatorship of the pr letariat is I Inve ing in the army We now the difference betwe n bour- geois and people's democraci s. The shee 's clothing seems thread are. So why year it? Because plainly t e Com- muni ts' strength in the union is not enou to give them real po er. The lesso the disaster in Chiles ems to have taught every Communist party in west rn Europe is that power lie neither in th ballot box, nor even with o ganised labo r, but in the army; and it !is to the arm that the Portuguese Co unist part has turned as a long-te invest- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000100440001~PYRGHT but stable junta in Portugal, with its nuisance value to the western alliance, to a precarious Allende-type leap for socialism which might call the whole concept of detente into doubt. And Sanhor Cunhai, who leads the most unreconstructed Communist party in western Europe, is not likely to be deaf to the interests of the Soviet Union. The stories one hears in Lisbon say thai the Communist party made its decision to infiltrate the army early in the 19~Os. Whether teat is true or not, the Communists were closely involved in the planning of the April coup, notabl}~ at a meeting with some radical army officers at Monte do Sobraa in September last year. Those officers now dominate the Co-ordinating Committee, the guiding body of the Armed Farces Movement. The social and political ideas of men such as Brigadier Goncalves, the prime minister, and Brigadier Carvalho, the military gover- nor of Lisbon, can only be described as marxist. But although these men control some important units, such as Copcon, the internal security force of commandos and paratroops, they do not dominate the whole of the armed forces. The majority of Portuguese officers aze, as in most armies, largely apolitical, imbued only with a vague commitment to democracy and an instinctive hostility to communism. It was to this group that President Spinola was chiefly aiming his appeal on September 28th for a "silent majority" to check the leftward drift of events, and it was these moderate officers' failure to respond that finally overthrew him. But most of them are still around the place, and next time they might not be so lethargic in their willingness to trust the Co-ordinating Committee. The real Spinolists have been all but eliminated from the army in the purges that followed September 28th, and General Spinola himself has been re- tired after the retirement age was azbit- rarily lowered to 62 (he is 64). But most moderates in uniform have been left. almost untouched, presumably because the Co-ordinating Committee feels it would be too dangerous to take ther.i on, The election is still scheduled for Mardi, although it could be delayed a month at the behest of the Communists. So far the radicals on the Co-0rdinating Committee have confined themselves to discouraging the one major party that stands outside the government, the moderately conservative Centre Democrats. A large vote for the Centre Democrats in March would be a grave embarrassment to the radicals both in and nut of uniform. The half-silenced opposition One form this discouragement takes is the late arrival of the army an the scene, sometimes apparently. deliberately, when -the Centre Democrats' meetings are attacked by left-~~~ing extremists. Two big rallies, and several smaller meetings, have been broken up in this way; on one occasion it took soldiers three -hours to arrive. The Centre Demo- crats' leader, Professor Freitas do Amaral,- has suspended some plans for future rallies. And no more than lip- service is paid to the principle of equal time on the. air by the broadcasting services, which have largely managed to avoid mentioning the Centre Demo- crats. General Fabiao and the army's moderates seem mildly disturbed about this. On December 6th they secured, for the first time, a plenary session of the Armed Forces Movement, which is thought to contaui a moderate majority, to consider decisions taken on its behalf by the Co-ordinating Committee. No- thing dramatic seems to have happened, but the Fact that the meeting took place at all reaffirms the principle of the sup- remacy ofthe plenary meeting. The test. is likely to come over the question of what rose the Armed Forces Movement intends to play in the con- stitution-making process after the Mazch election. Some disturbing noises have been coming from the Co-ordinating. Committee. Its Information Bulletin had an editorial on November 26th with distinctly anti-democratic overtones: 'The state of repression to which the working. class has been subjected, especially in the countryside, and its limited understanding of its own condition of repression and exploitation, mean that it could be manipulated in an electoral process for which the necessary political experience is lacking. The article concluded that the AFM "will have to guazantee ...that the new constitution is imbued with the same progressive spirit as (the AFM's] programme". The only democratic vote is a vote for our ideas? Major Vitor Alves, the minister responsible for defence and information, put it even more bluntly at a press con- ference in London on November 15th; he admitted it might be necessary to act against the constituent assembly "if the people press for it". In this he evidently differs from General Fabiao, for whom another military intervention would be "ts fall into the sterile game of low politicking, revolution following counter- revolution". It remains to be seen whether the Co-ordinating .Committee will heed General Fabiiio's warning when the time comes. An economic crisis and industrial unrest could provide Major Alves with his excuse. 14f` the present coalition survives next .year's elections, the Communists' Ionger- term hopes will rest on a steady increase in the power of the radicals in the army at the. expense of the moderates. The other parties hope the moderates will prevail, and the army withdraw from politics. General Spinola is due to pro- duce another book before the election which may be the same sort of rallying- point for moderates as his "Portugal and the Future" was for those who wanted to get Portugal out of Africa. The struggle within the Armed Forces Movement could yet spill out into the open again. For the forces of modera- tion ~ are stronger than General Spinola had reason to fear they were on September 28th. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000100440001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000100440001-7 CPYRGHT =PROGRESSIVE JANUARY 1975 VOLUME 39 NUMBER 1 t~auncled iri 1009 tw Robert h1, t.af ullette, Sr. Comment 1 he Editors and /udith Miller, Charles Conconi, 7homvs Lond, 5 Portugal's Half Revolution Christopher /ones 34 and Edtvin Newman The Word from Washington 12 Portugal; The Chile Treatment? Tami Hultman, Charles Ebel, oifd Reed Kramer 37 The Food Monopolies Daniel hverdliny 13 Now the Blood !_ouis A. Perez /r. 40 Exporting Food Monopolies Duniel /. Bulz 18 Whose First Amendment? Lewis ~l', K~olfson 42 Reflections: On Justice for the Palestinians ! F Stone 20 Movies: Eleven Ten-Best Kenneth Turon 47 . . Washington's World Blueprint Gary hlucf oin 22 Books Reviews by Richard /. Barnet and Robert Manning 49 Letters 56 The Politics of Population 25 /udith Miller Index for 1974 60 Persian Gulf: The Sub-Empires Burry Rubin 30 End Game /zichurd Lipez 66 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000100440001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000100440001-7 Fascism has ended after fifty years, CPYRGHT but what has begun? Portugal : The Half Revolution CHRISTOPHER JONES Last April's military coup d'etat, motivated initially by the concern of a group of officers for their own prestige, has been transformed into half a revolution, a young communist soldier told me in Lisbon recently. The political forces released by the termination of the Salazar-Gaetano regimes revealed themselves to be surprisingly strong. The people-of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola, as well as Portugal-have already carried the Armed Forces Movement and the governing junta further than they had planned to go before the elections scheduled for nextMarch. General Antonio de Spinola was appointed president at the time of the coup because of his "progressive" outlook on the resolution of Portugal's colonial problem; he hoped the colonies would federate -with Portugal but they pre- ferred independence. He saw his federalist ideas be- come obsolete and himself deposed in five months, buried by history catching up to itself in a rush. The Portuguese Communist Party is to be credited, to a large degree, for the progressive surge felt throughout the. country. After the April 25 coup, that party finally saw the fruits of fifty years of clandestine struggle. The communists are solid in the industrial belts around Lisbon and Porto, in the freshly purged unions in all sectors, and among the rural workers in the south. In a country of ten million inhabitants, the party has more than 500,000 inscribed members. The Socialist Party, headed by Mario Soares, is also strong, and the only other party of importance is the liberal Peoples Democratic Party. The Right has only recently he~un to organize inten- sit~cly. At first, each r~~~;ion,~l or? indusu ial strongman n~lievc~d ~l,al h~: cocl.i iurni a her=,,~z~al party. Union is t,ein~, torcccl ul;.,u thcr7~ by the realizt~tion that much more sophisticated political structures and techniques will be necessary to erode-the Left's solid base. The Right has also been under siege by the Left and Center, charged with plotting the assassination of President Spinola, in one of a number of crises that led to his resignation in September. But the ebb and flow, of the fortunes of the various factions making up Portu- gal's "half a revolution" are only the surface manifes- tations of the workings of a complex society suddenly freed from two generations of repression by an iron dictatorship. The social fabric of Portugal is composed of ex- tremes. At one extreme is a large mass of people still encumbered by a feudal heritage; at the other are several of the largest fortunes in the world. Between them, and demanding more elbow room, is a dynamic left movement based in the poorly developed industrial sector. Taken together, they make an explosive mix- ture. The ingredients of this mixture can be identified in various ways, but some clear distinctions are those among the cities and the towns and the vi{lages. There are only two cities, Lisbon and Porto, of one million and five hundred thousand inhabitants respec- tively. In the planning stages of the April coup d'etat, the Armed Farces Movement considered only objec- tives in the Lisbon and Porto areas, correctly assuming that the provinces w~n~ld fullow if the urban centers felt. The two areas a!?c? tlTC: country's heart and lungs, the centers of wealth and culern?e. They are also the centet?s of cholera, because of the bnirr?os cfe lata (shanty towns) which encircle them. Lisbon is physically charming, built low on a series of hills-a profile broken only -?ecerniy by the towering mew Sheraton Hotel. The life of the city is ti:at of any large city which has existed for millenia--l.-nfathum- able. Traditional social life goes on in closed circlca Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000100440001-7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000100440001-7 ~PYRGHT within rigid social classes, making a web of nearly impenetrable complexity. In early September, Lisbon was bustling with com- merce and politics, the prostitutes had taken to the streets, and the traditional fado singers were still holding forth in the old quarters for the benefit of tourists and the rich. In a small club for poets and artists, the habitues ignored a Maoist attack and con- tinued singing satirical songs about the leaders of the Left. Downtown, a musical called Liberdade, Liberdade introduced the anomaly of revolutionary theater for the upper classes into one more Western country. With censorship gone, only erotic or politically ori- ented films were to be found. These were the top ten best sellers in Lisbon bookstores: three works of Lenin; an expose of the fascist secret police; histories of Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique by their respective nationalist liberation movements; Toward Victory, by the secretary-general of the Communist Party, Alvaro Cunhal; The Resistance in Portugal; a book on Albania; and an expose of 1'arrafal, the infamous political prison on Cape Verde. September 4-11 was the Week of Solidarity with the Chilean People. In Lisbon, ten thousand people squeezed into the ancient Sports Palace to demonstrate that solidarity. Inside, the balconies were draped with red-and-green Portuguese flags with the green half partly folded out ~f sight, and banners with slogans like: Allende nao morreu (Allende didn't die); o Chile Verdes! (Chile will be victorious), and the. Chilean slogan, which the Portuguese have adopted as their own-El pueblo unido fames sera vencido/0 povo unido jamais sera veitcido (The people united will never be defeated). The crowd was composed not only of students and intellectuals; there were also steelworkers, secretaries, bus drivers, and bank clerks. It was not a demonstration of intellectual convictions. The participants knew through gut experience the meaning of imperialism, and knew as well that the Chilean tragedy could tomorrow be their own. Though the new- freedoms are a source of joy and strength for many, for others they are traumatic. Not everyone was prepared to shout slogans in the street which only yesterday would have been considered high treason against the state and cause for torture and imprisonment. Of this the city police are the most visible examples. Though they Formally adhered to the program of the Armed Forces Movement, their subse- quent attitude has been: ' `If the Armed Forces now dictate law, let them worry about order as \\~cli." With arms tressed they have w~;r~l~~d caps bcinb stolen, arung arrly w~li~~r~ i:a-~ssnrca icy indignant bystanders. The resis.t;~r~ce ro chsr~t,~; }s even more apparent when one }eaves the cities for the interrrrediate commnnit}es, the town.:;. Figueira da Foz, like many Portuguese caastal to\y'TrS, depends. orr the f=?hin~; and touurist industries for survival. Each evening at sunset, ~ large fleet of sardine boats chugs out of the river p rt and over the horizon, to return at daybreak low in the water with the weight of the catch. The tourist trade functions only in the mo the of July, August, and September. Then the area's opula- tiorr jumps from 10,000 to 100,000, the hotels in t e new quarter spring to life, and the casino is jamme every night. One resident described the local popula ion as "lower middle-class people who put on upper-class airs for the summer season." But there are surprises. As I sat eating codfl~h in a local restaurant, a plump little boy came in to j rn his fam}ly with a portable record player under his arm. A few minutes later we were all treated to his usical preference-The Internationale. Cacao Biscaia is a painter and schoolteacher w o was considered undesirable by "right-thinking" ociety under the old regime. Since April 25 he hasi been elected to the city council. Cacao declared that for four years he had been a member of the clandestine' Com- munist Party. He has been a good friend of mire for five years, and I never knew. He is one among many. The journalist, the s rdine fisherman, the shop owner-all had limited them elves to such cryptic comments as, "It's not good," co cern- ing the then reigning fascist regime. But all belon ed fo a web which has now surfaced. The Communist Party occupies an eight-room headquarters in Figuei~?a da Foz, just down the street from the Socialist !Party headquarters and across from the Portuguese emo- cratic Movement-the old anti-fascist front roue. The prime barrier to change, however, is the (reluc- tance of a large part of the population to get involved. One wonders how many times the. advice of Sellnhot?a Dias to her daughter has been repeated in the small stone houses of Figueira da Foz: "Don't get mixed up in politics. We've always been able to eat. Besi es, if they succeed in doing something, we'll be efit." The marks of fifty years of fascism will not disc pear overnight. But if there is a noticeable difference in the political climate of the cities and that of the towns, them is a vast gulf between both and the villages. Alguber is a small village in the Extremadura rep ion. Its only links with the outside world are the twice-daily buses which wind down the small road into the v (ley, then turn and wind back out after stopping in Alguber. There is no through road. There are no newspa~ ers, television, running water, or adequate sanitary facili- ties. The bucket-flushed tc;ilets drain onto the; dirt streets and down the hil} on which il-re few dozen hciuses are built. But the vi11aF=,ers arc proud. As Maria. Helena ays: "~'Ve are just th