FEATURES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000100760001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 15, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1C10b
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Some Problems in the International Communist Movement
One of the factors which hinders a policy of determined
attack upon imperialism is the division within the world revolu-
tionary and communist movement. First of all, the conflicts
between the USSR and China.
Matters in this regard have deteriorated in the past year.
Currently China and the USSR are confronting each other
more bitterly and harshly than they are confronting Yankee imper-
ialis. Generally speaking, they have better relations with the
capitalist governments than they have between themselves.
China has passed from ultraleftist verbalism to a "real-
ism" in foreign policy which has led it to reach understandings
and improve its relations with a series of governments, including
some of the most reactionary. It is relying on this method to
offset the policy of encirclement and military pressure which
the USSR in turn is pursuing with regard to China. The Soviet
obsession with the challenge of China leads it to such extremes
even as maintaining diplomatic relations with the Yankee puppet
Lon Nol, and not recognizing the government of Sihanouk. At
the meeting which was held in Brussels in May by the Committee
of the Assembly of Public Opinion on European Security, the
delegations from various socialist countries (the USSR, German
Democratic Republic, and others) proposed that China be condemned
as the main enemy of peace in Europe (while there was not even
any criticism of Yankee imperialism). This foolish action was
prevented by a resounding negative from the representatives of
the Communist Parties of Italy, France, Belgium, and Spain. Dur-j
ing the course of these discussions, which were private, one
could sense something which seemed to me incredible: a stubborn
insistence on naming China as the number one enemy, and to give
an anti-Chinese aspect to the European security policy.
This aggravation of the Chinese-Russian conflict allows
the Yankee imperialists to maneuver to make the conflict between
the two main socialist powers more bitter on both sides. This
advantage to the imperialists is noted even by individuals with
the least-possible political background. However, there has
been no evidence either from the Soviet or the Chinese side of
any kind of initiative to attempt to break this vicious circle,
to change the trend, at least to reduce the tension, to pave
the way toward the improvement of matters.
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The serious thing, apart from the conflict as such, is
the total lack of attempts, of efforts to find new channels,
new solutions. To invent a proper way, as Marxists withinf'
socialism, to deal with the upsurge of a very serious conflict
between two states which have brought about the socialist devo-
lution.
Instead of this, the conflict is developing along tte
most typical channels of the old kind of politics, and so ire see
how they are seeking support even from the imperialist nat.ons.
Given this reality, which should not be denied, we wonder hat
revolutionary consideration explains that things should pr~ceed
thus? Is it of interest perhaps to the workers class in China
or that in the USSR? Not at all. Is the Chinese or the Soviet
revolution perhaps benefited, not to seek a world revolution?
Simply asking the question gives the answer. In fact, it is a
conflict between two great powers, two states which oppose; each
other as such.
The root of this sad reality lies without a doubt i the
predominant role which the state plays today in the socialist
countries (at least the more powerful ones), to the detriment of
the party's own role, as the party: in other words, as a,van-
guard of the workers class, of the masses, as the conscio s van-
guard of historical progress, as the motive force of the process
which should lead to the transition to communism, to the ,orld
socialist revolution. The theoretical aspects have been taken
up in the report by Comrade Santiago Carrillo on the draf pro-
gram. In the conflict between the USSR and China, this p oblem
presents itself in acute form to all communists, all revo ution-
aries. Via paths which have been very different, and by means
of forms which are also very different today, we nonetheless
find ourselves faced with this problem of diffusion of th party
and the state as the tool of power. This distortion of tie
essence of socialism, with the limitation or elimination of
socialist democracy (at least with regard to the basic po itical
questions, which are resolved by a small nucleus of leads s) is
the reason that the role and the weight of the workers cl ss, of
the ..masses, is reduced and narrowed, being limited to secondary
?ara:a-s.. The state op the other hand, with all that every state
(even if it is socialist) has of presocialist aspect, of apital-
ist vestiges (as Lenin explained with full clarity) is pr,dom-
inating and imposing itself. To a process of bureaucratization
internally, is added regression in revolutionary attitudes,
externally. Events such as the recent election of the coarades
who head the diplomatic, army, and security services to the
Political Bureau of the CPSU seem good examples to me. Flow
worrisome'the trend to exalt the role of a single i?ndividiual
as a party or state leader is.
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Within this framework, there emerge in the foreign
policies of the great socialist powers aspects, and they are
not secondary ones, with which we are not in agreement, because
we believe that they are inconsistent with the demands of the
revolutionary struggle. We reiterate our total support of the
efforts of the USSR to guarantee peace and coexistence. We
understand the, extraordinary value of the conversations of Com-
?rade Brezhnev'with Nixon to this end. We also understand why
the USSR and other socialist countries seek to reach agreements
on commercial and economic cooperation, etc., with capitalist
countries, in order to raise the standard of living of their
peoples, to accelerate their development, etc.
The point of disagreement does not lie here. It arises
when, in the implementation of this policy, there is de facto
acceptance of the prospects for a political and social status
quo in the world, as if this were the natural consequence of
peaceful coexistence, while in our view, and this was set forth
by the 1969 Conference, they are two completely different things.
In the third point of the principles for USSR-U.S. rela-
tions signed by Brezhnev and Nixon in May of 1972 in Moscow, it
says that the two countries "should do everything in their power
to prevent the development of conflicts or situations which will
aggravate international tensions," a point which represents a
serious step, in our view, toward a policy of political and social
"status quo."
In a study on predictions for the future drafted by Comrade
Inosentsev, a leading figure in the Soviet delegation to the 1969
Conference (the study was presented as an address in Varna in
October 1972), three hypotheses for the development of western
Europe in the coming period were set forth. But none of them
included the possibility of some change of a socialist nature,
or even the end of fascism in any European country, and this when
the study was concerned particularly with the Mediterranean, the
area in which the greatest tensions in the future years are
expected to be focused. In other words, there are three possi-
bilities, with greater or lesser expansion of relations with the
east contemplated, but within a capitalist system as stable in
the west as socialism is in the east.
In connection with the recent visit of Comrade Brezhnev
to the United States, we had the opportunity of reading an
.article by a Soviet journalist,"Melor Stouroua, of the Novosti
Agency in the Paris newspaper Le Monde for 19 June 1973. Some
quotations from it are worth noting. "Attracted by these pros-
pects, the large American businesses such as General Electric,
International Business Machines, General Motors, etc., are signing
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contracts with the Sovietorganization. The financial giants
of the United States, such as Rockefeller's Chase Manhattan Bank,
the Bank of America, and the U.S. Export-Import Bank are estab-
lishing branches in Moscow. These gentlemen from Chase ,
Manhattan are proud of having offices in Moscow at the following
address -- No 1 Karl Marx Square. Is this not symbolic?
"Here, too, we see the transition from quantitative
changes to q-u'alitative ones. In the addresses he delivered dur-
ing his visit to the German Federal Republic, Leonid Brezhnev
spoke of the prospects for economic cooperation between the'
socialist countries and the capitalist countries over some
decades. Some of my colleagues in the west think of repiaci~ng
the "system of nuclear hostages" with a system of economic
hostages. I dislike the expression "system of hostages." $t is
in bad taste. But the idea as such is good."
This article sets forth the basically anti-socialist
thesis, suggesting that on a given level, the economic agre ments
with the USSR are a guarantee, "with hostages," against social-
ism, for the big fish in the capitalist world. The serious;
thing is that this can be said using quotations from leader of
the CPSU. However naive we might be, we cannot attribute such a
text to the enthusiasm or originality of the journalist.
With attitudes of this sort, wherein revolution disa pears
from the horizon in the foreign policy of the major social-i -t
countries, along with the other factors to which we have referred,
we arrive at the following contradictions: faced with the ver
more obvious crisis in imperialism, the communist parties w ich
are in power in the most-powerful countries are adopting de en-
sive attitudes in contrast with the requirements of the anti-
imperialist battle. Thus we are surprised to see that Sovit
and Chinese journalists keep silent.. about a case like Water ate,
that cancer of the Nixon team which reveals all of the putt -
faction of the Yankee imperialism.
When the main leaders in these countries speak of in~er-
national problems, they do so generally only as statesmen.
They do not express any combative vanguard thinking about t e
world struggle against imperialism. Theirs are ideas and w rds
almost always subjugated to diplomatic considerations, and hus
they do not reach the revolutionaries-. There is an enormou
chasm between the potential of the material media and the p ten-
tial. of revolutionary thinking. I
Although I have thus far stressed a series of negati e
aspects, which we cannot overlook, it would be one sided and
absurd to believe that this is the basic thing. Impressive
advances have been made in the world revolutionary movement]
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(and I said this at the beginning), and without a doubt others
are coming to fruition. The progress in detente represents a
basic factor in-changing the situation to the benefit of the
anti-imperialist forces. Thus more favorable conditions for
unity among and an offensive by the anti-imperialist forces are
being created. And it is because the real framework today is
thus that thee negative factors mentioned are so regrettable.
The PCE continues to support, perhaps even more today than
yesterday, a stubborn and tireless struggle for unity of action
on the part of all the communist and workers parties. To achieve
this it is necessary to utilize all situations which may emerge
from unity, the unity of all, even though they be very limited
to begin with. And at the same time we must avoid everything
which can be reflected in a crystallization of division, in in-
flaming tensions.
In this connection, we want to note here, giving them our
fullest support, the words spoken by Comrade Le Duan, secretary
general of the Workers Party in Vietnam, during his trip to a
number of socialist countries, in favor "of closer solidarity
among the brotherly socialist countries and within the inter-
national communist movement, on the basis of Marxism-Leninisn
and proletarian internationalism, and in a fashion consistent
with reason and judgement."
It is true that the horizon seems dark today. But we are
persuaded that in the longer run, the revolutionary changes
which have already come about, with the elimination of the
exploiter classes, are creating a foundation such that what
unites the socialist countries will be greater than what separates
them. What separates them is rooted in yesterday. What unites
them, what will unite them, belongs to tomorrow. And in one way
or another, although not automatically, the anti-imperialist
and socialist changes in other parts of the world will contribute
too.
We will continue to make our modest contribution in every
way that we can to the struggle to overcome conflicts and advance
toward unity, against imperialism, among all the communist
parties.
It is necessary to work with enthusiasm, with tenacity,
in order to achieve a world front of all the anti-imperialist
forces.
At the same time, we believe it essential to promote the
most serious debates possible among comrades within Marxism con-
cerning the problems of our movement, without concealing our
critical views, and in particular discussion of the negative
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phenomena which have emerged in the historic shaping of our
but tothem.
opartyovercome
theory, and which must be stu~~e one n specific order
all
This is of interest not only
the parties.
It is clear, therefore, that the PCE is in favor of meet-
ings and discussions, of gatherings and conferences, on princi-
ple. We favor' everything which may encouarge more collective
debates and discussions in the search for joint action. We
believe that a certain "decentralization" of the unity process
is needed today, in other words bilateral gatherings, meetings
of parties which havve common problems and more similar situations.
But our continuinj concern is to contribute to the unity of all''
the parties, of the movement as a whole.
We should mention a proposal which if indeed it is not
of a formal nature, is beginning to be discussed. This is the
proposal that a new international conference of communist and
workers parties be held. An article by Comrade Telalov,
secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party, urging such a
conference, has been published in the Revista Internacional.
On the-other hand, Comrade A. 'Kotlov has published an art cle in
the:Sovi:et-periodical Political' Self-education which in rather
di?reZt.?f,o:rm urges such a conference.
How is the concept of anew conference of this sort jus4
tified? The new thing (in comparison to that held in 1969,
which was focused on the idea of unity of action among the
parties) is that now there is an insistence on ideological
cohesion. Now then, cohesion about what? If we read the articles
,
by Comrades Telalov and Kotlov, if we study some of the recent !
documents or texts of the parties in the socialist countries, I
we see an unmistakeable desire to return to the positions which
were explicitly or implicitly placed in the past in 1969.
For example, the idea that "the touchstone of internati?n-
alism is the attitude toward the CPSU," or the concept to the
effect that the CPSU plays "vanguard role" in our movement arel
being increasingly repeated, even in official communiques such
as that signed by Comrades Brezhnev and Honecker in Berlin.
At the same time, the intention to condemn the Communist
Party of China emerges with growing clarity. Comrades Telalov
and Kotlov, in more or less the same terms, demand cooperation
among the parties in the struggle against the Chinese Communist
Party.
To believe that the path toward overcoming division is'
urging the parties to pursue a systematic campaign againsChina
is a completely distorted view of reality. It means trying o
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utilize the communist movement to promote a conflict between
states. This leads-not to unity but to more acute division.
It is one thing to criticize the Chinese comrades when
one disagrees with something they do. Naturally, there is justi-
fication for?,this. And we have condemned their conduct in their
relations with Franco. But it would be something very different
to plunge into a campaign of anathema against the Chinese Commun-
ist Party. The PCE (and we know that many other parties think"
the same) refuse and will continue to refuse to embark on any
such anti-Chinese campaign. Unfortunately, the negative phenom-
enon we see in the policy of the Communist Party of China, above
all, in its international activities, are not isolated or un-
usual examples. We see them in other cases with perhaps less
historical justification.
A conference to rally a series of parties around the CPSU
and to condemn the Chinese Communist Party would make no contribu-
tion to unity. Quite the contrary. In 1969 (this was one of
the most positive aspects of this conference) the independence
and equality of the parties was stressed. It was specifically
stated that there is no "leading center." And in practice, the
right of the parties to have their own positions, differing from
that of the CPSU, on such important questions as intervention in
Czechoslovakia and attitude toward the Chinese Communist Party,
was accepted.
A conference held now would tend to cancel out these posi-
tive advances made in 1969, as Comrade Telalov very clearly
explained. He accuses the parties which insisted on their inde-
pendence of "nationalism." He says that unity should be "organic"
as well as political and ideological. And that it is necessary
."for the policy of the parties to be drafted and coordinated
collectively." This means returning to a "center." But under
what conditions? It is frivolous to think that the parties in
power today will "collectively draft" their policy with other
parties. This is unrealistic. In fact, it is a way of urging
(and the article as a whole confirms this) a return to the prac-
tices of unconditional endorsement of the CPSU.
Under these conditions, to set about preparing for a new
conference now, far from contributing to creating an atmosphere
of unity, would be to cause differences and divisions to arise
and to inflame them.
Having said, we reassert our position in favor of inter-
national conferences in principle. We see how the idea of unity
in diversity, essential today, is advancing. What is growing
and developing, above all, there where the struggle is being
waged, is not unconditional endorsement. It is the trend toward
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independence for the parties, and true internationalism. An
ch as the Workers Party of Vietnam has extraordinary
l
e su
examp
We are certain that in
tion
value and weight in this connec
. the more or less long run, favorable conditions will be created
for.holding a conference which will represent a step toward
unity. We will support it with enthusiasm.
We regard the charge of "nationalist narrowness" made
against those of our parties which insist on "independence" as'
,)entirely unjust. This insistence is dictated precisely by our'
desire to struggle with greater efficiency today for the unity;
among the parties and all the anti-imperialist forces. This
insistence is dictated by our internationalist concern, in view
of the realities in a world which, as it is now, is not as we
would wish it to be. We have the specific experience of aggres-
sion of which we have been the victim, and from which we continue
to suffer, thanks to the manipulations of Lister and Eduardo
Garcia (now divided, but continuing to receive aid for the pur-
pose of attacking us) and other groups. And it is indicative,;
and not a happenstance, that at the same time as this new fact on
has come to the fore now in Valencia and Madrid, openly taking
an anti-Soviet stance, at the same time it is proposing unity to Lister's
group, to that of Eduardo Garcia and so-called "pro-Chinese," etc., for the
purpose of uniting more forces in order to struggle against the PCE. Ex-
perience shows that the choice today is as follows:
Either an independent party such as ours is (which for
this very reason can become the effective leader of the r-evolu;-
tion in its own country, and can then be truly internationalist;.
or
A series of little parties condemned to be manipulated by
external pressures, as a function among other things of the
conflicts between socialist states, doomed to be a fertile field
for all kinds of degeneration, and useless for the purposes of
the revolution.
We must see the somewhat contradictory conditions u~which the forms of proletarian internationalism present themselves
today. On the one hand, we have a basic objective need to raise
internationalism to a higher level, as a function of historic;
changes themselves. The international nature of the workers
class is today clearer and stronger than in the past. The ph -
nomenon of multinational enterprises is strengthening it still.
further. The interrelation among the various struggles in the
various countries against movementiof solidarity with'Vietnaml
everr, . The e e exaamplle e of the
is eloquent.
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But in the current stage, with 14 socialist nations and
an acute conflict among them, the forms of internationalism must
keep their distance with regard to the problems of state.
They must keep this distance not with a view to rupture,
but precisely the contrary, in order to avoid a break. So that'
the Communist ,Party, the communist movement, can play a role in
the directioiir'-of overcoming division and contributing to the
unity of all of the socialist and anti-imperialist forces on a
world scale.
Without a doubt, a temporary situation is involved. When
socialism reaches a higher level in its historical maturing, when
there is greater distance and more radical separation from the
capitalist vestiges which still weight it down, internationalism
will be able to take on much higher forms which are today impossi-
ble.
As to the advance of internationalism, on key questions
and points in the battle against imperialism and capitalism we
can today set forth achievements and prospects which are very
positive and far reaching.
We recall how forcefully Comrade Santiago Carrillo urged,
in his report to our Central Committee in September of 1970,
the need to establish closer relations with the Communist Parties
of Western Europe in order "to coordinate the class struggle on
a European scale in all those aspects imposed upon us by reality
today." He urged establishing contacts among the communist
parties, the socialist parties, trade unions, Christian and
Catholic and other groups, with.a view to common action on a
continental scale.
"If there were no other reasons," Carrillo said in 1970,
"the very trend of the European monopolies and the concrete steps
they have taken would reveal to the working masses of Europe,
and first of all to the communist parties, the need to draft a
common strategy with regard to the situation created for us by
European capitalist development." "It is a matter of opposing
the intentions of the monopolies and giving consistency to the
prospects for a democratic and socialist Europe."
We have worked in this direction with intensity, first of
all in our relations with the Communist Parties of Europe. At
the same time we have established contacts with various social-
ist parties, contacts which we believe have contributed to the
more combative attitude adopted against the Franco regime today
by the Social Democrats of Europe. On various levels, we have
held talks with the Socialist Parties of Great Britain, France,
Italy, Sweden, Belgium, etc.
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Parallel with this, similar concepts have matured within
the most influential Communist Parties of Western Europe. We
want to stress the first level importance of the Marehais-!
Berlinguer interview and the communique of the Communist Parties
of Italy and Prance, followed in recent months by a series of
other communiques issued by European parties which agree on the
need for closer collaboration. We are entering into a new stage
in the communist movement of western Europe, with the specific
prospect of articulated actions on the part of the Communist
Parties concerning key problems. These include; for example:
Struggle against the fascist regimes, and at the same time
against authoritarian tendencies and against neofascism, and for
the defense and development of democracy.
Coordination of the class struggle against the multi-
national monopolies, and defense of immigrant workers.
Struggle for a system of European security, against the
foreign military bases, for disarmament and the elimination of
blocs.
Struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism, and
solidarity with the anti-imperialist struggles (Indochina,lCuba,
Korea, Chile, Arab peoples, etc.)
Concerning these problems and others further possib''lities
for unity are also arising with the socialist parties and heir
youth groups, with vast Christian forces and with the trad
union movement.
The establishment of the new European trade union center
(although the reformists predominate therein today) represents
an important step which may work to the benefit of the pro ess
of unity. It is our view that the revolutionary trade uni n
movement of western Europe, by joining this center, will f nd a
possibility for united struggle by the workers much superior to
the potential existing today. Without a doubt this will cr ate
problems. But it is necessary to resolve them with the un ted
struggle firmly in mind. It will be necessary to take sta d
on this matter. One basic task of the Communist Parties o
western Europe is. the joint drafting of a "standard image";of
what socialism can and should be in this part of the world; Our
greatest contribution to this task will be the draft program.
Thus I will not go into this subject. I will merely stress that
if this image of socialism adapted to our western European
societies is jointly set forth by the Communist Parties of
capitalist Europe, this gives us and will give us much gre4ter
strength.
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It goes without saying that a clearer expression by the
parties in the capitalist countries, far from being a hindrance,
will make it, possible to make a more effective contribution to
the unity of the whole of the movement, which continues to be
a basic goal. First of all, with a view to strengthening rela-
tions with the parties in the socialist countries, and similarly,
with the non-European parties, but those with very similar prob-
lems (and I am thinking above all of the Communist Parties of
Japan, Australia, Canada, and the United States).
One basic concern is to encourage solidarity, the inter-
nationalist unity of the European proletariat with the national
liberation movements, with the struggles of the peoples of Asia,
Latin America, and Africa, specifically the Arab peoples (par-
ticularly the people of Palestine) who continue to. be the victims
of the aggressive criminal policy of the leaders of Israel,
supported by the United States.
We as a party are faced with the need for a more deter-
mined struggle against the colonial policy of the Franco regime
in Africa. Our stands are very clear. We must recognize in
self-critical fashion that we are not doing enough to promulgate
them. The interview we had with the Moroccan Party of Liberation
and Socialism represented a positive step in this sector.
It is obvious, then, that the more dynamic stage on which
we are embarking where relations among the Communist Parties of
Western. Europe are concerned, in accordance with the requirements
of the class struggle in this part of the world, will make a
contribution to the unity of the whole of the communist movement
and all of the anti-imperialist forces.
IV. A Foreign Policy for the Spanish Opposition
In this-final portion, I shall discuss the crisis in the
foreign policy of the Franco regime, and the situation, to some
extent new, being created in terms of a much more offensive
oriented policy and activity on the part of the opposition forces
in the international field.
Commentaries on the recent change in government have
stressed the chain of accumulating failures, above all, in the
most recent period, in the foreign policy of the Franco regime.
In this realm, the need for a change, even from the point of view
of the interests of the capitalist class, is making itself urgently
felt.
The world today is experiencing (and this is recognized
by all, even from different and opposing angles) a profound change
in the system of international relations. Bipolarity, based on
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I SOUDARIDAD CON LOS 0B EROS
Y DEMOCRATAS C I E~f0~
ua
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Niumero 72
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CPYRGHT
SUMARIO
Comite de
.Redaction
Director:
Tras la experiencia chilena, Santiago Carrillo ......
3
S. Carrillo
Llamamiento del P.C.E.: iSolidaridad con los obreros
y democratas chilenos!
9
Redactor-jefe:
Jesus Izcaray
Comunicado sobre la reunion del Pleno del C.C. del
11
Santiago Alvarez
Partido Comunista de Espana ..................
Juan Diz
Ignacio Gallego
Sobre la Politica International del Partido. Informe
15
Juan Gomez
i
de M. Azcarate ante el C.C . ....................
ra
A. Elv
Federico Melchor
E. Marti
Jaime Encinas
Nuria Pla
El campo espafiol y el Pacto para la libertad. Inter-
vencion de S. Alvarez en el Pleno ..............
31
La huelga general de junio en Navarra ............
43
La gran batalla obrera de la Ria bilbaina. Koldo
55
Etxeberri ......................................
El Partido y la revolution (Respuesta a un camarada)
71
N
o 72
Wenceslao Roces ..............................
C
Madrid
uarto trimestre
Resolution poli.tica del II Congreso del P.C. de Galicia
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CPYRGHT "' "%"' "
ALGUNOS PROBLEMAS .
DEL MOVIMIENTO COMUNISTA
INTERNACIONAL
Una de los factores que frena una pols-
tica de ofensiva resuelta contra el impe-
rialismo, es la division dentro del movi-
miento revolucip'hario y comunista mun?
dial. En primer .termino, el conflicto en-
tre la URSS y China.
Las cosas, en ese orden, pan empeo?
rado en el ultimo aiio.
En la actualidad China y la URSS se
enfrentan de forma mas enconada, mas
dura, entre si que contra el imperialismo
yanqui. Tienen, por to general, mejores
relaciones con los gobiernos capitalistas,
que no entre ellas.
China ha pasado de un verhalicmn ul
ttaizquierdista a un erealismo;. en poli-
tica exterior que ]a Neva a entendersc,
a mejorar sus relaciones con una serie
de gobiernos, incluso los mas reacciona-
rios; confla en ese metodo para contra.
rrestar la politica de cerco, de presion
militar que, a su vez, realiza la URSS
con respecto a China. La obsesion de la
URSS por oponerse a China le lleva a
cxtremos como el de mantener au.n rela-
ciones diplomaticas con el pelele yanqui
Lon Nol y no reconocer al gobierno de
Shianuk. En la reunion que se celebro
en mayo en Bruselas, del Comite de la
Asamblea de la opinion publica por la
seguridad europea, las delegaciones de
varios passes socialistas (URSS, RDA y
otras) propusieron que se condenase a
China como principal enemigo de la
paz en Europa (mientras no se criticaba
siquiera al imperialismo yanqui). Seme-
jante desatino fue evitado por una nega-
tiva rotunda de los representantes de los
partidos comunista.s de Italia, Francia,
Belgica y Espana. En el curso de eras
discusiones -que eran privadas- pude
palpar algo que me parecsa increible: la
obstinacion por colocar a China como
enemigo numero uno; y por dar a la
politica de seguridad europea un signo
antichino.
Tal agravacion del enfrentamiento Chi-
na-URSS permite al imperialismo yan-
qui maniobrar, enconando de uno y otro
lado el conflicto entre las dos principa-
les potencias socialistas. Este beneficio
para el imperialismo lo constatan hasta
las personas con menos formaci6n poli-
tica. Sin embargo, no aparece, ni de parte
sovietica ni china, ningan tipo de inicia-
tiva para intentar salir del circulo vicioso,
cambiar la corriente, rebajar al menos
la tension, abrir un camino que mejore
las cosas.
Lo grave, ademas del conflicto en si,
es la ausencia total de ensayos, de inicia?
tivas para encontrar cauces nuevos, so-
luciones nuevas. Para inventar, como
marxistas, dentro del socialismo, una for-
ma propia de abordar el surgimiento de
un conflicto gravisimo entre dos Estados
que pan hecho la revolucion socialista.
En vez de eso, el conflicto se desarro-
lla per los cauces mas tipicos de la vieja
politica; y ass vemos como se buscan apo-
yos hasta en los Estados imperialistas.
vnlucu,n:,r~a i K~,Itra ... -r? , -- ..
do China (, lit! );t 1'11h:; !ate ni'i .
en cllo' En rnodo a11;ur.,,. A ,;j i,i t,.. -
luciiin mina o ~ovti ti, ;~ :r? lu n, fn ;:its
por no hal,lar de lci rev-nluci( ,n nindi.,l'
Basta pacer la pregunta para conte-tai
De hecho, es el conflicto de dos grancles
potencias, de dos Estados que se oponen
como tales Estados.
La raiz de esta triste realidad esta sin
duda en el papel predominante que des.
empcna hoy el Estado en los paises socia-
listas (al rnenos en los mas potentes),
en detrimento del papel propio del par-
tido, como tal partido: es decir, como
vanguardia de la clase obrera, de las ma-
sas, como vanguardia consciente del pro.
greso historico, como promotor del pro.
ceso que debe llevar al Paso al comunis-
mo, a la revolucion socialista mundial.
Los aspectos teoricos pan sido abordados
en el informe del camarada Santiago
Carrillo sobre el proyecto de Programa.
En el conflicto entre ]a URSS y China
ese problema se presenta de forma aguda
ante todos los comunistas, ante todos los
revolucionarios. A travel de caminos
que pan sido muy diferentes, y con for-
mas que son tambien boy muy diferen?
tes, nos encontramos sin embargo con
ese fenomeno de fusion del Partido y
del Estado, como instrumento de Poder.
Tal deformation de la esencia del socia?
lismo, con la limitation o supresion de
la democracia socialista (al menos con
respecto a las cuestiones political fun.
damentales, que or resueltas por un
pequefio nucleo de dirigentes) determina
que el papel y peso de la clase obrera,
de ]as masas, se reducen, se estrechan;
quedan reducidos a zonal secundarias,
En cambio, el Estado. con lo que todo
Estado (incluso cuando es socialista)
tiene de presocialista, de residuo capita.
lista (como to ha explicado Lenin con
toda nitidez), va predominando, se im?
pone. A un proceso de burocratizaci6n,
en 1o interior, se agregan retrocesos en
las attitudes revolucionarias, en lo exte
iior. Hechos como la reciente election
al Buro Politico del P.C.U.S de los ca-
maradas que son jefes de la diplomacia,
del Ejercito y de los servicios de seguri?
dad, me parecen paradigmaticos. Como es
preocupante la tendencia a la exaltaci6n
exclusiva del papel de una persona como
dirigente del Partido y del Estado.
En ese marco surgen, en la politica
exterior de las grander potencias socia-
listas, aspectos, y no secundarios, con
los que esfamos en desacuerdo, porque
creemos que contrarian ]as exigencias de'
la lucha revolucionaria.
Repetimos nuestro apoyo mas total a
los esfuerzos de la URSS en pro de la
paz y la coexistencia. Comprendemos el
valor extraordinario que, para taI obje-
tivo, tenen las conversaciones del cama-
rada Bresnev con Nixon. Comprendemos
tambien el que la URSS, y otros passes
socialistas, hagan acuerdos de coopera-
cion comercial, economica etc. con passes
capitalistas, para elevar el nivel de vida
de sus pueblos, acelerar su desarrollo etc.
El
do,
]a realization de esa politica, se
de hecho la perspectiva de un
quoa politico y social en el mundo
acepta
cstatu
como si fuese consecuencia natural de la
nos preguntamos: i ue consideration re- 11 coexistencia Pacifica; mientras, en nues-
 rer C RiMYA i %VAQ
mente distintas.
En el punto tercero de los ecprinci-
pios,b de las relaciones URSS-EE.UU.,
firmados por Bresnev y Nixon en mayo
1972 en Moscu., se dice que los dos paises
odeben hacer todo lo que este en su
poder Para que no se desarrollen conflic.
tos o situaciones que agraven las tensio-
nes internacionales>, punto que repre-
senta un paso grave, en nuestra opinion,
hacia una politica de por un sistema
de rehenes econdmicos. A mi no me gusta
la expresi6n asistema de rehenes::>: es de
mal gusto. Pero la idea en si misma es
justa>.
Este articulo expresa una tesis en esen-
cia antisocialista: que a un determinado
nivel, los acuerdos econdmicos con la
URSS son una garant]a,
Es cierto que hoy el horizonte aparece
cerrado. Pero estamos convencidos que,
a mas largo plazo, las transformaciones
revolucionarias ya operadas con la liqui-
dacion. de las clases explotadoras, crean
la base Para que sea mas to que une a
los paises socialistas, que no lo que les
separa. Lo que les separa esta enraizado
en el ayer. Lo que les une, lo que les
unira, viene del manana. Y a ello contri-
buiran tambien -de una -u otra manera,
no de forma automatica- los cambios
antiimperialistas y socialistas en otras
partes del mundo.
001-2CIpYRGHT
001-2
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Seguiremos poniendo de nuestra parte, division es el de empujar los partidos a CPYRGHT
modestamente, todo lo que podamos para una campafia sistematica contra China
la lucha por superar los conflictos y es una vision completamente deformada
avanzar hacia la unidad, contra el impe- de la realidad. Es querer servirse del
rialismo, de todos los Partidos Comunis? movimiento comunista en un conflieto
tas. entre Estados. Eso conduce, no a la uni
dad, sino a agravar la division.
Hace falta trahajar con .entusiasmo,
con tenacidad, para realizar un Frente Una cosa es criticar a los camaradas
Mundial de todas las fuerzas antiimperia- chinos cuando se esta en desacuerdo con
listas. algo que hacen. Desde luego hay moti-
A la vez, sin esconder nuestras opinio- vos pars ello. Y nosotros hemos Conde
e
nes criticas, creemgy esencial promover Franco. Fraco. s. Pero conducts algo en y las diferente con
un debate to mas Akio posible, de cama- rase a una npa serfa
ri
radas, dentro del marxismo, sobre los contra El r ariatemas
ade nuestro movimiento; y en conttra el P.C. chino. .
problemas Fists de Espana (y sabemos os que que lo mil
mis?
particular sobre los fenomenos negativos mo piensan otros muchos partidos) nos
surgidos en la plasmacion historica de negamos, y nos negaremos, a embarcar?
nuestra teoria, y que es preciso estudiar, nos en tal tipo de campafia antichina
para poder superarlos. El1o interesa, no Desgraciadamente, fenomenos negativos
solo a un partido concreto, sino a todos que vemos en la politica del PC chino.
los partidos.
sabre todo en su actividad international,
Esta claro, por lo tanto, que el Partido no son unicos, excepcionales. Los vemos
Comunista de Espana, en principlo, esta en otros casos quiza con menos justifica-
en favor de las reuniones y discusiones, ciones historicas.
de los encuentros, do las conferencias. Una Conferencia para agrupar en tor-
De todo cuanto pueda favorecer debates no al PCUS una serie de partidos y con-
y elaboraciones mas colectivas, la bus- denar al PC chino no seria ninguna con-
queda de acciones cornunes. Creemos tribucion a la unidad. Todo to contrario,
que hoy hate falta cierta del proceso unitario; es decir los tivos de dicha Conferencia) se destaco
encuentros bilaterales. las reuniones de la independencia e igualdad de los par-
partidos que tienen problemas comunes tides; se especifico que no hay