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Approved For Releas 99/09/02?: CIA= 79 "THE DEATH OF THE LATIN AMERICAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT", Alan Riding, World, 3 July 1973. CPYRGHT Because i needed to crush guerrilla movements, this article is not suited for replay in most countries. It is, however, a highly realistic appraisal of the birth and demise of the continental guerrilla movements and the reasons for their failure. It is essentially a call for a reasoned approach to alleviating social discontent and living conditions in those areas where guerrilla movements have heightened impatience for a better life. The main point is that nationalism can succeed where violent revolution fails. Approved For Release '1Q89/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-O1194AO 00860097-6 CPYRGHT FEATURES 4 World Progress Report 6 Curmudgeon-at-Large by Cleveland Amory 8 Top of the World by Goodman Ace 10 Diversions by Leo Roston 12 As I Was Saying by John Ciardi 14 Editorial by N.C. 15 Letters From Readers 16 Geoview by R. Buckminster Fuller 43 World Environment Newsletter 82 Light Refractions by Thomas H, Middleton PEACE AND POLITICS 18 Robert S. McNamara and the Wiser Use of Power by Stephen S. Rosenfeld The former defense secretary today preaches an international gospel-that the plight of the poor is inescapably the problem of the rich. 29 The Death of the Latin American Guerrilla Movement by Alan Riding Latin American guerrillas have been unable to seize power in any country other than Cuba. While the movement has failed, it has awakened oppressed sectors to the need for change. WORLD REPORTER 33 A Capitalist the Socialists Can Trust: An Interview With David Rockefeller by E. J. Kahn, Jr. 36 Those Soviet Teams: Is Football Next? by Rudolph Chelminski Russian sportsmen are out to conquer the world. Having triumphed in basketball and hockey, they look to American 'football as a special challenge. BOOKS 51 Foreign Post: Two Literary Letters by Paul Moor and George Armstrong 54: Radical Visions and American Dreams by Richard H. Polls Reviewed by Stanley Kauffmann 56 For Reasons of State by 14oam Chomsky Reviewed by Louis Berg 58 Booked Ahead by William Cole 60 Books in Brief by Dorothy Rabinowitz Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00100860097-6 Approved Fo-rrAelease 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP7911194A000100860097-6 ~I! CPYRGHT WORLD AND SR-A BRIEF REPORT The bankruptcy proceedings concerning the Saturday Review have been under way for more-than a month. The editors of WORLD MAGAZINE have been attempting to acquire the title and the subscription list of the Saturday Review, which would then be com- bined with WORLD. There are some 400 creditors whose majority consent is essential to any plan of reorganization. Court hearings concerning the bankruptcy were held in federal court in San Francisco on May 23. Most of the proceedings concerned the sale to E. P. Dutton & Co. of the book-publishing house called Saturday Review Press. Slow and complicated though the negotiations may have been, we feel that substantial progress has been made. As this is written (June 8), we have every reason to be optimistic about the outcome and are proceeding with plans to publish the first combined issue September 11. N.C. FINE ARTS 64 Madrid-A Treasure Hoard of Art by Katharine Kuh TRAVEL 67 The Birth of a Blue-Water Nation by Horace Sutton DANCE 70 Transitions: Martha Graham and Melissa Hayden by Walter Terry FILM 72 Cannes '73 by Hollis Alpert PHOTOGRAPHY 75 A Show of Hands by Margaret R. Weiss MUSIC 78 Independence Day for the Met by Irving Kolodin 81 Record Notes by Roland Gelatt GAMESMANSHIP 83 Double-Gram No. 27 by Thomas H. Middleton 87 Eye on Chess No. 27 by Fairfield W. Hoban Cartoons: Bernard Schoenbaum, Herbert Goldberg, Henry Martin, Everett Opi, William Hoest, Robert Censoni WORLD Magazine published biweekly by WoRID Magazine, Inc., 488 Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10022. Norman Cousins, President; S. Spencer Grin, Executive Vice-President; Richard L. Tobin, Senior Vice-President; Roland Gelatt, Editorial Vice-President; Joseph S. Iseman, Corporate Vice-President and Secretary; Lyn While, Vice-President, Corporate Relations; Robert A. Burghardt, Vice-President, Director of Advertising Services; Fraser S. Howe, Travel Manager; Larry Leins, Automotive Marketing Manager; Joseph Luyber, Special Projects Manager; Peter J. Brandon, Cor- porate Development Manager; Judith Adel, Production Manager; Bruce E. Miller, Regional Man- ager-365 Notre Dame, Grosse Pointe, Mich. 48230; Advertising Representatives-Western Region, R. J. 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Unsolicited manuscripts cannot be returned unless accompanied by a properly addressed envelope bearing sufficient postage. Send all remittances and correspondence about subscriptiond, undelivered copies, and changes of address to Subscription Department, WORLD Magazine, P.O. Box 1226, Flushing, N.Y. 11352. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100860097-6 'Approved For Release W9/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO 100860097-6 THE DEATH OF THE LATIN AMERICAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT CPYRGHT by Alan Riding The revolutions inspired by Castro and Guevara have faltered and in some cases died. Yet the Latin American guerrillas "are not forgotten.... They have awakened many oppressed sectors to the need for change." At dawn on February 3 this year, Colonel Francisco Caamano Deno and nine khaki-uniformed guerrillas scrambled ashore from a forty-two-foot launch at Playa Caracoles on the south- ern coast of the Dominican Republic. Caamano, the charismatic leader of the Leftist forces during the 1965 Domini- can civil war, had been in exile for more than six years, and this was his long-awaited return. One of the guerrillas, wearing civilian clothes, set off for the capital of Santo Domingo to make contact with opponents of the right-wing gov- ernment of President Joaquin Balaguer. The other guerrillas, includ- ing thirty-eight-year-old Caamano, headed for the hills and jungles near San Jose de Ocoa. The plan was simple: to emulate Fidel Cas- tro's uprising in the Sierra Maestra fifteen years earlier, to estab- lish a. rural guerrilla force, and, eventually, to overthrow the central government. Within a few hours of the landing, Caamano's group was spotted and reported by local peas- ants; by the next day hundreds of govern- ment troops, helicopters, planes, and artillery had near Testero de Mejia; then the govern- ment declared a state of emergency, ar- rested hundreds of Leftist sympathizers, and placed tanks around the capital; and on the afternoon of February 16 Caamano and two of his cornpaneros were killed by troops. By late March three more guerrillas had fallen in battle, one had guerrilla movement was strong, grab- bing world attention with daring kid- napings and assaults and shaking nearly every regime on the continent. But more recently it has suffered a series of disastrous setbacks, and the list of mar- tyrs is growing: Camilo Torres in Colombia; Ernesto Che Guevara in Bo- livia; Carlos Marighela and Carlos Lamarca in Brazil; Turcios Lima and Yon Sosa in Guatemala; Genaro Vazquez in Mex- ico; and now Francisco Caamano in the Domin- ican Republic. Despite misery and unrest throughout Latin America, the continen- tal guerrilla movement has effectively been crushed. There are still occasional extremist con- vulsions, as in Mexico and Argentina recently. Joseph Scrofani Che Guevara, arrived in the area, about 100 miles west of Santo Domingo; two days later three soldiers died in a clash with the guerrillas Alan Riding specializes in Latin American affairs and is a contributor to the Economist and the Financial Times of London. 1928-1967-"... and the list of martyrs is growing." died of starvation, two had surrendered, and one had sought asylum in the Mexi- can embassy. The guerrilla uprising was over, and the impossible dream of the Left had claimed new victims. A few years ago the Latin American But the wild, young ad- venturers of the late Sixties have almost all been killed or jailed; most guerrilla organiza- tions have been broken up; and even Fidel Cas- tro has withdrawn his support for the "violent path" to revolution. Yet if social discon- tent is growing and liv- ing conditions are de- teriorating across the continent, why have the guerrillas failed? Why has the Cuban example not been repeated? One problem was the Cuban example itself. Most young guerrillas were daz- zled by the romance of the revolution, but they failed to examine it in detail. While they studied Fidel's military and political strategy against the Batista dic- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100860097-6 Approved Forelease 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP71194A000100860097-6 CPYRGHT tatorship, they overlooked elements pe- culiar to the Cuban experience. The essential point, of course, is Cuba came first. Much of the Cuban bour- geoisie was already opposed to the Batista regime when Fidel and El Che began their offensive in the hills. More- over, Fidel never claimed to be leading a Communist revolution, but rather a middle-class uprising against an un- popular dictatorship. In other words, many of Fidel's supporters in the late Fifties, including many liberal Ameri- cans, would have opposed him had they known how things would develop. The Cuban example was therefore as much a warning to the oligarchies as it was an inspiration to the Left. It meant that all future guerrilla movements would immediately be branded as Com- munist' and that the United States and the local ruling elites would mobilize at any cost to prevent "another Cuba." In April 1965 the United States dis- patched 25,000 marines to the Domini- can Republic to implement this policy. The political situation on the continent was further polarized, and Cuba be- came a "special case" that could not be repeated. Nevertheless, Cuba has had im- mense political impact on the continent. It created a new political dimension, a new awareness of the social injustices, the economic inequalities, and the polit- ical repression that are the norm in Latin America. And it inspired a guer- rilla movement that hoped to alter this state of affairs quickly and violently. IN ALMOST all countries, the guerrillas were middle- and upper-class university students and intellectuals. They were impatient young fighters rebelling against the conservatism and pro-Soviet dogmatism of the traditional Communist partiesi The Brazilian Carlos Marighela was a ,rare example of a Communist- party militant's turning guerrilla. Most guerrillas severed all relations with their local Communist party and sought ideological and strategic guidance solely from the Cuban example. But the same individualistic flair that led young Latinos to become guerrillas also produced disciplinary problems and ideological disagreements. Frequently, small national guerrilla movements were fragmented into splinter groups follow- ing Mao, Castro, Trotsky, Stalin, and assorted local heroes. And contrasts be- tween the Cuban revolution and the So- viet, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Algerian ones caused more disputes than mo- ments of enlightenment. "The guerrillas grabbed world attention with daring kidnapings and assaults ... shaking nearly every regime on the continent." Once the guerrillas were established in the hills, they suffered other problems because of lack of adequate support or- ganizations in the cities. The local Com munist parties were both jealous of the guerrillas and unwilling to risk their' bourgeois comforts by helping the rebels with food, arms, and money. At times the situation in the hills became so desperate that some guerrillas actually died of starvation. Disagreement, or just simple confu- sion over strategy, was common. For example, until Clie Guevara's death in Bolivia in October 1967, Havana's pol- icy was to sponsor rural guerrilla move- ments, as in Venezuela, Peru, Guate- mala, Colombia, and Bolivia. But there were conflicts: Should the guerrillas try to be entirely self-sufficient, or should they rely on urban support; should they establish fixed bases or remain nomadic; should they fight in single columns or divide themselves up into small units? Many guerrillas adopted as their Bible the treatise Revolution in the Revolu- tion, by the young French Marxist Regis Debray. Yet the book's argument that rural guerrillas should be entirely self- sufficient was later denounced by Ha- vana as "erroneous." Dissent within the revolutionary camp increased in the late Sixties with the eruption of urban guerrilla warfare across the continent. Havana's strate- gists were strongly opposed to brining the fight to the cities, arguing that ov- ernments could be toppled only by rural campaigns that would eventually isolate the capital. But it was the urban guer- rillas of Guatemala, Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina who ultimately had the most impact. In many cases urban guerillas emerged after their rural colleagues had been eliminated. And being in the heart of each country, they could act with smaller numbers to greater effect. Diplo- mats and government officials could be kidnaped or murdered, banks could be assaulted, police patrols attacked, and student groups easily infiltrated. While rural rebels could be dismissed as iso- lated problems, urban guerrillas c uld draw world attention to the impot nce of governments and the chaos of soci- eties. Indeed, in the countries where urban guerrillas were most acti~e- especially Brazil and Guatemala- for-eign opinion focused on the repressive tactics employed by local regimes rather than on the terrorism of the guerrillas. But the urban guerrillas also faijled, and they, too, were largely wiped Out. "We lacked experience, and we lacked structure," said one exiled Brazilian guerrilla. "We were too anxious to get away from the traditional schemes of the Communist party; we were in ;too much of a hurry. The early sue ess spoiled us. Everyone wanted to join in. We thought we were going to oer- throw the government, and we made no political preparations. We con en- trated too much on the military aspects." Nevertheless, the failure of both rural and urban guerrillas was due more to outside factors than to their own shortcomings and divisiveness. Above all, lack of popular support left them vulnerable when the inevitable repres- sion came. Once again, the Cuban example: Fidel's main backing came from the middle classes of Havana, but this same social stratum in other Latin Ameri -an countries has by now been awakene to the guerrilla threat. In any event, he revolutionary purity of the later g er- rillas taught them to seek a partners ip with the rural and urban masses, of with the petite bourgeoisie. And b Ore they failed disastrously. After 450 years of external and inter- nal colonialism, the Latin American masses are oppressed and apathetic. In country after country the rural guer- rillas have enormous difficulty in c m- municating with the peasantry. In C n- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100860097-6 Approved For Release 1999/09102: CIA-RDP79-01194A000100860097-6 CPYRGHT tral America and the Andean nations of South America, the rural populations consist of isolated groups of Indians, or mestizos, who live in extreme poverty and communicate in Indian languages, and who are invariably exploited by the local landowner, or cacique. The guerrillas, on the other hand, are usually white, or at least whiter than the rural mestizos, and are immediately identifiable as "foreigners." Frequently there is a language barrier; invariably there is a cultural barrier. The peasants feel no loyalty to the guerrillas and, if anything, are afraid of them. The tradi- tion of paternalism has taught them to respect authority: News of the arrival of "foreigners" is therefore quickly con- veyed to the local cacique, and soldiers arrive soon afterward. Both Che Gue- vara and Carlos Lamarca died after peasants had revealed their whereabouts. "We were like a heart transplant," one former guerrilla said. "The heart worked well, but the body rejected it." In isolated cases, however, owing to conditions of extreme poverty and ex- ploitation, peasants have assisted the guerrillas. But this has always brought on fierce repression of the rural inhabi- tants who, unlike the mobile guerrillas, are highly vulnerable. For example, in 1966 and 1967 Guatemala's Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) were active in the Zacapa region. Yet when the govern- ment response came, it was the peasants who were shot down indiscriminately. At present, in Mexico's turbulent Guer- rero state, a local guerrilla leader, Lucio Cabanas, has emerged and is unques- tionably supported by the impoverished local peasantry. Because the army has been unable to capture Cabanas, it has adopted a policy of broader repression in the hope of turning the guerrilla lead- er's protectors against him. On April 24 this year, for instance, soldiers entered the village of Piloncillos and executed six peasants for giving food to Cabanas. Obviously a point is reached where peasant hatred for the army is sur- passed by resentment of the guerrillas. Then the guerrillas are also vulnerable. In the cities the guerrillas need not depend on local support for the basic necessities of food, clothing, and medi- cine. Formed into small cells and ra- cially assimilated, they can lead double lives without easy identification. Never- theless, they have failed to awaken the urban masses to their cause. Most inhabitants of Latin American cities are slum-dwellers, and most of these are recent migrants from the campo. They bring with them a sense of social hierarchy and fear of author- ity; if they manage to build a home or even find a job, they are unwilling to risk political involvement. Control of the media by government or oligarchy also prevents the urban poor from recogniz- ing and appreciating the alternative of violent rebellion. "The slum-dwellers were not unsympathetic," one Brazilian exile recalled, "but they didn't feel part of the movement. It was our fault for not bringing them in." The trade-union movements, on the other hand, are invariably interested in protecting the rights of their members, not against the private sector of the government, but rather against the masses of unemployed. The unionized therefore cultivate good relations with the authorities in order to preserve their privileges as "proletarian elite." These are the "new" middle classes, and as the Swedish writer Sven Lindqvist has pointed out, it is the middle class and not the guerrilla that is taking over the continent. Of course, the guerrillas do receive student backing and occasion- ally even clandestine support from fac- tions of local Communist parties. But they are not "the people." And "the peo- ple" are not with them. Yet despite internal divisions and ex- ternal apathy, the guerrillas were at first able to score dramatic military suc- cesses against the Establishment be- cause local security forces were ill-pre- pared. The guerrillas suddenly erupted with assaults, bank robberies, and kid- napings, and the governments were constantly caught off-guard. Where the local oligarchy was united, however, the police and armed forces were given intense counterinsurgency training-under the guidance of U.S. military advisers provided under Agen- cy for International Development (AID) programs-and within a few months they were able to respond to the guerrillas. Interrogation techniques and antiguerrilla tactics developed in Viet- nam were used with even greater effec- tiveness in Latin America. In the countryside huge numbers of troops were used-the "ideal" ratio was about a hundred soldiers for each guer- rilla-to isolate and surround the rebels. Peasants were then intimidated or tor- tured for more detailed information on the guerrillas' whereabouts. Aircraft would frequently bomb or napalm sus- pected rebel hideouts. And eventually, direct contact would be made, a battle would follow, soldiers would die, and the guerrillas would be eliminated. The torture of captured guerrillas or suspects has been the single most suc- cessful technique used against urban guerrillas. The absence of strong struc- tures in the rebel movements and the brutality of the torture methods left the young guerrillas highly vulnerable. Ac- cording to one former guerrilla, who was himself badly tortured, "One com- panero would be caught, and after a few days of beatings and electric shocks, he'd reveal a name or two. Another cornpanero would be picked up, then another and another. In no time the en- tire group was dead or in jail," Brazil's military' regime, which was able to crush the guerrilla movement in about eighteen months, won fame for its "sophisticated" torture methods. But every government on the continent that has faced or faces a guerrilla threat has resorted to similar techniques. In the war to prevent "another Cuba," normal constitutional and human rights are ignored. In Mexico suspected guerrilla contacts or their relations often disap- pear for months; in Guatemala they dis- appear forever. But from a military point of view-which is the point of view of the passionate anti-Communists who run most security forces in Latin America- the end justifies the means. And the ob- jective is achieved consistently. Only in one set of circumstances- when the local oligarchy has been di- vided along traditional party lines or between moderate reformists and ultra- reactionaries-have the guerrillas been able to survive. The Cuban case is well known. In Guatemala the guerrillas flourished between 1966 and 1970 be- cause of just such a division; but when the bourgeois majority turned to a "law and order" government under Gen. Carlos Arana Osorio three years ago, the guerrillas were quickly smoth- ered. In Uruguay the Tupamaro guer- rillas took dramatic advantage of social disintegration during the mid-Sixties and early Seventies. But when the Tupa- maro-backed "Broad Front" candidate won less than 20 percent of the vote in the November 1971 elections, the army took the initiative and within a year rounded up most of the young guer- .101.1s, including Tupamaro leader Raul Se:ndic. Even more recently, in Argen- t=ina. the political confusion wrought by seven years of ineffective army rule has enabled the Trotskyist People's Revo- lutionary Army and other groups to make great headway in a short time, con- centrating mainly on gathering funds through bank robberies and kidnapings of wealthy foreign industrialists. Fol- lowing the victory of the Peronist candi- date, Hector Campora, in the March elections, the guerrillas stepped up their Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100860097-6 Approved Fd? elease 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000100860097-6 CPYRGHT activities, presumably to improve their bargaining position within the broad Peronist coalition now that Dr. CAmpora has taken over. This was the same tactic adopted by Chile's Leftist Revolutionary Movement (AIR), which since Presi- dent Allende took office in November 1970 has grown from 1500 to about 30,- 000 members and now acts as a revo- lutionary lobby close to the regime. But in both Argentina and Chile, the guer- rillas lack mass support, and they are acting essentially as extremists and not as vanguards of a popular government. Cuba's loss of interest in the conti- nental guerrilla movement became ap- parent after El Che's death in 1967. There were, of course, other factors, notably Cuba's economic problems and its need to depend more closely on as- sistance from the Soviet Union, which had long opposed Fidel's dream of "ex- porting revolution" and El Che's dream of "one, two . . . many Vietnams." But Che's death was the real blow: The chosen leader of a continental revolu- tion was dead, and the Cuban model, implemented by one of its creators, had failed on the South American mainland. THE GAP BETWEEN Cuban and other Latin American revolutionaries grew markedly after 1968 when Fidel op- posed the switch to urban guerrilla war- fare and reduced his assistance to several rebel groups. Many Latin Amer- ican guerrillas also began to resent Ha- vana's revolutionary dogmatism and its apparent insistence that Cuba's expe- rience should be the model for all continental revolutions. For example, Venezuela's perennial guerrilla leader, Douglas Bravo, began to complain pub- licly about lack of Cuban support. Ha- vana-based guerrillas found themselves discouraged from launching new offen- sives. And more recently, it has been rumored that Francisco Caamano was forced to leave Cuba in order to prepare his "invasion" of.the Dominican Repub- lic this February. The emergence of a Left-leaning mili- tary regime in Peru in October 1968 and the election of President Allende in Chile two years later gave Cuba further cause to reconsider its view that violent revolution was unavoidable. Since 1970 Havana has not only supported Peru and Chile but has "blessed" nationalist trends - in _ Panama, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Argentina. In other words, far from "exporting" revolution, as the Nixon ad- ministration maintains, Cuba is actively seeking friends among the bourgeois governments of Latin America. What guerrillas then still exist, and what are their prospects? Argentina's rebels are still strong, but they may be outmaneuvered by the new Peronist regime. In Uruguay, Brazil, Bo- livia, Guatemala, and Venezuela, there are remnants of the once-strong guerrilla movements, but they are broken, leader- less, and concerned with survival, not revolution. In Brazil new Maoist-line groups have appeared in the Amazon jungles, but they are isolated and, by definition, relatively harmless. In Colombia three different groups- one pro-Soviet, one Maoist, and one Castroist-have been active in the coun- tryside for a decade. But in terms of na- tional politics they are unimportant. De- spite frequent clashes with troops, the guerrillas are restricted to remote moun- tain districts and are unable to operate on a large scale. A similar situation exists with Lucio Cabanas and his fol- lowers in Mexico: They have killed sev- eral dozen soldiers but are limited to a region they know. In effect, there is a standoff that Cabanas cannot win. Sev- eral small urban guerrilla groups have also appeared in Mexico in the past two years-including one that kidnaped the U.S. consul general in Guadalajara, Terrance G. Leonhardy, in May and freed him only after thirty political pris- oners had been released and flown to Cuba. But the Mexican police and army have always managed to break up these groups quickly. Leonhardy's captors are similarly doomed. Against this background, the reasons for Caamano's failure this year are ap- parent. His attempt to reinstate the reformist president Juan Bosch during the 1965 civil war won him great fame and popularity locally. But in 1967 he disappeared from his diplomatic post in exile in London; he went to Cuba, lost contact with his mass supporters, and lost touch with the Dominican reality. Ile could not have hoped for active sup- port from the rural population where he planned his base; 'yet the Dominican Republic's repressed Leftist groups were not ready for him. In addition-and in this case crucial-the conservative gov- ernment of President Balaguer enjoys the full support of the army, which had been equipped and trained by U.S. "ad- visers" for just such an eventuality. But why have the Latin American guerrillas failed when the Chinese and the Viet Minh succeeded, when Black September and other Palestinian groups continue? Perhaps the main difference is that the Chinese, Vietnamese, and Arabs all had apparent foreign enemies: Mao's guerrillas gained strength against the Japanese invaders; Ho Chi Minh's guer- rillas resisted the Frenc ; Black Septem- ber, the Israelis. For the Latin American Left, the United States is the ob- vious foreign enemy, but the American presence is more symbolic than visible. The real enemy is the domestic Ri ht, and in an underground civil war, he Left does less well. The Palestinian guer- rillas discovered this when they c al- lenged King Hussein's loyal forces in September 1970 and were crushed. And they suffered a new drubbing when tl ey took on the Lebanese army this spring In other words, nationalism can succ ed where revolution fails. But perhaps the guerrilla efforts . and sacrifice have not been entirely in vain. They have failed to seize power in any country other than Cuba, but they have awakened many oppressed sectors to the need for change. Previously apolit- ical sectors have been made aware' of their own leftism by the martyred gr er- rillas. In a quasi-religious sense, the idea that El Che or Camilo died fighting on their behalf has had enormous imp et. Although the guerrilla tactics failed, lie dead heroes personify the dreams; of more and more Latin Americans. The bm- possible dream of the guerrilla revolution has been replaced by impatience f or a better life. "The outcome of today's struggle is not important," Che Guevara wrote shortly before his death: As far as the final result is concerned, it does not matter whether one movement or another is temporarily defeated. What inde- cisive is the determination to struggle w ich is maturing daily, the awareness of the reed for revolutionary change, and the certainty of its possibility. The guerrillas are gone but not tor- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100860097-6