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November 11, 2016
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April 1, 1973
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 25X1C10b Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00200050001-9 EXCERPTS FROM TEXT OF NUMAYRI SPEECH ON FEDAYEEN ACTION IN THE SUDAN, 6 March 1973 In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. Brother compatriots. In all our meetings together, we have accustomed ourselves to having heart-to-heart talks and to using frank, open and truthful language, We have nothing to conceal from the people. The people are the masters of truth; they have the say in things; and they have the authority. Brothers, we have lived together through the ordeal that was imposed on us. The ordeal was preceded, coupled and followed by events which I owe it to the people to place before them without any distortion. Our people have paid a high price of their feelings and nobility. The people should know why. The talk about what has happened, brothers, must begin with an important reminder about Sudan and the Palestine question, in whose name your land's sanctity was violated, your government was placed in an embarrassing situation and your laws were violated. Our honest cooperation with the Palestinian resistance, above all the Fatah organization. has bear. within the framework of this view and understanding of the revolution. [words ridistinet) We have provided it with unlimited means of lodgings. We have insured for it the right of movement inside and outside Sudan without restrictions. We have given it the right of trans-aission through the radio and publication media without censorship and even in a-manner that I do not think any state in the world can accept. We have done all this and for this reason we have received no little blame from certain Arab countries for the disparagement that they have incurred. My reply has always been that for the sake of revolutionary fedayeen action we would even accept the criticism that is leveled at sr government. Our aim from all this has been to economize efforts and mobilize resources for the sake of the Palestine pause, for the sake of the refugees in the camps, for the sake of those who have been dislodged from their land, for the sake of the orphans and widows and for the cause these have; besides their legitimate right to return to their land and determine their future by themselves. Brothers, the massacre at the Saudi Eimbassy has ended. In my opinion, as I have already said, it is a clear, evident crime committed in the land of Sudan to which the laws of Sudan apply and which can be tried by Sudanese courts in accordance with republic decrees. I will ask justice in our country to take its course [words indistinct] . The court's verdict shall be, honest and its sentence shall be fair and its punishment shall be in accordance with a sound standard. But, brothers, the facts I have gathered--I will not reveal all these facts to you for the sake of the investigations--these facts, which are numerous and (?start.ling), make the Black September operation a matter of secondary importance compared to other basic questions, such as the work of the Palestinian organizations in Sudan, the Arab states" relations with each other and the hard efforts by some citizens as agents for those who seek to distort the victories of the revolution, if not to undermine these victories. The preliminary facts which I want. to share with you brothers are that the head of the Fatah office in Khartoum has been the brains behind this operation, as proved by the documents he wrote with his own hand and which he left behind in his office before fleeing aboard a Libyan plane to Tripoli on the day of the incident. A cable which was found instructed him to be in Tripoli by 1 March. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-0,1194A000200050001-9 The man who implemented the operation was the second man in the- Fatah office. He is the same man whose voice you heard every evening over Radio Omdurman addressing you over the air without control or scrutiny. The car used for transporting the eight participants in the operation was a oar belonging to the organizations. This is not all I want to say. This is not what worries me. What worries me is what was revealed by the numerous documents that have been found. All these documents are now in the hands of the investigators. These documents have revealed that the Fatah office had initiated a watch on some embassies and even on some state officials and had been following their steps and movements. They had recruited commercial agents to write daily reports about the activities of the trade unions, students and the farmers in Sudan and not in Israel. These documents have also shown their periodic contacts with elements hostile to the regime in Sudan and some of them outside Sudan. These dissenters are headed by a man who fled from a position of responsibility for fear of being brought to task for the (?crimes) he committed, whioh are all punishable by the public law, which was the receiving of commissions abroad and'the smuggling of money and the divulging of the highest economic secrets of the. state and state doouments to.. quarters outside the country. Evidence has also been seized proving the radio transmitter was used to serve the outlaws in Eritrea. The messages discovered by the investigators--I still have not recovered from the shock at their contents of contempt for my people and insult to what I am most proud of, namely, the Sudanese (?soldier)--include a message in which the sender says to certain Eritreans gathering on the eastern borders of Sudan that a military patrol consisting of?a number of officers had been sent by the command to that area on an ordinary reconnaissance trip on the Red Sea coast. The message says; A group of high-ranking enemy,officers is going in your direction. Kill them secretly so that you will not be in an embarrassing situation. This is strange. The Sudanese Army has become the enemy. The Army of Sudan, whose sons have had faith, have gone out and struggled for God with their funds and their souls, is the enemy. They (the Palestinians] are not to blame because the steadfast Palestinian people would never say this, and the genuine Arab.ethies would never condone this. The diary of events in which the absconding director of the Fatah office recorded his daily activities has proved that all his efforts were concentrated on the regime in Sudan, on sabotage in Ethiopia, on meetings with the opposition and on casting doubt on (?your leadership). Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : (CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 Brothers, in view of all the above, I have conveyed the matter and its secrets in your name today to the Arab League secretary general. I did not ask them to express a view on or to condemn what has happened in Sudan,:and precisely in the Embassy of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom. Many.. of them have remained-silent about this. We have only asked them to return to their consciences in regard to what is more dangerous. It is our duty to consult; over joint Arab action and the nature of relations among the Arab 'states,and over the limits of fedayeen action and its programs inside Arab states. Brothers, I have always been eager to give the fedayeen action, which is connected with the cause, the complete freedom of action even when it exceeded its limits in a manner -embarrassing to my government and my country. But the matter today is different. It is different because the aid we are giving is being used (words indistinct] Arab countries which are not.part of the Palestine battle. It is different because the Sudanese people's aid for the liberation of Palestine was being direo,ted to other battles against us. It is different because the battle effort was being used for cooperation with subversive elements within our country for sabotaging our aauhory itself. In the race of all this, it is our right today to ask these organizations about their method of action and their ideas. This is the least demanded by comradeship of struggle, let alone by the sovereignty of the state which 'gives unlimited support, or the right of the people who give without asking for gratitude. Those who pursue a policy of open cgercion must know that the result of any such relation shall be the placing of the whole people of Sudan in a fight against any regime or Arab organization committing such a folly. Let Israel be happy, thanks to the acts of some people, who by historical accident came to positions of leaderships--people who are ignorant of the facts of life and who ,,-think that historical changes can be achieved over the radio or through the (word indistinct) handful of agents and henchmen. whether :absoonding or not, who trade in the name of the Palestine revolution while they plot to undermine their country and its revolution. To these I address this warning: I am determined not to be lenient or tolerant toward them. The revolution shall doubtly reply to every blow. September, will not be the only b;pok month. Indeed, the authority (in Sudan) is capable of turns- ing all the days of the year into pitch blank to them for the*sake of order, the revolution, Sudan and the people of Sudan. EXCERPTS FROM ABU DAWUD TESTIMONY BEFORE JORDANIAN MILITARY TRIBUNAL, Broadcast by Radio Am=, 24 March 1973 (Testimony of Muhammad Dawud Muhammad 'Awdah,?alias Abu Dawud before the military prosecutor on 15 February 1973--read by announcer] [Excerpts] question: Tell us about your identity in detail. ' Answer: My name is Muhammad Dawud ltahammad 'Awdah. I am 36 years old. My nationality is Jordanian. My father's nationality is Jordanian. I currently reside in Damascus. Question: Do you belong to a political party or organization and what is your position in the organization? Answer: I do not belong to any political party, but I .belong to the Fatah movement which is a political organization. My position in it is that of a member of the Revolat:ionary Council since November 1970. I joined the movement through 'Ali HasAn Sala.mai? in Kuwait in 1968. I was sent by the movement to an intelligence course in Cairo on 10 August 1968. Thy$pprove'~-t1?+se911f'12mrEl"`Ire'rlk3-09"y402?V0W00*J9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 to Fatah. They included 'Ali Hasan Salamah, Fak ri al-'Umari, Murid ad-Dajani, Muhammad Ngb.di Sutaytah--Abu 'Ali--Ghassan al-Agkaa 'Imz n of Jtnin, a man of the Al- Xa ashir family of Gaza living in biro, and Yusuf--I do not remember his other name but his father was a Shaykh in Al-Karasah. The Fatah movement accused him of.being a J'ardanian agent because he was a religious man. Also in the course were Mubammad Daw-ad 'AWfiah--that is myself--and Muhammad Subayh, a Cairo resident. The course was held in a house. We used to leave the house once a week for 24.hnurs. The training course nonsistcd of intelligence matters connected with sescurity intelligence and intelligence recruiting, information evaluation, managing agents, writing reports, observation and investigation, a course in the use of light weapons, and recognizing the weapons of the Israeli enemy such as planes, artillery and other weapons. We used to watch films and see drawings. I bras the first in this course. Afterward I returned to Amman where I worked in fedayeen bases as an ordinaxy element. . Then I took over intelligence duties in the north and trained elements for internal reconnaissance work. I was transferred to Amman to set up central intelligence at the end of 1968. I remained there until May 1969. The center was divided into two parts: Counterintelligence, and recruiting and gathering information on the enemy. Question: What is the status of the Revolutionary Council of Fatah in relation to the organizational structure, how are appointments made and elections held and what is the composition of the Revolutionary Council? Answer: In theory the council comes immediately after the Central Committee. The Central Committee is supposed to put before the council for discussion all matters pertaining to the movement. However, from the practical aspect. only what the Central Committee desires is being presented to the Council. Normally, the Counoilts views are not taken into consideration. Normally the deputy chiefs of the various departments are from the council. The structure of-Fata1 leadership is as follows: 1. The Central Committee: The committee's responsibilities include all affairs of the movement. The last Central Committee of Fatah was elected in September 1971. Normally, the election of the Central Committee is made by the movement's congress. The congress is composed of members of the former Central Committee and of the former Revolutionary Council and several others chosen by the Central Committee. The members of the present Central Committee are of two categories: The first category are those elected and the second category those appointed. The elevated members are: Abu 'Ammar (Yasir 'Arafat), Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf), Abu Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir), Abu al-Lutuf (Farug al-Qaddumi), Abu Yusuf (Muhammad Yusuf an-Najjar), Abu as-Sa'id (Khalid al-Hasan). Abu Mazin (Mahmud Rida 'Abbas), Kamal 'Adwan, and Abu Salin (Nimir Salih). The appointed members are: Abu.Mahir (Muhammad Ratib Ghunayn, and Abu al-Havel (Hayil 'Abd al-Hamid). The Central Committee elects from among its members a general command to assume the responsibility of the armed forces of Fatah. The general command is composed of Abu 'Ammar, Abu Jihad, Abu Salih, and Abu Mahir. The Central Committee includes 11 to 15 members. However, the present Central Committee is composed only of 11 members, nine by election and two by appointment.. 2. The Revolutionary Council: The Revolutionary Council was elected at the same time and at the same place as the Central Committee in September 1971 in'Hammuriyah camp in Damascus. The Revolutionary Council is composed of members elected by the congress and includes the military council appointed by the general command, five members appointed by the Central Committee and delegates assigned to regional areas,. who may be summoned to the Revolutionary Council. Normally, these delegates are assigned to neighboring Arab states. The elected members are: Majid Abu Sharar, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 engineer Yahya Habash alias Sakhir, Nabil Sha'b, Rafiq an-Nawshah, Nail 'Allush, Aby Akram, Abu Hisham (Sa'id al-Mazyin), Abu Dawud (Muhammad Dawud 'Awdah), Na'im Musa_al-'Umlah. The military council members are: Sa'ad Sayil, Abu al-Mu'tasim (Ahmad 'Affanah), Abu al-Zayim ('Atallah 'Atallah), Mahmud Da' 'ash, Al-Haf Ismail, and Hani al-Easan. The military council is composed of an unlimited number of members. Membership of the council can be increased or decreased according to the general commandts desire. From the theoretical aspect, the military council'* duties include the discussion of the affairs of the forces with the general command. However, from the practical aspect, its duties amount to nothing. Question: What are thae .,peration3 which the Fatah movement has narried out and who are the p :rsoz:,s who were j.:z charge of these operations? Answ er: The special op,s ations organ affiliated with intelligence carries out the .operation-. The inr;rll ;.ge~;xcet branch is headed by Muhammad lusuf an-Najjar and his c.-pity H.anr.d al- t A id. 5 ;.azi al-Husayni and 'Ali He saax Salamh are Hamad al -I AyidiIa assician'~s. lw:;aT sv Hamad al-'Ayidi's personality is weak and Ahazi al? It sa.yni's pei'to::aii'r, i~:lso 3.s weak: and 'Ali Hasan Salamah's personality is stronger, the latter har managed to carry c,ut operations alone and he used to act without reference to Hamad al-'AJid.. Sala;rah gathered a group of young men around him. Most of them had a crimi,nal -e:cocd. The source of 'Ali Hasan Salamah's power comes from the fact that he is supported by Abu '.Ammar personally. When he obtains the resources he needs to mount the operations he does not go back to Muhammad Yusuf an-Najjar. But he usually goes back to him when he cannot find the resources so that An-Najjar can provide him with the monry and the other needs. There such thing called Black September. Fatah announces its operations under this name so that Fatah would not appear as the direct executor of the operations only the intelligence organ [which -is run by] Abu YUSUf and Abu Hasan attributes the operations to the Black Septemba r. Abu Iyad does not link the operations to Black September. Abu Iyad carries out special operations whose quality and not number is accentuated. He plans for big operations like the Munich Operation and the abortive operation to take over the premier's office. The operations which Abu Yusuf carries out in collaboration with Khalil al-Wazir--uRbu Jihad, are usually ad hoc operations. They do not need long-term planning. Question. Name the operations which have been carried out by Abu Iyad, 'Ali Hasan Salamah, and by Abu ' uasuf and Kha1f 3: al-Wazir. Answer: First, A.uu Iyad operations. The successful operations are the Munich operation, and the killing Of an Israeli intelligence officer in badrid'early January,1972. I do not know'who implemented that operation. The unsuooessful operations are: The operation against the Council of Ministers in Amman. Second. 'Ali Hasan Salamah's operations. The auncessful ores are the Trieste operation--blowing up oil storage tar4ca in Trieste - Italy. These atorxge tanks supply Europe and Germany with tual.. lie sought the help of Ash-Shamali in this operation. Ash-Shamali died of cancer.az1 he was the husband of Antun S&Ia49.h's daughter. I do not know the persons who carried it out. The aecorx3 operation wee. blowing up the gas storage tanks in the Netherlands and Germany. The third o;ieration was killing five Jordanians in Hamburg on the p ^etect that they collaborated with the Israeli intelligence. The fourth oppration was firing shots on the Jordanian Ambassador in Wndon Zayd ar.;T.ifa'i. The fifth operation was the blowing up of an Israeli vessel in the United States. He also has one unsuccessful opeTation: The attemiered attack in Austria On the Soviet Jews who were emigrating to` Israel. Three, Abu Yusuf operations: Killing Wasfi at-Tall. He personally assigbxes the-men through Xahya 'Ashur. He transported them to Cairo and subsequently, he himself transported the weapons to Cairo. He carries an Algerian diplomatic passport; the Sabena plane: operation at LOD airport the 0 0 oration was a failure the o o tion which Approved For Release 199 /09102 : CIA5RDP79-01194A 0 `00' ~~01-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 was a failure also; another opgratior., which was supposed to take place together with th.?Bangkok operation, was attacking the laraeli embassy in ,Romania; that too failed. Another failure was the attempt on the life of 'Abdallah Salah in Tunis. It did not succeed because the Tunisian security measures were good. 'Abdallah Salal-i went to Tunis to put for'irari the United Kingdom project. Abu Jihad took part in the Bangkok operation. There were other operations against Mustafa Dudin, 'Adnan Abu 'Awdah, 'Abdallah Salah in May 1971. They were planned by Abu Yusuf and Abu Jihad. They failed. This is my statement which was obtained from me of my own free will, choice and full freedom, and I endorse it with my signature. NEW YORK TIMES 3 December 1972 CPYRGHT N\ATFROT U T UP, FOR PALESTJNIAS .BEIRUT, Lcba:ion, Dec. 2- an Revolution, which met here or Southern Yemen. Art organization to provide Pal- for two days earlier this week. :. An Egyptian Marxist, Lutfy estinian guerrillas with protec- The conference. was believed ?el-Kholy, representing the Arab Lion and support'is to be set up to reflect growing support for Socialist Union, Egypt's sole by Arab leftists and '?Commu- the Palestinian guerrillas in the political party., played a leading d of the Soviet bloc cpuntrics and in the 'role in organizing the confer- nests lvitb the bacn ldng Moscow-oriented Arab and in. once and in the duscussioDs. Vorld Communist movement. ternational Communist move- , Disagreement began the min- Calling itself the Arab Front nwnts. ?jite the debate opened on a for Participation in the Pe a es tin-- At the opening session, Yas- political program for the pro- Ian Resists Vie, SL is to leave a sir Arafat, the leader of warmly jccted organization, 1-2-man secretariat headed by grcted the Vintc nr. represen- tative and the representative of U.N. Resolution Opposed Kamai Jumblat, a member, of the Tup_ marg5, the Uruguayan *",'Commando delegations, espc- the Lebanese Parliament and 'urban guerrillas. cially such Marxist groups as leader of the Progressive So- China and Libya Absent -the Popular Front for the Liber- cialist party, who has been The gathering was attended Lion of Palestine and the Pop- Clected secrCtary general, by leftists from 20 countries, as ular Democratic Front, insisted et .. The other 11 members In. well as representatives of the .Outright the con e` mu Nations ons S f clude representatives from the Communist parties In the Soviet outright the United of ruling parties in Algeria, SYria, Union, Hungary, Poland, East 2, ,. 19067 67, calliAk resolution ~'? Nov. . for a a and Iraq, from the Lebanese Germany, Bulgaria, Rumania .peaceful settlement of the Arab- Communist party and from Al and Yugoslavia. sraeli conflict. Fatah, the main guerrilla group. .'i Communist parties from all .-Arab Communists objected to the Arab countries took part, . ration- Support in Eastern Bloc as did representatives of the men that called position and for moderation- The new front emerged from rival Baath party factions thatmember the Arab People's Conference rule Syria and Iraq and the the Politburo, of of a the e Lebanese se for the Support of the Palestini- ruling National Liberation )royat the P Lear Communist party, declared, I T CPYRGH ,wish .we would learn from ex- spcrience 4pf.the.past five years," since the 1967, war. "Let us set aside general revolutionary talk hand be guided only by reason," he said. ?In a compromise, a recom- mendation was adopted reject- ing all "submissive solutions" to the Middle East conflict but not making a direct reference to the Security Council resolu- tion. The conference also called for establishment of a Palestin- Jan-Jordanian effort to work for the overthrow of the Govern- ment of King Hussein of Jordan. 'e-Reaction to Jordanian Move " .. The creation of the front is a delayed reac?'iori to the -expul- ,Sion of-the ccitiiim ndos from- JordanlasL ar: The delay was designed to allow time for Arab Governments to intercede with Tong Hussein__;e nermlt__Uic guerrillas back into his country- Tliese efforts have been unsuc- cessful. 8 March 1973 Terrorism: immune To Diplomacy A "highly noticeable" Increase in the the desperate blackmail-massacre "traffic" of-suspected Palestinian guer- March 2 in Khartoum, capital of neigh- rillas in and out of the Libyan capital boring Sudan. of Tripoli occurred for several weeks Moreover, a very important part of before the murder of three diplomats the resources essential to the BSO is _including two high-ranking Ameri known to come from oil-rich Libya, :ens-in Khartoum last week. which is ledby the most extreme Arab That clandestine movement has led Nationalist-Col. Muammar Qaddafi- 'op officials here to A his tentative now in power. This aid either comes ;onclusion: Without the help of the indirectly through the major Palestin- ;ibyan revolutionary government, the Ian Nationalist organization. Al Fatah. Black September Organization (1350) or directly to the kllle * f might no pr ec p R leatse~989I9 d eRp 9~:0 i'1 1A monarchies with vast oil reserves, also have been financing Al Fatah since the 1967 war, when Israel seized the Pales- tinian west bank of Jordan and the Si. nai Peninsula. One reason for this Sa- udi and Kuwaiti help has been self-pro- tection. With the payment of blood money, both conservative pro-Western Arab states have been ignored by the Palestinian assassins. Yet, even in the case of Libya, the t.i4cl,y re- unter-. -. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 CPYRGI stt-okcs. A careful study of U.S. coun- teraution all the way up to breaking diplomatic relations with Libya has re- sulted In a tentative decision to do nothing, and that explains how diffi- cult it is to control world terrorism with diplomacy. Libya is a principal supplier of oil for Western Europe. Helping in oil production are some 3,000 American citizens, all more or less dependent on the U.S. embassy. If President Nixon broke diploma tic relations with Libya in retaliation for the bloody charade in Khartoum, these Americans would ei- ther' have to accept evacuation--or run the 'risk of a possibly violent anti- American Libyan reaction. Worse yet, it would play into the hands of super-Nationalists in the Lib- yan government, to the :left even of Col. Qaddafi, who want all American Influence expelled from the Mideast. Finally, such a diplomatic counterac- tion might not impede suture esca- pades by the BSO. Thus, ruling out strong diplomatic counteraction at least for the present, LONDON OBSERVER 4 March 1973 CPYRGHT FROM the moment at 7 p.m. on Thursday when the seven Black September guerrillas burst into the diplomatic reception at the Saudi Arabian hmbassy here, there was aiwas only one hope that the lives of the five dip- lomats held hostage could be saved. The hope was that Jordan's King Hussein would prove a softer target than the Israelis. In this, Black September clearly seem to have miscalculated their new strategy. The attack on the Saudi Ent- h:Lssy in Khartoum was carefully planned several weeks ago by the lack September group in al Fatah, whose central commit- tee was recently greatly strengthened by the militant Left obtaining stronger positions within it. Their new task was to achieve two major objectives. The first was to rebuild Black Septem- ber's morale after the disaster of the Munich massacre and the humiliating bungling of the operation in Bangkok against the Israeli Embassy last Decem- ber. The second was to force King Hussein to free Abu baud- code--name for the top commando s leader of al FaVOYAb~fsra ti- ifpFejy y, eC~ Atiit~( month while a I a the Nixon administration Is taking a different course: trying to persuade Arab leaders that they themselves must deal toughly with Palestinian ter- rorism-or risk self-destruction. As one high official told us: "If the Lib- yans don't handle this, sooner or later it will destroy them." This is clearly understood by Presi- dent Anwar Sadat of Egypt, who was responsible for restraining Qaddafi af- ter the outrageous Israeli shooting down of a Libyan airliner with 100 fa- talities two weeks ago. Sadat even threatened to end the special Egyptian-Libyan political link auring his successful effort to prevent Qaddafi from exploding in retaliation against Israel, Sadat'3s motive was obvious: to block an Arab retaliation so excessive that world opinion, solidly anti-Israeli after the Feb. 21 tragedy, would swing the other way. Then came Khartoum. Since then, Sa- dat-along with other Arab moderates -has continued his quiet pressure on Qaddafi. Their message: Let the Suda- nese government deal with the eight DID THE HOSTAGES HAVE TO DIE? mission in Jordan-and Colonel Rafe Ilindawi, a Jordanian otfieer who masterminded an un- successful coup against King Hussein last November. Although the freeing of these two top leaders was the main objective of the operation, it was hoped at the same time to secure the release of about 60 other al F.itah zuerrillas in Jordan. Tacked on to the principal .drntands were a whole string of more propagandistic objectives ?-the freeing of Sirlian Sirhan, the assassin of Senator Robert Kennedy, and of the Baader Meinhof urban guerrillas in Gorman prisons regarded as c.onu-:ules of al I'aluh ; and the. frecinr; of guerrillas in Israel and of all women guerrillas in Jordan. The operation was timed to coincide with King Hussein's visit to Washington. The . aim was to try to force the Ameri- cans to use his presence there- as a bargaining counter for the release of the American diplo mats held hostage. But the timing was wrong-Hussein was in Morocco on a State visit to King Hassan when the guerrillas struck in Khartoum. The choice of Khartoum was carefully made. The Sudan President, General Gaafar Numeir remain personaalllyy rre assassins without outside interference or threats. Their private hope: the eight will be sentenced to die, with that pen- alty-the first of its kind-beginning the end of the Palestinian terrorist move- ment. But Sadat has scarcely more lever- age against Qaddafi than does Presi- dent Nixon, and even the threat of breaking up the Egyptian-Libyan polit- ical union might not stop Qaddafi from attacking the Sudanese government as tools of American "imperialism" if the killers are actually executed. In sum, there are no international weapons capable of dealing with such global terrorism beyond maximum punishment of those responsible. That means the death penalty in Khartoum and a decision by all Arab states to stop aiding and abetting in- ternational criminal activity. Anything less not only threatens other lives in other countries but also guarantees that even the legitimate Arab cause in the bitter struggle with Israel will be more and more damned, everywhere in the world. recent troubles with the Egyp- civil war with the southern tians and the Libyans and his Sudanese. decision to start a rapproche- Numciry had decided to turn ntent with the United States and the anniversary into a major other Western countries follow- national and international occa ing the abortive Communist sion in order to consolidate his coup against him last year. Ile regime's could therefore be counted on ofationall un fi at neandeto as a friend. project a favourable image to Mor o l F h l e ver a ata as an t , office in Khartoum that is given official recognition in the diplo- matic list. Its representatives were in a good position to estab- lish the precise whereabouts of the sap tal's diplomats. They had advance knowledge of the planned reception by the Saudi Ambassador for the departure of Mr Curtis Moore, the US Charge d'Affaires, and to wel- come the new US Ambassador, Mr Cleo Noel, the entire Diplo- matic Corps was invited. Anniversary the world community. He had invited a number of leading per- sonalities to Khartoum--inelud. ing Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, who had played a help- ful role in bringing about "the settlement--to visit the southern capital Juba, with him. Black September struck on the evening of Nurnciry's cere. monial dinner for the Roiieror, and the day before his dis- tinguished party of visitors was due to fly south to participate in the Juba celebrations. The guerrillas' action angered and alienated Numeiry, who had invested a great deal in making It has been established that an outstanding success of the the Land-Rover used by the anniversary. guerrillas to. attack the Saudi The choice of Khartoum also Embassy belonged to the local marked a new stage in the Palestine Liberation Organisa- strategy of the Palestinian tion office. Their local represen- leadership : it was the first time tative has been detained for they had chosen what they questioning. regard as an Arab country The al Fatah men overlooked (though not a view of the Sudan only one fact: the reception was shared by.. most Sudanese). ?n held on the eve owe first In the past, the Palestinian e rfkTthb the 9 0 (l h - had 17-year ong r d t eit hijacking ment ending CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 and hostage-taking activities in the Western world on the ar; u- ment that since the AVest by and large supported Israel. Western capitals were simply an exten- sion of the `Palestini,n bau.le- front.' in a communique justifying their choice of Kltartotnn. Black September said that the Sudan was parr of the Arab fattier- Jand.* entitling thew to use its territory fur the liberation of the Arabs in Palestine--a vilnv which finds little favour in Khar- tnnni. Nevertheless, the :guerrillas were right in their calculations in one imt+nrtant respect. They world count on Nungciry playing the role of mediator. Front the beginning, his Government tool: the line that they would be guided by the single desire to ;avoid the killing of the hostages and of the guerrillas. This gave the guerrillas considerable room for manoeuvre. What vas equally clear from he beginning, too, was that this time the guerrillas, not daring to risk another denial icing -failure, could be relied upon to carry out their threat to kill their hostages unless their de- mands were met. The attack on the four-storey mansion which serves as Saudi Embassy and residence in the salubrious suburb abutting on the Khartoum international air- port was almost faultlessly executed. Only two guests were lightly and accidentally wounded-Ambassador Noel and the Belgian Charge d'Affaires, Guy Eid-by ricochetting bullets when the guerrillas burst into the reception as it was end- ing. Only one of their intended hostages was missing-the West German Ambassador- Michael' Jovy, who was showing a dis- tinguished German delegation the sights of Khartoum before himself going to attend the President's dinner for the Emperor. In the past, Black September had always found Bonn a soft target. They hoped this time to strike a blow for their German comrades in the Raader?Meinltof group who have been such loyal allies in Europe. We were all gathered for the Presidential dinner for the Emperor on the lawns of the glittering, illuminated presiden- tial palace-the old residence of colonial governors where General Gordon was killed- when the news of the attack on the Saudi Embassy came through. President Numeiry at once called his closest advisors to deal with the situation. He en- trusted the negotiations to his Vice-President and Minister of focused their demands on the I it t e r i o r , Major-Gencral leaders held in Jordan. All the Moltanmted El Bakliir Ahmed, pressure, therefore, was on and his Minister of Health, 'Hussein. Gassing Mohammed Ibrahim, a During the course of Friday voting and revolutionary-minded morning the guerrillas offered officer. It was the latter who a compromise. They would be was entrusted with the task of willing to fly with their hostages going into the Saudi Embassy to ;to the United States, provided talk to the seven guerrillas and who quickly established an easy and joking relationship with their 27-year-old but as yet un- identified leader,'- Cables were sent to, Saudi Arabia, - Jordan, The ? United States and Belgium - h'forming the governments of the tier-, rille,s demands after a three hour session between Health Minister Ibrahim and the guer.- rillas. Numeiry made no attempt to influence them as to their answers. He called in the Egyp- tian Ambassador to use his good offices in the Arab world. From the. start, close liaison was established with the skele- ton American staff, who throughout have continued to speak in terms of highest praise for the skill and correctness of the Sudanese handling of the affair. They were happy to leave all the negotiations to them. The first deadline was set for 7 a.m. on Friday. The first re- actions that reached Khartoum were toughly uncompromising. While there was no word from King Hussein in Rabat-the crucial figure in the negotiations if any concessions were to be made-the replies from his Crown Prince and Foreign Min- ister were reminiscent of Israeli attitudees : ` The Jordania Gov- ernment will not give in to pres- sure, no matter what the cir- cumstances; nor it is ready to bargain over any demands made by the guerrillas' Negotiators The Saudi King's reply was no less uncompromising, referring to the Black September action as `harmful to the Arab cause.' Only the Americans were non- committal at first. They were wil- ling to act in any way the Sudanese thought helpful in saving human lives. With these unpromising re- plies, the Sudanese negotiators telephoned the. guerrilla leader to ask for an extension of the ey were accompanied by the Sudan Foreign Minister and Minister of National Guidance to guarantee their safety. They did not explain their choice of the United States, but the Sudanese assume it was because they hoped to get the release of Sirhan and to scoop a major international propa- ganda coup. Nevertheless, their major de- mand for the release of their top leaders in Jordan held fast. The Americans were noncom. mittal in their reply, saying they would do anything to save lives. But the Sudanese firmly rejected any idea of their Ministers accompanying the guerrillas to America; they would go only to an Arab country. Meanwhile, the Americans took two steps : they offered to arrange for a plane to be avail- able at short notice to fly out the guerrillas and hostages, and they sent a senior State official William Macomber, who had recently negotiated the release of the US Ambassador in Haiti, to Cairo en route to Khartoum. The US Air Force sent a C141 aircraft to Khartoum Airport on Friday afternoon, but the Sudanese authorities asked that it should not put down as its landin would be visible to guerrillas on the roof of the Saudi Embassy. The authorities were afraid it would be mis- interpreted as a sign of the arrival of American forces. They asked for it to land after night- fall, so the plane returned to the American signals base in Asmara, Ethiopia. When the second deadline ex- pired at 1 p.m. on Fridays the Sudanese had nothing promising to report to the guerrillas in arguing for another time exten lion. They were now playing for time. All they could get from the guerrillas was an extension until 8 p.m. on Friday night-and they were told that was the end of the road If th are were no --- - f oo,,. ,...~ ... -- ----- - satis actory replies by then they was, needed. would begin to execute their ow the guerrillas withdrew hostages. Nobody was any longer their demands about the guar- in doubt that they meant what rillas in Israel, since the Sudan they said. had nogcontact with the ' Zionist Meanwhile, President Nixon- enemy and about the Baader- who had been playing host in failed f to group, take since the they had German Washington to Israel's Prime ailed Minister, Mrs Golda Meir-had Ambassador hostage. They were made up his mind. His message silent on Sirhan Sirhan, but reached the American Embassy officials in Khartoum early on' Friday morning. A little later, he was announcing at his Press conference that the posi- tion of diplomats had become a dangerous calling, but that the only way to remove future in- i security in their foreign posts was not to give in to pressures. The colleagues of Noel and' Moore knew that their death warrant had probably been sealed. They did not pass Nixon's message on to Mrs Noel and Mrs Moore, who were keeping vigil together in the American Em- bassy residence only a stone's throw from where their husbands were held captive. Macomber, who had reached Cairo, could not possibly, get to Khartoum before the last dead- line ran out at 8 p.m. `It is now simply a question of playing for time,' a taut Embassy spokesman told me an hour before the ex- piry of the ultimatum. "Even if Bill Macomber arrives here, there is nothing he has to offer to make any real difference.' The Sudanese negotiators made one last attempt just be- fore 8 p.m. They had heard that Hussein had left Rabat en route for Amman. They pleaded for an extension until 2 an. on Saturday morning to enable Hussein to reach his capital and make a personal decision. The streets around the Saudi Embassy were blocked oil by police and troops to leave only a quick exit route to the airport if that became necessary. General Numeiry was not yet back from Juba. Despite all the pressures, he had insisted on accompanying the Ethiopian Emperor there to carry out his planned schedule. In his speech gel spoke of the enemies of the Sudan who acted in a way tr sug~estthat they begrudged her achievements. Beyond that allu- sion, he made no reference to the drama in his capital. At 8.15 the guerrillas tele- phoned the Vice-President, General Bakhir Ahmed, to say that they were determined to execute their hostages since they had received no reasonable assurances. The general pleaded with them not to carry out their exe- cutions. An hour later, five shots rang out from the Embassy. Five minutes later the hostage Saudi Ambassador telephoned Radio Om Durman to say the two Americans and the Belgian had been executed. . General Bakhir Ahmed at once telephoned back to speak to t he guerrilla leader. He con- firmed the action and said that unless positive assurances were forthcoming the two Arab Diplo- ,mats would be shot next. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : Ck4-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 CPYR'GHTApproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 LONDON OBSERVER 1.1 March 1973 action in-closing down the local Fatale office and punishing the CPYRGHT j from ?COLIN LEGUM:. Khartoum, 10 March DAN7;SI; investigations, year-old agreement that brought paper Gornltotrt is has p tblished into the Black September kill." Peace between the Muslim north all editorial criticising the Black in of a Belgian and two and the non-\luslim south of the September operation in Khar?- I American:. diplomats . last Sudan after 17 years of civil toum. wifck have produced surpris war.) Meanwhile the Sudan Govern- ing evidence of a claridestinc. 2. Active support from Libya meat is determinedly pushing revolutionary Islamic: it10VC-',,through the Sudan for the ahead with its plans to stage two Eritrean liberation movement trials in a fortnight's time. The m nt which extends from -(ELF), which is partly Muslim- first involves nine Palestinians- Tripoli in Libya to the Middle led, to challenge aed overthrow the eight guerrillas who rusued 2-:''a the 1i ,.:t of frzicz_ t` t~ y~s:c c: :a and 4115 The c icrtsive ramification of C:-isian - dctn:r tcd Gorcrn- three of their five hostapcs, ar.3 this network of ,Hying and sub- merit, (ELF operates on the the ninth man, who drove the version has produced a major Sudan frontier hvith the F,ritrean t ten to the Embassy. This man crisis for Arab leaders. They Province of Ethiopia, but has was the No. 3 at the Khartoum -ar either too cnibarrassed or too suffered recently ? through Fatah office. The guerrillas' disturbed by the revelations to.,; internal divisions and the difli- leader, Riziq Abbou Kass, was make public pronouncements in culty of getting substantial arms the No. 2 at the Fatah office and reply to the open challenge and supplies to its rcbcl forces.) a well-known broadcaster who secret diplomatic Notes-., , 3. To undermine Arab Co%- enjoyed the privilege of usihhg adklressed to diem by the, etnments, ? including . Egypt, Sudan radio for a regular pro- Sudan's young military leader,. which are ready to co-operate gramme devoted to the Palestin- President Gaafar Nunieiry. . with the United States to achieve inn straggle. extensive doc.uinent:ary et.]. n nc?otiatcd settlement in the At one time, Rizicr av:;s the deuce shows that the secret Middle Nast crisis. neighbour of the Felgir.;r Charm The discovery that AI Fatah, mavenicnt has its headquarters `the thief Palestinian cf Aflaires, Guy Ei~, ., ivhn, .ntier in ',Tripoli, but whether or not guerrilla his fiance', was c:i regular visit- it is actively directed by Libya's ?. organisation-which 'n,ioyed ing terms. U the three diplomatic status in the Sudan- Pi esidcnt Miramar, Quadhali is ,vas not only en aged in the murdered diplomats, Lid was unclear.. Ile has so far refused Palestinian strhi;f lc a^ainst singled out for humiliating treat- to be drawn citlher privately or.; Israel but also in subversion in tnent before tie was killed. publicly by President Nttmciry's Arab 'and African countries re- Because lie was born in Cairo and public request to him to extra- ,t?ded s ' reactionary,' has spotce good Arabic, lie was sus- Bite Fawaz Yassin, the head of prccipitaatcd a major crisis both peered of being an Egyptian Jew thq office of the Palestine: Lihera? within the organisation and in and, as >uclh, a 'Zionist ac;en Lion Organisation (Fatah) in Its relations with the Arab Gov. Ilhs fiancee flew to Khartoum`. 1 h-utouni. "a' issue fled to . ci'mnents that support it? , with his birth certificate showing Tripoli a few hours before the President Nuniciry, who has he was of Lebanese Christian ronte(i storming of the Saudi Arabian ? always been an ardent supporter with het1t? But when chef n- Enlbassy which led to the killing of Eatalr and the Palestinian ivrt this evidence by fileS Suuddaan- -of the three diplomats. cause, had hoped to get n clear ese intermediaries, the Mack ,. said For some inexplicable- reasmi "dissociation by the Fatah leader, would . September lcadt he pathpt Led Yasin left behind in Khartoum ? Yasser Arafat, from the opera- by a Sabenafpilot in the shooting. Traft ist, diary and handwritten in. tions of his Khartoum office.. last year of two Black Scptcwbcr tr ictioths for the attack and a , Instead of this, Arafat has' ricrri]las' who had hijacked. his sketch of lire Saudi Ent chosen to insult him by sending air.cLaft to Lod, asst'. 'These showed not AiTIy a m ,sage to President 'Anwar hat he had personally directed Sadat of Egypt asking for his-; The Sudan prosecutor is hc~ Black Scptember operation, st'171101-t a,;ainst the 'feverish., expected to demand the death iuttliat he was also at the centre and surprising campaign by the sentence for all nine Palestin?. f a subversive organisation 'Sudanese President' for what' cans. But even if the court hat had among its aims:- he describes as anew and sent. should pass a death sentence, it 'y ores American plot to liquidate is doubtful- if Nunteir?y would' T. The overthrow of Iv`unieiry the Palestine revolution. . allow it to be carried out' ;overmnent in favour of an . 'file' Egyptians are clearly. While the Palestinians will be sl: mic socialist regime that e mbarrassed by tills open con- tried by an ordinary court, the ?oi}ld unite' tlhe Sudan with flict between Fatah and Libya six Sudanese.. who have been ibya and Egypt in the enibry- on one side and Sudan, Saudi ? arrested will be.tri'd by court lie Frderaation of Arab Rccprub Arabia and Jordan on tiler-otlter., mmaarrtiiaal.Tiivo'offthhemweetrrc eni,Y u'ne' At "(11. lsira~G~CIQel' l ttile+~r~v!/ mL~S3i t-tt~ICh?iii!o f-4i ~1RtJYtt+ l'ttllill't1fi"001- c to des r y the f agile one- solicitiut; leis "support for Ibis ?? members. are a prominent uni- CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 vcrsity lecturer and one of fife Sudan's hest-known pi;ysicia s. They belong to a ro-Libyan Arab socialist group that is both it not to danese S - -- - - ..--- --- u Llollil'i 11ood. I - - One of this group has been Libyan Government. ' ? - --the order for the execution to'Ptished her aside and she flea in -under police surveillance since it The documents left behind i11 be carried out. tears to her Ihcdroonh. was learner{ a year, ago that he the haiah otlice by.Fawaz Yassihh.. ? Having oftcrcd the diplomats The three doomed nleih were If a d approached one of show that t{te organisation was cigarettes and given them 25 led to it celiac, where they were Nuniciry's leading opponents, ,the link between a Sudanese cell minutes to write their' last letters roped to a rillar. Al] eioirt Pifer- exiled in Saudi Arabia, with pro- And the Eritrean Liberation to their families the guerrillas villas participated in tlfe siroot- posals to form a united Irotht to leaders to spy on Sudanese tried to get them to sign a last 'inr; three using automatic overthrow the Sudanese rcgimc- ihoop moventeitts along the will, dictated by them, in which weapotls and live ruin: Thcse overtures wcrc rejected L.thiopian frontier and to pro- the diplomats wcrc to have revolvers. When the guerrillas ,because the exiled leader re- vide lieip for the Eritreans. denounced their Governments, canoe back into the t` ~i~ vit? r325c Ve..ri ~ ` Ce a` ` 1s i1.~j4 ~r c.Sn ouE giving _ or even remonstrate. 11?:ir demands, Such 12-q the relcaSc of Sirhan Sirhan, were obviously megaloinnniac. Signifi- cantly, they beat tip their captives before killing them; their predecessors at Munich at least refrained from that barbarity. They then called in a doctor to treat the captives before shooting them. SThey have embarrasscd Arab nations which were sympathetic to their cause, evert if not actually financing and Supporting it. They alicnatcd the rnoder:ites through- out the Arab world. SThe government of Israel had incurred widespread condemnation for the shooting down of the Libyan air- liner, with the loss of 106 lives. [See Jon Kin;che: "Dayan, Melt and the Libyan Plane," The Nation, March 12.) There were mitigating circumstances in that incident, based in part on the earlier atrocities by Black September bands, and the failure of the Israeli military authorities to communicate on the radin frequencies used by the Cairo control tower and the lost airliner, but the onus remained on thy. Jsra:lis. The terrorists -got the Israelis off the hook for thc time bcinft, "By staging their action in Ehartouni, the i.csassins drove a wedge the l"wernnlcnt of the Su(Lin "{id tle. Arab world. 1hcy timed the biow for "Unity DIN'," as thour;h to punish the S(ldan se Government for app:ari:ig IA'Ii DPF9 Di I'04AEO)00'206Oi50001-9vsly 'from the Middle East. CPYRGHT Approved or Release '. hr terrori?is ~iixillc:111y nwrtiflcd S:lIh i Arabi;,, in The most deplorable aspect of the whole affair is that f1t~Sl rth11 . \' th.'. ti.\ cllt!~~:;:, accillrod, the Palestinians have a genuine grievance and reasonable l 11101-oic sr:tih must cuhilin:ltc in hwroic action, or it clamp for redress. The Arabs have exploited their cause rc~uncs local, r m : t hk, I: 11.11-lou r; l lam: har~l?: sccll~d clown in *the most shanielcss way, *,s-ithout pi g in ' them help I iplomats, and surrendered ignominiously. It was is if ing to represent the Palestinian cause is divisive even amsoti h.n;i retrained from paling down the Philistine among I'.h}estiniaus. t ~mplc because the did not want to get hit on the head. No one is entirely guiltless in this tragedy. Nor will ;The killings damaged prospects for possible peace it avail any of the participants to pass resolutions or Jenson for tho action, or the terrorists may have been the mats remain unscathed, there will always be the business- t ols of a Libyan plot. At the. outset they demanded the men and tourists, soldiers and sailors: the possibilities are ?eedom of hundreds of Arab captives; the end result endless. Jsn't it time to deal seriously with the Palestini, n l hay he that King Hussein will cxccutc the sixteen guer- question, Instead of leaving it to the most irresponsib e Approved For Release 1999/09/02 22CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 LOS .ANGELES TIMES 14 December 1972 Lthi E '7r CPYRGHT BUENOS AI13ES Ul-- ow close ould the future appear if two, -three, many Viet- tams flowered on the face df the globe ..." That was the musing of 3Ernesto (Che) Guevara, the Cuban -Argentine guerrilla leader, months before he died at, the hands of the Bolivian ar^l;, in 1^. 37. Five years after his abortive attempt to export the Cuban revolution 'to lithe jungles of Bolivia, the future npl) cars to have passed him by. Gucvara's yearning; for a series of bloody struggles in Latin America "with their quota of death and irnmen e tragedies" that would destroy North A m erican "imperialism" forever is ns far away from success today as it lwas when hn was shot to death. In the complicated arena of world diplomacy where yesterday's enemies can ' become , today's frig. nds, better relations be-Lwcen the Unilcd Slates and the Snvict Union and China are not heartening signs to Latin revolutionaries. In addition, the Imp'-key but potentially important ne- gotiations under way be- twcen Washington and Ha- vana over airliner :hijack- ings would be a critical blow to the g u e r r i l l a movcrrcnis in the Ameri- Ali Survey of Terrorist Movements Reveals Their Status as Fragmented FCalcidoscope 4as s lou the talks devel- I Source of Support Cuba has been a tradi- ifnnal source of moral and material support for La- t f n - American guerrilla movements. An Arsoc'ratcd Press survey of the status' of guerrilla movements in Latin .lrnrrica revcals a of rcvoitllinnary groups. Sonic old ni inizations, such. as ilia vaunted Tupa- maros of 'i%r1;:11av, have succambrd to attrition in virtual opon warfare with better-equipped army and police forcer. Other nrg.miz;ittnnc have shown that a (c'w rictcr- ?mined ni.en and women can carry off spectacular d c m o n s (rations of vi- olence arid terror, But they have failed to achieve Guevara's most cherished desire: to win the con- fidence anri support of La- tin-American workers and peasants in an organized uprising against the so- calierl "nlif;archy." Argentina -- Terrorist bombings have become an almost daily occurrence here but the recent return of former dictator Juan D. Peron as the country pre- pares for free elections next, year appears to have helped case tensions be- tween the military govern- ment and its opponents. The most active groups are t Mvriml,v All Montoncros and the Rcvo- lutionary Armed Forces. The former is Trotskyite, the latter two groups sup- port Peron's return to power. Last April, I;RP terror- Ist.s kidn^pcd and killed Oberdan Sallustro, the Ita- Is?n lztnaetr c Fiat-Concord. Lately, Argentine revo- 1 u t i ovary -organizations have switched attention to bombing attacks against exclusive social and sports elubs.whore the.- oli-garchy" relax and play. Argentine police do not supply statistics, but it is known that several hundred persons have been jailed as cccurity forces hunt down guerril- la, ? Bolivia - The military government of President Hugo I3azcr, an' army col- onel, has almost willed out the guerrilla movement in Bolivia. The N a t i o n a l Liberation Army founded by Guevara ha; ceased to be an effective force. Tough army rar,,gcrs de- stroyccl a 70-man guerrilla column in 11070. The eight ;urvivor> were allowed to seek political asylum in neighboring Chile. Brazil -- Ifawin- effec- tivciv curb'd most urban tcl'rn:'i`m ill burn^il since CPYRGHT to 'U1 powrr in le ne'v guerrilla lilovcnlent that claims to be gathering its forces "in a far corner of the Amazon jungle." The organization, in a pamphlet delivered anonymously in October to a foreign newsman, calls itself the "Araguaia G,.^ ri'la Forces River tributary.- - ~~- J Last September, the army announced that anti- government terrorists killed a sergeant on an an- tiguerrilla mission n e a r where the Transnmazon Highway is under con- struction, the first tints in two years the government acknowirdged the pre- sence of rural guerrillas in Brazil. A Brazilian newspaper recently reported that 5,- 000 troops were hunting for guerrillas near the Araguaia River. The armed, forces never con- firmed this but the fact the story was allowed to run in a paper constantly under the eyes of govern- ment censors indicated it was probably true. The armed forces and police have killed or cap- tured. most known Brazili- an guerrilla leaders. Thou-. sands'of real and suspected subversives, are in jail on Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 CPYRGHTAnnrn%iPrl Fnr RPItact 1 AAAMAW - (IA_RfP7A_nh 1 AAAnnn9nnn5nnn1 _q charges of "endangering natirnal.securitV." Chile--The 1070 victory of Marxist Salvador Al- lende and his leftist Popu- lar-Unity coalition in a. free presidential election Short-circuited the pro- grams of Chile's Revolu- tionary Left Movement, known by its Spanish ini- tials as the Mlll. This group has had to curtail its armed "expro- priations" of banks and su- permarkets. The 1MIR sees Allende's government as a "positive step," but says only violence will win "all power for the working class." Colombia-Three guer- rilla groups have operated in Colombia for 10 years.. mainly in rural areas. Aside from scattered ambushes of army pa rota or kirlnap in:r; of r i c h rancher:, they have pn crI no threat to the nation's civilian government. Ecuador-There 15 no history of guerrilla move- meats in Ecuador in re- cent years. Even universi- tv and secondary school students, traditional g o v crnment opponents, have been quiet since a military government seized power last Feb- ruary. Mexico-Guerrilla acti- vity appears to be mainly confined to sporadic ac- tions in rural areas. Gucr- rilla leader Lucia Cabanas, accused of leading 'an ani- bttsh last August is which IS soldiers were killed and 16 others wounded, has been promised amnesty by the government in ex- change for the opportuni- ty to talk with him. Anoth- e r i m p ortant guerrilla leader, Genaro Vazquez; died this year in an auto accident. Bombings of publio buildings and North American properties In- creased in Mexico this year. Peru - The country's military government, which took over in 1063, is proud of the infreouent outbreaks of violence since then. There is no or- ganized guerrilla move- ment In Peru, although military leaders frequent- ly accuse "the extreme right and the extreme left" of c o tt m e rrevolutionary agitation in connection with labor unrest. Uruguay A state of "internal war" by com- bined action of the Uru- guayan army and police h as virtually destroyed the action arm of the Tu- pamaros, probably the best known of Latin America's guerrilla move- ments. Its leader, Raul Sendlc, is under guard in a hospital with part of his jaw shot off. He was cap- tured" during a shootout last September, .The Tupamaros gained notoriety in 1970 when they kidnaped and killed U.S. police adviser Dan AIitrione. They also kept British Ambassador Geof- frey Jackson and U.S. ag- ronomist Claude Fly im- prisoned for months In a "people's jail." More than 30 Tupamaros have been killed and 2,000 jailed and a number of constitutional guarantees have been sus- pended to aid the hunt for other guerrillas. Venezuela -- Although they present.. no serious threat to the c i v i l i a n government, urban guer. r i l l a s have Intensified their activities In -recent weeks, presumably in pre- paration for disruption of next year's presidential elections. ' Vb'n ,e eradication," said ' P r e s? Ident . Rafael Caldera, re- cently of the guerrillas, ;"but there still remain small groups which once in a while carry out acts to: male their p r e s e n c e known," Last week gunmen from the Armed Forces of Na- tional Liberation, the main guerrilla organization in Venezuela, killed a former p o l i c o chief who h a d fought terrorists, AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT, Beirut 12 March 1973 CPYRGHT CUBA-SOUTH YEMEN : A SPECIAL POSITION Cuba is taking a growing military and econo- mic interest in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. According to Aden News Agency reports, Jacinto Vazquez de la Barza, Cuban ambassador to the PDRY, who is resident in Cairo, visited the republic from 17 to 21 January, when he had separate meetings with the three members of the Presidential Council, and the secretary general of the ruling Marxist National Liberation Front, Abdul Fattah Ismail.. _' - :.. : -. . During his visit, the ambassador was made o feel a guest of top-level importance. He returned his hospitality by organizing a party given on oard a Cuban freighter which had arrived in Aden n 9 January. The PDRY prime minister (who is lso minister of defense), and the Minister of the nterior, Mohammad Salch Mud', were among the nests. The freighter unloaded a cargo of sugar and ater, at night and in complete secrecy, large quanti- , g g 'es of stows wer r o d i o x An (3V protection of PDRY forces. It is also known that substantial numbers of Cubans, many of them military personnel, have begun to arrive in Aden. Deliveries of military stores to Aden, and the sudden arrival there of Cuban military personnel from Havana, are believed to be the outcome of Cuban-PDRY agreements concluded during Abdul Fattah Ismail's visit to Cuba in October/November 1972. He was accompanied by a number of military officials, and in the middle of December a Cuban delegation, headed by a senior Cuban defense of- ficial, arrived in Aden. Since then up to 1 50 Cuban military "specialists" have arrived in the PDRY, where they dispersed to special camps upcountry. Observers are wondering what lies behind this new Cuban military involvement in the PDRY. As allies of the Soviet Union, the Cubans are presum- ably diverting Soviet-made military stores to Aden with the full knowledge of the Russians. A possible explanation is that .Moscow aware of rowin Cpk`pIRC d For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 Soviet military aid, is using the Cubans as a cover Muscat. It operates in thc7Dhofar province of Mus- for its strategic: intcr6t in this geographically cat, adjoining South Yemen. important area. China, too, is strategically interest- At a nonmilitary level, there are other indica- ed in South Yemen, and Cuban military aid could tions of mounting Cuban interest in South Yemen. intensify Sino-Sovict rivalry for influence in this On 27 January an agreement was signed between remote part of the Arabian peninsula. The Cubans the PDRY's "Public Corporation for Fish Wealth" now in the" PDRY are expected to specialize in and the Cuban Fishing Company for cooperation training the tatter's, forces in guerrilla warfare and in the field of fisheries. A representative of the subversion directed against the YAR, Oman and Cuban company, Jolio Marx, signed the agreement Saudi Arabia. as head of a Cuban team which had arrived earlier In recent months South Yemeni leaders have in the PDRY to "assist" in the development of been critical of the amount of Soviet and East local fisheries. European aid directed to their country, which they Aden News Agency also reported on 3 Feb- say is infinitesimal compared with that given to Mary that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moham- Cuba. Abdul Fattah Ismail is on record as saying mad Salch Aulaqi, would be visiting Cuba in Feb- that the PDRY is "the new Cuba in the Arabian ruary at the invitation of the Cuban foreign min- Peninsula" and is more deserving of Soviet aid,' inter. This visit was announced as coinciding with since Cuba is "much more developed" and "the that of a delegation from the General Confedera- difficulties faced by the revolution in Yemen are tion of Democratic Yemeni Workers, led by the greater than those which Cuba has had to deal". Vice President, Mohammad Suda'i All, which was In a newspaper interview last November he said traveling at the invitation of the Federation of that' while the PDRY did not "negate the impor- Cuban Trades Unions. All the nonmilitary events ?tance of the current level of the aid and the great were publicized in speeches and press statements sympathy our revolution in getting from all socialist emphasizing the spirit of friendship and cooperation countries," this was "not yet sufficient to meet the between Aden and Havana. requirements of the revolution". He included in Although Cuba appears to have a position of the term "revolution" the Popular Front for the influence in the PDRY and commands respect Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf among Palestine resistance leaders, Fidel Castro's (PFLOAG) and the Palestine resistance movement. prestige has fallen in Arab countries because of his Both the Soviet Union and China support the inability to take an independent position. He has PFLOAG, but Chinese aid and influence are been accused of being "inconsistent" in maintain- greater. PFLOAG (formerly the Popular Front for ing diplomatic relations both with Arab states and the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf) seeks Israel; an Arab diplomat recently described this to destroy the "imperialist presence in all its forms" inconsistency as "a glaring blot" on the revolution- and in particular the regime in the sultanate of ary claims of Cuban leaders. DAILY TELEGRAPH, London 19 February 1973 Cuban guerrillas kffted in Guinea river clash CPYRGHT irrrlePe"donr.rl of Guinea and . ~I;atltt Vrrr1C) It ern nrnactn.n ~s,n l rave died in a clash with Porto f;?ii se troops in Guinea - llkssau, according 'to military sources in Bissau. The Cnbnn;s, Ilravil~,y-armed` and In the bailie dress of t11o I' A T G C (African r,114?ty for tiho EIGtr1' Cubans serving with African guerrillas sank in nrr strealn, The bodies or t91e Cabins, it was claimed, gent force, led by i'ho Cuban,, was prrpa,ri'n.g to launch a mornde4roosltng attack in the heartland of Guinea-Bissau. Communist plot The. P A I G C is in urgent need of moral uplift. since the organ- isation has been riven by Intor- nvl dissent ain'ce lfic assncsin- CPYRGHT ilntris tilt read: or enionri in the forces In Cuinea ?2iscat>.' Y4 Gen. Antonio "de Spinola, Portuguese commander-in-Chief, has told me there are " hun- dreds " of Cubans acting as training ? ofliret' at P A T G C canters in Senegal and Guinea. Conakry. 'rhrro arc reports that other foreign " advisers " are serving with the P A l G C and Lisbon will now serer In show th t h a t e fo h h ?, ?.? e root t at roc, .wont Coils moist conspiracy. when titry tyre attacked by a Coil ns threw raudien to the Tn lblozambignr., it was repot- j paarol of 1'ortirrla an marinna. n nd r rI~~ ~ n c r 1 r t r i Ar9ill( 44oo:d rope ire gi enva es and '1hr,?y are not the first Cubans or e,pturt d 141 rreiimn insur- hrtiavy michinc.gnfl fire And to fl; )pear with gents during the past montl Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 TEE MIAMI HERALD 25 February 1973 CPYRGHT- CUBA STILL MEDDLING, AFRICA DEATHS SHOW CPYRGHT By FRANK SOLER IT REMAINS uncertain Herald Latin America staff w h a t long-range effect Cuba's continuing su ver- ive activity in Africa has the movement. But judging t urfaced again with the eaths of eight Cuban-born errillas in Portuguese the PAIGC's strike capability appears undiminished. uinea. The death of the PAIGC- The eight guerrillas report- affiliated Castroites once dly drowned when their again focuses attention on oat was intercepted and Cuba's role In that "forgotten unk by a Portuguese naval war," as newsmen have dub atrol vessel on a river in the bed the bloody, Vietnam-like orthern part of that Portu- conflict between the rebels uese West African colony. and Portugal. Portuguese intelligence ources said the dead Cubans ad been part of an insurgent o r c e surprised on the acheau River as the group ttempted to infiltrate into ortuguese Guinea from eighboring Senegal. ACCORDING to the same ources, the Cubans. had ecently arrived from Ha- a n a to replace other astroite guerrillas returning o Cuba after a tour of duty n Africa. The Cubans were serving vith the Partido Africans da ndependenca da Guine e abo Verde (PAIGC) a rebel rmy of 10,000 soviet-trained ind equipped irregulars based in Guinea and Senegal. . Currently, an unspecified but s i z a b l e number of Cubans are said to be serving as "advisers" with the guer- rillas. And a large number of PAIGC guerrillas reportedly continue to undergo insurgency training in special schools in Cuba. CUBAN delegates were present when PAIGC sup- porters met in Conakry following Cabral's death to discuss ways of keeping the movement afloat. And most. if not all, mem- bers of Guinea President Sekou Toure's personal body- guard reportedly are special- ly-trained Cubans. The Cubans' role in Portu- Operating I r o m these guese Guinea has been com- neighboring havens - a n d pared to, albeit on a smaller from Portug4tcse Guinea ter- scale, the "adviser" role of ritory it controls- the the first U.S."forces sent to PAIGC has been waging a Indochina. hit-and-run jungle miniwar with Portugal for control of THE DROWNING of the the colony for 10 years. eight Cuban guerrillas in Por- Until last month, when its tuguese Guinea comes at a 46-year-old London-trained time when Cuban subversion agronomist-leader Amilcar in the Western Hemisphere is Cabral was assassinated in said to be on the wane. Conakry Guinea, the PAIGC The apparent decrease in was considered one of the the I e v e I of Cuba's most succesfui, anti-white hemispheric intervention is colonialism ss guerrilla cited by some as a key rea- movements in Africa. on for lifting sanctions im- posed against Cuba by the, Organization o American States in 1964. - stibet's meddling in affairs is by no means recent. .- .. been ee"Aned to Portuguese Guinea. The African interventions dates back to' at least 1962 and includes, such other targets as The Congo (Braz- zaville), Ghana and Zanzibar. IN MID-1962, a contingent of Cuban blacks was discov- ered fighting beside Commu- nist guerrillas in the eastern Congo. In November 1963, Moroc- co severed ties with the Cas- tro regime after charging that several Cuban freighters loaded with Soviet weapons had been sent to aid hostile neighbor Algeria in a Sahara Desert war. In January .1964, a ship flying the Algerian flag docked at Tanganyika, on the African mainland about 25 miles from the East African island of Zanzibar, and un- loaded the Soviet weapons. Ten days later, John Okello, a former Mau Mau terrorist who in 1961 headed the Cuba-Zanzibar polio^a1 office in Havana, toppled the Zanzibar government. REFUGEES evacuated from the island told of seeing many Spanish-speaking per- sons in Castro-style fatigues among the rebels. Tanganyika and Zanzibar recently independent from Great Britain - then joined to create Tanzania, which soon became a "back door" for Cuban infiltration into Africa. More than 100 Cuban "ad- visers" arrived in Tanzania during 1965 to train rebels from other African countries, notably The Congo. That year, Congo Premier M o is c s hom a accuse Cuba of sending agents to 6444 displayed the bodies of scv- oraloft#e A NUMBER of Cuban ex- iles, many of them veterans of the 1961 Bay of Pigs inva- sion, were among fighter. bomber pilots flying for 'Tshombe's air force at the time. it was in 1965 also that Ernesto (Che) Guevara drop- ped from sight in Cuba and traveled to Africa to l e a d guerrilla groups there. His ef- fort, however, was unsucces- ful and he moved on to Bolivia, where he was killed in 1967. Cuba's African subversion intensified following the 1966, Tricontinental Conference of African, Asian and Latin American Peoples, which was held in Havana. REPORTS of Cuban in- volvcment in various African hotspots proliferated and the number of Cuban officers in- volved increased. In 1969, one of the highest- ranking Cubans then serving. with the PAIGC guerrillas was wounded and captured, by the Portuguese as he led a: guerrilla group from Guinea into Portuguese Guinea. The officer was identified; as Cuban army Capt. Pedro; Rodriguez Peralta, a long- time associate of Fidel Cas-; tro who fought with Castro, in the Sierra Maestra moun- tians against Fulgencio Ba= tista. Peralta confessed that he and "several other" officers had been assigned by the, Castro regime as "aides" to- the PAIGC insurgents. He is currently serving - a; 10-year prison sentence. Approved 'For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001?-9 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY April 1973 NOTEWORTHY EVENTS April Libya A Union of European and Arab Youth meeting is being personally spon- sored by Libyan President Qadhafi. The object of the meeting is to pro- mote militant positions on the Mideast problem, particularly in sup- port of Palestinian Liberation efforts. April 10 Czechoslovakia Fifth Anniversary of the publication of the 'faction program." Known as the "April Theses," the theoret- ical basis for the liberalizing reforms that Alexander Dubcek inaugurated in 1968, which led to the Soviet invasion in August of that year. April :10-15 Chile An International Conference Against Multi-National Com- panies is to be sponsored by Chilean General Confederation of Workers (CUT) and supported by Communist World Federation of Trade Unions. CUT claims it has support of all the trade unions but the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) declined to support the meeting. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 April 6 Ethiopia Under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) a pan-African Trade Union Congress will take place in Addis Ababa to discuss the establish- ment of a single trade union organization. This new organization would replace the non- Communist African Trade Union Confederation (ATUC) and the Com- munist dominated all- African Trade Union Federation (AATUF)o April 22 USSR Vladimir Ilyich Lenin born, 1870. In the exchange of CPSU party cards which began on 1 March, party document number one was accorded Lenin as a traditional gesture in honor of his role as founder of the Soviet com- munist party. CP Chief Leonid Brezhnev was given card number two, May Germany-USSR Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev will make an official visit to Bonn. May 15 US-Japan In 1972 the United States returned the last of its World War II captured islands, Okinawa and the remaining Ryukyus to Japanese sovereignty. By contrast the USSR still asserts its author- ity over the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin, which it seized in the last week of World War II. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 CPYRGHT "He exterminated millions of men; millions died with his name on their lips. He accepted both as a necessity, but of the one and the other, it was never possible to discover in him any sign, any trace on his visage or in his words, even though he must have had a boundless hatred for the one and was not concerned to know about the other. The party bureaucracy recognized in him its leader and its guiding spirit, even when he oppressed and decimated it. At no moment that I was with him did I ever feel that he was able to experience a second of untainted joy or an instant of disinterested and non-egoistic happiness. Such sentiments were outside his world." tic In 'un incontro diretto aleggiati'a subito nell'aria tutto cio che tradiva it tennperainento di calcola tore di cui era finpastata la sua personaliti>t - Ma era anche un uomo Halle CPYRGHT Afilovan Gilas ha 62 anzli. Ex-co naudante pare tigiano, aiurtante di Tito e suo presunto delfino, egli si distacco se??pre piu dalia Linea ulIciale del: var~ito com.unista. ?ugo_ !cumentari. slarlo, auspicando riform.e i In realty in luogo di questo in senso demnocratico. Nei: Stalin pubblico, inventato dal suo celcbre libro xLa~la sua perponale propaganda, nuova classe b, clzc gli entrava in scena davanti al- I'd l u procurd una dura con-, danna, critico aspra.m.en- to l'involuzione burocra- tica' del,o sovie- tico Galas s'incontro piu di una volta con Stalin e dalle sue esperienze tras-, se in altro libro, intito-i latol appunto a Conversa-' emozioni forti e vigorose contegno marziale e pensoso e da una grottesca maschera1 di bonarleta., quella stessa co- struita dalle sue fotografie uf- fficiali, dad ritratti artistici, e In buona parte dai film do- nter ocutore st pefatto uno Stalin privato, per cost dire operativo, di lavoro, nervoso e intelligente, e dall'altro lato vanitoso, e tuttavia amante di un modo di vita inodesto. Sono stato ricevuto per In prima volta da Stalin duran- te In guerra, nella primavera del 1944. Aveva vestito allora voc zzone clze pubblic]zia-!;1'undforme di maresciallo the mo je inedita. non doveva pill smettere. Quella dura uniforme militare Inutilnzente cerco di capire subiva pero istantaneamente le ricorda,re quale altro perso-1 sul suo corpo una strana tra- nagglo ss,torico contemporanco, sformazlone, quasi una meta- al di fuorl di Stalin, stimo-I morfosi, determinata dal suo lasse c i?icreasse nei rapportil atteggiamento assolutainente personal diretti le stesse ins-I nOn militare, vivace e non pressionl dell'inunagine che' convenziurale, che facevano tostruit~ ad/4a lle roveaotmotReieaseci illvit pubblic 1. ,a Gia prime pa- quotidlano, mutavano la divi- n - minciava anche ad aleggiare pero subito nell'aria tutto cio the tradiva a denunciava la mentality e it temperamento di calcolatore di cui era im- pastata la sua personality, per quanto sia necessarlo dire che egli non cercasse affatto di nascondere queste sue quali- ty, ritenendole anti insepara- bill da quelle di un vero po- litico. Qualche volta in modo. grottesco egli cercava addirit- I tura di sfoggiarle e di met- terle in rilievo. Cosa verso in M21110 271 deftntbim mezzi col quail poteva essere, rinfoizato lo Stato sovietico,~ quale centre di proptulsione ,del movimento comunista; mondiale. I sistemi e ii carattere di calcolatore. insleme all' astuzia che si riscontravano in Sta- lin, davano l'impressione di un uomo freddo, senza pieta .1 incapace di slanci sentimen- !tali. In effetti egli era anche uomo dalle emozioni forti e vigorose, propenso ad improv- vise espiosioni. fine della guerra aveva con-1 Naturalmente tale emotivi-, sigliato ai comunisti Jugosla- I to era da.lui subordinata allal vi di accordarsi pure col re Pietro II, aggiungendo: a E poi, quando vi sarete raffor- zati - ii pugnale nella schie- I na... i,. I Memoria ferrea I leader comunisti, anche quella del partiti stranieri, era- no a conoscenza di queste particolaiita di Stalin, ed era- +no Spinti per questo motivo situazlone a agh obiettivi da.; raggiunere: Stalin si agitava! in tutto it suo essere, ma pro- C babilmente riusciva benissimo; a dominarsi quando cost era! necessario . Possedeva una memoria ec- cezionale: ricordava. senza Cr-, roil tutti i particolari riguar-, danti i personaggi di un librot o romanzo, o di persone reali, I anche so dl cssc non ranunen tava piu I nomi, e cost pure teueva ben lisse nella menmo- y~ .l 4,04ye~h,~e ~gtsa (, e M~O84o1~ L~Yi St~lti a dc- biasimo o un appunto, non- gli uomini politics stranieri. che a provarne Un certo corn- Spesso se la prendeva per aeiia a era, Milan, 4 March 1973 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9 nessun corto, che successiva- mente si dtnlos 1-ill-also all'Im- prorviso di grand' importa11-1 za: net moudo di Stalin e nel- la su:l nlente non esisteva nulla di tanto trascurabile che; non potesse Un giorno diven-1 tare importante. Direl che averse pill ulenloria per it ma- ie che per ii bene, gorse anche; perche intuiva the 1'ordine che egli costruiva non avreb- be potuto esistere in nessun nitro mondo se non nemico... In sostanza era Itil autodi- datta, Ina non soltanto net steno in cui to a ogul uonlo dotato, ma nnchc nelle sue effective conoscenze. Si MUG-1 veva tuttavia colt abbastailza disinvoltura net Campo dells toria e delta letteratura clas- sica, come pure in quello de- gli avvenimenti c fatti di oo li giorno. Non si aveva la sen- sazione che egii Si vergognasse o provasse un steso di infe- riorititi o nasco!idesse la pro- pria ignoranza. Se accadeva che non fosse informato sul- 1'argoniento delta conversa- zione, nscoltava con intensa attenzione. aspettando con impazienza the si passasse a un altro tema. II rigido, unilat