CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES APRIL 1973

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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EXCERPTS FROM TEXT OF NUMAYRI SPEECH ON FEDAYEEN ACTION IN THE SUDAN,
6 March 1973
In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. Brother compatriots. In
all our meetings together, we have accustomed ourselves to having heart-to-heart talks
and to using frank, open and truthful language, We have nothing to conceal from the
people. The people are the masters of truth; they have the say in things; and they
have the authority.
Brothers, we have lived together through the ordeal that was imposed on us. The ordeal
was preceded, coupled and followed by events which I owe it to the people to place
before them without any distortion. Our people have paid a high price of their feelings
and nobility. The people should know why.
The talk about what has happened, brothers, must begin with an important reminder about
Sudan and the Palestine question, in whose name your land's sanctity was violated, your
government was placed in an embarrassing situation and your laws were violated.
Our honest cooperation with the Palestinian resistance, above all the Fatah organization.
has bear. within the framework of this view and understanding of the revolution. [words
ridistinet) We have provided it with unlimited means of lodgings. We have insured for
it the right of movement inside and outside Sudan without restrictions. We have given
it the right of trans-aission through the radio and publication media without censorship
and even in a-manner that I do not think any state in the world can accept. We have
done all this and for this reason we have received no little blame from certain Arab
countries for the disparagement that they have incurred. My reply has always been that
for the sake of revolutionary fedayeen action we would even accept the criticism that
is leveled at sr government. Our aim from all this has been to economize efforts and
mobilize resources for the sake of the Palestine pause, for the sake of the refugees
in the camps, for the sake of those who have been dislodged from their land, for the
sake of the orphans and widows and for the cause these have; besides their legitimate
right to return to their land and determine their future by themselves.
Brothers, the massacre at the Saudi Eimbassy has ended. In my opinion, as I have
already said, it is a clear, evident crime committed in the land of Sudan to which
the laws of Sudan apply and which can be tried by Sudanese courts in accordance
with republic decrees. I will ask justice in our country to take its course
[words indistinct] . The court's verdict shall be, honest and its sentence shall
be fair and its punishment shall be in accordance with a sound standard.
But, brothers, the facts I have gathered--I will not reveal all these facts to you
for the sake of the investigations--these facts, which are numerous and (?start.ling),
make the Black September operation a matter of secondary importance compared to
other basic questions, such as the work of the Palestinian organizations in Sudan,
the Arab states" relations with each other and the hard efforts by some citizens
as agents for those who seek to distort the victories of the revolution, if not
to undermine these victories.
The preliminary facts which I want. to share with you brothers are that the head
of the Fatah office in Khartoum has been the brains behind this operation, as
proved by the documents he wrote with his own hand and which he left behind in
his office before fleeing aboard a Libyan plane to Tripoli on the day of the
incident. A cable which was found instructed him to be in Tripoli by 1 March.
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The man who implemented the operation was the second man in the- Fatah office.
He is the same man whose voice you heard every evening over Radio Omdurman
addressing you over the air without control or scrutiny.
The car used for transporting the eight participants in the operation was a oar
belonging to the organizations.
This is not all I want to say. This is not what worries me. What worries me is
what was revealed by the numerous documents that have been found. All these
documents are now in the hands of the investigators. These documents have revealed
that the Fatah office had initiated a watch on some embassies and even on some
state officials and had been following their steps and movements.
They had recruited commercial agents to write daily reports about the activities
of the trade unions, students and the farmers in Sudan and not in Israel.
These documents have also shown their periodic contacts with elements hostile to
the regime in Sudan and some of them outside Sudan. These dissenters are headed
by a man who fled from a position of responsibility for fear of being brought to
task for the (?crimes) he committed, whioh are all punishable by the public law,
which was the receiving of commissions abroad and'the smuggling of money and the
divulging of the highest economic secrets of the. state and state doouments to..
quarters outside the country.
Evidence has also been seized proving the radio transmitter was used to serve
the outlaws in Eritrea. The messages discovered by the investigators--I still
have not recovered from the shock at their contents of contempt for my people and
insult to what I am most proud of, namely, the Sudanese (?soldier)--include a
message in which the sender says to certain Eritreans gathering on the eastern
borders of Sudan that a military patrol consisting of?a number of officers had
been sent by the command to that area on an ordinary reconnaissance trip on the
Red Sea coast. The message says; A group of high-ranking enemy,officers is going
in your direction. Kill them secretly so that you will not be in an embarrassing
situation.
This is strange. The Sudanese Army has become the enemy. The Army of Sudan,
whose sons have had faith, have gone out and struggled for God with their funds
and their souls, is the enemy. They (the Palestinians] are not to blame because the
steadfast Palestinian people would never say this, and the genuine Arab.ethies
would never condone this.
The diary of events in which the absconding director of the Fatah office recorded
his daily activities has proved that all his efforts were concentrated on the
regime in Sudan, on sabotage in Ethiopia, on meetings with the opposition and on
casting doubt on (?your leadership).
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Brothers, in view of all the above, I have conveyed the matter and its secrets in your
name today to the Arab League secretary general. I did not ask them to express a view
on or to condemn what has happened in Sudan,:and precisely in the Embassy of the Saudi
Arabian Kingdom. Many.. of them have remained-silent about this. We have only asked
them to return to their consciences in regard to what is more dangerous. It is our
duty to consult; over joint Arab action and the nature of relations among the Arab
'states,and over the limits of fedayeen action and its programs inside Arab states.
Brothers, I have always been eager to give the fedayeen action, which is connected with
the cause, the complete freedom of action even when it exceeded its limits in a manner
-embarrassing to my government and my country. But the matter today is different. It
is different because the aid we are giving is being used (words indistinct] Arab
countries which are not.part of the Palestine battle. It is different because the
Sudanese people's aid for the liberation of Palestine was being direo,ted to other
battles against us. It is different because the battle effort was being used for
cooperation with subversive elements within our country for sabotaging our aauhory itself.
In the race of all this, it is our right today to ask these organizations about their
method of action and their ideas. This is the least demanded by comradeship of struggle,
let alone by the sovereignty of the state which 'gives unlimited support, or the right
of the people who give without asking for gratitude.
Those who pursue a policy of open cgercion must know that the result of any such
relation shall be the placing of the whole people of Sudan in a fight against any
regime or Arab organization committing such a folly.
Let Israel be happy, thanks to the acts of some people, who by historical accident
came to positions of leaderships--people who are ignorant of the facts of life and who
,,-think that historical changes can be achieved over the radio or through the (word
indistinct) handful of agents and henchmen. whether :absoonding or not, who trade in
the name of the Palestine revolution while they plot to undermine their country and
its revolution. To these I address this warning: I am determined not to be lenient
or tolerant toward them. The revolution shall doubtly reply to every blow. September,
will not be the only b;pok month. Indeed, the authority (in Sudan) is capable of turns-
ing all the days of the year into pitch blank to them for the*sake of order, the
revolution, Sudan and the people of Sudan.
EXCERPTS FROM ABU DAWUD TESTIMONY BEFORE JORDANIAN MILITARY TRIBUNAL,
Broadcast by Radio Am=, 24 March 1973
(Testimony of Muhammad Dawud Muhammad 'Awdah,?alias Abu Dawud before the military
prosecutor on 15 February 1973--read by announcer]
[Excerpts] question: Tell us about your identity in detail. '
Answer: My name is Muhammad Dawud ltahammad 'Awdah. I am 36 years old. My nationality
is Jordanian. My father's nationality is Jordanian. I currently reside in Damascus.
Question: Do you belong to a political party or organization and what is your position
in the organization?
Answer: I do not belong to any political party, but I .belong to the Fatah movement
which is a political organization. My position in it is that of a member of the
Revolat:ionary Council since November 1970. I joined the movement through 'Ali HasAn
Sala.mai? in Kuwait in 1968.
I was sent by the movement to an intelligence course in Cairo on 10 August 1968.
Thy$pprove'~-t1?+se911f'12mrEl"`Ire'rlk3-09"y402?V0W00*J9
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to Fatah. They included 'Ali Hasan Salamah, Fak ri al-'Umari, Murid ad-Dajani,
Muhammad Ngb.di Sutaytah--Abu 'Ali--Ghassan al-Agkaa 'Imz n of Jtnin, a man of the Al-
Xa ashir family of Gaza living in biro, and Yusuf--I do not remember his other name
but his father was a Shaykh in Al-Karasah. The Fatah movement accused him of.being
a J'ardanian agent because he was a religious man. Also in the course were Mubammad
Daw-ad 'AWfiah--that is myself--and Muhammad Subayh, a Cairo resident.
The course was held in a house. We used to leave the house once a week for 24.hnurs.
The training course nonsistcd of intelligence matters connected with sescurity intelligence
and intelligence recruiting, information evaluation, managing agents, writing reports,
observation and investigation, a course in the use of light weapons, and recognizing
the weapons of the Israeli enemy such as planes, artillery and other weapons. We
used to watch films and see drawings. I bras the first in this course. Afterward
I returned to Amman where I worked in fedayeen bases as an ordinaxy element. .
Then I took over intelligence duties in the north and trained elements for internal
reconnaissance work. I was transferred to Amman to set up central intelligence at
the end of 1968. I remained there until May 1969. The center was divided into two
parts: Counterintelligence, and recruiting and gathering information on the enemy.
Question: What is the status of the Revolutionary Council of Fatah in relation to
the organizational structure, how are appointments made and elections held and what
is the composition of the Revolutionary Council?
Answer: In theory the council comes immediately after the Central Committee. The
Central Committee is supposed to put before the council for discussion all matters
pertaining to the movement. However, from the practical aspect. only what the
Central Committee desires is being presented to the Council. Normally, the Counoilts
views are not taken into consideration. Normally the deputy chiefs of the various
departments are from the council. The structure of-Fata1 leadership is as follows:
1. The Central Committee: The committee's responsibilities include all affairs
of the movement. The last Central Committee of Fatah was elected in September 1971.
Normally, the election of the Central Committee is made by the movement's congress.
The congress is composed of members of the former Central Committee and of the
former Revolutionary Council and several others chosen by the Central Committee.
The members of the present Central Committee are of two categories: The first
category are those elected and the second category those appointed. The elevated
members are: Abu 'Ammar (Yasir 'Arafat), Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf), Abu Jihad (Khalil
al-Wazir), Abu al-Lutuf (Farug al-Qaddumi), Abu Yusuf (Muhammad Yusuf an-Najjar),
Abu as-Sa'id (Khalid al-Hasan). Abu Mazin (Mahmud Rida 'Abbas), Kamal 'Adwan, and
Abu Salin (Nimir Salih). The appointed members are: Abu.Mahir (Muhammad Ratib
Ghunayn, and Abu al-Havel (Hayil 'Abd al-Hamid).
The Central Committee elects from among its members a general command to assume
the responsibility of the armed forces of Fatah. The general command is composed
of Abu 'Ammar, Abu Jihad, Abu Salih, and Abu Mahir. The Central Committee includes
11 to 15 members. However, the present Central Committee is composed only of 11
members, nine by election and two by appointment..
2. The Revolutionary Council: The Revolutionary Council was elected at the same
time and at the same place as the Central Committee in September 1971 in'Hammuriyah
camp in Damascus. The Revolutionary Council is composed of members elected by the
congress and includes the military council appointed by the general command, five
members appointed by the Central Committee and delegates assigned to regional areas,.
who may be summoned to the Revolutionary Council. Normally, these delegates are
assigned to neighboring Arab states. The elected members are: Majid Abu Sharar,
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engineer Yahya Habash alias Sakhir, Nabil Sha'b, Rafiq an-Nawshah, Nail 'Allush,
Aby Akram, Abu Hisham (Sa'id al-Mazyin), Abu Dawud (Muhammad Dawud 'Awdah), Na'im
Musa_al-'Umlah. The military council members are: Sa'ad Sayil, Abu al-Mu'tasim
(Ahmad 'Affanah), Abu al-Zayim ('Atallah 'Atallah), Mahmud Da' 'ash, Al-Haf Ismail,
and Hani al-Easan. The military council is composed of an unlimited number of members.
Membership of the council can be increased or decreased according to the general
commandts desire. From the theoretical aspect, the military council'* duties include
the discussion of the affairs of the forces with the general command. However, from
the practical aspect, its duties amount to nothing.
Question: What are thae .,peration3 which the Fatah movement has narried out and who
are the p :rsoz:,s who were j.:z charge of these operations?
Answ er: The special op,s ations organ affiliated with intelligence carries out the
.operation-. The inr;rll ;.ge~;xcet branch is headed by Muhammad lusuf an-Najjar and his
c.-pity H.anr.d al- t A id. 5 ;.azi al-Husayni and 'Ali He saax Salamh are Hamad al -I AyidiIa
assician'~s. lw:;aT sv Hamad al-'Ayidi's personality is weak and Ahazi al? It sa.yni's
pei'to::aii'r, i~:lso 3.s weak: and 'Ali Hasan Salamah's personality is stronger, the latter
har managed to carry c,ut operations alone and he used to act without reference to
Hamad al-'AJid.. Sala;rah gathered a group of young men around him. Most of them had
a crimi,nal -e:cocd. The source of 'Ali Hasan Salamah's power comes from the fact that
he is supported by Abu '.Ammar personally. When he obtains the resources he needs to
mount the operations he does not go back to Muhammad Yusuf an-Najjar. But he usually
goes back to him when he cannot find the resources so that An-Najjar can provide him
with the monry and the other needs.
There is.no such thing called Black September. Fatah announces its operations under
this name so that Fatah would not appear as the direct executor of the operations only
the intelligence organ [which -is run by] Abu YUSUf and Abu Hasan attributes the
operations to the Black Septemba r. Abu Iyad does not link the operations to Black
September. Abu Iyad carries out special operations whose quality and not number is
accentuated. He plans for big operations like the Munich Operation and the abortive
operation to take over the premier's office. The operations which Abu Yusuf carries
out in collaboration with Khalil al-Wazir--uRbu Jihad, are usually ad hoc operations.
They do not need long-term planning.
Question. Name the operations which have been carried out by Abu Iyad, 'Ali Hasan
Salamah, and by Abu ' uasuf and Kha1f 3: al-Wazir.
Answer: First, A.uu Iyad operations. The successful operations are the Munich operation,
and the killing Of an Israeli intelligence officer in badrid'early January,1972. I do
not know'who implemented that operation. The unsuooessful operations are: The operation
against the Council of Ministers in Amman. Second. 'Ali Hasan Salamah's operations.
The auncessful ores are the Trieste operation--blowing up oil storage tar4ca in Trieste -
Italy. These atorxge tanks supply Europe and Germany with tual.. lie sought the help of
Ash-Shamali in this operation. Ash-Shamali died of cancer.az1 he was the husband of
Antun S&Ia49.h's daughter. I do not know the persons who carried it out. The aecorx3
operation wee. blowing up the gas storage tanks in the Netherlands and Germany. The
third o;ieration was killing five Jordanians in Hamburg on the p ^etect that they collaborated
with the Israeli intelligence. The fourth oppration was firing shots on the Jordanian
Ambassador in Wndon Zayd ar.;T.ifa'i. The fifth operation was the blowing up of an
Israeli vessel in the United States. He also has one unsuccessful opeTation: The
attemiered attack in Austria On the Soviet Jews who were emigrating to` Israel. Three,
Abu Yusuf operations: Killing Wasfi at-Tall. He personally assigbxes the-men through
Xahya 'Ashur. He transported them to Cairo and subsequently, he himself transported
the weapons to Cairo. He carries an Algerian diplomatic passport; the Sabena plane:
operation at LOD airport the 0 0 oration was a failure the o o tion which
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was a failure also; another opgratior., which was supposed to take place together with
th.?Bangkok operation, was attacking the laraeli embassy in ,Romania; that too failed.
Another failure was the attempt on the life of 'Abdallah Salah in Tunis. It did not
succeed because the Tunisian security measures were good. 'Abdallah Salal-i went to Tunis
to put for'irari the United Kingdom project. Abu Jihad took part in the Bangkok operation.
There were other operations against Mustafa Dudin, 'Adnan Abu 'Awdah, 'Abdallah Salah
in May 1971. They were planned by Abu Yusuf and Abu Jihad. They failed.
This is my statement which was obtained from me of my own free will, choice and full
freedom, and I endorse it with my signature.
NEW YORK TIMES
3 December 1972
CPYRGHT
N\ATFROT U T UP, FOR PALESTJNIAS
.BEIRUT, Lcba:ion, Dec. 2- an Revolution, which met here or Southern Yemen.
Art organization to provide Pal- for two days earlier this week. :. An Egyptian Marxist, Lutfy
estinian guerrillas with protec- The conference. was believed ?el-Kholy, representing the Arab
Lion and support'is to be set up to reflect growing support for Socialist Union, Egypt's sole
by Arab leftists and '?Commu- the Palestinian guerrillas in the political party., played a leading
d of the Soviet bloc cpuntrics and in the 'role in organizing the confer-
nests lvitb the bacn
ldng
Moscow-oriented Arab and in. once and in the duscussioDs.
Vorld Communist movement. ternational Communist move- , Disagreement began the min-
Calling itself the Arab Front nwnts. ?jite the debate opened on a
for Participation in the Pe a es tin-- At the opening session, Yas- political program for the pro-
Ian Resists Vie, SL is to leave a sir Arafat, the leader of warmly jccted organization,
1-2-man secretariat headed by grcted the Vintc nr. represen-
tative and the representative of U.N. Resolution Opposed
Kamai Jumblat, a member, of the Tup_ marg5, the Uruguayan *",'Commando delegations, espc-
the Lebanese Parliament and 'urban guerrillas. cially such Marxist groups as
leader of the Progressive So- China and Libya Absent -the Popular Front for the Liber-
cialist party, who has been The gathering was attended Lion of Palestine and the Pop-
Clected secrCtary general, by leftists from 20 countries, as ular Democratic Front, insisted
et
.. The other 11 members In. well as representatives of the .Outright the con e` mu Nations ons S f
clude representatives from the Communist parties In the Soviet outright the United of
ruling parties in Algeria, SYria, Union, Hungary, Poland, East 2, ,. 19067 67, calliAk resolution ~'? Nov. . for a
a
and Iraq, from the Lebanese Germany, Bulgaria, Rumania .peaceful settlement of the Arab-
Communist party and from Al and Yugoslavia. sraeli conflict.
Fatah, the main guerrilla group. .'i Communist parties from all .-Arab Communists objected to
the Arab countries took part,
. ration-
Support in Eastern Bloc as did representatives of the men that called position and for moderation-
The new front emerged from rival Baath party factions thatmember the Arab People's Conference rule Syria and Iraq and the the Politburo, of of a the e Lebanese
se
for the Support of the Palestini- ruling National Liberation )royat the P Lear
Communist party, declared, I
T
CPYRGH
,wish .we would learn from ex-
spcrience 4pf.the.past five years,"
since the 1967, war. "Let us set
aside general revolutionary talk
hand be guided only by reason,"
he said.
?In a compromise, a recom-
mendation was adopted reject-
ing all "submissive solutions"
to the Middle East conflict but
not making a direct reference
to the Security Council resolu-
tion.
The conference also called
for establishment of a Palestin-
Jan-Jordanian effort to work for
the overthrow of the Govern-
ment of King Hussein of Jordan.
'e-Reaction to Jordanian Move
" .. The creation of the front is
a delayed reac?'iori to the -expul-
,Sion of-the ccitiiim ndos from-
JordanlasL ar: The delay was
designed to allow time for Arab
Governments to intercede with
Tong Hussein__;e nermlt__Uic
guerrillas back into his country-
Tliese efforts have been unsuc-
cessful.
8 March 1973
Terrorism: immune To Diplomacy
A "highly noticeable" Increase in the the desperate blackmail-massacre
"traffic" of-suspected Palestinian guer- March 2 in Khartoum, capital of neigh-
rillas in and out of the Libyan capital boring Sudan.
of Tripoli occurred for several weeks Moreover, a very important part of
before the murder of three diplomats the resources essential to the BSO is
_including two high-ranking Ameri known to come from oil-rich Libya,
:ens-in Khartoum last week. which is ledby the most extreme Arab
That clandestine movement has led Nationalist-Col. Muammar Qaddafi-
'op officials here to A his tentative now in power. This aid either comes
;onclusion: Without the help of the indirectly through the major Palestin-
;ibyan revolutionary government, the Ian Nationalist organization. Al Fatah.
Black September Organization (1350) or directly to the kllle * f
might no pr ec p R leatse~989I9 d eRp 9~:0 i'1 1A
monarchies with vast oil reserves, also
have been financing Al Fatah since the
1967 war, when Israel seized the Pales-
tinian west bank of Jordan and the Si.
nai Peninsula. One reason for this Sa-
udi and Kuwaiti help has been self-pro-
tection. With the payment of blood
money, both conservative pro-Western
Arab states have been ignored by the
Palestinian assassins.
Yet, even in the case of Libya, the
t.i4cl,y re-
unter-.
-.
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CPYRGI
stt-okcs. A careful study of U.S. coun-
teraution all the way up to breaking
diplomatic relations with Libya has re-
sulted In a tentative decision to do
nothing, and that explains how diffi-
cult it is to control world terrorism
with diplomacy.
Libya is a principal supplier of oil
for Western Europe. Helping in oil
production are some 3,000 American
citizens, all more or less dependent on
the U.S. embassy. If President Nixon
broke diploma tic relations with Libya
in retaliation for the bloody charade in
Khartoum, these Americans would ei-
ther' have to accept evacuation--or run
the 'risk of a possibly violent anti-
American Libyan reaction.
Worse yet, it would play into the
hands of super-Nationalists in the Lib-
yan government, to the :left even of
Col. Qaddafi, who want all American
Influence expelled from the Mideast.
Finally, such a diplomatic counterac-
tion might not impede suture esca-
pades by the BSO.
Thus, ruling out strong diplomatic
counteraction at least for the present,
LONDON OBSERVER
4 March 1973
CPYRGHT
FROM the moment at 7 p.m.
on Thursday when the seven
Black September guerrillas
burst into the diplomatic
reception at the Saudi
Arabian hmbassy here, there
was aiwas only one hope
that the lives of the five dip-
lomats held hostage could be
saved.
The hope was that Jordan's
King Hussein would prove a
softer target than the Israelis.
In this, Black September clearly
seem to have miscalculated their
new strategy.
The attack on the Saudi Ent-
h:Lssy in Khartoum was carefully
planned several weeks ago by
the lack September group in
al Fatah, whose central commit-
tee was recently greatly
strengthened by the militant
Left obtaining stronger positions
within it.
Their new task was to achieve
two major objectives. The first
was to rebuild Black Septem-
ber's morale after the disaster
of the Munich massacre and the
humiliating bungling of the
operation in Bangkok against
the Israeli Embassy last Decem-
ber.
The second was to force King
Hussein to free Abu baud-
code--name for the top commando
s
leader of al FaVOYAb~fsra ti- ifpFejy y,
eC~ Atiit~(
month while a I a
the Nixon administration Is taking a
different course: trying to persuade
Arab leaders that they themselves
must deal toughly with Palestinian ter-
rorism-or risk self-destruction. As
one high official told us: "If the Lib-
yans don't handle this, sooner or later
it will destroy them."
This is clearly understood by Presi-
dent Anwar Sadat of Egypt, who was
responsible for restraining Qaddafi af-
ter the outrageous Israeli shooting
down of a Libyan airliner with 100 fa-
talities two weeks ago.
Sadat even threatened to end the
special Egyptian-Libyan political link
auring his successful effort to prevent
Qaddafi from exploding in retaliation
against Israel, Sadat'3s motive was
obvious: to block an Arab retaliation
so excessive that world opinion, solidly
anti-Israeli after the Feb. 21 tragedy,
would swing the other way.
Then came Khartoum. Since then, Sa-
dat-along with other Arab moderates
-has continued his quiet pressure on
Qaddafi. Their message: Let the Suda-
nese government deal with the eight
DID THE HOSTAGES HAVE TO DIE?
mission in Jordan-and Colonel
Rafe Ilindawi, a Jordanian
otfieer who masterminded an un-
successful coup against King
Hussein last November.
Although the freeing of these
two top leaders was the main
objective of the operation, it was
hoped at the same time to secure
the release of about 60 other al
F.itah zuerrillas in Jordan.
Tacked on to the principal
.drntands were a whole string of
more propagandistic objectives
?-the freeing of Sirlian Sirhan,
the assassin of Senator Robert
Kennedy, and of the Baader
Meinhof urban guerrillas in
Gorman prisons regarded as
c.onu-:ules of al I'aluh ; and the.
frecinr; of guerrillas in Israel
and of all women guerrillas in
Jordan.
The operation was timed to
coincide with King Hussein's
visit to Washington. The . aim
was to try to force the Ameri-
cans to use his presence there-
as a bargaining counter for the
release of the American diplo
mats held hostage. But the
timing was wrong-Hussein was
in Morocco on a State visit to
King Hassan when the guerrillas
struck in Khartoum.
The choice of Khartoum was
carefully made. The Sudan
President, General Gaafar
Numeir
remain
personaalllyy
rre
assassins without outside interference
or threats. Their private hope: the eight
will be sentenced to die, with that pen-
alty-the first of its kind-beginning the
end of the Palestinian terrorist move-
ment.
But Sadat has scarcely more lever-
age against Qaddafi than does Presi-
dent Nixon, and even the threat of
breaking up the Egyptian-Libyan polit-
ical union might not stop Qaddafi from
attacking the Sudanese government as
tools of American "imperialism" if the
killers are actually executed.
In sum, there are no international
weapons capable of dealing with such
global terrorism beyond maximum
punishment of those responsible.
That means the death penalty in
Khartoum and a decision by all Arab
states to stop aiding and abetting in-
ternational criminal activity. Anything
less not only threatens other lives in
other countries but also guarantees
that even the legitimate Arab cause in
the bitter struggle with Israel will be
more and more damned, everywhere in
the world.
recent troubles with the Egyp- civil war with the southern
tians and the Libyans and his Sudanese.
decision to start a rapproche- Numciry had decided to turn
ntent with the United States and the anniversary into a major
other Western countries follow- national and international occa
ing the abortive Communist sion in order to consolidate his
coup against him last year. Ile regime's could therefore be counted on ofationall un fi at neandeto
as a friend. project a favourable image to
Mor
o
l F
h
l
e
ver a
ata
as an
t
, office in Khartoum that is given
official recognition in the diplo-
matic list. Its representatives
were in a good position to estab-
lish the precise whereabouts of
the sap tal's diplomats. They
had advance knowledge of the
planned reception by the Saudi
Ambassador for the departure
of Mr Curtis Moore, the US
Charge d'Affaires, and to wel-
come the new US Ambassador,
Mr Cleo Noel, the entire Diplo-
matic Corps was invited.
Anniversary
the world community. He had
invited a number of leading per-
sonalities to Khartoum--inelud.
ing Emperor Haile Selassie of
Ethiopia, who had played a help-
ful role in bringing about "the
settlement--to visit the southern
capital Juba, with him.
Black September struck on
the evening of Nurnciry's cere.
monial dinner for the Roiieror,
and the day before his dis-
tinguished party of visitors was
due to fly south to participate in
the Juba celebrations.
The guerrillas' action angered
and alienated Numeiry, who had
invested a great deal in making
It has been established that an outstanding success of the
the Land-Rover used by the anniversary.
guerrillas to. attack the Saudi The choice of Khartoum also
Embassy belonged to the local marked a new stage in the
Palestine Liberation Organisa- strategy of the Palestinian
tion office. Their local represen- leadership : it was the first time
tative has been detained for they had chosen what they
questioning. regard as an Arab country
The al Fatah men overlooked (though not a view of the Sudan
only one fact: the reception was shared by.. most Sudanese).
?n held on the eve owe first In the past, the Palestinian
e rfkTthb the 9 0 (l h - had
17-year ong r d t eit hijacking
ment ending
 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9
and hostage-taking activities in
the Western world on the ar; u-
ment that since the AVest by and
large supported Israel. Western
capitals were simply an exten-
sion of the `Palestini,n bau.le-
front.'
in a communique justifying
their choice of Kltartotnn. Black
September said that the Sudan
was parr of the Arab fattier-
Jand.* entitling thew to use its
territory fur the liberation of the
Arabs in Palestine--a vilnv
which finds little favour in Khar-
tnnni.
Nevertheless, the :guerrillas
were right in their calculations
in one imt+nrtant respect. They
world count on Nungciry playing
the role of mediator. Front the
beginning, his Government tool:
the line that they would be
guided by the single desire to
;avoid the killing of the hostages
and of the guerrillas. This gave
the guerrillas considerable room
for manoeuvre.
What vas equally clear from
he beginning, too, was that this
time the guerrillas, not daring
to risk another denial icing
-failure, could be relied upon to
carry out their threat to kill
their hostages unless their de-
mands were met.
The attack on the four-storey
mansion which serves as Saudi
Embassy and residence in the
salubrious suburb abutting on
the Khartoum international air-
port was almost faultlessly
executed. Only two guests
were lightly and accidentally
wounded-Ambassador Noel and
the Belgian Charge d'Affaires,
Guy Eid-by ricochetting
bullets when the guerrillas burst
into the reception as it was end-
ing.
Only one of their intended
hostages was missing-the West
German Ambassador- Michael'
Jovy, who was showing a dis-
tinguished German delegation
the sights of Khartoum before
himself going to attend the
President's dinner for the
Emperor. In the past, Black
September had always found
Bonn a soft target. They hoped
this time to strike a blow for
their German comrades in the
Raader?Meinltof group who have
been such loyal allies in Europe.
We were all gathered for
the Presidential dinner for the
Emperor on the lawns of the
glittering, illuminated presiden-
tial palace-the old residence of
colonial governors where
General Gordon was killed-
when the news of the attack on
the Saudi Embassy came
through.
President Numeiry at once
called his closest advisors to
deal with the situation. He en-
trusted the negotiations to his
Vice-President and Minister of focused their demands on the
I it t e r i o r , Major-Gencral leaders held in Jordan. All the
Moltanmted El Bakliir Ahmed, pressure, therefore, was on
and his Minister of Health, 'Hussein.
Gassing Mohammed Ibrahim, a During the course of Friday
voting and revolutionary-minded morning the guerrillas offered
officer. It was the latter who a compromise. They would be
was entrusted with the task of willing to fly with their hostages
going into the Saudi Embassy to ;to the United States, provided
talk to the seven guerrillas and
who quickly established an easy
and joking relationship with
their 27-year-old but as yet un-
identified leader,'-
Cables were sent to, Saudi
Arabia, - Jordan, The ? United
States and Belgium - h'forming
the governments of the tier-,
rille,s demands after a three
hour session between Health
Minister Ibrahim and the guer.-
rillas. Numeiry made no attempt
to influence them as to their
answers. He called in the Egyp-
tian Ambassador to use his good
offices in the Arab world.
From the. start, close liaison
was established with the skele-
ton American staff, who
throughout have continued to
speak in terms of highest praise
for the skill and correctness of
the Sudanese handling of the
affair. They were happy to
leave all the negotiations to
them.
The first deadline was set for
7 a.m. on Friday. The first re-
actions that reached Khartoum
were toughly uncompromising.
While there was no word from
King Hussein in Rabat-the
crucial figure in the negotiations
if any concessions were to be
made-the replies from his
Crown Prince and Foreign Min-
ister were reminiscent of Israeli
attitudees : ` The Jordania Gov-
ernment will not give in to pres-
sure, no matter what the cir-
cumstances; nor it is ready to
bargain over any demands made
by the guerrillas'
Negotiators
The Saudi King's reply was no
less uncompromising, referring
to the Black September action
as `harmful to the Arab cause.'
Only the Americans were non-
committal at first. They were wil-
ling to act in any way the
Sudanese thought helpful in
saving human lives.
With these unpromising re-
plies, the Sudanese negotiators
telephoned the. guerrilla leader
to ask for an extension of the
ey were accompanied by the
Sudan Foreign Minister and
Minister of National Guidance
to guarantee their safety.
They did not explain their
choice of the United States, but
the Sudanese assume it was
because they hoped to get the
release of Sirhan and to scoop
a major international propa-
ganda coup.
Nevertheless, their major de-
mand for the release of their top
leaders in Jordan held fast.
The Americans were noncom.
mittal in their reply, saying they
would do anything to save lives.
But the Sudanese firmly rejected
any idea of their Ministers
accompanying the guerrillas to
America; they would go only to
an Arab country.
Meanwhile, the Americans
took two steps : they offered to
arrange for a plane to be avail-
able at short notice to fly out
the guerrillas and hostages, and
they sent a senior State official
William Macomber, who had
recently negotiated the release
of the US Ambassador in Haiti,
to Cairo en route to Khartoum.
The US Air Force sent a C141
aircraft to Khartoum Airport on
Friday afternoon, but the
Sudanese authorities asked that
it should not put down as its
landin would be visible to
guerrillas on the roof of the
Saudi Embassy. The authorities
were afraid it would be mis-
interpreted as a sign of the
arrival of American forces. They
asked for it to land after night-
fall, so the plane returned to
the American signals base in
Asmara, Ethiopia.
When the second deadline ex-
pired at 1 p.m. on Fridays the
Sudanese had nothing promising
to report to the guerrillas in
arguing for another time exten
lion. They were now playing
for time.
All they could get from the
guerrillas was an extension until
8 p.m. on Friday night-and
they were told that was the end
of the road If th are were no
--- -
f
oo,,. ,...~ ... -- ----- -
satis
actory replies by then they
was, needed. would begin to execute their
ow the guerrillas withdrew hostages. Nobody was any longer
their demands about the guar- in doubt that they meant what
rillas in Israel, since the Sudan they said.
had nogcontact with the ' Zionist Meanwhile, President Nixon-
enemy and about the Baader- who had been playing host in
failed f to group, take since the they had German Washington to Israel's Prime
ailed Minister, Mrs Golda Meir-had
Ambassador hostage. They were made up his mind. His message
silent on Sirhan Sirhan, but reached the American Embassy
officials in Khartoum early on'
Friday morning. A little later,
he was announcing at his
Press conference that the posi-
tion of diplomats had become a
dangerous calling, but that the
only way to remove future in-
i security in their foreign posts
was not to give in to pressures.
The colleagues of Noel and'
Moore knew that their death
warrant had probably been
sealed. They did not pass Nixon's
message on to Mrs Noel and Mrs
Moore, who were keeping vigil
together in the American Em-
bassy residence only a stone's
throw from where their husbands
were held captive.
Macomber, who had reached
Cairo, could not possibly, get to
Khartoum before the last dead-
line ran out at 8 p.m. `It is now
simply a question of playing for
time,' a taut Embassy spokesman
told me an hour before the ex-
piry of the ultimatum. "Even if
Bill Macomber arrives here,
there is nothing he has to offer
to make any real difference.'
The Sudanese negotiators
made one last attempt just be-
fore 8 p.m. They had heard
that Hussein had left Rabat en
route for Amman. They pleaded
for an extension until 2 an. on
Saturday morning to enable
Hussein to reach his capital and
make a personal decision.
The streets around the Saudi
Embassy were blocked oil by
police and troops to leave only
a quick exit route to the airport
if that became necessary.
General Numeiry was not yet
back from Juba. Despite all the
pressures, he had insisted on
accompanying the Ethiopian
Emperor there to carry out his
planned schedule. In his speech
gel spoke of the enemies of the
Sudan who acted in a way tr
sug~estthat they begrudged her
achievements. Beyond that allu-
sion, he made no reference to
the drama in his capital.
At 8.15 the guerrillas tele-
phoned the Vice-President,
General Bakhir Ahmed, to say
that they were determined to
execute their hostages since they
had received no reasonable
assurances.
The general pleaded with
them not to carry out their exe-
cutions. An hour later, five shots
rang out from the Embassy. Five
minutes later the hostage Saudi
Ambassador telephoned Radio
Om Durman to say the two
Americans and the Belgian had
been executed.
. General Bakhir Ahmed at
once telephoned back to speak
to t he guerrilla leader. He con-
firmed the action and said that
unless positive assurances were
forthcoming the two Arab Diplo-
,mats would be shot next.
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 CPYR'GHTApproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9
LONDON OBSERVER
1.1 March 1973
action in-closing down the local
Fatale office and punishing the
CPYRGHT
j from ?COLIN LEGUM:. Khartoum, 10 March
DAN7;SI; investigations, year-old agreement that brought paper Gornltotrt is has p tblished
into the Black September kill." Peace between the Muslim north all editorial criticising the Black
in of a Belgian and two and the non-\luslim south of the September operation in Khar?- I
American:. diplomats . last Sudan after 17 years of civil toum.
wifck have produced surpris war.) Meanwhile the Sudan Govern-
ing evidence of a claridestinc. 2. Active support from Libya meat is determinedly pushing
revolutionary Islamic: it10VC-',,through the Sudan for the ahead with its plans to stage two
Eritrean liberation movement trials in a fortnight's time. The
m nt which extends from -(ELF), which is partly Muslim- first involves nine Palestinians-
Tripoli in Libya to the Middle led, to challenge aed overthrow the eight guerrillas who rusued
2-:''a the 1i ,.:t of frzicz_ t` t~ y~s:c c: :a and 4115
The c icrtsive ramification of C:-isian - dctn:r tcd Gorcrn- three of their five hostapcs, ar.3
this network of ,Hying and sub- merit, (ELF operates on the the ninth man, who drove the
version has produced a major Sudan frontier hvith the F,ritrean t ten to the Embassy. This man
crisis for Arab leaders. They Province of Ethiopia, but has was the No. 3 at the Khartoum
-ar either too cnibarrassed or too suffered recently ? through Fatah office. The guerrillas'
disturbed by the revelations to.,; internal divisions and the difli- leader, Riziq Abbou Kass, was
make public pronouncements in culty of getting substantial arms the No. 2 at the Fatah office and
reply to the open challenge and supplies to its rcbcl forces.) a well-known broadcaster who
secret diplomatic Notes-., , 3. To undermine Arab Co%- enjoyed the privilege of usihhg
adklressed to diem by the, etnments, ? including . Egypt, Sudan radio for a regular pro-
Sudan's young military leader,. which are ready to co-operate gramme devoted to the Palestin-
President Gaafar Nunieiry. . with the United States to achieve inn straggle.
extensive doc.uinent:ary et.]. n nc?otiatcd settlement in the At one time, Rizicr av:;s the
deuce shows that the secret Middle Nast crisis. neighbour of the Felgir.;r Charm
The discovery that AI Fatah,
mavenicnt has its headquarters `the thief Palestinian cf Aflaires, Guy Ei~,
., ivhn, .ntier
in ',Tripoli, but whether or not guerrilla his fiance', was c:i regular visit-
it is actively directed by Libya's ?. organisation-which 'n,ioyed ing terms. U the three
diplomatic status in the Sudan-
Pi esidcnt Miramar, Quadhali is ,vas not only en aged in the murdered diplomats, Lid was
unclear.. Ile has so far refused Palestinian strhi;f lc a^ainst singled out for humiliating treat-
to be drawn citlher privately or.; Israel but also in subversion in tnent before tie was killed.
publicly by President Nttmciry's Arab 'and African countries re- Because lie was born in Cairo and
public request to him to extra- ,t?ded s ' reactionary,' has spotce good Arabic, lie was sus-
Bite Fawaz Yassin, the head of prccipitaatcd a major crisis both peered of being an Egyptian Jew
thq office of the Palestine: Lihera? within the organisation and in and, as >uclh, a 'Zionist ac;en
Lion Organisation (Fatah) in Its relations with the Arab Gov. Ilhs fiancee flew to Khartoum`.
1 h-utouni. "a' issue fled to . ci'mnents that support it? , with his birth certificate showing
Tripoli a few hours before the President Nuniciry, who has he was of Lebanese Christian
ronte(i
storming of the Saudi Arabian ? always been an ardent supporter with het1t? But when chef
n-
Enlbassy which led to the killing of Eatalr and the Palestinian ivrt this evidence by fileS Suuddaan-
-of the three diplomats. cause, had hoped to get n clear ese intermediaries, the Mack
,. said
For some inexplicable- reasmi "dissociation by the Fatah leader, would . September lcadt he pathpt Led
Yasin left behind in Khartoum ? Yasser Arafat, from the opera- by a Sabenafpilot in the shooting.
Traft ist, diary and handwritten in. tions of his Khartoum office.. last year of two Black Scptcwbcr
tr ictioths for the attack and a , Instead of this, Arafat has' ricrri]las' who had hijacked. his
sketch of lire Saudi Ent chosen to insult him by sending air.cLaft to Lod,
asst'. 'These showed not AiTIy a m ,sage to President 'Anwar
hat he had personally directed Sadat of Egypt asking for his-; The Sudan prosecutor is
hc~ Black Scptember operation, st'171101-t a,;ainst the 'feverish., expected to demand the death
iuttliat he was also at the centre and surprising campaign by the sentence for all nine Palestin?.
f a subversive organisation 'Sudanese President' for what' cans. But even if the court
hat had among its aims:- he describes as anew and sent. should pass a death sentence, it
'y ores American plot to liquidate is doubtful- if Nunteir?y would'
T. The overthrow of Iv`unieiry the Palestine revolution. . allow it to be carried out'
;overmnent in favour of an . 'file' Egyptians are clearly. While the Palestinians will be
sl: mic socialist regime that e mbarrassed by tills open con- tried by an ordinary court, the
?oi}ld unite' tlhe Sudan with flict between Fatah and Libya six Sudanese.. who have been
ibya and Egypt in the enibry- on one side and Sudan, Saudi
? arrested will be.tri'd by court
lie Frderaation of Arab Rccprub Arabia and Jordan on tiler-otlter., mmaarrtiiaal.Tiivo'offthhemweetrrc eni,Y
u'ne' At "(11. lsira~G~CIQel' l ttile+~r~v!/ mL~S3i t-tt~ICh?iii!o f-4i ~1RtJYtt+ l'ttllill't1fi"001-
c to des r y the f agile one- solicitiut; leis "support for Ibis ?? members. are a prominent uni-
 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9
vcrsity lecturer and one of fife
Sudan's hest-known pi;ysicia s.
They belong to a ro-Libyan
Arab socialist group that is both
it
not to
danese
S
- -- - -
..---
---
u
Llollil'i 11ood. I
- -
One of this group has been Libyan Government. ' ? - --the order for the execution to'Ptished her aside and she flea in
-under police surveillance since it The documents left behind i11 be carried out. tears to her Ihcdroonh.
was learner{ a year, ago that he the haiah otlice by.Fawaz Yassihh.. ? Having oftcrcd the diplomats The three doomed nleih were
If a d approached one of show that t{te organisation was cigarettes and given them 25 led to it celiac, where they were
Nuniciry's leading opponents, ,the link between a Sudanese cell minutes to write their' last letters roped to a rillar. Al] eioirt Pifer-
exiled in Saudi Arabia, with pro- And the Eritrean Liberation to their families the guerrillas villas participated in tlfe siroot-
posals to form a united Irotht to leaders to spy on Sudanese tried to get them to sign a last 'inr; three using automatic
overthrow the Sudanese rcgimc- ihoop moventeitts along the will, dictated by them, in which weapotls and live ruin:
Thcse overtures wcrc rejected L.thiopian frontier and to pro- the diplomats wcrc to have revolvers. When the guerrillas
,because the exiled leader re- vide lieip for the Eritreans. denounced their Governments, canoe back into the t` ~i~ vit?
r325c Ve..ri ~ ` Ce a` ` 1s i1.~j4
~r c.Sn
ouE giving _
or even remonstrate. 11?:ir demands, Such 12-q the relcaSc
of Sirhan Sirhan, were obviously megaloinnniac. Signifi-
cantly, they beat tip their captives before killing them;
their predecessors at Munich at least refrained from that
barbarity. They then called in a doctor to treat the
captives before shooting them.
SThey have embarrasscd Arab nations which were
sympathetic to their cause, evert if not actually financing
and Supporting it. They alicnatcd the rnoder:ites through-
out the Arab world.
SThe government of Israel had incurred widespread
condemnation for the shooting down of the Libyan air-
liner, with the loss of 106 lives. [See Jon Kin;che: "Dayan,
Melt and the Libyan Plane," The Nation, March 12.)
There were mitigating circumstances in that incident,
based in part on the earlier atrocities by Black September
bands, and the failure of the Israeli military authorities
to communicate on the radin frequencies used by the
Cairo control tower and the lost airliner, but the onus
remained on thy. Jsra:lis. The terrorists -got the Israelis
off the hook for thc time bcinft,
"By staging their action in Ehartouni, the i.csassins drove
a wedge bctiv~.cn the l"wernnlcnt of the Su(Lin "{id tle.
Arab world. 1hcy timed the biow for "Unity DIN'," as
thour;h to punish the S(ldan se Government for app:ari:ig
IA'Ii DPF9 Di I'04AEO)00'206Oi50001-9vsly 'from the
Middle East.
 CPYRGHT
Approved or Release
'. hr terrori?is ~iixillc:111y nwrtiflcd S:lIh i Arabi;,, in The most deplorable aspect of the whole affair is that
f1t~Sl rth11 . \' th.'. ti.\ cllt!~~:;:, accillrod, the Palestinians have a genuine grievance and reasonable
l
11101-oic sr:tih must cuhilin:ltc in hwroic action, or it clamp for redress. The Arabs have exploited their cause
rc~uncs local, r m : t hk, I: 11.11-lou r; l lam: har~l?: sccll~d clown in *the most shanielcss way, *,s-ithout pi g in ' them help
I
iplomats, and surrendered ignominiously. It was is if ing to represent the Palestinian cause is divisive even
amsoti h.n;i retrained from paling down the Philistine among I'.h}estiniaus.
t
~mplc because the did not want to get hit on the head. No one is entirely guiltless in this tragedy. Nor will
;The killings damaged prospects for possible peace it avail any of the participants to pass resolutions or
Jenson for tho action, or the terrorists may have been the mats remain unscathed, there will always be the business-
t ols of a Libyan plot. At the. outset they demanded the men and tourists, soldiers and sailors: the possibilities are
?eedom of hundreds of Arab captives; the end result endless. Jsn't it time to deal seriously with the Palestini, n
l
hay he that King Hussein will cxccutc the sixteen guer- question, Instead of leaving it to the most irresponsib
e
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 25X1C10b
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Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9
LOS .ANGELES TIMES
14 December 1972
Lthi
E '7r
CPYRGHT
BUENOS AI13ES Ul--
ow close
ould the future appear if
two, -three, many Viet-
tams flowered on the face
df the globe ..."
That was the musing of
3Ernesto (Che) Guevara,
the Cuban -Argentine
guerrilla leader, months
before he died at, the
hands of the Bolivian
ar^l;, in 1^. 37.
Five years after his
abortive attempt to export
the Cuban revolution 'to
lithe jungles of Bolivia, the
future npl) cars to have
passed him by.
Gucvara's yearning; for a
series of bloody struggles
in Latin America "with
their quota of death and
irnmen e tragedies" that
would destroy North
A m erican "imperialism"
forever is ns far away from
success today as it lwas
when hn was shot to
death.
In the complicated arena
of world diplomacy where
yesterday's enemies can
' become , today's frig. nds,
better relations be-Lwcen
the Unilcd Slates and the
Snvict Union and China
are not heartening signs to
Latin revolutionaries. In
addition, the Imp'-key but
potentially important ne-
gotiations under way be-
twcen Washington and Ha-
vana over airliner :hijack-
ings would be a critical
blow to the g u e r r i l l a
movcrrcnis in the Ameri-
Ali
Survey of Terrorist Movements Reveals
Their Status as Fragmented FCalcidoscope
4as s lou the talks devel-
I
Source of Support
Cuba has been a tradi-
ifnnal source of moral and
material support for La-
t f n - American guerrilla
movements.
An Arsoc'ratcd Press
survey of the status' of
guerrilla movements in
Latin .lrnrrica revcals a
of rcvoitllinnary groups.
Sonic old ni inizations,
such. as ilia vaunted Tupa-
maros of 'i%r1;:11av, have
succambrd to attrition in
virtual opon warfare with
better-equipped army and
police forcer.
Other nrg.miz;ittnnc have
shown that a (c'w rictcr-
?mined ni.en and women
can carry off spectacular
d c m o n s (rations of vi-
olence arid terror, But
they have failed to achieve
Guevara's most cherished
desire: to win the con-
fidence anri support of La-
tin-American workers and
peasants in an organized
uprising against the so-
calierl "nlif;archy."
Argentina -- Terrorist
bombings have become an
almost daily occurrence
here but the recent return
of former dictator Juan D.
Peron as the country pre-
pares for free elections
next, year appears to have
helped case tensions be-
tween the military govern-
ment and its opponents.
The most active groups
are t
Mvriml,v All
Montoncros and the Rcvo-
lutionary Armed Forces.
The former is Trotskyite,
the latter two groups sup-
port Peron's return to
power.
Last April, I;RP terror-
Ist.s kidn^pcd and killed
Oberdan Sallustro, the Ita-
Is?n lztnaetr c
Fiat-Concord.
Lately, Argentine revo-
1 u t i ovary -organizations
have switched attention to
bombing attacks against
exclusive social and sports
elubs.whore the.-
oli-garchy" relax and play.
Argentine police do not
supply statistics, but it is
known that several
hundred persons have
been jailed as cccurity
forces hunt down guerril-
la, ?
Bolivia - The military
government of President
Hugo I3azcr, an' army col-
onel, has almost willed out
the guerrilla movement in
Bolivia. The N a t i o n a l
Liberation Army founded
by Guevara ha; ceased to
be an effective force.
Tough army rar,,gcrs de-
stroyccl a 70-man guerrilla
column in 11070. The eight
;urvivor> were allowed to
seek political asylum in
neighboring Chile.
Brazil -- Ifawin- effec-
tivciv curb'd most urban
tcl'rn:'i`m ill burn^il since
CPYRGHT
to 'U1 powrr in le
ne'v guerrilla lilovcnlent
that claims to be gathering
its forces "in a far corner
of the Amazon jungle."
The organization, in a
pamphlet delivered
anonymously in October
to a foreign newsman,
calls itself the "Araguaia
G,.^ ri'la Forces
River tributary.- - ~~- J
Last September, the
army announced that anti-
government terrorists
killed a sergeant on an an-
tiguerrilla mission n e a r
where the Transnmazon
Highway is under con-
struction, the first tints in
two years the government
acknowirdged the pre-
sence of rural guerrillas in
Brazil.
A Brazilian newspaper
recently reported that 5,-
000 troops were hunting
for guerrillas near the
Araguaia River. The
armed, forces never con-
firmed this but the fact
the story was allowed to
run in a paper constantly
under the eyes of govern-
ment censors indicated it
was probably true.
The armed forces and
police have killed or cap-
tured. most known Brazili-
an guerrilla leaders. Thou-.
sands'of real and suspected
subversives, are in jail on
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 CPYRGHTAnnrn%iPrl Fnr RPItact 1 AAAMAW - (IA_RfP7A_nh 1 AAAnnn9nnn5nnn1 _q
charges of "endangering
natirnal.securitV."
Chile--The 1070 victory
of Marxist Salvador Al-
lende and his leftist Popu-
lar-Unity coalition in a.
free presidential election
Short-circuited the pro-
grams of Chile's Revolu-
tionary Left Movement,
known by its Spanish ini-
tials as the Mlll.
This group has had to
curtail its armed "expro-
priations" of banks and su-
permarkets. The 1MIR sees
Allende's government as a
"positive step," but says
only violence will win "all
power for the working
class."
Colombia-Three guer-
rilla groups have operated
in Colombia for 10 years..
mainly in rural areas.
Aside from scattered
ambushes of army pa rota
or kirlnap in:r; of r i c h
rancher:, they have pn crI
no threat to the nation's
civilian government.
Ecuador-There 15 no
history of guerrilla move-
meats in Ecuador in re-
cent years. Even universi-
tv and secondary school
students, traditional
g o v crnment opponents,
have been quiet since a
military government
seized power last Feb-
ruary.
Mexico-Guerrilla acti-
vity appears to be mainly
confined to sporadic ac-
tions in rural areas. Gucr-
rilla leader Lucia Cabanas,
accused of leading 'an ani-
bttsh last August is which
IS soldiers were killed and
16 others wounded, has
been promised amnesty by
the government in ex-
change for the opportuni-
ty to talk with him. Anoth-
e r i m p ortant guerrilla
leader, Genaro Vazquez;
died this year in an auto
accident.
Bombings of publio
buildings and North
American properties In-
creased in Mexico this
year.
Peru - The country's
military government,
which took over in 1063, is
proud of the infreouent
outbreaks of violence
since then. There is no or-
ganized guerrilla move-
ment In Peru, although
military leaders frequent-
ly accuse "the extreme
right and the extreme left"
of c o tt m e rrevolutionary
agitation in connection
with labor unrest.
Uruguay A state of
"internal war" by com-
bined action of the Uru-
guayan army and police
h as virtually destroyed
the action arm of the Tu-
pamaros, probably the
best known of Latin
America's guerrilla move-
ments. Its leader, Raul
Sendlc, is under guard in a
hospital with part of his
jaw shot off. He was cap-
tured" during a shootout
last September,
.The Tupamaros gained
notoriety in 1970 when
they kidnaped and killed
U.S. police adviser Dan
AIitrione. They also kept
British Ambassador Geof-
frey Jackson and U.S. ag-
ronomist Claude Fly im-
prisoned for months In a
"people's jail." More than
30 Tupamaros have been
killed and 2,000 jailed and
a number of constitutional
guarantees have been sus-
pended to aid the hunt for
other guerrillas.
Venezuela -- Although
they present.. no serious
threat to the c i v i l i a n
government, urban guer.
r i l l a s have Intensified
their activities In -recent
weeks, presumably in pre-
paration for disruption of
next year's presidential
elections.
' Vb'n ,e eradication," said ' P r e s?
Ident . Rafael Caldera, re-
cently of the guerrillas,
;"but there still remain
small groups which once
in a while carry out acts to:
male their p r e s e n c e
known,"
Last week gunmen from
the Armed Forces of Na-
tional Liberation, the main
guerrilla organization in
Venezuela, killed a former
p o l i c o chief who h a d
fought terrorists,
AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT, Beirut
12 March 1973
CPYRGHT
CUBA-SOUTH YEMEN :
A SPECIAL POSITION
Cuba is taking a growing military and econo-
mic interest in the People's Democratic Republic
of Yemen. According to Aden News Agency reports,
Jacinto Vazquez de la Barza, Cuban ambassador
to the PDRY, who is resident in Cairo, visited the
republic from 17 to 21 January, when he had
separate meetings with the three members of the
Presidential Council, and the secretary general of
the ruling Marxist National Liberation Front,
Abdul Fattah Ismail.. _' - :.. : -. .
During his visit, the ambassador was made
o feel a guest of top-level importance. He returned
his hospitality by organizing a party given on
oard a Cuban freighter which had arrived in Aden
n 9 January. The PDRY prime minister (who is
lso minister of defense), and the Minister of the
nterior, Mohammad Salch Mud', were among the
nests.
The freighter unloaded a cargo of sugar and
ater, at night and in complete secrecy, large quanti-
,
g
g
'es of stows wer r o d i o x
An (3V
protection of PDRY forces. It is also known that
substantial numbers of Cubans, many of them
military personnel, have begun to arrive in Aden.
Deliveries of military stores to Aden, and the
sudden arrival there of Cuban military personnel
from Havana, are believed to be the outcome of
Cuban-PDRY agreements concluded during Abdul
Fattah Ismail's visit to Cuba in October/November
1972. He was accompanied by a number of military
officials, and in the middle of December a Cuban
delegation, headed by a senior Cuban defense of-
ficial, arrived in Aden. Since then up to 1 50 Cuban
military "specialists" have arrived in the PDRY,
where they dispersed to special camps upcountry.
Observers are wondering what lies behind this
new Cuban military involvement in the PDRY. As
allies of the Soviet Union, the Cubans are presum-
ably diverting Soviet-made military stores to Aden
with the full knowledge of the Russians. A possible
explanation is that .Moscow
aware of
rowin
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Soviet military aid, is using the Cubans as a cover Muscat. It operates in thc7Dhofar province of Mus-
for its strategic: intcr6t in this geographically cat, adjoining South Yemen.
important area. China, too, is strategically interest- At a nonmilitary level, there are other indica-
ed in South Yemen, and Cuban military aid could tions of mounting Cuban interest in South Yemen.
intensify Sino-Sovict rivalry for influence in this On 27 January an agreement was signed between
remote part of the Arabian peninsula. The Cubans the PDRY's "Public Corporation for Fish Wealth"
now in the" PDRY are expected to specialize in and the Cuban Fishing Company for cooperation
training the tatter's, forces in guerrilla warfare and in the field of fisheries. A representative of the
subversion directed against the YAR, Oman and Cuban company, Jolio Marx, signed the agreement
Saudi Arabia. as head of a Cuban team which had arrived earlier
In recent months South Yemeni leaders have in the PDRY to "assist" in the development of
been critical of the amount of Soviet and East local fisheries.
European aid directed to their country, which they Aden News Agency also reported on 3 Feb-
say is infinitesimal compared with that given to Mary that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moham-
Cuba. Abdul Fattah Ismail is on record as saying mad Salch Aulaqi, would be visiting Cuba in Feb-
that the PDRY is "the new Cuba in the Arabian ruary at the invitation of the Cuban foreign min-
Peninsula" and is more deserving of Soviet aid,' inter. This visit was announced as coinciding with
since Cuba is "much more developed" and "the that of a delegation from the General Confedera-
difficulties faced by the revolution in Yemen are tion of Democratic Yemeni Workers, led by the
greater than those which Cuba has had to deal". Vice President, Mohammad Suda'i All, which was
In a newspaper interview last November he said traveling at the invitation of the Federation of
that' while the PDRY did not "negate the impor- Cuban Trades Unions. All the nonmilitary events
?tance of the current level of the aid and the great were publicized in speeches and press statements
sympathy our revolution in getting from all socialist emphasizing the spirit of friendship and cooperation
countries," this was "not yet sufficient to meet the between Aden and Havana.
requirements of the revolution". He included in Although Cuba appears to have a position of
the term "revolution" the Popular Front for the influence in the PDRY and commands respect
Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf among Palestine resistance leaders, Fidel Castro's
(PFLOAG) and the Palestine resistance movement. prestige has fallen in Arab countries because of his
Both the Soviet Union and China support the inability to take an independent position. He has
PFLOAG, but Chinese aid and influence are been accused of being "inconsistent" in maintain-
greater. PFLOAG (formerly the Popular Front for ing diplomatic relations both with Arab states and
the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf) seeks Israel; an Arab diplomat recently described this
to destroy the "imperialist presence in all its forms" inconsistency as "a glaring blot" on the revolution-
and in particular the regime in the sultanate of ary claims of Cuban leaders.
DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
19 February 1973
Cuban guerrillas kffted
in Guinea river clash
CPYRGHT
irrrlePe"donr.rl of Guinea and
. ~I;atltt Vrrr1C) It ern nrnactn.n ~s,n
l rave died in a clash with
Porto f;?ii se troops in
Guinea - llkssau, according
'to military sources in
Bissau.
The Cnbnn;s, Ilravil~,y-armed`
and In the bailie dress of t11o
I' A T G C (African r,114?ty for tiho
EIGtr1' Cubans serving
with African guerrillas
sank in nrr strealn, The bodies
or t91e Cabins, it was claimed,
gent force, led by i'ho Cuban,,
was prrpa,ri'n.g to launch a
mornde4roosltng attack in the
heartland of Guinea-Bissau.
Communist plot
The. P A I G C is in urgent need
of moral uplift. since the organ-
isation has been riven by Intor-
nvl dissent ain'ce lfic assncsin-
CPYRGHT
ilntris tilt read: or enionri in the
forces In Cuinea ?2iscat>.' Y4
Gen. Antonio "de Spinola,
Portuguese commander-in-Chief,
has told me there are " hun-
dreds " of Cubans acting as
training ? ofliret' at P A T G C
canters in Senegal and Guinea.
Conakry.
'rhrro arc reports that other
foreign " advisers " are serving
with the P A l G C and Lisbon
will now serer In show th
t
h
a
t
e
fo h
h
?, ?.?
e root t
at roc, .wont Coils moist conspiracy.
when titry tyre attacked by a Coil ns threw raudien to the Tn lblozambignr., it was repot- j
paarol of 1'ortirrla an marinna. n nd r rI~~ ~ n c r 1 r t r i
Ar9ill( 44oo:d
rope ire gi enva es and '1hr,?y are not the first Cubans or e,pturt d 141 rreiimn insur-
hrtiavy michinc.gnfl fire And to fl; )pear with gents during the past montl
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9
TEE MIAMI HERALD
25 February 1973
CPYRGHT-
CUBA STILL MEDDLING, AFRICA DEATHS SHOW
CPYRGHT
By FRANK SOLER IT REMAINS uncertain
Herald Latin America staff w h a t long-range effect
Cuba's continuing su ver-
ive activity in Africa has the movement. But judging
t urfaced again with the
eaths of eight Cuban-born
errillas in Portuguese
the PAIGC's strike capability
appears undiminished.
uinea. The death of the PAIGC-
The eight guerrillas report- affiliated Castroites once
dly drowned when their again focuses attention on
oat was intercepted and Cuba's role In that "forgotten
unk by a Portuguese naval war," as newsmen have dub
atrol vessel on a river in the bed the bloody, Vietnam-like
orthern part of that Portu- conflict between the rebels
uese West African colony. and Portugal.
Portuguese intelligence
ources said the dead Cubans
ad been part of an insurgent
o r c e surprised on the
acheau River as the group
ttempted to infiltrate into
ortuguese Guinea from
eighboring Senegal.
ACCORDING to the same
ources, the Cubans. had
ecently arrived from Ha-
a n a to replace other
astroite guerrillas returning
o Cuba after a tour of duty
n Africa.
The Cubans were serving
vith the Partido Africans da
ndependenca da Guine e
abo Verde (PAIGC) a rebel
rmy of 10,000 soviet-trained
ind equipped irregulars based
in Guinea and Senegal. .
Currently, an unspecified
but s i z a b l e number of
Cubans are said to be serving
as "advisers" with the guer-
rillas.
And a large number of
PAIGC guerrillas reportedly
continue to undergo
insurgency training in special
schools in Cuba.
CUBAN delegates were
present when PAIGC sup-
porters met in Conakry
following Cabral's death to
discuss ways of keeping the
movement afloat.
And most. if not all, mem-
bers of Guinea President
Sekou Toure's personal body-
guard reportedly are special-
ly-trained Cubans.
The Cubans' role in Portu-
Operating I r o m these guese Guinea has been com-
neighboring havens - a n d pared to, albeit on a smaller
from Portug4tcse Guinea ter- scale, the "adviser" role of
ritory it controls- the the first U.S."forces sent to
PAIGC has been waging a Indochina.
hit-and-run jungle miniwar
with Portugal for control of THE DROWNING of the
the colony for 10 years. eight Cuban guerrillas in Por-
Until last month, when its tuguese Guinea comes at a
46-year-old London-trained time when Cuban subversion
agronomist-leader Amilcar in the Western Hemisphere is
Cabral was assassinated in said to be on the wane.
Conakry Guinea, the PAIGC The apparent decrease in
was considered one of the the I e v e I of Cuba's
most succesfui, anti-white hemispheric intervention is
colonialism ss guerrilla cited by some as a key rea-
movements in Africa. on for lifting sanctions im-
posed against Cuba by the,
Organization o American
States in 1964.
- stibet's meddling in
affairs is by no means recent.
.- .. been ee"Aned
to Portuguese Guinea.
The African interventions
dates back to' at least 1962
and includes, such other
targets as The Congo (Braz-
zaville), Ghana and Zanzibar.
IN MID-1962, a contingent
of Cuban blacks was discov-
ered fighting beside Commu-
nist guerrillas in the eastern
Congo.
In November 1963, Moroc-
co severed ties with the Cas-
tro regime after charging
that several Cuban freighters
loaded with Soviet weapons
had been sent to aid hostile
neighbor Algeria in a Sahara
Desert war.
In January .1964, a ship
flying the Algerian flag
docked at Tanganyika, on the
African mainland about 25
miles from the East African
island of Zanzibar, and un-
loaded the Soviet weapons.
Ten days later, John
Okello, a former Mau Mau
terrorist who in 1961 headed
the Cuba-Zanzibar polio^a1
office in Havana, toppled the
Zanzibar government.
REFUGEES evacuated
from the island told of seeing
many Spanish-speaking per-
sons in Castro-style fatigues
among the rebels.
Tanganyika and Zanzibar
recently independent from
Great Britain - then joined
to create Tanzania, which
soon became a "back door"
for Cuban infiltration into
Africa.
More than 100 Cuban "ad-
visers" arrived in Tanzania
during 1965 to train rebels
from other African countries,
notably The Congo.
That year, Congo Premier
M o is c s hom a accuse
Cuba of sending agents to
6444
displayed the bodies of scv-
oraloft#e
A NUMBER of Cuban ex-
iles, many of them veterans
of the 1961 Bay of Pigs inva-
sion, were among fighter.
bomber pilots flying for
'Tshombe's air force at the
time.
it was in 1965 also that
Ernesto (Che) Guevara drop-
ped from sight in Cuba and
traveled to Africa to l e a d
guerrilla groups there. His ef-
fort, however, was unsucces-
ful and he moved on to
Bolivia, where he was killed
in 1967.
Cuba's African subversion
intensified following the 1966,
Tricontinental Conference of
African, Asian and Latin
American Peoples, which
was held in Havana.
REPORTS of Cuban in-
volvcment in various African
hotspots proliferated and the
number of Cuban officers in-
volved increased.
In 1969, one of the highest-
ranking Cubans then serving.
with the PAIGC guerrillas
was wounded and captured,
by the Portuguese as he led a:
guerrilla group from Guinea
into Portuguese Guinea.
The officer was identified;
as Cuban army Capt. Pedro;
Rodriguez Peralta, a long-
time associate of Fidel Cas-;
tro who fought with Castro,
in the Sierra Maestra moun-
tians against Fulgencio Ba=
tista.
Peralta confessed that he
and "several other" officers
had been assigned by the,
Castro regime as "aides" to-
the PAIGC insurgents.
He is currently serving - a;
10-year prison sentence.
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY April 1973
NOTEWORTHY EVENTS
April Libya A Union of European and
Arab Youth meeting is
being personally spon-
sored by Libyan President
Qadhafi. The object of
the meeting is to pro-
mote militant positions
on the Mideast problem,
particularly in sup-
port of Palestinian
Liberation efforts.
April 10 Czechoslovakia Fifth Anniversary of
the publication of the
'faction program."
Known as the "April
Theses," the theoret-
ical basis for the
liberalizing reforms
that Alexander Dubcek
inaugurated in 1968,
which led to the Soviet
invasion in August of
that year.
April :10-15 Chile
An International
Conference Against
Multi-National Com-
panies is to be
sponsored by Chilean
General Confederation
of Workers (CUT) and
supported by Communist
World Federation of
Trade Unions. CUT
claims it has support
of all the trade unions
but the International
Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU)
declined to support
the meeting.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9
April 6 Ethiopia Under the auspices of
the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) a
pan-African Trade Union
Congress will take
place in Addis Ababa
to discuss the establish-
ment of a single trade
union organization.
This new organization
would replace the non-
Communist African Trade
Union Confederation
(ATUC) and the Com-
munist dominated all-
African Trade Union
Federation (AATUF)o
April 22 USSR Vladimir Ilyich Lenin
born, 1870. In the
exchange of CPSU party
cards which began on
1 March, party document
number one was accorded
Lenin as a traditional
gesture in honor of
his role as founder
of the Soviet com-
munist party. CP
Chief Leonid Brezhnev
was given card number
two,
May Germany-USSR Soviet Party Chief
Leonid Brezhnev will
make an official visit
to Bonn.
May 15 US-Japan In 1972 the United States
returned the last of its
World War II captured
islands, Okinawa and the
remaining Ryukyus to
Japanese sovereignty.
By contrast the USSR
still asserts its author-
ity over the Kurile
Islands and Sakhalin,
which it seized in the
last week of World War II.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9
CPYRGHT
"He exterminated millions of men; millions died
with his name on their lips. He accepted both as a
necessity, but of the one and the other, it was never
possible to discover in him any sign, any trace on his
visage or in his words, even though he must have had
a boundless hatred for the one and was not concerned
to know about the other. The party bureaucracy
recognized in him its leader and its guiding spirit,
even when he oppressed and decimated it. At no moment
that I was with him did I ever feel that he was able
to experience a second of untainted joy or an instant
of disinterested and non-egoistic happiness. Such
sentiments were outside his world."
tic
In 'un incontro diretto aleggiati'a subito nell'aria tutto cio che tradiva it tennperainento
di calcola tore di cui era finpastata la sua personaliti>t - Ma era anche un uomo Halle
CPYRGHT
Afilovan Gilas ha 62
anzli. Ex-co naudante pare
tigiano, aiurtante di Tito
e suo presunto delfino,
egli si distacco se??pre piu
dalia Linea ulIciale del:
var~ito com.unista. ?ugo_ !cumentari.
slarlo, auspicando riform.e i In realty in luogo di questo
in senso demnocratico. Nei: Stalin pubblico, inventato dal
suo celcbre libro xLa~la sua perponale propaganda,
nuova classe b, clzc gli entrava in scena davanti al-
I'd
l
u
procurd una dura con-,
danna, critico aspra.m.en-
to l'involuzione burocra-
tica' del comuni.sm,o sovie-
tico Galas s'incontro piu
di una volta con Stalin e
dalle sue esperienze tras-,
se in altro libro, intito-i
latol appunto a Conversa-'
emozioni forti e vigorose
contegno marziale e pensoso
e da una grottesca maschera1
di bonarleta., quella stessa co-
struita dalle sue fotografie uf-
fficiali, dad ritratti artistici, e
In buona parte dai film do-
nter
ocutore st
pefatto uno
Stalin privato, per cost dire
operativo, di lavoro, nervoso
e intelligente, e dall'altro lato
vanitoso, e tuttavia amante di
un modo di vita inodesto.
Sono stato ricevuto per In
prima volta da Stalin duran-
te In guerra, nella primavera
del 1944. Aveva vestito allora
voc zzone clze pubblic]zia-!;1'undforme di maresciallo the
mo je inedita. non doveva pill smettere.
Quella dura uniforme militare
Inutilnzente cerco di capire subiva pero istantaneamente
le ricorda,re quale altro perso-1 sul suo corpo una strana tra-
nagglo ss,torico contemporanco, sformazlone, quasi una meta-
al di fuorl di Stalin, stimo-I morfosi, determinata dal suo
lasse c i?icreasse nei rapportil atteggiamento assolutainente
personal diretti le stesse ins-I nOn militare, vivace e non
pressionl dell'inunagine che' convenziurale, che facevano
tostruit~ ad/4a
lle roveaotmotReieaseci illvit
pubblic 1. ,a Gia prime pa- quotidlano, mutavano la divi-
n -
minciava anche ad aleggiare
pero subito nell'aria tutto cio
the tradiva a denunciava la
mentality e it temperamento
di calcolatore di cui era im-
pastata la sua personality, per
quanto sia necessarlo dire che
egli non cercasse affatto di
nascondere queste sue quali-
ty, ritenendole anti insepara-
bill da quelle di un vero po-
litico. Qualche volta in modo.
grottesco egli cercava addirit- I
tura di sfoggiarle e di met-
terle in rilievo. Cosa verso in
M21110 271 deftntbim
mezzi col quail poteva essere,
rinfoizato lo Stato sovietico,~
quale centre di proptulsione
,del movimento comunista;
mondiale.
I sistemi e ii carattere di
calcolatore. insleme all' astuzia
che si riscontravano in Sta-
lin, davano l'impressione di
un uomo freddo, senza pieta .1
incapace di slanci sentimen-
!tali. In effetti egli era anche
uomo dalle emozioni forti e
vigorose, propenso ad improv-
vise espiosioni.
fine della guerra aveva con-1 Naturalmente tale emotivi-,
sigliato ai comunisti Jugosla- I to era da.lui subordinata allal
vi di accordarsi pure col re
Pietro II, aggiungendo: a E
poi, quando vi sarete raffor-
zati - ii pugnale nella schie- I
na... i,. I
Memoria ferrea
I leader comunisti, anche
quella del partiti stranieri, era-
no a conoscenza di queste
particolaiita di Stalin, ed era-
+no Spinti per questo motivo
situazlone a agh obiettivi da.;
raggiunere: Stalin si agitava!
in tutto it suo essere, ma pro- C
babilmente riusciva benissimo;
a dominarsi quando cost era!
necessario
.
Possedeva una memoria ec-
cezionale: ricordava. senza Cr-,
roil tutti i particolari riguar-,
danti i personaggi di un librot
o romanzo, o di persone reali, I
anche so dl cssc non ranunen
tava piu I nomi, e cost pure
teueva ben lisse nella menmo-
y~ .l 4,04ye~h,~e ~gtsa (, e
M~O84o1~ L~Yi St~lti a dc-
biasimo o un appunto, non- gli uomini politics stranieri.
che a provarne Un certo corn- Spesso se la prendeva per
aeiia a era, Milan, 4 March 1973
 CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200050001-9
nessun corto, che successiva-
mente si dtnlos 1-ill-also all'Im-
prorviso di grand' importa11-1
za: net moudo di Stalin e nel-
la su:l nlente non esisteva
nulla di tanto trascurabile che;
non potesse Un giorno diven-1
tare importante. Direl che
averse pill ulenloria per it ma-
ie che per ii bene, gorse anche;
perche intuiva the 1'ordine
che egli costruiva non avreb-
be potuto esistere in nessun
nitro mondo se non nemico...
In sostanza era Itil autodi-
datta, Ina non soltanto net
steno in cui to a ogul uonlo
dotato, ma nnchc nelle sue
effective conoscenze. Si MUG-1
veva tuttavia colt abbastailza
disinvoltura net Campo dells
toria e delta letteratura clas-
sica, come pure in quello de-
gli avvenimenti c fatti di oo li
giorno. Non si aveva la sen-
sazione che egii Si vergognasse
o provasse un steso di infe-
riorititi o nasco!idesse la pro-
pria ignoranza. Se accadeva
che non fosse informato sul-
1'argoniento delta conversa-
zione, nscoltava con intensa
attenzione. aspettando con
impazienza the si passasse a
un altro tema.
II rigido, unilat