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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 25X1 C1 Ob Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 LAS.J.LhAJJAX,L L L SOVIETIZING RELUCTANT RELIGIONS May 1972 Two recent events, a "Lenten Letter" addressed to the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church by Nobel Prize-winning author Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and a petition sent to the United Nations Secretary General by 17,000 Lithuanian Raman Catholics have served to refocus world attention on the continuing persecution of religious groups within the USSR and on the dilemma that "religion" poses for the Soviet regime. The Lenten Letter In his open letter to Patriarch Pimen, Solzhenitsyn highlights both the hypocrisy and the duality of Soviet policies regarding religion at home and abroad. He accuses Pimen of being a tool of the atheist Soviet state who passively acquiesces in regime efforts to stamp out the church within the Soviet Union while serving Soviet propaganda abroad in its efforts to portray the USSR as a country in which complete religious freedom exists. Recalling that Pimen's New Year's message had appealed to the Russian faithful abroad to raise their children to love the church, Solzhenitsyn notes that "perhaps for the first time in half a century, you finally spoke about the religious upbringing of children." He then asks, "But what is the purpose of all this; why is your earnest appeal directed only to Russian emigres; why do you call only on those Children to be brought up in the Christian faith; why do you admonish only the distant flock to 'discern slander and falsehood' and be strong in truth and justice; and we---what should we discern; should we or should we not foster in our own children a love for the church?" Given Solzhenitsyn's moral authority and the worldwide publicity his statement has been receiving---with much of this publicity filtering back into the Soviet Union---this denunciation of Pimen (and indirectly of state-controlled spiritual heads of other religious bodies in the USSR) may have widespread repercussions bot only within the Russian Orthodox Church but throughout the religious communities in the Soviet Union. The "Lenten Letter" marks the first time since Stalin's death that a public figure of Solzhenitsyn's stature has openly demanded greater religious freedom for Soviet citizens and denounced the compliance of Church leaders with the Kremlin's anti- religious measures. Solzhenitsyn portrays the futility of .a religious man under the yoke of the totalitarian atheist Soviet regime as he dissolves the veneer of "religious freedom" in the USSR, to indict the Kremlin with specific charges of officially administered religious persecution. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 He captures the substance as well as the essence of repression, not only of Orthodox believers, but also of Moslems, Jews, Catholics, Protestants and others in the USSR in the following excerpts from his letter: "The entire administration of the ment of priests and bishops (including Churchmen who make it easier to deride all of this is secretly managed by the Affairs. A church dictatorially ruled sight not seen in two thousand years. Church, the appoint- even sacrilegious and destroy the 'church), Council for Religious by atheists is a "Priests are powerless within their own parishes; only the conduct of church services is still entrusted to them, and even then, only if they remain within the church building. But if they wish to visit the bedside of the sick or a cemetery they must first ask for approval 4 the city council. "For every functioning church, there are twenty that have been razed or irretrievably ruined and another twenty are in a state of neglect or profanation. How many populated places are there in this country where the closest church is one hundred or even two hundred kilometers away? Any attempt on the part of the church activists, donors or bequestors to restore even the smallest church is blocked... ft...after the baptizing of infants, all of the child's associations with the church usually cease. The doors to a religious upbringing are tightly shut against them. They are barred from participating in Church services, taking communion and, perhaps, even from attending church. The right to propagate the faith of our fathers has been broken, as well as the right of parents to bring up their children within the precepts of their own world outlook. And you, leaders of the church, have yielded to this and condone it by accepting as reliable evidence of religious freedom the fact that we must place our defenseless children not into neutral hands but into those of the most primitive and unscrupulous kind of atheistic propagandists. "We do not even ask about the pealing of church bells. Why is Russia deprived of her ancient adornment, her most beautiful voice? "There are even no gospel books---these are brought to us from abroad.... "Why was it necessary for me to show my passport when I came to Church to baptize my son? With what sort of canonical demands must the Moscow Patriarchate comply in 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 registering the souls of those who are being baptized? One must wonder at the spiritual strength of the paretts and at the fathomless spiritual resistance inherited through the ages with which they go through this denunciatory registration and must later face the persecution at their place of employment or the public ostracism of ignoramuses." The Catholics In February of this year more than 17,000 Lithuanian Roman Catholics, in the largest known open protest of its kind ever experienced in the Soviet Union, petitioned the United Nations because "believers in our republic cannot enjoy the rights set out in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." (The declaration, passed by the UN with the Soviet Union abstaining, calls for the recognition of religious freedom by all countries.) Among the specific charges of religious persecution cited by the Lithuanians were: "Soviet officials limit the number of new priests to be trained and control the assignment of priests to parishes. No more than 10 youths a year can enter the seminary. There are so few priests in Lithuania that one must often serve two or three parishes and that even invalid and aged priests must work. "Catholics have not been allowed to rebuild churches destroyed during World War II and have difficulty in getting permission to hold services in private homes. "Two parish priests were sent to labor camps for providing religious instructions to youngsters. Two bishops were exiled without trial. "The authorities do not enforce a law which would punish those who persecute church-goers." There are an estimated 3.5 million Raman Catholics in the Soviet Union, most of them ethnic Lithuanians and Poles living in Lithuania] and in western parts of Belorussia and the Ukraine. Lithuania, with a current population slightly over 2.5 million, is the largest single Catholic area with an estimated 500 churches stillipperating. Prior to its annexation into the USSR in 1940, well over 80% of the population of Lithuania belonged to the Roman Catholic Church. Catholicism has been strong and influential in Lithuania through several centuries and is deeply engrained in the Lithuanian national identity. Unlike the Orthodox Church, whose spiritual head, Pimen, rules from Moscow, the Lithuanian Catholics fall under 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 the spiritual domain of the Pope, in Rome. Lithuanian Communist Party attempts to sever these ties by forming a state-sponsored National Lithuanian Church in 1952 were abandoned because of stiff resistance by church leaders. Although the church still remains within the spiritual realm of the Vatican, part of the price for its survival is the Lithuanian Catholic leaders' public support for Soviet foreign policy objectives. The Moslems Islam, next to Orthodoxy, has the setond largest following in the Soviet Union. Official figures published in 1912, gave the number of Moslems in Imperial Russia as 16,2 million. According to Radio Moscow, following the 1959 census, there were some 30 million Moslems in the USSR. This figure is obviously based on nationality rather than on active religious affiliation. The most recent Soviet census, of 1970, lists the greatest percentage gains of population since 1959 for those areas inhabited largely by Moslems, so that today the number of ethnic Moslems in the USSR may be well in excess of 40 million. There are no reliable figures on the number actively engaged in Islam worship. In 1912, however, there were over 26,000 mosques in Imperial Russia, whereas in 1959 the last date for which official figures are available, Tashkent Radio placed the number of mosques at about 1200. The position of Islam in the USSR is unique in several respects: it is the sole religion practiced by over 30 more or less compact but distinct nationalities, among whom it serves as a cultural bond. The traditional Islamic way of life, although to some extent affected by Westernization, especially in the towns, remains as a whole far more distinct and particularist than that associated with any other religion or ideology; the Moslem peoples of the USSR have much closer cultural, social and biological affinities with the non-Soviet Moslem peoples living adjacent to them than with any of the non-Moslem Soviet nationalities*. Today, Moslem leaders give full support to Soviet policies as the price for the continued existence of their institutions and the practice of their faith. Like the other main religious bodies of the Soviet Union, the followers of Islam, too, are controlled by the Council for Religious Affairs which is centrally directed by the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Some state repressive measures peculiar to Islam are: *Religion and the Soviet State - A Dilemma of Power, Max Hayward and William C. Pletcher, 1969. 4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 - The Hajj (the pilgrimage to Mecca which is the canonical obligation of every believer once in his life- time if he has the material means) has long been banned to the rank and file Soviet Moslem. For external propaganda purposes, small groups of usually not more than 20 Moslems, selected primarily for their devotion to the Soviet regime, are occasionally flown to Mecca at state expense amidst much publicity directed to areas of the Middle East by Radio Mbscow. - Since 1955, Soviet authorities have permitted the publication of only three small(editions of the Koran. The latest edition came out in 1969 in 5,000 copies. It is printed in old Arabic, however, and therefore, cannot be read by most Central Asians, who do not even know the script in which their own languages were once written. The Jews Unlike the official status accorded to the other main faiths recognized in the Soviet Union, Judaism has not been allowed to establish any form of central organization to administer the Jewish communities scattered throughout the Soviet Union. The 1970 Soviet census lists 2.1 million ethnic Jews in the USSR. The number of active believers of Judaism is not available nor are official statistics on the number of practicing synagogues remaining in the USSR. One source gives the number of recognized synagogues in 1965 as 62. By contrast, the number of synagogues in 1941 was 1,011 while in 1926 1,003 registered Hebrew communities had existed in the Ukraine alone. Official measures of persecution peculiar to Judaism included: - The rite of circumcision, allegedly symbolizing the concept of the "chosen people" has been attacked with particular vehemance. Information on the medical value of circumcision reportedly does not even appear in Soviet medical journals. - The observance of Passover With its national overtones, for example, the phrase "next year in Jerusalem" with which the Seder, the traditional Passover ceremony ends, has also been strongly discouraged. - The baking of matzos (unleavened bread eaten by Jews during the Passover) has been made very difficult and except for a very limited supply baked in Moscow, it is virtually unavailable. 5 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 The Protestants Officially Russian Protestantism was a protest against Tsarist state intervention in the affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church. It was made up of numerous sects, the two most important being the Evangelical Christians and the Baptists. In marked contrast to other religious groups in the USSR, the Evangelical Christians and Baptists, with a total membership of only about 100,000 in 1914, were treated with an attitude of positive benevolence by the new Soviet regime in the first few years after the Revolution. As a consequence, by 1928 there were about 4 million Evangelical Christians in some 3200 congregations in the USSR. The year 1929 marked the beginning of almost continuous severe repression of the sects, primarily over their resistance to the collectivization of agriculture. Many members of the sects were deported to Siberia. Many died en route to or in labor camps. By 1941 the number of congregations was reduced to approximately 1,000. In 1945 the Evangelical Christians and Baptists, together with several other small denominations, were united in the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christian-Baptists (the VSEKhB, from the Russian initials). Since its inception, the VSEKhB, managed and controlled by the Council on Religious Affairs, has been at pains to preserve correct relations with the Soviet authorities. In 1962 the VSEKhB claimed 545,000 full members in its application for membership in the World Council of Churches. Today, outside sources estimate the figure as high as 1.5 million full members and a total community of 3 million. In 1965, a group of Baptists calling themselves "Initsiativniki" broke away from the VSEKhB in protest of its leaders' compromises with the Soviet regime. Demanding complete freedom of religion, the dissident Baptists have established themselves into well organized illegal (unregistered with the Council of Religious Affairs) communities. In disregard for Soviet laws and repressive measures, they give religious training to their children, print and distribute their own religious literature, some of which attacks the Soviet state, and actively seek new members. Over 500 of their members have been illprisoned in the last ten years. The Dilemma Religious protesters play an increasingly important role in the growing civil rights movement in the USSR, as evidencedlory'thereporting on instances of religious persecution in the Chronicle of Current Events. The Chronicle is a clandestinely circulated samizdat publication issued on a more or less regular schedule of once every-two months Whith, although not yet known to the Soviet masses, is rapidly growing in significance and influence among Soviet intellectuals. 6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Religion is a alemma for the Soviet regime. The question faced by Soviet policy makers is not whether religion in general or any specific religion is compatible with communism. Rather, the question is how does religion influence the realities of Soviet power objectives While Soviet foreign policy objectives require an image of progressive liberalism towards religion (as well as towards the closely related phenomenon of nationalism), Soviet internal objectives, stemming from the multinational make-up of the USSR and involving Kremlin attempts to foster an all-embracing "Soviet nationalism," demand the suppression of religion and nationaliSmL) ibecause of theif chauvinitic and irtedentist tendendies.drice,the complete liquidation of religious groups (if this were possible) would severely damage Soviet foreign policy objectives, however, the Kremlin is at pains to maintain a plausible tightly-controlled facade of constitutionally guaranteed "religious freedom" for all of its citizens. The latter is no easy task, however, for it involves the manipulation of the most subtle human thought processes and emotions as well as the ethnic, racial and spiritual heritage of many centuries of human existence. It is furthermore complicated by a modern world in which racial, ethnic and spiritual identity :AM more universally sought after than ever before and technology in communications and transportation increasingly facilitates international human exchange. There are many indications that Soviet attempts to maintain their delicately contrived balancing act regarding religious affairs are experien4ng serious difficulties. Solzhenitsyn's Lenten Letter and the Lithuanian protest highlight these difficulties. The samizdat revelations on a continuing and ever-expanding basis, lend considerable substance to what appears to be an increasing interest in religion by a wide variety of Soviets but most pointedly on the part of Soviet intellectuals. The controlled Soviet press, itself, in admitting the ineffectiveness of its own anti-religious propaganda and in chastising youth,. intellectuals and even Communist Party members for their interest in religion provides probably the best indication that the problems posed by religion for Soviet policy makers are far from resolved. Furthermore, while this growing interest in religion will almost inevitably tend to increase Kremlin measures of repression and persecution, the growing voice of protest resulting in worldwide publicity of Soviet ambivalence with a potential for damaging Soviet foreign policy objectives will, hopefully, act as a restraint on those in the Kremlin who might otherwise favor a'return to Stalinist terror. 7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 NEW YORK TIMES 9 April 1972 Today is Easter by the calendar of the Russian Orthodox Church. This is the full text of the letter sent to Patriarch Pimen of Moscow snd All the Russias by Alehsandr L Solzhenitsyn, express- ing his deep concern over the state of the church, its subservience to the Soviet state and its failure to defend the cause of the faith in Russia. By ALEKSANDR I. SOLZHENITSYN CPYRGHT A Lenten Letter lkilostow Patriarchate comply In regis- tering the souls of those who are being baptized? One must wonder at the ?spiritual strength of the parents and at ;the fathomless spiritual resistance in- herited through the ages with which they go through this denunciatory reg- istration and must later face the perse- ? cution at their place of employment or the public ostraciSm of ignoramuses. At this point persistence runs out ter the baptizing of infants all of the c lid's associations with the church, ually cease. The doors to a religious! u ibringing are tightly shut against t em. They are barred from participat- 1 g in church services, taking corn- union and, perhaps, even from at- nding church. We are robbing our , ildren by depriving them of that un- peatable, purely angelic perception ! the church service, which in adult e can never be recaptured nor even derstood as to what has been lost. The right to propagate the faith of r fathers has been broken, as well s the right of parents to bring up their ildren within the precepts of their wn world outlook. And you, leaders ; f the church, .have yielded to this and ondone it by accepting as reliable evi- ence of religious freedom the fact at we must place our defenseless hildren not into neutral hands but to those of the most primitive and nscrupulous kind of atheistic propa- Most Holy Master! That?which presses upon the head like a gravestone and crushes the breast of a moribund Russian Orthodox, 'people ? is the subject of this letter. Everyone knows this, and it has al- ready been shouted aloud, but every- one has again reverted to a doomed silence. And a small stone needed to be placed on top of the large one to make it no longer possible to remain silent. I was weighed down by such a small stone when I heard your message on Christmas Eve. , I felt a pang at that point when, per- haps for the first time in half a cen- tury, you finally spoke about childrenb suggesting the following precept that, along with infusing their children with love for their country, parents should foster in them a love for the church (and apparently for faith itself?) and they should strengthen that love by setting a good personal example. I beard this ? and saw before me my, early childhood, spent in attending many church services, and remembered that initial impression, exceptionally fresh and pure, which later could not be erased by any millstone or mental theory. But what is the purpose of all this? Why is your earnest appeal directed only to Russian trnigres? Why do you call only on those children to be _brought up in the Christian faith, why' do you admonish only the distant flock to "discern slander and falsehood" and eb strong in truth and justice? And we --what should we discern? Should we or should we not foster in our own children a love for the church? Yes, Christ taught us to search even for the hundredth sheep that is lost ? when the remaining ninety-nine are found. ?But when even the ninety-nine are missing ? should we not concern our- selves, first of all, in their behalf? Why was it necessary for me to show my passport when I came to church to baptize my son? With what sort of, :n fli al d ds nu- the 'The right to propagate the faith of our fathers has been broken." andists. You find evidence of religious freedom in the fact that adolescents orn away from Christianity (God for- bid that they should be infected by it) are left with the ravine between the agitator's manual and the criminal code for their moral upbringing. Half a century of our past history has been neglected. I do not even speak of rescuing the present but how can we save our country's future?the future which will be constituted by to- day's children? In the final analysis the true and profound 'destiny of our coun- try will depend on whether the idea of the rightness of power shall be irrev- ocably implanted in the people's con- ether that darkening eclipse shall be cleansed and the power of righteousness radiate once again. Will we be able to reinstate within our-, selves at least some of-the traces of Christianity or shall we lose them com- pletely and surrender ourselves to the , calculations of self-preservation and profit.? A study of Russian history in the, last few centuries will show that it might have been incomparably more humane and harmonious if the church had not surrendered its independence and .the people had listened to its voice, as for example, in Poland.. Alas, with us it has been different for a long time. We were losing and have lost that bright, ethical Christian atmosphere in which our values, way of life, world outlook, folklore and even the word "peasant" have been founded for thousands of years. We are losing the last traces and signs of a Christian people?is it possible that this should not be the main concern of the Russian Patriarch? The Russian Church has its indig- nant opinion on every evil in distant Asia or Africa, yet on internal ills- -It ha none ever. Why art the mes: 7ges which we receive from the church hierarchy traditionally tranquil? Why are all church documents so complacent, as if they were issued among the most Christian of peoples? One serene message follows another, in the course of the same inclement year. Will not the need for these messages soon cease altogether? There will no longer be anyone left to whom they should be addressed; the flock will disappear, With the exception of the Patriarchal Chancellery office. Almost seven years have passed since two honest priests, Yakunin and Eshliman, wrote their famous letter to your predecessor in which they demonstrated through personal sacri- fice that the pure flame of the Chris- tian faith has not as yet been extin- guished in our country. They described in an extensive and convincing fashion the voluntary internal enslavement of the Russian Church which has reached the point of self-annihilation and asked that anything which was untrue be pointed out to them. But every word was true; none of the hierarchs too CPYRGHT 1,p4Notity4 i0C.itiktp.wemitil 1 uTa9potP1M9t10-n? Preservn- "Half a century of CPYRGHT our past history has been neglected." It upon himself to refute them. And how was their letter answered? In a most simple and crude manner: for telling the truth they were forbidden to conduct services. And up to this very day you have not corrected this. The frightening letter of the twelve ' believers from Vyatka has also remained unanswered; they were only put under pressure. And the only , fearless Archbishop, Yermogen of Kaluga, is still in monastic seclusion. It was he who had forbidden the closing of his churches and the burning of icons and books, an accomplishment In which degenerate enraged atheism achieved great success up to 1964 in other diocese. It is almost seven years now that all of this was, said aloud, but what. has changed? For every functioning church there are twenty that have: been razed or irretrievably ruined and another twenty are in a state of neglect or profanation. Is there a sight more harrowing than these skeletons, the sole domain of birds and store- keepers? How many populated places, are there in this country where the, closest church is one hundred or even two hundred kilometers away? And our north?that age-old repository of Russian spirit and, perhaps, Russia's most dependable future?is left entire- ly without churches. Any attempt on the part of , church activists, donors smallest church is blocked by the one-sided laws of the so-called division of church and state. We dare not even ask about the pealing of church bells. Why is Russia deprived of her ancient adornment, her most beautiful voice? But how can we speak of churches? There are even no gospel books? these are brought to us from abroad, in the same way as our own preachers used to take them to the Indigirka. This is the seventh year?and has the church asserted itself on anything? The entire administration of the church, the appointment of priests and bishops (including even sacrilegious churchmen who make it easier to deride and destroy the church), all of this is secretly managed by the Council for Religious Affairs. A church dictatorially ruled by atheists is a sight not seen in two thousand years. Also under their control is the, church economy and the use of church resources, those coins deposited by the fingers of the devout. Five million rubles are donated to outside funds with magnanimous gestures, while beggars are chased away from the portico and there is no money to repair a -leaking roof in a poor parish: -Priests are powerless within their own parishes; only the conduct of church services is still entrusted to them, and even then, only if they remain within the church building. But if they wish to visit the bedside of the sick or a cemetery they must first ask for approval of the city council. What sort of reasoning can be used to convince oneself that the consistent destruction of the Spirit and body of the church by atheists is the hest an for whom? Certainly not for arist. Preservation by what meanV '74lsehood? But after falsehOod?what ;art of hands should perform th icharist? Most Holy Master! Do not scar entirely my unworthy outcry. You will nrobably not hear one like it ever' ven years. Do not let us suppose.. not make us think that for the high 71iests of the Russian Church earthly authority is higher than heavenlr authority, earthly responsibility mon r ghtening than responsibility before Gd. Let us not deceive the people, and more importantly, let us not deceive ourselves while praying, by thinking that external fetters are stronger than or r spirit. it was not any easier a . Il e time of Christianity's birth, bu . X has survived and flourished and ha : t own us the way: that of sacrifice He who is deprived of all materia power is always victorious througt acrifice. The same martyrdom worth3 of the first centuries was acceptec by bur priests and fellow believer: La our living memory. But at tha time they were thrown to the lions today one can only lose well-being. During these days, when the Cros: ii brought out to the middle of tin cl-urch and you kneel before it, asl tfta Lord: What other purpose coulc tillare be for your serving a peoph winch has lost the spirit of Christianita and the Chrisitian image? ?Great Lent, Sunday of Veneration of the Cross, 1972. , Ti"nslated by Ludmilla Thorne CPYRGHT NEW YORK TIMES 23 March 1972 Solzhenitsyn Says The Russian Church Neglects Its Flock Soecial to The New York Tiraes MOSCOW. March 22?The author Aleksandr i. oiznerut- CPYRGHT "A gravestone presses upon he head and rends the breast of a moribund Russian Orthodox aeople," the letter Ibegins, ac- :ording to a copy made avail- able to Western newsmen. Written in the ecclesiastical language customary in com- munications with the church, syn, in a "Lenten letter" dr.; culating in Moscow, has accused the Russian Orthodox Church lof forsaking its flock and of ;being a tool of the atheist state. The letter, addressed to Patri- arch Pimen, leader of Russian Orthodoxy, also contains an Union since the middle sixties Impassioned plea to the church cn the ground that he has Ito bring the Christian spirit painted the country's Stalinist lback to the people. ast in dark colors. Approved For Release 1999/09/02. tIC letter lists limitations on Lie rights of priests, the closing ri churches and the repression o( dissident churchmen as ex- amples of submission to the authorities. Mr. Soilzhenitsyn's novels, best sellers in the, West, have een banned in the Soviet 2 While continuing to write for publication abroad, the 52-year- old novelist and Nobel laureate has also become increasingly vocal on issues of civil rights. His open letter is believed to be his first protest on church matters. He depicted a land in which, for every functioning church, "there are 20 that have been "razed or i etrievably ruined and another 20 in a state of neglect or desecration." He was, presumably referring to a prac- tice common after the Bol- shevik Revolution of converting churches to secular uses. "How mry populated places are there in this country with no church within 100 or even 200 kilometers?" Mr. Solzhen- itsyn asked, Charging that restoration of _even ?the_smallest church was CIA-RDP79-01194A000 being hampered by what hel termed the "one-sided laws of the so-called division of church and state," he said that he did not dare ask about the renewed pealing of church bells, no longer tolerated in the Soviet Union. "And yet," he went on, "why should Russia be deprived of her most ancient adornment, her most beautiful voice?" The novelist, accusing the church of taking orders from the Council for keligious Af- fairs, wrote: "The entire administration of the church, the appointment of prieSts and bishops, including even sacrilegious churchmen who seek to deride and disrupt the church?all these are se- cretly managed by the Council for Church Affairs. 200170001-8 "A churclMini9rUP r PSMARd PigtinaVti, rected hv atheists IS a sight not seen in "2,000 years." Mr. Solzhenitsyn said that Patriarch Pimen, in his first year in office, had done noth- ing to reinstate two dissident priests, Nikolai I. Eshliman and Gleb P. Yakunin, who were de- frocked in 1965 for having ques- tioned the church's collabora- tion with Soviet authorities. IArchbishop Yennogen of Ka- luga is still being kept in mon. close churches in his diocese, the letter said. /In an allusion to occasional church statements on world is- sues, apparently at the Soviet Government's behest, Mr. Sol- zhenitsyn said: "The Russian :church has an impassioned opinion about the slightest evil In far-away Asia or Africa, but never about its own domestic troubles.? " Deploring restrictions on the CI< Li pi yrliegs1 uiptiaydy nts nests are powerless within their own parishes, with only the conduct of church services entrusted to them. And if they should ever wish to visit the bedside of the sick or a ceme- tery they must first ask for an ordinance by the city council." Referring to a. message by Patriarch Pimen apparently read in orthodox churches at Christ- mas, Mr. Solzhenitsyn berated him for calling on Russian Or- trodox abroad, to teach their CPYRGHT 214jilidlettAjoUllal3the church but avoiding such a recommenda- tion to believers in tho Soviet Union. Russian history might have been "incomparably more hu- mane and harmonious in the la few centuries," Mr. Solzhenit- syn said, "if the church ha not surrendered its indcpend ence and had continued to Imake its voice heard among the people as it does, for ex?' ample, in Poland." , . WASHINGTON POST 27 March 1972 CPYRGHT MOSCOW, March 27 ? 17,000 Baltic Catholics Cite Soviet Persecution Lnm Animus This CPYRGHT more tnan 17,11U0 Homan Cath- olics from Lithuania have sent petitions to the United Na- tions, charging Soviet reli- gious persecution. It was the largest open protest of its kind in the Soviet Union. An inch-thick stack of peti- tions, bearing over 17,000 sig- natures of "believers," was sent to U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim last month after Soviet 'officials in Mos- cow ignored their earlier pro- tests, according to dissident Russian sources who made 'copies of the papers available to Western newsmen today. Lithuania, a small republic on the Baltic Sea that was an- nexed by the Soviet Union in 1940, is known as an area where traditional religious be- liefs persist despite official, harassment by the Communist regime. The petitions suggest con- tinued strength of the Catho- lic Church in Lithuania de- spite steady anti-religious propaganda. It also seems to he a part of a growing effort by religious communities to induce the government to im- plement religious freedoms guaranteed by the Soviet con- stitution. Last September, 2,000 per- sons from the town of Prenai, which has less than 10,000 pope ulation, signed an open letter to the Soviet leadership charg- ing that freedom of religion was being curbed by local au- thorities in Lithuania. Three other open letters with a total of 5,000 signatures were sent last fall to' Party, leader Leonid tBrezhney but' police -using threats, arrests and handcuffs prevented the mass collection of signatures,Y the letter to Waldheim said. "Such action by the authori- ties prompted the conviction that the present memoran- dum, signed by 17,000 believ- ers, will not attain its aim if it' is sent by the same means as ?previous collective declare- ions," the letter said. The Catholics were taking their complaints to the United Nations, the letter went on, because "believers in our re- public cannot enjoy the rights let out in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of, human Rights." The declara- tion, pased by the United Na- tion with the Soviet Union ab-i staining, calls for the recogni- tion of religious freedom by all countries. [At the United Nations, a ;pokesman had no comment in the petitions today.] In their petition, the Lith- uanians complained that So- viet officials limit the number of new priests to be trained and control the assignment of priests to parishes. They said no more than 10 youths a year can enter the seminary. ? ,The are so few priests in Lithuania, the letter charged, that one must often serve two or three parishes and that '"even invalid and aged priests must work." ' The Lithuanian authorities do not enforce a law which would punish those who perse- cute church-goers, the petition claimed. k In addition, Catholics have , not been allowed to rebuild [churches destroyed during :World War II and have diffi- ' cony in getting permission to hold services in private homes. "At the same time, a dance hall was allowed to be built in the parish of Andreivas where the church stood," the petition said. It repeated charges made last November that two parish priests were sent to labor camps for providing religious instructions to youngsters. Two bishops were also exiled without trial, it said. More signatures Would have been included in the 123 sepa- rate, identical typed petitions' If the Soviet police had not red acted so strongly against the dissidents, the letter said. "If in the future, the organs of the state take the same atti- tude toward believers' com- plaints as they have until now, we will be obliged to address ourselves to international bod- les, the Pope, the head of our church, or the United Nations as an authoritative institution defending human rights," In addition to repressing re- ligion, the Catholics said, the "forcible atheistic upbringing" of Soviet society has also caused increases in juvenile crime, alcoholism, divorces, abortions and suicides. The Lithuanians' protest comes at a time of improving relations between Moscow and: .the Vatican. Soviet President' Nikolai Podgorny and Foreign' Minister Andrei Gromyko have called on Pope Paul VI, and the Most Rev. Agotino ? Casaroli, who is tantamount to a Vatican foreign minister, vis- ited Moscow last year. There arc an estimated 3.5 million Roman Catholics liv- ing in the Soviet Union, most of them Lithuanians and' Poles. Catholics are situated in Lithuania, and in western parts of Byelorussia and the Ukraine. Lithuania is the largest sin- gle Catholic area, with nearly 500 curches still operating there, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 3 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 LE MONDE, Paris 29 March 1972 CONTRE LA POLITIQUE ANTMELIGIEUSE Dix-scpt omit= IitIllQS s'adresscni a M. Droiray Moscou minimise emig? ration juive ? Les catholiques iltuaniens, lasses de volt sans reponse diverses petitions envoyees aux autorites sovietiques, viennent d'adrosser M. Brelnev un memorandum portant dix-sept millet signatures. La police a vainement essaye den empecher la collecte. Les sIgnataires ont adresse copie do cc document a M. Kurt" Waldheim, en prient le secretaire general de l'ONU de le transmettre lul-mente au chef du part! sovietique. Le four memo ? le 27 mars ? oCi le texte des catholiqueS Nue- niens OMR communiqu?ux correspondents, occidentaux a Moscou, un porte-parole officiol laisait des declarations stir l'emigration ((five. En minimisant le chiffre des departs, if a voulu apparemment rassurer les Etats arabes. De notte correspondant ALAIN JACOB CPYRGHT meme 'curs propres frets, les Moscou. ? Les catnoliques (Wises bridees )), et les fideles ittuarnens duab le !MAIM, doivent obtenir avec de grandes' dum est date des mois de &cern- ? eiffictates, des autorites. la per- bre 1971 et janvior 1972 ? se pia- cent sur le terra n des droits de l'homme et const stent que ? pour les croyants de totre pcuple, la liberte de conscience est toujours absente et l'Eglise sujette a per- secutions ?. Les !Pits qu'ils citent peuvent se resun er ainsi : - o Le clerge : c Nos eveques- Ju. Stepanovitcluis et V. Sled- kiavitchus ont t?xiles sans proces tandis qu'en ruivem- bre 1971 a les pr tres You. Zdep- skis et P. B ibnis ont etd condamnes a Lt privation de liberte parce Wits exptiquaient les fondements le la foi it des enfants, sur la cr,mande de leurs parents ?. Le manque de pretres s'accentue d'aut .e part du fait que a les autorite.s ne permettent qu'a dis etudiat ts par an d'en- trer au seminair7 ?? (de et que celui-cl ti'est pas entre les mains de notre eveque, mats du pouvoir ?. ? L'educatior religieuse des enfants est non seulement entra- vee par des mcsures telles que les arrestations. mais ? atheisme est inculque dg force dans les &ales sovietiquet ?. ? En violation du code crimi- nel de la Repu )11que sovietique de Lituanie,croyants sont victimes d'ostracisme ? us per- dent notamment leur emploi, ? en raison de h ur lot : a Les croyants de l'in elligentsia crai- gnent de pratiq ler leur religion tick no represente qU'une petite ouvertement. ? plus, a les re minorite en U.R.S. et ne bent- presentants des autorttes inter disent aux croyants de restaur tide pas des tolerances relatives , Approved or Release 1999/09/02 ? r-ussion d'exercer le cute it leur Comitile ?. Les signataires concluent en clarant que des efforts du gou- -rernement sovietique pour re- edier a cette situation ? nous Ideraient, nous, castholiques, nous considerer comme citoyens ? l'Union sovietique a Part en' I iere n. Annexee a l'U.R.S.S. en 1939. Lituanie comptait encore, 11 r a une dlzaine d'annees, envi- ron deux millions et demi de ( atholiques, soit pres de 85 % de Is population. M. Nikita Struve, (,111 cite ces chiffres dans son ou- nage les Cltretiens en U.R.S.S. (le Seull), ajoute cependant que ks effectifs du clerge ont dim,- slue de moitie entre In fin de la tuerre et le milieu des ann6es it) et ment,ionne plusieurs rres-1 !ations de pretres en 1961 et ( n 1962. D'apres Ilinnualre du Va- tican, seul l'eveque de Kaunas, \4gr Matulalkis est actuellement in fonctions. Quelques jours peine apres I lettre de l'ecrivain Soljenitsyne u patriarche Pimene. chef de 'Yeglise orthodoxe (le Monde du :4 mars), le memorandum des ca- t holiques lituaniens contribue A attirer l'attention sur le probleme lc rapports de la religion et de l'Etat en IJ.R.S.S. Le cas des ca- I holiques soviatiques est plus dif- ficile encore que ceiui des ortho- loxes. Le catholicisrne remain, en nccorcke a l'eglise nations le russe. Au contraire. 11 prete le !lane A, des sma !games ? justi- fies ou non ? avec la survivance de sentiments nationalistcs et se- 4,riratistes dans des cornmunautes plus ou moms receminent annexes h ? dans les Pays bal- tes, notaminent mats susst dans les nciens territoires polo- nais. L'Eglise romaine est d'au- tant plus K suspecte ? aux yeux des autorites de Moscou qu'elle est liee au Vatican. Enfin, le sort des catholiques petit ici se com- pares a celui des baptistes l'ac- Myna' spostolique est beaucoup plus essentielle pour l'Eglise ea- tholique que pour l'Eglise ortho- doxe, cc qui provoque des conflits plus aigus avec le pouvoir, qui propage ratheisme. En &pit dune certalne pru- dence et d'une grande discretion, les autorites sovietiques cherchent eteindre ce que les communau- tes catholiques ont de plus vivant ur les marches? du territoire de l'U.R.S.S. Les uniates de Galleie en font l'experience au meme titre que les catholiques lituaniens. Si it sons dipiornatique du Kremlin s'est manifesto par les egards avec lesquels Mgr Casaroll. sous-secre- hire d'Etat nu Vatican, a ete ccuellii ?oscou nu mois (lc fevrier 1971, les nrrestations de pretres signalees par le memo- randum des catholiques Btu:miens datent de novembre de. la meme armee, comme les petitions de plusieurs communautes demeurees sans reponse de scptembre, octo- bre et decembre. Un autre document, tout A fait offlciel ce1u1-14, a ete nubile lundi. II s'agit d'une interview de M. Choumiline, vice-ministre de l'interieur de l'U.R.S.S., l'agence de presse Novosti sur question de l'emigration des julfs sovietiques h destination d'Israel. Le porte-parole du minister? se defend contre les accusations a prevaricatrices ? scion lesquelles cette emigration attein- drait des proportions ? massives et aurait pour resultat d' ? ac- croltre k potentiel mititaire israe- lien D. L'auteur de l'interview croft mettre les choses au point en admettant qu'un nombre timito de julfs sovietiques ont demande partir pour Israel: ?.Ces personnes, explique-t-i1 avec un parfait sang-froid, peuvent. quitter l'U.R.S.S. au meme titre que les antres citoyens sovie- tiques,,sans distinction d'appar- tenernee nationale, ethnique, de sexe et &doe. Leurs demandes de depart sont soigneusement etu- diem' par les organes du ministere de l'interieur de l'U.R.S.S. selon La procedure en vigueur et, en regle generale, satisfaites.- Le porte-parole sovietique donne le chiffre de dix mule senst- blement inferleur aux estimations reeties (Vinare part ? pour le nombre tni a I des den.irts en Israel en 1971. 11 entime apprirem- ment contrilmer it lute meilletire appreciation de cc phenomene en rappelant min a pendant tante la period(' de rapres-grierre, environ, vingt et 1111 tnille personnes ont valid l'U.R.S.S. pour Israel n ? atom que u le nombre total des immigres venus dans cc pays du- rantlz meme periode a atteint deux millions ' Mimes le texte de l'interview, les limitations nctuellerm.nt nosees aux demandes de depart CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved CPYRGHT eleaseai I. : Proche-Oricnt s. En conse- quence. lrs limitations cancer- neat surtout crux qui possetient tine instruction ntlittaire ott qui out ten travail touchant dr prds les interdis de i'Etat s. e Pen de &mantles de depart, ajoute le porte-parole, ant etd ddmsdes par les habitants tie growls centres de l'U.R.S.S. tele quo Moscou, Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa, et de regions idles quo la Republique socialiste sovietigne tie MoWavle, etc. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 1 April 1972 114;WERIttaittAVIZIT sent essentlellement &stirs:Ts alimenter une contre-propagande rassurante pour les pays arabes en rneme temps qu'h detendre ? avec redress? nue ron volt ? 11J.R.S.S. centre les accusations dont elle est robjet dans de rmil- Myles ,paya occidentaux. ALAIN JACOB. CPYRGHT 70001-6 CPYRGHT Nationalism stirs in Baltic States By Charlotte Salkowskl Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Moscow Local nationalisms are smoldering in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and getting Increased attention from Soviet authorities these days. Whetherlethnic sentiments are actually on the rise in these tiny republics, once inde- pendent states that were incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940, is difficult to know. It could be they are simply getting to be more of a problem for the regime because Soviet society as a whole is harder to control without Stalinist methods of repression. In any case, some recent developments point to continuing nationalist discontent in the Baltic region: . * More than 17,000 Lithuanian Roman Catholics hare signed a memorandum to party leadei Leonid I. Brezhnev charging persecution of their Church, according to unofficial sources this week, The Catholics call on the Soviet leadership to ensure the freedom of conscience guaranteed in the ,Constitution, "which until now does not exist In practice." Etittanie issue discussed ? In Estonia early in March the party leadership called a special plenum to dis- cuss "interethnic indoctrination of the work- ing people," indicating a concern about rela- tions between Estonians and the growing number of Russian migrants; ? An underground letter from 17 Latvian Communists charging the gradual russifica- tion of Latvia, was published in the West In January. The letter has been discussed (and denoqnced) in the local Latvian press, and recently Latvian party leader August Voss called on party propagandists to corn- Although the Lithuanian petititin concerns religion, it has strong nationalist overtones. for Lithuania was predominantly Roman Catholic before the Soviet annexation. The Soviet press itself has complained that loy- alty to Catholicism has fed anti-Russian na- tionalism in the republic. The Catholic memorandum, sent to United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim for forwarding to the Soviet leadership, cat- alogs a host of grievances. It says two priests were imprisoned in 1971 for giving religious instruction to children and that two bishops have been exiled for 10 years with- out trial. It also charges that atheism is forcibly Inculcated in Lithuania's Soviet schools, that Soviet authorities rather than the bishops ,handle seminary affairs, and that Catholics are not permitted to rebuild burnt-out churches. "In the years of Soviet power in Lithu- ania," an appendix to the memorandum states, "such vices as juvenile crime, alco- holism, and suicide have grown tenfold, and , divorces and abortions have taken on threat- ening proportions as well. The further we are removed from the Christian past, the clearer become the terrible consequences of forcible atheistic upbringing and the more widespread becomes an inhuman way of life deprived of God and religion." In Latvia and Estonia, for their part, there has long been resentment about the influx of Slays, mainly Russians, into the republics. Some local officials have even resisted the expansion of industry so there would be less need to import Russian manpower ? an bat "manifestations of nationalism local- , attitude that has been sternly assailed in the ism, and separateness." ' . official press. ApprouPri Few PPIPase 1999/09/02 ? SIA-RDP79-0119AA000200170001-6 Approveri-Enr-Release 1999109102 ' CIA-RnP79-011QAA00020n1700n1WYRGHT The concern of some Estonians and Lot- vianS is that Russians, who account for 30 percent of the population of Latvia and about 25 percent of that of Estonia, will eventually tlominate every aspect of indigenous he. Thus the letter from the 17 Communists (which was addressed to Communist parties in the West and smuggled out last summer) bitterly charged that only Russians or "So- viet Latvians" hold the top party posts, that the share of Latvians in the population dropped from 62 percent hi 1959 to 57 per- cent in 1970, that most of the radio and tele- vision programs are in Russian, and that few all-Latvian kindergartens and schools remain. Political bservers cite a number of fac- tors that could account for what seems to be a stirring of nationlist activity generally (in the Ukraine, and other areas as well): The success Soviet Jews have had in agitating to emigrate to Israel, the influence of Western broadcasts and tourism over past years, and the spread of underground publishing. Some observers believe that the general ideological apathy in the country May play a role. After so many years of Marxist in- doctrination and a less than stimulating leadership, it is suggested, people may be seeking spiritual' nourishment in religion and in their traditional cultures. Failure to inspire youth seems to be par- ticularly troubling to the regime. In recent months party leaders in the Baltic region have placed great stress on bolstering ideo- logical indoctrination in the schools and uni- versifies, It is possible, too, that ethnic feelings are coming to the fore more because the regime - is reluctant to deal as brutally with the problem as it would have in Stalinist times. It continues to crack down on political dis- sent but seems to apply only enough force to keep it under control. In the case of the Lithuanian memoran- ? dum, for instance, Soviet authorities knew it * was being circulated, and although they re- portedly interfered with the collection of signatures, they did not move with full force to stop it. CPYRGHT BALTIMORE SUN 27 November 1971 Lithuanian trial reportedly bloody CPYRGHT ny nevi. mum Moxcow Bureau IV The Sun- Moscow?Several Lithuanians were injured early this montl. in a melee that resulted when ,-)o- lice broke up a crowd of several hundred Catholics who raffia to the support of a priest on tr al, reliable sources reported yes er- day. The incident is described ir an unofficial account of trials 1,10-1 vember 11 and 12 in which two! priests were sentenced to me year in a labor camp for teach-1 ing children the catechism. The underground document, m ide available to Westervorrespc-nd- ents, gives this account of the trials and the events that ge? ceded them: The Rev. Juozas Zdcbekis, the pastor of a parish in the cit./ of Prenai, was arrested Angus 26 and placed in a police lock p. lie was beaten so badly by o- licemen that his mother "ba ely recognized him.". Other Lith- uanians arrested/M*0M ed hooliganism and placed in thei next cell heard the priest "beg : he policemen not to beat himi about the face." I . Case moved to Kaunas . The case was moved from Prenai, where it would have been tried normally, to the city of Kaunas. "Probably," the un- derground report states, "the authorities wanted to avoid a confrontation with those people whom the priest had served, whose respect and love he had N011." But all the same, many people learned about the trial. From arty morning, people hurried to ( the courthouse. By 10 A.M. near- y 600 people had gathered. Although the trial was ostensi- bly open, the report says, in fact only court officials, school offi- cials, and employees of the _KGB he secret police ,were let Fir -Release 1999/09/0 Several injured "Believers filled the corridors, the staircase, people crowded into the courtyard and onto the street. Shortly before the begin- ning of the trial policemen be- gan to push people roughly out- side and chase them away. Dur- ing the 'clearing' of the stair- case, several people were in- jured. One woman lost con- sciousness from a blow on the head, another broke a rib. "On the street, policemen seized men and women. The girls with flowers suffered the, worst?the policemen seized-i them and shoved them into po- lice vehicles. Those who resisted were beaten; thrown to the ground, dragged by their legs." 'About 20 persons, including I priests, were arrested. Formal! cha ges were brought againsti abo t 10. Father Zdebekis was charged mold frequently by admoni- with the "organization and sys- lions from the judge, Father IPCIAQIROPMCPV4914Adoceti Off TN) Mt-enstitu- I lessons for minors," The priest ! admitted that he had given reli- gious instruction to the children of parents who requested it. The prosecuter argued that the priest had violated Soviet regulations requiring the separa- Bon of church and state by inter- fering in the educating of chil- dren. Vague answers About 10 children from Father Zdebekis's confirmation classes I were called to testify, but gave vague answers to the prosecu- tor's questions. A few refused to talk at all or simply cried on the witness stand. One 10-year-old girl said she and her friend had attended two lessons, then stopped because people had pho- tographed them near the church and warned them not to return. In a 10-minute speech inter- 6 CPYRGHT tional gunrAppreveillof or religion give him the right to offer religious instruction. ? Father BubinS sentenced The ether one-year sentence was given the following day, No- vember 12, by a court in Rasei- 'yan tn.the Rev. B. Rubins. par-! ReAsztaAPAil 1A9 thiPP/Ct2G:r.0 IAeRdaRZEOlcle4ANW 0 047 CIONIA. ing and fright; .kalnis. Along with other priests drove around to the churches. encd?into the fire station. Lock- in the area, Father Bubins had On July 25. officials burst into ing them in the fire station, they :offered to examine children on Father Bubins's church while he gave the children pencils and ;their religious knowledge after was questioning a boy on his,? paper and dictated a written ae. the bishop in Raseiyan was giv- religious knowledge as 30 other cusation against P'ather Buhiris;,t en official permission to confirm children waited in line. No details, other than the sett; .children, The officials, the underground tence, were given of the Bubistis1 On the days children were to report says, "began to seize and trial. ? T., I GIRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 11 April 1972 71. C/3111 itara d.espite ersists ha U.S.S.a. io71 ? remora 0171ave By Paul WA! Written for The Christian Science Monitor CPYRGHT Religion is strengthening its hold on the thinking of many people in the Soviet Union. "The religious mist not only does not dis- appear, but on the contrary, begins to en- compass our youth," the Byelorussian youth journal Znamya Yunosti recently com- plained. In response, one atheist conference fol- lows another, and antireligious militancy does not cease. The latest effort to snuff out religion was a national seminar of college and high-school teachers of "scientific atheism." It was convened March 14 by the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Educa- tion. Last June, a similar conference deliber- ated for four days. Its findings were pub- lished in the atheist monthly Nauka i Zhizn (Science and Life). The main reasons for the tenacious survival of religion were said ,to be the indifference of part of the coun- try's youth, Western influences, a concilia- tory attitude within the Komsomol (Com- munist youth organization), youth's gulli- bility, family influences, and the spreading of underground religious literature. The objection atheist agitators most fre- quently come across ? even among non- believers ?' is that "religion helps." This way of thinking recently came out in a sur- vey made by the administration of? the Vinnitsa medical institute. Survey question The question asked in the survey wa.. "What is your attitude to religion?" The results of the survey were discussed on Feb. 4 by the Vinnitsa radio in Ukrainian. Out of 350 students questioned, only 163 stated firmly what they knew the adminis- tration wanted them to say, namely that they do not believe in God. More than half of the students, exactly 180, stated that their attitude could be de- scribed as indifferent. A different 180 said, they came from families who maintained religious traditions. And 83 students said . they had believers, meaning church mem- bers, in their families. these 'medical missionaries' is: 'Tile doctors merely bandages the patient; it is God who cures him!' "Medical establishments should pay mora attention to the atheist education of stu4 -dents," the broadcast warned. This is pre-, cisely what last month's Moscow seminar; was supposed to bring about, through atheist "enlightenment" and militant antireligious propaganda. That is the Soviet line toward its own citi- zens. Its line toward the Arab world .is differ- ent. In a series of talks entitled "Against Imperialist Attempts to Exploit Religion for Reactionary Purposes," Dmitry Ponomarev, candidate of historical sciences, proclaimed March 27 that among the Afro-Asian people, "religion may serve a noble purpose under certain circumstances. "Men of religion currently exercise great influence in mobilizing Egyptians for the struggle against Israeli aggression. . . . Many men of religion, Muslims included, have expressed their sympathy for the struggle for peace and justice. "Marxist-Leninist parties call for alliance with believers in the common struggle for just objectives." On the following day Mr. l'onomarea sought to dispel any qualms Arab Muslims might have about the Soviet attitude toward religion in their own country: "The Corn. munsts show respect for the feelings of be. lievers," he said, "including Muslims. The true democracy of Soviet society lies in the fact that every Soviet person is free to be. lieve in God or to disbelieve." In an attempt to explain the continued in- fluence of religion, the broadcast went on to describe the "missionary activities" of "some sects, such as the Adventists and the Baptists, who try to instill in man's con- science a social program of their own." Especially singled out were so-called "medico-missiortary" activities: "One frequently encounters in hospitals a nurse or a sister who secretly whispers to the patient: 'Pray to God, for only He can help you.' Although the patient subsequently recovers thanks to the ingenuity of the doc- tors, he will nevertheless have in his con- science traces of the nurse's brainwashing and will begin to believe that he was saved by God." Priorities suggested "That is why," the broadcast continued, i "believers give priority to medical establish- ments when sending their children to insti- tutes of higher learning. The formula of 7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 NEW YORK TIMES 13 December 1971 Islamic Past of Azerbaijan Republic Frustrates Moscow's Marxist Plans BAKU, U.S.S.R.?Half a cen- tury of Soviet power has done much to modernize the Azer- baijan Republic, but the Azerbaijani style of life, re- flecting centuries of Moslem Influence, refuses to conform to the Communist model. As an Institution the Islamic faith Is weak here. The veil has virtually disappeared. Wo- men as well as men have been educated and moved into jobs in numbers unheard of before the Bolshevik take-over in this region of the Caucasus on April 20, 1920. The industry of Baku has been modernized and diversi- fied and new plants have been installed , in district towns. Phalanxes of square - faced apartment houses surround Baku and have sprouted in new Industrial towns like Sumgait. Some Western economists have reckoned that, for many, health care, education and standards of living are higher in Soviet Azerbaijan than in neighboring Iran, where several million ethnic Azerbaijanis live. But vestiges of the past re- main to bedevil and frustrate determined flarxists. 'For Mercenary Reasons' No less a figure than GekJar. A. Aliyev. the Communist party chief, has been complaining about nepotism, forced child marriages, corruption on a grand scale, the urge for private ownership and the penchant for private tradIng?"plundering of socialist property for mercenary reasons,, '.,.he called it.--and the practice of bribing examiners at universities for entrance or, graduation. In to unusually tarti speeches in March and October,1 Mr. Allyev castigated idea-, logical backsliders of all kinds.. Ile was upset by commercial- ism in local theaters, painters who copy "the worst models of modern art of the West," the ii undue pessimism of some novel- ists, non-Marxist probing of local history, worrisome cur - Apprrtvpri. nr By HEDRICK SMITH Rportal In The T:ekr York ?Imre ',say alma religion among tile young and even financial dona tions to mosques by leading intellectuals. "One reason for bribery is the striving for private prop erty, the basis for which is Individualism and selfishness, and worrying only about one's own benefit, and the wish to get as much as possible for oneself and less for society," the party chief declared. "One should not undervalue the in- fluence of bourgeois ideology." The clannishness of the 'Azerbaijanis, their skill at ar- The New York Times/Doc 17. 1411 ranging deals under the table and their generally undisci- plined ways have long been a problem for Communist leaders ?apparently at a greater scale than in many other regions. Some local Communists blame centuries of Moslem domination over this southern territory during the conquests by Per- sians, Arabs and Turks. "Islam is more aggressive and more reactionary than other religions," asserted Gasham Aslanov, editor of the Communist party youth news- paper Yunost, which circulates 350,000 copies three times a week. , "This religion tenches people to think about them- selves and their families." 1 The for mer hairen ana younger looking than his 37 years cited what lie said were Moslem proverbs to demonstrate the selfishness fos- stered by Islam. "We have these proverbs," he said. "'He who sacrifices all of his efforts for the bene- fits of the people suffers more.' 'First It Is necessary to build up the inside of the mosque and then the outside.' Each man tries to gather coal under his own stove." "We lived about 1,300 years by this religion, by this ide- ology," he explained during a chat in .a hotel cafe. "We have, lived under Soviet power only 50 years. During 50 years it is very difficult to change human nature." City With a Hybrid Past Actually 13aku is an inter- national city with a hybrid past. Its Victorian - style balconied apartments and its tree-lined promenades facing the Caspian Sea give it a Mediterranean flavor. Russian influence dates from 1806, when the czarist empire won this region from Persia. At- tracted by oil. Russians made up a fourth of Baku's population Cr percentage today. Azerbal- ,jianis constitute just half of the city's 1.3 million people. The language of commerce, politics and advancement is Russian, spoken by most people;' regardless of ethritc origin. Major public speeches arc de- livered in Russian. A young ;journalist recalled his older brother's insistence that he learn Russian at school not ;only for the sake of his career but so he could date Russian girls. Nonetheless, it is Islamic tra- dition and the Azerbaijani char- acter that give the region its distinctive personality. Beside the vast homes of one-time oil magnates, put up on a scale to rival Fifth Avenue mansions, are buildings with the graceful arches of the Islamic world. And the faces of the Azer- baijanis, dark, lively, honey- coloaldat PrAritaA nut / 8 CPYRGHT ; Formal Islam has withered under the pressure of militant atheism. Local specialists slay :there are only 16 mosques, two, ,in Baku, for Azerbaijan's 5.11 ;million people. The Koran, it is? !reported, was last printed ini !Russian three years ago and is, ' not available in local book- shops. Some Youths Turn to Faith Generally the mosques at- tract only the old, though the leader of the Communist Youth League complained recently that young people, including some of his members, were at- tending religious rites. It is less the formal religions structure that disturbs Com- munist leaders than it is the social influence of Islamic cus- toms?girls dropping out of school for marriages arranged by their families, women left at home by husbands going out to socialize and not advanced properly even in the Commu- nist party, and the undisciplined economic style. Privately, some people talk like unreconstructed capitalists, eager to display Western watches or fountain pens, boastful about their financial canniness, unashamed that bribes or contacts are the key to success. "You've got to have money to get what you want," said a well-tanned director of a state farm. "It's the same every- where?in America, in the So- viet Union, everywhere." It is that style of life that Mr. Aliyev, formerly chief of the republic's secret police, has pledged to wipe out since being , put in charge here in 1969. He has removed up to 50 ;senior government and party officials for abuse of office or dereliction. A number of offi- :ials have been put on trial for iribery, among them a judge who allegedly took bribes from three men accused of fraud but was caught before he could fix the case. Nonetheless, some Azerbaijanis remain skeptical. "Let them bring another and another and anntherr said a ascribed how ?.!T Alls7VetfCrl speed surgical operations. "It will stay the same." Approved For Release 1999/.09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, Moscow 26 January 1972 PAPER CONDEMNS ACTIVITIES OF amsK BAPTISTS [Article by Ye. GoloshUmov: "The poisoners"] Omsk?Wow his arrival in the commune of the followers of the so-dalled Csuncil of Churches of the Evangelical Christian Baptists and the sermons and the meetings of brother-dissenters and much else seems like a delusion or a bad dream. But all this took place and lasted for many years. These years he, Gennadiy Skalyga, now regards as being erased from the 20 years of his life, as spent vainly, to no purpose. Or rather, there was a purpose and, according to his notions of that time, an extremely significant purpose--the service of God--but on verification it turned out to be no more than a mirage. His "spiritual fathers" themselves, however paradoxical it may seem, razed to be ground his religious world outlook which, in his opinion, was as firm and tenacious as the smell of incense in the church. But he had only to come into contact with the secular affairs of his mentors in the commune and nothing remained of this "world out- look." ...The beautiful and large city of Omsk where he went a few years ago from neighboring Tyumen Oblast to study at the road transport technical college seemed comfortless and unwelcoming to him. Who knows, it is possible that everything would have turned out differently if he had been in a hostel among his contemporaries. But he happened to settle in a private apartment. The shy, reserved and impressionable Gennadiy felt equally ill at ease in the noisy corridors and lecture halls of the technical college and the quiet, soothing apartment of his landlady and relation Ye. KoznaCheyenko: he was homesick. -Koznacheyanko meanwhile gradually sized up her tenant. She sized him up not Just for the sake of curiosity but to carry out the order from the ringleaders of the commune of followers of the Council of Churches to which she belonged--to swell the ranks of the dissenters, to agitate and to advance. From a distance, obsequiously and diplomatically, she talked with Gennadiy about God and about how it was only in Cod that he would find his solace, how God would calm his soul. At first Skalyga Listened with surprise and indignation: "Stop putting, all this nonsense into my head!" Keznacheyenko and her daughter Lyuba, also a commune member, did not take -offense and were silent, but then they began all over again: subtly, unnoticeably and meekly. It all ended with Gennadiy going to a prayer meeting one evening. The commune greeted him guardedly, distrustfully, although in a superficially af,able manner. From the very start the elder "brothers" started to talk. to Skalyga abwAt the need for the strict observance of the church secret. What this secret was Gennadiy understood later, when he was accepted in at a general meeting as a commune member end had undergone the baptism ceremony and then become the leader of a youth group. But meanwhile he sawed and chopped wood and gathered potatoes in the dissenters kitchen gardens and learned religious verses. At first Gennadiy did not understand why such secrecy, such mystery and reticence was necessary. Surely the religious feelings of believers in our country are guarded by law and nobody raises any obstacles before registered religious groups and sects providing, of course, that they do not violate the law. But then it gradually became clear that the whole point was in the antisocial provocative trend displayed in the activity of the ringleaders from the commune of the followers of the notorious council of churches?activity which they carry out illegally, hiding from people's view. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : bIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Who ArkWiegthOrSFtglear56142929/09/Q2re gA:PiPligag)19444Q924,0P1M01-6 ideologist, who taught humility before God, obedience and readiness to bear one's heavy cross to the end. Behind his demagogic words he skilfully concealed selfishness and excessive ambition. "Religion for Kozorezov was a means of having power over people, of obtaining an advantage for himself and of insuring his own personal well-being," Paval Dronyayevn, former commune member and now a soldier in the Soviet Army testifies. Kozorezov did not consider it shameful to profit by gifts from believers or to make use of believers to work on his private farm. Hostile to Soviet society, Kozorezov had created an underground printing office in the apartment of the Gams sisters where the illegal journals "Chronical of Salvation" [Vestnik Spaseniya] and the "Brotherly Leaflet" [Bratskiy Listok], and sermons were printed and other hostile ideological materials were prepared. For this Kozorezov ended up in exile 5 years ago. When he returned he set abouthis former occupation, and naturally he again got his reward. - The other "mentors?" N. Savehenko was tried for marauding, A. Popov and P. Pererva were tried as criminals, and I. Yefimenka served time for betraying his motherland. F. Poyunov and others were brought before the court not because of their belief in God. The ringleaders of the sect pay special attention to recruiting young people. At the prayer meetings the members of the youth group recited reactionary verses and songs which contained veiled, and indeed open, anti-Soviet appeals. In addition to the dissemination of foreign radio broadcasts and postcards, literature' obtained illegally from abroad was studied. The efforts of' the commune ringleaders did not go unnoticed by foreign "well-wishers." Letters of thanks and parcels began to arrive from somewhere in the Netherlands addressed to Kozorezov's wife Aleksandra and Savehenkols wife Lyudmila. As the leader of the youth group Gennadiy Skalyga frequently had occasion to visit the communes of other cities, including cities outside Siberia: the sect leaders attach special significance to contacts with young people. Everywhere he saw one and the same thing: the hypocrisy and demagogy of the commune leaders and their antisocial activity. They poison the souls not only of the young people who have fallen into the sectarian snares but also the souls of the children df believers who are educated "in the fear of God." Special underground school groups according to age are created for them, where illegally printed anthologies of religious stories, verses and songs are studied. "Why should I be in the same company with such obscurantists as A. Kozorezova, N. Savchenko, Yu. Terekhov and E. Gossenrik? Why should I deprive myself of the joys of life? Why should I hate my motherland which has nurtured me and given me an education?" Gennadiy Skalyga asked himself these questions with ever increasing , frequency. He left the sect. ...I met Gennadiy in the hostel of the machine unit plant where he works. It was a rainy fall evening. Skalyga was hurrying to the road transport institute where he is studying in the evening department'. Genhadiy is a Komsomol member. In addition. to the institute he is engaged in the "Metelitsa" ensemble with which he' went on tour to Mongolia last summer. His life is now interesting and full-blooded. He is glad that Pavel Dronyayev, Galina Poyunova, Lyudmila Kolohanova and many others. have left the sectarians. But the obscurantists continue to poison unsophisticated people. Ivan Vine, Vladimir Pedorchenko, the sisters Olga and Yelizaveta Kolosova, Lyudmila Stanova and Lyudmila Oalaktiionova whisper prayers on their knees at secret meetings. "It is necessary to struggle to help the deceived people rise from their knees', see the joy of life, and realize the happiness of creation,." Gennadiy says. ."The poisoners should be deprived of the opportunity of. continuing their black deed." Approved For Release 1999/0g/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, Moscow 17 October 1971 PRACTICES OF RELIGIOUS SECTARIANISM VIOLATE SOVIET LAW (Article by S. Ousev, Moscow Oblast prosecutor and state legal adviser 3d class: "The Strict Letter of the Law") The. behavior of brothers yoloda and Sasha worried their teachers. At first the brothers, under a variety of pretexts, refused to accompany the'class on a visit to the museum. Then they declined a cultural visit to the movies and, finally, when the time arrived for them tlio join the pioneers, they categorically refused to wear red ties. The worried teachers went to se with your children? their parents and asked them: "What ia the matter They are dSfferent from all the Other boys," The parents however, were hot in tt.e least surprised and were even pleased to hear this. This was explained by the fact that the parents of Voloda and Sasha were members of a strict Baptist sect and brought up their children in a specially created religious circle, A certain N. Vorenova was the leader of this circle. She got the children of members Of the sect to go to her house or to someone'S apartment, read religious sermons to them,, taught Biblical dogma, made them learn religious verses, psalms, and prayers, and organized special childrens' prayer meetings. This was a flagrant violation of the legislation on religious cults. It was instilled into the Children that they must not learn or sing Soviet songs. listen to the radio, watch television, read the newspapers, go to the movies, theater, or the circus, or in any way participate in any of the school's mass social functions whatever, in a word, an attempt was made to turn the children into juvenile recluses and deprive them of all human pleasures. Voronova was warned of her responsibilities and required to cease the illegal meetings. However, the members'of the sect replied that they were answerable only to the laws Of cod. It got to the stage where, without permission of the authoritative organs, they:arranged open-air baptisms of adults. Children were brought to these ceremonies, which were an insult to social conduct, and Voronova took an active part In all this. The prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings, and a people's court sat in justice on her and sentenced her to imprisonment. . . Prosecution organs, local soviets, and social organizations perform a considerable amount of work in suppressing the illegal activity of members of sects Talks and lectures are organized on their behalf, and individual work is conducted. Many members of sects, when they realize their mistakes, refrain from infringing the legal norms in force. Those who 'shamelessly and maliciously infringe the laws are brought to justice. Sect members Semen Tabachkov from Zhukovskiy and Vasiliy Ryzhuk from Krasnogorsk have beenmenteneed to imprisonment at different times. These people represented themselves as defenders of the believers and actively worked against the Soviet legislation on Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 11' cults, ey Approvede ForRelease1999/99/02_: CAA-RE)F79-011S4A000200170CM31-6 maeciously condemned the sinfulness of the world"--something which they themselves concocted--and tried to completely isolate the believers from society and instill in them a negative attitude toward our reality. Moreover, they tried to provoke conflicts and deepen the gulf between the sect and all the rest of our fellow citizens. Sectarian' leaders strive to be permitted to propagate religion unrestrictedly and to stop antireligious instruction in schools. They demand that rank-and-file believers undertake not to acknowledge the state laws and they frustrate their implementation, But maybe the sectarian leaders teach their flock to acknowledge no Soviet 'laws--,without exceptioh? Such is not the case. They by no means refuse to accept wages from the state, concession trips to rest homes and sanatoria, paid leave, apartments, or pensions. They acknowledge their right to free medical services and willingly and without relying on the grace of the almighty enjoy these and other benefits available to all our Citizens irrespective of sex, age, nationality, or religion. Our laws pebtedt the rights Of believers and the treeddm of their religion. RoWeveri these laws ifttpOte On believers an obligati-On, the S'affire as Oh atheiets, to fulfill their civil duty a:6 defined by the USSR Constitution, Our state is particularly concerned to protect the interests of children and young citizens of the country, in whom we see our future. Hence in allowing adults freedom of religibn, regarding this as a matter of conscience and the periOnal view of each individual, the state allbws no one to impose his religious views on children, The RSFSR Council Of Peoples' Commissars decree signed by V.I. Ltnin Oh 0 January 1918 "On the Separation of the Church Prom the State and the School From the Church" pointed out: "Nobody may refuse to fulfill his civil obligations by reason of his religious views.,., Freedom from the performance of religious ceremonies is secured provided that they do not infringe social order and are not accompanied by encroachments On the rights of citizens Of the Soviet republic. The local authorities are empowered to take all necessary steps to safeguard' social order and security in Such cases," The position of religious organizations was clearly defined by subsequent legislation. Primarily they Were allowed to engage in their activities only after appropriate registration in accordance with established procedure and were allowed to function only for the purposes of jointly satisfying citizens' religious heeds. Here they were ferbidden to organize prayer meetings and groups and circles for religious instruction specially for children and young people, arrange excursions and children' recreational areas, or open libraries or reading rooms. Ministers of religion were categorically forbidden to conduct propaganda aimed at alienating believers from active participation in social, cultural, and state activity, A certain Petr Rumachik, one of the leaders of the strict Baptists, systemdtically infringed all these legal requirements. For months he did not work anywhere. traveled around cities and villages, met sectarians, and supplied them with illegally published literature containing direct appeals not to observe the Sbviet legislation on cults. In the so-called "Brotherly Advice to Yoeng Christians" young believers were called on to alienate themselves from Soviet society, renounce the study of modern science and technology, and observe only the laws of God and not Soviet laws.., naturally the prosecutor instituted legal proceedings against him, Methods of persuasion should be more broadly used with regard to the rank-and-file believers, who frequently do not realize the real aims of their leaders. Local authoritative organs and party, Komsomol, trade union, and other social organizations should conduct special meetirgs arrange for the most respected local citizens to meet believers, and intensify individual explanatory work in homes and in enterpribes where there are sectarians. In this scheme 0 large role can be played by teachers-- it is mratOOkeroilketdaWei MOVIOnte tA-IttiFentonfigiimolnoti'rOoo1 -6 pepils. 12 , Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 It is up to all of us to realize profoundly that although sectarianism has demonstrated its utter hopelessness, this must not give us cause for complacency. The struggle against religious ideology is an integral part of communist education. It was and still is the party's program requirement. It is an ideological struggle based on atheistic propaganda and on methods of persuasion. However, those who systematicalli and Maliciously infringe Soviet laws under cover of the demands of their faith, who incite other citizens to infringements, organite them into nonregistered communities; and commit other illegal acts will continue to be held responsible, With the Pill severity of our laws. ZARYAVOSTOKA, Russia 31 August 1971 STRICT PARTY CONTROL OF ATHEISTIC PROGRAM DEMANDED Increasing attention is being given, in the process of building a communist society in our country, to questions on the further cultivation of communist morality; further development of the culture of Soviet man--mainly spiritual culture; overcoming the survivals of the past in the consciousness of the people--including eradication of religiosity and the formation of a scientific- materialistic outlook for all members of the socialist society without exception. Religious prejudices are the most vital survivals of the past, the struggle against which demands special sensitivity, caution, and perseverance. Even under socialisM the struggle against religious prejudices does not cease to be a difficult matter, although with each decade our people are becoming more educated and enlightened. False and pernicious is the opinion that survivals of the past will die out when we are able to offer everyone a sUfficient education. Religious prejudices cannot vanish by themselves. They cannot be repealed. Administrative measures are important here. They can only lead to intensification of religious fanaticism. Persuasion is the only correct and the only necessary measure in atheist propaganda. It is no secret that a trend to idealize the church way of life and church rituals. has begun to manifest itself among the youth in recent years. There have been instances when Komsomol members have participated in the performance of religious rites. Just what attracts a person to the church? Curiosity? The quest for "poetry" or "romance"? How can one explain that long-forgotten ceremonies are being revived in a number of populated points of Adzhariya and Abkhaziya, and that the youth is participating actively in this? Komsomol and trade union organizations are not participating sufficiently actively ' in atheistic propaganda. Many cultural-educational establishments are doing a poor job in such. participation. This is especially important in Abkhaziya, Adzhariya, ' Rustavi, and several other areas in the Georgian SSR where religious sects exist. Atheistic education, being a composite part of the work in communist education, requires constant strict party control. Moreover, certain party organizations forget that the path to success lies through systematic and consistent work, and they engage in it incidentally, mainly during religious holidays. Religious views are incompatible with a materialistic world outlook and with social and scientific- technological progress. Resolute struggle against them is an important condition for the formation of the man of the new society. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 13 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 WASHINGTON POST 12 March 1972 Co-via .jews: Different View By John Dornberg The writer, Newsweek's correspond- ent in Munich, was the magazine's Moscow bureau ehief until his exputsion in October, 1970. This article is ex- cerpted from his forthcoming book, "The New Tsars." CPYRGHT rIESPITE THE OUTCRY against UP their treatment, Jews in the Soviet Union have actually fared as well or better than most minority groups here. Perhaps this is because there are 10 limes as many as there are, for nstance. Crimean Tartars. More likely it is because they have influential brethren abroad and the force of world public opinion behind them. Propaganda in and outside the So- viet Union has contributed to a dis- torted picture of the plight of the Jews in the U.S.S.R. As long as Jewish mili- tants in the United States and else- where scream hysterically "Let my peoOle go," threaten Soviet diplomats, disrupt performances by Soviet artists (most of them Jews themselves) and vandalize Soviet diplomatic, journalis- tic and commercial offices, as long as the Soviet authorities trumpet the lie that there is no anti-Semitism in the U.S.S.R. and that Jews in the Soviet Union have never been as well off, that picture is not going to be in focus. In one sense the plight of the Jew in the Soviet Union is that of the Jew anywhere, except in Israel. If his situa- tion in Russia, the Ukraine, Byelorus- sia, Moldavia and Uzbekistan, where anti-Semitism has a long and violent tradition, is worse than his position in France, Britain or the United States, it is largely because as a Jew he is a member of a minority in a country in which all minorities are more or less oppressed. His nationality is stamped into his passport. Often his physical appearance identifies him. He is sub- jected to a delicate system of quotas designed to maintain a balance of pro- . portional representation of nationali- ties in the economy and in high gov- ernment and party organs such as the council of ministers, the politburo and the central committee. He is scorned and discriminated against in a society of more than a hundred nationalities, nearly all of whom scorn and discrimi., nate against each other. In some ways his situation is worse than that of the other nationalities: a consequence of the confusion, first of all, whethei his is a nationality, an ethnic group or a religion. Undeni: ably, it is the only nationality group, that is also a religion, 'an inherently difficult situation in a state that pro- ? fesses atheism. Moreover it is a reit. ? gion that has been the traditional ob- feet of intense discrimination in Rus- Sia, where chauvinism and orthodoxy ? went hand in hand. Furthermore it is a religion that tends to be tribal rather than ecumenical. Jewish culture as a whole presents difficulties for Soviet 'neology. Finally, he is the only member of a Minority group that is genuinely extra- territorial. Not only do most of his brethen live outside the Soviet Union, but 2.5 million of them live in a state that calls itself his homeland and cove petes for his loyalitics. Worst of all, ....?.that state is at war with a group of countries whose principal ally and sup- porter is the Soviet Union. Because of the Soviet Union's propaganda against that state, anti-Semitism has again be- ' come acceptable, if not actually fash- ionable, in the U.S.S.R. ' The plight of no other Soviet minor- ity group has received as much Wen-. tion outside the U.S.S.R. as that of the Jews. Some of it has been justified. Some of the attention has been blatant propaganda and the product of con- fused emotions growing out of the bel- ligerent relationship between two sov- ereign states: Israel and the U.S.S.R. Overstating the problem has merely ? worsened the predicament of the Jews In the U.S.S.R. And to assess their real situation, fact must be separated from fiction. It Is a fact that for many years very few Jews were able to leave the U.S.S.R. But some did leave: at an av- erage rate of 150 monthly, even after the Six-Day War in 1967. At times the number rose to 300 a month, at times it was as low as 80. This figure is the highest emigration rate of any nation- ality group of the U.S.S.R. Israel has been receiving the highest number of Soviet emigration since 1967. The United States is a poor second, Canada, sought out mostly by Ukrainians, is an even poorer third. It is also a fact that in early 1971 the number of Jews permitted to leave in- creased sharply, as a consequence, apparently, Of intensified propaganda abroad and more militant agitation in the U.S.S.R. itself. Most of the emigres. however, were those Jews who had aggressively pressed their de. ;rands. Between January 1 and May 31, an cAtimated 3,500 hail emigrated. The Kremlin apparently decided to get rid of "troublemakers," particularly those Jewish militants who had formed links with the dissident movement, Approved For Release 1999/91)2 CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 A Delilskapiteifitfm? se I) UT 'IT IS A FICTION that Jews are being discriminated against in their desire to leave and a deliberate distortion of the facts to imply that vast waves of Jews are just waiting for exit visas: The Kremlin sees the desire to leave as an expression of disloyalty and makes little distinction between Jews who want to go to? Israel, Ukrainian who want to emigrate to Canada and Russians who want to leave for any- where because they are weary of an economically deprived life in one of the world's most regimented dictatorships. Who wants to leave and why? Israeli and Zionist sources have spoken of "tens of thousands." It is an, accurate fit ure. but cloaked in a semantic play to the grandstands. Joseph Kazakov. the 50-year-old Moscow engineer who organized and led the letter-writing and petitions-signing campaign of Jew- ieh dissenters until he was finally per- mitted to leave for Israel in February, 1971, told me that Jews who want to leave represent about 5 per cent of So- viet Jewry. That would mean approxi- mately 103,000 people based on a 1970 Soviet census figure of 2,151,000 Jews. "Perhaps," he said, "if all of them were suddenly allowed to emigrage without difficulty, others would be en- couraged to apply for visas and the number might double. But 10 per cern Is the maximum." How many of these 5 or 10 per cent, I asked him, want to leave because they are Zionists, religious or consider themselves, as Jews, victims of special discrimination? How many simply want to leave the U.S.S.R. because it is an unpleasant place to live in, but have no special affinity fo Israel? "I don't know," Kazakov said, "Maybe half and half." Actually, hundreds of thousands of Jews would elect to remain in the U.S.S.R. Assimilated, prosperous and Sovietized. they consider themselves Soviet citizens first, Jews second: like most Jews in the United States, France and Britain. The Kremlin made this argument effectively in March, 1970, when it staged a press conference by a group of prominent Jews who professed their loyalty for the U.S.S.R. and their condemnation of Israeli foreign and military policy. On the platform in Moscow's House of Friendship for the 2-hour news con- ference were 31 Jews from the Soviet establishment, led by Venyamin Dym- %hits, one of the U.S.S.R.'s nine deputy prime ministers and the highest-rank- ing Jew in the governmental hier- archy. Beside him were three uni- Q2d. 1r1s generals; a koikhoz chairman from the Ukraine; Alexander Chakovsky, the conservative editor in chief of Liters- turnaya Gazeta; Aaron Vergelis, the editor of Sovietish Geimland; govern- _ment officials; scientists; popular SO. ,viet comedian Arkady Raikin, who had just stalked off the stage of a theater In the Ukraine because someone from the audience had called him a Yid. They delivered themselves of anti-Zi- onist and anti-Israeli diatribes which were repeated in a long statement, signed by those on Mage and 22 others. In the West this curious display of loyalty by prominent Jews was imme- diately written off as a "put-on" job by "tame-house Jews." Indeed, no Ameri- can Jew would be likely to go before a press conference to beat his chest and proclaim his loyalty to the United States. On the other hand, why shouldn't these Jews have said what they did? They are among those who made it to the top and have a vested Interest in the Soviet Union. Many Are Assimilated ONE OF THE SIGNATORIES (lid tell a Western journalist that he had signed the statement under threat el* being denied a trip abroad. But on the whole, these 53 Jews represented hundreds of thousands of 'ess prom- inent Soviet Jews who did not care whether or not Jewish culture is sup- pressed or Yiddish theaters and maga- rines exist, whether or not there is a Yeshiva and whether or not prayer shawls and prayer books are available for the believers in the synagogues. They did not care because they are as- similated in the Soviet culture around them. Dissenting Jews complain that "young Jews cannot read Jewish books because the Jewish language is not taught in a single school lathe Soviet Union." That is ture and that is part of the discriminatory picture, hut it means little to the majority of Jews, who would not read a book in Yiddish if the Kremlin gave them out free. When assessing the status of Soviet Jews, Western observers find it diffi- cult, if not impossible, to make objec- tive judgments, to separate fact from emotion. To draw an accurate picture certain facts should be borne in mind. The Jews are virtually the only minority? the Volga Germans are also an impor- tant exception?who did not become Part of the old Russian Empire through conquest and colonialism. Anti-Semitism is deeply rooted, and reached exceptionally violent propor-, CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-0119 15 M}lWifdfohjff4"oT'the U.S.S.R.'s na- tionalities, especially the Russians and Ukrainians. The present Soviet regime is not anti-Semitic, but it is anti-Zionist and through its propagation of anti- Zionism it ineluctably kindits anti. Semitism because its propaganda is crude and the masses at whom it is dill reeled cannot differentiate between I the two. Aber Nand, profession:OW Jews are very well off in many fields,/ Including art, music, :Science, litera- ture, engineering and law. Although they represent less than 1 per cent of the total Soviet population, they ac- count for 14.7 per cent of all physi- cians, 8.5 per cent of writers and Jour- nalists, 10.4 per cent of all judges and lawyers, 7.7 per cent of actors, musi- cians and artists. Of some 650,000 scientific workers in the U.S.S.R., 55,000 are Jews. Fourteen per cent of the Jewish population has a higher or specialized secondary edu- cation, a rate almost triple that of Rus- sians, In the U.S.S.R. as a whole there are 10 students per 10,000 population In institutes of higher education. For Jews the figure is almost double-315. Of 844 Lenin Prize holders, 564 ? are Russian, 184 represent all the other na- tionalities and 96 are Jews. And where else but in Israel itself would one find that many Jewish generals? Yet Jews seem to be deliberately barred from the government and Com- munist Party hierarchy and their role in both has decreased steadily since the days when most of the Bolsheviks were also Jews. In 1939 Jews ac- counted for more than 10 per cent of the central committee membership; today they represent less than 1 per cent. They are proportionally under- represented in the Supreme Soviet and the republican soviets. They have al- most no role in the foreign service and in journalism many Jews feel they must adopt Russian-sounding pseudon- yms to get ahead. Most of the nationalities have their own territories, where the language is their own and where most officials are of their nationality. Theoretically the Jews have Biro-Bidzhan, the Jewish Autonomous Region on the Chinese border, established in 1934. It is about as Jewish as a ham sandwich. Of a total popuation of 180,000 only 20,000 are Jews and of these only 30 per cent give Yiddish as their mother tongue. Until 1970 the first secretaries of the regional Communist Party committees have been Russians and Ukrainians. Now, at last, the party chief is a Jew. 4A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 CPYRGHT Agents of Russifiention CULTURALLY AND POLITICALLY the dominant role in BiroBidzhan has been played by Russians. not Jews. and only in 1970 was an attempt made to redress the balance. In the li- braries and bookshops there are few shelves of Yiddish books. There are no shops catering to kosher requirements and there is in the city of Bit.oRidzhan itself only one synagogue, called "the prayer house for Judaists," which serves the whole region. Yiddish is not taught in any of the schools, no special courses in the history of the Jewish people are given, there are hardly enough settlers left who write Yiddish well enough to contribute to the re- gion's small daily newspaper Shtern,' and of the five deputies which the re- gion sends to the Soviet of Nationali- ties, onY two are actually Jewish. The Jew thus is the eternal stranger. Since Jews tend to assimilate into the Russian culture rather than the indi- genous culture of the non-Russian areas in which they live, they are further suspected as agents -of Russification. Thus, in areas of traditional anti-Semi- tism such as Moldavia and the Ukraine, the Jew is doubly damned: for being ethnically Jewish and cultur- ally Russian. In Russia, they are sus- pected of harboring dual political and psychological loyalties to a homeland other than the U.S.S.R., a suspicion ' that Israel and Zionist propaganda has not allayed but merely fostered. 'wva flocked in great ea-ethers to the revolutionary banner in the early 191)0s. The overthrow of the tsar gave them a chance to leave the Pale of Set- tlements and to escape, hopOully for- ever, from the threat of pogroms. Jove like Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Sver- dlov and Litvinov were indispensable to Lenin in making the Revolution. And as long as Lenin lived anti-Semi- tism was held at bay. By 1939 anti-Semitism in all its varied manifestations had receded into the background. True, Stalin had purged the party leadership of most of its Jew- ish members, but the motivations were, political and his own surge for ultimate \ power. An ominous reversal followed the. flitter-Stalin pact. Foreign Jewish Com- munists who had found refuge in Mos- cow and survived the purges of the Comintern membership suddenly found themselves being shipped to Germany and Hitler's concentration camps. Soviet propaganda swung onto the Nazi line. After the war, Stalin cracked down In earnest. His campaign against "root- less cosmopolitan?' resulted in the shutting down of virtually all Yiddish cultural institutions, from theaters to newspapers. In 1952 approximately 30 leading, Jewish writers and intellec- tuals were liquidated as Stalin set the stage for the "anti-Zionist" purges that gripped his satellites Hungary, Czecho- slovakia and East Germany. Finally the "Doctors' Plot" was in motion. If Stalin had lived it would surely have led to pogroms. Khrushchev once denied publicly that anti-Semitism exists in the U.S.S.R. But it was under Khrushchev that dozens of Jews were shot at eco- nomic speculators and their Jewish ? names prominently published in the press. It was under Krushchev also that the furor started over Yevtushen- ? ko's poem "Bahi Yar." What Stalin started and Khruschev , finished, in his own way, was the de- struction of Jewish cultural life. Under Brezhnev, as a consequence of the Six- . Day War and Soviet commitments to the Arab countries, antiZionism and an. official anti-Israel policy have been un- leashed. Until 1967 the dilemma of the , ' Jews in the Soviet Union had been that the majority were ceasing Jews. Now, as a consequence. of Moscow's carnpagin against Israel and Zionism even some assimilated Jews have been reimbued with a sense of their own. Jewishness. Most significant of all, however, are the spirit of militancy which has ?gripped the Jewish communities in the U.S.S.R and the draconian measures which Soviet authorities have employed to suppress it. Scores of Jews have sent and signed petitions to the Krem- lin demanding exit visas. Dozens hn?e staged hunger strikes In Riga, Vtnius and Moscow and dozens more have en- gaged In sit-in. strikes in both the re- ' ception offices of the Supreme Soviet and the Central Telegraph building in Moscow. In August 1971 an estimated 3,000 Lithuanian Jews staged a march to commemorate the deaths of Soviet Jews killed in World War IL Dozens of others all around the U.S.S.R. have been arrested, questioned. intimidated. convicted and jailed for demonstrating or demanding their rights and emigra- tion visas. Inadvertently, the Kremlin has fos- tered Jewish awareness, and thereby added yet another ingredient to the simmering melting pot of national and racial unrest. 1P12 be Jnhn ?timber,. Prom the forthcominr book "The Neer MITE MIAMI Under the Heirs st ettlln," lo W Pub- Unhed by Doubled'. ? Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 16 25X1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 I'MPIPPPMPA4WW1101111111 TI1In May 1972 ?SOVIET YOUTH TOREIY,'CYNICAL, RESTLESS In 1953 the world was much moved by photos of desperate East German youths battling Soviet tanks with nothing but stones. In 1956 even 12-year old HUngarian youngsters manned barricades in the hopeless battle against Soviet armed suppression. In 1967 students issued a bold challenge to the Czechoslovak regime, symbolic of the national sentiment which eventually ushered in the doomed but courageous 1968 experiment of Communism with a human face. Not only had Communist institutions patently failed to mold these youths into the new Communist man, a conforming servant of the State in which they had virtually no voice, but their bold protests threatened the stability of other Communist regimes whose youth might catch the same infection. In 1968 and 1969 when youthful rebellion and unrest in the non-Communist world was making headlines, the Soviet reaction was ambivalent. However much they deplored and distrusted the anti- authoritarian attitudes, the inexplicably classless nature of the demonstrations, and the occasional Maoist slogan, they were also beguiled by their revolutionary potential. At the same time, the Soviet Union was fearful of the reaction of their own population, more than half of it under 30. So the Party press turned reportorial somersaults to explain that western radical youth was, of course, rebelling solely against capitalism. To protect their own people against contamination, they tightened controls on _foreign travel (even to the East European Communist countries where life styles were a bit more casual and westernized, as in Poland), forbade reading of foreign periodicals and limited controversial foreign news coverage. Word of foreign cultures does reach the Soviet citizen, however, via radio, foreign tourists, and occasionally by an oversight in the Communists' own propaganda films and literature. Official reluctance -- sometimes refusal -- to admit the existence of anti-social behavior in USSR is typified by Party Chairman Brezhnev's pep talk to a 1970 Komsomol conference. Soviet youth, he declared, is "healthy, energetic, ambitious.. .full of enthusiasm for the cause of the Party and Communism" (see attached New York Times article, 27 May 1970). Such wishful thinking is understancrable. For a Party leadership whose average age is now over 60, the spectacle of ever-greater numbers (though still a small percentage) of its youth turning away from political concerns despite all the Party and government pressure, must be extremely alarming and conjure up fears for the future. One Politburo member, P.Y. Shelest, was more candid when he called Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 on all public organizations to fight the intolerable, shameful hippy who "scorns work" ("khippi" in Russian transliteration) under the influence of bourgeois propaganda and morals (see attached New York Times article, 30 Jude 1971):. All inditations, including scathing comments in the Party press, are that Shelest spoke more accurately than Brezhnev. In 1969 more than 80% of juvenile offenders were drunk when picked up; hooliganism and vandalism are increasing; western dress and hair styles, western music are enormously popular and are seen as inherently evil by the authorities. Most disturbing of all is the fact that idleness and apathy are more and more a way of life among the educated youth. Many thousands reportedly far as the SibetianrPlains to avoid the_sta.ificationLof life in the Soviet labor force. Agricultural lands, suffering from the inefficiencies of centralized, bureaucratic management and emptiness of rural Soviet society, now lose as many as 19 of every 20 youths to the cities where many of them are content to work only enough to provide a bare subsistence. The age of the Stahkanovite is over; the age of the parasite may be ascendant. "Parasitism" is the official term for refusal to do approved work, a definition which is easily stretched to include all non-conformist activities. Penalties for parasites include being shipped off to "special locations" for two to five years. Soviet youth is manipulated, politicized and bureaucratized, starting at an early 'age, by four institutions: the schools-, military services, Pioneers and Komsomols (Communist Youth League) The last two are especially significant. At age 10 nearly all Soviet children join the Pioneers. Supervised by Komsomol leaders, Pioneers are indoctrinated with group discipline and patriotism along with being taught a wide range of recreational games and skills. The Komsomol, the junior Communist Party, has traditionally been a more elitist organization but is now moving toward all- encompassing membership of youths from 15 to 28. Directly controlled by the CPSU, the Komsomol provides an interesting window on authoritarian Communism. Its paid professional officers are directly responsible to the Central Committee of the CPSU and are not account- able to the membership. Komsomol structure apes that of the CPSU and like that body is managed from the top down through "democratic centralism." "In pluralistic societies, the term 'youth organ- ization' brings to mind a voluntary association of members with conmon interests and shared goals -- a description that should not be applied to Komsomol. Its existence depends not upon massive popular support, but upon the power and authority of the Communist Party. The Komsomol is the antithesis of a youth movement. It iS an organization sponsored 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 by the Party preciselyinorder to monopolize the field and to orestall the emergence of what are viewed As authentic youth movements in democratic societies. This characteristic of the Komsomol is of fundamental importance in evaluating its role in the Soviet system and in attempting to account for its successes and failures."* remphasis added]. Like their mentors in the cpsu, Komsomol leaders are aging. Although regular membership is limited to those under 28, leaders stay on (at one Komsomol Congress, over 50% were over 28). Two recent Komsomol chiefs were later rewarded with leadership of the KGB, the Soviet secret service, on the strength of their work in the Komsomol! In addition to the schools, the Pioneers and the Komsomol, pre-military training is mandatory for all students, beginning at nine years. Further enhancing the patriotic, dutiful-citizen model emphasized by other institutions, military training during school years is so thorough as to permit reducing the term of regular, mandatory military service for adults. Despite these years of regimentation, or more probably because of it, a rising number of Soviet young people are dis- enchanted with the reality of Soviet life after school, which they compare unfavorably with the selflessness they have been trained to cultivate. While many of the worlds' youth are questioning their parents' values, their elders, their teachers and leaders are experimenting with responsive reforms. The Communist reaction to problems with their young people contrasts vividly with some non-Communist efforts. Instead of trying to understand youthful attitudes and problems, they deny their validity; instead of trying to bridge a generation gap, they deny its existence. Instead of examining educational institutions for their contribution to humanistic needs in a technical society, they establish more boarding schools for closer control over students. Instead of exploring the basis for apathy and cynicism, they try to repress its manifestations. Instead of questioning their.own restrictive training methods, they blame disaffection on western influences. Instead of helping the individual to achieve the highest possible level of education, they require students to augment factory labor forces. Instead of practicing the egalitarianism .;hey ipreach, they'award the best -cljools, the best jobs to the political activists. Instead of opening the political process to youthful partitipants, they close it further *Allen Kassof, Soviet Youth Program, Harvard University Press, 1965. 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 by denying secret ballots to regular Komsomol members and excluding students from decisions about their own lives, just as they exclude the average Party member from important decisions. Realistically, little else can be expected. In education and youth training, as in politics and every phase of Conununist life, to decentralize command, to permit individual choices or experiment along untried lines is to invite the loss of Party control over every field of public activity. There is little likelihood that the Soviet Union, or any of its East European subordinates feels strong enough to run that risk. 4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Thi; was believed the -first! time that a leading Soviet of- 1k al has used the word ' ."11 ppies" in public, In Rus- .simn and Ukrainian it sounds I ahoost the same as it does in , , Er glish?"khippi." 'Many youths by their un- worthy behavior have brought ? sh me on themselves, their comrarkb' parents and collee-, hich they work. or', study," Mr. thelest said, fie.' carding to the latest issue of 141 Ukranian party paper to CPYRGH "_Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 CPYRGHT NEW YORK TIMES 27 May 1970 ? Brezhnev Compares Unrest of Youth in West With Calm in Soviet By BERNARD GWERTZMEN sordid to Tho New York Times MOSCOW. May 26?Leonid I. Brezhnev, the head of the Communist party, said at the opening session of a congress of the Young Communist League today that the "stormy upsurge" of youth in the West provided evidence of the "deep- ening social crisis of cnpitelism. ' The 5,000 delegates?most of them between 25 and 35 years of age--cheered as Mr. Brezh- nev compared this "crisis" with the situation in the Soviet Union. Mr. Brezhnev said that In the West "youth does not want to put up with h system of exploitation and with the bloody adventures of imperial.' ism.' Urging more contact with these "progressive" forces, he said protests In recent years "have become a serious factor In the political fight in the cap- italist countries." Mr. Brezhnev said that So- viet youth, meanwhile, . "is growing up morally healthy, energetic and ambitious." 1 ' &Act youth ? is full. of enc ?gy and enthusiasm ? for the fig it for the cause of the party, for the cause of Com- munism," he said. Po ideally Most Active The delegates in the Krem- lin's P lace of Congresses rep- resent the country's 27 million, members of the Young Commu- , nist League, kohWK111-fhe Set yiet Union by the acronym Komsc mol. The r election as delegates Indica .ed that they were ,the most politically attive of thel Komsomol members. . They form the traditional training grouni for future party lead- ers. They have a reputation of being the most ideologically orthodox, 'certainly more so than their nonactivist fellow memt crs. Thr7 aiaiimAiialeatiy shouted CPYRGHT NEW Y?R1( TIMES 30 June 1971 in rhythm, "Glory to the party," and 'Lenin is with us," waiting for the meeting to open. Mr. Brezhnev, in his speech to the -quadrennial congress, drew the attention of the dele- gates ?to .the economic prob- lems that he has underlined in many of his speeches this year. He said the first years of the Soviet system were like "a pri- mary school" compared with the difficulties facing the peo. 'plc today. The main report was given by Yevgeny M. Tyazheloikov, the First ?Secretary of the Komsomol. He said that al- though Soviet youth was ba-4 Isically on the right track, "we' icannot say That the poison or anti -Communism does ot pose dangers." He then said that the! %Komsomol could not tolerate ..rsome appearances of skept1-1 tism, ? apolitical .. behavier, a, 'sconiful attitude, toward work study, School or :civil ?obliga. tiori. 1: I f I, .. ...; $4.4 :).68t.V1...14'....' CPYRGHT Ukraine Leader Urges Soviet to Get Rid of Whippis! &Witt to Th1 Nrr Otic Times MOSCOW, Arne 29?Pyotr, Y. Shetest, a. bovIrt, roll I LII 1.? member, has called for a pub-, lie campaign to rid the Soviet, Union of what he regards as the latest Western scourge?, , hippies. At a Central . Committee, meeting of the Ukrainian ' ? party organization last Week, .Mr. Shelest, the Ukrainian leader, said every Communist and every public organization: must loin in the fight. reach Moscow. "Under the influence of bourgeois propaganda and morals, part of the youth for this or that reason has slipped from under our tnflu- once," he complained. "Phe- nomena not unlike the so- called hippies who scorn work have developed. This is harmful to the Socialist world view." ?He said that "these siinme.. ful phenomena are intoler? able in our society." Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT Russian youths often register apathy when their elders try to instill Commu- nist Wet logy in them.. ? They adopt Western fads such as' miniskit s and long hair, and display what o der people generally regard as. sexual looseness. These youngsters arc accused of fail- ing to ippreciate the sacrifices of their elders in making possible the "good life" which they appear to take for granted. Rossi in parents, no less than their U. S. ci unterparts, seem baffled in deal- ing wit such attitudes. Their reactions range f om official crackdowns and stern admon, inns to attempts at sympathetic tinders ? .?ling. Politi ;Iv, Russia's young are i)..iyinv a maim role in protests dematnin4; citizens be given, in practice, me righo. accorded to them in theory by ose So vict C mstitimon?frecdom of spero.. press a id assembly, and the right to a fair tri . ? or e pase WF(0114A0002001 (0001- .A1PRYAu ists ant n it .5 uthris not tolerant of any public show of disorder. There is also little sign of any interest in marijuana , among Soviet youth. What Mr. Shelest seems most upset about are the in- terest in Western fads shown . by Soviet youth and a cer- tain skepticism toward offi- cial ideology exhibited by some of them. Thus, in fash- ions, the miniskirt, the midi ? and even some maxis are seen here, and all sophisticat- ed young people listen to, .Western popular music. ? ") Ironically, the interest in hippies was in a sense los.; tered by the official props, ganda. , Nipples Seen in Films Soviet television and mo- Nie theaters have shown many films about the anti- war movement in the United States and almost all the voune mimic in the films public opinion must join in .the fight against them. The goal-of party organizations is to raise decisively the re- sponsibilities of all Commu- nists for the education of our youth," he, said. Mr. Shelest did not say ' how extensive he thought ' the hippy influence was. But it has been quite clear that in major Soviet cities, the young people are gradually moving toward a hippy look. Part of the reason for this is the de- sire of Soviet youth not to be out of step with young people in other countries. Although long - haired youths are no longer curiosi- ? ties and blue jeans are even manufactured in the Soviet Union, there Is nothing like the hippy cult of the West in the Soviet Union. Restrictions on movement and residency in most cities prevent the communal arrangements of have the hippy look. Soviet efforts to encourage tourism . have brought some Western hippies here as well. In addition, quite a few Hungarian and Polish hippy -- types have been here on offi- cial youth exchanges, much to the consternation of offi- cials of the Soviet Young communist League. ' The proper appearance for 'young Communist men in- cludes 'short haircuts, dark , suits, and either white shirt- isnd tie or a white turtleneck shirt. Girls are expected to wear a sober stilt, or blouse k and skirt, with the hem just ,above the knee. ? There have been some re- , ports that a number of peo- ple, not all of them young, .'have been , migrating to Si- , j berla, where there are fewer -f; restrictions and where they,t, i can live a sort of hobo exist- Am. These Russians are t,ealled "bichi,lk at ,distinct trom hippies, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT 18 August 1969 CPYRGHT YOUNG GENERATION: SOVIET WORRY Now it is Russia where grown-ups are beginning to look at their brash youngsters with disbelieving eyes. Widening, there, is the gap between young and old as Marxism's children learn about protest?and miniskirts. MOSCOW The "generation gap" that has brought anguish to millions of American parents and educators is also becoming a.,major problem in Communist Russia. Here. in a country supposedly ruled - by, Marxist discipline, fathers and mothers despair increasingly over their . children. Small groups of students have staged illegal demonstrations over such . issues as minority rights, and have circulated petitions denouncing the persecution of dissident intellectuals. - The challenge. As in Ameriett, an "underground press"' flourishes among , students here?mocking the "establish- ititent" and its ways. Little is seen of a drug problem among Soviet youngsters. But their elders corn- constantly about drinking and hooliganism" among the young. Communist authorities, from the ag- ing men in the Kremlin on down, are responding with jail, exile and other' - repressive Measures. Occasionally, however, an older per.; ,son's voice rises in defense of the young and their (lemands. Typical is -a letter sent by Ivan A. l'akitimovich, chairman of a Latvian collective farm, to the prominent theorist and Politburo mem- ber Mikhail A. Suslov. Commenting on the trial of four youthful dissidents in Moscow, the writer said: "I believe that the persecution of young dissenters in a country where more than 50 per cent of the population is younger than 30 years of age is an ex- tremely dangerous line: adventurism. It . not toadies, not a public of 'yes men' Lord, how they have multiplied), 'mama's boys' who will determine ? future, but rather those very rebels, the most energetic, brave and high- principled members of our young genera- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00020017000RYRGHT tion. It is stupid to see in them the ene- mies of Soviet power, and more than stupid to let them rot .in prisons and make mock of them. For the party, such a -line is. equivalent to self-stra?gulation. "Too bad for us if we are net caOable of reaching an understanding with these - young. peinple.; They will inevitnbly "serenitt'tn new Palti." Worry over the future course of BUS. sia's young was indicated when the Sov- iet ICadership recently accused the country's official youth organization, the 23-million-member Young Communist League, of failure to enlist youthful en- . thusiasm for Communist ideals and causes. Concern over morals. Soviet elders nlso me paying much attention to sex among the young. An "Izvestia" article reported a court : case of 15-year-old girls who had sexuai. relations with 40-year-old men. The or-. tiele brought a flood .? etters' froml readers, ; ? ' These are some excerptst "I would ban tho showing of all for., , 7 eign films, as Welt as some of our own." ; ... "This idiotic short-skirt fashion must ? be prohibited. A man can't ride in streetcars any more." . . . "Ise't it time that the content of books were carefully checked? I. Nieras's novel. 'What Makes the World Co Round; glorifies a girl who gave birth to an, illegitimate child. It would be better for young people to send the classics." One reader wrote: "There is need for discipline. When (other used to lay on with the saddle girth, you didn't easily forget it. And it's ton had that the custom of smearing tar ou the doors [of delinquent girls] is being made fon of. "If it didn't help one particular girl, nt lent it scared off other&- . L. Ocha]korskaya replied with this edi- torial Opinion: ? "Nonsense! As though it were possible to instill morality with a saddle girth. . . Communist morality can be in- stilled only by a lofty goal, by serious work, by nobility on the part of those who surround yOu." "All the bare knees." The miniskirt. especially, stirs indignation among older ROSSialiS. In an unsigned letter to the "Literary Gentle." a reader reeently derenmeed short skirts as "a great shortcoming and a harmful thing in nor society." The let- ter added: "When I see nil the bare knees every- where. I sec nothing elegant about it.. I am being pursued by miniskirts. They are everywhere-in buses, in parks, in theaters, in streets, in planes, in trains, on land and on the sea. . . . The emo- tions of a normal man develop in the wrong direction." Replying to this, one A. Raskin urged the anonymous author to calm down and' argued that although he, himself, did , not care for mieiskirts, women should be free to choose their own fashions, ? Le s_s tolerantly, the Soviet daily "Len- inist. Balmer" recently attacked Soviet ? youths who imitate 'We.stern dances such as the "shake." The newspaper said: "The boys are shaking their bodies as if their pants are nailed to a fence and, they are trying to tear them off. . . . "After such a hot dance, the wornout. partners return to their places and em- brace. There is nothing surprising about this, since the lack of modesty in the movements of the 'shake' and the 'twist' are creating relations which can cause anxiety...... Shakes' and 'twists' are not an in- ' nocent amusement, but a means of build- ing ideological bridges." Lush life. Complaints also are being heard about young people's "spoiled. " insistence on high living. A. recent article by T. Kozhevnikova - in "Pravda" criticized lavishness of grad- uation parties, citing the case of a girl . who presented her parents with the fol- ; lowing ultimatum: "Either a dress of white guipure' [heavy lace] or I won't go to the party!" , Said the writer: "What is it that creates excessive de- mends on the part of someone who is still a minor and who has not earned a single kopeck? Is it the growing material ,1 well-being of the family, or consideras tions of prestige, or the implacable laws. of fashion? Probably all three. Also ap- ,. parently. there is the absesice of reason- ably &iced and yet modem merchau.7; disc, fled also the fact that recurrences of philiStine conceit, vanity and exhibi- tionism :.often go unchallenged -by public opinion nt the school, and by a firm 'No' at home." In ?It recent article in "Pravda," E. i.' Kostyashkin, nn educator, said: - "Present-day schoolchildren. especia - ly in the city, and most students as we1 ' freed from labor obligations, sometime0 take it for granted that their parents should mquestioningly fulfill their needs and even their whims. NVe are witness- ing a kind of inflation of material values -for adolescents. They make less and Jess of a connection between the results of labor and labor *elf. . . . According to our observation, ;expenses for children grow more rapidly than income of the .parents, and abs#0 nn ever-larger part of the family budget... - "Children often dress much better than their parents:- Many have expensive cameras, -transistors mid Moo recorders- without "even having learned what it is to earn .a ruble," Cerinsule Kostynslikin found nothing wrong with this, provided a corrective was ;introduced in the form of physical Mhos which should, he thought, accom- pany n youngster's schooling from child- hood onward. A recurring complaint is that unity's youth in Russia pays no mind to tho work lied sacrifices of its elders, not only the "men of the '40s" who defend- ed the country ? in war and rebuilt it from ruins, but the "men of the '30s" who laid the foundations for Russia's industries. . Clowns and guitar players. This point was made strongly by n spokes- man for the older generation, the well- known writer Nikolui Cribachev. In a, Poem, No Boys!" that appeared in "Pravda," he told Ilussia's young that their elders did 'not toil and sacrifice "so that you could become clowns in the market- place and guitarists for languid girls." ' An American) would immediately grasp .the thought, if not the imagery, of Com- . rade Cribacliev's complaint-which re- veals much about the "generation gap" rapidly developing within the world's No. 1 Communist power. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-hDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT EVENING STAR 27 July 1969 ? By ANTHONY C. COLLINS ' Imoeiste4 Prem. Stall Wr!tot ' ;P. ? MOSCOW ? Angry student dem- viistrations In liw West NCUIll like :'scenes from another world to Rus- :tria's tightly reined students. Yet, despite Communist party control which prevents nny inaseive ;student rebellion, Kremlin rulers fAee n few signs of youthful restless- ,- sass here ? and they're worried. A tiny handful of students has taken part in recent illegal demon- ' strations over minority group f rights and has signed petitions pro- ;testing the persecution of dissident intellectuals. I% A larger number read, and some- times contribute to, underground !literary magazines which pre free Communist censors. An even larger number of youths ;expresses its restlessness not in in- tellectual or political dissent but in ;drinking and 'hooliganism." Soviet rulers have shown their 'contern by arresting the few dem- .onstrators, trying to suppress the ,underground magazines and seek. Ing new ways to combat juvenile 'delinquency. t. One new proposal on combatting 'crime gives a rare inside look at the frustrations of Soviet youth and ttlio problems Moscow has in con- trolling its young citizens. .'? Two women jurists, N. Bukov- fskaya and E. Melnikova, proposed .that the regime's existing controls on youth be expanded to cover their after-work or after-school '.hours. YOUTH HAS KREMLIN WORRIED Under existing controls, the par- ty's 24-million-member Komsomol- 'Communist Youth League, keeps sharp eye on young people at iseh.00l, at work and in the army. !This is not only to combat crime but also to prevent copying the po- , !litical'agitation of Western youth? seizing school buildings, striking, disobeying military orders. . j. No Control Now But the Komsomol does not now !control the average Soviet youth on his neighborhood streets, the two ; ? ?women wrote in Komsomoiskaya :Pravda, the official .Komsomol vaner. "Only on the street does he feel I 'free,' " they said. ? This leads to spontaneously fesaturl groups, and about 80 per- iscent of ?,ivenile crimes are commit- ;led by them. ;' The s )1ution, the women said, Is 4far Communist youth officials to i.`work with the manager of each tapartmuit building ? the .most (widespread type of housing ? "to Organize groups . of youths of the same rice, education and inter- t.'ests " i ? ? Closely' watched groups of 15 to 20 :4 ,,youths ach should be encouraged 'to go ice skating together, visit mu- seums Ind movies, and go with ,i,Komsorned volunteers to work on or construction sites, the two k women n This ins been tried In Leningrad, lisecond biggest city after Moscow, they ad led, and has helped cut l'teen-nge crime in half. K. Such i. system of tighter party control would "cultivate the spir- itual needs of minors and their moral i leals," the writers main- tained. They e aid their studies at a crime Institute showed that most juvenile crime re suited from "spiritual pov- erty, combined with unorganized leisure activities." This f is in with previous corn- ? plaints by the press and youths themselt es that often there's noth- ." ing inter :sting to do. Deprived of many Western con- sumer pods such as cars and good ' clothes, some youths complain that ? cultural mtlets such as records, TV. shows aid movies are .either in short supply or weighted down with ? propagat da. On col ective farms, increasingly abandon( d by youths for the cities,' the boredom problem is worse, oth- er articles have said. ? Although studies of home life are lacking, Western observers see some st .ains on youth stemming from crowded one-room apart- ments an I working mothers. This rr akes the lack of adequate leisure f nzilities more critical. The di bate in the West over ? youthful marijuana users Is un- heard at here, and there is no pub. lie evidence of a drug problem. '. Added to the lack of leisure nctiv- ' !ties, young people face other limi- tations more constricting than those which Western youths rebel against. ;? Two years of military service are :mandatory for all 18-year-olds, al- though those lucky enough to get Into college can defer active duty. Travel Curb ' After college, or one of the many 'vocational institutes, students are expected to "repay their debt to society" by working at least a year in some unpopular, labor-short area ?' such as Siberia. Many find ways to quit before the year is up. Soviet young 'people travel more ? than in the past, but few aro al; lowed out to the West or even to Eastern Europe. A lucky one, Yuri, saw East Germany and reports: ' "Life is better there." The travel ourb, like restrictions on studies, apparently stems from a Kremlin ? fear that contact with forelpn ideas ?might turn young people's thoughts ? ? toward rebellion. Possibly for a similar reason, So-? , viet news media which usually de-, ' light in 'U.S. troubles have largely. Ignored America's ? student upheav- al. ? But observers do see some signs I -of a Soviet-style generation gap...! One sign is a taboo on even discuss- ing the problem, called "The fa- ,thers and sons question." ?`; When one writer in Molodoy ! !Kommunist-Young Communist, a ? party youth journal, dared to sug- . gest a conflict existed, the journal's next issue attacked him. "No other ? society has ever known such soli- ?clarity between 'fathers and sons,'? it claimed. As proof that the new generation' shares the Communist ideals and patriotism allegedly held by the; I previous one, the press cites school' group trips to World War II come- (cries. At the same time, cartoons in the ressline's Own satire magazine, Kress kodil, ridicule young people for' we,iring, long hair o? miniskirts blnri-ng week, &ming vo(l!ca or. listeisng to Western pop music. ' Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :ipIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-R0P79-01194A000200170001-6 CPYRGHT NEW YORK TIKES 6 July 1969 IOUTH'S PAPIOISIA SCORED I SOVIET Army Journal Asks 11-latrq for Nation's Enornios By It ERNAIID GWFATZMAN ri*ct'i IoDI tree, York 71mte MOSCOW, July 5 -- The Communist party jumoal e the Soviet armed forces com- plained this week that some young people were pacifist and lacked the "hatred" of older generations for the Soviet Union's enemies. The journal, liCommunist Vooruzhennikh BII, said lb W113 mandatory for young recruits to be educated in "hatred for the enemy" led by the United Stith& ' I The )ournal, published every ? two weeks, h rend primarily by military officers and Political CPYRGHT commissars of the armed forc- es. It genersilly refieets an ul- Unpatriotic conservative lino reactionary and anti-semitie groups had developed in Czarist Russia. . The May Issue contained un- nubl ished poems by Miss Aklunntova and the first publi- cation in Russian of Albert Camus's story, "The Fall," with a postscript that justified the publication of this ruminative work as an example of contem- porary Western thought. Memoirs Are Begun Tsetsiliya Kin started her mrmoirs about her husband Viktor Kin, n Soviet journalist, and writer who was executed In 1937 during the Stalinist purges. i The conservntives seek to discritirnee reviving memoirs of the Stnlinfst purges in Sovieti publications. . Perhaps the most interesting' article was by one or Nnvy blir's more controversial critics, Vladimir Lnkshin who eulo- gized Mnrk Slicheglov, a close friend of his. Although the works of liberal writers have become known in the Soviet Union since Mr. Shcheelov's death In 1955, Mr. Lnitshin mourned that his friend and fellow critic had not lived to write of them and their work. Listing many authors who were either unpublished in Stalin's time or severly at- tacked, hut who have gained acceptance rimong the country's liberal Intelligentsia since then, Mr. Lakshin saki of Mr. Shche- glov: "About all. this he would have written. He truly Would have written, And would have Written better than we." , Approved For Release 1999/09/02: ClAiRDP79-01194A000200170001-6 25X1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6PYRGHT NUMtRO SPtCIAL Mars 1972 ISTY EDITION FRANcAl&E Bulletin de la resistance socialiste tchecoslovaque PROCLAMER LA Vain par VERCORS La tragedie tchecoslovaque n'a pas ete seulement celle d'un pays de douze mil- lions d'habitants. Elle reste celle peut- etre de tante Tespece humaine. Avant ?intervention, en 1968, un parti commu- niste avait reussi a secouer, de l'inte- rieur, la masse enorme d'erreurs, d'in- justices et de mepris de l'homme qui, depuis quarante ans, alteraient si gra- vement le visage du socialisme que l'opinion publique, a travers /e monde et dans la grande ma jorite, assimilait le socialisme aux crimes commis en son nom. En quelques semaines, au cours d'un printemps prodigieux, des centai- nes de millions de gens sur la terre assis- talent a la demonstration que le soda- lisme etait tout le contraire de ce mons- tre froid et, cessant soudaln d'en avoir peur, s'ouvraient a plus d'espoir meme qu'en 1917. Apres un demi-si?e pen- dant lequel, avec Staline puis sans Jul. le socialisrne s'etait lentement et parfois cruellement denature, void qu'eclatait Prague une joie barite nouvelle, a la- quelle participait toute la population, tcheque et slovaque, une explosion de liberte dans les idees, les arts, les let tres, le theatre; une explosion surtout de la vent& et pas seulement pour quelques- mais de la verite pour tous, celle chantee par Eluard, tandis qu'une renou-? veau economique, et de nouvelles con- ditions de gestion auxquelles participaient les travailleurs, ouvraient les perspec- tives d'une merveilleuse prosperite. Tou- te cette allegresse avait, hors des Iron- tieres, Un tel pouvoir de conviction, un tel attrait sur les populations d'une so- ciete capitaliste en vole de decomposi- tion, que l'Europe en restait tremblante, non de crainte, mais d'esperance. Le 21 mit a detruit tout cela, en un instant. 11 l'a detruit pour le moment. Car il demeure que cette joie a eu lieu. Qu'elle a ete possible. Qu'elle a ete produite par une prise de conscience d'un parti de son appareil. Ce qui s'est produit une lois, sous la contrainte des realites, peut se produire de nouveau, sous la con- trainte de realites analogues. L'histoire ne se repete pas, mais la vie no cesse d'evoluer ; et ce qui a produit le prin. temps de Prague peut susciter des reac- tions de meme ordre dans d'autres part is communistes, dans d'autres appareils al-' ironies a des impasses equiva/entes. Le moment venu, un meme besoin de juge- ment sain, une meme contestation, une meme aspiration a la franchise, a la ye-, racite, peuvent balayer semblcrblement les elements fetus et scleroses, les obli- ger a licher le pouvoir, a le ceder a des hommes plus lucides, a des communistes plus clairvoyants. Mais cela se prepare. 1968 ne s'est pas fait tout seul, ni en un jour. 'Ce tut l'effet d'un long et persistent effort de l'intelli- gentsia communiste au cours des annees precedentes ? et le nouveau pouvoir ins- talle a Prague par les baionnettes russes le sait si bien que ses coups ont ete et sont de plus en plus diriges contre ceux- la, contre ces intellectuels qui leur onf fait Icicher les leviers de commande, les ant precipites a bas du pouvoir. Et corn- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-R0P79-01194A000200170001-6 C0 ? ?I II Par la seule vente. t,n procicr- mant la verite. Aussi la verite est-elle pour eux la menace dont us OM le plus peur, puisqu'ils savent bien qu'elle est revolutionnaire, et tout ce gulls font de. puis quatre ans, c'est de Tempecher par tous les mdyens de sortir de son putts, of d'y fourrer; dans le pulls, tous ceux qui pourraient la faire Miler une lois encore. Alors on empeche les ecrivains d'ecrize, quand on ne les met pas en prison, on ne publie pas leurs nouvelles ceuvres et Ton met les anciennes au pi/on, on les reduits a la misere et a la mart civile, a la disparition intellectuelle, on vide les universites, on fait, selon l'expression d'Aragon, un Biafra de Tesprit, clat?on ramener la nation au desert culture], au dernier rang des connaissances de tons les pays du monde. Mais un tel crime ne peut etre commis que par des hom- mes au cerveau petrifie, a Tesprit cor- mmpu, crux yeux desquels seul compte l'exercice du pouvoir, quelles qu'en doi- vent etre les consequences. A utrement dit, Sous les vieux crocodiles, les reve- nants staliniens qui s'accueillent muluel- lement, comme Novotny, avec cies roses et ne revent que de retablir les bonnes vieilles met bodes, les procedes drasti- ques du bon vieux temps. S'ils se set:- tent retenus encore de les app/iquer pleins gaz, s'ils se contentent encore de recluire leurs victimes a la liquidation so- dale, faute de pouvoir d?, comme trefois, recourir a la liquidation physique ce n'est pas ? us en riraient -- au nom du respect de la vie, de considerations humanitaires ; mais seulement pour des raisons &cliques, provisoires. II ne foul pas effaroucher trop vile les ames sen. sables des partis freres, qui croient en- core, les pauvres. au XX" Congres. Alors la tactique est simple : bien stir on ne renonce pas crux arrest ations ni crux pro- ces, on assure seulement gulls n'ont pas lieu. On jure gulls n'auront pas lieu dans Ie moment-meme oti us se font, sans se soucier d'une contradiction que tout le monde peut voir en lisant le journal. A l'envoye du P.C.F. que ces nouvelles inquietent, on repete n'y aura pas ed For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 CPYRGHT de poursuites poiMes faits remontant a 1968-69, justeme t c-uand l'auteur d'un article de 68, ap roive par le comite central, est condo rnne pour cet article, en meme temps q re vingf et un autres, dont l'ancien commestateur a la teleyi- sion, porte-parole du bureau politique. Salt-on que retie p 'orrteese, ce rnensonge pris sur le fait, c ue ce propos a ete tenu par M. Husak mais non pa* seui a soul, mais er presence de Sot? ennemi M. Bilak ? Cc r on ne laisse pas M. Husak parler a ten camarade fran- ccris sans temoin. M. Husak est surveille. C'est de nouveau le regne de la me: fiance generalisee, as chacun surveille l'autre. C'est l'amlaiance des annees 50; au pire moment dr lc denonciation mu: tuelle ? lorsque S'anaky laissait pendre Clementis et que Got wald laissait pen- dre Slansky de p?ur d'?e pendu lui- meme. Car forcemmt tout recommence, les memes causes produisent les memes effets. Seulement, c es effets, apres vingt ans de deviation cl Ins Ia terreur, us ont fini par causer, a leur tour, la reaction subite et salutaire du prinfemps de Prague... Mais ils ne Tont pas causee sans aide. II a fallu la femor46 de quelques 6cri- vains et /a con fiance 7u'un Smrkovsky, un Dubceir leur on hate. II a &Hu la proclamation incessonte. quotidienne, de Ia verite, de Joules Ces verites. Ce fut l? l'honneur et la gloirc die la presse tcheco- slovaque. Ce fuf l',ionneur au premier chef de Literarny Liely ? et qui explique Tacharnement du noureau pouvoir con- Ire la redaction de oe journal courcrgeux. La presse est morte en Tchecoslovaquie, et avec elle la vc rite. II n'est qu'un moyen pour faire refaiire icr verite, c'est de faire renaitre autssi Ia presse. Void le premier numero dt nouveau Listy traduit en longue frongaise. C'est le premier espoir, Ia precnii re pferre de celte renaissance. Saluons4e: VERCORS 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 LISTY . Listopad 1971 e. 6 , Casopes leskogovenske socialistick4 oposke 'Politika cukrovi a biZe CPYRGHT ?Stettin, politlks le onlehrt?A ? porlobE kampant a tak jsme pies pribubtlny temet nepneorovant z kampsue posjesdove v kant- psnl pferlsolebni, trprostfed mrsdnIn vykel Xerstkitv klink net kde je Warn! nebezpeel ? lute hlasnl teIlgtt boje o ',Mond Ildn, ktcrj obsshosnl nektcr.) enjintavd, pHs- ?Ong. Je to prepearovsny text projesn k kleologIckim injernnIkUm. gvestka prIsnAsk, re neberperi "pravIce" deend try& Iseprestola \ poletlekt MI a existovat ?"jejl konceper majl dowel enstlay vtiv r rinmi MU". Venni thke, ninori sitstdvoll r onsistd reshicnct nebo pomyglejl na aktivni Moor ? elat s filch je JJL nyrd progrumove aktivni. Dot proto ideologIcke tronte ukoly: 1) xtipas o siskdrd delnicke Indy, sejmina yelkych Riendib 2) strum verlond mlAdefe. Semites byl v taroks predern ? al na tackle pro- prrammllsticke ligfe, kale dAvid do kdnoho pylle "prissier ? "Icrirrilmtbd s vnbte mot!. spedeSenske Slyly" -.. sfejnt2hiIIskntetnostl net Itustik. Tun ? ntkolika poslednich proje- vech. JOrjrnt predvolelmIch, sehnzoje. dolcm. jeko by P vyjinikon pAr 'pn1lkh erldblelonista celc tenk.sslovenslm rovslo Jelin polltlkn. nedasno Re porlob- ni vvjoultoval .Novolny I n 11..xikorl a itival ha ila Rouvislostl tg estlannlinInti centrib land. schnenn ibirintiskym. llyrokrall km. Oleo Bourbon' -- nemmilleint lIngSk v projsva k 211A11,41 StraterIcl) daval es Mahn) 7.Stopthr Obrnl. Ziejult by titter syrolat jaked 'zitopkorske Inurti' ? morning sa- ntolumt. Zeitortk Rim dopisech Widens' tredi. byl 'vsstasen existent...arm tlaktt, ornolttilhu glifidni std. J1n1 Usk* oduldwall. Vtra enslasski odmith remnant. 7.1'opkuto "dnemittl" r Rodent orlon. CH. klatInf je portoj kokYch gptgovateld; ptemens rtipegruello r nosy Seas spisovattli se tnnsela jit po ntkollkAte odlotit. Ethan ? pfedlotenem fekl. Frv IsSm alkoho nerni. Kempf tohn Is ? adsrha nejson sninut poem,. je 1 prAntitny re& ochotnYch kanditliad semen Grl let. Melaka) polittka se tak panel sflosno keno a pedbizenlm. Silo.. se ml hrgt s ten% kteti treed' na svem. Tint ss mail strnAlt I ?slain' n Me, postragenl map ease dostat nabilika Irskaveho zachdeeni ? p(,jdon-11' k volbtlm. dostst softie zejmina \ Tribute, k undies Vysledck voleb se 111 gamine unmet jen rteutast se ttrko rust IA. Pled. tolebrd spoleine essedSulOV PCSC ? NT, tato polltikn huslkovskeho cukrovl ? blie elme pletlextlit pokud moino ? lAkavent Laical. Nebot jak syldtd6 Inds& sulskternIkiim ? volbj ,budon pleblReitem. ,Sk11(211 o volbu.,nebucle meg) Itym vont. Ve4en1 nem.) Huse gni o hodnott Masi) pro. Cher polose vedet, bylo mato itch. Ma se enlvASIII postarlt aktIvnt moll, at ut Skrtem nebo pfetlertim ne.iirdt1 n4 vnlbt-h. Nik.ln It nits mho& Moths( trelm setierd starobnkli 11Stelus1k byt je. troeint tralme. Se k ntmn docidiel r potlobt volebn Ito allfhte. i'llilmejme slut steehno, mint v pholvolefnifelt mbetfurkli nal. el. Chodnir tin ptertvolelnil issithre apormlut ne ? skim titbit jet. re Weed. nti stn h. kotintmllniclo, vittrAnlelb el okremsleh. Al ti. vitn rollers, on nit dimly NnImil se isk m Se ih'er emenit 2 2221121P2111 opagandy ? nook lobo, eo filady sleds. . Vedeni potty-bole mlnitrigni Oast ns dvotebnIch sehArch a maximilni na rot Sch. s echo/ swims& pooh's,. UI ted se dtji tajinnart ski. X 21. Irmo byly pflorsT4 alery birdlike Intents. cktailn1 pont drodalky. /Dahmer/ No tenni "Nepredilr . V mbilech me moonshots pottidkoo sa pflpestrovaty sugary II ssokiiiikogi CPYRGHT ? LISTY ? en francals CPYRGHT 4( LISTY ? es le journal de l'opposi- En accord avec nos amis .tcheco. lion sociaiiste tchecosiovaque. siavaques, nous reproduisons icl quel. II parait bus es deux mots, dans dif- ques articles, informations ou echos ferents pays et rangers et en Tcheco- p3rus dans ? LISTY ? en 1971. II esl slovaquie ineme. Par lui clrculent les b en comprehensible que les redac. Informations sur la situation dans le te urs vivant en Tchecoslovaquie occu. pays, la repression, les luttes de la pe n'ont Pu signer certains articles resistance. de leurs noms reels. ? Soutenu auss bien par les hommes Jiri Mikan, editeur de X LISTY ?, di- ? du X Printemps de Prague ? qui furent recteur de la Television de Prague en contraints h l'exil que par ceux qui 1968, elu membre du Comite Central continuent la kite dans le pays, malgre au XIV' Congres du Part! Communiste la repression du pouvoir ? normalise ?, tc hecoslovaque, le 22 ao0t 1968, a re. le retentissement 1checoslovaque de ce petit journal est considerable. d go specialement un editorial. A l'exterieur, II est la manifestation Le grand ecrivain Vercors, dont is de la continuit4 du courant en faveur notoriete en Tchecosiovaquie est con. d'un socialism a Visage humain ; a siderable, a blen voulu &tire la pr? ? l'interieur, dan3 ioccupee, H es la Tchecosiovaquie le symbole stimulant fe ce de ce numero special. de la resistanc a soclaliste, le porteur En le remerciant, nous exprimons des espoirs. n3tre q reconnaissance a celles et a ceux A, repondant a notre appel, nous onl Le COMITE )U 5 JANV1ER, consti- p prmis de reunir la somme necessaire Rue au debut de 1970, en cherchant a la publication de ? LISTY ? en fran. de nouvelles fc rmes d'activite suscep- c3is. Nous avons tenu a donner a ce Itibles de renforcer, en France, le cou- n mem le meme aspect, format el rant ^croissant de solldarite avec le yr Ise en page, qu'au ? Usty ? tcheco. peuple Ichecos ?vague, a pense gull s ovaque auquel 11 rend hommage, en serail bon qu'une edition en langue womettant au peuple de Tchecosiova. francalse de a LISTY * fosse mieux cpie et a sa resistance socialiste d'am. connaltre cells publication. Oilier 'noire campagne de solidarite. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 ? 3 CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001 6 AirpliovedFor Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 tine repression qui est CPYRGHT l? ? 6 ding e contre vous par Ad PELIKAN editeur de ? USW n Pour cc ountero exception net de List!! ), nous nurions voulu presenter au public &melds one selection representative d'ar- (Holes annlysnnt de c Printemps de Pra- gue i, des essais brillants ct um programme pour ravenir. Mais in sortie de te !turner? cointide avec tine ,nottvelle ? et malheureissement pas in derniere ? vague de repression en Tchecoslovaquie. C'est Masi que nornbre d'organisations plus de documents et d'articles stir In lutte de notre people que sur sa culture. 111 le comprendra sans doute, aneme s'il nous est desagreable de nous represent& comme ceux qui, en exposant Jour cas viennent troubler la conscience des mitres. Nous savons bien que de l'Histoire, les gens aiment it oublier les &Tenements der plaisants, surtout lorsqu'ils risquent de !cur donner un sentiment de culpabilite. I:occupation de la Toliecoslovaquie, d'un pays sane an &ear de l'Europe et cela en plein (lege international, appartient sans doute it cette cntegorie d'evenements dont le rappel m'est pas lagreable... C'est stir eels que cornptent les occu- pants de notre pays et le-s gotiverneurs (fulls ant places it an direction. C'est..pour- quoi its ont considere que le moment etait opporttm ? it l'abri de nouveaux espoirs de detente ? pour regler leurs comptes avec ceux qoi Tonkin:yid, en 1968, tin socialisane it visage human et qui ,ntont pas abandonne deur lune au lieu d'aocepter la crealite,. iMais nous serions injustes si nous no voyions pas que beaucoup de femmes et d'hommes, dans le monde, se revoltent .contre cette ,creglei de l'Histoire et que lettr solidarite avec le people tchecoslo- vague est toujouns vivante. La partition de cette edition ,francaise de Linty) en est un des nombreux exemples. C'est ainsi que de nombre d'organisations et d'amis out (Metre leurs voix, ces der- mieres semaines, contre da nouvelle vague ? de repression en Tchecoslovaquie. Nous Ileur en sornmes profondernent reconnais- sants. C'est un encouragement moral dont valeur ne pout pas se mesurer. Un excel;? Mais le problem est beattcoup plus pro- fond. Quand on deponce In repression it Prague, on a souvent tendance it in pre- senter comtrne onal exces 3. des groupes ou des personnes extremikles ? tels les ultras Blink et lndra, on la police secrete ? qui iraient it rencontre de In volonte de lltisnk et surtout en opposition avec de ligne (le In direction sovietique actuelle. comme (lit tin proverhe tcheque, 4 de desir. ilevient fie Ore de In pensee En effet, la repression policiere aujour- d'hni, en Tchecoslovaquie, est, seulernent ttne consequence inevitable de l'occ?upa- lion sovietique du pays, le nesultat de In politique de granite puissance. Un regime d'occupation, impose de cello maniere ine pout pas ? independamment (les .personnes et de deur volonte ? regner autrement que par In peur et roppression. Tonics les comparaisons avec In Pollogne el la Hongrie sont fausses parce que ? en ilehors de 'traditions differentes ? l'Anntee sovietique knit install& dans ces pays avant son intervention, alors que, dans le ens de la Tchecoslovaquie, II s'egissait (rune invasion pure et simple, avec ton- les les consequences psychologiques que cola suppose pour la population. Contains observateurs etrangers conti- nuent it repeter que Husak ne vent pas In repression, lambs que Bilak, Indra et d'au- tres la venlent. Vest one vision superfi- cielle, inome si on admet l'existence de contradictions an sein du groupe dirigearst de Prague. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 CPYRGHT Approved For Heiease 1999/09/02 Chaque regime prefere que tons les ci- toyens l'acceptent et le soutiennent volon- tairement. C'est dans ce sens que Husak voulait, ,comme ?les autres, qtte les s hom- ilies du ,printemps de Prague ) fassent leur autocritique et se salissent eux-minres, lents camarades et deurs idees defentlues en 1968. A ceux qui anraient accepte tette humilia- tion pultlique, on promettait tine bienveil- lance ,magnanime. Mais ii ceux qui refuse- rent et persisterent it conserver leurs opi- nions, on a declare la guerre sans mettle Guerre politique, tout d'abord : des ac- cusations publiques de etrahlson), sans in moindre ,possibilite de defense. Puis materielle : expulsion du travail, 4ransfert trtin poste a Pautre, discrimination envers Icon enfants chassis des Universitee on de Fern plol. Atteinte physique dans beaueotip de cas : interrogatoires, perquisitions, ar- restations, condemnations, brutalites tlani les prisons. 11 ne s'agil. pas d'une errcur, person- nelle tie Husak, d'un exces tie Blink ou trim groupe incontritle r, rnais des con- sequences logiques de l'occupation sovie- lique. La settle difference entre Cr. Husak d'une part, et Indra-Ililak de l'autre, c'est que lc premier ipensait pourrnit !wiser In resistance du pettple sans tecourir it la repression, tenths que les seconds sont con vaincus depuis le debut qu'on ,ne pourra y aboutir, ni obtenir des autocritiques sans da ,peur resultant de in repression. Alais le but est le Mine : etouffer la voix an- thentique ties peuples tcheque et slovaque et burs aspirations it l'independance, au socialisme demooratique. On salt que Cr. Husak a donne Passurence n'y a pas, qu'll ,n'y aurait pas de proces e prefabriques ) et des attestations en raison des opinions manifestees en 1968- 1909, mak iftivait-il pas assure aussi qua cpersonne ,n'avait invite Perm& sovieti- que on hien resterait on tomberait tivec le cainarade Dulteek ), pour affirmer tout le contra-ire un an apres? 414 Les assurances >0 de G. Husak La valtur de telles c assurances, a dep ,ete demontree par de nomItreux exemples connus ? de In comlainnation du general Prchlik en 1971 it ceHe du joutnaliste Lederer en fevrier 1972 ? sans patter des centilitres de can inconnus. Le ministere de la Justice tchilque a avoue, thins sea : GIA-Klat rascgtileq1WPWIRMAPAntibi- tie de l'annee 1970, 11 y (wait en 506 per- sonnes condamees pour c nctivites contre In Republique ). On snit que, .mniheuretise- un ouvrier on un etudiant n mins tie chance de beneficier it l'etranger de la publicite qui peut entattrer ?Ia condamna- tion d'un journailiste cm d'un intellectuel tonal's hors du pays. Si mime tine telle repression retroactive n'existait pas, devrions-nous etre reconnais- sants parce qu'un regime qui se reclatne du e socialism ne punit pas des dirigcants ,politiques on des citoyens pour les opinions politiques gels ont exprimees 3 ou 4 an- flees auparavank ? Ces hommes politiques tictivent-ils acceptor volontairetnent la fin tie lent vie politique et professionnelle alors gulls ne sont pas revoques par ceux qui des ont emus .apres tine lutte politique interne, mais tenverses par tine invasion armee etrangere ? Est-il 'normal .de les con- traindre it acceptor en silence les accusa- tions les plus monstrueuses diffusecs pu- bliquement centre eux et contre Jo peuple qui les await spontaniment sontenus ? Nest- ii pas de leur droit et mettle de deur devoir de militants et de patriotes de se defen- tire par tons des moyens, de denoncer les crimes contre lent pays, contre tout le mouvement socialiste et dome de parler it haute rvoix. Et si cc lour est refuse par le (regime, us n'ont d'autre recours que de s'exprimer dans tine presse clandestine ? cc qu'ont fait tons les fondateurs do socia- lism ? et aussi dans In presse interna- Umiak. ,Devrait-on accepter des e lois* inn- poiikes par In force (Pune occupation et considerer toute ,activite contraire it cette occupation corn-me etant c hors la loi) C'est la force morale de Dubcek, de Smrkovsky, de Kriegel et des autres din- pants ou militants du e Printemps de Prague qui refusent l'autocritique ) et demeurent ainsi des symboles de la resis- tance, une alternative possible pour l'arve- nir. ',Information est parvenue jusqu'a la presse occidentale que Dubcek, Smrkovsky, Kriegel et des imilliers d'autres ant refuse de participer it la farce electorate de no- vembre 1971; an geste qui a sans doute aggrave leur situation, mais augmentA leur prestige dans In population. Une opposition socialist? C'est odors an settle v&ntte dans lee ? assu- rances} de Ilusnk n'y aura pas de Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 -6 proce prefabriqt parce y a it y aura des proces politiques contre une opposition politique reelle. Une opposition organisee ou spontanee qui ? pour an pre- miere fois dans un pays de tl'Est n'est pas une opposition anticommuniste, mais one opposition socialiste. 11 ,ne serait done pas juste de parlor de la repetition mecanique des procedes des annees 50. Car Slansky et les 'autres diri- geants executes alors n'etaient pas en oppo- sition consciente it la ligne du Patti et c'est pourquoi on devait fabriquer s cette opposition et tleurs aveux s. Cette fois, on arrete et on persecute des communistes, des socialistes, des patriotes qui sont eonseiem- meet dans l',opposition et qui se battent pour un socialisme different de celui qui existe en U.B.S.S. f;'est aussi In raison pour laquelle it n'est pas possible aujourti'lliti de faire des grands (show tprocess, ear In plupart des accu- ses s'y defendraient ouverternent ? d part one ,minorite qui sc laisserait baser. ?Et le public refuserait de oroire aux accusations, mais s'ielentifierait plutest aux accuses qui exprimeraient ses sentiments. Devons-nous, pour autant, etre satisfaits de ce progres Le schema des process Certains faits, comme l'arrestation journatiste italien Valerio Ochetto, la cam- pagne developpee Indoor .de cc (casts par in .presse officielle itchecoslovaque ? et aussi sovietique laissent prevoir In cons- truction artificiellle de [ohms proces poli- tiques, qui se preparent a Prague, it Brno, it Bratislava. Le regime, intpose de l'exte- rieur, no petit pas accepter que les hom- mes de l'opposition agissent par leur pro- pre conviction et s'appuient sur le peuple : il sent In .necessite de les presenter corn- inc des e agents corrompus s diriges 4 de 1.'istranger s. De la resulte le schema ? d'un cote, l'opposition interieure qui Prepare i un coop d'Etat s ; -- de l'autre cede, les .?gr?lebeco- slovaques qul envoient des s instructions s Popposition intenieure et qui, nature/le- nient, travaillent i pour les services de ren- seignetnerds hoperialistes s ; - onfin, les journalistes et touristes et/lingers qui, emote courriers s, font In liaison entre les deux groupes. Sur cette base, les opI"I. vent etre artificiellement condamnes non pour leurs opinions politique.s s, mnis pour !curs c activites criminelles a. Et I. llusak pent dire qu'll a respecte les assurances) gull avtait donnees... On peut se demander pourquoi cette peur de l'oppoSition et des hommes pro- dames plusieurs .fois c hallos et ouhlies s et attssi Si cette repression n'est pas en contradiction avec les efforts sovietiques pour la Conference Europeonne de seen- rite. 11 n'y a pas de contradiction, mais plutot tine logique de fer : l'ouverture vers l'Occident suppose la liquidation de l'oppo- &Rion et de toutes les ttlissidentes s it l'interieur du bloc, et le renforcement de l'higemonie absOlue de Moscou. Doe oppo- sition, meme minoritaire on epotentielle s, exprimant les sentiments de la population, pent se transferor subiternent it roccasion /Pune ?rise interieure on internationale qui transformerait l'etincelle en grand incemlie s. CA' tla .est particulierement vral en TIM de tension on de confrontation avec un autre pays, ermine In Chine Populnire par exemple. Telle est In VTIVIC raison de l?epression actuelle contra tout cc qui ressernble it tine opposition politique dans les pays de l'Est, et particttlierement en Tchecoslova- quie, qui est ,nujourd'hui le maillon le plus foible du bloc et on l'opposition est enra- cinee 4e phis profondement dans le people. Brejnev, ilusak et les autres dirigeants tin newstalinisme savent bion gulls pen- vent settlement offaiblir, mats non detruire cette opposition par In reprission. Its oat (lone besoin de In complicite de l'opinion publique occident/de pour etotiffer In 'yds de l'opposition. Les vraies questions .Cette situation pose un dilemme difficile .certains, parfois mettle tragique et ton- jours inconfortable. Comment exiger, ii juste titre, In liberation d'Angela Davis el des ontifascistes espagnols on grecs, en se taisant MIT la repression qui frappe des communistes et des pittriotes tchecoslo- vaques ? Pent-on ? it juste titre ? demon. der le retrait de l'anmee americaine er Indochine et ignorer ,l'occupation de h Tohecoslovaquie par l'armee sovietique Ext-Il possible de se taire par orainte d'art Approved For Release 199910t9/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 CPYRGHT taxe it' 4 antisovietistne), talons que ces cri- Ines discreditent Oe socialisme dans le monde entier ? tics Tcheques et les Slovaques ? et pas , Popinion publique occidentale ces ques- settlement eux attendent la reponse del tions. Avec espoir mais non inquietude ni angoisse. En attendant, us continuent leur Outte avec obstination, car elle a ses racines , dans ?leur Histoire. Faut-ill rappeler qu'en 1938 un IrEtat trancais, avec on homologue hri- tannique, ont snorifie la Tchecoslovaquie l'abandonnant a Hiller pour 4 saii- .ver h Nix pour sine generation ? Cette illusion ? si ce ne tut que cella ne shwa pas 'plus d'une .annee. ? La. repetera- tt-on ? Combien de temps Iamb-a-WI, cette fois, pour comprendre qu'on ne peut pas servir la detente Internationale en elouffant In ..,voix (Pun people et de la Illyerte,? et .que la repression en Tchecoslovacpsie est ? gee ani contre tons ceux qui, dans 4e monde, Itutttnt pour le progres GAZETIE DE LAUSANNE 10 Felbruary 1972 CPYRGHT Chasse aux rOfractaircs en Tchecoslovaquie. ? III Obstade- C!,--.cdterite et-irnexsinue. O Durcissetnent ideologique .en (JRSS, arrestations et 'repression en Tchecoslovaquie, l'hiver en Eu- rope de l'Est est decidement tres rigoureux. (t Gazette de Lausan-. ne du 9 fevrier). M. Husak, qui semble Vostlok en fink avec les oppositionnels irreductibles, laisse la bride sur h, cou a la police d'Etat. L'arbitraire du . regime reepargne personne COMIC k re- late notre correspondant. (D'un corrcspondant pour les affaires de l'Est) Le'cas de Jan Bzoch,.ancicn redacteur de la revue hebdorna- claire Kulturny Zivot ?, mon- tre bicn quelle est la perfidie des accusations. Jan llzoch a t?reete sur lie simple fait qu'il portait dans sa serviette k nu- mero de la revue communiste italicnne c Vie Nuove-Gior- ni contenant la famcitse in- terview de Joseph Stnrkovsky. Fait alarmant, des hornmes comme Vladimir Skutina, d'au- tre part, gravement maladc, et Vaclav Prchlik, directeur. repoque de Ditbcck de la Sec- tion des forces ?armees du Co- 'mite central, qui vient d'etre ? condamne a 3 sins de prison, sont soumis ?outes sortes de mauvais traitements ? Les derniers evenements de- vraient scrvir Wavertissement au monde libre. Le jour meme ou l'agence de presse CTK pu- bliait un premier communique sur les arrcstations elk COM- mcntait egalement la reunion a Bruxelles de la conference con- sultative des represent:10s de !'opinion publique ettropeenne, conference an curs de lamiclle le chef de In delegation sovi& tique Alexei Sitikov, appuye bicn sinr par la delegation tchtS- coslovaque, demandait que ropinion publique europeenne soutienne activement le projet de mise en place d'une commis- sion internationale chargee de convoquer tine conference sur In cooperation et la securite europeenne. II existe unc contradiction manifeste entre la volont6 for- cenee des pays du Pacte de Varsovie de 'convoquer une conference europeenne de secu- rite et la chassc aux sorcieres I laquellc ces Etats se livrent ,chez cox. Un rapprochement tine detente authentique ne sont guere conccvables s'il n'y a pas possibilite de garantir un libre &flange d'in formations honnetcs. Le renforeement du black-out sur its informations dans les Etats de l'Est et les persecutions auxqueltes sont soumis ccux qui devient, ne serait-cc que d'un ponce, dc la doctrine officielle font que l'on petit se demander si les Etats du Pack de Varsovie s'interes- ? sent reellement a la securite eu-. ropeenne ou s'ils n'ont en tate qu'une nouvelle ruse tactique; - FIN LONDON OBSERVER 12 March 1972 , Ir77,f7J4r4 41!:04' ? AH'61;:r ihmuf 771 a C A. Czech dissident re- port.on a new- Prague drive tecrushlthe under ground.. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 7 CPYRGHT THE CieellosiotkiK itaciembjge is seeking to con*HEITAMenr Communist' Party with, the': .underground opposition, in' Ciechoslovakia, According to information from Prague, not only political. detainees but even members of the Central Conimittee of the Party have been. questioned' about their personal and' ?Moira! !contacts with the Italian CoM-. munists, who continue strongly; to condemn the 1968 Soviet-led' invasion of Czechoslovakia. This attempt to collect damaging. evidence against the 'Italians may,be a search for grounds eventually to ,demand the excommunication' of: 'the Italian Communists from; the? :world Communist movement. The. 'search could not be conducted' without- the implicit approval' of Moscow or at least a,group in the' Kremlin. For a Party leader.who has con - sternly promised `no political! arrests,' Dr Gustav Basel-, the First' Secretery, has achieved the remark- able score of more than 200 arrests since last November's elections. In most cases, no charges have been laid. The group arrested in Brno. for instance, has been held. for over three months although a new law allows &tens ii0r1 without charges for only 90 days. The pattent of the arrests' is ,startling. It is not the non-Corn- ?munists of 1968 who are' beings Ort d hut net 10 erre lease oreanieations labelled as counter- revolidionary after the invasion? ' KAN e' the 23!, Club, the? Social-Democratic?Partye?has bee'n held. ? Some of those arrested are ex- Communists, like . Mehl and Sabala, both former Central Com- mittee members; the journalists Karel Kynel and fin Hochman. the hiOoriane Bartosek and. Kap-- . Ian. the lawyers Sarrialik and' Soe.hor. the sociologists Siklova; ? and Klofec, and the ? erninent ideoloeist Karel Kosile The others ,are former students' union officials, known. for New Left 'views: Mravec (e.tready sentenced), Jane- slay Jira and the well-known Jiri Mueller.. who headed' the Student Committee for Co-operation with, Workers, created' after the invasion. The attests ere a hid- to crush the underground, Whose very exist- ence proves that the official policy i of 'consolidation.' is a dead duct But to Party, astonishment, the undergeound.continues to circulate leaflets and even Teenier bulletins in Bohemia.' and Moravia., The ' levet of their deformation indle. caws that Party members' and'even secret sympathisers in.: the Central Committee' are-. in touch with the opposition:. ? The secret police are trying psi- meetly to. utemaek. these sources of informations House searches are increasing, typewriters and! mail are examined and loaded' questions dosing interrogations prove that letters from abroad--even letters rorii.ogetibr so meo police (STP) is trying hard, so far, teefind out how financial' aaostance? to the families of politi- cal prisoners is being organised. Even spme members of the ' Central! Committee, and close friends and. relatives- of President Svoboda, were not informed about the latest arrests': This-suggests that a situation reminiscent of the 1950s. is arising in which a small,, anony- mous and uncontrollable group- within, the ruline, clique usurping power. This group may be directed. from the' Ministry of the Interior and by Soviet advisers. The dissidents will probably be tried by small groups, in trials given. little publicity. Official statements ? will go on insisting that they arc being tried' for offences committed after 1968, hoping. to placate criticism from Western Communist Parties. TheT authority of Dr Husak has waned,. but not vanished. The February Meeting of the Central Committee was a minor victory for him: iediscussed the' economy in- stead of the report on ' political' given a forum for his hard-line. consolidation' which would. have opponents like Bilak and Kapek. But littsak's harping on economic shortcomings?excessive increase in production costs, non-fulfilment of sense areas of the plan, chronic emphasis on quantity at the expense of quality?was a partial admission of defeat. Worried economists demand the Installation of highly qualified managers and the profit criterion in 2004 95000+-6rnarkd improve- ment in the neet two years. They hint that the consolidation, policy , should not be allowed to impede this. progress.' It seems that features of Professor Sik's old economic , reforms arc to he surreptitiously introduced again. In the leadership there is Fdalc- mate, and apparently the waning factions have declared a truce, for several months. For the preseqt, no major personnel changes aro to be made. Moscow is still willing to support Husek as long as he can. put the economy on its feet and keep the lid on the political crisis in the country. . If the crisis boiled oyer, he would become dispensable. It is sometimes argued that underground opposition is counter- productive because it undermines fiusak and opens the way Cor the hard-liners. Such pragmatism may interest historians and Weetertt 'experts on Communist effeirs,' hut the opposition feels it cannot afford to compromise on principles. The dissidents clo not wish to degenerate?as Kesik put it?into a. mere 'Czech- and Slovak-speak- ing population producing steel and! grain,' devoid of political identity. Those who protest publicly lay themselves open to arrest for sub- version. Members of the opposi- tion' in Czechoelovakia want, it to be known that 'it is protest by Western Communists and promi- nent /eft-wingers, above all, which; might reduee the severity of the sentences on those now in prison?, ? LONDON TIMES 22 February 1972 771CY 9S CITIVA ? t Vaclav Pravda is the pseudonym of a Czechoslovak journalist who was an orthodox communist propagandist until I963. . when he came out strongly in , favour of Mr Dubcek's i reform .movement. In this remarkable letter to a friend in the West he explains ? ' bow he came to change, . why he will not change again, and what it feels like to live in Czechoslovakia today. The text has been edited and shortened, mainly to avoid easy identification. ? Approved For Ftele Prague..lemiery 16. 1972 CPYRGHT a:Eery' :411i4A. c:Irt? to poorfr senieneed not for what! Dear X. At last I have managed to sit down at this borrowed typewriter. Even to own a type- writer is a luxury tor criminals like myself because the police will always prove very costly that this or that illegal pamphlet has been written on a particular machine. But somehow I feel I do not care any snore. There seems no point in being a " good boy The machinery of revenge . for 1968 is working in th6 traditional manner. First they invent the guilt. then they stage the crime and order evidence and testimony. The judge and the prose- cutors arc instructed by the Party, and the Party secretariat fixes the length or the sentence and chooses the defendants who. anyway. were placed on prepared lists long ago. It is true that in Moscow. and where necessary in Prague too, they promised the Italian and the French communists that t here_ seivieljeceng lisalierikejegfrime ase woubuilahi 8 they did in 1968 but for later activities ". You must understand that I have no idea what my fate svill be. 11 I am still sitting in my house a month front now I shall not - know why they let time it here. They have, already spent so much money on mc that . I feel they must somehow bring the whole matter to an end and get something in return for all that expense. They check on any car which stops in front of my house. and every person who walks here is immortalized on film. The moment 1 drive away the boys step on their - pedals and a convoy is formed, I have an escort to the food shop. the shoe shop. the butcher, the supermarket. the barber, the cinema By now I know all their faces. and recently I criticized them for ell wearing the same type of sweater. Three times f was obliged to get lost. and 1 have an ad- vantage here because of my exec/lent imigktolkilei striisiwee have snow ehere Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A00020017WOYaGHT is no roily Hi ihe IMIC I !ling. It must cost a hell of .1 lot of money. Surely they do not think I am such an idiot as to -organize the Min-throw of the Government whcn .1 have the police on my heck. Clearly 1 will do this when I ;iin left alone. In December and this month they struck at mallY or to).' closest friends. All of 'theni had- ;Also been closely watched in recent rhonths.: Fluter some pretext even thc driving ficea..cs of some of them w'ere invali- dated. One of them had a recurrence of ulcer troubles and was twice in hospital in January because his blood count is lousy and his liver does not function properly. Our great police force also follows my wife svherever she goes. Poor girl. on one occa? . sion she not?iced someone eyeing her and thought: he was making passes at her. but - not so:, it Vvas comrade ! ? . Now I have a special system for quickly destroying what is necessary when thc police :come. I kr ow dready what they are aftcr and what they like to take. For instance. ? they take Solzhenits?yn from the .libraries. so :I have already sent these hooks to safe places. I have also removed?as all other -candidates for the gallows all docu- ments from the past era. all my corre- sponderice.:and naturally all newspapers and magazines of 1968-69. because that is what they always steal. All incoming mail I burn. There .are. of course. some things I want to keep at .home- until the last moment, like drafts of letters and unfinished manuscripts. and my address book, which I have tran- scribed on to one little sheet of paper. All these things I keep in one place and they will be thrown into thc flames the minute thc first agent of thc Holy Congregation shows up. We have begun to lock aricl secure our front door, which was not done herc in the past. That gives me at least 30 seconds. I am only sorry I can never kccp a whole manuscript here. for that means that working is no fun. - In the rt two rears I have also learnt - to distinguish sounds. At night, for in- stancF. I can distinguish the sound of a car which is going to stop from that of (me that is merely slowing down. I can recognize whether a car stops at the front or the back door. It reminds me of thc ?war, wilco I was a teenager and my lather was arrested by the Gestapo. My mother :cursed the Czech policeman .who accom- "panicd the Germans. He looked exactly :like the present ones. .I am glad that I inherited much of my mother's courage and Ntrong will and that I managed to overcome the ? kindheartedness from my fathers side. We all 4.7ree that Ihe- comrades from thc keret police arc worse than those immortalized by liaSek in The Good Soldier Sehweik. We try. to convince our- selves that we should not . underestimate then. but it is hard not to. Certainly they will be able to organize perfect trials. like Bukovsky's. but: if there were really an organized opposition. or even resistance. they would just pack up. But this is probably true of, any political police wherever and Whenever there exists that instittitional absurdity a political party with absolute power- which pros between itself and the population not arguments hut policemen. This .brings me to some debates of thc past. What was wrong with mc was that I was biased in favour of thc RusSians. Yoti. knoW that I was very critical of thc rigidity -of their foreign policy. and I found their priinness. prudery and exaggerated pathos ridiculous. bin I always found excuses for all this sinsply because I wanted to. Perhaps it was because thc s practically saved my life and my father's in May. 1945. Also. was Om in a working class family. My recollections of life in the pre-war republic are negative, and it has taken mc a long time to learn to.. under- stand it objectively. My father. by thc way., Wa an old-time communist And always had a sober altitude. but I Kasai) to understand things only much later. To be quite frank. I never felt that the posl-revolution dictatorship be a permanent arrangement. I could, never convince myself that all that nonsct)se was necessary. but I had only a very saigtic notion about thc scope and thc melliods of the dictatorship and its impact 7on the opposition. I was locked in my sindy and was interested only in thc big %void issues. never really grasped what was :ping on in my country. Having had an, injustice to a friend of mine put right 'I thought that justice could always he achie?ed if one tried. I ardently believed that socialism was good. that the dictatorship WM only temporary. that the horrible and limitedapparatt-hicks smith' be ,:ent lo hell, and that people would again speak With* human OICCS. I reinsert to believe that this was the way thc Russians wantcd it. On the contrary I judged them by the few 1 met?the Khrushchcv people-t.and I thought that -they detested thc spittle-licking Czecho... slovak Comnumist Party. . Years ago 1 came to the conclusion that ?a democratically elected team %vorild replace the idiotic dictatorship run by lin established. incompetent clique. and that:a political opening svould have to be start0 in a situation when there was no longrer an eyriloiting class. It took mc t long time lo understand 111;it Kbrushchev's f. Inuaimt a turn towards conservatism. hceause I was disgusted by his excursions into the 01- tura' field and 1 was only sorry that with him thc last human facesdisappeared from Russian politics. F read Marchcnko only last year. The First Crrele and Cancer Ward only in 1%9. But I had to be conditiooed to understand aIl this. and only after the,Russian invasion was I able to undcrstand,'or perhaps a few weeks before. when I began: to grasp the scope of Russian pressure. Another influence was the Kidder Repirt and the Piller Report on the Prague trials (of thc I950) which I read in hill only in 1969. People who were gaoled in the 1950s spoke frankly with me only in June. 19(ift. That was a real shock ror mc. I rcalifcd th?t our type i'V.socialism bore the same relation to my ideals as the inquisition did to Christianity. I remembered what inv father said in February.? '? .Now nc rc? going to have socialism according to Stalin, and that will bc no fun.- At that tinn: I thonaht this was heresy. Now I am sitting here staring out of the window, and I realize that 30 years of my life have been wasted, I have used up my energy and my health in the, cause of a great fraud. I never for one moment. cherished the idea of emigrating. I feel I don't have the right to do that. I know .1 will have to go through it here until the hitter end, but nothing will rid me of my feeling of complicity. Mind you. I never: had any position of power in the regime. but I peddled all that nonsense about a harpy future at a lime when millions were suffering, eating my daily ration of half a pound of salami. which ;Ira,. ay was get- _ ling more expensive every vear. When people ask me now if I am still for socialism I usually answer indirectly : let the Czechs choose what they consider basic- --that the right of choice must be guaran- teed for ever. If f am ever allowed to write again this is what I Will idi.rocate :thrive all. Democracy k basic. Th. 'Social Democra'ts knew this 50 years ag,i- but wc did not Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : cIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 CPYRGHT iiiiiterst;ind it (AprioyeidifteirRqlem SM1 red %0 I chi/ 11 the Hen to sneak ou .on other thin s, and only if others art 'allowed to speak equally freely and frankly. If they are not allowed to do that I will shut lop too, I hove written gibberish tong enough. Personally. I still advocate public ownership of the means of production as the foundation of social justice. in that -respect I shall never. change. I reject etas- 'sical capitalism even if under it democracy is corrupted negligibly compared with under our bureaucratic dictatorship. The whole nation is silent. It is a silence of a kind I have never experienced before. People are totally dieemeted but at the same time there is surprising optimism. Most people pin their hopes on 'he Euro- pean Security Conference. expecting that the Russians will be forced to leave and ?that once the regime has to face the people alone it will have to climb down a lot. The Mobile Guard is. it is truc, being feverishly built up. but everyone knows what an reliable Clement it is in our country. According to the experts the economy i4 going to the dogs. Sometimes I meet people who compare our situation with aril of the 19.50s. when .Stalin was still alive. I do not think this is correct. For instance. look at my situation compared ? with the situation of communists ostracized in the fifties. They were completely isolated. The anti-communist majority had no reason to syropithite with them because it had no reason to believe in their guilt (how could we haVe believed in it ?). and the communists and their fellow travellers' 'were absolutely hostile to them. Now the situation is different. During that. one Year. IV68. the whole nation s,as Mat' 4 (OW` -1-1111;t1 ; 011,9,4Qi I the occupation and the dictatorship. Ninety-live per cent supported that. After the." restoration " only a small part of the majority was bought, 1 he great mass of ?people cannot he bribed. They are the nation and if they accepted the new state of affairs it would he an act of suicide. This is why the leaders remain isolated. When I enter a shop or go somewhere I have never been before. when I pick up a hitch-hiker, or when I hitch-hike mysetf. whenever I get among people I do not know. I have the great and rewarding feeling that people think exactly the same as I do. And once you get a little closer to the people you ?ind they speak the same language. I have the great advantage that ' my views are publicly known. sO that people who know my name immediately ? start speaking with me quite openly and ? frankly. This was a new discovery three years ago. I realized that for 20 years people had not talked to me honestly. 1 , was flabbergatitld how many people had rejected this regime from the very beginning. Now I know. ? . If there are any anti-communist senti- ments in this country they emanate in the , first place from what official propaganda calls the working class. There arc among the workers, it is true, a few who for a few thousand crowns are willing 10 per- form heroic laboiirs. but the general , situation is quite clear, If the Politburo kncsv the rcal thoughts of the class .....whose name it pretends to govern it would . jump into the lake. Or, more likely, it does know hut we shall have to throw it in the ? lake. CPYRGHT tilM1 gcr 171 dell tsfhtir;;', 'except in t c sense that the bureaucrats arc always he last to sneak not and the ? first to sh 4 tip. Illit these people ,also know the rids from their figur6 and papers. anr they see the economic:roeSe. hut of coit se it is better to spend the winter neir Iv. stove 111111 to be sent, with a shovel in is the fresh air. The te,.! nological intelligentsia h always oornsed the regime. The intql ? gentsia of he liberal arts is a rig newcomer it opposition: So all the re lent ? has got is the police. the officer corns. the manapers and their deputies. the proper seri nts of the dictatorsliiii. They have to piy people even for joining . parades an I waviac flare. Otherwise the chief meths. d is fear. Here methods are being improved. People arc shown hew . large is the scale of things they should be afraid of. Nervous tension must be kept up. People ; re-led to feel there is nothing they can be sure of. It starts with children.... I listen ao the foreign broadcasts in ? Czech and I often feel that they do not have any .:al idea what things are like there. The) do not seem to realize the enormous c imensions of this farce and .how pearl: arc playing at Schweik. But probably lb s has to be so. once you have no direct contact. I spent _three evenings writing this ?letter. I hopi it will arrive. , Vaclav Pravda a Times Newspopen Lid 1972 10 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 25X1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200,170001-6 Nhy IMMIIMIWWINNWOMPICOMP PEKING'S STAKE IN EUROPE Last October a Radio Prague commentary, denounced the visit to France of Chinese Foreign Trade Minister Pai Hsiang-kuo as an example of China's efforts to obstruct a pan-European detente. According to Prague, the purpose of this visit (the first of ministerial level to a West European country) was to foment tensions in Europe which would "preoccupy the Soviet Union politically and limit the influence of the peace policy of the socialist countries." The broadcast also criticized China's silence on the Berlin agreement (September 1971) and the Soviet proposal for an all-European security conference. That this commentary should have originated in Prague (rather than Moscow which inspired it) was particularly appropriate, since the arrival in Europe of a high level Chinese delegation was directly related to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia three years before. Until the end of the nineteen sixties, Peking's foreigninitiatives were concentrated on the under-developed countries of Asia and Africa. Europe was not a priority area, although the Chinese made some attempts to cultivate potential East European dissidents following the Polish and Hungarian uprisings of 1956. By the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, China had close ties in East Europe only with Albania, while in West Europe it had diplomatic relations with France, the U.K., the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries. It was also in the process of developing commercial relations with West Germany. The Cultural Revolution disrupted these initiatives. Peking's excesses of this period strained relations with both East and West Europe. (For example, the British Chancery in Peking was sacked and burned 1111967.) China's stridently anti-Soviet policies made it difficult for any of the Soviet bloc countries to maintain close relations with Peking. And Tito was alienated by Chinese diatribes against Yugoslav "revisionism." All China's ambassadors in Europe were recalled at the time of the Cultural Revolution. Alarmed by Moscow's aggression (1968) against its fellow "socialists" in Prague, as well as by the ideological formula which Brezhnev developed to justify this action, China began to adopt more realistic and flexible tactics in its foreign relations. The objective was to counter any Soviet initiatives in Asia; however, Peking was also concerned that the U.S. and the USSR would reach an agreement regarding Europe. Therefore, the Chinese moved quickly to improve their relations in Europe, giving particular priority to those states which they thought were trying to resist Soviet and U.S. hegemony. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 At the time of the Sino-Soviet border. talksand the renewal of the Sino-U.S. meetings in Warsaw (1969), China's approach to Europe became more active. The French were singled out for special attention. Great Britain, for its part, was no longer portrayed by Chinese media as a supine tool of Washington but, increasingly, as an independent European state seeking to resist U.S. domination. Peking lauded British efforts to join the Gammon Market and switched its line on the European 'community to one of approval. (In early 1971 China inquired about establishing fOrmal relations with the Common Market in Brussels.) It also became more circumspect in its support to European Maoist groups. Although West Germany is China's most important trading partner on the continent, heither-has-Yet-agreed to estabiish-dipliailatic relations'.'Nforeover, Peking has-continued to oppose -- the Soviet concept of a detente between the two Uermanys, as well as Moscow's demands for a pan-European security conference (which the Chinese interpret as an effort to break up West European unity and expand Soviet influence). Peking is also appealing to East Europe's anti-Soviet sentiments and its traditional fears of a united German state. In East Europe there were also indicative changes in China's approach. In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, when Moscow was threatening wayward Rumania with consequences similar to those suffered by the comrades in Prague, China publicly assured Rumania of its support and -- to make its point clear -- dispatched a high ranking Chinese official to Bucharest. Later, in 1970, Peking signed an aid agreement with Rumania, its first formal assistance to a Warsaw Pact country since 1957. During this period, China also put an end to its attacks on Tito, signed a ten-year trade agreement with Yugoslavia, and in 1970 cemented the new relationship between the two countries by receiving a high level Yugoslav delegation. (China has not agreed, however, to restore party -- as opposed to state relations with Tito.) In Albania, the Chinese continued their large scale military and economic assistance program. Chinese efforts vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc countries of East Europe (as opposed to Albania and the independent-minded governments of Yugoslavia and Rumania), have encountered strong Soviet opposition. What are the basic reasons behind Peking's renewed efforts vis-a-vis the advanced states of East and West Europe? Obviously, the men who run China are not motivated by any altruistic concern for the well-being of countries they regard as unsavory capitalist or "revisionist" relics. First of all, there are sound economic reasons: China has adMitted it needs access: to the advanced industrial products and techniques of the West. Also, renewed diplomatic and commercial contacts with Europe are helpful in all, Peking China's image as a responsible world power. Above all, Peking would like to make sure that the USSR is confronted by a 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 strong and indepenaent power on its western flank, since the more Moscow is challenged from this quarter, the fewer resources it will have to devote to the critical eastern frontier with China. Similarly, if the United States has to shore up its position in Europe, it may be obliged to curtail some of its Far Eastern activities which China considers a threat. For these reasons, then, China is encouraging both Europes to develop independently of the United States and the USSR, and is discreetly taking advantage of a changing situation to bring to bear its limited but growing influence. 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 g?MIMOM?MMM?MM?M?????????oab????mo?ngewaO OW. 41.0011100.111.4. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 001?11001.011111?1111.011.4m May 1972 CUBA-USSR: REVOLUTION AT THE SUMMIT Next month Fidel Castro goes to Moscow. It will not be an easy trip for the no longer youthful dictator. Nineteen years of "revolutionary" leadership have taken their toll. When Castro and Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev sit down to review just where Latin America stands today and what changes they have been able to bring about in this portion of the globe, it would be understandable if Castro felt a little discouraged. Great Changes are shaking the area from Mexico to Tierra del Fuego. But where can Castro point and say, "I caused this change?" Even more discouraging must be the realization, if he can bring himself to admit it, that Cuba's potential as a revolutionary catalyst is diminishing with each passing year. In a lesser man the impact of this realization might bring with it a retrenchment, a lowering of sights. But Castro, as the Soviets have long realized, is unique -- egotistical in the extreme. His life style, as he showed in every phrase and gesture during his three-week barnstorming tour of Chile late last year, is active and aggressive, with wild swings in moods from depression to ebullience. At the start of his visit to Chile Castro tried to stay away from his usual revolutionary rhetoric and to give at least indirect endorsement to the Soviet doctrine that a peace- ful path to socialism can be found in some countries. Few believed him. More typical were his reactions to the defeat of the leftist front in Uruguay or the overthrow of the leftist regime of Gen? Juan Torres in Bolivia: "Bourgeois institutions can never reform themselves and the idea of a peaceful road to revolution is a farce." Most recently Castro has been telling visitors to Havana that he believes the days of his friend in Chile, President Salvador Allende, are numbered since Allende has vacillated about smashing his Christian Democratic opposition and their middle class supporters. Meanwhile, guerrilla movements that Castro has backed over the years in :Bolivia,: Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, Peru and Brazil have either been wiped out or reduced to mere nuisances by the governments in power. And yet he :cannot face fact.7 It, Venezuela, for instance, after four guerrillas were caught by government forces in February of this year, their interrogation revealed that they were part of a group of Venezuelans who had been in Cuba since 1967 being trained in rural and urban guerrilla warfare. They had recently been dispatched from Cuba with specific instructions to form a nucleus around which other guerrilla groups Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 could unite in Order to wage terrorism in the urban areas of Venezuela in the period leading up to the 1973 elections. For the Soviets Castro's guerrilla adventures are a nuisance but not a serious threat to their strategic plans for Latin America. They have succeeded in taming him to the point where he will begrudgingly give vocal support to popular front tactics in some areas. A second factor is that, for all the dimming of Castro's luster, Brezhnev knows that he is still an_iMportant-inspiration for Latin American revolutionary movements. In some instances the Soviets probably see positive benefits to be gained by letting Fidel play guerrilla. First, it. gives Moscow a counter to the new threat they see from the Communist Chinese in Latin America. Peking already has (or will soon have) representation in Chile, Peru, Argentina, Guyana and Mexico. While the Chinese have demonstrated: only the most correct behavior so far, the Soviets must be anticipating that their strongest competitor for leadership elsewhere in the Communist world might soon become involved in subversive activity in Latin America. If, however, Cuba remains the main source of training, arms, money and inspiration to the guerrilla and urban terrorist movements of Latin America, the Chinese will be to some extent pre-empted. Even though the Soviets have expressed doubts about the wisdom of some of Castro's involve- ments, they must be saying, "Better Fidel than Mao." The essential difference between Castro and the Soviets when it comes to guerrilla warfare seems to be mostly a question of timing. The Soviets see the revolutionary process in a longer time frame. They believe that precipitous violence, such as Che Guevara's fatal escapade in Bolivia in 1967, can result in a strengthening of the forces of "repression" and severe setbacks for the left. Bolivia today is still a point of contention between Castro and the Soviets. Their differences about it may figure in the upcoming Mbscow talks, particularly in view of the Bolivian government's ouster of a large number of Soviets during April. Those who know Castro say he is absolutely determined to see a leftist regime take power there through armed revolution, regardless of the cost in time, money and manpower. They attribute his compulsion to see a guerrilla movement succeed in Bolivia to his inability to admit that he and Che Guevara were wrong when they chose that country as the point from which to launch a continent-wide revolution. The overthrow of the leftist regime of General Jose Torres in 1971 only enraged Castro further. Bolivian exiles in Chile are now being marshaled by Castro forces to try again for the goal that Guevara failed to reach -- to communize Bolivia. Five months ago they set up an "Armed Revolutionary Front" (FRA) dedicated to the development of an insurgent movement in Bolivia and the overthrow of the government 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 of Col. Hugo Banzer Suarez in La Pat'. FRA is made up of a conglomerate of radical groups including the Soviet-oriented Communist Party of Bolivia, pro-Chinese Communists, Trotskyites, and the National Liberation Army (ELN). The ELN is an organization of Bolivian and other Latin American exiles directed, trained and financed by Cuba -- and, if Bolivian suspicions are justified, indirectly by the Soviet Union. Cuban intermediaries between the Bolivian exiles and the Chilean government work for the "Liberation Directorate" of the Cuban Ministry of Interior. This is a new organization which was broken out of the regular Cuban intelligence organization about two years ago to work exclusively on exporting the Cuban revolution. The head of this special group of Cuban Embassy officials in Chile is Luis Fernandez Ona, husband of Allende's favorite daughter, Beatrice. While personal relations between Allende and Castro are very close, Allende has tried to maintain a tight lid of security over both Cuba's involvement in Chilean internal security and the efforts of Castro to use Chile as a safe haven for guerrilla operations against neighboring countries. Allende does, however, understand the strategic value of using Chile as a base of operations against contiguous areas such as Bolivia. The Chilean President was told by General Giap of Hanoi, wham he met when visiting North Vietnam in 1969, that the reason for Guevara's failure two years earlier was that he did not have support bases in the countries around Bolivia to which to retreat if hard pressed. While Castro and Brezhnev may find that they do not agree on supporting armed insurgency at the moment in Bolivia, they will have less trouble when they discuss Guatemala and Colombia. The tactics of the Soviets and Cubans towards these two countries run closely parallel. Both countries are run by conservative governments, both have had a history of violence over the years, and both now confront guerrilla terroristmovements. The pro-Moscow Communist Parties in Guatemala and Colombia are supporting guerrilla groups in the countryside and terrorist units in the cities with money that is received from Moscow as part of the regular stipend that each party gets. The Soviets probably figure that, given the spe4a1 history of violence in these countries, if they do not permit the local Communist Parties to sponsor armed insurgents, they will lose most of their appeal to the young and disaffected. Cuba has long maintained its own guerrilla groups in these countries -- the Liberation Army (ELN) in Colombia and the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) in Guatemala. Most recently, the Cubans have sent their own paramilitary personnel to work directly with the Guatemalan FAR to resucitate from the blows being received from the Arana government. 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Recent information gathered by the Guatemalan and Colombian governments shows that the pro-Cuban and the pro-Moscow guerrillas are meeting and planning strategy and tactics together, a little suspicious of each other to be sure, but nonetheless overcoming old hesitancies. These two countries, where violence is already a way of life, may well be the best example of the concerted Sovet-Cuban "liberation" warfare to which other Latin American countries will be subjected in due course when "the masses have matured politically," One sector in Latin America presents both opportunity and possibly problems to Castro -- and to the Soviets behind him. This is the social-minded, "progressive" military DOW in power, as exemplified in Peru and Panama, and perhaps (if is early yet) in Ecuador. The military junta in Peru and the hyper-nationalist general Torrijos in Panama both are determined on reform and have grudges against the United States -- to the point of strained relations with that country. The nationalization of U.S. companies in Peru's case and the colonial status of the Canal Zone in Paftama's both have afforded Castro diplomatic openings to exploit- CaStro has maintained quasi-diplomatic personnel in Peru as "earthquake relief advisors" ever since the quake in 1971. He has hopes that Ecuador's new military regime -- itself wrangling with the U.S. over fishing rights -- will follow suit once Peru breaks the logjam. Castro is maintaining close relations with Torrijos in Panama and is advising him on the canal treaty negotiations with the United States, These ties are prized in Panama as a counter to U.S. weight. At the same time, none of the three regions is pro-Soviet or pro-Castro in ideological or strategic terms, To a degree they are partners of convenience because their disputes with the United States offer common ground. Castro's (and Brezhnev's) problem is how to play these issues to "lock in" these regimes to their long-range purposes, 4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 BOHEMIA, Caracas 28 February 1972 CASTRO TAMED By Fred Stokes The constantly rising numbers of Russians in Cuba, occupying more and more important positions, and always carrying their cameras and large briefcases, is the most typical feature of Cuba's existence. They dine in special places; they make purchases in special shops; they travel in spe- cial vehicles; and they hold special positions. According to the most con- servative estimates, there are some 5,000 Russians there; perhaps as many as 12,000, if one counts the military personnel. This penetration, though nothing new, has become especially inten- sive during the past 6 months, coinciding with the presence, in Cuba, of a group of special envoys and delegations assigned to discuss with Castro the specific terms for the continuation of the trade pact with the U.S.S.R. Forced by the failure of Castro's attempts to industrialize the coun- try to depend exclusively on the sugar industry, Cuba is now completely under the control of the U.S.S.R. Two years ago, the Soviet diplomat, Ru- dolf Shiliapnikov, who now resides in Caracas, was assigned to threaten Castro with the total stoppage of petroleum supplies from Baku, Which would have paralyzed Cuba's sugar industry if Castro had not agreed to a certain amount of Soviet control over the country's administration. See, for exam- ple, page 1475 of Hugh Thomas' book entitled, Cuba, the Pursuit of Freedom. Since that time, the Russians have been exerting increasing amounts of pres- sure, with the support of Kosygin who, for several years, has been known in Cuba as "the man who insists upon collecting," a phrase that Castro him- self let slip out in the presence of foreign journalists. In everyday life, the increasing pressure to control Castro is felt in the harsh antipathy that now prevails in Cuban-Soviet relations which, up until a few years ago, were cordial. At first, when there were only a few volunteer Soviet advisers, a wave of sympathy arose; but now that they are being sent to control and direct, the Soviets have become increasingly bureaucratic. They are almost not on speaking terms with the Cubans, who react with sullen disdain. Even the military advisers live totally apart from Cuban officialdom. Elimination of Castroites Soviet pressure on domestic political affairs has taken the form of constant elimination of Castro's cronies, who are gradually occupying posi- tions of lesser practical importance. Men such as Armando Hart and Faustino Perez Almeida have been removed from positions that bore some direct rela- tionship to production and administration, and have been assigned as figure- heads on the Central Committee. The Soviets' confidence has turned exclusive- ly in the direction of the technocrats trained in the U.S.S.R., who are spe- cialists of humble origins who returned from their study grants with the habit of obeying the Russians. Their confidence has also been directed to- ward Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Raul Castro or Sergio del Valle, who enjoy a certain amount of trust on the part of Moscow, in high-ranking positions. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 APi?irec'Clift:niAqA9laJs9/490-NONOPoi WARP lit7930124A4102C0170001 -6 damaged Moscow's good relations with Dorticos. The latter, who at one time was the favorite of the Soviets, chose to remain loyal to Castro at the time of the friction between the two governments. The consequences are that he has lost the complete confidence of the new owner of Cuba's sugar indus- try, Kosygin. The presence of the Soviets in the economy and in intermediate posi- tions is even more evident. Since Kosygin's second visit and the ratifica- tion of the trade agreement between Cuba and the U.S.S.R., all the nation's administrative posts now have their built-in "Russian." All the sugar re- fineries have a Soviet administrative expert controlling their expenditures. Daring January 1972 alone, four key Soviet missions, headed by General Ni- kolay Shchelokov, the U.S.S.R.'s Minister of Internal Affairs, and, an- other, by Andrey Kirilenko, from the Central Committee's Political Bureau, toured Cuba to ascertain the efficacy of these controls. The other two delegations were headed by the Central Committee's Deputy Chief of Propa- ganda, Yuriy Aleksandrovich, and Lieutenant General Leonid Batrushevich, from the political directorate of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R. Following these visits, which checked the efficiency of Soviet pen- etration into all areas (the economy, education and the Army), a veritable wave of high-ranking experts practically took over the Cuban Central Plan- ning Junta, the National Bank and the Ministry of the Sugar Industry. And, simultaneously, a series of agreements on technical cooperation which had been suspended for several months, were signed, with additional changes, and went into effect. It is difficult to determine to what extent the Soviet pressure will succeed in subduing Castro, in whose view the Russians hold only a secondary figurehead status, without any real authority, but who has kept the support of his own internationally advertised image that is practically impossible to tarnish without a collapse of the regime. Rise of the Pro-Soviets However, the Russians are even taking an active part in the affairs of internal repression, protecting their own, and eliminating those who are opposed to Soviet influence. For example, there are specific reports that, during Castrola visit to Chile, over 50 individuals who had been arrested in connection with the case of the pro-Soviet "micro-faction," headed by Anibal Escalante, were released as a result of pressure from the Russians and orders from Raul Castro himself. These men, the "Anibalistas" of the so-called micro-faction, had been given long sentences of forced labor; and the principal charge was that they were "pro-Russian." All, or nearly all of them were old Communist militants who, faced with the choice of obeying Castro or the Russians, had decided in favor of the latter. Two years ago, Castro could have repressed and imprisoned them. Their release and return to industries and positions is like the amen of an about-face that Castro cannot prevent. Those fond of impressive talk see in all this an act of submission by Castro to Moscow; but, in fact, all that is involved is acceptance of the fact of the failure of Cuba's economy. Che Guevara, opposing Castro, maintained that Cuba must be industrialized, at any cost. However, the inefficiency of the regime, Castro's madness and the paltriness of Soviet aid brought the industrialization effort to disaster. It has, by now, been Approved For Release 1999/09/fq : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Appritated offdRild044f0 9-g9h49A2t:oCI&WF.12411,1 90(E, Viandlst ry . At the start of the revolution, Camila Cienblegos? who foresaw the problems involved in drastic change, tn;ed to defend the theory of a democratic re- volution that would not break off relations with the rest of. the continent; but Camilo died under mysterious circumstances. The result is that, 13 years after his rise to power, Castro is de- upon sugar, just as 411 Cuban rulers in, the past had to depend on it to support the country. Hence, the fruit of these 13 years has been just a change in masters. Many Cubans are of the opinion that the only thing which makes the new master different is that, not only is he poorer, but more gloomy and aloof. Thirteen years of hard work, a million exiles, the loss of tobacco markets, the disappearance of tourism and the increased political repres- sion seem toohigh a price to pay for such an insignificant and disadvanta- geous change. But no amount of pondering can now prevent more and more Russians from arriving in Cuba each day, aimed at preventing further waste and at controlling the economy, education and the Army on what Castro, but a short time ago, loudly proclaimed "free territory of America." Meanwhile, the Russians have assigned Castro the role of sales agent in Latin America. A completely tamed Castro, who continues to play the guerrilla fighter inside Cuba, but who works in Latin America as Moscow's errand-boy, with the sole purpose of expanding the U.S.S.R.'s trade rela- tions, and of destroying the Communist groups that are pro-Chinese, inde- pendent, or suspected of hostility toward the U.S.S. R. BOHEMIA, Caracas 28 February 1972 C PYRG HT Mosce ha sometido el "co- munismo nacional", regi- menta cada paso de la po- litica y la economia cuba- nas y ha reducido a Castrt at papel de jefe de yentas en America Latina. Por Fred Stokes 1 ti constante aumento de rusos dentro de Cuba quk ocuurvet y ms cargos impf3/4P0154 siempre con sus cameras CPYRGHT totograficas y sus grandes portafolios, es el signo mas caracteristico de la vide cubana. Comen en lugares especiales, compran en tiendas especiales, vlajan en vehlculos especiales? y ocupan cargos especiales. Hay en el orden de cinco mil rusos segOn los calculos m? prudentes. Tal vez doce mll, si se incluye a los mIlltares. netraci6n, aunque no es atinn Mr 2 Esa reciNts. F fikEntffi semesti e, y ha coincldido con la presencia en Cuba de una serie de envlados y delegaciones especiales, cuya mision ha sido discutir con Castro las condiciones especificas para la continuaciOn del tratado comercial con la URSS. Condenada por el fracaso de los Intentos castristas de administraclan del pals. Ver, por industriallzar el pals, a depender excluslvamente del azikar, Cuba .ejemplo, p. 1475 on el libro de este ahora totalm Hugh Thomas, "Cuba, The m '. Desde : % 6J749P cYsaovie4tico???"/414664114? s, 1 plomati presionando mas y m? apoyadOs a han Ido Rudolf ShIllapnlkov. ahnra nor Kneigyr Gite-n doode ka...e 3 . 1 residente en Caracas, tue el encargado de amenazar a Castro con el cierre total de los suministros de petroleo de Baku, wet hubiera paralizado la Industrie azucarera cubana, si Castro no aceptaba un cierto control sovIetico de la ? Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A0002001700YGHT-6R varios anos, es conocido en Cuba como "el hombre que insiste en cobrar", segOn f rase lue.una vez deje escaper el )ropio Castro ante )eriodistas extranjeros. En la vide corriente, se siente presiOn creciente por conholar, 4 Castro n troves de la ruda Antipatia que rige ahora as _ relaciones entre cubanos y sovitticos, clue hace unos ems eran cordiales. Al principle, cuando los asesoret sovieticos eran pocos y voluntaries, surgio Jna corriente de simpatia. Perci ahora, enviados para control& y dirlgir, los sovietices se han vuelto m?y mas burocraticos. ? Cast no hablan con los cubanos y estos les pagan con un hosco desprecio. Inclusive los asesores militares viven totalmente aparticlos de la ? oficialidad cubana. ELIMINACION DE CASTR1STAS En la Vida politica interna, la presiOn sovietica ha tornado la forma de una constante eliminaclifin de los amigos de confianza de Castro, que cada da ocupan puestos de menor importancla practice. Hombres como Armando Hart, Faustino Perez, Almeida, han sido separados de los cargos que tenian alguna relacien directa con la eroducciOn o la administracien, y asignados a puestos figurativos en el Comite Central. La confianza de los sovieticos se ha oriented? exclusivamente hacla los tecnOcratas formados en la URSS, especialistas de origen humilde que volvieron de sus becas con el habit? de obedecef a los rusos. Y tambien hacia Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Raul ' Castro o Sergio del Valle, que en los altos niveles gozan de clerta confianza por parte de Moscii. La preferencia de la URSS por Carlos Rafael Rodriguez ha . golpeado tamblen a la buena relaclon de Mont) con Dorticos. Este, que en un tiempo era el favorite de los sovieticos, prefiriO mantenerse f lel a Castro durante Is fricciones entre ambos gobiernos. El resultado es 'que ha perdido toda la con? fianza del nueVo propietario del azOcar cubano, Kosigyn. En la economfa y los puestos intermedlos, la presencia sovletica es todavia m?nofable. A partir de la segunda visite de Kosigyn y de la ratificacien del acuerdo comercial entre Cuba y la URSS, todos los puestos administrativos del pais tienen ahora su "ruso' incrusted?. Todos los centrales azucareros tienen su experto sovietico en administracien Ilevando el control de los gastos. Selo en enero cje 1972. cuatro miaiones sovieticas de lmportancia, encabezadas por el: General Nikolai Shchelokov, Ministro de Asuntos 1nteriores de la URSS y otra por Andrei Kirilenko, del Bur6 Politico del CC, recorrleron Cuba pare comprobar la el icacia de esos controles. Las otras dos delegaciones fueron encabezadas por el Diputado Jefe de Propaganda del CC, Yurl Aleksandrovitch, y por el Teniente General Leonid' Batrushevitch, del directorio politico de las Fuerzas Armadas de la URSS. Posteriormente a esas visitaa, que controlaron la eficiencia de la penetracien sovietica en ?todos los reng ones ?la economia, la educaci6n y el ejercito? una verdadera oleada de tecnicos de alto nivel ocupO practicamente la Junta Central de PlanificaciOn de Cuba, el Banco Nactonal y, et Ministerio de la Industrie Azucarera. Y simultaneamente, una serie de acuerdos de cooperaciOn tecnica que Ilevaban varios meses suspendidos, fueron firmados con nuevas modifIcaciopes y I comenzaron a funcionar. Es dificil determiner hasta que Punto la presion sovietica poara doblegar a Castro, pare qulen ? los rusos sOlo reservan un papel secundario de figuritin sin autoridad real, pero que conserve el respaldo de su propia imagen internacionalmente divulgada y practicamente imposible de clesvIrtuar sin que el regimen sufra un colapso. AUGE DE LOS PRO SOVIETICOS Pero inclusive en los asuntos de la represion Interior, los rusos estan participando activamente, protegiendo a los suyos y elimlnando a los qua se resisten a la influencia sovietica. Por ejemplo, hay noticias concretes de que, durante la visite de Castro a. Chile, m?de cincuenta detenidos por el caso de la "micro faccion" pro-sovietica, que encabezaba Anibal Escalante fueron liberados por presIones rusas y Ordenes del propio Ratil Castro. Estos hombres, los "anibalistas" de la Ilamada micro-facciOn, habian sido condenados a largas penas con trabajo forzadocy la acusaciOn principal era la de "pro-rusos'. Todos, o casi todos, eran viejos militantes comunistas que ante la alternative de obedecer a Castro o a los rusos, se habian decidido por lo segundo. Hace dos arms, Castro pude dominarlos y encarcelarlos. Su liberacion y retorno a as industries y cargos, es como el signo de un viraje que Castro no puede impedir. Los partidatios de as grandes palabras senoras, ven en todo esto un acto de sumisiOn de Castro a MoscO, pero en la practice, se trate sOlo de la aceptacien del hecho del fracas? de la economia cubana. Frente a Castro, el Che Guevara, sostuvo la necesidad de industrializar a Cuba contra toda dificultad, pero la ineficiencla del regimen, las locuras de Castro y la mezquindad de la ayuda sovietIca, condujeron al esfuerzo industrializador al desastre. Hoy est a ya abandonado y Cuba ha vuelto a la dependencia del azticar. Al principio de la revolucion, Camilo Cienfuegos / que preveia las dificultades de un viraje excesivo, intente defender la tesis de una revolucien democratica, que no rompiera con el resto del Continente, pero Camilo murio en circunstancias misteriosas. El resultado es que, a los trece ems de su Ilegada al poder, Castro depende del azOcar, igual como en el pasado todos los gobernantes cubanos dependieron pare mantener el pais. El fruto de esos trece arms ha sido, pues, sara un cambio de duerio. Muchos cubanos piensan. que lo Unica que distingue al nuevo amo es que no sOlo es m?pobre, sino que es tambien mucho m?hosco y lejano. Trece afios de duro trabajo, un miller] de exilados, la perdida de los mercados pare el tabaco, la desaparicion del turismo, la creciente represiOn politica, parecen un precio demasiado &to para un cambio tan Insignificante y desventajoso. Pero ya ninguna reflexiOn puede impedir que, dia a die, m? y mas ruses Ileguen a Cuba destinados a impedir nuevos derroches y a controlar la economfa, la educacien y of ejercito de lo que hasta hace poco, ruidosamente, Castro. Ilamaba "territorio ? fibre de America". Mientras tanto, los rusos destinan a Castro el papel de agente vendedor en Latino- america. Todo un Castro domesticado, que dentro de Cuba sigue presumiendo de guerrillero, pero en latinoarnerica trabaja como mensajero de Moscti en el proposito exclusivo de expandlr las relaciones comerciales de la URSS y destruIr a los grupos comunIstas pro-chinos, independientes o sospechosos de antipatia frente a la URSS. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : FIA-RDP79-01194A00.0200170001-6 CPYRGHI?PProved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 NEW YORK TINES CPYRGHT 28 January 1972 Cuba's Treasury Remains in Moscow By GEORGE VOLSKY MIAMI?"It is more di 'ft- cult to govern man to WI ge guerrilla warfare," Fidel Castro of Cuba marked - marked last month. The remark pointed up the extent to which the former guerrilla leader is bedeviled by the task of govern!' g, which in Communist Cusa Means directing the countr7's economy. The 1971 performance of the sugar-dominated economy of the island must have been disappointing to Mr. Castro, who recently suggested that prospects for an economic improvement this year we .e not very bright. As a result, Cuba's depen f- ence on Soviet aid?estimated at $750-million a year, et more than $2-million a day? became greater than ever. "Without [Soviet] fuel, raw Materials, equipment, mach's- ery and factories Cuba cou4 not fimction," the Economics muusuer, t-anos iterate }wart- guez, said last April. Thus the size of Soviet aid, negc tinted annually in trade talks in Moscow, has become as important to Havana as the volume of the country's prodiction Last year, Cuba registered sorra gains in the industrial sect( r add in fishing, and continued to invest heavily in expanding output. But agricultural production declined. Intensive efforts to revitalize the sagging produc- tion of rice, coffee, tobacco, cattle and fruit proved unre- ward ng. Strict rationing of food and consumer goods conti wed, and on a few items it had to be tightened. More important, the 1971 sugar output of 5.9 million tons was a million tons be- low tie target, and Mr. Castto predit ted that 1972- produc- tion would be even lower. We stern experts believe that Cuba will produce 5 mil- lion bin of sugar this year. A rent Soviet purchase of ')Cs2 Qt 0 tens of Brazill sugar was regarded as an in- dication of Moscow's concern that Havana might find it difficult to fulfill its sugar export commitments. Sugar is, and according to Mr. Castro for many years will be, the basis of the Cu- ban economy. It represents about 85 per cent of the country's exports, with nickel accounting for 10 per cent and tobacco 3 per cent. Because of declining ex- ports and growing domestic needs, Cuba's annual trade deficits have been steadily rising, especially her imbal- ance with the Soviet Union, which provides 60 per cent of the island's imports. United States economists estimate that Cuban exports in 1971 totaled $1,4-billion, of which $840-million came from the Soviet Union, $200- million from other Communist countries and $360-millions, from non-Communist nations. According to. these esti-, AL vI ts tyn to Sor- tne e."7 million in economic aid, the Soviet Union last year sup- plied Cuba with $240-million in military and other assist- ance. In all, Cuba is believed to owe the Soviet Union $4- billion, a debt that Moscow cannot realistically hope to collect. While a shortage of trained ? personnel along with govern- mental inefficiency has ad- ? versely affected production, the main economic problem seems to be the apparent apathy of Cuban workers and peasants, who do not respond with the required enthusiasm to constant governmental ex- hortations for harder work, Last year, which Mr. Castro called "the year of produc- tivity," a campaign was ordered against what he de- scribed as "laziness, loafing, disloyalty, parasitism, selfish- nes, and bourgeois mental- ity." At the year's end, a Cuban radio commentator reported that despite the shortage of manpower "loafers are on .CPYRGHT WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS 19 February 1972 Biossat Cuba in the red ink - CPYRGHT Firm reports from the island say malinger- ing and job absenteeism are worse than in any Iron Curtain country. Castro is searching rath- er desperately for non-material incentives to spur more and better work. There is no sign these are broadly effective, and Cuba now applies a two-year jail term to hose convicted of "vagrancy," which includes hat the regime deems to be avoidable unern- loyment. The government's control over the Cuban ork force is both rigid and sweeping. Identifi- ation cards are required of workers. Chronic lackers may find themselves in Castro's "cor- ective rehabilitation" camps. CUBA'S Fidel Castro may log some priceless tube time when he plays basketball in Chile, but it doesn't do all that much to refurbish his tar- nished image. His ?big nega- tive in most Latin lands is Cuba's terrible economic flop. His country's total indebted- ness to the Soviet Union is in the range of $3 billion, with upward of $300 million owed to other communist nations. Th q red ink grows every year. 0 OfHING so pointedly revealed Cuba's eco- omic shortcomings as Fidel'S all-out 1970 ef- Ort to reach the long-promised goal of 10 mil- ion tons of sugar cane output per year. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A0002001W0\61NHT His hard lunge for the goal came after years of failure. In the attempt, he pulled thousands of Cubans away from other jobs into the cane fields, thereby seriously disrupting the entire economy. And even then he didn't make it. Production in 1970 was just 8.5 million tons. Thereafter, output slid back toward 5 million tons and the newest harvest may well fall be- low that. To get just that much, Castro has to rely on manpower from the strong Cuban armed forces for 15 per cent of the year's harvest. ? His moves to industrialize quickly have drawn people from the cane fields. Still, they. lack the training and skills for the new work? not to mention incentives. He is also short of ' management talent, not least because of the exodus of 250,000 Cubans from the island to the United States in recent years. ? ? ? WHAT all this adds up to is an economy- essentially stagnant since Castro took power in 1959. Cuba's annual population growth has been averaging around 2 per cent, despite the outflow. Economic development has not offset ,this growth, Measured in real terms (correct- ed for inflation), the country's gross national produce ? on a per capita basis ? declined 9 per cent from 1958 thru 1970. For contrast, a study of 18 major Latin American lands shows that their real per capi- ta GNP shot up by 24 per cent from 1900 to 1970. Maybe all this will change one day. Cuba has poured large sums into capital investment. Roads, electric power facilities, and other "in- fra-structure" elements of the economy have' been markedly improved. But, again, American specialists looking at this effort do not find it being translated into significantly higher output. There are count- less Soviet advisers and technicians on the is- land, but they do not appear to compensate for the out-migration of qualified Cubans. Even Castro sees no real upturn until 1975. Against this gray backdrop, he's no hero in most Latin lands. Says the same official in summary: "The Latins are not impressed. And Cuba is certainly no model in their eyes." , CPYRGHT WASHINGTON POST 13 February 1972 CPYRGHT Cuban Housing Cheap, Scarce No Buying Is Allowed, Only Trading By Marlise Simons thsecial to The Washineton Post HAVANA ? "Under the trees-. on me rase? aei Prado is the casual address of a vital Havana institu- tion: the open-air housing exchange. Every morning scores of men and women mill around in the shade by the warty treetrunks along the avenue, some pinning up notices, others reading them eagerly. Officially, the Havana Housing Exchange is behind Impersonal office walls nearby, but since Cuban newSpaners carry no adver- tising, "under the trees" has become a classified ads sec- tion. "We have only two chil- dren," one neatly typewrit- ten message reports. "Will exchange house with patio for apartment In the center. Must have bath." Another Approved F hand-scrawled note in red ink says: "Urgent. Offer apartment with view of the bay for house in West Ha- vana. You can only see me on Sunnays." When parties come to an agreement, the exchange of- fice must come into the pic- ture to formalize the deal, which it does free of charge. In feet, an exchange of this sort is all that house owners or tenants can do in Cuba, since the buying or' s selling of real estate ended with the Urban Reform No one, according to th s law, may own more than one residence, and no ore need pay more than 10 per cent of his salary in re It. After 10 years of pay. 1n, rent, a tenant becomes" th_s owner of the property, which, of course, he can oily exchange, a local offi- cii 1 explained. Desmie the post-revolu- ti confiscations and the di ;tribul ion of the I hott- saiads el homes vacated by the masqive exodus of refit- Havana, the beautiful cap- ital which Premier Fidel Castro has often called too large and too costly for Cuba, bears the brunt of the shortage. Most of the spa- eious emigrant homes have been turned into schools,i kindergartens and boarding houses for high school and university students, The high-rise apartments, .,built shortly after the Cas- tro takeover, went to the homeless and the squatters who traditionally ring Latin cities, Since then, building has been reserved or the countryside. But even in the country as a whole, the housing proj- ects of the revolution have been few, compared to the population increase of 1.5 million. Yet in the last few months since Castro an- nounced the formation of "microbrigades" and the new national target of "building 100,000 homes per year," there are signs of a drastic change. Some weeks ago, "Granma." the official daily of the Communist Party, counted 274 apartment buildings going up at the hands of mierobrigacies in ? Havana province alone. These brigades are construe- . tion teams made up of fac- tory workers who take time off from their ordinary jobs. A factory receives suitable land and building materials, Its brigades go off and build ? the homes needed by its em- ployees. The advantage of such teams, according to Castro, is that construction workers need not be taken away from such In- dispensable projects as dams, roads, hospitals and agricul- tural warchoescs. The plan is workahte, Castro told a meet- ing of union leaders, since a government study has shown thati toe majority of Cuba's factories are overstaffed. . Foreign observers have dis- missed the ambitious honsing goes, Cuba's housing shor- 'program as another Castro im- tage Is suu very serious. e ? or Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000/01Yfrobtate nnot be ef-, CPYRGHT Ap roverl-F-nr Release 199Q/0Q/02 ? r 79-0 194A0 fieiently carrier out _because of its size and the use of un-, trained personnel. Yet, at the moment, apartment building is moving ahead full steam, In Alamar, a construction ? site some 15 miles outside Ha- vana, the. improvised micro ? brigades seemed no different , from professional hard hats. Huge Russian trucks loaded with sand wet e eriven about with great dexterity. and roof- top workers Joolsed steady de- spite the breeze coming off the Caribbean only a few hundred yards away. Now 66 Days The 18 apartment blocks, four floors each, were in dif- ferent stages of completion .and the roads were finished. "Luckily, these brigades learned very' quickly," said Emigclio Diaz, the 30-year old building coordinator. "The first blocks took more than 80 days, Mit now we ere reaching the fourth fIcY.r 'in 66 days," The 000 i-nen- and- wome-n at work in Ammar are divided into brigades of 30, supervised - by trained builders and archi- tects. "We have all kinds of1 people here, except for astro- nauts," said an official as he led the way into a workshop were men were soldering pipes. Andres Regera, in blue over- all and cover^d with soot, said he ordinarily worked as an ad- ministrator in r Havana fac- tory. He gets the same salary here as he d'd behind his desk, and his job is kept for him until he Jets back. In the meantime his office colleages have to do his share of the work. Regera does not know whe(lwr he or other members of his brigade will be living in Alamar. "When the apart- ments are finished they be; come property of the facto-i ries," he explained, "and the, workets' asse-uhly will decide who gets them, depending on individual neer s and men sQ20. The first farwlies are sup- posed to start moving in this month. Monthly rent, irrespec- tive of the size of the apart- ment, will be ti pet cent of the tenant's salary. An additional 4 per cent of his salary will pay of the fin niture, which comes with the apartment, in- cluding refrigetator and tele- vision set. Eventually he will own the furniture, most of which ts built in the Alamar carpentry shoo. Neighbor Upkeep When all of the 336 apart- ments have been handed over, neighborhood committees will be responsible for their up- keep. 'With workers having made such a great effort them-, selves, we expect- that the neighborhood will be well looked after," said supervisor Diaz. "We do not want a repetition of what happened in East Ha- vana, the new suburb built after the revolution. There the 0170001-6 people were given their homes for free, without any effort on their 'tart. so they let .t.he place crumble," But for t he timete*Inv. , Diaz's problems are to get sup. plies hi finkti the building, Most n Ater ;all arrive without trouble though there are ex- ceptions "like steel parts ? tubes and sockets --that fiavc to come all the way from I9ast _ ern Europe." Food supplies for the work emace also ent by the gov : ernment in tfavana. However. Diaz explaineo. Alamar it finding its own solutions. "Wc have made a deal with the fisherman of Cojimar. We con- struct them a voiding, an they supply us with fish." "But I'm no,. so sure now who *ins the better deal,' laughed Diaz 'There has beer : quite a bit of northern winc lately and wren the nortt blows you can btiild, but yot can't ge fishing," CPYRGHT WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS 25 January 1972 CUBA DIARY: CPYRGHT Havana stores are nearly empt) - Mr. Bo-how is the second accredited American journalist ? and the first news service representative--to report from Cuba in nearly two years. By IRA BERKOW (Copyright gi 1972 by Newspaper Enterprise Am) HAVANA ? In a large department store Ir downtown Havana, a "saleslady" leans va. cantly on a glass case that is empty except fat one .pair of perfoiated black men's shoes. Or the second shelf there is one box wrapped It colorful paper and a blue ribbon. There ar( rows and rows of such stark glass cases. ThE shelves are also almost empty. Few custom. ers. You can hear their footsteps. "We have money now in Cuba," she says "But we have very little goods to buy." With a few exceptions, only necessities art sold. Almost everything in Cuba, from cigar: to shoe laces, is rationed. A copybook It needed for every purchase. I tried to buy t pair of socks and found that a foreign visitoi can buy limited goods only at one of two stores (in hotels) in Havana. The buying popu lation of Havana Is split into groups, with one group able to make purchases on given clays SOME APPLIANCES There are appliances In a corner of the store. East German-made radios, Soviet refrig- erators and television sets. One television set sells for 750 pesos ($750 ? the U.S. exchange is "par"). Yet only_a privileged few can buy these rare Items: They are the people who have worked 7well and herd and long, have done much vol- unteer work in the sugar cane fields, for ex- ample, aric . in a meeting of their fellow work- ers and eft zens, are chosen as worthy enough to buy the luxury items. For othe .s there is a stiff black market. "To buy a 1949 Westinghouse freezer," says a woman who had lived in New York for two years in tie early 1950s, "it will cost about 13,000 peso t. A 1958 Ford, 35,000 pesos." On the rarrow street there are a goodly number of cars, tho there are no traffic jams. Autos are neither made nor sold in Cuba. Offi- cials usual y get ears from Russia, tho Castro himself, has a chauffeur-driven 1970 Alfa-Ro- meo, Mos cars In Cuba are Detroit-made from the 950s. Chevys, Fords, Oldsmobiles, even an Edsel, are common; often the chrome Is off1 the paint jobs are ancient. HEIRLOOM AUTOS "But they run," says one owner of a 19! faded-blue Plymouth. "I got mine from tr father. I take care of it very, very carefully. is like the baby in our family." It is lunchtime, I stop In a store that wit once a Woolworth's. The sign above the fro, door is 'still up, but looks shabby without ti embossed lettering. It is called "El Ten Cent The line is long. I wait 30 minutes before heir seated. No menu. Everyone eats the san thing. Today: A simple roll, a soapy crew soup, a slab of a white fish topped with heav cream, a hard red piece of chicken, rice pu ding, a small cup of dark sweet coffee. "No other choices?" I ask a workingmt seated on the stool beside me. "No," he says. I ask him if that doesr bother him. "No, no," he says, surprised at my questio Then proudly: "El Ten Cent has the best foc around here." NOT LIKE SEARS The man once lived in Miami, he says. I a! him how he has adjusted to the scarcity goods and choices in Cuba. "It was hard at first," he replies. "1 mea a dcpartenint ..tehe Kr,. Is not like Stara ax Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : 9A-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 fPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170uu1-b Roebuck In the States. But you get used to it And you are suffering now for your, country. We know that. "We do not have the consumer mentality here like you do in North America. We know that we cannot have the luxuries we like today because we must export clothes and food to import industrial and farm equipment. We look to tomorrow. Tomorrow will be better. We are in a revolution. A revolution takes time. Some of us have less luxuries than be- fore the revolution, but at least now we know that there are no more starving children with big bellies filled with parasites, that there are no beggars in the streets, that everyone in the country is guaranteed work." SOME THINGS FREE He tells me that schools are free, phone calls are free, medicine Is free, that buses cost only five cents. It has been 12 years since Castro took over.. How long will people endure the lack of goods? . "As long as it takes," he says. "You first stop being, before you stop being a revolution- ary." Two blocks away, there Is a neon sign above tall building facing a broad, tree-lined street. The sign reads, "You first stop being, before you stop being a revolutionary." (Fidel says it often, I learn.) I walk thru the neighborhood streets In the Veda-do section. On every block there is a shingle in front of one house. It reads: "Com- Mittee Mr the Defense of the Revolution." The "committee" is a kind of vigilante group com- posed of block neighbors. Blocks are part of zones. The committees, organized by the Com- munist Party, perform such tasks as providing two neighbors each einghi_m.,, 0.14..womee. ? to patrol the streets, watching out for van- dalism or fires or thieves. CLEAN HOUSES "Cubans are becoming some of the best says one man. " n it comes my turn to patrol, I sit around ith another guy and shoot the baloney. It' like the volunteer workers in the sugar cane fds. People from the city are asked to fro retaYbe once a month to the country to help. May b) all day one person cuts eight sugar canes and eats six." I notice the houses. At first glance, they are shabby and peeling. But they are also neat And clean and orderly. Carelessness is costly, a luxury. . "We must be demanding," Castro has told crowds. "It is neither right nor correct to al- low a pig to be raised in a bathtub in the City of Havana." Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :8CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 25X1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Excerpts from article by Tran Quoc Hoan, North Vietnamese minister of public security, reviewing the carrying out of the party line against I'counterrevolution" in North Vietnam: HOC TAP No. 3 March'1972 During the past 40 years...our people have struggled and achieved great successes in the great Vietnamese revolutionary struggle, opening the finest era for our nation. ...During the period when the party struggled for power, the French and Japanese imperialists resorted to many wicked, cunning and ruthless tricks to destroy our party and quell the revolutionary movement. To protect the party and revolutionary bases, the party led the masses in struggling against secret agents, informers and other reactionary lackeys, incessantly checked and eliminated from the party ranks the "AB" elements (Footnote: "AB" is short for anti-Bolsheviks who disguised themselves as communists and were organized by the French imperialists as fifth columnists to undermine our party) and continually educated cadres, party members and revolutionary bases fo firmly maintain revolutionary pride and preserve revolutionary secrets. As a result, the party and revolutionary movement were increasingly consolidated and developed and won one victory after another. In the August 1945 general uprising, faced with the enormous offensive strength of the revolution, the reactionary forces were caught off guard. Driven into a:passive position they declined quickly. Under party leader- ship the revolutionary masses ruthlessly repressed stubborn reactionaries and elements owing blood debts to the people, but were lenient toward those who went astray and sincerely repented... After power was won our people were faced with the danger of having an enemy within and without, with the responsibility of coping with many enemies at the same time and with the extremely difficult situation of a newly established administration. But...our people's struggle against counter- revolution completely frustrated all of the enemy's sinister and wicked schemes and overcame a number of great obstacles as the people entered the protracted resistance struggle against the aggressive French colonialists. In nearly 9 years of resistance against the aggressive French colonialists our people's struggle against counterrevolutionary elements occurred in all domains--military, political and economic--in all strategic urban, rural and mountain areas. Illuminated by the correct party line, the struggle against counterrevolution recorded great successes in protecting the party, the revolutionary administration, the people's armed forces, the resistance forces and the revolutionary struggle of the masses in the free areas as well as in the guerrilla base areas, thereby greatly contributing to the great victories of the resistance against the French colonialists. After our people won in the resistance against the French.. .the struggle against counterrevolution became a broad, widespread mass movement, especially the campaign to motivate the masses to implement agrarian and socialist reform. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 This struggle foiled all enemy schemes and sabotage... The 'Northern people have unceasingly struggled against spies and other, counterrevolutionary elements. They firmly maintained order and security throughout the time the U.S. imperialists expanded the war of destruction throughout the northern part of our country... The line of struggle against counterrevolution is an important part of the political program of our party... The imperialists have made use of reactionary members of our more elite nationalities to organize and instigate the underdeveloped masses in such a way that they, formerly giving no support to the revolution, turned against the revolutionary administration after the successful August revolution. The imperialists introduced many religions into our country to use this situation to saw disunity among our people and use the reactionary followers of these religions. They criticize communism, prevent compatriots of various religions from participating in the revolution and help the imperialists sabotage the revolution. The task of struggling against the reactionary clique which is using Christianity and against the reactionary clique of the more elite nationalities must be imbued with the party's policy toward religions and minorities and must be closely related tb:the satisfactory fulfilling of all tasks set by the party and state in these areas... With regard to counterrevolutionary forces, especially foreign spies, we must use the absolute superiority of the revolutionary forces to resolutely attack them and promptly suppress all their dark schemes and sabotage. The absolute superiority of the revolutionary forces must be used to resolutely suppress all hostile sabotage of socialist construction.... The imperialists headed by U.S. imperialists have constantly sought and capitalized on all vulnerable points of the socialist camp and of the world revolutionary movement to launch counterattacks. They have carried out combined measures and tricks?such as armed aggression, engineering of internal subversive riots and coups, economic blockade, psychologica] warfare, promotion of peaceful evolution...with the ultimate aim of eliminating the Marxist-Leninist parties, revolutionary power and the socialist system... The imperialists' plots and activities are aimed at destroying our revolution through all acts and maneuvers, including armed aggression. To implement the imperialists' plots the counterrevolutionary clique in our country has carried out investigations and intelligence collection in the military, political and economic fields in order to study and evaluate our strength. It has carried out material and spiritual destruction with a view to causing difficulties and obstacles to the revolution, and has established secret bases in order to carry out destructive schemes, psywar, riots and murders of our cadres and to prepare its strength to overthrow the revolutionary administration and annihilate the socialist regime through violence or "peaceful evolution." The counterrevolutionary clique is camouflaging itself and infiltrating deep into our ranks in order to persuade, buy and corrupt our cadres 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09h02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 and to build secret bases. Its most common activities are psywar and counterpropaganda with a view to distorting all party and state policies and slandering our regime in order to reduce our party's prestige, to sow disunity and to kindle chaos among our people. It has actively carried out its activities in the military, political, economic, cultural and ideological fields anywhere and any time, especially when the revolution faced temporary difficulties. Therefore the struggle against counterrevolution must be a struggle,- of the entire people led by the party and must be an overall struggle aimed at frustrating all the enemy's destructive schemes and plans in all fields. This is a continuous political struggle that accepts no "afrmistice" and no clear battleground... In the period from its founding to the success of the August revolution our party led our people in struggling against the secret agents, informers and reactionary organizations--lackeys of the imperialists and the dominating colonialists--in order to protect our party, our revolutionary organizations and our revolutionary movement. In the resistance against the French colonialist aggressors the tasks related to the struggle against counterrevolution consisted of effectively protecting the leading organs of the resistance, protecting the revolutionary armed forces, firmly maintaining public order and security in our free areas, contributing toward strengthening and developing the resistance forces and the revolutionary movement in the areas under temporary enemy occupation, creating conditions for liberating the temporarily occupied areas and firmly, maintaining public order and security in the newly liberated areas in order to contribute toward victoriously carrying out the resistance. At that time, the targets of our attacks in the liberated areas were all sorts of French aggressive imperialist lackeys such as enemy spies, informants, secret agents, bandits, commando spies, the reactionary clique that was making use of religion especially Christianity, the reactionary upper class in the highlands and reactionary parties and factions. In the areas temporarily controlled by the enemy, these were the Vietnamese traitors and reactionaries who collaborated with the French imperialist aggressors in destoying the revolution as well as the secret agents and informants who chased our cadres and destroyed our resistance bases. During the days of mobilizing the masses to reduce land rent and carry out land reforms, the objective of the struggle against counter- revolution was to serve the peasants' struggle. The peasant struggle's targets--in areas where the movement to cut land rents and carry out land reforms was being conducted--were the cruel and stubborn landlords and despots as well as those who sabotaged and opposed this movement... From Lenin's viepoint, the suppression of a basic task to which great attention must be given. Lenin considered the organization and building tasks to be more important but he absolutely never considered the suppression of counterrevolution to be a secondary task... 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Experience in building socialism in the Soviet Union, China and other brother socialist countries has completely testified to the great Lenin's teaching. The counterrevolutionary riots in Hungary late in 1956 and the "peaceful evolution" plot in Czechoslovakia in 1968 were also profound lessons... There is an...inseparable relationship between suppressing the counterrevolutionary elements and the organization and building tasks. We do not consider violence to be an objective and an essential or sole method but when the use of violence is deemed necessary, it must be used. resolutely and appropriately. Actually, in our dealings with counter- revolutionary elements in the recent past we have still entertained rightist thoughts and have not properly used violence. A great number of cadres and party members have been inclined to emphasize the organizational and building aspects of the proletarian dictatorship while neglecting the aspect of suppressive violence, believing it is no longer necessary... In the socialist revolution in the north, our party held that "generally speaking, any person or organization that hates the revolution, sabotages socialist reform and socialist construction...or opposes the struggle for peace and national unification must be considered counter- revolutionary." In the process of socialist reform and socialist construction, a number of people, because they were deeply dissatisfied with their personal material situation, have performed counterrevolutionary acts against the revolutionary administration. The imperialist clique's spies are always the most dangerous for opposing the socialist revolution in the north. In the anti-French resistance we had to cope with French colonialist spies. Since 1954 we have had to cope with the spies of the Americans and their henchmen who are very perfidious and possess many modern means and techniques. However, to carry out sabotage against Vietnam, the enemy has to use his henchmen among Vietnamese reactionaries. The most notable of these are reactionaries who take advantage of Catholicism, who belong to the ethnic minority upper classes, who were members of the exploiting class in the old society or who are former local administrative personnel and spies. Because of the political and social conditions in our country, this reactionary force is not an independent political force. In various revolutionary phases they all have served the imperialists under one form or another. To have a force to carry out sabotage against the north, spies stationed outside the north must seek ways to collude with the counterrevolutionary clique remaining in the north in order to organize and have it sabotage the revolutionary administration. In the same way, to have a force to oppose the revolutionary administration, the counter- revolutionary clique inside the country must contact and receive aid from the imperialists' spies outside of the north. This is a natural relationship between the imperialists' spies and the counterrevolutionary clique inside the country. Therefore, in this struggle it is necessary to actively prevent and break all relations tetween the domestic counterrevolutionaries and foreign spies and deprive the foreign spies of their prop by eliminating all the domestic reactionaries and gradually abolishing the social organizations of which the reactionaries make use. Approved For Release 1999/09/d : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 To what extent the enemy can carry out his scheme depends less on him than on us. If our people constantly heighten revolutionary vigilance and actively struggle against counterrevolutionaries they will be detected and properly punished and their schemes, no matter how poisonous and deceitful they may be, will be traumatically defeated. WASHINGTON POST 14 April 1972 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak 'Doves' 'roublina anoi CPYRGHT AN ASTONISHINGLY tough warning by North Vietnam's internal security boss against a "counterre- volutionary" wave that may even now be affecting parts of North Vietnam has raised the specter of internal crisis resulting from Hanoi's mas- sive offensive against the South. Just how much the tough call for "repression" of all antiwar forces in North Vietnam is based en events 'actually occurring, and how much Is designed to put , party cadres on notice to be- ware, is admittedly some- what speculative. But the long and ex- tremely specific lecture by Tran Qum Hoan, North Vietnam's minister of public security and an alternate member of the controlling, politburo, published in the March issue of Hoe Tap, the party's theoretical journal, hints strongly at the eXist- ence of grave home-front problems. Consider, for example, these words: "The counterrevolutionary clique in our country has , carried out investigations and intelligneee-collection . in the military, political and economic fields in order to study and evaluate our strength. It has carried out material and spiritual de- struction with a view to causing difficulties and ob- stacles to the revolution and has established secret bases in order to carry out de- structive schemes, psywar ' (psychological war f ar e), riots and murders of our cadres (trained party work- ers) to . . . annihiliate the Socialist regime through violence or `peaceful evcilu- tion'." In the past, the Commu- nist government of North Vietnam has periodically been forced into draconian measures to put down re- volt, particularly among the 700,000 Catholics, the mon- tagnards (mountain tribes) and former small landown- ers .dispossessed by the revo- hition. Two such occasions came in the' convulsive aftermath of de-Stalinization in the So- viet Union and the Hungar- ian revolution of 1956, and following the Soviet hive-, sion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Both are referred to in the Hoc Tap article. BUT TODAY, the sweep- ing directives to party cadres in Tran Quoc Hoan's draconian call to arms seem surely the result of war wea- riness coupled. with fears that the 'main-force invasion of South Vietnam would trigger the strongest wave of antiwar fever yet experi- enced. Thus, the interior minis- ter's definition of "counter-' revolutIonary"?the first time such a definition has ever been published by Ha- noi?includes "any person or orginization . . . who op- poses the struggle for peace and national unification" (as Well as anyone against "So- cialist construction" or the building of a Communist State). What the publication of that flefinition of "counter- revolutionary" hints is that Hanoi is deeply concerned by the growth of North Viet- namese "doves." The mes- sage to party cadres: iden- tify and punish anyone heard criticizing the war, be- cause pursuit of the war for "national unification" of North and South Vietnam has equal urgency with 'minding communism at ' home. Moreover, the interior minister implicitly and sharply rebukes party cadres for being too lenient, with home-front dissenters; . "A great number of cadres and party ? members', have been inclined to em- phasize the organizational and building aspect of the proletarian dictatorship"' (obviously by indoctrination. and education) "while neg. lecting the aspect of ? sup.' , pressive violence, believing It is no longer necessary." in short, violent measures are ' needed. Continuing, Tran Quoc ' Hoan writes that the object "In this struggle" is to sever all connections between "the domestic counterrevo- lutionairies and foreign spies, and deprive the for- eign spies of their prop by eliminating all the domestic reactionaries and gradually abolishing the social organi- zations of which the reae- tionaries make use." The clear ? implication: Hanoi is worried not only about counterrevolutionary agitation among individuals but among "organizations" ?almost certainly including the Catholic church. Approved For Release 1999/09/025: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 May 1972 May 9 DATES WORTH NOTING Geneva 25th Assembly of the World Health Organization. May 15 Japan Okinawa k reverts from the United States to Japan, reestablishing Japanese sovereignty rights over islands captured during World War II. The Okinawa reversion points up the Soviet Union's refusal to return to Japan the Northern Territories it seized after declaring war on Japan in the last week of World War II when Japan was on the verge of surrender. May 19 USSR 50th anniversary of the founding of the Young Pioneers (See article in this issue). May 20 - June 1 U.S./USSR President Nixon is to visit the USSR May 22-30, stopping first at Salzburg, Austria on May 20. He is to visit Iran on May 30-31, and Poland on May 31-June 1. May 29- Geneva International Labor Organization, 57th June 7 Conference and meeting of the ILO Governing Body. June 5 Europe 25th anniversary of the Marshall Plan. Chancellor Willy Branatof West Germany is to speak at Harvard University ceremonies commemorating Secretary of State Marshall's announcement there in 1947 of the U.S. offer of financial aid to European countries devastated by World War II. The aid totalled $12 billion over the next three and one half years. Moscow forbade East European countries from accepting the aid and instead imposed upon them trade agreements with the USSR that cut them off from world markets, reoriented their trade towards the USSR, and limited them largely to a barter farm of trade with members of the Soviet Bloc. As a result the East European countries were held bad( from participating in the rapid technological achievements realized in Western Europe in the 1960's. Now the Soviet Bloc finds itself economdcally and technologically far behind Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 June 5-8 Munich June 5-16 Stockholm June 6 Bulgaria June 11-12 USSR June 12-15 Prague June 12 Rabat the (West) European Camon Market and is trying to demand the dissolution of EEC through front activities such as the Soviet-sponsored Peoples Assembly for European Security that is to meet June 2-5 in Brussels. 21st General Assembly of the International Press Institute. UN World Conference on the Environment. 25th anniversary of the arrest in the National Assembly of the Bulgarian agrarian opposition leader, Nicola Petkov, in the Communists' drive for total power. Petkov was hanged a few months later, on 23 September 1947. 35th anniversary of the arrest, secret trial and execution of Soviet Marshal Tukhachevsky and seven other top Red Army generals in 1937. In the ensuing Stalinist purge of the army, about half of the officers, including all eleven army and navy vice-commissars dis- appeared -- an important factor in the Soviet Union's subsequent losses when Germany attacked in 1941. Congress of the Czechoslovak Revolutionary Trade Union Movement (national trade union organization). Summit meeting of the Organization for African Unity. 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 simmiummoRmaimmomimmNimon May 1972 SHORT SUBJECTS SOME ARE MORE EQUALTHAN'OTHERS-: "A:WDOSLAV ANALYSIS OF SOVIET POLICY The Yugoslays have come up with an interesting and useful analysis of Brezhnev's 20 March speech to the Soviet trade union congress, pointing out the significance of Soviet acceptance, faUte-de mieux, of what Brezhnev describes as a Chinese offer to conduct relations between the two countries on the basis of "peaceful coexistence" rather than "proletarian internationalism." In addition to providing a succinct and accurate definition of the Soviet use of these terms, the Yugoslav commentary indicts Moscow for using the principle of proletarian internationalism to extend its hegemony over East Europe and, ironically, wonders why, since the USSR has recognized the independence and sovereignty of one socialist state, this should not open the door to other socialist states to build their relations on a similar basis. The Yugoslav analysis concludes that "simultaneously with the granting of coexistence status to China, the pressure for socialist integration.. will increase in the socialist camp." 1972: Janez Stanic's col aentary in the Ljubljana Delo, 25 March "At the Soviet trade union congress which opened at the beginning of this week, Leonid Ilith Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, unexpectedly made a major foreign policy speech. Following a whole series of important international events, including' above all the visit of President Nixon to China, this speech represented the first Soviet reaction at the highest level. Although Brezhnev discussed all major problems in his speech, he actually introduced essentially new views on only two topics! West European integration, and relations between China and the USSR. "The proposals which the chief of the Soviet party addressed to Peking throw a completely new light on those basic principles which Soviet policy has tried to follow in its relations with China. What is essentially involved here is this: Brezhnev is offering the Chinese relations based on the principles of peaceful coexistence, and not on the principles of proletarian internationalism. He said that the initiatives for building the relations between the USSR and China on the principles Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 of peaceful coexistence had come from official sources in Peking, and that the Soviet Union was ready to accept this if the Chinese leadership believed that it was impossible to build relations between two socialist states on the basis of higher principles, that is, on the basis of proletarian internationalism. "To grasp the novelty and significance of this statement by Brezhnev, it is necessary to recall what peaceful coexistence and proletarian inter- nationalism mean to the Soviet Union. "According to the Soviet concept, peaceful coexistence is a model for relations between states with different social systems. According to these principles, the Soviet Union recognizes the independ- ence and sovereignty of states with capitalist social systems, renounces all interference in their internal affairs and all attempts to influence their social systems, and develops trade, economic, and other cooperation with them exclusively in accordance with the principles of mutual benefit and interest. It is only in the sphere of ideology, that the USSR retains its right to a sharp and constant ideological confrontation and struggle. "Proletarian internationalism on the other hand represents a model for relations between socialist states. It is based on the following viewpoint: the world is divided into two opposing camps, socialism and capitalism. Peaceful coexistence between these two camps is necessary because both are so powerful militarily that a battle between them would be catastrophic for both. However, this does not mean that an ideological and social rapprochement between them is possible because the capitalist camp is doomed to collapse. Of course, ih its own struggle for existence, capitalism would like to destroy socialism, but is unable to do this because the Soviet Union is sufficiently strong militarily and economically to be able to defend the entire - socialist world. Among other things, this also represents its first internationalist duty, whereas it is the duty of the smaller and weaker socialist states to support the Soviet Union, the sole bulwark of their defense against capitalist aggression. Since the Soviet Union bears the responsibility for the existence of socialism, it demands that other socialist states subordinate their own national interests to the 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 general interests of socialism, which essentially means the interests of the Soviet Union. "Thus, the difference between the two models is that the Soviet Union recognized the complete independence and sovereignty of any state with whicla it develops its relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence, whereas it demands subordination to the common interests -- which are primarily the interests of the biggest and the strongest, that is, the Soviet Union -- from any state with which it builds its relations on the principles of proletarian internationalism. "Therefore, the offer to China to build its relations with the Soviet Union on the principles of peaceful coexistence rather than on principles of proletatian internationalism is equivalent to an official statement that in relations to China, the Soviet Union renounces its leading role and hegemonist policy. At the same time, this is also an admission that China represents too great and too powerful a reality to force it to adapt to Soviet wishes and needs as was done with Czechoslovakia in 1968. Thus, Brezhnev has offered the same relations to the Chinese that Nixon offered them recently, that is relations between two equal great powers unencumbered by any ideological ballast. "This step is quite logical and had to be made sooner or later because all the ideology in the world is of little use if an opponent refuses to accept it voluntarily. It is *possible to force it upon him. Nevertheless, by its political consequences, this step is at least as far-reaching as Nixon's visit to China. Things have now been made clear within the great triangle: there are three superpowers which mutually recognize and respect one another and among which none is able to claim a leading role in relation to either of the other two. "If we were naive, we could visualize more far- reaching conclusions; for instance, we could say that by recognizing the independence and sovereignty of one of the socialist states, the USSR has also opened the door to other socialist states to build their relations with the USSR on the principles of peaceful coexistence. Of course, this kind of judgment is completely groundless. China has not won its status as a "coexisting" state as a result of any Soviet good will, but rather because it is so great and powerful 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 that no other solution was possible for Moscow. We can call this realism. There was a great deal of realism in Brezhnev's speech, but nevertheless, considered from the Soviet viewpoint, this realism provides no grounds for any similar concessions where such concessions are not necessary. It is precisely for this reason that we can safely predict that simultaneously with the granting of a "coexisting" status to China, the pressure toward socialist integration and for relations on the principles of socialist internationalism will increase in the areas where this is possible to implement, that is, in the socialist camp." FRENCH COMMUNIST DAILY ANALYZES WORK CONDITIONS IN THE U.S. L'Humanite, daily organ of the French Communist Party, published between 18 and 28 January a series of seven articles on the American worker (available on request). The series was written by Jacques Arnault, a Humardte reporter who spent two and a half months in the United States interviewing laborers and union leaders. Monsieur Arnault was reported to have been surprised and pleased by his reception and by the frankness of his interlocutors. He has responded by presenting his communist readers with an unexpectedly balanced account of working conditions in the U.S. Although the author does not ignore the problems of contemporary American industrial life, he also finds many positive aspects, such as the high levels of personal consumption, the physical and social mobility, and the dynamism of the American economy. In applying a Marxist analysis to the American scene, the author notes that certain "contradictions" in.American life have caused serious problems for the Commnist Party of the U.S.A. Among these contradicions he includes the fact that most American workers accept the system and that genuine grievances tend to be taken up by the major political parties and incorporated in their programs. Reader response to the series has been overwhelmingly favorable, praising the objective reporting which has helped 'correct an erroneous image of life in the United States. In particular, French communist readers expressed surprise that there are white workers (and not just black) doing assembly line work, and noted with satisfaction that U.S. workers, although higher paid, still have the same problems and worries as their French equivalents. Readers also showed a greater appreciation of the complexity of the race problem and the absurdity of anticipating a Marxist revolution in the United States. 4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 SOVIET-IRAQI-TREATY The persistent Soviet effort at spreading its influence in the Middle East took a dubious step inithe-sipinF-of a treaty: with Iraq, announced on 9 April during Kbsygin s visit to Iraq. It is similar to the Soviet with Egypt without being so clear in its military clauses concerning military assistance or mutual aid in the event of hostilities, though in some respects it places the Soviets in a stronger position vis-a-vis its new treaty partner. For the Soviets, it is the payoff for considerable financial aid to Iraq's oil industry, primarily for developing the North Rumaila oil field. Additionally the Soviets apparently intend to capitalize on this agreement to gain naval access to the Persian Gulf via the Iraqi port of Um Qasr. The treaty is one more case of the Soviets'fishing in the troubled waters of the Middle East for their own ends, which, needless to say, are motivated not at all or, at best, incidentally by regard for the interests of the countries with which it deals. In the current case, for example, some observers see the treaty as a Soviet move to gain a second foothold in the area as insurance should its relations with Egypt deteriorate even faster, and also as a.kind of pre-emption of Egypt's ambitions to be the prime mover in Arab affairs. The indications are that the USSR will seek some similar arrangement with Syria, again as a counter to Egyptian claims to exclusive relations with the Soviets and to hegemony in the Arab Middle East. The Soviets feel the need for a freer hand in dealing with Egypt. It will be interesting to see to what lengths Soviet diplomacy will go in forthcoming months in its pursuit of improved relations with Iran, a non-Arab country which views neighbor Iraq's advances in the Persian Gulf with considerable suspicion. (Evaluation and analysis of this new Soviet initiative are contained in the attached news articles and commentary on the treaty.) 5 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999109/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 NEW YORK TIMES 10 April 1972 SOVIET AND IRAQ 1g 15-YEAR PACT BEtRUT,, Lebanon, April 9? More Military Assistance ? Expected Under Treaty Signed by Kosygin CoormIliqo on Del CPYRGHT OVernmenL Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 THE ECONOMIST 15 April 1972 Iraq and Russia The tip of the boat CPYRGHT Mr Kosygin cut the ribbon and the oil flowed. A little oil, anyway. On April 7th production started at North Rumailah, one of the oilfields expro- priated from the Iraq Petroleum Com- pany and developed with Russian financial and technical assistance. According to Baghdad, the first ship load is already in a Soviet tanker on its way to destinations in Russia or elitern Europe. On April 9th Mr !n:nnygin and President Bakr signed a y?-?ir friendship treaty, similar to lie Russian-Egyptian treaty signed nearly a year ago. On April xrth a Scviet naval squadron began a five-day goodwHI visit to the Iraqi port of Umm Q,cr. Frieodship is, indeed, a lovely ahing. The initial yield from North Rumailah will be ,about 5m tons a year. This is only peantrts compared with the oil that the IPC, despite the bitterness of the open-ended quarrel over expropriation, continues 'to export from Iraq. It is, all the same, a turning point--though the direction of the turn depends, partly, on the measures that the IPC's shareholders, an international group of major oil companies, may take in retaliation. Mr Saddam Hus- sein, Itareil Ilanith party boss, claimed that with Russian help Iraq had at last managed to break the oil com- panies' monopoly of production and marketing. In response, Mr Kosygin rejoiced over the forced retreat of colonialists, capitalists and all such bad men. What it adds up to is that Russia !has made a start in establishing a Middle East oil source. This, if it leads to larger operations, could be useful in helping Russia to keep up with eastern Europe's growing demands and thus releasing its own supplies for other markets ; a project for transporting Siberian oil to Japan is, for instance, in the air. But this is only one aspect of Russian- Iraqi friendliness. Iraq's great value from Russia's point of view is its superb geographical position : it leads Pit4itiunkliteitlagbcfMtN9/02 of rich, western-oriented states and kingdoms ; it also outflanks the Nato and Cento positions in Turkey and Ira,n. True, Iraq is no alternative to Egypt ; despite its repeated efforts to join some Arab club or other, it is too battled up by its own power groups to have much influence on the Arab world to its west, let alone on the Arab- Israeli conflict. The importance of the Iraqi alliance is , that it provides a foothold in preoisely the position where it is useful, strategically and economic- ally, for Russia to balance the tip of its boot. Iraq's neighbours are playing the new development coolly, though the Kuwaitis have privately allowed their nerves to show. The Shah of Iran, who might have been the first toover-reaot, has been markedly restrained. Before Mr Kosygin descended on Iraq, the Iranians made discreet inquiries from the Russians, which produced an informal assurance that nothing was intended that might damage Russian- Iranian 'relations. The Shah, one presumes, is less than assured. But he may, uncharacteristically, be taking the advice of those advisers who believe that his recent boast that Iran would be the strongest military power in the Middle East within five years, and his preparations to this effect, are partly responsible for Iraq's turn to the Soviet Union. The western powers have banked their money, and their arms, on Iran ; Russia may now be deciding to put ? considerably more effort than before into building up Iraq. While the Iraqi regiine is treated dismissively by many other Arab governments, it could well have a better chance of survival than most. The regimes now in danger of losing out are the ones that could be caught between a western-directed push from Iran and .an eastern- directed push from Iraq. At the least, a new factor has been added to the edginess of politio in the Gulf?and beyond. : CIA-R0P79-01194A000200170001 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 _ CPYRGHT CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 7 April 1972 Oil?literal and figurative Kosygin visit linked to cloudy Iraqi scene oviet premier Alexei N. Kosygin's visit to Iraq comes at a time of growing friction between the Soviet Union and Egypt, its major Arab-world ally. ? The Moscow-Cairo clash over the quality and quantity of Soviet arms deliveries and over Moscow unwillingness to back any Egyptian military campaign against Israel has led Moscow to improve relations with other Arab states. Premier Kosygin's visit demonstrates Moscow's growing interest also in Mideast oil supplies and in access to the Persian Gulf, observers here believe. Mr. Kosygin and an entourage of high- ranking Soviet technocrats, including the Soviet petroleum minister, were met at Baghdad airport April 6 by Saddam Hus- sein, vice-chairman of Iraq's ruling Revo- lutionary Command Council Baghdad Radio said. The Soviet visit, apparently arranged on short notice, topped ceremonies in Baghdad marking the 25th anniversary of Iraq's rul- ing &lath Party. Events coincide It also coincides with the ceremonial start of production at southern Iraq's giant North Rome'la oil fields, which the Soviets are helping to develop. Further, the Koskgin visit returns one made to Moscow by Saddam Hussein. Iraq's most powerful politician in February. It Might Jr-ad to signing an Iraqi-Soviet coop- eration and friendship treaty similar to that signed by the Soviets and Egypt last May, reports from Baghdad said. After Saddam Hussein had visited Mos- cow? a Soviet-Iraqi communiqu?redicted the nations would "embody in treaties" their interstate ties and "raise them to a new and higher level," the same phrase used by the Soviet Communist Party news- roller Pravda after signing the Soviet-Egyp- tian pact. The Kosygin visit closely follows a new port call by Soviet naval units at Iraqi Persian Gulf ports. The gulf area's con- servative rulers are increasingly worried about Soviet moves in the gulf and Indian Ocean zones. A stride forward The Baghdad government sees the April 7 North Rumeila oil field inauguration as a major stride forward for Iraq National Oil Company (INOC), the Iraqi-owned rival of the Western-owned Iraqi Petroleum Com- pany (IPC). ? INOC took control of North Rumeila away from IPC following passage of a law in 1961. 1PC's British, U.S., French, and Dutch shareholders have continued to con- test the move and demand compensation from Baghdad. Moscow granted to INOC loans totaling $72 million to develop North Rumeila. Its oil production is expected to increase from an Initial annual level of 5 million tons to 18 million tons. Hungarian technicians are drilling wells. Czechoslovakia is building a new refinery In the Persion Gulf port of Basra, while Poland, Bulgaria, and East Germany pro- vide technical aid and 'equipment. Romania has loaned INOC $35 million, for industrial , development, to be repaid by crude oil de- livered over seven years. Tankers chartered INOC is chartering Soviet tankers until Spain delivers the remaining five of six 35,000-ton tankers it is building for INOC. On the Persian Gulf, the Soviets are working in a joint venture to develop the Iraqi fishing industry in Basra. They have completed a drydock there and now are building a shipyard. East Germany has promised to build a merchant-marine school in Basra and is constructing four large cranes to improve the port of Umm Qasr, used by Iraqi and Soviet naval units. In Al FFIW the other Iraqi Gulf port, the Soviets are building new oil installations as part of a pipeline system to export the North Rumeila oil. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-R0P79-01194A000200170001-6 CPYRGHT JAPAN TIMES 12 April 1972 LONDON (UPI) ?Russia is "diversifying" ner alignmenta in the Middle East to safeguard her foothold in the area against any weakening of Egypfian de- pendability. Iraq seems the latest alterna- tive, amid signs that Moscow is aiming at a "friendship treaty" With that country's Baathist re- gime. Until recently Egypt was the sole Arab nation singled out for such close alignment. (This article was written before ' Iraq signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union Sunday.? Editor) T h e Kremlin leadership, steadily pushing its influence in the Middle East, in the past re- lied heavily on the late UAR President Abdel Carnal Nasser in whom they placed virtually unlimited trust. , Egypt then seethed the only ? worthwhile partner is the So- viet search for a permanent .foothold in the area. The grow- ing dependence of Egypt on So- viet military aid seemed to as- sure Moscow's objective: Soviet penetration of the Mediterrane- an and the eventual passage to the Indian Ocean. The Soviet investment in tgypt is estimated at 0,000 to Russia Seeks New Friends - In Mideast By K. C. THALER $6,000 million over the past de- cade. If the Arab-Israeli war con- stituted a heavy blow to Soviet prestige and undermined Egyp- tian trust in Russian depend- ability, the death of Nasser shook the foundations of the friendship between the Commu- nist superpower and the de- feated Arab nation. Moscow accepted his sikces- sor Anwar Sadat, largely be- cause it had no alternative. But Moscow's uneasiness has since grown into an apparent growing distrust of the Cairo !ender. Sa- dat in his ,turn has shown little confidence in Russian credi- bility as a genuine, dis- interested friend and partner, anxious to rally to the Arab cause. Cracks in the Moscow-Cairo axis have widened lately, with Russia leaving Sadat in no doubt she has no intention to be dragged into a confrontation with the United States over the lingering Middle East crisis. Moscow has shown signs of growing disappointment with Egypt's military prowess, des- pite the heavy RusSiari in. vestment, and Cairo has clis- played discontent with the Rus- sians' coolness and criticism. More recently the Soviets have been looking around for CPYRGHT other partners in the area, as a sort of reinsurance against any change in Egypt's posture to- ward the USSR. There have been comings and goings between Moscow, Bagh- dad and Damascus, and latest reports suggest that Moscow has clinched a deal with Iraq which might become a major clew foot- hold, if it came to a major crisis In Russo-Egyption relations. This is obviously planning ahead on the part of the So- viets, who are known not to take risks lightly and to reach for political safeguards wher- ever they see a 'chance. This chance has now come to all intents and purposes in Iraq. A Soviet flotilla is on the way to Iraq's Persian Gulf ports, long a glittering strategic tar- get and more recently made more important for Moscow in the light of its successful push to the Indian Ocean. Important contacts are also in progress between Moscow and Syria whose strategic im- portance is considerable in the wider framework of Mideastern security planning. Some diplomatic experts con- sider these latest moves a sig- nificant pointer to a major shift in Moscow's dealings with the Arab world. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 GUARDIAN/LE ICNDE WEEKLY 15 April 1972 Moscow: still busy making friends Atexei Kosygin's visit to Bagdad last week ? the first ever by a Soviet Premier to Iraq ? marks an astonishing improve- ment in relations between the two coun- tries after a long period in the shadows. The greater degree of cooperation be- ween the two nations initiated during the February visit to Moscow of Iraqi "strong- men" and deputy chairman of the Council ,of the Revolution Saddam Hussein, was ,consolidated last Sunday with the signing of a treaty of friendship and co- operation. There can be no doubt that this pact represents another success for :the Soviet Union in its bid to strengthen ? its influence in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. 2 The treaty is also an indication that the Kremlin, set on its guard by anti-Corn- munist repression in Khartum and Cairo's momentary flirtation with Wash- ' i ? ington, wants to increase and diversify its ...alliances in the Arab World. , The text of the Bagdad agreement is virtually identical to that signed between I the USSR and Egypt on May 27, 1971, ?except that this earlier pact spelled out greater involvement by the two signa- tories in the Middle East conflict, in the military sphere, and in constructing and defending Egyptian Socialism. But if the Egyptian Soviet pact falls squarely into the framework of the Arab- Israeli conflict, the agreement with Iraq testifies to Moscow's concern with assur- ing its presence in the Persian Gulf, which harbours the world's largest oil reserves. In a transparent 'attempt to upstage China in this region and rival the United States, which Is well established In Turkey end Saudi Arabia, the USSR already main- tains diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates. It was unable to do as much with Qatar and Bahrein, but it does have a port of call in Men for its warships from the Indian Ocean, while its fishing vessels sail at will through the Gulf, thanks to agree- ments with Iraq and the People's Demo- cratic Republic of South Yemen. Some of these vessels on "special missions" have been sighted regularly at the entry to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. As part of its design to secure its position in the region, the USSR, while maintaining good relations with Tehran, seeks at state level to exercise a tri- partite mediation mission ? along with Damascus and Bagdad, whose own rela- tions have improved ? between Kurds and Arabs to maintain peace in Kurdistan. And finally to eliminate differences be- tween the Baath and Communist parties so as to pave the way to a "national front" in Iraq. Success Of such a policy would be cer- tain to strengthen the hand of the "pro- , gressive" Arab oil producers in their dealings with Western petroleum inter- ests ? particularly the Americans. The treaty just signed in Bagdad also repre- sents an important. card in the Soviet hand only weeks .before the Nixon- Brezhnev summit in Moscow. Paradoxi- cally, even though Saddam Hussein Is soon to visit Paris, Europe, which is the rnain user of Iraqi crude oil as well as the . petroleum products of the Persian Gulf, remains a virtual spectator in e part of the world that Is vital to Rs interests, CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :1A-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6 DAILY TELEGRAPH, London 12 April 1972 CPYRGHT RUSSIA'S NEW ARAB OPTION IRAQ HAS now signed what has become the standaro form of defence treaty with Russia, which Egypt signed last June and India shortly before the start of the war with Pakistan. Russia is now strategically firmly on the P.ersian Gulf, having lost no time in moving into the vacuum left by Britain's withdrawal. Last year the extremist and unstable Iraqi Left-wing Government, after pushing its traditional pretensions in the Gulf too far, was faced down by Persia, which is rightly taking no chances in the new situation. Iraq now has a Super-Power. backer, and will seek to exploit this. Mr Kosvoint, in addition to signing the treaty, also celebrated Russia's entry into the Middle East oil business. He inaugurated the first shipments from the new North, Rumaila field which Iraq expropriated from Western oil companies in 1960 and which Russia. has since developed at a cost of ?110 million. Thus Russia's long-standing campaign to get into a position to deny Middle East oil to the West now brnadens out into getting hold of increasing amounts of it for herself and her satellites. A confrontation with the Western companies will now follow if she tries .to market it outside the Iron Curtain. There may be some flies on this double layer of gingerbread. Egypt will be peeved that its upstart rival Iraq is accorded an equal place in Moscow's comradeship. Syria will also be jealous, and even more suspicious of Iraq than at present, King Ilussr.iN, after Egypt's rupture of relations with him because of his Palestinian initiative, will feel that the ring of brotherly Arab malevolence around him. -is more dangerous. The result i8 to make a Jordan-Israeli settlement even more obviously .a mutual matter of self-preservation and of political and economic advantage titan is already the case. In fat the two .keep in touch to explore the possibilities, which were made to look unduly bleak' a month ago by -Israel's calculatedly over-adverse public reaction to King Hussrites Palestine plan. The prospects should now be better.' Approved For Release 1999/09/0Z : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200170001-6