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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194k eimfriefooc(45,(2_y_____ Propaganda PERSPECTIVES MARCH 1972 SOVIET NAVAL STRENGTH IN THIRD WORLD WATERS THE YUGOSLAV EXPERIMENT CHALLENGED STAKES IN EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE UNCTAD III - BUSINESS OR POLEMICS? DATES WORTH NOTING SHORT SUBJECTS UNCENSORED RUSSIA ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY PROTESTS TREATMENT OF JOURNALISTS IN PRAGUE P.S. TO SOLJENITSYNE INDEX TO PERSPECTIVES SEPTEMBER 1971 - FEBRUARY 1972 25X1C10b re?prommi Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/041**(441Z-01194A000/MOM1-2 INDEX TO PERSPECTIVES September 1971 - February 1972 SUBJECT DATE AFRICA Penetration of Africa via the Tan-Zam Railroad Moscow and the Arab World: A Turning Point? WILE September November Chile's Free Press in Danger October Chile's Deteriorating Economy December Castro in Chile: The Leopard Fails to Change January his Spots USSR's Reported Offer of Credits to Chile February CHINA, PEOPLF'S REPUBLIC OF Penetration of Africa via the Tan-Zam Railroad Shifting the United Nations Scenario on China CUBA September October New Legal System for Cuba September Castro in Chile: The Leopard Fails to Change January his Spots CZECHOSLOVAKIA Czech Underground Makes Election Plea October The Smrkovsky Incident November Czechoslovakia's "Consolidation" Election January A Cold Winter in Prague February EAST-WEST RELATIONS The Berlin Agreement October Soviet Leaders Pack Traveling Bags October Brezhnev's Paris Debut December ESPIONAGE The Ubiquitous KGB Addendum to "The Ubiquitous KGB" November November Approved For Release 1999/09/01911PPF-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/0//peeferf)P79-01194A000200200001-2 KGB/GRU Operations Abroad December FRANCE Brezhnev's Paris Debut December A New Year's Greeting from the CP February ITALY The Italian Communists and Europe January JAPAN Tokyo and Moscow Wrangle Over the Northern February Territories KOREA, SOUTH South Korea is Setting an Example January MALAYSIA Malaysia's Scarlet Pimpernel November MERRY-ANDREWING Can the New "Svetova Literatura" Accept September Solzhenitsyn? Warsaw Intercontinental on Its Way September The New Admirals February NEAR EAST-SOUTH ASIA Moscow and the Arab World: A Turning Point? November Moscow's Plan for South Asia January View of Bangladesh February POLAND Whither Poland? The December Party Congress November PRESS, LITERATURE AND ARTS Can the New "Svetova Literatura" Accept September Solzhenitsyn? Samizdat: The Unofficial Soviet Press October Chile's Free Press in Danger October Rigor Mortis on the Left: "Without Marx or November Jesus" 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 ?"'"Eitnivorms Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :961,01114111169-01194A000200200001-2 Two Soviet Views of Stalin: Let History Judge January & Tupolev's Sharaga One Year in the Life of Alexander Solzhenitsyn February ROMAN IA Recent Soviet-Romanian Tensions September SOVIET UNION Foreign Recent Soviet-Romanian Tensions September The Russian Church in Political Action September Scholarships for Subversion: A Footnote September The Berlin Agreement October Soviet Leaders Pack Traveling Bags October The Ubiquitous KGB November Moscow and the Arab World: A Turning Point? November Brezhnev in Yugoslavia (special) November Addendum to "The Ubiquitous KGB" (special) November KGB/GRU Operations Abroad December Soviet Contempt for Yugoslavia December USSR's Reported Offer of Credits to Chile February Brezhnev's Paris Debut December Moscow's Plan for South Asia January Tokyo and Moscow Wrangle Over the Northern February Territories Domestic Samizdat: The Unofficial Soviet Press October Perversion in Soviet Psychiatry January Two Soviet Views of Stalin: Let History Judge January & ayolev's Sharaga On Eliminating Dissent February The Bukovsky Case: A Travesty of Justice February One Year in the Life of Alexander Solzhenitsyn February SWEDEN Morality - Swedish Government Style October One Year in the Life of Alexander Solzhenitsyn February URUGUAY Election in Uruguay: Challenge from the Left October Uruguay Rejects Leftist Election Bid January 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/0244=9-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/1141o614416111111-01194A000200200001-2 VIETNAM Get Out of MV Cabbage Patch! January Some Facts on U.S. Disengagement in Vietnam November South Vietnam and the Question of POWs December Where is the Dedicated Communist Warrior of December Yesteryear? WORLD-WIDE The Russian Church in Political Action September Scholarships for Subversion: A Footnote September A Message for Revolutionaries February YUGOSLAVIA Brezhnev in Yugoslavia November Soviet Contempt for Yugoslavia December 4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 "Svisaaja. Approved For Release 199921MiliAltilAgia79-01194A0MOM901-2 STAKES IN A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE The attached backgrounder attempts to put into global and European perspective the rather serious current Soviet detente effort in Europe, of which the initiatives for a European security conference appear to be an important part. Pegged to the Warsaw Pact meeting and European Declaration of 26-27 January, it presents the Western posture (expounded in part in a 1 December 1971 speech by Secretary of State William Rogers - excerpts attached), reviews Soviet expansionist foreign policy historically and places in this context the evolution of Soviet European policy. Finally, it points to the dangers and advantages to the West of the current Soviet detente drive and of participation in a European security conference. Specific challenges to Soviet motives in calling for a European security conference are given in the final section of the Backgrounder. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY March 1972 STAKES IN A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE Renewed interest in a European security conference which developed following a recent Warsaw Pact meeting makes it worth- while to re-examine the issues and stakes involved for both the Western allies and for the Eastern Bloc of Communist countries led by the Soviet Union --- particularly Soviet motivations in pushing the project. January Warsaw Pact Meeting The Warsaw Pact (WP) powers, consisting of the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, met in Prague 26-27 January. In addition to a declaration routinely condemning U.S. policy in Indo-China, the WP Political Consultative Committee signed a separate Declaration on Europe (attached). The main purpose of the Declaration was to promote the long-standing Soviet project of convening a Conference on European Security and Cooperation (CESC) with the participation of all European countries, East and West, plus the United States and Canada. The Declaration suggested the conference take place in 1972, but most observers feel the Soviets would be content even with a preparatory conference (Helsinki would probably be the site) in 1972. While the Declaration contained nothing substantially different from many earlier proposals, hints at possible concessions and its generally optimistic, conciliatory tone can be regarded as a measure of the eagerness with which the Soviets are pressing the issue. Western Posture The Western allies have recently become more willing to explore the value of a European security conference as a means of seeking a genuine East-West detente, Among the factors contributing to the West's greater interest are a number of tension-reducing moves, such as the treaties the USSR and Poland recently concluded with West Germany, normalizing their mutual relations; the apparent progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), in which the Soviets indeed seem to be negotiating in good faith; and the successful Four-Power negotiations on Berlin, guaranteeing Western access to the city and thus removing the Berlin issue as the source of a possible East-West military confrontation. The Berlin issue is particularly important in that the Western powers had made it a kind of test of Soviet detente intentions. Nevertheless, the Western allies have felt, and still feel, a certain skepticism about the value of a European security con- ference. Simply put, they mould be pleased to see progress made on those specific issues that separate and create tensions Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 between East and West Europe, and would wish to avoid convening a conference merely for the sake of the appearance of detente, as a grand propaganda forum that did not address itself to the solution of practical issues. Among the issues calling for solution would be a mutual and balanced reduction of military forces (MBFR) in East and West Europe, reduction of the barriers to the free exchange of information and ideas, and freer movement of people across the boundaries that separate East and West Europe (see U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers' statement, attached). The WP Declaration did not address itself directly to any of these issues. Soviet Aims What advantages do the Soviets see for themselves in the convening of a European security conference? During the 15 or more years the Soviets have proposed such a conference, changes on the international scene, especially the steady progress toward European integration and the intensifying Soviet conflict with Communist China, have forced the Soviets to modify their major objectives in Europe. However, there is reason to believe that their original motivations retain their essential validity today. A 11116001- Soviet objective since World War II has been to vitiate U.S. influence in Europe, ideally by eliminating the U.S. military presence there. Of comparable importance has been the Soviet objective of preventing the military, economic, and political integration of West Europe. These objectives simultaneously served a defensive and an offensive Soviet strategy. There is little doubt that as a result of tremendous human and material losses in the conflict with Germany in World War II, the USSR acutely feared the emergence of a strong, united Europe which the Soviet Union considered might well fall under the domination of a powerful Germany. It seems likely that the early offer of an all-European security conference was designed in part as a defensive maneuver to preclude the formation of a West European military and economic organization including Germany and strongly supported by the U.S. (It should be remembered that early proposals for a European security conference made no provision for American participation.) Motivations of Soviet Foreign Policy But Soviet policy toward Europe (and the rest of the non- Communist world as well) has deeply-rooted, offensive, expansionist motivations as well. And here it will be necessary to digress briefly and review Soviet global strategy in order that Soviet European policy and Soviet aims with regard to a European security conference can be seen in proper perspective. Regardless of the weight one attaches to the persistence of 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 the Russian Messianic tradition or Czarist imperialistic ambitions in Soviet foreign policy, there is little doubt that the modern- day Soviet leaders' view of the international arena in which the USSR operates is deeply influenced by Soviet-Marxist conditioning. From Lenin and Trotsky to Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev- Kosygin, Soviet leaders have regarded Soviet Communism as a universal form of society arising from an inevitable historical process. They have seen their own function as one of moving this historical process forward. Thus, they protect Soviet Communism where it has been imposed (in the Soviet homeland, and as in Czechoslovakia in 1968), support and encourage its growth where- ever it manifests itself (primarily in local pro-Soviet Communist parties), cooperate with non-Communist forces which either show sympathy for the Soviet Union or antipathy to the capitalist camp headed by the U.S. (in Latin America or the Arab world), and seek converts among neutral and even anti-Commumist states (Egypt or India). Finally, they resort to any means, short of a self-destructive war, to weaken, divide, or subvert those states which they consider incurably hostile, above all, the U.S. and its European allies, among others. (This last strategy is one proper way to describe what the Soviets mean by "peaceful coexistence.") Meanwhile, Communist regimes like Yugoslavia, Albania, and China, which at one time supported and cooperated with the Soviet Union, found their national interests or ideologies Oar both intermixed) at cross purposes with the Soviet Union, and were successful (unlike Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968) in pursuing a policy independent of (and when necessary, hostile to) the Soviet Union. Of these, only China, because of its sheer size and its proximity to the USSR, represents a potentially serious threat to Soviet global strategy and aims. Soviet Post-Wdr European Policy Soviet expansionist policy in Europe has undergone considerable modification under pressure of events and successful Western policies. In the chaotic aftermath of World War II, there was a high likelihood of a Communist takeover in the key countries of France and Italy (the reason that Italy and France were the only non- Communist countries to be included in the Cominform, which was established in 1947, was that Stalin expected they soon would join the ranks of the other "people's democracies"). With the demilitarization of Europe, there was a constant danger of a Soviet military overrun, which NATO was eventually created to counter. When an indigenous Communist takeover failed to materialize (largely because of the Marshall Plan), and military overrun became too risky to the homeland of socialism, nuclear threats combined with pressure tactics, as in the Berlin blockade, were used in the attempt to force Europe to the Soviet will. Concurrently, using the Donimunist front World Peace Council as their main vehicle, the Soviets mounted a massive, long-term peace campaign. Though unsuccessful, it evidently was calculated to 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 convince the West Europeans that military defense measures were unnecessary. At various times since the mid-fifties, the Soviets have offered one or another form of a European security conference as an alternative to NATO, until recently with the hope of excluding the U.S. from such a conference. Eventually, all these maneuvers to prevent the strengthening of Europe and to eliminate the U.S. from Europe failed. Strategy of Detente Now, faced with the prospect of a full integration of Europe militarily, economically, and ultimately politically, the Soviets seem to have been forced in Europe to accept the path of real detente in which the current proposal for a European security conference appears to be one move. The current detente campaign has both an offensive and defensive aspect. Its defensive aspect is clearly related to Sino-Soviet relations. An increasingly powerful, influential, and hostile China looms larger and larger in Soviet thinking, both as an immediate problem and as a long-range threat to Soviet security. Thus, it has become important for the Soviet Union to seek a stabilized, friendly atmosphere in Europe, in order to have a freer hand to deal with China. As an offensive strategy, detente (and a European security conference) is designed to show Europe not only an air of reason- ableness, but to grant judicious concessions which are either unavoidable, or limited but sufficent to convince a skeptical West of Soviet good intentions. In the long term, the detente strategy is calculated to soften Western resolve in its military defense posture, to soften Western resistance to Soviet foreign policy requirements, and to encourage Europe to seek closer relations with the Soviet Union, as much as possible at the expense of the U.S. It is not too far-fetched to see the following emergent strategy in Soviet European policy: unable to prevent European integration or to eliminate U.S. influence in Europe, the Soviets are seeking over the longer term what is coming to be known as the "Finlandization" of Europe. This may be defined as Soviet use of its multiple resources as a global super-power: a) to erode the will of a people (Finns or Europeans) to resist encroachments on their legitimate claims to independence and sovereignty, b) to exercise a veto power over a people's foreign and domestic policies which the USSR considers undesirable. Thus, the Soviet Union seeks to create not a truly neutral area but a neutralized area which has a severely limited capacity to act in its own enlightened self-interest because it has to take prior 4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 account of favorable Soviet reaction. "Finlandization" is a status of which West Europe and other areas close to Soviet power should be acutely aware for the long term. Mbre immediately, the West should seek from detente and a European security conference whatever will enhance its own sovereignty, but at the same time beware of merely helping create an atmosphere in which avoiding offense to the Soviet Union becomes the touchstone of foreign policy (the attached analysis by Walter Laqueur describes how this "Finlandization" process is already beginning). The West should seek concrete achievements rather than pronouncements of good Soviet intentions. Questions for the Soviets In examining the seven main points made in the January Warsaw Pact Declaration for Europe (attached), the West European countries should first of all be aware that they are being asked to endorse Soviet hegemony over its East European satellites. Apart from the difficulty of accepting this proposition, the West should ask whether the Declaration's requirement for the renunciation of force, the inviolability of borders, and the recognition of the principle of sovereignty of nations as now constituted, means repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which would be a commitment by the Soviet Union never again to invade its neighbors as it did Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It should question whether a concept of true and equitable balance of conventional forces in East and West Europe is contained in the assertion that mutual reduction of forces should not be "to the detriment of countries taking part in such reduction." If a European security conference can advance mutually pro- fitable exchanges on such questions, it should be welcomed, but West Europe should not accede to a conference whose main purpose would be merely to create an atmosphere of euphoria which would begin a process of. "Finlandizing" Europe. Finally, whatever moves the Soviets undertake in Europe, the West should not take the Soviets' detente campaign as the abandonment of their conception of the operation of the dialectic in international relations. Under the dialectic, conflict in one form or another, rather than peace, stability, and harmony, is the natural law of international relations in Soviet eyes. 5 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 CPYRGHT NEW YORK TIMES 27 January 1972 East Bloc Nations Suggest Cuts in National 'Armies ?MOSCOW, Jan. 26 ? Com-1 munist-bloc leaders, deferring slightly to the demands of the ? Western allies, declared today that any East-West accord to reduce forces in Europe should Include the Euoropean nations' own armies as well as foreign ones. In a conciliatory communique at the conclusion of a two-day meeting In Prague, the leaders of the seven Warwaw pact powers for the first time of- ficially embraced the idea of Including national troops as well as outside forces in even- tual recudtions. This will help ease Western sears thatthe reduction of So- 'viet and American forces alone ;would work to the disadvantage of the West because of the So- viet Union's proximity to 'rope and the relative ease with which it'eould put its forces .back inte, the center of the continent: To offset such an 'advantage, some Western pow- ers wanted advance assurance that other East European forces could also, be cut back. New Formula Adopted Moreove`r, the Warsaw Pact .Conuntiniqho said that any cut-, back in foOes should not work "In' the delriment of the coun- tries taking, part." which West- ern diplomats read as corre- sponding rrghly to NATO's icall for "m tual and balanced" reductions. The formula was used last September in a coin- muniqua issued by the Soviet party leader. Leonid I. Brezh- By HEDRIC1C SMITH Special to The New York Times ....v. and Willy Brandt of West Germany, but the entire Warsaw Pact has never before adopted it. The communique, carried In full by Tass, the Soviet press agency, also seemed to allow for the East-West arms talks to take place outside a Euro- peen security conference as the West, especially the United States, prefers. But in keeping with Moscow's objections to bloc-to-bloc negotiations, it in- sisted that this topic "should be the prerogative" of the existing alliances. This comment appeared once again to rebuff NATO, which has demanded that Moscow begin preparations for East- West talks on force reductions .by receiving Manlio Brosio, the Italian diplomat designated .last October by several NATO ,countries RS an emissary on the issue. The communiqu? said merely that "appropriate agreement' could be reached on the "way of conducting talks" or force reductions. As expected, the Communist powPrs called for the start of multilaterial preparatory talks for a European security con- ference to begin in Finland "in a very short time" and an- nounced their decision to name deleeatcs. Early Conference Urged The preparations, the War- saw Pact leaders asserted, should promote the "Speediest r?onvocation" of a European security conference, a cherished objective of the Kremlin and its allies. They voiced confidence that the meeting could be con- vened in 1972, despite Western forecasts that it is not possible beluie 1111.-S, but put less in- sistence on a conference this year than previously. The leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries ? Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the Soviet Union?took a gen- erally positive view of develop- ments in Europe and avoided any sharp attacks on Western powers in their official com- munique. They issued a sepa- rate declaration, however, con- demning the latest American actions in Vietnam. The absence of any direct criticism of Communist China despite the current intensity of the Chinese-Soviet dispute, was taken as an apparent indication that Moscow preferred to re- tain Rumania's support on European issues rather than risk her opposition to a public attack on Peking. Nor was there any public comment on the expansion of the west European Common Market or of the internal situa- tion in Yugoslavia, topics pre- sumed by Western diplomats to have come up in the talks. West Germany was praised not only for having negotiated nonaggression pacts with Po- land and the Soviet Union, but also for follow-up agreements with East Germany to the Big Four accord on Berlin, and for negotiations seeking to normal- ize relations with Czechoslo- vakia. The time has come, the communiqu?sserted, for ad- mitting both East and West Germany to the United Nations "without further delay." Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 -WASHINGTON POST 27 January 1972 CPYRGHT RedsRejectNATOBid For Troop Cut Talks MOSCOW, Jan. 26 ? The ',Warsaw Pact powers today re- jected Western ideas for pre- liminary discussions on troop reductions in Eur op e and p re s e nted a seven-point agende for a European security ...conference. Though today's proposals were: more detailed than any- thing the Communist nations ' have saki previnusly, tiono ? of their suggestion's were sur- prising. Like previous state- ments favoring a security con- 4crence, this one points clearly in' one direction?toward rec- ogeition of the status quo in Europe with a weaker role for, the two military blocs. the! Warsaw Pact and NATO. As if to emphasize this point, the senior lenders of the So- viet Union and its six East jEuropean allies said in a coin- numique issued after a two- day meeting in Prague that talks on troop .reductions in IEurpoe "should not be the prerogative of the existing Imtlitary-politeal alliances in , Europe." Although the communique suggested reductions of "both Inational arid foreign" troops I in Europe. it sidestepped carkt 'ber Western proposals for pre- liminary talks between NATO "and the Warsaw Pact by say-1 ling that "appropriate agree-; I ment could be reached on the way of conducting talks un this ' (troop reduction) question." This appears to be an out- right rejection of the U.S. and NATO positions on the troop. reduction issue. NATO has been trying unsuccessfully to get an invitation to Moscow Or its former secretary gen- eral, Manlio Brosio, who was supposed to represent the Western 'allies in preliminary Appr oved Fur Reledbe By Robert G. Kaiser Wsshlitotoit Post Foreign Service talks on troop reductions. she Sestets aersist ently avoided inviting Brosio to Moscow. Soviet officials and journalists have been tell-; ieg Westerners in Moscow re.! cently that they saw no reasonl to receive him. "He Is out of, office, he doesn't represent. anyone," as one prominent So- viet commentator put it. Today's Warsaw Pact coin-, munique seems to put the whole troop withdrawal clues- ? lion on a far distant back burner, though It does say , that "reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe, both foreign and national" would "correspond with the interest of strengthenIng Eu- ropean security." The communique is also a strong restatement of the So- viet policy of detente ? in Eu- rope. It says that the seven Communist powers "are of the opinion that European secu- rity and cooperation require the creation of a tstem of commitments precluding any use of force or threat of using force in the mutual relations among the states in Europe, a system of commitments guar- anteeing all the countries that they are protected from acts of aggression, promoting the ' benefit and prosperity of every people." I The Warsaw Pact offered seven "principles of European security and relations among !European states," including: 1 ? "The frontiers existing t now between the European states, including the frontiers that were formed a result of the Second World War, are inviolable. Any attempt to vio- late these frontiers would threaten European peace. . ." * "Force or threat of force must not be used in the mu- tual relations arnong the Euro- 1999/09/02 . CIA2RDP79-0 peen states." " The ealatonee of differ ent (social) systems (In Eu- , rope) must not be an unsur- . mountable obstacle to the all- ; round development of rein- ' tions among them. . ." ! ? "Good neighborly rela- tions truong the European states must develop on thei basis of the principles of in- dependence and national sov- ereignty, equality, non-inter- ference in internal affairs and ?mutual advantage . . . (to) make it possible to over- come the splitting of the con- tinent into military-political groupings." The Prague communique Inlso advocated An improve- ment in relations between' European states in fields rang- , in-g, from trade and culture to tourism and environmental ' controls. The communique added: "It would also be possible to agree nt the all-European ainferenee : on concrete directions for thel I further development of recip- rocally advantageous relations by European states in every ; sphere for the elimination of , all discrimination, inequality I and artificial barriers. Their 1 cooperation in the rational I utiltration of the raw mated- , als and power resources of ' Europe, in raising the indus- trial potential and Improving . I land fertility, in utilizing thei achievements of the scientific and technological revolution will allow the opportunities for raising the well-being of the European peoples to mul- tiply. Blutual enrichment in spiritual values and acquaints lance with each other's culture and Art will assume still great- er scope." 1 1 94A00020020000 1-2 1.11' IVS /1 4 IA Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 WASHINGTON STAR 23 January 1972 CPYRGHT CROSBY S. NOYES two Grand Conferences That May Never Be Held It is pot accidental that the two moSt heavily ballyhooed diplomatic events scheduled for Europe in the coming year ? talks on "mutual and bal- anced" force reductions on both sides of the Iron Curtain and a grand All-European Conference on Security and Cooperation ? show no signs of getting off the ground any time soon. The fact is that the more they are examined, the more dubious both of these projects appear. At this point, neither we nor the Russians seem par- ticularly anxious to find out what the other side really has In mind. Both sides, to be sure, have expressed an interest in tht. talks at one time or another. The West Europeans look on them as tying in with their general quest for "detente" with the East. The Russians have been clamoring for the security conference for years and last year Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev was saying. he was all for force ; reductions as well. The; Nixon Administration has used the prospect of mu- tual foIrce reductions as a con- venient argument against re- peated' Senate efforts to force a unilateral withdrawal of American forces in NATO. It also has indicated that. once the status of Berlin is finally settled, it has no objection to taking part in the wider Euro- pean security conference. But no one seems in any hurry to get on with it. Last October, former NATO Secre- tary General Manlio Brosio was assigned to go to Russia to explore SoViet views on the possibilities of troop reduc- tions, lie has been waiting in vain for an invitation from Moscow ever since and it is now considered highly unlikely to be forthcoming. Everyone at this point seems to be having second thoughts. When it comes to troop re- ductions, the Russians could very well be interested in low- ering tensions along their western border and relieving themselves of some of the ex- pense that their huge military garrisons in Eastern Europe entail. But the Russians also are very well aware that there are definite limits to the ex- tent to which they can with- draw and still continue to ex- ert effective political control in their East European do- main. The lessons of Hungary and Czechoslovakia have not been forgotten. Similarly, in Western Eu- rope a sober reappraisal of the possibilities seems to be under way. As a talking-point, mu- tual force reductions are fine. As a practical proposition, they raise uncomfortable com- plications. ? The Europeans are aware that the only meaningful force reductions that are likely to be made in Central Europe will be those of Russian and Amer- ican forces. They also know that NATO forces are heavily outnumbered by those of the Warsaw Pact. Whatever "balanced" may mean in the context of a mu- tual withdrawal, it is clear that the Americans would be pull- ing back 3,000 miles, while the Russians would move, at most, a few hundred. Europe- ans who have been arguing for years that any reduction in the present American force as- signed to NATO would under- mine the security of Western Europe are not happy about the prospects. The same thing goes for the plan for an all-European secu- rity conference. In theory, ev- eryone is all in favor of it. But as they define their ideas of what such a conference should produce in the way of results, it becomes less and less likely that the meeting ever will take place. The purpose of the Russians is calling for the conference in the first place never has been in much doubt. The major objective from their point of view would be to confirm their own hegemony in Eastern Eu- rope and perpetuate the pre- sent division of Europe, in- cluding. Germany. Anything else that the meeting might accomplish, in the view of most experts. would be mere window-dressing. ?The objectives of the West ' are, quite different. In a lit- tle-noted speech last month, Secretary of State William P. Rogers spelled out in the hfird- est terms yet used what a se- curity conference should and should not do. What it should do, in Rogers' view, is to spike Leonid Brezh- nev's famous "d oc tr in c" which proclaims the right of ' the SovietUnion to interfere in the affairs of other socialist states. It should do this by affirming "the independence and equality of sovereign states, whether their political or social systems are different or similar.' ? Beyond this, the conference, according to Rogers, should. take steps to encourage the freer movement of people, ideas and information through- out the European area. "We would firmly oppose any attempt to use it to perpe- tuate the political and social division of Europe. We would see a conference not as a rati- fication .of the existing divi- sions but as a step on the long road to a new situation. . ." It is not overly pessimistic to predict that, if the Russians can prevent it, this is a step which will, not be taken soon. Excerpt from the NEW YORK TIMES, 31 January 1972 byline Bernard Gwertzman, dateline Washington, 30 January 1972. Larger Soviet Cut Mutual and balanced reduc- tion of forces was first pro- posed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1968 as a way to reduce military spending without harming either side's security. It was argued that any reduction in the force of 310,000 Americans in Eu- rope had to be matched by a larger Soviet cut because of ge- ography. It was suggested, for example, that if the Americans withdrew a thousand men 3,000 miles to the United States, the Russians'should pull back 6,000 men the 500 miles to the? Soviet Union. NATO has about a million men in Europe, with West Ger- many's 466,000 the largest con- tingent, but United States troops the best equipped and trained. The Warsaw Pact nations have about 1.2 million troops, of which about 275,000 are Soviet. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 20 December 1971 Our Permanent Interests in Europe Following is an address made by Secretary Rogers before the 50th anniversary dinner of the Overseas Writers at Washington on December 1, together with the transcript of the questions and answers which followed. Press release 279 dated December I ADDRESS BY SECRETARY ROGERS I was reminded recently that this Nation had a press before it had a foreign policy. Possibly this timing accounts for the belief in some quarters that with a press corps there is no need for a foreign policy. It should be mentioned, too, I think, that there is also a respectable body of opinion which believes that when you have a press corps it is not possible to have a foreign policy. And then there is a growing segment of public opinion that thinks the United States would be better off without either a press corps or a foreign policy. It is against this latter group that we must unite. For this reason I am particularly honored to be asked to join you in marking the 50th anniversary of the Overseas Writers. It marks the durability of this distinguished association?and for those of us in public life, durability is a quality that is highly re- spected and too little honored. I am honored, too, to be your guest at this public meeting. I understand that the Over- seas Writers traditionally operates in secret. I applaud your new policy of openness. I knew that you would finally have to knuckle under to the public's right to know! We in the State Department empathize with you. I think you will agree with me when I say that President Nixon came to office with an experience in foreign affairs matched by few of his predecessors. A review of his public statements shortly before and after he assumed office foreshadowed the major initiatives that this administration has taken. Yet few would have been willing to predict their sweep. They can be broadly stated this way: First, maximum practical efforts in every .forum to achieve a more peaceful world, RS with the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), Berlin, and Middle East talks; Second, concerted action to achieve a bet- ter balance of responsibilities to reflect the growing shift in political-economic power in the world; for example, the Nixon doctrine, which has resulted in the reduction of more than 420,000 men from East Asia, and the new economic policy; Third, intensive diplomatic activity to im- prove relations throughout the world in or- der to provide a foundation for a generation of peace, as illustrated by the President's forthcoming trips to Peking and Moscow. Basic to this third point is a fundamental ? and often ignored concept in 'foreign -af- fairs?that nations do not have permanent enemies, only permanent interests. I will not attempt to cite the various ini- tiatives the President has undertaken to carry out these objectives, because you are all well aware of them. Rather, tonight I want to speak briefly about the U.S. relationship with Europe? about our permanent interests and, in the true sense of the word, our permanent friends. In each of the permanent interests Of United States foreign policy?security, economic well-being, peace?Europe con- 693 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : C4IA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 6ppecotvoesgoar icutpaqsAll.9woomepiAgpfp-m3A4Nowsopsarg and curity is indivisible from our own. Europe's economic strength reinforces our own. And as the President has said, "if we are to found a structure of peace on the collabora- tion of many nations, our ties with Western Europe must be its cornerstone." This statement is fundamental to our foreign policy. We hope it will not be forgotten by our friends in Europe. It is more than symbolic, then, that the President has scheduled meetings with Pres- ident Pompidou, Prime Ministers Heath, Trudeau, Caetano, and Chancellor Brandt and that within a few days I will be attend- ing a NATO Foreign Ministers meeting. These consultations are all important aspects of implementing our foreign policy, in which our relations with western Europe remain of fundamental importance. They will give the President and members of his adminis- tration an opportunity to discuss in person the visits he will be making to Peking and Moscow, economic and monetary issues, and other matters of common interest. Europe today is in an important period of transition, a transition embodying two processes. The first, the process toward in- tegration of western Europe, is progressing rapidly. The second, a process toward recon- ciliation between countries in eastern and western Europe, appears to be beginning. The United States Government fully sup- ports both of these. Since the days of the Marshall plan the unity and strength of western Europe have been central objectives of American foreign policy; we will not cease to be active supporters of these objec- tives now that they are on the threshold of success. And we are no less determined to participate actively in the process of re- ducing the political and social barriers which still divide the European Continent. In the process toward western European integration, we have always known that, as western Europeans developed collective policies and a collective identity, their views " The complete text of President Nixon's foreign policy report to the Congress on Feb. 25 appears in the BULLETIN of Mar. 22, 1971. 694 transitory differences would develop. In the economic field this has happened from time to time over the years, but we have resolved our disputes without damaging the underlying strength of our relationship. We realize that the international aspects of the economic policy announced by Presi- dent Nixon last August directly affect the interests of western Europeans. We believe that they understand why we had to take drastic action to correct a balance of pay- ments deficit running at three times the 1970 rate. It is not our intention, of course, to damage the economies of our allies and friends or to impair the system of economic cooperation which has served all of us so well over the past quarter of a century. Since August 15, we have consulted closely with the principal industrial and fi- nancial nations about the measures we have taken. There is a wider measure of agree- ment among us than is evident from some of the public comment on the subject. There Is a recognition that exchange rates had got- ten out of line and that a substantial realign- ment is necessary if the international sys- tem is to function effectively. There is un- derstanding that we have unfinished and urgent business of major importance in the area of trade rules and trade practices to in- sure freer and fairer trade. There is no dis- agreement that the burden of the common defense should be shared more equitably and that multilateral efforts must be intensified to accomplish this result. We believe that mutually beneficial solutions can and will be worked out. U.S.-Western European Interdependence Moreover, whatever our contemporary eco- nomic problems, the broadest interests of western Europe and of the United States remain inseparable. And neither these nor any other problems will cause us to abandon our support of western European alliance or our commitment to a strong NATO alliance. First, there is, of course, no intention on our part?as has been suggested in some quarters?to exploit the economic situation Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A 0020 2 0 -2 to try to divide western European countries from each other. We hope western Europe will continue to speak with unity and co- hesion in the economic as in other fields. Second, while we firmly believe that de- fense burdens should be shared more equi- tably, economic differences and problems have not caused us to change our views on the maintenance of U.S. forces in Europe. As President Nixon pledged a year ago: Given a similar approach by our allies, we will maintain and improve those forces and will not reduce them unless there is recipro- cal action.2 The administration's steadfast- ness of purpose on this point should be clear from the determination and success with which we have continued to oppose attempts in the United States Senate to cut U.S. forces in Europe unilaterally. Third, we will not withdraw?in the eco- nomic field, in the security field, or in the political field?into remoteness or isolation from western Europe. Rather, in recogni- tion of U.S.?western European interdepend- ence in all these fields, we will remain com- mitted and involved. This, then, is the message that the Presi- dent has asked me to take next week to the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Brus- sels: that America's partnership with west- ern Europe and America's commitment to its defense are undiminished. At that meeting the allies will be con- cerned, too, with the second process I have referred to?the movement toward recon- ciliation in Europe as a whole. In particular, we will be discussing two elements in that process, the mutual and balanced force re- ductions (MBFR) and a conference on Euro- pean security and cooperation. We hope that it will soon be possible to move into more definitive preparations for a negotiation on force reductions. At the Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting in Oc- tober, former NATO Secretary General [Manlio] Brosio was named to explore So- viet views on approaches o nego ia io . e regret that the Soviet Government, despite its earlier public assertions of willingness to proceed at once to negotiations, has not agreed to receive Mr. Brosio. We hope it will do so soon. Concern has been expressed in certain quarters in western Europe that the United States Government may consider the discus- sion on force reductions as little more than a cover for American troop withdrawals. This concern is without any foundation. We have no interest in an agreement which would alter the conventional-force balance in Europe to the West's disadvantage. Only reciprocal withdrawals which are carefully balanced could be contemplated. Only such withdrawals can contribute to the overall process of East-West reconciliation to which we and our allies are committed. Together with our allies we must make certain that all proposals for force reductions are care- fully examined for their security implica- tions. 'For a message from President Nixon read by Secretary Rogers before the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Brussels on Dec. 8, 1970, see BULLETIN of Jan. 4, 1971, p. 1. Conference on European Security Another step in the process of reconcilia- tion which will receive active consideration at the coming NATO meeting is a conference on European security and cooperation. NATO has made clear that it would not engage in preparations for such a confer- ence until the Berlin negotiations were suc- cessfully concluded. The first phase of the Berlin agreement was signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, the United King- dom, and France in September. The second phase, the talks between East and West Ger- many, has now reached the point of decision. If those talks succeed?and there is now every reason to believe they will?the four powers would subsequently proceed toward the signing of a final protocol bringing the entire Berlin agreement into effect. When this would occur is uncertain at the present time because of the Soviet Union's insistence that it will not sign the protocol until the time of the ratification of the treaty between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of 695 Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Germany. They insist that it be done simul- taneously. The United States, for its part, would be prepared to sign the final protocol as soon as the results of the German nego- tiations have been found acceptable. And we expect this to occur very soon. However, when the protocol is signed? so that a satisfactory solution to the ques- tion of Berlin is an accomplished fact?the way will be open for concrete preparations during the coming year for a conference. In this connection we would be prepared to support the convening of a special NATO Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting to con- sider ways to proceed. Let me outline the basic United States ap- proach to such a conference. In the first place, we believe that a con- ference should emphasize substance over at- mosphere. It must attempt to mitigate the underlying causes of tension, not merely its superficial manifestations. It should there- fore deal with any security issues on the agenda in a concrete way. In the second place, we believe that the discussions could usefully address the basic principles that should govern relations among states. A conference should encour- age the reconciliation of sovereign European states, not confirm their division. The con- ference could help make this clear by affirm- ing?as President Nixon and President Tito affirmed in October?the independence and equality of sovereign states, whether their political or social systems are different or similar. In the third place, we believe that a con- ference should give major emphasis to issues of cooperation on which East-West progress is attainable. While a conference might con- tribute to enhanced security, the progress achieved on Berlin and in the SALT talks suggests that detailed negotiation of indi- vidual security issues is more likely to be handled in less general and less highly vis- ible forums. A conference could, however, stimulate cooperation in Europe toward increased East-West trade, toward more frequent and 696 more useful exchanges of science and tech- nology, and toward common efforts to pre- serve the human environment. In the fourth place, we believe that a conference should go beyond the traditional pattern of cultural exchanges between East and West. It should take specific steps to encourage the freer movement of people, ideas, and information. In general, we would view a conference on European security and cooperation in dynamic rather than static terms. We would firmly oppose any attempt to use it to per- petuate the political and social division of Europe. We would see a conference not as a ratification of the existing divisions but as a step on the long road to a new situa- tion?a situation in which the causes of ten- sion are fewer, contacts are greater, and the continent could once more be thought of as Europe rather than as two parts. Improving Relations With Eastern Europe I have spoken of our efforts with our al- lies to lessen tensions and improve relations with the peoples and states of eastern Europe. In our bilateral efforts as well, we are seeking the same objectives and making progress. As you know, we have been mak- ing progress in the SALT talks. The suc- cess of Secretary [of Commerce Maurice H.] Stans' visit to the Soviet Union underscores the progress we are making in our relations. You know, for example, the progress that has been made in trade recently. In May President Nixon will become the first American President to visit the Soviet Union in 27 years. As the official announce- ment of the trip made clear, both we and the Soviets had agreed that a summit meet- ing "would be desirable once sufficient prog- ress had been made in negotiations at lower levels." a We are pleased that such progress is taking place. The objectives of the President's visit? to improve bilateral relations and enhance 'For background, Bee BULLETIN of Nov. 1, 1971, p. 473. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 the prospects for peace?cannot be attained, nor will they be sought, at the expense of the other countries of Europe, eastern or western. Indeed, we are prepared to im- prove and expand our relations with the eastern European states at whatever pace they are willing to maintain. Good begin- nings have been made. In bilateral trade, the area in which the Soviet Union's allies have shown the greatest interest, the total is expected to reach $415 million this year; although still small, it is an increase of more than 50 percent since 1967. We hope to in- crease it substantially in years to come. We welcome the authority President Nixon was given by Congress to approve Export- Import Bank financing of trade with eastern Europe. Yesterday, as you know, the Presi- dent notified Congress of his intention to apply this authority to Romania, and we have some possibilities under active consid- eration now to carry out in practice that au- thority. Other eastern European countries, notably Poland and Hungary, have also shown a de- sire for improvement in their relations with us. We reciprocate this desire and are re- sponding to it. With Poland, for example, our overall trade already approaches in vol- ume our trade with the Soviet Union, and we hope further steps will soon be possible to increase it. Our approach in eastern Europe, as else- where, corresponds to the words of Presi- dent Nixon's inaugural address in 1969: "We seek an open world?open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people?a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation." There are voices in this country calling for United States withdrawal from the af- fairs of Europe. Such withdrawal would be folly. It would not be in the interests of our allies. It would not be in the interests of a more peaceful and more open European Con- tinent. It would not be in the permanent in- terests of the United States. Therefore we will work to strengthen our partnership with our allies in western Eu- rope. We will work to improve our relations With the states of eastern Europe. And we ' will work to help clear the way for more stable and cooperative relationships within the whole of Europe. 697 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CtA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 CPY*10Toved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200WARGHT COMMENTARY JANUARY 1972 The Fall of EuropeP Walter Laqueur 1, Lyra in its history has Europe suffered From so large and perceptible a dis- crepancy beciveen mmomic strength on the one hand. and political and military impotence on the other. II is true that economic predictions for 1972 are not too sanguine and that Britain for instance is still in the throes of a severe .economic crisis, but the foreign visitor would be hard put to discover signs of it in the streets of London CII elsewhere. Italy's economy has taken a down- .Ivaid nun. but a traveler classing from -Italy into Switio land, or the oilier way around, would not observe a great difference in prices or in the standard of living on the two sides of the line. A heated debate recently held on French tele- vision between a leading Gaullist and the new Secretary General of the French Communist party focused on the issue of whether the average French income has trebled (as the Gaullist claimed) or only doubled (according to the Communist thesis) in the last two decades. On paper. the new Europe is a major world power: with a total population of 250 million, a combined GNI' of some $6.10 billion (about two- bir(Is of the American GNP and considerably larger than that of the Communist bloc), it ac- counts for sonic 10 per cent of world trade. But thete is something profoundly askew about this continent which for the past twenty-five years has lived on borrowed time, incapable of mustering sufficient strength to overcome national partic- ularism and establish some form of political unity. Europe now finds itself in a perilous polit- ical and military situation. It is usually said that 1973 will be the European year of decision, when the general elections that are scheduled to be held in France, NVest Germany, and Italy will produce new governments, armed with a mandate to engage in more decisive and far-reaching ,policies. Yet even if all should go well from this ' point of view in 1973, Europe will still find itself SS A1,111( 1.101 I I 11. IS (III IC MI Of 110! I,iiic or Cron- icrn pori ty If istok in London awl a professor of history at the Univet shy of 1 (.1 Ills books ludo& The Re- birth oArivtbireAD crfeiraRelleag?E1903/09/02 : on y at the start of a long-drawn-out march to- ward political unity, and if that march is not undertaken, it is doubtful whether even the Com- m( n Market will manage to survive. n recent days there has been a great deal of movement in European politics. Only a few months ago the entire Continent was agitated over the issue of Britain's entry into the Europe- an Economic Community, but by early October the debate bad fizzled out even in Britain itself, wl ere the issue had been regarded- as the gravest thr nation had to decide upon in this century. W ICH, on October 28, the !louse of Commons finally voted to join the Common Market, the rest of Europe hardly noticed, so many more impor- taut problems having intervened and taken prece- dence: Brandt's Ostpolitik, the impact of Amer- ica's .new economic policies, the Soviet drive for a European Security Conference, Still, had the vox on October 28 gone against joining the Mar- kc ., it would have meant not just the further(te- ch le of Britain but very probably the beginning of the end for Europe as a whole. The debate over Britain's entry into the EEC is closely connected with the other problems fac- ing Europe. West Germany's growing indepen- de Ice, both in economic matters and in areas of foreign policy, contributed decisively to Porn- pickles decision to make British entry possible. Tr put it in somewhat oversimplified terms, wl ereas in the 50's and 60's the French -needed West Germany as a counterweight to British in- fluence, in the 70's Britain herself has become ?for France the counterweight to West Germany.. Moreover, the French, notwithstanding official declarations, now share British skepticism with ref ard to Soviet intentions in Europe. In view of du near certainty of American troop. reductions in the years ahead, it has become clear to the French government that only a common defense pin icy can prevent what is now commonly re- ferred to as the Finlandization of Europe. In this rewect, as in others, the pendulum has swung far since the era of Charles de Gaulle. ? Though Parliament voted in favor of entry, the majority of Englishmen were against joining Eu- rope. In this sense the decision was undemocratic, tiMkemiteltsivc9liguytitrattriein fon 9 CPYRGHT hi`ApprovedlEldrReldad ilvpgicf9111.12' ? c(KHAV4111.1001plira(jbadomi Pat'lain ? Icirm polls. 77 per rent o Ilic I titis c cc- LI Ma a milt. would also voic iii favor of restoring Apir.11 punishment, and in addition would no Imuln have stopped non-white immigration into Ittitdin long ago. The opposition to joining the 10110%1rd of a strange assortment c)I extreme ight-wing Tories and .extreme left-wing Labour- tes. both of which groups exploited all the free- loafing conservatism, fear, distrust, envy, and etiaphobia abroad in British society. For once Bernadette Devlin and Ian Paisley were on the ;ante side of the barricade. One of the basic arguments employed by left- wing critics was that British social services would suffer as a result of entry into the EEC. The Wel- fare State and the National Health Service have been the pride of Britain for several decades. What is less well known is that all the European Community countries have overtaken Britain and now spend a higher proportion of their GNI' on social welfare. In absolute terms the discrepancy is even more striking: Britain spends $285 per person per annum, West Germany $507; a Brit- ish worker gets between 16 and 20 paid holidays a year, an Italian worker between 29 and 47. No European government spends less on housing than Britain does, and France spends almost three times more. Family allowances on the Con- tinent arc more than double Britain's. But, opponents argued, the Common Market was inward-looking, parochial, oblivious of its duty to the countries of the "Third*World." Here too a closer look reveals that every European country contributes at least as much as Britain to the Third World, and many contribute more. The Common Market, these critics went on, is right-wing, reactionary, dominated by the super- cartels. This argument may have had some force five years ago, but West Germany, the most pow- erful European country, today has?what Britain does not?a socialist-dominated government; So- cial Democrats are also represented in the Italian government, as well as in Benelux. But, still an- other group of critics said, Britain is likely to lose the Commonwealth, or the special relationship with the United States, or above all its sovereign- ty, the time-honored traditions that have always set England apart from Europe. The truth is, however, that the Commonwealth has for a long time been a fiction, the special relationship with America was lost years ago, and the idea of Brit-. ish "apartness" did not even come into being un- til the 19th century. rrIIE economic argument (non-Com- munist variety) against entry can be summarized under two headings: (a) the scheme. would not work; and (b) the price of Britain's entry was too high. It would not work because British industry, being outdated, poorly managed, and strike-ridden, cannot compete any longer it advantages of the Common Market (the avail- ability of a wider market, lower wills against in- (lustrial goods, etc.). There is no denying that this is a real consideration. But even assuming. on the basis of the defeatist argnment, that Bui- tain is destined to become Eitiope's depte%sed area, a second Ulster, the country would still probably be better off inside the European com- munity than out in the cold, For, once inside, it can count on the help of the other members. The real nub of the matter is the price of Britain's entry, estimated by the government at 5250 mil- lion in 1973 and rising to twice that sum in 1977. Will not this outlay devastate the country's re- cently-restored balance-of-payments position and thus -inhibit economic growth? Why should Bri- tain support the Common Market agricultural policy which, whatever its original intentions, has done nothing but subsidize inefficient farming at a ruinously high cost? Will not the British house- wife end up paying the price of British entry into the Market?. There does seem to be general agreement that food prices in Britain are bound to rise substan- tially once entry into the Common Market is effected, though why this should be so is not al- together clear. During a recent visit to the Con- tinent I found that, butter aside, food prices in France, Switzerland,. and Italy are more or less the same as in Britain: fruit and vegetables are a bit cheaper, meat is a little more expensive hut of better quality. It is taken for granted that whereas the benefits of having joined will not be felt for a long time, the toll., in the form of higher food prices, will make itself felt almost irnmedi- ately. Maybe so, but on the other hand an in- crease of even a half of one per cent in Britain's growth rate would more than cover the member- ship fee. And since exports will unquestionably increase as a result of the merger, the inordinate amount of time being wasted in the debate. over the future price of butter already seems a little ridiculous. The Tory campaign in favor of joining was helped along by the fact that the Labour party had only two years earlier favored British entry into the EEC on conditions that were certainly no better than those finally obtained by Prime Minister Heath. If anything, the Conservatives were hampered by a lack of enthusiasm in their own ranks; their new Europeanism, however loudly proclaimed, is limited in scope and not altogether convincing. Certainly the propaganda put out by the Conservative Central Office in de- fense of joining Europe would be disquieting to anyone who regards Europe as something other than a free trade ?one, an economic convenience. One pamphlet, in trying to allay public fears of a "faceless bureaucracy" and a reduction in the prerogatives of Parliament and the Queen, noted Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 10 Approved For Release 1999109/02 tim onirinov dim there "has teen tto progress yet towaid t loser polnital unity, - ami that there was list k likeliht,od of ally pooling of sovereignty in the foieserable future. This argument is self-defeating because the case tor Britain's entry rests in the last resort precisely on not economic, premises. The real issue is not the price of butter and sugar. not even the rate of growth, but the sim- ple viability of the various countries of Western Europe. Taken one by one these countries do not count for anything politically, they are defense- less militarily, and they arc economically highly vulnerable. European unity is the only way to overcome these weaknesses and to prevent the suicidal infighting which has so far in this cm, tiny caused Iwo world wars. In a recent. article, Andrew Shoulield rightly complained about the apparent lack of concern with international re- lations manifest in the British debate over the Common Market. For if a slowdown should occur in the growth of international trade in the years to come, would there not he an overwhelming temptation for individual European nations to seize short-term advantages at the expense of other nations, unless a firmly established frame-? work existed to contain and regulate economic tensions? The same goes, a fortiori, for the -re- crudescence of violent nationalism in any Euro- pean country. Seen in this light, the trouble with the Common Market is not that it has moved too far and too fast toward supranationality, but that, .on the contrary, movement in that direction has been agonizingly slow. It is of course quite possible that political and military cooperation in Western Europe will pro- ceed independently of economic development. In a press conference in early 1971, President Pom- pidou ridiculed the idea of Europe as a third Force in world politics. But the fact of American disengagement from Europe, combined with tra- ditional distrust of Soviet intentions and the fear of a deal between the two superpowers at Eu- rope's expense, may well cause a quickening in the pace of cooperation outside the economic field. The political argument for British entry seems so overwhelming on the face of it that fu- ture gencrations?will no doubt be puzzled that it took so long to accept the obvious and that Eng- land had to be pulled into Europe kicking and screaming. The cost of joining may be high, but the cost of not joining .would in the long run be insupportable. II H E course of Soviet-German talks in J. recent months highlights the dilem- mas involved in the current phase of European politics. For more than two decades Germany CPYRGHT CIA-R9P79-01194000200200001-t2 in %mope. It is clear in retrospect tha the official German attitittle was too rigid; Bonn should have accepted long ago, unilaterally if necessary, such consequences of World 1Var II as the Oder-Neisse line, and it should have re- nounced the Munich agreement of 193g. Instead of insisting on the Hallstein Doctrine (threaten- ing to break with all countries recognizing East Germany) it should have put up with the fact that an East German state had come into being and would not disappear in the foreseeable fu- ture. It was argued for too long that for domestic reasons?the opposition mounted by refugee or- ganizations?any accommodation with the East would have suicidal consequences for the party in ww/cr. But if it was not really necessary to wait until the great coalition came into being in late 1966 For an initiative in German Ostpolitik, it is also true that up until that time the Soviet Union continued to threaten West Germany with mil- itary intervention (on the basis of paragraphs 53 arid 107 of the UN charter) and had launched a massive propaganda attack (with accusations of "neo-Nazism," revanchism, etc.) against Bonn. Not until the spring of 1969, when the Soviet diplomatic offensive aimed at the establishment of a European Security Conference was stepped up, did hints emerge that the Russians were will- ing to engage ,in serious negotiations. This coin- cided with the advent to power in Bonn of a new government; when Willy Brandt became chancel- lor in September 1969 he devoted much of his energy to the discussions which led to the Soviet- German treaty of August 1970. This treaty, very broadly speaking, envisaged closer relations be- tween the two countries on the basis of the recog- nition of the status quo in Europe. But it was to come into force, as the Germans insisted with full NATO support, only after a satisfactory solu- tion had been found for the thorny Berlin issue; and this finally occurred in August 1971. There is some promise in the new German Ostpolitik, and there are many dangers. Brandt can rightly claim that he did only what was in the long run inevitable, and what his predecessors, lacking courage and foresight, had failed to do? that is, to recognize, de jure, that Germany had lost the war. He can claim furthermore to have defused a potentially dangerous situation. West Germany is no longer the main villain of Soviet foreign policy; on the contrary, Brandt was praised in almost extravagant terms by Brezhnev in the latter's recent talks with Tito. This is a far cry from the past situation and it is only hu- man for the architects of the Ostpolitik to believe that?far from having given anything away?they have restored to their country ("an economic .giant but a political dwarf") much greater free- dom of maneuver than anybody would have dreamed of even a year ago. Once the outcast. was tAilf81/86t0SelidRtintrisOlgagt/2 : dilk-Ikti/17gf-OSt/ffalbeeore/206M1Y2 has 11 CPYRG HT 461/8418'P: c Yet West Germany may one day have to pay a heavy price for these achievements. Ilowevcr often Brandi and Scheel may profess their loyalty to their Western allies, there is a great deal of her-floating distrust in Europe of Germany's re- emergence as a leading power. Some of this ap- prehensiveness is exaggerated if not downright hysterical; Brandt and his colleagues are good Europeans and they have had too many dealings with the Communists in their own lifetime to join a Popular Front on the interstate level, as a few commentators have implied they might. But the distrust persists; the recent French-British rap- prochement was caused at least partly, as noted above, by French feais of Germany's growing role in Europe. Potentially more dangerous than these relative- ly harmless rivalries, however, is the general climate of make-believe concerning Soviet inten- tions to which Brandt and his colleagues have succumbed and also contributed. The German Social Democrats may in fact have taken their stand on a slippery slope. ? For if Brandt and his government fail to live up to Soviet expectations in the political and economic fields, the Soviets will not hesitate to bring strong pressure to bear. Brandt realizes that but for a militarily credible American presence in Europe his deal with the Russians is bound to turn sour; his government has been among those protesting most loudly against any American troop reductions. But at the same time the Ostpolitik has given invaluable ammunition to American Senators and Congress- men who favor troop withdrawal below the point of credibility. After all, U.S. troops were kept in Europe mainly to defend Germany against So- viet encroachments; if Germany has reached an agreement with Russia which supposedly guaran- tees its security, what further need can there be for an American presence? According to a public opinion poll taken a few days after Brandt re- icived the Nobel Peace Prize, 50 per cent of the German people now favor neutrality and only 38 per cent support the Western alliance; why should they be prevented from having it their own way? Brandt knows of course that neutrality is just not practical so far as Germany is con- cerned, and that, the balance of power in Europe being what it is, the only alternatives are either close collaboration with the West or gradual ab- sorption into the Soviet sphere of influence. But he has already to some degree fallen captive to the illusions nursed by too much loose talk con- cerning Soviet-German rapprochement.* III 9-HE signing of the agreement on Ber- lin has been seen by some as an of- ficial acknowledgment, so to speak, that the post. ppluvtu rut lttictbG war era is over. But periot ization is an enterprise 14f- RUFUS 94A00a2062000014 these are not the best of times. When, for example, did the previous postwar era end? The question is of course unanswerable. In one sense it ended in 1923, in another it lasted until the outbreak of World War IL With equal justice, it can he claimed that the second postwar period ended in. 1948-9, when the European economy had once again attained its pre-war levels and the location of the Iron Curtain was fixed. Yet most of the problems created by the war remained unsolved. As a consequence orWorld War II the balance of power in Europe underwent a radical shift; the resulting situation has continued in force despite years of East-West dialogue, diplomatic activity, security conferences, unilateral and multilateral talks, and no end of new schemes, ideas, and ap- proaches. In other words, to a very real extent the postwar era is not over: Europe remains divided, the Soviet Union is the dominant mil- itary power, and but for the military alliance be- tween Western Europe and the United States it would be the dominant political power as well. Such are the harsh facts, and no new formulas, however ingenious, no theoretical legerdemain, can make them disappear. The age of dialogue, we are told, has replaced the age of confrontation. This is only partly true. Western Europe no longer fears a Soviet inva- sion, but on the other hand neither the funda- mental assumptions nor the political aspirations of the Soviet Union have changed. It is the age of d?nte?not, unfortunately, a d?nte that signals real peace and security, but a d?nte in the more narrow meaning of a "period that suc- ceeds a period of crisis in the Cold War."t For European security since the end of the war has rested not on dialogues and mutual understand- ing but on the existence of a certain balance of military power, and this balance, never complete or perfect, has in recent years been radically upset. The facts are not in dispute: the Soviet Union and its allies now have three times as many tanks in Europe as does NATO, and 3,500 more tactical aircraft. From 1962 to 1968 American forces in Europe were reduced from 462,000 to 300,000, whereas the number of Soviet divisions has grown during the last four years from 26 to 31. The number of American ICBM's has remained static since 1967 at 1,054, while during thc same period the number of Soviet missiles has almost doubled, ? To provide but one example, Brandt's Foreign Minister declared its an Interview in late November that "structural changes inside the Soviet Union in recent years" could provide a good balls for a further reduction of tension. Even Communists outside the Soviet Union have been hard put to discover the presence of any such "structural changes." Philip Windsor, Germany and the Management oi Menge, London, 1971.. .C PA-RDP79-01191 A000200200001 -2 12 PYRG H CPYRGHT Approve&Pori Release ift999169/02 :IGIA-RDE11*-04144M1092002400014 ph,' to No?ret lice! publicized :mil need not be prevent the consolidation of NATO in Europe. desi e 0,411 in detail. In sum. between 19(37 and When this failed, various schemes for tliwymage. 1971) the military expenditures of NATO de- mem were introduced (slid] .as the Itapm ki co eased by tell billion dollars. those of the War. 5.1W Pact countries rose by five billion. The Soviet Union now spends two to three times more per capita than NATO on military affairs. These facts. 10 repeat. are not in dispnte. What is at issue is their significance. Thus, for exam- ple. it has been said that they are of no great political consequence: the Soviet Union is too en- grossed with its allies and with domestic problems to desire any further expansion. All the Russians need in Europe?at any rate so long as the con- flict with China continues?is security and recog- nition of the status quo. Having acquired the nec- essary strategic parity with the United States, the Soviet Union is unlikely to engage in a ruinous arms race in order to gain a superiority which, in the age of modern nuclear warfare, might well prove specious. On the contrary, proponents of this line of reasoning find much evidence that the Soviet Union wishes to expand trade rela- tions with the West, and they suggest that the West make the most of the situation and work for a modus vivendi in Europe that will help es-. tablish a climate of mutual trust and security. The argument is alluring but many of the premises on which it is based are debatable, and some are manifestly wrong. First, the Soviet mil- itary build-up is by now well in excess of what can be reasonably considered essential for Soviet security in Europe. Second, and more important, the argument rests on the assumption that the Soviet Union (like the United States) is now a status quo power. This is simply not the case, and those who th?k it is are merely succumbing to the escapism which these days pervades political thinking in the United States and Western Europe alike. True, Chinese pressure may induce the Krem- lin to make certain concessions?on SALT, for in- stance?and as a short-term goal the Russians do also wish closer economic ties with Europe. But beyond this, the Soviet Union has more ambitious plans of which it has never made a secret. As the greatest European power it aspires to political, economic, and military hegemony, and it hopes to achieve this goal by inducing Western Europe to relax its political cohesiveness and military vigilance, by encouraging an accelerated program of American disengagement, and by preventing all moves toward closer political and military co- operation or integration among European coun- tries.t HE main instrument of Soviet foreign policy in Europe in recent years has been the demand for the establishment of a Euro- pean Security Conference.** The basic concept dAtislOaalcrUirveiPtivieitihit3it1 srciA474tirrrytoni awistootnteitomo 1 2 plan), all of which were widely discossed but in the end discarded by the West because they were thought to contain no elements which would have contribmed to real security in Europe. The Soviet aim all along was to dissolve both NATO and the Warsaw Pact and to create something like a European co-prosperity sphere. But the scheme was too crude, the lack of symmetry all too appar- ent: the Communist countries of Eastern Europe were . tied together by bilateral defense agree- ments which would have remained in force, whereas Western Europe had no such arranger ment. Furthermore, if hostilities broke out, Amer.! ican forces would have had to cross the Atlantic, while Soviet divisions merely would have had t4 move two hundred miles eastward. Gradually the schime became more sophisti- cated: in July 1966 the Warsaw Pact leaders is- sued a declaration on peace and security in Eu- rope which included some concrete proposals. But the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia two years later put an end, temporarily at least, to negotiations. It was only in October 1969 that talks began in earnest on an agenda proposed by the Soviets "to insure European security, to re- nounce the use or threat of force in mutual relations, to expand commercial, economic, sci- entific-technical, and cultural relations for the purpose of developing political cooperation among European states." By time the project had begun to make a more solid and tl oughtful impression. Skeptics still argued that, given the character of the Soviet regime, vague talk about the renunciation of the use or threat of force lacked credibility. More- over, since both the Soviet Union and th,_. West European countries were already signatories to a declaration to the same effect?the United Na- tions Charter?what was to be gained by affirming these principles yet another time? As for expand- ing trade relations, the Soviet Union's interest in this matter was never in doubt; the Russians badly needed (and need) Western computers and other modern equipment. Cultural relations, the free flow of people and ideas across international borders, posed a more problematical issue, rais- ? The impact of nuclear parity has been discussed in considerable detail in Walter Slocombe's recent study, The Political Implications of Strategic Parity, London, 1971. .1- Michael Palmer, The Prospects for a European Security Conference, London, 1971, p. 18. **Several recent studies analyze Soviet policy on this matter in detail: Karl Birnbaum, Peace in Europe, London, 1970: "Europe and America In the 1970's." Adelphi Papers 70/71, London, 1971; Hans Peter Schwarz, ed., Europlibehe Sicherhetts Kortierenz, Opladen, 1970; Thomas W. Wolfe, 13 iw the sovict,s* vicw_thr possibility of ideo- logic,ffiPPPYRa,forAVA-a?galiNg.9/0M2 ne, mid other Soviet leaders have stressed time and Pine again (most recently at the 24th Party Comp ess) that there can he no coexistence in the ideological spliete. This raised the old problem Which has bedeviled East-West relations for so long: it Soviet doctrine does not in the long run envisage coexistence with political systems differ- ing from its own, how can anyone be expected to take seriously the constant Soviet invocation of an era of "mutual trust and security"? Despite all these reservations and other, pro- cedural, misgivings, NATO at its meetings in Reykjavik, Lisbon, and Rome (May 1970) de- cided to take up the Soviet suggestions and explore them further. The NATO Council made its participation conditional on the further im- provement of the situation in Central Europe. Such improvement appeared to be rapidly forth- coming: with the Soviet-German treaty, the Berlin agreement, the prospects for further ad- vance in the SALT talks, and Soviet hints con- cerning discussions on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), it was decided last October to delegate Mario Brosio, the outgoing NATO Secretary, to explore Soviet intentions in Moscow. The West has been strongly urged to partic- ipate in the European Security Conference, not only by the Soviets but by East European leaders as well. The interest of some of the latter is ob- vious: while the Soviets negotiate, any military initiative against Rumania and Yugoslavia, for example, would be self-defeating. Since the talks would last a long time, perhaps several years, Ru- mania and Yugoslavia would gain, at the very least, a breathing space. Other East European leaders, notably in Poland and Hungary, think that they, too, would gain more freedom as a result of ESC, but the position of these particular states would more likely worsen; for the Soviet Union, fearing that its allies might go too far to- ward rapprochement with the West, would be inclined to tighten rather than loosen its hold over them. ANOTHER group of lobbyists for the ESC is made up of politicians from neu- tral countries. Some of these sincerely desire to act as mediators and bridge-builders; with others ulte- rior motives may be at work. Not much need be said about Finland in this context; in view of its relationship with Russia it cannot very well re- frain from supporting its powerful neighbor. Swedish foreign policy has pursued a middle line between West and East which, if not morally rep- rehensible (as the late John Foster Dulles claimed), does not reflect either superior moral courage or wisdom: but for the existence of a balance of power in Europe, Sweden could not afford to be neutral. There is a tendency in Sweden to forget its unfortunate record oF deal- CiiiA-Kiftni011194A00120102000034 -044; there may or may not be lessons to he drawn from that record for the present time, but it might be hoped that study of the period would neverthe- less serve to curb the Swedish habit of moraliz- ing about situations involving the security of others. The British and French attitude has been one of "polite reserve," in the words of one observer, though not necessarily for the same reason. The ? French prefer bilateral talks to mass circuses; dc Gaulle certainly would not have approved of a scheme as lacking in substance as this one. In most British eyes, American disengagement from Europe seems likely to produce in the long run a situation more dangerous to peace than the present state of affairs. In Italy, Norway, and Denmark, on the other hand, the idea of ESC has found a considerably more friendly reception. The Italian government, in its insistence on responding to the Soviet initiative, has taken ac- count of the' fact that one-third of Italy's elector- ? ate votes regularly for parties which oppose NATO and which, in contrast to the situation in France, constitute a very real political factor. These parties are eager to find compromise for- mulas in their opening to the Left?and it is far easier to find them in matters of foreign policy than in matters of domestic policy. "Neutralism" is an important factor in Norway and Denmark as well; recent elections in both countries saw an increase of support for anti-NATO parties. While these two governments in general exhibit an awareness of just to whom it is they owe their in- dependence, public opinion is not so clear on this point. Soviet intimidation too has had a cer- tain effect here; Russia has tried hard, and not entirely unsuccessfully, to demonstrate that it is the strongest military power in the area and that American help cannot be relied upon. The advocates of ESC in Western Europe main- tain that dialogue with the East, even if limited at first to areas like oceanography and the envi- ronment, will gradually gather momentum and lead to an improvement in the general political climate. Some of the main obstacles toward such dialogue were removed by Willy Brandt's Ost. politik. Brezhnev's announced approval last sum, mer of the NATO proposals for balanced troor reductions seemed yet another step in the right direction. It is, however, by no means certair that the Soviet leadership has accepted the West ern demand that troop reductions be asymmetri. cal (because the conventional forces of Westerr Europe are so much weaker than those of the East). Even so, the, signals from Moscow encour aged President Niion and other Western lead- ers to probe Soviet intentions further. Nevertheless, it is not altogether certain that conference is what the Russians really want. It it obviously in their interest to prolong the present Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 CPYRGHT Apprnvp For RIcP inqin9 ? "1.111,s it lonl la 's For as long as possib r; con- ference that is bound to reveal disagreement on the one issiie that really matters, namely who is going to dominate Europe, wottlil constitute an anii-elimax after the present upsurge or expecta- tions. CAN bc argued that the pessimism I expressed here is unwarranted. To be stile, the resolutions of the last Soviet Party Con- gress mention the "consolidation and extension of the Soviet ['socialist'] order"?but why -take at face value the ritual invocations of a basically conservative leadership that has no use for rev- olutionary fervor and no expansionist aims? The answer is that a regime need not be revolutionary in character to aim at expansion, provided the temptation is strong enough and the risks in- volved not too high. It may well be that Soviet leaders are willing to make certain concessions in order to achieve their principal aim in Europe? the removal of American forces. They do not, for instance, insist any longer on the exclusion of the United States from the proposed conference. Similarly, as the threat from China increases? more Soviet divisions arc now stationed on the Chinese border than in Eastern Europe?it is ,not unthinkable that. the Soviet Union may evince a willingness to engage in more meaningful talks with the West. And it is also not impossible that if this state of affairs were to last long enough, the Soviet Union would give up its more am- bitious aims in Europe altogether. But this optimistic outlook presupposes one of two conditions, neither of which unfortunately exists at present: the 'continuation of a strong American presence in Europe, or alternatively, the existence of a strong Western European de- fense community. So far as the first is concerned, domestic pressures in the U.S. for disengagement from Europe are no secret to the Soviets; and as for the second, nobody in Western Europe seems ready to shoulder the cost in money and man- power necessary to bring West European conven- tional forces up to a level roughly equal to that of the Warsaw Pact forces. It would take .a Soviet invasion of Rumania or Yugoslavia, or Soviet participation in a Middle Eastern war, to galvanize West European public opinion on this point. This the Russians of course know, and they will no doubt refrain in the near future from actions which may cause disquiet in the West. In the meantime, while the Russians greet unilateral American troop reduc- tions and cuts in American defense spending with polite and reassuring professions of good will and peaceful intentions, we may be sure that they are not about to make any far-reaching concessions of their own. In the face of all this, the only alternative would seem to be appeasement or, in more re- SI CPYRGHT 1 Ad Annn9nn9nnnn1_9 term used, the likely result will be the gtailital growth of Soviet power in Europe. At piesent, there arc not many outright advocates of Soviet hegemony in Ettrope, even atnong the Commit- nisi parties. But if the American retreat con. finites and if Western ,Ettrope proves incapable of strengthening its own defenses fairly rapidly, the argument will increasingly be heard that ac- commodation with the Russians, being inevitable, should be sought sooner rather than later. What would Soviet hegemony mean in practi- cal terms? Certainly not the physical occupation of Western Europe. Europe would be expected, however, to help with the economic development of the Eastern bloc. The Soviet Union would not necessarily insist on the inclusion of Communists in every European government, but (as in Fin- land) it would surely demand that untrustworthy political leaders or parties be excluded from po- sitions of power and influence, and it would ex- pect a ban on any criticism of Soviet policies. To a limited extent it is possible to discern some- thing of this pattern already emerging. Soviet leaders have declared unequivocally that they would take it as a threat to peace if the German ? Bundestag should fail to ratify the Soviet-German treaty. Broadcasting stations critical of Soviet pol- icy have been called a danger to European secu- rity and Soviet _demands have been issued for their removal from the air; needless to say, no such ' restrictions have been suggested with regard to 'Soviet broadcasts. Similarly, the Soviet Union re- gards interference with the activities of its intel- ligence agents in Western Europe as a hostile act; protests are brushed aside or dismissed as cold- war propaganda or even a threat to peace. (After the recent expulsion of some ninety Soviet agents' - from London, it was sadly observed in Bonn and Paris that such drastic action would now be al- most unthinkable in any other European cap- ital.) There is still a chance that out of the present confusion a new European defense community will emerge, based on Anglo-French nuclear co- operation and the combined conventional forces of ten European countries. Attempts to establish a European defense force date back to the early 1950's; they were voted down by the French Na- tional Assembly while Pierre Mends-France was Prime Minister and they failed to kindle much enthusiasm in any of the other countries in ques- tion. For twenty years Europe lay under the American nuclear guarantee, and by a stroke of unique good fortune resulting from the Soviet conflict with China, the Continent has now re- ceived a second respite. No one knows how long this breathing space will last, or indeed whether it can be successfully exploited. Pooling their re- sources, the West European countries could mus- ter a sum total of $23 billion by way of a military budget (as against the $63 billion spent by the . I . ' C. .1 I ? 15 men and :MO combat vessels. Sill], if one takes nnApprowediFoiAeleasell9991109/021* in other parts of the world the overall picture is not as hopeless as it appears at first sight. p) or would a European defense corn- munity bc of any consequence 'without att independent nuclear deterrent? The immensely complex issue of Anglo-French nu- clear cooperation has recently been analyzed in some detail by Ian Smart.* Britain has had much longer experience than France with nuclear weapons, whereas the French have made more progress in producing their own missiles. The French tactical nuclear artillery (Pluton) will be deployed in Germany later this year. The main obstacle is not, as is frequently thought, an eco- nomic one; Britain has spent less than 0.2 per cent of its GNP on strategic weapons, France about 0.6 per cent. France's progress has been hampered in recent years above all by certain technical difficulties which will, no doubt, be overcome in due course. But there are immense political problems. Should Germany and other European countries participate in this program? Leaders of the German CDU have in the past welcomed the concept of a British-French pool as an important step toward an all-European de- terrent. But it is doubtful whether the present German government' would risk incurring Soviet ? "Future Conditional: The Prospect for Anglo-French Nuclear Cooperation." Adelpht Paper 714 London, 1971. displeasure and ilms Me achievements, real and CIAADP194111(94)A0002E0W00601-2 finan- cial contribution. Moreover, how tremble would an Anglo-French deterrent be? in Smart's view, the only threat such a deterrent told pose would he the threat of retaliation either for a Warsaw Pact military action which could be held to en- danger vital British or French interests, or for a strategic nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. "The former threat is one which entails suicide, the latter a blow from the grave." Nevertheless, a European capacity to retaliate, however small, would not be lightly dismissed by the Warsaw Pact countries. Considerations of this nature will, of course, appear outdated and irrelevant (if not altogether heinous) to those who have decided to their sat- isfaction that the cold war has ended at long last and a new era of peace and cooperation is auto- matic and inevitable. But there is still a distinct danger that by unilateral concessions and disar- mament those who strive for peace will under- mine the very basis on which the prospects for peace and security in Europe rest?namely the ability of Europe to defend itself. A European Defense Organization could play a decisive role in bringing about a real detente. If, on the other hand, the .Europeans put their trust in high. sounding but basically meaningless dialogues and security conferences, while at the same time fail ing to take adequate measures to insure their own defense, the outcome, short of a miracle, will be only too predictable. TASS, Prague 26 January 1972 Warsaw Pact Declaration on Peace, Security, and Cooperation in Europe Prague January 26 TASS--Follows the full text of a declaration on peace, security and cooperation in Europe. The People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania. the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, represented at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member-states held in Prague on 25-26 January, 1972, examined the course of recent events in Europe. They analyzed these events in the light of their steadfast goal of working to turn the European Continent into an area of permanent, lasting peace, into an area of fruitful cooperation between sovereign and equal states, into a factor of stability and understanding throughout the world. The meeting participants noted with satisfaction that further progress has been achieved in this direction. The proposals of the socialist States for Strengthening European security and convening an all-European conference with this purpose play a most important role in rallying . all the forces that come out for peace and cooperation in Europe. These proposala Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 ,1 V,M,IfMr ,X.1 6n( CPYRGH MINOW4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 are contained in the Bucharest declaration of 1966, in the Budapest address of 1969, and the Berlin statement of 1970. These proposals of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty, as well as further actions and initiatives undertaken by them1 constitute a broad peace program and promote the creation of a new politioal climate in Europe. .Other European states are also making an ever growing significant contribution to the common cause of European peace. The policies of some of them definitely put first the interests of European peace, which has a favourable effect on the situation in Europe. The participants in the meeting point to the great poeitive significance of the contacts growing of late between European states belonging to different social systems, the development of political intercourse between them, particularly in the form of consultations on questions of mutual interest. This promotes mutual understanding between European states in regard to their common long-term interests in the sphere of peace and cooperation. As a result of the efforts and the constructive contribution of the member states of the present meeting and also due to the efforts and constructive contribution of other states, the relations of peaceful coexistence between European states are Asserting themselves more and more. /n this connection the meeting participants note the importance of the principles of cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and -Franck which were adopted at the conclusion of the recent Soviet-French summit talks:' Relaxation of tension on the European Continent is also promoted by the expansion of economic1 trade, scientific toOhnologicalv cUltural%and,other,rpleitions between European states. The relationships between European peoples are growing stronger and are acquiring a more diversified content. There is growing activity by the Eurdpean public in the struggle for deepening the relaXation of tension, for peace and security in Europe. The states represented at the meeting expressed satisfaction over the fact that the results achieved in the process of easing tension in Europe are supported when necessary by appropriate documents, valid under international law. The political consultative committee positively assesses the beginning of the ratificatidn of the treaties between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany, between the Polish Peoples Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. The putting of these treaties into force will promote the interests not only of their direct participants, but of all European states as well, will lead to the consolidation of the foundations of peace in. Europe. The member states participating in the meeting stressed the positive significance of the four-power agreement of September 3, 1971, over questions related to West Berlin, and of the agreements between the governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, and between the Government of the German Democratic Republic and the Senat of West Berlin. The widening international recognition of the German Democratic Republic is a major factor in strengthening peace. Further progress in this direction, including the establishment of relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany according to norms of international law, will be an important contribution to peace, security and cooperation. The participants in the meeting come out for deciding without further delay the question of admitting the GDR .and the FRO to the United Nations Organization. The participants in the meeting point out with satisfaction that the governments of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany conduct an exchange orANslialecf*Ohre Iffelavn 110?/613/61 heiX113f319b-ecinegtaticind841661651 I*" 17 all, on the question of declaring the Munich agreement null and void from the very 3 tartApPISSIMdrS5ritt% 9#91i)SI/ efArlit 01518:017 pnotyty2 Republic and believe that an achievement o an agreement w e p improvetttql36 on in Europe. The implementation of these steps will promote the rapid and radical elimination of the consequences of the lengthy period of distrust and tension from the relations of the FRO with the socialist countries, will promote complete normalisation of these relations, which would, in turn, promote relaxation on the European Continent and the development of cooperation among all the European states. ' The states taking part in the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee welcome the prospects for further positive changes in Europe. At the same time, they are taking into account the fact that the forces that are interested in maintaining tensions, in ? opposing some European states to others, in preserving the opportunities for pushing the development of events on the European Continent to aggravation continue operating in Europe. These forces, as seen from the faets, including the latest facts,'cannOt imaginf the European policy free from blocs, are striving to intensify the arms race in Europe. The Warsaw Treaty member states cannot but draw from this the definite conclusions for their security. But they are convinced that by now such a correlation of forces formed in Europe that it is possible to overcome the opposition of those who are againht relaxation, if the efforts to consolidate peace are made jointly and consistently. The states taking part .in the meeting expressed the conviction that it is particularly important and quite possible at the present stage to achieve collective, joint actions of the European states towards conselidation,of the European security. in,this:. connection, they declare for the speediest holding of an all-European Conference on security and cooperation in which all the European states arid also the United States and Canada should take part on an equal footing. At the all-Europech-Conference,*its,participants..00Uld Werk out practical' measures' ' .for further easing of tensions in Europe and lay the foundations for the construction of a European security system. The participants in the meeting are of the opinion that European security and cooperation require the creation of a system of commitments precluding any use of force of threat of using force in the mutual relations among :the etates in Europe, a system of commit- ments guaranteeing all the countries that they are protected from acts of aggression, promoting the benefit and prosperity'of:.every people. The states taking part in the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee declare . for general recognition and practical implementation in the political life of theEuroliein Continent of the.following basic principles of European security and relations among Europepn states:. Inviolability of the frontier The frontiers existing now between the European states, including the frontiers that formed as a result of the Seeondjiorld War are Inviolable Any attempt to violate these frontiers would threaten European peace. Therefore, the inviolability of the present frontiers, the territorial integrity of the European states must continue to be observed unswervingly endsthere.Mmat be no territorial claims from some states to others. Nonuse of ferce.-Fprceprrthreat of force must noti)euse0 In the mutual relations among the European states,? All the disputable questions mustbe? peaceful pelitical. means, through talks, injiccerdance.with the ,basic principles of international law,, --so that the legitimate Interests, peace and security of the peoples are:nnt'Jeopardise4. Peaceful coexistence. The states of the two social systems?the socialist and the. capitalist--have formed in Europe in the process of the historical development 7and existnow.. The_existence pf.the, be an insurmountable obstacle to the allround developmentof.relations aping them.; Renouncing'war'es a . means of 'their policy,-the?Eutopean stateei belonging systems, " Approved For Release 1999/09/02 iCIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 II nimilYmN twomil:mowl(VmmWWMWIW chirippatJ iru9rdIRALcp3v jp99/09/143 ? CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001 -2 . 1 i ns on e'basis of accord and cooperation in the interests of peace. The foundations for goodneighbourly relations and cooperation in the interests of, peace. The.goodneighbaurly relations among the European. tates must .develop on. the bSsis of the principles of independence ahd. natiOnal.sovereignty, equality, ' noninterference in internal affairs. and mutual advantage. this approach must become _ the permanentpolicy in the relatOns.among;the.EUropean states, the :..,perManent factor in the life ofall.:the.EuroOan pqoplasapdpiust:.leid,to.tiqe:: development of goodneighbourly ielaticins'sand-tUtuai Un4eistiniiing'among the 'sates in different parts of Europe. It is necessary to strive forsucha tranefOrmation Of relations among the European states that will make it possible to.nirercomesthe splitting of the continent into the military-politleal groupings Mutually advantageous relations among the states. Diversified mutually advantageous relations among the European states in economic, scientific, technical and cultural fields, in tourism and environmental control must be widely developed in the conditions of peace. The development of these relations, in turn, adding material content to the striving of the European peoples for peace, calm and efflorescence, will consolidate the stability of the system of security and cooperation forming in Europe. Disarmament. In the interests of consolidating the world peace, the European states must promote in every way the solution of the problem of universal and complete disarmament, above all nuclear disarmament, and implementation of measures for limitation and ending of arms race. The support for the United Nations. The goals of the European states on the international arena are in keeping with the articles of the United Nations Charter calling for maintenance of the world peace and security, for the development of friendly relations and cooperation among the states. The European states declare in support of the United Nations, for its consolidation in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. By taking these lofty principles and goals as a basis for relations between the stqtes of Europe, the all-European conference will adopt a decision of great historical scope. This will set the beginning to joint, capable of turning Europe into a truly peaceful continent. It would also be possible to agree at the all-European conference on concrete directions for the further development of reciprocally advantageous relation by European states in every sphere; for the elimination of all discrimination, inequality or artifical barriers. Their cooperation in the rational utilization of the raw materials and power resources of Europe, in raising the industrial potential and improving land fertility, in utilizing the achievements of the beientific and technological revolution will allow to multiply the opportunities for raising the wellbeing of the European peoples. Mutual enrichment in spiritual values, acquaintance with each others culture and art will assume still greater scope. It would be expedient to set up at the all-European Conference a permanent body of all the participating states concerned that after the conference could continue 'joint work to agree on further steps in this direction. In the opinion of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty all these questions should be high on the agenda of the all-European conferenc, The states represented at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee believe that an all-European conference can be convened in 1972 and regard the statements by a number of West European states to the effect that they adhere to the a gplfgrokredardrfikt4f6agbfigg9/0028:' CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 19 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 The participants in the meeting of the Political Consultative Ccomittee regard with understanding the reasoning of many states who favour the carrying out of necessary preparations for an all-European conference in order to promote its speediest con- vocation and its success. They believe that the Finnish Government's proposal to conduct in Helsinki multilateral consultations with the participation of all interested states of Europe, as well as of the United States and Canada, should be realized. The member states participating in the meeting reiterate that they decided to appoint delegates for taking part, together with the delegates of other states, in multilateral consultations aimed at reaching agreement on questions related to the preparations for and the organization of an all-European conference. They note that the proposal on multilateral consultations as a form of preparing for an all-European conference is now meeting with the agreement of all the states concerned, and call for starting the multilateral consultations in a very short time. The member states of the Warsaw Treaty believe that achieving agreement on reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe would also correspond with the interests of strengthening European security. In this they proceed from the fact that the question of reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe, both foreign and national, ought to be solved in such a manner as not to be to the detriment of the countries taking part in such reduction. The examination and determination of ways toward solving this question should not be the prerogative of the existing military-political alliances in Europe: Appropriate agreement could be reached an the way of conducting talks on this question. The People's Republic of Bulgaria. the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the polish people's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania. the Union of Soviet,Socialtst Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic believe that historical development has brought Europe up to an important juncture, apart from a new hope for lasting peace and security the year 1972 may bring the European peoples a real advance towards translating that nope .into life. The supreme duty of all states is to vigorously help in bringing this about. The declaration is signed: For the People's Republic of Bulgaria: by Todor Zhivkov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria; by Stank? Todorov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic Of Bulgaria. For the Hungarian-Peopae!s Republic: by Janos Hadar, first secretary of the Central committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party; by Jeno Pock, chairman of the Hungarian Revolutionary Government of Workers and Peasants. For the German Democratic Republic: by Erich Honecker, first secretary of the Central Committee of Socialist Unity Party of Germany; by Wolfgang Rauchfuss,vice chairman of the Council. of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic. For the Polish people's Republic:- by Edward Gierek, firstilecretary of the-Central.--- 7Coamittee of Polish United Warkers.Party; by-PiotrZaroszewicz chairman .of the-- Council:of Ministers of the polish People's Republic' r).% For the Romanian Socialist Republic: by Nicola? Ceausesou, general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party. chairman Of the State Council of the Socialist Hepublic of Romania; by Ion Gheorghe Maurer chairman of .the Council of Ministers of the Socialist 'Republic of Romania. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 1A-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 For the Union of Soviet'SocialistRepubliessby L.I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; by A.N. Kosygin. chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist:Republics. For the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic: by Gustav Huaak, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia; by Ludvik 81/abode, president .of the Czechoslovak Socialiet Republic; by Lubamir Straugel, president of the,Gavernment of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :2FIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/fleffirir,~41.-01194A000280200111-111 -2 THE YUGOSLAV EXPERIMENT CHALLENGED The attached backgrounder provides current information on the situation in Yugoslavian Tito's measures to restore order in Croatia are apparently succeeding; however his ability to find long-range solutions to regionalism, economic stagnation and the problem of his own succession remains in doubt. In treating the Yugoslav situation, we should suggest: a. that Croat leaders had lost their persepective and had became swept up in the tide of the extreme nationalist demands of their constituents; b. that Moscow is working with Croat refugees in West Germany and elsewhere to overthrow Tito and establish an independent Croat state under Soviet control; c. that Tito's purge of Croat party leaders was necessary and that the Yugoslav president did not over- react; d. that despite some harsh words for "rotten liberalism" and "legal niceties" (used for the purpose of goading somnolent party leaders into action), Tito wants the essentials of his decentralization program to survive and has DO intention of bequeathing his regime to discredited hard-liners; e. that nationalist difficulties, while serious, are not inevitable, permanent or incapable of solution; f. that Croat leaders were -- with possible exceptions -- guilty of no more than reflecting the excessive national enthusiasms and aspirations of their constituents and will not be the victims of traditional Communist purge trials; g. that the Yugoslav system is strong enough that even when President Tito (who currently enjoys excellent health) eventually leaves the scene, the commitment to his unique form of socialism and federalism will not be in doubt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY March 1972 THE YUGOSLAV EXPEREENT'CHALLENGED For over twenty years Yugoslavia has been involved in a political experiment which seeks to combine Cannunist state social- individual freedom and capitalist production methods. Last summer a constitutional reform granted almost complete autonomy to the six republics and two autonomous regions that comprise the Yugoslav federation, However, decentralization has not worked out as planned, and the Yugoslav experiment is currently Challenged by acute problems relating to the erosion of federal authority, regional separatism, economic stagnation and the question of what to do when Tito is no longer around to hold things together. The immediate crisis has been posed by Republic of Croatia efforts to obtain a larger share of federal funds. In the political marketplace in Belgrade where federal policy is formed and funds disbursed, the bargaining power of a regional party representative is proportionate to the amount of mass support and pressure he can generate in his local republic. In mobilizing such support, the regional representative has all too frequently chosen to play upon the Chauvinism of his constituents. Swept up in the tide of nationalism and local interests, he has increasingly assumed the role of the defender of these interests at the expense of the federation as a whole. For, pace Marxist orthodoxy which holds that national rivalry is a bourgeois aberration and that by eliminating capitalism and building a classless society national contradictions will disappear, the substitution in Yugoslavia of the Communist political system for the monarchy has not resolved the nationalist appetites of either the party bureaucracy or the regions they represent. In the case of Croatia, local party leaders felt strongly that their republic was not getting a fair share of federal funds and their demands on Belgrade were reinforced by student demon- strations. The actions of student organizations and the voices of Croat extremists who were publicly demanding the real prerogatives of independence (such as a Croat army, customs service and foreign office) alarmed and angered President Tito. However, when he called upon the central party apparat to intervene, he discovered that decentralization had eroded federal authority to the point that neither government nor party was capable of taking effective action, Faced with the intransigence of top-level Croat leaders and the paralysis of central party organs, Tito was obliged to engage his personal authority and prestige to cope with the situation. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Castigating thwyjnigt forces at work in all the republics, he specifically accusea the party leadership in Croatia of "rotten liberalism" and a lack of vigilance which permitted counter- revolutionary elements to thrive. Subsequently he forced the resignation of Croat party president Savka Dabcevic-Kucar and Mika Tripalo, a Croat representative on the federal party executive bureau and a member of the collective presidency set up by Tito last summer to resolve the succession problem. All together the purge in Croatia has affected at least 400 persons. Criminal proceedings have been initiated against one outspoken Croat delegate to the federal parliament and pre-trial hearings have begun for 11 Croats suspected for counter-revolutionary activity. These procedures may presage the first Yugoslav treason trials in over twenty years. A Conference of the League of Yugoslav Communists, which met from 25 - 27 January, cut the decision -making party executive bureau from fourteen to eight members. It also reduced the size of basic party organs and resolved to increase the workers role in the party. However, despite Tito's exhortations, the Conference was unable to formulate a program for dealing with the resurgence of national antagonisms. The meeting did affirm the validity of Yugoslavia's self-management principles and Tito made a point of disclaiming any intent of encouraging the party to reassume its former omnipotent role. Nonetheless, Conference decisions and the tone of Tito's own remarks indicate the Belgrade will continue to take measures against national dissension. In Croatia the new party leadership is proceeding to restore public order and party discipline. It has asserted that the basic liberal orientation of the Croat party is not in question, And the position of the new leaders has been strengthened by a federal decision to allow the individual republics to retain a greater share of their own currency earnings. On the other hand, in trying to reassert party control, these leaders will be working against the dominant mood of the party and people of Croatia which favors more independence and resents the dismissal of their most popular leaders. Events in Croatia have obliged Tito and his lieutenants to re-examine the role of the Communist Party in Yugoslav life.. The concept of a party that guides but does not direct has been tried and found wanting. In calling for a more compact, disciplined party led by men dedicated to the principles of socialism and federalism, Tito wants an organization which can bring its authority to bear on the regions whenever local interests impinge on the unity and well-being of the federation as a whole. However, the erosion of federal authority was not accompanied by the development of alternate power centers and Tito is discovering that it is much easier to surrender authority than to take it back again. 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY March 1972 THE YUGOSLAV EXPERIMENT CHALLENGED For over twenty years Yugoslavia has been involved in a political experiment which seeks to combine Communist state social- ism, individual freedom and capitalist production methods. Last summer a constitutional reform granted almost complete autonomy to the six republics and two autonomous regions that comprise the Yugoslav federation. However, decentralization has not worked out as planned, and the Yugoslav experiment is currently challenged by acute problems relating to the erosion of federal authority, regional separatism, economic stagnation and the question of what to do when Tito is no longer around to hold things together. The immediate crisis has been posed by Republic of Croatia efforts to obtain a larger share of federal funds. In the political marketplace in Belgrade where federal policy is formed and funds disbursed, the bargaining power of a regional party representative is proportionate to the amount of mass support and pressure he can generate in his local republic. In mobilizing such support, the regional representative has all too frequently chosen to play upon the Chauvinism of his constituents. Swept up in the tide of nationalism and local interests, he has increasingly assumed the role of the defender of these interests at the expense of the federation as a whole. For, pace Marxist orthodoxy which holds that national rivalry is a bourgeois aberration and that by eliminating capitalism and building a classless society national contradictions will disappear, the substitution in Yugoslavia of the Communist political system for the monarchy has not resolved the nationalist appetites of either the party bureaucracy or the regions they represent. In the case of Croatia, local party leaders felt strongly that their republic was not getting a fair share of federal funds and their demands on Belgrade were reinforced by student demon- strations. The actions of student organizations and the voices of Croat extremists who were publicly demanding the real prerogatives of independence (such as a Croat army, customs service and foreign office) alarmed and angered President Tito. However, when he called upon the central party apparat to intervene, he discovered that decentralization had eroded federal authority to the point that neither government nor party was capable of taking effective action. Faced with the intransigence of top-level Croat leaders and the paralysis of central party organs, Tito was obliged to engage his personal authority and prestige to cope with the situation. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Castigating chavyjnist forces at work in all the republics, he specifically accusea the party leadership in Croatia of "rotten liberalism" and a lack of vigilance which permitted counter- revolutionary elements to thrive. Subsequently he forced the resignation of Croat party president Savka Dabcevic-KUcar and Mika Tripalo, a Croat representative on the federal party executive bureau and a member of the collective presidency set up by Tito last summer to resolve the succession problem. All together the purge in Croatia has affected at least 400 persons. Criminal proceedings have been initiated against one outspoken Croat delegate to the federal parliament and pre-trial hearings have begun for 11 Croats suspected for counter-revolutionary activity. These procedures may presage the first Yugoslav treason trials in over twenty years. A Conference of the League of Yugoslav Communists, which met from 25 - 27 January, cut the decision -making party executive bureau from fourteen to eight members. It also reduced the size of basic party organs and resolved to increase the workers role in the party. However, despite Tito's exhortations, the Conference was unable to formulate a program for dealing with the resurgence of national antagonisms. The meeting did affirm the validity of Yugoslavia's self-management principles and Tito made a point of disclaiming any intent of encouraging the party to reassume its former omnipotent role. Nonetheless, Conference decisions and the tone of Tito's own remarks indicate the Belgrade will continue to take measures against national dissension. In Croatia the new party leadership is proceeding to restore public order and party discipline. It has asserted that the basic liberal orientation of the Croat party is not in question. And the position of the new leaders has been strengthened by a federal decision to allow the individual republics to retain a greater share of their own currency earnings. On the other hand, in trying to reassert party control, these leaders will be working against the dominant mood of the party and people of Croatia which favors more independence and resents the dismissal of their most popular leaders. Events in Croatia have obliged Tito and his lieutenants to re-examine the role of the Communist Party in Yugoslav life._ The concept of a party that guides but does not direct has been tried and found wanting. In calling for a more compact, disciplined party led by men dedicated to the principles of socialism and federalism, Tito wants an organization which can bring its authority to bear on the regions whenever local interests impinge on the unity and well-being of the federation as a whole. However, the erosion of federal authority was not accompanied by the development of alternate power centers and Tito is discovering that it is much easier to surrender authority than to take it back again. 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 During the Croatian crisis Tito has had the unequivocal support of the Yugoslav military and he made it clear to Croat nationalists that he was prepared to use force if necessary to restore order in the republic. As a result the role of the military has been strengthened. Should the party prove incapable of regaining its authority, the Yugoslav military would remain the only force capable of holding the country together. Its influence will be felt even more strongly after Tito's demise. Since World War II Yugoslavia has withstood the threat of regional separatism internally and external pressure from Moscow which dates from the time of Tito's break with Stalin in 1948. The country's survival attests first of all to the ability and prestiage of President Tito. It also attests to the flexibility of Yugoslav socialism and to the pervasive fear of. Soviet inter- vention. Tito has made it clear that he expects the economic and administrative essentials of his decentralization program to survive. He obviously does not wish to bequeath his regime to those who would attempt to reimpose authoritarian rule. Moreover, liberal elements in Croatia, Tito's home province, have always been the strongest supporters of his reforms. The fate of the Yugoslav experiment has an influence transcending its own borders. As a leader of the non-aligned nations, Yugoslavia can exert considerable influence on the developing countries of Asia and Africa. As such it constitutes a relevant and unique example of a regime which seeks to combine participating social democracy (the self-management principle), individual freedom, a market economy and a large measure of autonomy for its component republics. The Soviet Union, ever fearful that the Titoist heresy is infecting its East European empire, is an interested observer of Yugoslavia's problems, Tito and the new leadership in Croatia have already accused Moscow of abetting nationalism and separatism. While this accusation cannot be confirmed (it is probably the only point on which Yugoslays of whatever nationality or political persuasion can agree on), there is ample evidence that the Soviet leaders are exerting economic and psychological pressure to achieve their aims. Thus, Tito's recent problems in attracting western capital have not gone unnoticed by Moscow which is offering attrative loans and credits to hard-pressed Yugoslav firms in an effort to increase their trade with the Soviet bloc. And a January article in the Soviet Pravda, observing the Croat crisis with obvious satisfaction, compared the current climate in Yugoslavia with that which existed in Czechoslovakia during the period of the Dubcek reforms; that is, before the Soviet-led invasion 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 GUARDIAN/LE MONDE WEEKLY, London/Paris 8 January 1972 CROATIAN NATIONALISM Afly in the f ointment By M1LOVAN DJ1LAS CPYRGHT The Yugoclay Communiats ore side by side in Bosni:., Herzegovina ing variety of national traditions and in the very existence of the Mon- guided by the same doctrinal and and Croatia. These resemblances the problems posed by fostering ihe tencgrin nation a dismemberment practical considerations in handling may well bring the.two grouPs closer various grouPs? There were also the of their own group. Before the war, the question of national groups as .together, but they also give rise to nationalist appetites of their own the Communists were inclined to give in dealing with all other problems. fears of losing their identities. party bureaucracy. The fact is that a measure of autonomy to Bosnia In orthodox Marxist terms nation-, The complexity of their relations is some of these- bureaucracies seemed Herzegovina. With the revolution they allies are the product of capitalisin better seen against the background to be ? to borrow Orwell's phrase decided to go further and give the and national rivalry is a bourgeois of their differences. Their traditions ?more equal thanothers. conflict.. So by eliminating capitalism' 'region Instead the status of a repub- and their -mentalities are different, For the first time in their history lic, although half the population is rind the bourgeoisie, and "building" as are their religions (the Serbs are Slovenen and Macedonians were given Serb and the rest Croat and Moslem. the classless society, national con- Orthodox, the Croats Catholic).. Be- the right to set up their own State,. They thus effectively blocked the tradietions should gradually die- tween the two world wars. Political and this could not hut please them. historic aspirations of Croatian appear. The operation or -building parties were formed on the basis .of The same right was given the Mon- nationalism and the ethnic hopes of this classless society is presided over national differencea, unleashing tenegrins, although they were an Serbian nationalism while at the by a monolithic and internationalist irrational forces, reviving old myths, integral part of the Serbian national same time meeting the wishes of party which, by the same token, is destroying legal order, and delaying group. Both the Kornintern and the Moslems anxious to affirm their own the embodiment -of nationalistic life social progress. In 1929, King Mex- Yugoslav Communist party regarded identity. An outburst of nationalistic and tendencies. ander I tried to save the country Yugoslavia as sornethinst aretriiaciiiaellRy fervour could turn Bosnia Herzegovna into a battlefield. Apart from the As this same docttine holds that fr o vsf am breaking up by resorting to per- created by the Treaty f i there are no differences. between sonal rule, and by promoting the idea The Montenegrins, in their view, six I republics, the Communists also national groups except language, of a "Yugoslav nation" and of "Yugo- constituted a special national group created tailturat. traditions. psychological atavism." . because they had had their own two autonomous regions in- characteristics, and economic condi- sde the Serbian republic?Voivodina inns, the Communists?once they are in power?do not permit anything more than cultural and administra- tive autonomy when they recognise the rights of national groups. The - Yugoslav ' Communists aban- doned this position only when they were forced to. But there is no deny- ing that they have gone a step further than the Soviets, who pioneered in this terrain, by giving official recogni- tion to the rights and special charac- teristics of national groups. There is no "Big Brother" among Yugoslavia's ? national groups, no single party bureaucracy leading the others. This departure from Soviet practice atems not from principles but from the Yugoslav reality. If this reality Is discounted there is no way of a revolution, and the time seemed So it was that a region which had understanding the policy pursued by ripe for the Communists to PinS:ittria every ground for demanding autoa- the Yugoslav Communists in handling decisive role in safeguatdIng. the yogosiev state. Is.,Y, emY found itself elevated to the rank national problems, nor the national- restor ing"? of a nation and State. This peculiarity isle rivalries which are today Shaking did this by launching_iiceinrovridt, created no problems as long as up and eroding socialist structures 'ag I-nr aihst the occupying a 'n. Ideological and party unity ensured just as they once did In a monarchist their collaborators. They 'wen. t-ht? a de facto centralisation. Today, with and bourgeois Yugoslavia. ? struggle because ? albeit. ,ini their the party hold loosening and repub- What happened? What is happen-- nwn way ? they were the einbodi- lies enjoying near-sovereign power Ing today? flew Is It that there haa merit of the Yugoslav idea, that 18 t? the "Montenegrin nation" assumes been a resurgence in . Yugoalavia Ray the idea of a eommon Yugdstris . peat significance for the Croats ? of nationalist movements and an- State grouping a variety of nationali- whose own nationalism is in full tagonisma These stirrings have ties. It is worth noting here that - this flower, taken the whole world by oirprige, visiOn is. at the root of Yugoslavia's and borne, especially the Communist quarrel with Stalin anti its determined countries,. view them with concern. opposition to Moscow's attempts at ' The Serbs and Croats constitute extending Soviet control. the large.St national groupa ? in Yugo: ? The Communists Were prepared Slavic There Is a very close simi. to grant equal rights to all the larity between their languages and national groups, but they were con- .en they are not The Serbs. on the their ethnic ons and they liye fronted with more than the bew when For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 His action did stave of the country's State until 1918, and since then disintegration, but there was nn had represented a separatist ten- way of injecting life into the idea of dency in the Yugoslav kingdom. Dur- one Yugoslavia. The entire Croat ing the Second World War, the Serbian population challenged this concept. counter-revolutionary movement (the the Serbs' democratic parties made Chetniks) was the most active group a futile attempt to head it off, while in Montenegro. By turning this extremist elements in all camps region into a State, the centralist sharpened their axes 1 or the day when and hegemonistic tendencies of they could settleold scores. Serbian nationalism which constituted That day came with the Nazi In- the most serious threat to the Corn- vaslon. Croat Fascists (the Ustachls) munists, were weakened. Besides, got the German invader to set up a during the war, bases of party strue- so-called independent state, and used hire and administration were laid It as a basis for an attempt to eider- which took Montenegro's special minale the Serbs. IteactIonariss itsal characteristics ' into consideration. fanatical chauvinists trot? the ranks Equality with other republics which of the Scrim hit back using similar the new structural order bestowed melluxia. could only help the newly created All the ingredients were there for Montenegrin party machines Republic status and Kosovo. These provinces have identical con- stitutions, although the Serbs form the majority in Voivodina, which also has a large Hungarian minority, and the Albanians predominate in Kosovo, where the Serbs constitute a little more than a third of the population. As far as I can recall, the question of the Hungarian minority played only a secondary role in the granting of autonomy to Voivodina. Decisive There was an autonomist current, admittedly weak, among the Serbs of this region before the war. But during the revolution the party sup- ported the idea of setting up an autonomous party apparatus. All this had a decisive influence when the question of granting autonomy to Voivodina was taken up. It was different with Kosovo. The Communists had also set up autono- mous structures in this region, which borders on Albania. Since at that time the Yugoslav and Albanian Com- munists were hoping to unite the two countries, Kosovo's autonomy was considered an intermediate step towards such a union. When the Yugoslav constitution was amended last year, Voivodina and Kosovo were nearly awarded the other hand, even status of republics, and this in the nationalistic, see teeth Of Serbian opposition. The CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2CPYRGHT solution finally decided upon was bizarre: in order to meet the demands of the Albanians, the same rights were granted to Voivodina ? which had not asked for any of them. Although they. represented almost half the Yugoslav population and Kosovo was part of their republic, the Serbs found themselves coming under increasing pressure. The dream of uniting Albania and Yugoslavia gave way to a threat of Albanian irre- dentism. It would be wrong to conclude from the present resurgence of nationalism that the Communists have done nothing here or that they have made serious mistakes. The truth is that the substitution of social and political ? systems does not do away with nationalist problems. In a multinational State these can be solved, even given optimum condi- tions, only for a particular period and within the framework of certain social and political structures. Each time these structures are altered, the relations between the national groups change, and vice versa. This is what has happened in Yugoslavia. The party monolith and its ideology have been gradually transformed, largely as a result of 'changes in social structures. The break-up of the party bureaucracy was accompanied by the emergence of a middle class. Officials installed by the revolution were replaced ? before their useful- ness expired ? by men less dogmatic and more ingenious. The social and intellectual climate resembles that of Louis Philippe's time, as seen by Balzac and Stendhal. True, the middle class in Communist countries is not properly speaking a bourgeoisie because there is no bourgeois owner- ship of property. It has, however, cer- tain things in common with the bourgeoisie, such as its goals of technical progress and aspirations towards a high standard of living. It is made up of all social classes ? managerial and professional men, party bureaucrats, petit bourgeois, even workers and peasants. The beliefs and outlook of this ciass, with Its reliance on what are in fact modern "capitalist" production methods, impregnate eVery fibre of the nation's life. This transformation of society and the party is built on a natural, and the only possible, founda- tion ? that of national groups. It is evident in claims made by the party bureaucracies in the national groups, and in other aspects of "bourgeois" nationalism. Disintegration There are as many Yugoslav Com- munist parties as there are republics, and the disintegration has been ac- celerated by differences in social and other tendencies of their members. As national bureaucracies ? bureau- cratic nationalisms, that is to say ? began to press their special claims. there also appeared an "ideology" of superiority and intolerance among national groups. "Scientific" studies have been published, especially in Croatia, on the exploitation of one national entity by another and the "limitless" possibilities for develop- ment in the exploited national group. Dark, illogical forces were thus set in motion by the charges of exploita- tion and hegemony. There was, of course, exploitation, not as a result of the predominance of this or that national group, but because of waste and the exercise of _privileges in the party bureaucracy at the expense of the rest of the Yugoslav national en- tities. In this context, the criticism directed against Belgrade can be justified, not because it is the Serbian capital, but because it is the com- mon capital of the federal bureauc- racy. The reality of national relations and national claims remains well hidden. This is true of society as a whole and of the Various tendencies which exist in it. For the changes that have taken place in society have not been backed up by a renewal of ideas and Institutions. In many respects, the political structures have not changed since the end of the revolution. The party bureaucracy may well have been unable to stop social change, but it was strong enough to suppress new and more democratic tendencies. The changes have been limited to reshuffles within its own ranks. It gave legal recognition to the independence and equality of the party bureaucracies in the various nations, but it refused any liberalisa- tion in other domains. In view of the traditional and legendary aspirations of its people, it was inevitable that Croatia should become the theatre of the most seri- ous outburst of nationalism. Contri- buting to it were both actual and potential economic difficulties in the area. The party bureaucracy's "pro- gressive" wing struck a nationalist posture: But it was weak, and all it did was open the door to the tradi- tional sort of nationalism, which led to the merger of two nationalist struc- tures ? the party and the bourgeoisie. Croatian slide The policy was pursued in seem- ingly democratic fashion, with leaders paying lip service to "Yugoslavism." But quite clearly Croatia was sliding towards separatism and authori- tarian nationalism. It could hardly have been .otherwise: not a single popular or democratic measure was sanctioned in the republic. Although the party's nationalism came to be Identical with that of the bourgeoisie, It was neither dynamic nor inventive. The bureaucrats were stunned when students from Zagreb University went on strike last month. Marshal Tito reacted by getting rid of the nationalists in the party and arrest- ing student leaders. The drive has been contained, but the Croat ques- tion and the other problems afflicting the system have yet to be solved. By and large, Yugoslav society has been liberalised, but its political structures remain authoritarian. It is for thh re ison that a crisis like that of CI:oat an nationalism seems to involve thE whole of Yugoslavia. Yet the 3asi4 of the Yugoslav State and its sGeietor is far sturdier than appears a first sight. Note that the outburst E f Croat nationalism was Isolated - at d led to unfavourable reactions !'rons the other republics. Officially, these reactions came from top-level -revolutionaries." In fact, however, it was the entire post- revolutions ry consumer society, eown to its humble >t levels, that insisted upon ant. obtained the vitally essential mak tenance of the State's unity. Authoritarian As long a5 Yugoslavia's present bureaucra ic itructure remains, the country will c ntinue to be shaken by crises. No on can say just when or where they wit end. There seems no possibility of renewing or stabilising the party bu eaucracy, nor does a political d mocracy of the sort known in the Went seem likely. Yugoslavia is tending towards a political State which is rot dogmatic, but continues to be au horrtarian. The structures -which carte ir to being as a result of the revolt' ton including the national structures, nevertheless continue to be modified, and in some instances are even di ;apt earing. But all :his is being done without disturbing the foundations of society, particularly n ationalist rights. There Is every iodic ition that the country's social andf economic life is evolving towards greater liberty, thereby offering tie rational groups greater opportunit es or their individual de- velopment Tt e vision of confedera- tion of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes. and Macedonians all enjoying wider civil rights belong to take on the dimen- sions of mE thing more solid than a pipe drea BALTIMORE SUN 9 February 1972 Fourteen Centuries Apart MILOVAN DJILAS CPYRGHT Croatia and the 'Yugoslav Idea'. By JOSEPH it. L. STERNE Zagreb a line roughly comparable to d dive For those who prefer the long sion perceptible in Yugoslavia even view of political affairs, the latter ,to this day. To the south and east, years of the Fourth Century might the Byzantine Empire with its be a good starting point for assess- Orthodox Church and Cyrillic al- ing the upsurge of Croatian phabet held sway; to the north and nationalism that is now roiling west, the power of Rome persisted Yugoslavia. in the Catholic Church and the In that distant epoch, the Roman Latin alphabet. Empire finally bilklp pity etrF (Inn pipxia trilndogifinm stIte illtrfiLaPtitd 2n: 2 the Sixth and Seventh Centuries, their political and religious fates Thus these two Slavic tribes, were determined by the cleavage though speaking a common Ian- between East and West. The Serbs guage with no greater differences became subject to the Byzantine , than "English" and "American," Empire and later to Its Turkish remained politically apart through successors. The Croats after a fourteen centuries?from the days heady period of independence fell of the migration until 1918. under the domination of Hunger- In that year, as World War I Oth2gptgemitttgArMI) 2 tozdoodiuzslualav;5,orivtlaies Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 CPYRGHT formed by big-power decision from the debris of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, . . ? From the beginning, Yugoslavia has never been an easy Union. Not only the Serbs and the Croats, but the Slovenes, Bosnians, Monteneg- rins, Albanians, Macedonians and ungarians who live within its borders have nurtured nationalist passions quite contrary from the assimilationist Ideal that has shaped the American Union. The Serbs, who by 1918 had been nominally independent for a cen- tury and fully independent for half a century, were the dominant force in Yugoslavia from the outset. Al- though leading Croats had long sup-. ported the "Yugoslav Idea," they were quickly disillusioned after the 1921 constitution established a cen- tralist monarchy with power firmly entrenched in Serbian hands. Political turbulence prevailed in the period between world wars. Croatian parliamentarians often boycotted meetings of the Skupstina in Belgrade and then withdrew al- together after their leader, Stjepan Radic, was shot dead during a de- bate in 1927. One product of Croatian disil- lusion was the assassination in 1934 of King Alexander by a member of Ustashi, an extremist, separatist group which considered him the embodiment of Serbian hegemony. Another result was the creation during the Nazi occupation of a separate Croatian state, led by Ustashii which committed atrocities against Serbs comparable to the bloodiest deeds of Hitler's hench- men. ? ? ? As a result, the resistance move- ment in Yugoslavia deteriorated into a civil war between Serbs and Croats?with only the Communist partisans under the redoubtable Josip Broz Tito holdihg firm for thtks "Yugbslav Idea." When World War IT ended and- Tito took power, the new regime made the historic decision (after a decade of Communist theoretical indecision) to make Yugoslavia a federation with considerable power vested in the nation's six republics and two autonomous provinces.... The purpose was to defuse na- tionalist passions, but in practice difficulties have never ceased. In the early postwar years, the Com- munists imposed a Stalinist rule from Belgrade in which Croatia was treated almost as an occupied state despite Tito's Croation origin. After the Tito-Stalin break in 1948, there was quite a change. To court popular support in' the struggle against the Soviet threat, Tito preached national rather than in- ternational communism and insti- tuted a more democratic, "self- management" style of socialism. Since that time, political life in Yugoslavia has been characterized by constant experimentation, with the pendulum almost dancing in response to a myriad of national- ist, economic, ideological and for- eign pressures. The early 1950's brought the democratic heresies of Milovan Djilas, an old Tito ally who flirted 'ith the unforgivable idea.o a mull-party system. The mid-1960's saw a return of Serbian centralism in the form of Aleksander Rank- ovic, another old Tito ally who used his control over the secret police to reinstitute a touch of Stalinism. Now, today, Yugoslavia Is going through Its third internal crisis since the break With Stalin., In many ways, it is the most serious' crisis because it Is the most pert- inent to Yugoslavia's peculiar prob- lems. What Djilas and Rankovic re fleeted, after all, were the basic dilemmas of Communist regimes everywhere: democratization ver- sus repression, stability through relaxation or through control. In the present case, Tito is deal- ing with a fervent Croatian ha- tionalism which grew to proportions he bluntly defined as a threat to the entire Yugoslav state. Accordingly, Tito has deposed a ? number of Communist Party leaders who had made themselves quite popular by appealing to the nationalist sentiments of the Croa tian population. And he has tacitly approved the indictment of eleven members of "Malice Hrvatska" (Mother Croatia), a cultural organ- ization now being charged with promoting a political mass move- ment and having links with "Ustashi" separatist groups in exile. While the deposed Croatian leaders, Miko Tripalo and Mrs. Savka Dabcevic-Kticar, proved no more capable of surviving Tito's wrath than Djilas and Rankovic were, they reflect a force that will buffet Yugoslavia for years to come. memories of Tomislav, 'by jealoue: rivalry with the Serbs and by. con. flicting political theories. - Some Croats want "pure" sep- aratism, an idea harking back to Tomislav. Others dream of a highly autonomous political connection with undefined western powers, a concept reflecting the years of Habsburg rule. ? ? ? Among the majoritrlhat has ac- cepted the reality and Arability ef the Yugoslav state, differences re? main over the degree of control : from Belgrade that should be per- mitted. President Tb, perhaps realizing this is an age of nationalism .from Northern Ireland to the: Ukraine, made major constitutional changes last year to decentralize govern- mental authority. It was a bold move to appease jealousies within Yugoslavia, and it may yet prove to be a major achievement. But as an instant defusing mech- anism, the granting of greater ,powers to the various republics just did not work. Blaming Croatia's continuing economic problems (one tenth of its 4 million people have to go to Western Europe to find work), na- tionalist elements put forward es- calating demands: complete control of foreign currency earnings, a sep- arate banking and marketing sys- tem, a Croatian seat in the United Nations and even a Croatian army. Tito's response?mass arrests of striking students, the firing of lead- ing party and government figures. the indictment of _eleven intellec- uals on treason charges?reasserted the cohesive power of the party (and the army, if necessary). Over the short run, popular sup- port of the "Yugoslav Idea" will regain strength in Croatia only if there is economic recovery. Over the longer run, mixed marriages and common interests may erode separatist sentiments. But It is a process of decades, one that could be accelerated only if the danger of outside intervention becomee Urgent. ? ? ? The Croatian people, It must be remembered, have clung to their separate identity and heritage through the vissitudes of centuries. Soon after they migrated into the Balkans they were in conflict with the Vatican over the use of their own language instead of Latin. Then, In the year 925 A.D., Duke Tomislav of the Dalmatian town of Nin declared himself King of an independent Croatia that remained a major Balkan power until 1102 A.D. An imposing statue of Tomis- lay astride a bronze horse can be seen today outside the Zagreb rail- way station. After 1102, the Croats were never fully independent again although ,they frequently enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. Until the Six- teenth Century the Hungarian mon- archy held sway only to be re- placed by the House of Habsburg and Austrian influence. For con- siderable periods, the Venetians controlled Dalmatia and at one point the Turks pushed within 35 miles of Zagreb. During the Nineteenth Century, while the Serbs alreadk were in the process of gaining initOpendence Croatian nationalism hills modern form , took shape. It Ia a heady phenomenon, marked by romantic Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 3 25X1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY March 1972 SOVIET NAVAL STRENGTH IN THIRD WORLD WATERS Introduction Until the mid-1960's the Soviet Union limited its approaches to the Third World to diplomatic ties, economic and technical assistance arrangements, military aid and training agreements, trade relations and educational exchanges. The military power factor was a relatively small part of the overall Soviet posture and policy in its dealings with Third World areas. Only within the past decade have the Soviets become more consistent in trying to project military power into distant areas, and to do this they have depended primarily on naval deployments. Although the focus of this paper is mainly on the major buildup of Soviet naval power and facilities, there has also been a spec- tacular increase in the merchant fleet, making it the third largest in the world. The USSR has likewise developed highly sophisticated oceanographic ships which operate throughout the world, and it has built up a tremendous fishing fleet, with an estimated total of over 4,000 vessels, many of which frequently become involved in international incidents because of illegal fishing operations within territorial waters. Along with this expansion in sea power, the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, other East European Communist countries, have been involved in developing ports and obtaining shipbuilding and repair facilities in some twenty-five countries throughout the world. Mast recently the USSR entered into a commercial agreement with Malta which was signed on 27 December 1971. According to the Soviet news agency, TASS, by terms of the agreement Soviet vessels will be able to use drydocks in Valletta for repairs in return for "definite payment," plus assistance in developing Malta's light industry. In August 1971 TASS had reported that during talks between Prime Minister Dominic Mintoff and Mikhail Smirnovsky, Soviet Ambassador to London and Malta, Mr. Smirnovsky had promised "total" Soviet support in "liquidating colonial domination and liberation: from commitments imposed from outside." At stake in the Malta issue is the balance of power in the Mediterranean which would be drastically altered if the USSR were to acquire rights to the naval and air bases located on the island. The Mediterranean and Emt The Mediterranean, especially the Middle East, is where the Soviet Union has attained its greatest prestige and influence through Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 a combination of diplomacy, trade, military and economic aid, military advisors, the presence of some military personnel, and a growing naval presence. In the Mediterranean it maintains a squadron of SOM2 fifty surface ships and submarines, and an estimated 16,000 Soviet citizens are stationed in Egypt alone. Activities of the Mediterranean Squadron are directed mainly against NATO naval forces and the U.S. Sixth Fleet in particular. In these activities the Squadron is in effect an extension of the Black Sea Fleet's defense of the maritime approaches to the southern flank of the USSR. Since the Soviet Union is also interested in extending the range of its naval operations into the western Mediterranean, it is therefore working to develop its relations with the North African states as well as with Malta. Moscow has concluded a number of arrangements for use of Egyptian facilities, including repair facilities in Alexandria and storage and billeting facilities in both Alexandria and Port Said. They make more limited use of the port at Mersa MetrUh, which is still being developed. The Soviets have apparently not acquired other Mediterranean port facilities similar to those they have in Egypt. Mbst of the Soviet visits to the Syrian ports of Latakia and Tartus and to the Algerian ports of Algiers and Annaba have been brief, probably to "show the flag" and to take on provisions and fuel. The geographic location of Mers-El-Kebir in Algeria would be suitable for ships operating in the western Mediterranean, but it is unlikely the Soviets will obtain use of its facilities since the Algerians increas- ingly oppose the presence of any great power fleets in the Mediterran- ean. However, a small number of Soviet naval and technical personnel are assigned to this base to assist the Algerian navy. Likewise, Tunisia and Libya have accepted Soviet assistance in port construction but have consistently refused Soviet requests for repair and refueling facilities. Elsewhere, units of the Squadron make occasional formal visits to the Yugoslav ports of Split and Kotor. Moscow has been putting increased pressure on Tito for port and supply facilities at Kotor, but to date Tito has steadfastly refused- A number of anchorages are used by the Soviets in the Mediter- ranean, ranging from one located in the area of Gibraltar, and used by vessels in the western Mediterranean, to one south of the Peloponnesus which is reported to be the principal eastern Mediter- ranean anchorage for combat ships. Others are located off Tunisia's east coast, one within Egyptian territorial waters, one near Malta and two located in the area of Cyprus and Crete. The Indian Ocean Fleet and Activity in Contiguous Waters The Soviet Union's increased visibility in the Indian Ocean includes not only its growing naval presence, first established in 1968 and now considered to have attained fleet status, but also its civil air routes, arrangements for facilities for the Soviet fishing 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 fleet and increased diplomatic and trade relations. There are more ports open in the Indian Ocean than in the Mediterranean for short naval visits and the frequency and duration of these have generally increased. In the Gulf of Aden alone, Soviet naval units have made at least six appearances since the British announced their intention to withdraw. But the Soviets have not obtained access to or use of facilities comparable to those available in Egypt or in Cuba. Naval activity has apparently been limited to their port visits, "showing the flag," hydrographic research and space support. There has been no indication they engage in operational exercises to the extent they do in the Mediterranean. Other Soviet activity complementing the naval presence has been important and includes the following: signing a friendship treaty with India, in which they probably requested the use of naval facil- ities; signing a trade agreement with Thailand; dispatching military aid to Ceylon following the latter's insurgency crisis and also signing a fishing agreement; negotiating with Singapore for use of commeroial and perhaps port facilities; continuing to supply military and economic aid to many countries in the area; extending their civil air routes and increasing their fishing operations. The Soviets' prompt use of expanding naval power was exemplified by the fact that Soviet naval units began calling at Persian Cult ports within three weeks after the British announced in 1968 that they would withdraw from east of Suez by 1971. These deployments have ranged from a single missile destroyer and a tanker of the Pacific fleet to surface combat ships, submarines and auxiliaries from all four Soviet fleets. They have made calls at Abadan, Kuwait, Basra and Uthm Qasr. In this area Soviet activity in construction or improvement of port and shipyard facilities has been most extensive in irag* ports, where the leftist regime has favorably received such aid. Shore facilities along the Red Sea, at Aden, or along the coast of the Horn of Africa would facilitate Soviet operations in the Indian Ocean. Probably with the aim of obtaining these, the Soviets have helped with the construction of port facilities at Berbera and Mogadishu in Somalia, where it is also rumored they have obtained some access to the port of Alula at the strategic tip of the Horn. They have also been involved in similar activity in Aden where they are known to have used the airfield in past years. It is not known, however, if they have applied for permanent facilities in these areas. The island of Socotra, belonging to Southern yemen, has been reported used as a Soviet forward base because of its position near the Red Sea and Persian Gulf.. So far, however, it appears that nearby anchorages are being used more by the Soviets, and these are in international waters. In Yemen, the port of Hodeida was built by the Soviets in 1968-1969, but there are no indications that they have actual port or other base facilities there. 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 On the island of Mauritius, further south in the Indian Ocean, Port Louis has been used for visits and supply purposes by Soviet naval and space support ships. A recent fishing agreement will enable Soviet fishing boats to use these facilities also. So far the Soviets have been refused the right of unrestricted access to shore facilities in India, although they are assisting in the improvement of the east coast naval base at Vishakhapatnam. Ceylon, with suitable facilities at Colombo and Trincomalee, would also probably refuse such a request in view of Prime Minister Bandaranaike's campaign to make the Indian Ocean a neutral area. Through a 1971 fishing agreement, however, Soviet fishing boats have access to the port of Colombo and the smaller port of Galle on the southwestern coast. In Singapore, the Soviets have been trying for over a year to gain access to important dockyards for naval and merchant ships, but no firm agreement is known to have been reached. Apparently, however, the Soviets have obtained permission for short, informal naval visits to Singapore? In addition to the anchorages in the vicinity of Socotra, which are reported to be used frequently by both combat and support ships, two or three other anchorages in the Indian Ocean are allegedly used more by space support and hydrographic research ships. West African Coast Although sporadic Soviet naval operations off West Africa are known to have started as early as 1967, for the past three years Soviet ship operations have been related to political events: a Soviet task force patrolled the Ghana coast in the spring of 1969 to effect the release of two Soviet fishing vessels that the Ghanaian government had impounded. Since 1970, the date of an attempted coup against Sekou Toure, the frequency, duration and conspicuousness of naval ships visiting at Conakry has mounted to the point which suggests the Soviets have now established a floating naval presence off the Guinea coast. The vessels reportedly include one or two destroyers, a landing ship and an oiler. There is no evidence that Nbscow intends, or that Guinea would agree, to the Soviets' building a naval base at Conakry or on the nearby islands, but both obviously have a mutual interest in a standing Soviet patrol of Guinean waters. In view of the Soviets' apparent success at having won entry into Conakry, which they will certainly seek to consolidate and expand, ?this will probably became a model for similar operations along the African coast in the future. Already Soviet ships have called at least twice at Freetown, Sierra Leone, the first time in May 1971 when President Stevens claimed to fear a plot against his regime. Since the Soviets have no strategic need for a naval base on the West African coast, and the cost of operating such a base would most likely outweigh any defense gains, their naval presence 4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 serves primarily their political aims of establishing and defending Soviet interests in the area. The Caribbean, Cuba and Latin America After the missile crisis in 1962, Soviet naval activities in the Caribbean were negligible until July 1969 when Soviet surface ships and submarines begain to visit the Cuban ports of Cienfuegos, Havana and Mariel. Although the purpose of these visits has been mainly political, the ships had access to supply facilities and were known to engage in a few basicexercises with Cuban navy ships. Nbst recently a Soviet task force visited Cuba in late 1971. A repair and supply facility for both surface vessels and submarines is known to have been established at Cienfuegos, but to date the Soviets, apparently aware of possible US. reaction, have been very careful as to the type of ships which they deploy to the Caribbean and which use the Cienfuegos facility. Other Soviet aims in the Caribbean are similar to its aims elsewhere; to enhance its international prestige and to improve its operational capabilities, Specifically, such activity demonstrates Soviet support for Cuba and increases Soviet prestige in Latin America where it doubtless sees, in the trend toward radical nationalism, an element which will strengthen its position in the area and, over a period of time, draw a number of countries into a pro-Soviet posture. In Chile, the former Christian Democratic administration of Eduardo Frei was offered $50 million in credit by the Soviet Union to modernize the port of Valparaiso, but as far as is known, that credit has never been used. Nbre recently an agreement for use of the port by fishing vessels was reportedly signed, and a similar agreement has been drawn up with Peru, 5 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 CPYRGHT TIME 31 January 1972 Reaching for Supremacy at Sea C INCE early in 1970. U.S. intel- ligence experts have been partic- ularly interested in satellite photos of a ship with an exceptionally long keel being constructed at the big Soviet naval shipyard in the Black Sea port of Nikolayev. In recent months, as the hull began to take shape, the pho- tos disclosed a number of significant details?large shafts for elevators, huge fuel tanks, a flattop deck. Last week some Defense Department experts were finally willing to make a striking prediction: the Soviet navy, which for years scorned U.S. attack carriers as "floating coffins" and "sitting ducks," is now building one of its own. The Pentagon's leak about the mys- terious ship at Nikolayev was obviously limed to coincide with President Nix- on's request for more defense funds. It is possible that the vessel, which is about half complete, may turn out to be a tanker or a big cargo freighter. But some Allied naval experts are al- ready willing to bet that the Pentagon is right, and that the ship really is Rus- sia's first attack carrier (it already has two cruiser-sized helicopter carriers). If so, the decision to build an attack carrier represents a dramatic and fun- damental shift in Moscow's naval strat- egy, with profound consequences for the rest of the world. "It changes the whole ball game," says retired U.S. Commander Robert Waring Herrick, a onetime naval attache in Moscow who wrote the authoritative book, So- viet Naval Strategy. "It could be an event of historical significance that would change the entire mission of the Soviet navy." Throughout its rapid buildup dur- ing the past decade, that navy has re- mained basically a defensive force. Its chief military mission has been to deny the U.S. unrestricted freedom of the seas, especially in waters within Polaris- missile range of the Soviet Union, and to limit U.S. options for inter- vention in areas where the Soviets also have an interest. A decision to build attack carriers, however, would shift the capabilities of the navy from defense to offense. It would show that the Kremlin is determined to extend its own global reach by equipping its navy with seagoing airpower that conic! Alarming Rate. Even without a carrier force, thc psychological and po- litical impact of the Soviet navy is far greater than its actual power and poten- tial would warrant. In terms of firepow- er and megatonnage, the other Russian services are more awesome. Moscow's arsenal of 1,510 nuclear-tipped ICBMs, which outnumber the U.S.'s Minute- men by 3 to 2, remains the major Rus- si arf strategic threat. Its superbly equipped army (2,000,000) is still the biggest worry to the U.S. and its NATO allies in Europe. Russian airpower, which is continually probing the air de- fenses of Western Europe and the U.S. (Britain alone made 300 intercepts of Red bombers last year), is developing at a rapid and alarming rate. On the world scene, though, the Red fleet is the most dramatic and as- sertive manifestation of Russian will and determination to make its pres- ence felt. Russian men-of-war are far more visible symbols of national pow- er than the barely visible contrails of a high-flying jet bomber or the re- mote exploits of a spaceflight. Though the U.S. Navy still holds a sizable edge over the Soviets in firepower, technological prowess and mobility, the Russians have cleverly managed to pro- ject an image of rapidly shifting bal- ance of naval power that has had a sizable impact on much of the world. Brigadier Kenneth Hunt, the deputy di- rector of London's International In- stitute for Strategic Studies, jokingly taunts American friends by saying, "Remember, you still have the second most powerful navy in the world." Moscow's naval buildup began in 1961 as a response to the U.S. de- cision to deploy its Polaris subs with- in missile range of major Russian tar- ' gets. It gained considerable momentum after the Cuban missile crisis; the per- formance of the U.S. Navy convinced the Russians of the political and dip- lomatic value of seapower. Under the brilliant leadership of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov (TIME Cover, Feb. 23, 1968), the Soviet navy has been able , to apply pressure on points that would cause the U.S. the most political dis- comfort. In less than a decade, for in- stance, it has started a sweeping pin- cers maneuver to outflank NATO on contest the U.S.'s dominance at sea. both its southern and northern sec- and more,yffilbias era of competitionasetlonn9WS3/62siat 1"DrhY?,11 antic numbering ose o That coul cAgfitirewteptpitit flew. s between the U.S. arid the Soviet NATO by a 6 to 1 margin, Denmark Tin enn 4 gvs "in I ss bus about continued membership in? an alliance that In times of war could hardly be expected to effectively pro- tect them. In the Mediterranean. Mos- cow's armada now outnumbers the powerful U.S. Sixth Fleet, 61 ships to 40. Not only are Turkey. Greece and Italy uneasy, but Yugoslavia is worried that in the event of a new out- break of fighting in the Middle East, the Russians might try to seize one of its ports on the Adriatic as a base. The strategic value of Yugoslavia as a naval outlet for the Mediterranean heightens the temptation for the Rus- sians to intervene in that country's af- fairs in the uncertain situation that may well follow Tito's resignation or death. Russian warships are frequently at anchor in Egyptian and Syrian ports, in part to inhibit Israel from making air attacks. The Russians are building huge new naval facilities on the Egyp- tian coast midway between Alexandria and the Libyan border. In the event of a new Middle East war, the Soviet fleet might try to blockade Israel, cut- ting it off from possible help from the West?even though such an act could mean a confrontation with the Sixth Fleet. Moscow juStifies its loom- ? ing presence in the eastern Mediter- ranean as a sign of its determination to protect the developing nations from imperialist machinations. Admiral Gorshkov has declared that "the pro- tection of the fraternal and peace-lov- ing peoples of the Arab world is a sacred mission of the Soviet navy." At the Doorstep. In Washington's eyes, a recent ominous development in the Kremlin's naval strategy has been the increase in the number of its ships in the Persian Gulf and the In- dian Ocean. Defense and State De- partment officials believe that sooner or later India, in return for support dar- ing the Indo-Pakistani war, will allow the Russians to construct port facil- ities on its territory, as Egypt has done. (The Indians, who are intensely proud of their own muscular little navy, have persistently denied any such deal.) As a response to the expanding Soviet presence, the U.S. announced that units of the Pacific-based Seventh Fleet would make more frequent pa- trols of the Indian Ocean. That de- 9Uctovankfttnitiont) who fear be lured away from its role as part of Japan's defense. In additinn, _the la CPYRGHT u.s. MEN 460, NAApprzymd IfEars 610,985 000 Attack carriers umilimmoir Helicopter and 10 support carriers Cruisers Destroyers, frigates 214 & destroyer escorts 4-momIMOININI Nuclear-,powered submarines Destroyers, frigates & destroyer escorts Nuclear-powered submarines ralliara Other submarines diameadir 68 Landing craft Other submarines Landing craft Torpedo and missile boats Torpedo and missile boats Fast and Young. In its style and IS comparable in size and speed to e aS etrieni019102niCikApiRr1194119 tirn KVORM2,Ssfmtiiry of, De- might almost have been inspired by 1 Wthably dis- close in testimony to Congress this - week, the Soviets now have in com- mission or under construction 42 Yan- kees. They are adding new ones at a ! present annual rate of twelve a year while the U.S. years ago leveled off its Polaris fleet at 41. The Russians are developing a new 3,000-mile un- dersea missile that would require the construction of an even larger sub. In response to the Soviet buildup, Pres- ident Nixon last week requested funds from Congress for the start of de- velopment of a 5,000-mi. undersea missile called ULMS (for Undersea , Long-Range Missile System). Russia's desire to strengthen its position in un- derwater missile-delivery systems is a -major reason for the hick of progress at . the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Meanwhile, the Soviets arc engaged in buildup of hunter-killer submarines, which the Russians regard as the best - weapon against the Polaris subs. The emergence of Russia as an ocean superpower has touched off a gi- gantic global war game on the seas. Sometimes the game is played with a - dash of old-style chivalry and locker- room humor. As the rival ships ma- neuver, often coming within only me- ters of one another, the commanders exchange congratulatory signals on smart seamanship and derogatory re- marks on poor shows. "Gorshkov wouldn't be impressed with that per- formance," one Sixth Fleet captain re- cently signaled to his counterpart after a particularly awkward maneuver. Sometimes close is too close, and, the warning goes out: "You are interfering with my right of freedom of the seas." Crucial Factor. Russian ships of- ten cut . across the bows of U.S. car- riers as they launch and retrieve air- craft, mostly to ?annoy and distract. But they also come close to learn. As a possible preparation for starting up carrier operations of their own, the So- viets have filmed hours upon hours of U.S. and British carriers in action. Last summer, a Soviet destroyer in the Eastern Mediterranean was rammed and badly damaged by the British carrier that it was watching con- dile( nighttime landings and takeoffs. In time of peace (or at least of non- war), the most important aspect of the high seas game is surveillance, which could be the crucial factor in vic- tory or defeat if a real war broke out. While the Russians deploy a larger sur- veillance fleet of trawlers jampackcd , with electronic gear, U.S. technology is vastly far ahead of its rival's in the highly sophisticated field of submarine detection. Russian subs are what U.S. Navy men call "clankers"; their "Mg- : nature"?the distinct and definable 4.1?11bsigrai Merchant fleet 14Merchant fleet (millions of cl.w. lens) = (millions of d.w. Ions) anese fear that the growth of Soviet naval presence near the Chinese main- land will spur Peking into building up its own navy, and thus trap Japan be- tween two naval powers hostile to each other. The most audacious challenge is taking place almost literally on Amer- ica's own doorstep. Five new Russian subs are now stationed off the U.S.'s East and West Coasts, their nuclear missiles aimed at American targets. During the past two years, Soviet task forces, in conjunction with Cuban na- val units, have conducted antisubma- rine exercises in the Gulf of Mexico, cruising at times to within 30 miles of the U.S. coastline. The Nixon Administration insists that this naval presence in Cuba is not permanent. But U.S. Navy com- manders in the Caribbean believe that the fleet will stay. The Russians have built a modern logistics base at Cien- fuegos on Cuba's south coast that in- cludes three large docks, a deepwater anchorage, repair facilities and, inter- estingly, a radio tower for commu- nicating with subs. Russian fishing ships, merchantmen and oceanic re- search vessels operate from other Cuban ports. "In the 1970s," predicts Robert A. Kilmarx of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, "we may expect to see a Soviet naval presence in the the Russians' most Relent Caribbean undersea the Soviet U ritAllioseitaleasee*S9 9/091102a ss euKeREIR19-0 11 Igagtitagatts.pisronpoelieerr co Mediterranean." kee in American navy parlance, which the prophetic writings of the American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914). who contended that sea- power is essential to a nation's eco- nomic well-being and political prestige. Russia's new approach to the sea, more- over, is not limited to building war- ships. Its merchant fleet is now even with the U.S. in tonnage. Its fishing fleet, which is three times as large as second-place Japan's, provides one-fifth of the country's protein supply. The Soviets have also built up an oceanic research fleet of 200 ships ?larger than the combined research fleets of all other maritime powers. In nearly every major body of water, their sea scientists are plumbing the depths for data on currents, water tem- perature and the sea bed that are vital to fishermen and submariners alike. Although responsible to different chains of command, the commercial and armed navies often work in tan- dem. A visit to a neutral port by a Rus- sian freighter, for instance, may be fol- lowed by a request for docking priv- ileges by a trawler fleet?then by the flag-showing appearance of a rakish, gray-hulled missile cruiser. Russia's navy is divided into four geographically grouped fleets?the Bal- tic, the Northern, the Black Sea and the Pacific?of 270 to 350 vessels each. It is second in overall size only to that of the U.S., and in some categories of ships, it is far ahead (see chart). In gen- eral the Russian ships?which range in size from swift 83.7-ft. Komar missile boats to the 19,200-ton Sverdlov cruis- ers, no longer in production?are fast- er and younger than the U.S.'s (an av- erage of about eight years, v. about 18 for American ships). Fleet for the '80s. The Soviets are developing great momentum. At present, they are outbuilding the U.S. in naval vessels by the impressive ra- tio of 8 to 1. In addition, major Pol- ish and East German builders are pro- ducing merchant ships for Russia, and the Soviets have ordered others from foreign yards from Japan to The Neth- erlands. In the front-line, high-sea naval squadrons, some classes of ship are being replaced by more advanced designs after only eight years of op- erational duty. The Kresta II cruisers (see picture box, next page), whose de- sign is much admired by U.S. naval architects, will apparently be replaced in the near future by the smaller, cheaper but more heavily armed Krivac destroyers. "The Soviets," says British Military Expert John Erickson, "are building a fleet for the '80s." That fleet will certainly include a powerful armada of nuclear-powered, missile-carrying submarines. Currently than that of U.S. submarines. To the CPYRGHT 01194A000200200001 2 great irritAPPAPIVOtifsigks, wnOSC RQI 1 sonar-laden "fishing trawlers" period- ically tear up international cables in - an effort to find America's undersea lis- tening devices, the U.S. has criss- crossed parts of the ocean depths with lines of supersensitive acoustic receiv- ers that pick up, sub sounds (as well as whale songs, grouper grunts, and shrimp Crackles) and flash them to a land-based central computer that can ? instantly identify the vessel's particular signature. In addition to the . cable systems, which arc known as Sostis and Cae- sar. the U.S. also tracks submarines with sonar buoys dropped by aircraft and floating robot platforms that ma- neuver around the ocean surface. Cur- rently under construction, at an initial cost of $1 billion, is an even more so- phisticated system called SAS (for Sus- pended Array System). It consists of a towering triangular frame, its three legs situated ten miles apart. which will rest somewhere in the Atlantic on the abyssal plain, about 16,000 it. below the surface, SAS will take ad- vantage of the oceanic phenomenon that sound travels vast distances hor- izontally through the ocean's chilled lower layers. With ultra-acute hydro- - phones, which will be strung along its structure, SAS will be able to detect sub- marine noises in the deeper reaches throughout the entire Atlantic. A sim- ilar listening system is planned for the Pacific. Bird Farms. In the unlikely event of an outbreak of war, which navy would win? Many U.S. Navy men are no longer so cockily confident of America's overwhelming superiOrity. Says one ranking naval officer: "Take the Mediterranean.. If we lost those two bird farms (attack carriers), we would be in big trouble. It would be the 5-in. gun [the U.S. destroyer's basic weaponj against the 300-mile cruise missile. Sure we might beat them. But it is not certain, particularly RR9199(Pc1,11-dclA,RTP7A. Vice Admiral Gerald E. Miller, commander of the Sixth Fleet. is con- siderably more optimistic. "I'm not running for Gibraltar yet," he says. A "brown shoe" admiral who still wears his pilot's wings, Miller believes that America's air superiority gives his fleet a decisive advantage over the larger Russian flotilla. The Sixth Fleet has about 160 A-6 Intruder and Phantom jets stacked aboard its two attack car- riers, the John F. Kennedy and the In- dependence. Miller's Russian counter- part has only the limited aerial sup- port of fighters and medium bombers at airfields in Egypt. Test of Will. In the event of war, the Soviet navy would be a prisoner of its geography. Ships that were not already at sea might never get there. , With the exception of the Northern Fleet's base at Severomorsk near Mur- mansk, the principal bases of the other three fleets are located in tactically dif- ficult positions. A few hundred well- placed mines in the Kattegat and the Dardanelles would serve to bottle up both the Baltic and Black Sea fleets. In addition to having shallow and of- ten ice-clogged approaches, the Pacific Fleet headquarters at Vladivostok is k cated on the Sea of Japan, which has only four narrow straits opening to the Pacific and is relatively easy to keep under surveillance. The Soviet navy also has some se- vere shortcomings as an offensive force. In view of its growing global role, Brit- ain's Erickson regards it as "over- stretched." It badly needs air cover at sea and more permanent and developed bases near its new areas of operation. Though it might be able to deliver a powerful first blow, the Russian navy still is basically a one-shot outfit that would be virtually defenseless after it had emptied its quivers of missiles and torpedoes. Admiral Gorshkov, who has run the navy for 16 years?considerably longer than the other service chiefs ?is trying to remedy these shortcom- ings. Exactly how far the Soviet Union is prepared to go in its quest for dom- inance of the oceans will become more evident after the mystery ship in Ni- kolayev is completed. If it is indeed an attack carrier, naval experts would then feel that four to eight more must be in the planning stage if each of the major fleets is to enjoy the pro- tection of seaborne aviation. Even so, the carriers could not be truly operational until the end of the decade. It would probably take even longer to acquire proficiency in the complex business of running the float- ing airfields. If the carriers are any- thing like the ship at Nikolayev, they are only in the 30,000-ton range. They would be no match for the nuclear- powered 75,700-ton Enterprise apd the other big U.S. carriers. Still, the creation of a carrier fleet would be a test of Russia's intentions in decades ahead. The cost of building even one is so enormous and the re- quirements are so taxing for the already strained Soviet technological capacity that this decision must have ranked in the minds of the Soviet leaders as a crucial and historic choice. Moscow's political strategy holds that the out- come of the struggle between capital- ism and Communism will be decided not by a clash between the U.S. and the Soviet Union but by the ability of the respective superpowers to create dis- sent among their opponent's allies and to exert influence upon the uncommit- ted nations. Russian policy toward Western Europe and Moscow's treaties with Egypt and India seem to bear out that theory. For the U.S. it would be a stunning irony of the nuclear age if such traditionally old-fashioned objects as naval ships should serve as the force that helped to tip the balance of power away from the world's most technolog- ically advanced nation. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 t/.5 RAVI CPYRGHT soviAPAtivieicMositei.crwtww. ontaii-10921,9-01194A000200200001-2 Bock to-back search radar SAM control radar SAM launcher tietwopter pod Surveillance radar . SAM control radar Surtacelto-surface missile launcher 171.11. %Ow irs?b. geik Ise 7,4 sos 41, 4.1.6" Or ON A ies Op Al 41. A? tho Or d's - 'strict& 1141* t A.. 40,? 4. A A AL ? A A - at. es; .104, %, doe; SAM launcher - ma; I ADEN with a fearsome array of L missiles and electronic gear, the two operational Krestei If-class guided-mis- sile cruisers Felled the skill of Soviet naval architects in muting the max- imum punch in the smallest package. Equipped to operate without long range air cover, the 6.000-ton Kresta II has a crew of 500 and a cruising speed or 33 knots. It carries one pair of surface-to-air missile launchers for- ward and another aft, each pair with its individual radar-guidance and lire- control unit. Towering atop the Kres- The Sailor's Life ta II is its big Top Sail surveillance radar, designed to spot enemy ships and planes. One back-to-back search radar unit tracks targets for Kresfa Il's principal weapons: eight t surface-to- surface missiles housed in tubes on ei- ther side of hc ship's bridge. The missiles reportedly have a range of 150 miles anc can carry either con- ventional or nuclear warheads. On a landing platform aft, the Kresia It can accommodate two helicopters, which arc used' for submarine detection and act as tar#t spotters for missiles. THE life of the average Soviet sailor?at least by com- parison with that of his counterpart in the U.S. Navy ?is austere, uncomfortable, constrained and boring. Some U.S. experts feel that if American sailors had to live under the same conditions, they would all mutiny. Despite the sleek, functional modernity of their lines, Soviet ships are not designed for living. Ar- maments and electronic equipment take up all avail- able space, and 20 Russians must hang their hammocks in quarters that would house ten U.S. sailors.. Few Rus- sian ships have air conditioning. Thus vessels on duty in tropical waters are frequently rotated not so much for maintenance as to provide relief for "roasted crews." At the bitterly cold bases of the Northern and Pacific fleets in Murmansk, Vladivostok and the Kamchatka Pen- insula, crews spend uncomfortable winters ashore in badly heated, uninsulated barracks. Nonetheless, Soviet sailors are among the elite of Russia's armed services, ranking in prestige with the men of the missile forces. Although there are periodic shortages of staple foods in Russia, sailors have a plen- tiful but monotonous diet of borsch, meat, potatoes, bread, butter and tea, supplemented by vitamin pills to make up for the absence of fresh fruit and vegetables, chance to visit foreign lands on shore leave, but even The base pay of a seaman is six rubles per month then their liberty is severely restricted. Sailors travel in (about $7). Sailors on duty at northern bases get an ad- groups of six while ashore, under the supervision of an of- ditional two rubles per month, and base pay is doubled ficer; seldom do they have enough money for anything for submarine crews. A specialist, like a sonar tech- more than the price of a sandwich and a bus trip back nician, earns about $10 per month, a chief warrant of- to port. ficer about $55, a lieutenant $65 and a captain $135, Aboard ship, the sailor is even more subject to dis- which is doubled if he commands a ship. There are enor- cipline and ideological indoctrination than his civilian mous differences between the life-styles and privileges brothers at home. "Recreation time" is filled with Corn- of the various ranks. Officers above the rank of corn- munist Party lectures, propagandistic books and films. mander, for instance, are provided with housing near TV shows visible in foreign ports are often banned as bases for their families; enlisted sailors?mostly three- "corrupting." Ashore or at sea, the sailors' activities are year conscripts who quit the service for jobs at home closely watched by the ship's zampolit (political of- when thqir enforced tqui? are gndcd?get neither a hous- flee r) a combination cheerleader, disciplinarian and f a- ing nor Aipligif WiMalieGfr imeased 999/09/02 :tlethOPIRDP7890111194A000201000Gtinin, Unlike most of their countrymen, the sailors get a with full authority to punish any wayward salt. RUSSIAN SEAMEN RELAXING ABOARD CRUISER 4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200897GHT CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 7 February 1972 .7r 0 o J /11? ilfaT ?AL A 2:7.5 eltratePTIC paWe? pagltiOn ? It .4:J) Bandar Abbas, Iran ? Big-power naval politics, in the wake of the Indo-Pakistani war. and Britain's with- drawal from the Persian Gulf, have moved this subtropical port into the spotlight of strategy. Iran's 1p00-man Navy ? already the strongest ia the gulf and now building a strike force of destroyers, frigates, and hovercraft ? will shortly move its main headquartefs here from Khorramshahr, 1,500 miles to the north on the Shatt al-Arab river boundary with Iraq. Up to now these subordinate naval head- quarters have kept watch on the gulf islands and on the area beyond in the Gulf of Oman, adjoining Pakistan'. - The impending move of the main Iranian naval headquarters here from Klierrarn- shahr, where it is within rifle shot of Iraqi territory, reflects more than just the peren- nial and recently sharpened Iraq-Iran ten- sions. Clearly a shift It is clearly a shift in the entire center of gravity of Iranian Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi's cld(ense effort southward toward .the Strait of tIformUz?through which more than half the Western world's oil supplies must 'pass?and toward the Indian Ocea.n, Where tar& American and Soviet fleets have been watching one , another since Decern- ber's Inclopkistani war. .' ObServett,. here:believe the next Iranian port to bd developed will be the (excellent natural h4rbor of Shah Bahr on the Ara- bian .Sea (theta htitidred miles from the Pakistan border.... ??????? Iranian ?Officcia .ih this booming city of :70,000?where Iran is using its huge oil revenues to build an air and naval base. low-cost tesusing for the growine labor force, and-twill soon begin a naval dockyard ?are well aware of the new emphasis, But therOseems to be no feeling here of an impending Arab-Iranian clash or of any other emertency in the Persian Gulf area. "We are wit. particularly worried just now about an eticiny getting control of Oman," said one ollicer. . Xs:lands occupied One reason for Iranian self-confidence is recent Iranian possession of the islands of Abu Musa and Big and Little Tunb, west ' of here. Iranian marines occupied Abu Musa and 13ig Tunb despite a wave of-Arab protest and Iraqi diplomatic action. cilaliT.1:404#0001104Ktelt99/09/02 5 In the gulf. Formerly, our 12-mile territorial waters exi.ended Oulwant trom our coastime and au, ,,aa..1 eat( 1,51a such as L+a- vancma, Farur, and Iiindarabi. "Now, the chann*el between Qeshm Island and the outer islands, Abu Musa and the two Tunbs, has become indisputably Iranian territorial waters. "Of course, the right of innocent passage by all ships through these waters is recog- nized. But this does not include warships, for which there have to be special clear- ances and arrangements." Statements studied The Shah's government has been care- iully studying U.S. and Bahraini stateme about U.S. naval rights in Bahrain. In an exchange of letters, the Sheikh of Bahrain agreed with Washington to continue port facilities extended to U.S. naval unit: during the last 25 years, while Bahrain was under British protection. Bahrain denies that it granted the U.S. any new base rights since it became independent last year. ? U.S. officials repeatedly have been assur- ing Iran and Arab governments that Wash- ington has no wish to take over Britain's former senior naval and political role here. These assurances were given formally by the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia, Roger ' Davies, during a gulf tour in December, shortly after Iran's occupation of the three outer islands. Settlement urged Diplomatic sources say he urged a dis- creet diplomatic settlement of the disputed three outer islands. U.S. overtures were made to Iran and, through Saudi Arabia, to the Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah, which claims the Tunb islands. Washington also reportedly proposed its good offices in settling an old dispute over :he Buraimi oasis area, which is partitioned between Oman and Abu Dhabi, but also claimed by Saudi Arabia. Sultan Qabbus of Oman visited King Fai- sal of Saudi Arabia in late December. They announced agreement in principle on Burai- mi. But the United States is reportedly re- placing the British in representing Abu Dhabi in detailed talks to follow, to the an- noyance of Saudi Arabia. The senior U.S. diplomatic mission in the gulf area is the Embassy in Kuwait. A new Embassy in Bahrain is headed by U.S. charge d'affaires John Tatch. The U.S. Em- bassy to the new six-state Federation of Arab Emirates will he in its capital Abu : CIA-Rbla791-0,t Dhabi and a ecmitimo4 404 Oman. 1-2 poroyed For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 NUSANT 'ujakarta 28 January 1972 ARAB LANDS SUSPICIOUS OF THE SOVIET UNION By A.H. Shahab CPYRGHT ? "Egypt will not go comMunist and we will strangle any effort to bring the life." This was what an Egyptian diplomat told me in Djakarta. This statement by the diplomat is. indicative of Egypt's annoyance, for Egypt feels that its lack of success in winning the war against Israel is due to the hesitant attitude of the Kremlin. The general attitude in the Arab world toward the role played by the Soviet Union was quite evident following the India-Pakistan war, for nearly all of the Arab press criticized the "policy of imperialistic intrigue" of Mbscow. ? "Russia is an aggressor and opposes Islam" -- this was the title of . articles and editorials in the. dailies AnNadwah; \1-Madinah, and'AlBilad, which are published in Saudi Arabia. Setback .Soviet diplomacy really experienced a setback following the abortive coup d'etat in the Sudan (1971) and the large-scale arrests of Communist leaders in Syria by General Hafes Asad at the end of 1971. The failure of the . communists in the Sudan was followed by the suppression of communist elements not only in the Sudan but also in Libya, North Yemen, Morocco', and in Egypt -- Where there was also an attempted pro-Nbscow coup d'etat under Ali Sabry. The most diligent anti-communist is Prime Ndnister Muammar Qaddafi, who has prohibited, the circulation of a communist book defaming Islam which was written by Klimovich. Last year Qaddafi convened the Conference of Islamic Scholars. Here he said, "Our religion,. Islam, is far more progressive than communism. Islam was teaching the fulfillment of life and the happiness of . man long before Mark. We do not need communism, or another party which is obedient to a foreign power." Faisal's Victory When between 1960 and 1967 the Kremlin wind blew across the barren stretches of the Arab Sahara and heated the minarets of the mosque, Faisal constantly declared that danger lay in the Soviet role in the Arab world. Official voices in Saudi[Arabia declared, "Russia will not bring victory to the Arabs but to communism in the Arab ,world." Now, one by one, the Arab states Are encountering disappointment in their relations with the communist bloc. Some, like Iraq, Egypt, and Algeria, have had hitter experiences in the industrial sector because of accepting machinery of poor quality. Some have been subjected to political pressure: Egypt was pressed to free or at least change the sentences of the Ali Sabri--Fawzy conspirators who plotted to overthrow Sadat. The rapprochement between Egypt and Saudi Arabia has resulted in warm' relations between the two countries and now Egypt is more active in Islamic conferences than in leftist conferences. Even more, the E Ae tiamysfs and publtIppriiitedaF003ilielagem$999i0N92agtRagg9tifilit Pi l! with401-2 religious tenor are being produced. 6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200Mq9NT Anti-Islam Campaign h0111.e two or three months ago the dailies in Saudi. Arabia exposed Soviet attacks on Islam, covering both the Moscow broadcasts which.defame Islam and also the condition of the Moslem population behind the Iron Curtain. For some time most of the press in Saudi Arabia has paid little attention to the condition of the Moslem population behind the Iron Curtain, but now articles on this subject appear regularly. Soviet dailies, like the Turkmen- skaya Iskra, which attacks Islamic principles, are opposed. The dailies 'An- NadWah and Al-Madinah have revealed how Moslems are pressured and forced ET leave the Islamic religion. The young prime minister of Libya certainly was angry when Soviet books defaming Islam were circulated in his country. This colonel said, "We don't need communism." Trapped The Soviet naval forces and fleet are making the Mediterranean into their own lake, and they are not having much difficulty in doing it. One of the recipes they use is: Maintain tension and don't reach a settlement in the Middle East. The existence of a state of permanent tension has lured several Arab countries into obtaining aid, but the fact is that this aid is for (the Soviets) themselves. The Arab countries are beginning to realize this even though it is rather difficult to change overnight, although Algeria and Libya did succeed early on in freeing themselves from the Soviet trap and dared to say, "Soviets, leave the Mediterranean." Anwar El Sadat, a pragmatist, gradually is loosening his ties with, the Kremlin and has begun purging his apparatus of pro-Moscow-men'even though, he still needs weapons from the Kremlin because, until now', it is his only source of supply. Alab Tjurigai Sovjet Uni A.H. SHAHAB: CPYRGHT "Mesir tak akan djad) komu Setback. nis dan apabila adv. usaha Diplomasi Soviet benar2 me rnenghidupkan partai komunis ngalami Setback, setelah usa- akan kita tjeltik". demikian ha kudeta gagal di Sudan berkata seorang diplomat Mr (1971) dan pentangkapan besar2 sir pad?a saja di Djakarta. an terhadap pentolan komunis Utjapan diplomat itu menggam di Syria oleh Djenderal 1-infes barkan kedjenkelan Mesir L.; Asad diachir tahun 1971. Ke selama mi merasa dirinja tak gagalan kau.m komunis di Su berhasil memenangkan peran.g clan diikuti dengan penindasan terhadap Israel, disebakkan Si' anasir komunis ,bukan hanja kap ragu2 Kremlin. . di Sudan tetapi djuga di Libya Sikap umum didunia Arab Jaman Utara,' - Marokko dan terhadap peranan tint Soviet Mesir, jang djuga mengalami terasa seltall setelah perang pertjobaan kudeta pro-Moskow India-Pakistan, ?dimana ham, dibawah All Sabry. pir senma pers Arab menglcri tik "politilt intri kimperialistis" Moslcow. "Rusia agressor dan anti Is lam" dernikian djudui berita2 dan tadjuk rentjana harian ? Jang paling getol anti-komn nis adalah PM Muammar Qad duff, jang melarang bereclarnja buku komunis karangan klime vich jang menghina Islam. Pa d,a tahun jang lalu Qadclafi An-Naciwah, Al-Madinah dan inenjelenggralcan Muktamar Al-BiIad jang Approve4lForfte4ease4999/09102a: Arabia. berkata : "Agama kita, cljauh lcbith progressif .darina da komunisme. Islam monga cljarkan kescmpurnaan hidup, kebahagian ummat ?djauh sebe lum Marx. Kita tak butuh lto munisme, atau partai lain jang taut pada kekuatan asing. Kemenangan Ketika antara 1960-19,07, Angin Kremlin menghembusi padang sahara Arab jang ger sang dan membuat menara2 Mesdjid mendjadi gerah, Fai- sal terus tak henti2nja menja taltan bahwa peranan Sovjet didunia Arab adalah berbaha ja. Suara2 resmi Saudi Arabia rnenjatakan bahwa : "Jang akan dimenangkan Rusia bu- katilali Arab, melainkan- Itoniu nisme diciunia Arab". Kini satu demi satu negcri Arab mengalami pengaltamnn caatiiik9IMAXixia laman pahit dibidang indusiri, ripngarr n-trn.arirng rnecin9 ignr djelek ? kwalitasnia separli Irak, Mesir clan Alcijazair. Ada jang menerima tekanan2 non tik seperti Mesir, jinn! ?clitylcan agar memlyibaskan atau paUng tidak merubah hukuman lerha dap Icomplotan jang alt:nn menggulint-r,kan Sadat dibawah komplotan Ali Sabri-Pawzv. Ranrocherne.n Mesr-Satidi, rnembut hubu.ngan lce(l'ua nrtqa ra hil mesra don Mesir kini lebih giat dalam muktamar2 Islam darirada muktamar2 jg berbau kin. Malahan pars dan 'penerbitan2 Mesir kini barials dihiasi tartikel agama rta jproduksi filmnja penuh sclera keagamaan. Kampanje anti-Islam. Kira2 dua tiga bulan 'hula kangan mi harian2 Saudi Ara okimbur4et t gungekririci pk aan he Ir- lam. Balk bcrupakan siarrin2 MrvArrvur inn?. .mnr,g1lin, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-R0P79-01194A000200200001-2 CPYRGHT itaupun kea dam ummat Ts1rn- ang berada dibelakang tirai lesi. Sedjak lama. urnumnia per 5audi -Arabia talc begitu meng airaukan keadaan ummat Is- arn dibelakang- tircl besi. na mun kini setjara perioclik kca (lama ummat IsIrm mendiacli. topic. Harian2 Sovjet seperti "Turkmenskaya Iskra" jang menjerang akidah2 Islam, dila wan.- Marian An-Nadvrah dan Al-Marlinth mengungkapkan 11,-telms?na keaclaan Muslimin ditCcan clan dipaksakan tmtuk meninggalkan agama Islam. Kernan saclia PM Libya jang: mucla marah2 ketilca dinegeri? nja ,disebarkan buku2 Sovjet; jang ? menghint: Islam dan ber katalah kolonel itu : "Kita tak butuh komunisme". Terdjebuk. Koltuatan taut Soviet dan madmija mendjadikan lautan. Tengah sebagai danaunja, dgn tak banjak usaha atau bersti Sala pajah. Salm resep clipakai nia adalah : "relihara kete- gangan tanpa penjelesatan di Timur Tengah". Dengan .ada- nja ketegangan penmanen, ma Ica dlcuiratnja beberapa negeri Arab untuk mendapatkan ban tuari, tetapi njatanja bantuan itu hanjalath bunt dirinja sen din. Dan negara2 Arab mulai ,menjadari mi, walaupun agak nia sukar untuk merubah se- kaligus, ketjuali misalnja Al- cljar.air dan Libya jang sudah Ingi2 berhasil melormsken rh ri dari diebskart Sovjet clan berani berkata : "Soviet ting:. galkartlah Lautan Ten gab". Anwar El Saciat jang MCrli pakan orang pragmatis, setlara berialrap mengcndorkan ikat- an2 dengan. Kremlin, dimuall clenrian pembersihan aparatur dan i orang2 pro Moskow, na- num dia masih buttth sencliata dari Kremlin karena hinega nt masih merupaltan satu2nJti sumber. NEW YORK TIMZS 17 January 1972 CPYRGHT Warships at Latakia Upset Shipping and Arab Trade tpwai o ne Neve Yora Toles BEIRUT, Lebanon, Jan. 16? A visit by units or the 'fleet in the Mediterranean to. .the Syrian port of Latakia has played havoc with Arab trado and affected international_ ship- ping in this area. Since late last month, two Soviet destroyers, two cruisers, a submarine and a supply ship have been taking up much of the space in the small Latakia Harbor, forcing Syrian authori- ties to turn away gome privatel shipping and to divert other vessels tn neighboring Lebanon,' to the already congested port of Beirut. Foreign owners of the af- fected ships have complained that the situation has upset RUSSIANS PROLONG. SYRIAt PORT GALL their worldwide selicaules aria aused costly delays. According bo shipping sources, the situa- tion for the companies has been rendered worse by the fact that die Syrian authorities have said, Ii reply to inquiries, that they o not know how long the So- ?ief naval craft intended to rc- iiai i in Latakia. Pr Mous Visits Were Shorter Ti the past, such visits (lid not last more than five days. ionte diplematic sources have ?ep nted that the Soviet units on the currtnt port call are either in6Tgoing repairs or buying monlies from Syria for the rest )f the winter. 'like Egypt, has been no riding, Soviet warships in the ViefliterrNnean with facilities at ler ports in part payment for 5o% let .assistance, including we: pons, The Beirut port authorities tat e accepted the extra business thaL has come their way, but sinx diverted hero from Lata- kia have had to dock outside tile pier ared kind ..1. their turn. Workers and officials at the port have been put on dou- ble shifts to accommodate the added work load. Most of these ships are bring- ing commodities from Europe' or the United States for Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf countries. Diversion of the unloading from Syria to Leba- non means extra transit costs and delays for the Arab im- porters. Meanwhile, press reports to- day told of the arrival here of 40 Chinese Communist business- men to promote commodities from their country In Lebanese and Arab markets. According to the reports, the Chinese will form a commercial community in advance of the establishment of an embassy representing the Peking Gov- ernment here. The embassy is expected to be functioning either at the end of this month or early next month. An agree- ment in November establishing diplomatic relations between CPYRGHT luLo..),,ft and Ch" 'months as a deadline for set- tin up embassies. 4 '1 ? y ? Latakia" SYRIA *Horns eDanzscus ielsradkowpia. tynAct. Tho Now York Thou/Jan. 11. T472 Visit to Latakia (1) by Soviet ships has diverted port traffic to Beirut (2). THE ECONOMIST 15 January 1972 A vacuum that's filling up fast CPYRGHT The Americans may have rescued Mr Heath from his problem about selling arms to South Africa. The American Aircraft-carrier Enterprise and its seven attendant !hips, which sailed into the Indian Ocean during the India- Pakistan wgEknoroxirtej RCI rtirriTR:e woo 3tviiuLIi I Lt iii hc p S woo But on January 7th it was announced that thel Enterprise had gained " operatin ' experience " in the Indian Ocean ai1 that there would be fre- quent pa 'ols of the same sort in the future..Tlip Seventh Fleet already had q bin sliy. of the eastern part of the maigwava; A IAA D !V&A, *1 domain. But last summer, it is .said It was decided to extend its responsi bilities (rim the start of 1972 up to line drawn due south from the western border of Pakistan. For a long time the United State has had three warships operating ou 94401002Mo sit_pahrain in tlw u , dnJ t at lhl..itin *i d Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00020020094AGHT pendent the Americans have nego- tiated a new agreement to allow them to stay on. The Americans have already leased from Britain the tiny atoll .of Diego Garcia, plumb in the middle of this vast ocean, and are busy building a communications centre and airstrip which are due .to be finished late next ear, The difference from now on is that the: Seventh Fleet will pre- sumaltiv send some of its ships into the Indian Ocean whenever it feels that the gap between the size of the Russian Beet there and that of the western navies is getting dangerous... According to American intelligence sources, the Russians now have some 15 combat and support ships in the area, and an unknown number of. submarines, against the five or six' British frigates which are based in Singapore along with one Australian and one New Zealand frigate and an Australian submarine. Australia is building a fairly sub- stantial base at Cockburn Sound on its west coast, which will be com- pleted by 1975. There .are also several airfields in western Australia that mari- time reconnaissance planes can operate from. So eventually Australia will be able to make a sizeable contribution to the defence of the area even if Mr Cough Whitlarn's Labor party does win this year's eleotion and fulfil its promise to withdraw the Australian share of the force in Singapore. But in the shorter run it is the new Ameri- can, contribution that will cancel out the Russians' advantage. With the Seventh Fleet coming in reinG,ree the British rciursdre.. Singapore, the Russians will no longer have local naval superiority unless they greatly expand their presence in the :Indian Ocean. This makes it less necessary for the British to rely on the co-operation of the tiny and increas- ingly ?ancient South African navy. Anyway,- in December South Africa placed orders for the hulls of six cor- vettes to be built in Portugal that will keep the South African navy going for some years. But the unpalatable fact is that the weakness of the British? and the other Europeans?has made . it necessary for the United States to redress the balance of power in the Indian Ocean at a time when most Americans want to limit their com- mitments abroad, not expand them. WASHINGTON POST 2 February 1972 CPYRGHT U.S. Seeking Indian Ocean aval Cm's By William Greider The Nixon administration has approached the Soviet Union about arranging a mutual limit on naval arma- ments in the Indian Ocean, a top State Department of- ficial disclosed yesterday. Without providing any details, Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson assured the Senate Foreign Re- lations Committee that the' U.S. government has no inten- tion of competing over mill- tary installations on the South Asian subcontinent, compar- able to what has occurred in the Mediterranean. Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D- Ark.), chairman of the commit- tee, asked Johnson: "Has your department ever approached the Russians concerning mu- tual restraint on the naval race in the Indian Ocean?" "We have made such an ap- proach," Johnson said. "There have been discussions." Johnson added that, while the United States will continue to keep its navgyfiskeewed Ing through the WonnlOfcean regularly, "We do not plan a regular presence in the Indian' Ocean. ... We have no inten- tion of engaging in competi- tion or maintaining a regular force." The question arose out nf the Senate committee's fear that the United States is again inching into major new de- fense commitments via "exec- utive agreements" which are not submitted to the senate for ratification as treaties. The hearings yesterday and today focus on two new agree- ments for U.S. military facili- ties, one with Portugal to renew an airbase on the Azores and another to estab- lish naval support facilities on the oil-rich island of Bahrain in the Persian Gulf. Johnson, in his testimony, insisted that both were properly handled as executive agreements because neither involves any new Ainerican defense commit - significant foreign policy moves. They both involve the stationing of American mili- tary forces abroad. As we have learned in the past, this can lead ultimately to war." Case is sponsoring a Senate resolution which would call pn the President to submit both issues to the Senate as treat- ies. , This represents a new round in the Senate's continu- ing struggle, so far largely un- successful, to regain control over foreign commitments under its constitutional au- thority to ratify treaties. Last year, the Foreign Rela- tions Committee challenged a new agreement on U.S. bases in Spain. In recent years, the committee has scrutinized se- cret executive agreements with Asian nations and their close relationship to the con- duct of the war in Vietnam. 2t T Johnson u ed ien r For Release 1999/09/0gelAifPP9414%A0e&Yeastptd;at- rain k agreements are es.sen- 9 N.J.) warned, however, that tially continuations of current both Azreentents drenresent u.o. practices anti nut witmn CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999109/02 ? rIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 the President' constitutional, authority as commander-in- chief to arrange for troop fa- cilities. Sen. Jacob Javits (R.-N.Y.) asked Johnson if this means the President can station troops anywhere in the world, without consulting the Con- gress, and the diplomat replied: "The powers are very. broad. I would not like to be quoted as saying they are un- limited. At the same time, I would not want to say where those limits are." Fulbright remarked testily, I"For practical purposes, that amounts to?he can do any- thing he likes. You don't want to say that because it won't look good in a headline." The Bahrain agreement, Johnson said, was necessary because the United States for- merly "subleased" docking and supply facilities from the British who are terminating their protective military pres- ence in the sheikdom. Now the United States is continuing the arrangement for a "mod- est naval presence" directly with the Bahrain government but he stressed "we have no ihtention of replacing the Brit- ish in the area. We are not in- creasing our force." Sen. Fulbright portrayed the arrangement as the begin- ning of another costly round of escalation in which, now that the United States has es- tablished a base, the Soviets will follow, and then the 'United States will seek to out- do the Russians. "What do we gain by this constant escala- tion?" he asked. "I don't think we gain anything in security.: All we do is deplete the Treas- ury." Johnson was asked what' would happen if U.S. person- nel stationed in Bahrain were attacked by nationals there)) and he replied: "If trouble! were to break out on Bahrain and oUr personnel , were: threatened, the thing to do! would be to put them on a ship and sail away." WASHINGTON POST 11 January 1972 CPYRGHT U.S. Squadron Leaves The Indian Ocean Area A carrier-led naval task force that maintained a strong! ,U.S. presence in the Indian lOcean for nearly a month dur- ing the India-Pakistan war I steamed out of the area yes- f terday, the Pentagon an- nounced. Defense spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim said the nine- . ship squadron, including the nuclear-powered carrier Enter- prise, has "returned to normal operating control of the com- mander, Seventh Fleet." He said the Enterprise is 'due to arrive Wednesday at Subic Bay in the Philippines where the crew will be given five days of liberty after spending two months at sea. Last week the 'Pentagon in- dicated that the visit of the En- terprise marked the beginning of regular U.S. naval opera- ? tions in the Indian Ocean. This is something that has been urged by U.S. naval lead- ers ever since 'the British began pulling out and the Rus- sians sent their first naval ' squadron into the area more than three years ago. The departure of the Enter- prise came rather suddenly. As of Friday, "they had not been directed to move," Fried- heim said. Asked why, he re- plied, "liberty for the crew.' Friedheim said 15 to 20 So- viet ships remain in the In- dian Ocean, including five or I' six combat vessels. The Sovi- ets normally maintain 10 or 12 , ships in the area. ? CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 11 January 1972 . WUU?? lake? By Paul Wohl CPYRGHT Tim &via inediu ure avcusing he United States of gunboat diplomacy and of trying to turn the Indian Ocean into an American , lake. From recent Russian naval movements, however, it would appear that it is. Moscow that regards the Indian Ocean as a Soviet' lake. On Dec. 29, Hsinhua, the official Chinese news agency, reported, "When the Ameri- can aircarft carrier Enterprise and some other warships of the 'United States Seventh, Fleet appeared in the Bay of Bengal, the So-4 viets countered by moving cruisers and 'other warships of their Pacific fleet also into the Bay." Approved For Relea 'Intelligence gathering ;fishing, is are their large factory ships The Soviet Pacific Fleet is not normally in 'in proceising the catch. But since every the Indo-China area, so the new units must ,economie activity of the U.S.S.R. is directed have come from the China Sea ser ..:ral thou., by the state, it is only natural that the sand miles away. Thus it would appear that fishing tiffpt acts as an auxiliary to naval 1n the Russians must have had advance knowl- telligened operations. edge and have reacted with surprising The Soviets also have had, and still speed. ? have, several oceanic scientific research 1 The mobility of the Soviet fleet and its ships in the Indian Ocean. These, too, prob. ' speed of communications may have its ably are used for naval intelligence. explanation in the presence in the Indian ( According to the Chinese news agency, ' Ocean of naval vessels disguised as fishing. the Soviet Union in 1968 purchased from , trawlers. India against delivery of the number of air. 1 For several years, -the Soviets have been craft a right for their naval vessels to use ' reaping the fish riches of the Indian Ocean. ithe ports of Madras and Bombay. In ex. , gVii 9 rine/Aim migyet ini MA tibraiblp use. India's naval ' ileilso gave several x7;Mr';':1311111PAPrtiNiTriftwarmfA n r uvA iTt It Few JI/ !!,' Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00020020000Y-P2YRGHT ? naval ships to India, Moscow makes no bones about its interest in the Indian Ocean, Last year, the cruisers of the Soviet Pacific fleet carried out a naval exercise there. Earlier, Adm. Sergei G. Gorshkov, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, said, "Our ships sail in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans . ? wherever it is required by the interest of otir country's security." A political chief of the Soviet Navy, Adm. ,Vladimir A. Kasatonov added defiantly on Navy Day that "the flag of the Soviet naval forces is today flying in all latitudes, even on waters traditionally considered as pre serve of the British and American navies.' Now that Britain no longer controls the most convenient access to the Indian' Ocean-..through the Suez Canal and by way of Singapore?the Indian Ocean for all prac- tical purposes has become an open sea. Its coastlands which once were in the, Western orbit now are held largely by third- world countries. China, as well as the Soviet, Unioti, has begun to establish strong points along its shores. The Indian Ocean carries more traffic' than the North Atlantic. The defense of its supply lines is thus vital for the West. Naval visits For the past six years units of the Soviet Black Sea and Pacific fleets have appeared . from time to time in the Indian Ocean visit- ing almost every country from thp Gulf rif Aden and the Arabian Sea down to Mom- basa and Zanzibar. Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, serves several routes which either have relay stations or terminate in Indian Ocean ports. During the recent Indo-Pakistani conflict the Soviet Union, according to the Japanese paper Mainichi Shimbun, airlifted large quantities of weapons to India. According to another Japanese newspa- per, Yomiuri Shimbun, "The prevailing Indo-Pakistan situation offered Moscow a golden opportunity to realize its Indian Ocean strategy," which is to Use India as a "pawn" to ensure a passage through the Win" (1"'n fr expaulen 3',U. .t Asia. NEW YORK TIItES CPYRGHT 8 January 1972 CPYRGHT 11 British Go, Maltese Ask, Who'll Help Us? By PAUL HOFMANN Sccia I TM New Ycrk VALLETTA, Malta, Jan. 7 72"yal Nem/ hulli_upLerg" dangling heavy bundles have been busy over this island In the last few days. Royal Air Force transport planes have been sitting at Luqa Airport and hundreds of fam- ilies of British military per- sonnel have been packing amid arguments . The Talk -DIneq PO aql up ?pumaq ?AUDI 02 3cqm puu jJO Aialta TP s oi arum Jano mcnts of Valletta small knots of Maltese have been standing day after day, staring glumly at the British cruiser Blake lying 200 feet below in the Grand Harbor. "I just can't believe they're pulling out," an elderly man said. "I hope there'll he an agreement at the last minute. If the British leave we'll have an awful lot of unemploy- ment . here. Who'll help us? ? The Russians? The, Arabs?" Despite the possibility that negotiations might still be reopened, Operation Exit was already under way. "It is not our naem," said eftar Adm. John Templeton-Cotill, commander of British forces in Malta, 3,500 men in all. "It's Mr. Mintriff's." Mr. Mintoff, the short sulphuric Prime Minister of this island state five times the size of Manhattan has in- deed coined his own sarcastic code name for the British_, withdrawal. OnAppromeu set Jan. 15 as at deadline by which the British forces niest. leave necause London had rejected his demand for a $45-million annual rental for military bases. nit 1,-t effrr h Britain and the North Atlan a Treaty Organization, after lengthy, pokrrline bargaining was for a $5-million annual ent and some supplementa pay- mens. Mr. Mintoff said no and 14andon announ ed that it would recall its r mining forces?the fleet left in 1969, five years after MaR became fully independent?b March 15,1 NATO maintains that it does not really need Malta's facilities and defers to the British. The alliance' South- ern Naval Command, ?rifler- iy here, was transf red to Now, it secni:;, to time has come for the itish to go. "Fifteen days to get out after we have been ere for 170 years," Admiral emple- ton-Cotill mused in n offi- cers mess still hu g with r Christmas deocratio s. "We are acting out a v ry sad story." In Aden, Singapor, , Libya and other places fro which Britain has recentl with- drawn her military p sence, he explained, there lid been hardly any contact th the local population. Bu Malta was different?"here ehave deep roots." A real-egtate agen said: 'Can you imagine. at it means for a tiny entry with 320,000 populatioi when 3,500 decently pal c ? ? 4 /641102 cincMs?imm-e than 10,000 people altoget InaM, A er Duv a $20,000 home overlooking the sea at half that price?" The spending power of the British forces and their de- pendents is placed at nearly $40-million annually. The possible loss is just one of the many problems faced by Mr. Mintoff, a Socialist. Right after his Labor party won a one-seat majority in Parliament in ? the election last June and he was back in power for the first time in 13 years, he had to ration butter and milk. Now the new Miami-style hotels with their heated swimming pools just west of here on St. Julian's Bay are nearly empty al- though there is plenty of sun- shine. 30,000 British Residents On the other hand there are still 30,000 British civil- ians living permanently in the tax haven on these wind- swept islands?Malta, Gozo and Comino?which lack any rivers and mountains, and have only a few trees but do have 300 Roman Catholic Churches. The 1600 policemen look more genuinely British than London bobbies these days. Restaurants still serve the joint with two vegs, both limp. Tea is excellent and coffee abominable. The Maltese still queue up for their buses with a disci- pline totally unknown in nearby Italy. However, the "Cinderella" pantomime, used to make $251 day, but most of this island's 200 taxis will be idle now. Three of my girls married British boys and the fourth an American from Cincinnati, so you can imagine how I feel." Frank Brizzi, a bartender at a British club, said: "My wife has been worrying for months?will I keep my job or lose it?" Joe Robbins, a Royal Air Force ground crew- man, said: "It's kind of hard on the wife?I married a Maltese girl, you know. She has been to England only once for a week and we don't know where we are going to live." The British Government pre- pared this week to fly out more than 5,000 women and children by Jan. 15. The five schools for the 1,800 British children were closed last week. The British informed Malta that they would withdraw the military forces "with all reasonable speed" but did not feel bound by Mr. Mintoff's deadline. Britain contends that her $12-million payment in September covered use of the bases until March. "If the British didn't pull out now, they would have to pull out in three or four years," a trade-union official who backs Mr. Mintoff said. "It's inevitable." "For years," he continued, "we have been told that the :auttiby gla)Vglept000diSb s r 6615f.ffur island week beca Ise of events. A taxi utivor 404,314. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001PYRGHT 1111.""1"111111r- \"\ VALY Rome Naples Palermo it" %SICILY 0 gsditurancan GOZO OW! INO 1lMALTA cttaZIN, 4. A AIRPORT GREECE Atiikn9 Tripoli LIBYA Say LE.!..; 01 ? The New York Times/7m C? 1072 I is gone in the era of nuclear warfare. So Mr. Mintoff asks for more money to develop new nonmilitary industries. If Britain and NATO don't want to shell out a fcw lousy millions, we'll have to turn elsewhere." He conceded that if the 5,000 Maltese civilians em- ,ployeci by the military lost their jobs, the unemployment figure would rise to 11,000, a whopping 11 per cent of the labor force. "Mr. Mintoff has assured us that no worker will suffer any hardship," the union man said. "I hope he knows what he's doing. He clearly needs a lot of cash now, and I'm confident he has a firm pledge from the Libyans." Ready Cash From Libya Libya, a major .oll pro- ducer, has plenty of ready cash and the head of the military regime, Col. Muam- mar el.Qaddafi, has come to Mr. Mintoff's aid with loans in recent months. When the two men met again in Tripoli last week, Colonel Qaddafi reportedly promised more money to tide Malta over the crisis that British withdrawal will cause. Over the weekend two dozen or so men in civilian clothes with large crates ar- rived in n Libyan military aircraft and were whisked to a compound of the 500-man Maltese Army. The official explanation is that the new- comers are Libyan techni- cians who will take over flight control at Luqa Air- port, but many Maltese are convinced they are Egyptians , ?or Russians. An Italian who knows much about Malta observed: "People hem don't care for us although they avidly watch Italian television? Sicily is less than 60 miles away. We mustn't allow Malta to become our Cuba. Valletta still has one of the finest deep-water ports in all the Mediterranean, and if it is of no use to the Wester alliance, can we permit this Soviet Navy to install itself here just half-way betwes Suez and Gibraltar?" Backers of Mr. Mintoff insist that he does not wan the Russians in Grand Ha bor and that Colonel Qaddaf doesn't either. However, . Soviet economic mission wa here over Christmas and hat talks with the Prime Ministe on construction and repai of ships, industrial cooper tion and tourism. Malta hal also concluded trade agree ments with Poland, Hungary Rumania and North Korea. The island saw Phooni clans, Carthaginians, Romans, Arabs, Normans, Germans, Spaniards, the multinational Knights of Malta and French- men as its masters before the British came. A young left- wing intellectual, 'recalling the past and noting the possi- bilities? said: "1 horn) we are left alone and don't see any new faces around here when the British go." WASHINGTON POST 8 January 1972 CPYRGHT uge New Soviet Ship Is Under Construction By Michael Getter Washlrartors Post eltaff Writer t...onstrucuort la uutles way on the largest surface ship ever built in the Soviet Union. It is still too early to tell what type of vessel is being built, but the prospects out- lined in recent intelligence re- ports ? reflecting the latest U.S. reconnaissance satellite photos ? are said to focus on _either an oil super-tanker or a much more startling develop. ment: the first Soviet aircraft carrier. " The Russians have made no .secret of the fact that they in- tend to build their first giant led tanker. But a Soviet newa tagency dispatch last February Indicated that the ship would be built at Baltic Sea ship- s ! While atellites is at Black Sea ship- the carrier possibility Is said to be advanced, not sur- ards. prisingly. by Navy analysts, cl- While U.S. officials refuse vilian intelligence Is known that the largest ship- point. specialists to provide any more details, are not discounting it at this it. a ?ds in the Soviet Union are. The Russians do not have at Nikolaev on the Black Sea.: any planes that are designed TI at is where the only two hel- for carrier use in the style of cc pter carriers in the Soviet the U.S. Naval air arm that is with folding wings, tail hooks ae1t?the Moskva and the and specially designed fuse- aningrad?were built. , lages to take the jolt of car. The Soviets have tier landings. aid that k , it re is the possibility that ' Russians have overcome their s h y intend to build a fleet of' I But some intelligence he large new tankers, andi sources speculate that if the ithe work at the Black Sea' disdain of the carrier's mill- yards ! the such tanker. be planning to use vertical is e beginnings of a tary usefulness, they may well e f lowever, there is enough and short take-off jets (V/S- ir certainty about this to lead TOL), rather than the type of 'Acme members of the intent- U.S. planes which require el- gence community to wonder if ther rolling down the deck or title Russians may have made a catapult shots. Ac cision to build a true air- The ' Soviets have built at let-Ift carrier, big enough to least two experimental yards near Leningrad. carry fighter and attack I The newshAppicitifsiskFor. eeleatmr11909109102. : MiAlaifi_ a Ain opters anjile 'spotted recently by the U.S. The only operational plane CPYRGHT of dial 1yp1101111-b1,1n ! Harrier jet, which the U.S. Marines are buying and intend to use from aircraft carriers and amphibious ships outfit- ted with special platforms. Though the carrier has been the backbone of the U.S. fleet for decades, and the U.S. atill maintains 16 of the floating airbases, the Russians have al- ways downgraded their effec- tiveness. Those holding the theory that the Russians may have changed their mind, claim there is also some evidence of a "more positive tone" about carriers reflected In recent So- viet internal military publica- tions and an alleged Soviet Navy concession that these ships may be "a valuable polit- ical tool." If these reputed hints of a I Soviet shift in position are true, they would tie in neatly with the U.S. Navy's massive 02OQOOO11t4d in large measure by a strong bloc in CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Congress?to greatly expand and modernize the U.S. fleet In reaction to the Soviet naval modernizations of recent years. It is estimated that it will be several months, or perhaps a year, before construction Is, far enough along to identify, the type of vessel being built. THE ECONOMIST 8 January 1972 The Ull AS in war CPYRGHT The British of all people should know what sea power means: it gave them their century of predominance in the world, and it saved them from defeat by Napoleon and by Hitler. And yet it sccms that even the British arc in danger of forgetting. The argument about Malta this January, like the argument last January about selling naval arms to South Africa, has shown how difficult it is for public opinion to come to grips with the idea of sea power: what it is, what it can do, why it still matters in the last third of the twentieth century. The real rcason for not giving Mr Mintoff the amount of money hc wants for the British base on Malta (see page 28) is that Malta is no longer particularly important ? for the control of the Mediterranean. It is not that it has stopped mattering whose navy is the strongest in those waters. Sea pmver does still matter, in the Mediterranean and in every other sea that is not either for all practical purposes a private lake or too frozen to be worth sailing through. The curious thing is that people who understand what an armoured division can do, or an intercontinental missile, have come to find it hard to grasp the meaning of command of thc sea. How sea power still gets used Of course, sea power alone can never again do for any country what it oncc did for, Britain. It is too easy for ships to be sunk by aircraft, unless they have aircraft of their own to protect them. It is too easy for almost every movement of almost every warship to be kept under inspection, by radar and radio, like a snail in a torch beam. It will never again be possible to say of any navy what Mahan said of the British navy's frustration of Napoleon: Those far distant, storm-beaten ships, upon which the, Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the world. The limitations that sea power has to work under in the twentieth century arc obvious enough: it is the hope of regaining invisibility, and safety, that is making the navies go under water to do more and more of their job in supinarines. But even the ships that have to crawl across the surface are still much more useful things than many peOple realise. It is worth remembering what they can do, anAppiomerlifehRebpasevle .401911112c1: out the warship: After all, thcrc is no need to look any further back than the past month to find examples of thc use of naval power. The most basic way of using it is simply to put it on display in order to persuade a foreign government to do something you want it to do, or not to do what you don't want it to do. The Americans sent the aircraft-carrier ;Enterprise into the Indian Ocean last month partly to divert the attention of thc Indian navy from the Pakistani one, and partly to discourage the Indian government from attacking West Pakistan after it had won the war in Bengal. The Indians say that they never intended to do anything of thc sort, although their defence minister, ? Mr Jagjivan Ram, has been saying things that cast some doubt on that ; but if they were thinking of it the Enterprise was onc good reason for abandoning the idea. It is easier to use a detachment of warships for dropping this sort of hint than to put your air force into the sky or to send your army clumping up and down. The sea , is open to everybody, and you can always say afterwards that you sent your ships that way just to give their crews a change of air. It is a technique every aspiring naval power has used in its time, from Commodore Perry's arrival in Tokyo bay in 1854, and thc Panther's at Agadir in 1911, to thc first visit by a Soviet squadron to the Gulf in 1968. If the mcrc demonstration of strength turns out not to be enough, you can then move to thc next step up the ladder, which is to stop the other man's ships. That is what President Kennedy did in the Cuba crisis in 1962, which was the cleanest-cut success of American fureign policy in the past quarter of a century, and he was able to do it because he had local naval superiority ; if the Russians could have scnt a naval escort with thc ships that were carrying -missiles to Cuba it would have been far more dangerous to give thc order to intercept them. It is what the Indians did to thc Pakistanis in thc Bay of Bengal last month, and what the British have been doing off Beira since 1966, and what Nasser tried to do to the Israelis in the Straits bf Tiran in 1967. If that is riot enough, the next move is to use your command of the sea to put -troops ashore. The Americans did that in? Lebanon in 1958 and irr the Dominican Republic in C !AMOK 941 ri tiNIAV60200120 Vacan countries Iii 1961. Every time it-wavenough to settle the argument: the govi:rnment that could move its soldiers across the sea without a gre9gi , Afi. a Ractfe he p irom air power, achieved almost everything it had set out to 'achieve. it can do it so quietly Those are all examples of the use of sea power in the past few years, at a time when many people in the west were being encouraged to believe that sea power 'was obsolescent. It is worth noting that in most of them the ships involved never had to fire a shot. Of course, there arc more brutal ways for a navy to make its presence felt. The British navy used its guns against the Indonesians off Borneo in 1966. The American aircraft-carriers off Indochina provide something like half the bombers that arc keeping up the American part of the Vietnam war.? It might even be argued that the most brutal means of enforcement of all is passing into the hands of the navies, because the nuclear powers are increasingly coming, to look on missile-carrying submarines as the best way of keeping the nuclear deterrent safe from enemy attack. But the point is that sea power can, often achieve its purposes with remarkably little violence. The trouble with armies and air forces is that they almost always have to usc their weapons in order to establish that they are stronger than their adversaries; there arc not many countries that will tell their soldiers, as Czechoslovakia did in 1968, not even to try to put up a resistance. In the wide open sea, once a naval squadron has shown that it is the strongest force around the place, it has a tolerably good chance of being able to go about its work unchallenged. The other point that needs to bc made is about the relationship between sea power and air power. Certainly, in a straight fight between aircraft and ships, the aircraft will generally win. But the only places where a straight fight is likely to happen are those parts of the world where the aircraft have bases to operate from, 'and where they cannot be prevented from getting at the ships by the other side's air power. Nowadays the two kinds of power work in tandem, and indeed where local naval superiority is established its instrument is often an aircraft carrying bombs or a helicopter carrying troops. In the north Atlantic and the Mediterranean, both the Soviet fleet and those of the western countries have to spend most of their time with unfriendly eyes watching them from above their heads. But there are other parts of the world's seas?the south-western Pacific, and large stretches of .the Indian Ocean?which arc still outside the range of the land-based aircraft of the major powers. It is here that aircraft-carriers may still have a few years of useful life left in them, as providers of a local monopoly of air power. It is here too that even a fairly small naval CPYRGHT - hind them. The snag about planes is that the only way they have of cancelling out the ships' advantage is by actually attacking them. That is a major act of war, and a govern- ment is not going to order its aircraft into action against' somebody else's fleet unless 'it is prepared for a. major, confrontation? , ? Sea power does still count: It is no longer the' final' arbiter of relations between the powers, even the powers 'that need the sea most for the purposes of trade ; the invention of the aircraft has turned that page of history. But it still matters too much for any major country willingly to leave the.command of 'any important piece of ocean in the hands of a potential adversary. This is the, unending.war. It is why the Russians in the past to years have put so much-of 'the money they can ill afford into .an attempt. to match' the naval strength of the United States. It is why the rival fleets in the various 'oceans still shadow each other, and the planes keep watch on the surface ships, and the hunter-killer submarines 'try to hang on to the heels of the missile-carrying submarines in the terrifying game of underwater tag that goes on beneath the surface. Above all, it is why neither side wants the other to establish a clear superiority in naval power in any of the world's major oceans. ? ?? ? .? ? Can Europe even look after its own? The curious thing is that a western Europe which now lays claim to a separate identity of its own should be willing, to remain so dependent on the United States on and over the seas around Europe. It is the Americans, as much as the Europeans, who guarantee the shipping routes across the north Atlantic. The ? Europeans rely upon the American Sixth Fleet to hold the balance against the Russians in the Mediterranean even more than they rely on the American troops in. central Europe to keep things even there. If ;the Sixth Fleet went away the, political effect on southern Europe and north Africa ?not to mention the Middle East?would be stunning. The .Pacific, of course, is left almost entirely to the Americans. And the one sea where the Americans do not yet have a permanent presence, 'the Indian Ocean, has seen the Russians establish a local superiority within the past four years over the one Nato country?Britain? that does keep a regular force there. If Mr Heath and M. Pompidou and Herr Brandt /man what they say, i'when they talk about taking some of the burden off the Americans' backs, they will have to include sea power, especially the submarine sort, on their list of things they have to tackle. There is something not quite serious about a Europe that talks of unity but does not take the main responsibility for ,the sea and air around itself. force can still hope to establish ? a local superiority of power?the command of that bit of the sea-L7-and use. it to do all the things, from showing. the Rag 'to putting. the marines ashore, that are the prerogatives .of. -naval supremacy. And even in the other. parts world, -which do lid within range of the .great powers' airfields, it is worth bearing in mind that aircraft work under one' major han di I6illtrpeetliggisilitrattln# : CIA-RDP7941194A000200200001-2 ? ? part of thei ? CPYRGHT4pproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDPARARRAT300200200001-2 HINDUSTAN TIMES 4 January 1972' 6 ? P CIO; 1-3 ^n1 k..1.0 Ct5. ICI 71 C.A. T' -r L?74"..-,?-.1 LONDON. Jim. 3 ? The H`k 1,131111(M, ATI 1111. 1):11,0 near the Aswan in Er.ypt, and its completion. hy the of this year, aialomatie sourceL: said to- day. Ttie bar,e has been under con. gl ruction for some time tinder strict secrccY. sources said. Diplomatic- sources said 3.-wlet- operated and piloted planes to be bal:ed on this now air have ere pri- madly intended for protextfon of the Soviet-hullt. Aswan dam. Egypt and Russia are worried lest the Aswan dam he a pritne. target for Israeli attack in the event of a now war. Attack on the Aswan dam, 016 pert s warned. could result in (11.,s;. ris...or on a big scale, drowrtnn nctreds of. thousands Pr ever, mire were the waters held back In the clam rclen.?!rd. DAILY TELEGRAPH, London CPYRGHT 5 January 1972 POLITICAL AIMS OF . SOVIET AID IV STEPHEN CONSTANT inunist Aftalrs Matt 1.Z.USSIA'S export of major weapons to untie r- d eloped countries has shown a drastic rise over 1 he past decade. Total ? value of Russian weapons exported over the past 20 years is estimated. to be over ?2,101 million. CPYRGHT The aim is political rather 11 au commercial. Major red- !iients :of Russian Nvrapollry in he 111idille T.7,ast, the Indian sub- 7ontinetit, the Kai. East mid in America (Cuba), have all wen countries whose military mslures were seen as bringing wnelits In . Moscow's global Inti-NVestern aims, A dirNI benefit to Moscow of inns shipments to sensitive ,i?nas is that they are accom. Med by 'Russian technicians. ese remain to 1 tam local local (T5 in the Ilse of the weapons ti to T1dOCI rina lc flint. Cuba d Egypt are glaring examples, ill 10.000 Russian technicians ported in the latter country. .1; I'h Long-range aims A survey or Russia's arms- pplying policy shows that the Moscow leaders are prepared to forgo immediate benefits to establish long-range strategic footholds. Catba can Ilins be seen as !something of " old-age. pen- sioner" of Russia's. The island !has receivnd ?115 million in ? weaPons since 1959. It is estim- ated to cost Moscow an average 1135 million a year to underpin .its "skid-row " economy. The size of 'Russian spending !abroad by means of weapons !and other aid-with-strings shows :clearly that Russia would find .Malta a cheap proposition should it consider tlie Medite.rranean island as a useful footholcl for its Mediterranean and Middle :East ambitions. Malta's economic and military requirements would IT present a minute frac-lion or Russia's total spending on . Ihe subversion of . the Free. NVorld. Among the earliest and loudest. !warnings about Russia's desians !on /mold V( ?f! I hose! by com. animist A limn in. China's tiny IIlY by the Adriatic. ? The official Albanian news agency has declared Ilia! the: British novernment's announcfl.. men! about preparations to with- draw forces from Malta had caused the "Soviet revisionist clique " in intensify its efforts to gain influence on the island. Malta, said Albania, was a "very good MEM t' Kir posit ion for the Soviet Navy, which is sabre- rattling iii thr Alediterranean alongside I he A merican neet." The recent trade agreement between Bussia inn! .711alla " will rnsiirr Soviet warships a port or, to put it bet ter, a base in the Mediterranean." Nal YORK TIMES 29 December 1971 CPYRGHT Malta Moscow and the': West By C. L SULZBERGER PARTS?A new allied (nista over CPYRGHT Malta, at any rate, another flare-up of the old one, can he regarded as prob- able. The strategically located island, republic has not figured much in re- cent news?but only because it hat been negotiating with Britain and NATO. These negotiations appear to have failed. Dom Mintoff, the Socialist Prime Minister elected this year, is a fiery and emotional man who has the praise- worthy idea of seeking to raise Mal- tese living standards and alter Malta's economy to such a degree that by 1977 the is1andzi4 tin knakazed tc4i colonial ruler and still Malta's source of military sustenance, sees no point In paying heavily to finance this goal : imply in order to prepare its own permanent expulsion from Maltese lacilities. And Britain's allies?particu- larly interested in the Mediterranean? : hare this view. ' Mintoff, after early hints that he might turn to Moscow if he could not ome to terms with the West, original- ly proposed that Britain and NATO pay thirty million pounds annual rent or continued use of facilities?a stag- gering increase from the previous fee, of slightly over five million pounds.' The British, the North Atlantic allies italVtienrealitvglfgRrInti? acceptable compromise. They haven't on its nav p QK ease The trouble is that Britain, former succeeded. Mintoff reduced his original' asking price to 18 million pounds a year. Britain and NATO came back by upping their original offer to 10 mil-, lion?half British, half from the all- *ance. Since Mintoff spurned this, London suggested he negotiate bilateral aid. agreements with other NATO members on an individual basis. The Maltese have had little luck with this idea. The 'gap between what is being demanded ? and what is being offered remains ap- parently unbridgeable. The British maintain Mintoff is be- ing unrealistic by not taking into account expenditures?separate from 11 9ttorddaluglowat_pfirments but WWI flee island's facilities by Britain and its allies. success at pulling together po- lit;cal support, hardware, and er ws to float, almost over- night, a modern navy. But he bably miscalculated when he decided that the aircraft car- ria was an obsolete weapon, and intelligence photographs, wi ich closely scan the Russian sh pyards, disclose no evi- de ace of any effort to correct hi! mistake. A lack of carriers and bases ak ng the North African coast ans that Soviet ships sailing beVond the defense radius of tlu Egyptian bases have no air cover. They carry the of- fensive sting of surface- to-surface missiles which can jf jet first-strike damage on thc NATO fleet. But outnum- be .ed and trapped in a sea wi h narrow outlets, they would be easy prey for NATO aircraft. Wisely the top American ad- mi:als in the Mediterranean, NA TO Comdr. Hondo Rivero and 6th Fleet Comdr. Ger- alc Miller, are taking a cool, unexcited view of the Soviet pr sence. There was a time when the navy seemed to mag- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A0002002000ReGHT London estimates such disburse- ments amount approximately to 13 million pounds a year and provide jobs for seven thousand of Malta's labor force of one hundred thousand. It is ftifotable that unemployed workers in, tilts now total roughly seven thou- n4. . In n sense, therefore, London feels it ltas ri strong bargaining position, bemire if a crunch were to come Mintoff might be faced with double an already high unemployment rate. But the excitable Prime Minister also, has trump cards in his hand. While: he appears, to have once 'held hopes that Libya might take up the finan- cial burden if Britain were expelled, he now seems to mistrust the reliabil- ity of support from that Wealthy oil- pi-educing land. Nor has Libya any navy that could conceivably require the services of Maltese shipyards; but this is by no means the case with the Soviet Union. Both Britain and NATO are acutely conscious of the danger to their West- ern Mediterranean position should the Russians sign a pact gaining access to Malta's facilities. The island republic is not quintes- sentially important to allied navies.-' Including the U.S. Sixth Fleet?but it is considered strategically vital that It be denied to Moscow's admirals. Were Malta open to Soviet vessels, the U.S.S.R. would be well on its way to penetration of the western Mediter- ranealt as it ' has already penetrated the eastern Mediterranean. ? Moreover, there is a lurking fear in West Europe that, in the latter case, the United States might thin out or pull back its Sixth Fleet rather than Tisk seeing it bottled up. Such a precaution would have strategic logic and would also be consonant with the -present American mood for military retrenchment The Maltese problem?although no longer as flamboyant as when Mintoff first took power?represents a matter of urgent seriousness. The Russians have not recently been expanding in the Mediterranean. Indeed, their air- craft have been expelled from Algerian Mers-el-Kebir. , Nevertheless, Soviet strength in the inland sea is extensive and well backed up by a ring of bases to the east. Should Malta open its arms, Moscow is, in a 'position to take Im- mediate advantage of the break. Min- toff knows this and is ,going to bp gain hard when the next found starts ?quite possibly preceded by at least another minicrisis. 1LLSEINGTON STAR 24 November 1(371 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT Seviiteit'fi? rJsk ithe /Ale iterraneen NAPLES ? Soviet diplomats are running so far behind the Soviet navy in Moscow's pene- tration of the Mediterranean that the show of force must be counted, in military terms, an extremely high-risk venture. However, Russian rhetoric is running ahead of the cold facts of Mediterranean life. Boasting in July that the new Soviet fleet "ties the imperial- ists' hands," Adm. Grashkov said the skill of Soviet ship- builders is attested by the navy's ability to spend long periods at sea without using overseas bases. But the Soviets' lack of Med- i ter r ane an bases outside Egypt is a deficiency that will leave the shiny new ships dan- gerously exposed if hostilities develop. Even their peacetime purpose of "showing the flag" is restricted by their lack of access to ports. They can't pour vodka for visiting digni- taries as long as they must anchor at sea. Greshkov is rated brilliant by American admirals for his nify its implications. But these admirals candidly ba lance their concern at sharing the sea with 10 Soviet submarines and a shifting number of capi- tal ships against the power which they can call into ac- tion. Miller even explains the psychology which produces incidents when Soviet ships or helicopters brush close to 6th Fleet units. "There are squareheads in the Russian navy like there are in all navies," he says, "and when they get orders to ascertain the identity of an American ship, they sometimes take foolish risks to be sure they don't make a mistake." Most incidents of Russian brashness are like the eve. berance of a man driving his first sports car. They want to show off their navy, but they are well enough aware of its vulnerability, to avoid great risks. In fact, the stubborn, presence of a sinkable Soviet navy in the Mediterranean is something of a promise that Moscow intends to behave. It is even a reassurance in re- gard to the Middle East. So the real significance of the Mediterranean confronta- tion lies in the fragile politics along the shore. It is hard for. Americans to understand how a ship can affect politi- cal attitudes, but this reporter is satisfied, after a swing through most of the fragile countries, that the outlook of peasants in places which have known much aggression is colored by the flags they see flying 'on ships offshore, This floating American pres- ence grows more important at a time when this part of the world is unclear on the impli- cations of the Nixon doctrine and the daily press carries exaggerated accounts of the isolationist intentions of the United States. The fleet sails as a refutation of fears that s shift is occurring in the bal- ance of power. Even at its cost of $2 billion ,a year, the 6th Fleet is a good Investment. And it will be a secure investment as long as the Soviet diplomats find no new bases. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 16 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A0002002M:2 Way' YO; IS UHT 9 Dec eat er 1971 East Mediterranean NATO Fleet Asked By DREW MIDDLETON La The New York Time, BRUSSELS, Dec. 8? Seem- rary ot Defense Melvin R. Laird proposed today the formation of a permanent allied naval; force operating in the easter& Mediterranean in cooperation with the United States Sixth Fleet. Mr. Laird also told the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that the United States would make available to other mem- bers of the alliance weapons systems, especially those relat- ed to electronic warfare, that have been tested and proved in South Vietnam. The emphasis at today's meeting of the Defense Planning Committee was on progress in 1 strengthening the alliance and on programs for build-ups in this decade. The object of this exercise In what American and British sources call "realism" is appar- ently to convince the Soviet Union and its allies that there will be no unilateral disarma- ment by the Atlantic allies and that the East's only hope for force reductions lies in nego- tiations. American officials, military: as well as civilian, praised the; alliance's "new spirit" and re- ported some results. Tim Dan-' ish Defense Minister, Kjeld Ole-, sem, for example, told Mr. Laird. that the new Socialist Govern-i me it would not carry out a campaign promise to reduce the Danish Army from 24.000 -to 7,000 or 8,000 men during 1972. The connection between an stei. dy increase in Western strength and negotiations with the East on mutual zald bal- one :..r1 reductions of forces, whi h the Atlantic alliance: first proposed three years ago,' was stressed by United States offii lats. They said that the Soviet Union was likely to be-., gin talks when it was con- vir=d that the West was do- tern ined to maintain its streagth. T1 Is determination was shown yesterday by 10 Euro- pear nations, which pledged to raisc their defense expenditure in 11172 by a billion dollars. and itoda 7 by a series of reports by ldefcfse ministers of "signifi- cant" additions and improve- ments in equipment of forces.i U.S. Troop Level Rises I Mr. Laird reported that the! United States had increased its, troops in Europe by 20.000. This results from the Defense; Deeartment's ability to bring: units in Europe up to etrengthi as the Vietnam ,war winds; down and its call on draftees! dezreases. There are now about 310,000? American servicemen in Eu- rope. including those of the Sixth Fleet. , Ships of six NATO navies, those of Britain. France' Italy, Greece, Turkey and the Unita !States, onerate in the Mediter- ranean. But only till Ameri- can Sixth Fleet operates at ?vill into the eastern Mediter- ranean, where Sol-let naval: and air forces are strongest. The United States proposal calls for a "standing" force, comprising Greek, Italian, Turk- ish, British and United States! vessels to operate in the East- ern Mediterranean. The French Mediterranean; fleet cooperates with other al- lied squadrons in exercises.i But national policy forbids' military inteeration of the type proposed by Mr. Laird. France, because of her rejection of mili- tary integration in the alliance, is not represented on the De- fense Planning Committee. The alliance has a standing force in the Atlantic, made up of Canadian, Dtuch, Norwegian, British, Portuguese and Amer- ican vessels. lits political pur- pose is to show alliance soli- darity by visits to ports. The military aim is to provide joint training in antisubmarine war- fare and escort duty. The United States is press- ing West Germany, whose fleet ? Is mainly concerned with the defense of the Baltic Sea, to detach a destroyer for service In the North Sea. The West German Defense Minister, Hel- muth Schmidt. apparently was more amenable to this proposal today than in the past. American officials did not specify the types of weapons the Defense Department is ready to make available to European allies. They are understood to include some of the newest sensor systems, ' tactical air-control systems and 'other electronic equipment de-1 signed to improve control and; command functions in Now. WASHINGTON STAR CPYRGHT8 November 1971 TRIPOLI, Libya?Outside of r.gypt and targety oceause 01 Its experience with the Rus- sians, the revolutionary re- gimes on the north coast of Africa are supplying no assist- ance to the Soviet aim of pene- trating the Mediterranean. When Chairman liosygin visited Algiei's in October, he elicited warm avowals of the . bonds which link the two so- cialist governments. But when he asked for a Soviet naval base at Merselkebir, he was, according to sources deemed reliable, politely told no. When he asked for docking rights for Soviet ships, he was again re- fused. He reportedly succeed- cd in persuading his hosts ? to let a few local Communists out of prison. Here A mitrimiecifidt have so raf Tiff alrigtTrecep- CPYRGHT : ececon for the Soviets i 4 a,i,dk lion. the wife of the new Sovi- et ambassador relates how she plcaded with her husband to ast Moscow to install central he .ting and air conditioning In thc ir uncomfortable residence. Th., Central Committee could no be expected, he replied, to m; ke even that modest in- vei tment in the current state of 'elations with Libya. The uptight regime of Cot Qa idafi offers no levers for So ict diplomacy. Bursting wiU1 oil revenues, the govern- ment has no need for financial aick Qaddafi did buy some So- vie: tanks and military equip- me it from the Russians, but he would let no Soviet techni- ela is come in to teach his sol- die -s how to use the hardware. He used Egyptian instructors 4Vgla?te tuls919/a9t9/13e no secret of Ills dismay over the extent to which the Egyp- tians have grown dependent on the Soviet Union. The bristling Soviet presence In Egypt and their success at squeezing a base at Alexandria out of their hosts affront this purist Moslem as ground lost in the Arabs' struggle to get the En. means off their back. He also scorns the Soviets' lack of reli- gion.. The urgency of the Russian quest for holds on this coast is indicated by their earnest courtship of West-oriented re- gimes in Tunisia and Morocco. They have exerted their wiles, but they have done no better than to secure occasional ac- cess ? for Soviet ships in Tunis and a fueling_azekosaxg, %yew, 1310PREJF7r11111191 been turned de?vn cold on re- peatcd requests for a naval base at. Bizerte. None of this can be attribut- ed to the brilliance of Wash- ington's diplomacy or love of? th,.1 United States. These Arabs, like the rest, count the Nixon policy as sol- idly pro-Israel. Tunisians fee1. they have gotten nowhere in pleading with the State De- partment to give Egypt's' President Sadat more encour- agement as a counterweight to the Russians. Qaddafi is cool with American officials and tough with the 19 American oil companies that have conces- sions here. As with the Algerians, whose: hostility has been mellowed by their anxiety to market frozen @ILI Amer- a Merit-es the Amorirsan ermecsciorairos only Approved For CPYRGHT Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 to the extent that he can squeeze them for revenues to develop his country. But he says frankly to Americans, we need your technology, and more Libyans are studying in the United States now than were there in the days of King Idris. The black and white view of the world which emerged in the early days of Algerian in- dependence has matured into a pragmatic study of how the colonialists can be useful, Recently Qaddafi even brought American rainmakers to Libya. But the dusty, shab- by streets of Tripoli exude the essential isolationism of the regime's mood. Tourists are treated miserably, and the ab- sence of the Italian communi- ty which kept things running is reflected in a discomforting lack of maintenance. But Qaddafi wants a pure, prohibitionist, unfrlvolous .Arab state, and he is willing to pay the price for it. Outsiders .and the outside way of life Were chief targets of the revo.; lutions in Libya and Algeria, and the Russians will find it hard to dent the stability and standoffishness of the regimes they produced. CPYRGHT BALTIMORE SUN 28 October 1971 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT stronaer Mediterranean, ? By JOSEPH n. L. sTERNE 1 terranean stuoic-s coula beup- sun sin/I Correspondent I Plied, with modifications, to the ' the alliance. . Bahic and North Eeas, where the U.S.? Officials reported that the Brussels?Defense ministers '411-iptUnion also has stepped up defense, secretary *iced concern' that of the North AtiantIc .1 rem), Or. 'Its ganization decided yesterday to na.ial strength considerably. some nations?not includi 1 seek improvements in the Wit i the exception of the pro- Britain and Germany?May )1 ' The Schmidt offer would be: be making this total commi F art of a CEA' West Gcrman-: ectec .11editerannean study, the redev of the East-West nude- .' -...;:-..'rno egeoment nom ur.e.N. West's tactical nuclear deter- ment. ? rent against increasing Soviet Lord Carrington, British d negotiation to help offset the naval power in the 'Mcditerra- 1 .S. balance Of payments costs , ar ba mice by the seven nations! ; assert bled here was basically' fense secretary, reportedly we . corned Mr. I..aird!s warning an o' keeping 300,000 servicemen in nean. 1 an updating operation. They instructed military and said 1,1ATO members must ?*rope. of Do_ prepared to make greater con American officials described technical experts to make Acaording to officials, Melvin studies comparable to those R. Laird, U.S. Secretary tributions to their own defens his move by the Bonn govern- nearing completion for the cen. fense cautioned against any nu- ment as very important?proba- tral and northern land fronts?in merical change?up or down?in t Reduction expected fly the largest cash offer that Europe. ? -"the e timated 7,000 tactical nu- ,. h 33 been formally presented. clear warheads that form a key British authorities were sai ? At a meeting of the alliance's The Pentagon, nuclear planning group. there r art di NATO defense. to be of the view that Europ which has long was stress on the possible .need He reportedly stressed to his must begin to face up to th teen worried about , the run- for tactical nuclear defenses colleagues that it would be a possibility that after the end cbwn condition of barracks in E urope, ' should the Warsaw pact launch gravo, mistake to make a President Nixon's present tern welcome im- would s an underwater, surface or air changp in the mix of weapons in office some reduction In th provement as. a Means of mak- i g military service more at- strike in the Mediterranean. at a ,ime when NATO and the number of U.S. forces In Europ If the study about this south- Wars.iw Pact are moving1tt active. to. is to be expected. ? 1 Ag ern flank of the alliance should ward negotiations on mutual Helmut Schmidt, the Wes 1tb But final reement on the tails of a new 'offset sigree- follow the pattern set for pro-! and balanced force reductions. German defense minister. use jected East-West conflict 0111 As he 'had signaled clearly the occasion of the Brussel lent,' it. ias Wed' will be a natter for negoliationS being land, there would be planningl even )efore leaving Washington, meeting to Make a cash offe conducted by the State DePart- about initial Western responses' Mr. Laird warned the European worth "several hundred milli? n ent. ? - ' ' ' :' . ' " ' . .: ' ''' ? , allies that if they really want deutsche marks" to improve di to an enemy strike plus paten- ? tial follow-on measures. lapidated barracks occupied b ' detente they should Meet and , It was assumed that the Medi-1 improve their commitments to. U.S sentemen In his country. . . Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-lipP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 SWISS REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS November 1971 R'isks of the Soviet Naval Buildup CPYRGHT The Soviet naval buildup, which actually began in the 1930s and has been taken note of in the West during the last decade,. is causing some alarm. In the last twenty years the Soviet navy has developed from . an insignificant marine force which was a mere un- successful coast guard fleet in World War IL to the world's second strongest maritime power (after the ? USA) which already has more combat ships and personnel than the leading Western naval power. Even more important is the fact that, as far. back? as 1968, 521 of the U. S. navy's 894 warships were more than 19 years old, while of the 1,575 Soviet combat ships only tWo were.that aged; of 146 Ameri- can submarines, 68 were more than 20 years old while all 375 Soviet submarines were built less than 14 previously. Depending on the class of ship, the Soviets are currently building between three and five times as many units as the Americans, while the con- struction of warships by the other NATO powers serves merely to replace obsolete units. As the Soviet navy grows in size and strength, the number of NATO. warships with genuine combat capability, and parti- cularly the still-decisive aircraft carriers, steadily diminishes. The Soviet na'vy must also be given credit for the fact that in recent years it has built quite a number of solid, seaworthy craft of completely Original de- sign, with interesting armament, and thus has freed itself from its partial dependence on other countries for certain equipment and electronic apparatus, a dependence which was observable until about 1960. The Soviet navy is now pursuing a completely in- dependent and original policy of organization and ship-building, which is claimed by Soviet ideologists to be disproof of .the classical "capitalise' theory of maritime domination by the mere presence of supe- rior surface and air forces. This. typically Soviet doctrine, which in a certain senie was already applied during Word War II though it had extremely slight success, comprises a mixture of new weaponry (pri.- marily a wide range of missiles), the mass utilization of subm! arines, and the subversive influencing of the personnel of opposing navies. The Soviet navy today unquestionably has a richer arsenal of missiles than the NATO fleets, .at least in terms of variety?though it remains to be proven whether, under combat condi- tions, missiles have any greater accuracy than naval aircraft over long distances and naval guns over short range. At any rate even the most modern Soviet cruisers, suO as ships A?fl.he Caladryndma /02 : shindasset,kiitiarcDOYErig :tt.W IdV radius of land-based Soviet aircraft of successfully combating for a long period of time an opponent with a ship-based, flexible naval air arm. Moreover it is known in the West that certain Soviet weapons sys- tems, particularly those involved in anti-submarine warfare, lag far behind those of the West technologi- cally. On the other hand the formerly grossly lacking seamanship of Russian sailors has improved sharply, a fact which is linked to the worldwide activities of the Soviet navy.. in terms of numerical strength ? and geopolitical factors, the Soviet navy, in the North Sea, the Black Sea, the Barents Sea and in general along tic Siberian coast, is greatly superior (by a ratio of up to 10:1) to all non-Communist coastal states and there- fore, at least at the start of a conflict, would largely dominate these waters, particularly since in this area the land-based Soviet air force can provide the neces- sary cover. It is another question, however, whether the Soviet navy's surface forces in their current make-- up could operate successfully in those far-reaching oceanic regions in which they have been constantly cruising in recent years, such as the Mediterranean, the North and Middle Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. As long as the NATO alliance remains intact, Soviet surface combat operations in the Atlantic would have little chance of success; to keep this situation un- changed, however, it is necessary that the bases in Iceland remain firmly in Western hands and the theo- retically available air and marine bases in the Middle Atlantic, such as those on the Cape Verde Islands, Ascension, St. Helena, the Bermudas. and the Falk- land Islands, be improved and better supported. The exclusion of the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean from NATO for political reasons seems militarily dangerous today, in an age of worldwide Soviet naval policy and strategy. Another obstacle is that the polit- ical reservations of certain Scandinavian countries, which are themselves making inadequate contribu- tions to the defense of their own territories, are com- pelling NATO to adopt a strategy vis-a-vis Spain, Greece, Turkey, Portugal and South Africa which can benefit only the Soviets. The action potential of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet is also limited, although it unquestionably now has its own air forces operating from Egyptian and Syrian bases and its reconnaissance aircraft can in some zases also make use of Algerian, Yemenite and Iraq airbases. The West no longer has any bases on Ci red:16eigf e Mediterranean. As to Malta, dbie i1.1WWW4UPUMlelidnt of a 1 Q CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 third world war, particularly if it is fought with nucle- ar weapons, because of its small size the island would be useless to either party as a naval and airbase in the classical sense. In contrast to Iceland, Malta's great importance is exclusively in terms of the present poli- tical "war" in the Mediterranean region. The Soviet capability to wage successful war in the Mediterranean depends largely on the reliability and operational capacity of its Arab allies and friends. On the basis of recent events in the Sudan, the atti- tude of Libya and Soviet experiences with Arab poli- ticians and military in general, the Kremlin probably reckons that the Soviet Union could hardly count on the active help of the Arabs in a war with NATO. This would eliminate the utilization of "neutral" Arab ports and airbases, without which the Soviet fleet would not be secure against attacks from supe- rior NATO air and sea forces. The Mediterranean is spatially too small for Soviet surface naval units to be kept supplied and operating for very long without 'discovery. Similar considerations also apply to the Soviet surface naval forces which are now more or 'less constantly present in the Caribbean, the South 'Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. Of its six most impor- tant tasks in the event of a war against NATO, de- spite its great numerical strength and the modernity - BALTIMORE SUN . 1 November 1971 CPYRGHT ?Sbvitit 'Unioit's cliforts. to fill setrilower void. . ? . ? ;1,11(Ja lu oceu luringu o J.1 MiC11111 'PARKS ? Sun Staff Corrtsponttent Singapore?The Soviet's Un- ion's efforts to establish itself a the dominant power in the Judi- -an Ocean,- one of the world's most important trade routes, is luring the United States into a Contest for naval supremacy there. Five years ago, there were no Soviet warships operating regu- larly in the ocean. Three years ago,. there were a half dozen. Now, the number averages from 12 to IS and has run as high as 30 at i time. This growth has accompanied extensive Soviet efforts to in- crease its political and economic influence in the developing na- tions of Fest Africa and South Asia that border the Indian Ocean. ? Only major power While Russia's ships In the In- dian Ocean account for only a tenth of its Pacific fleet, the Soviet. Navy is, in fact, the only. major. navy operating regularly. in the ocean in signifitant strength. in air ------,-----00- nuciettr- '17ccolkon., a race to keep tip with in Ocean, says Vice Adm. Mau, CPYRGHT Soviet naval vessels are welcome at ni--.0y no bases. Western naval bases In ports near Indian Ocean though they h;.vo are underlined. ..s a, Africa and the Middle elle of the Indian awn. It vill! Navy officers also note that 1 a t. ' be finiOled in lt174. Diego Garcia's harbor could be '- armed American naval offi; Although CSii4/1!:!MIT'k i't r'l 1"-.: dredged to accommodate an air- ce 's plan to send U.S. 7th Fleet. base runs eoun!er to rre Nk....:. craft carrier. Its 8,000 foot land- :h. )5 into the ocean as they are doctrine of loweriilg th". Arneri- ing strip LS already handling N xi from duty off Vietnam so four engine cargo planes. ? ' irt Russia does not go unchal-, eerg .s; it is Pr tolqin:n1 tI.:.- can profit.: Li A:..,i, :Vivy of,i? i If the United States fails . to' ? I 1:11.4ed. The latest such exercise: . . - , , ' i %Int i ? in Sia,ps ,:an n ? s crease its presence in the Ind- With the once-mighty British r(H:el'ed *craft carrier Enter- ihe rapidly expanding Soviet rice F. Weisner, the deputy. Far East Fleet reduced (0 SIX 'pre and a giiitird-missile frig- ,N8vy. frigates and a submarine and f- e in September. - - chief of naval operations for air ? The 250-rilz,n, ScAmbilitt Oa- and a former 7th Fleet corn- ( y , aging U.. Navy he United States began con- - ii?,i tho iirq 1.; sha,e in the face ships stationed in the area, 4 'teflon earlier this year of 1 '.:::. ..:vit ii.:IPI;e. it easier for the Russians are approaching ; If million communications sta- : A;.,. :.i on -.:`?-,,I;-,cs !a or:t- navaLdominatikn of the ocean, frea on Diego Garcia atoll, a I ; i. ;? y . T.. ', .? (1.:;:n, it wilt' :an evont that ftpprioyeaFsamfteleiaift 11 9A7 Aalicri WO mender, "we turn it over to the Soviets. I think it's that simple." Adm. John S. McCain; Jr., fie Command was re- G040144st 0 . significant political benefits in es south of India In he mi(.1 Bussian activities. ' of the Indian Ocean, said In an' CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01191A000200200001-2 interview: "We are in a global competition with the Russians, and we must not allow any por- tion of the world to fall under their exclusive influence: This is the danger in the Indian Ocean." The United States, in fact, is the only nation able to balance the Soviet presence In the ocean. The British fleet has shrunk under economic pressures. The Indian Navy is concerned only with the Bay of Bengal and Ara- bian Sea in case of war with Pakistan. The Japanese Navy is kept close to home as a self-de- fense force. The Australian fleet is modern but small. The 1,001-ship Chinese fleet is primarily coastal' but several occan-going warships have re- cently traveled to East Africa, where China has aid programs. A greater Chinese presence is expected in the next two years when Peking test-fires its inter- continental ballistic missiles. Major power struggle A U.S. congressional commit- tee, predicting that the Indian ? Ocean will soon be the site of major power struggles between, Russia, Japan, China and the, United States, urged that "diplo- matic finesse" and negotiations be used in the area rather than sheer military and naval power. India and Ceylon, expressing similar worries, have asked the major powers to make the ocean, a "zone of peace." The Russians have said they are willing to study the proposal with other powers. The American congressional committee was told last sum- mer by two former assistant , secretaries of state, William Bundy and Phillips Talbot, that trying to match the Russians ,would be counterproductive. Because of nuclear weapons, ' Mr. Bundy said, "I don't think any foreseeable level of Soviet power makes that much differ- ence. . . . Naval gunboat diplo- macy has las and less rele- vance." Russian diplomats in the re- gion say, however, that it is the United States that is practicing gunboat diplomacy in the ocean, They say the initial Soviet move into the ocean was prompted not by some grand geopolitical design but by the earlier entry of American sub- marines cargaZaipolaris ? - siles with a s Soviet diplomats have shown elaborate charts of the submar- ines' movements to sonic of the area's 'governments to justify the Russian presence. American officials refuse to discuss the Polaris program, but the submarines are presumed to be operating in the Arabian Sea and, according to Russian sources, the Bay of Bengal, from where their missiles could reach targets in the Soviet Un- ion and mainland China. , Tends to confirm presence The construction of the com- munications station at Diego Garcia?far too elaborate for the three surface warships oper- ating from the Persian Gulf? tends to confirm the presence of Polaris submarines as does the American acceptance of an Aus- tralian offer to base U.S. sub- marines at Cockburn Sound, a new facility in Western Austral- ia on the southern Indian Ocean. The Soviet ships In the ocean generally sail from the Russian Pacific 'Fleet hcadonarters at Vladivostok. A few have come from the Black Sea port of Odes- sa, a 13,000-mile trip around Af- rica with the Suez Canal closed. Western intelligence sources report that the Soviet fleet in the i Indian Ocean generally includes two guilded-missile cruisers, two missile-hearing frigates, two to three missile-bearing de- stroyers, two to three conven- tional destroyers, a landing ship Iand four or five oilers and sup- ply ships. They are often accom- panied by submarines, some of Which are nuclear powered and missile equipped. . The ships make regular calls at 30 ports In 18 countries bor- dering the Indian Ocean, the Red: Sea, the Arabian Sea and? the Persian Gulf. . Soviet merchant shipping In the Indian Ocean is also Increas: Ing. A quarter of the ships, rounding the Cape of Good }lope' are Russian, and another 15 per) cent are from East European countries, The increase is par- tially due to economic assist- ance and trade agreements Rtiss sin has negotiated with at least 1 19 countries on the ocean's I shores.? . . Russian fishing and rhaling fleets?including several of the famous spy trawler?: aerate continuously in wide a .eas of, the Indian Ocean. Twelv.: mil; tries have signed special I ishing agreements with the Sovitt Un- OThea?,glagninip2. : cl To service these ships the Soviet Union is lining no a chain of facilities from the 'Bed Sea down the African coast. It IS admittedly eyeing parts in Cey- lon, India and the Indian Nico- bar and Andaman islands off the Burmese coast in the Bay of Bengal. But both Colombo and New Delhi say they are wary of the Rusins, and Indian offi- ? With the Suez Cannl closed, dais say they arc trying to min- the most practical access to thc imize Rbssian influence on their , ocean is through areas dominat- heretofore British-equipped. ed by Western navies?the South Navy. - China Sea and around the Cape Western intelligence officials - of Good Hope. believe that the Soviet Union is Soviet sailors are gaining ex.] , establishing several bases of its own?at ssas Banns in Egypt on perienee operating major naval the Red S'en, on the South Yem- task forces for long periods of - time thousands of miles from en islandg of Perim and Socotra I Soviet marines have home ports, but hot-weather landed) and, for its fishing fleet,1 , sailing In tropical waters still (where on Mauritius. , . 1 presents problems, according to 'No large bouys, seven feet In1 Western naval sources, With no aircraft carriersi and no established naval airfields in the area, the Indian Ocean fleet lacks both tactical air support and aerial reconnaissance.' Western naval units moving Into area would have both. , Western-dominated waters I diameter, have been placed in ; the Indian Ocean, apparently to turn supply ships and submarine; tenders into floating bases. American naval officers warn ? ' that Soviet activity will increase sharply If the Suez Canal is re- opened, permit ling Russian ships to sail from the Black Sea through the cannel and the Red Sea into the Indian Ocean. . Threat to shipping ? Western 'naval attache here commented. "I would not be surprised if the Russians in- creased their activities?politi- Finally, the Soviet Navy curs rently lacks a secure base or the ocean itself, although it has the use of repair and refueling facilities in a number of coun- tries. ? Western naval officers note that these barriers would be quickly removed with the open- ing of the Suez Canal and the establishment of one or two na- val bases and airfields on the ocean. Number of obstacles A European diplomat, assess- ing the growing Soviet political as well as military influence in a the region, commented,. "there , naval-h' a and co eafnaonciic as wl a factor of five elevlithin are a number of obstacles to as three Years of the opening of the ?.Russian naval activity right canal." , 'now. But it is only a matter of American naval officers speak time until they have the facili- of the Soviet activity as a threat ?tics they need because of the to Western shipping-50 per cent ? Indian Ocean as does 90 per cent way governments in the area of Europe's oil moves across the are welcoming them as a coun- tering to interfere with shipping terweight to the Chinese." of Japan's?but any Russian at- Most diplomats in the area, in than regional. "Interference with ships onl fact, see the Soviet activity in i ? i the Indian Ocean as part of a is likely to be general rather; the high seas would be pretty! broader effort to fashion a cres-? cent or influence beneath China, Vice Mm. William P. Mack, close Britishto staffvar ,oaffeictueart.iy," says one l commander of the U.S. 7th '? Fleet, said in an Interview: The British, however, have "How do you influence a', coun- ? used this potential threat to jus- try as to whether she signs a I tify the sale of arms to South treaty with you? I am thinking Africa despite widespread pros specifically of India (which re- tests from black Africa. ?eently signed a twenty-year Japan, one of the countries friendship treaty with Russia/, that would be most affected by "The Soviets do it by putting Soviet domination of the ocean, more ships in the area and visit. has aodpted a wait-and-see atti- ing these countries more often. tude. "We are still talking about In the Orient, countries are in- potential not actual domina- fluenced a lot more if you pre. tion," say; a Japanese ambas- sent yourself to them in a big, 20 ignitatile cruiser than u saiT in with a little World War 11 destroyer." itl??7%-0;11tif,'01Re Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean hnc niy lit' if fl +oinacitv uhagMetil kROCkfttidi 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001apyRGHT 15 November 1971 CPYRGHT A LOOK AT 'U.S.-SOVIET RIVALRY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN Interview With V. Adm. Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. With Soviet and U. S. warships maneuvering at close quarters in. the Mediterranean, could an accident lead to war? How good is Russian surveillance? Would reopening the Suez Canal add significantly to Moscow's global might? ? Aboard U.S.S. SPRfNGFIELD in MEDITERRANEAN (,) Admiral Now, %vault, reopening the buez t...anat give the Soviet Union a dramatic new advantage in the Mediter- ranean or thc Indian Ocean? A From the Soviet point of Ariew, there would be less a tremendous advantage than a tremendous convenience. The largest single Soviet fleet in !mothers of surface ships is their Black Sea Elect. Their "locker room" in the Black Sea is convenient to the "playing field" in the Mediterra- nean. Thirty-six hours after their ships leave Odessa or Sevastopol, they can piss through the Dardanelles and be (a Egypt. Or tiley can reach the entrance of the Suez Canal in about 40 hours. ; The Suez would lw a fine short cut to the Indian Ocean: They could avoid the long way down, out past Gibraltar, around West Africa and Up the other side. So, from the So- viet point of view, (aiming the Suez Canal would be a tremendous convenience. As you know, the Russians already keep some ships in the Indian Ocean. O Is the U. S.?and specifically the Sixth Fleet?in ally danger of being pushed out of the Eastern Mediterranean? A No?absolutely no.' We can't be forced out of any placc, Someone might try to drive us out by fighting?or try to bluff us out. That simply hasn't happened here. ? What do these two big fleets?U. S. and Soviet?do in the Mediterranean? Is it mainly a matter of keeping tabs on Cadl other? A That is certainly part of it. They keep tabs on us, but t h k business of watching works both ways. I'm intensely interested, for example, in their new de- I signs. the new systems that we see installed in their new ships?their implied new capabilities. WC Nvatch their ships? not all of theiu. hot those I select, based upon -a corn- hi;ituiii of Iiings. A new device: What is it? flow does it - - work? We follow that ship?and watch and learn. When a Soviet ship comes down with one of ,their more advanced weapons systems installed?one that could pose a serious threat to our ships?it stands to reason that we want to Leep an eye on that ship and know what he is about all die time. This we do. 0 Do Ow Stu. s harass you?try to interfere with your I !rut nuu s? A .1111.11` ttid,rd IICCatiiiIIIS WIWI) .tifiell MIMES, IMI 11M11 t,??oliyIN Itrn? 11, Ihe \irdnurranValt. There IMP Ind- it, 11,,, tdif?ft? 111'111111S ecnbetallet? and carelessness ,tt% ,.liaves'. For answers, Alex Kucherov of the staff of "U. S. News & World Report" interviewed Ad- miral Kidd shortly before he relinquished com- mand of the Sixth Fleet last month. The inter- view now has Defense Department approval. A change has taken place, incidentally. Ten years ago t c Russians used small trawlers or ex-fishing craft to trail .,Now you see a guided-missile frigate doing the job. This a good indicator of the growth of their navy. Q Is this continuing surveillance dangerous? A Their motivations, I'm sure, are very similar to ours? e iriosity, a desire for close-in photography?and if t110 N cattier is bad, if the ceiling is low, they've got to come 1 w to see. I've operated up in Norwegian waters on large exercises s here the Soviets were intensely interested in what we were dung. The weather is absolutely abominable tip there. The c fling is low, it's rough, it's windy, it's cold. I tell you our a lators there had nothing but admiration for Soviet air- anship. These great big long-range Bears and Badgers e me down low over the water to observe our ships. The veil- ii g was under a thousand feet, and they had to be that low t see. ? CI When Soviet ships approach lyours and you warn t cm, do they respond? Do they keep clear? A The question 'implies they come too close. The signals e send are more often signals of intent: "I'm going to turn I the right," "I'm going to turn to the kit," "FM going to gin refueling; please keep clear." Generally, they do, - CI Could an accident in the area escalate into war? A We pride ourselves on being very, very circumspect a id careful professionals. One of the absolute orders of the y in the Sixth Fleet is to guarantee that we deport our- Ives accordingly.. When their aircraft approach our ships and we intercept t em far out from the ships that they might be reconnoitering, I ere's no nonsense, no playing around, pointing things at o c another?absolutely none. They will open the bomb bays, a d we go under and look up inside?no bombs. I would reassure you most careNlly and thoroughly on t at point?most carefully. Anyone villo believes that World ar HI is about to start over here because there are con- f ontations by irresponsible people is just looking for a adline. ? How powerful n force do the Soviets have here? A They have an absohitely first-rate force here, and we onld be fools to mulerestimate their potential. They are lifessionals. Their ships are quite obvionsly well Imilt. The Soviets are not 9 feet tall by a long shot, but they we good. They have made it their business to 'flirt) from t Ic best in the business?and that's us. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA2RDP79,01194A000200200001-2 . ,,,10,,v,,,,,m799.Tilitml.firmvpiPIPInVIM ? ? ,(,.,(fate4.w rfflOgi CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 They've been- following us around fon years?Watching, koning. copying, We make mistakes, sometimes in tactics, in uvollitions, Ill ship designs, in techniques, in such simple things as replenishing at sea. They watch. Then within a very t time we ronected from their watching, the adap. lion of mho math] NVOrk best for tluan in installations on their own ships. Side-to-side refueling is an _example. They started out ns- ing the astern method of refueling, which we used early in Wodd War II, and then progressed to the more efficient alongside refueling method. Q Is the Soviet submarine fleet in the Mediterranean much larger than yours? A Indeed it. is--to the tune of about 4 or 5 to 1. If you want to know why there is this tremendous concentration, I think the answer can. be found somewhere among the following: .. . First, they have large numliens of stibmarirles in their military inventory. If you have a, job to do and you've got a toolbox filled with one kind of tool and are limited in "tow of the other kinds of tools, Situ will use what you have. So they bring in snbmarines. Secondly, we have abominable sound conditions in the %Iliterranetm. It probably thie worst body of water on the face of the earth in which to locate a submarine, bar 11000. The hot winds off the desert rapidly evaporate the v.,fliate water. The rusidnal salt sinks. That causes great turbulence, and variations in salinity. This in turn affects dm paths of sound waves: They bend. The fish down here, the marine lily. iire very chatty creatures and create a very elm noise level, The number of commercial ships at sea Add!, It OR' 111.01110I11. ()II oily f/Ile day dm density of ship- lUg square mile of Mediterrinwan water is fantastic?. peihaps not as high as ill tile Nit dose to This makes noise. All (il these factors affect the ability of Antis( ibinarine sl ips lii find siihmarin es. Thirdly, the Russians IlaVe a "choke point"- philosophy. That is, tlICY Valli to he tillre that they have enough sub- 1,1a, mes to cont oil the natnral choke points in the Mediter- rmcan. There .are seven of them: moving from west to east? (dbraltar, the waters between Sardinia and the African ,tt4st, the Strait of Sicily, die Strait of Messina, the area be- hymn Crete and Africa, and the two passages at each end of Crete leading into the Aegean Sea. If you and I are playing in the line of the Chicago Bears and we want to stop the runner from getting through the line, we line up shoulder to shoulder so he can't squeeze through. And I think that's why they'v. got so many sub- marines. They line them up side by 'side so that nobody can get through?at least not undetected. Q Do they have underwater ballistic missiles? A Yes, we give them credit for that?not with all these submarines but with their new boats and their new missiles. . 0 Do the MIG-23s recently introduced into Egypt lilt significantly the balance of power in the Mediterranean? A Yes, the Russians have MIG-23s in Egypt. I don't think it will have any great effect. No one weapon or weap- ons system of this type?no matter what it is?can be that important. Q Does the U.S.S.R. have amphibious forces here? . A Yes, they have their naval infantry in the Mediter- ranean and a lift for that infantry ready in Egypt. They have enough amphibious. lift down here to haul a battalifm?a battalion landing team. That force of a half dozen or so amphibious ships, LST's and smaller laniling craft they keep here all the time. O Does this Soviet expansion of naval power concern you? A 'I don't think we should suddenly reach for the panic button. They are behaving the way many countries have behaved over the centuries in pushing their trade frontiers ?and tlmin flag?as far as they can. The Phoenicians' merchantmen sailed far and wide, and I lie in eminlyYmon hi the rowing-machine warships, with shields hung over the side next to the- oarsmen, and spears in the seats beside them, were not far behind. This is the way maritime-oriented and economically motivated nations have operated for centuries. It's what the Russians arc doing now. The disquieting thing is their rate of growth and, of course, their ultimate goals: flow will they use what they have, and to What purpose? It's. clear to me OW they are no longer interested in parity at sea. 1 believe they hare set their sights on naval supremacy. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 13 September 1971 WHERE RUSSIAN THREAT ? KEEPS GROWING Interview With Artim. Elmo N. Zumwalt, Jr., ? U.S. Chief of 1Vavot Operations ? CPYRGHT It mere were a showdown betwelen U. S. and Soviet power at sea, who would prevail? That's a vital question at a thine when U. S. strength is dwindling-Lin manpower, ships and planes?and Rus- sia is showing more muscle. How big a worry is this? Just what is Moscow up to? What comes next? Admiral Zumwalt came to the confer- ence room of "U. S. News & World Re- port" to answer these and other ques- tions in this exclusive interview. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 2 ? Admi..:ApprOlveldtFloveReilelist 1-99t709/02 : qat-ttrAnt-retOmum444wy:g0J 41:41 I e ? s .11.1ta hal _c isis, they A l'here are pluses and minuses. With reeard to personnel, we are generally better off f .nm a quality standpoint. Our re-enlistment rates have impro ?ed. .1 loweeer, we're not :Is strong in numbers because w I've I een required to make major reductions in personnel--d nye from 692,-135 officers and men a year ago to 622,500 now. Nor are we as strong from the standpoint of ships, bee: use we have also made major reductions there as well. Whereas we had 769 naval ships a year ago, we are down to 70C to- day. ?Ve also have 770 fewer aircraft than a year ago. . So we have gained qualitatively with regard to people; lost quantitatively with regard to people, ships and aircraft. - Q Has this been because of the cost of the Vietnam war? . - - A The effect of the Vietnam war has been, in essdnce, to cost us the equivalent of about a generation of . hip- building. What increases there were in Navy budgets have been spent largely on attrition aircraft, bombs, bullets ' and increased operating expenses. . If you look at the years 1962 through 1972, in its Ship- building appropriations the Navy was down to less thin a billion dollars per year at a time when we should have )een spending 3 billion dollars a year on new ships. We need that much if we are to replace our 75-billion-dollar plant every 25 years. Q Compared :Nvith 10 years ago, is the Navy a str nger or a weaker force? A Weaker in some categories and stronger in others. With regard to the submarine force, the Navy is stn tiger . than it was 10 years ago because we've been able to conitinue our nuelear-eonstrection program, using nuclear submtrines to replace the much less capable diesel submarines. On the other liand, the number of Aircraft carriers has been dramatically reduced, and this has meant major reduc- tion in mu strength. We are down from 24 to 16 carriers. The number of escorts has been dramatically reduced. And although there have been qualitative improvements as new ships have been built, the improved quality has not been ade, plate to make up for the reduction in numbers that we've lost. O Against that background, Admiral, what has happened to the Navy's responsihilitie.s worldwide? Have they tended tia shriek in this period? A No. In my judgment, the Navy's responsibilities ac greater than they've ever been before. We've always been the nation's first line of defense. You will recall I hat during the Korean War it was the ? Navy carrier air support that made it possible for us to hang on to the Pusan perimeter as our bases were overrun in i South Korea, and it was the Navy-Marine Corps amphibious landing at Inchon that outflankied the North Koreans and : drove them out of the South Korean Peninsula. During the Southeast Asia war, naval carriers carried the large fraction of the action while we were building our air - bases ashore irethe first year. At the present time, under the Nixon Doctrine it is clear that the high-technology services?air and naval power?are going to be required increasingly to come to the support of indigenous armies of our allies. I would have to say that the Navy's mission is greater than it has been in the past, as I understand the Nixon Doctrine. C) Does the Soviet Navy worry you? A The Soviet Navy is dramatically more powerful than it was 10 years ago. You can trace, almost to the moment, the point at which the Soviets began their tremendous construc- tion program in two fields: one to achieve strategic nuclear parity, and the other to achieve a strong naval capability with the results of the lessons they learned in the Cuban missile crisis. Approved For Release 1999/09/02: 24 ,'111iit VIM MIi 0.1 1.111114:1e,Is1 wailvimwriv144.40.,',Trt J7A/14.5[1.5HUM , acquisition of a submarine fleet which outnumbers ours by 3 to 1 and which is outbuilding us at an appreciable annual rate. They have acquired air, power increasingly capable of coming to grips with ships at sea because they arc in- creasingly picking up airfields around the Eurasian littoral. They have built surface ships that have been optimized with the surface-to-sm?face missile against our surface ships. Q If there were a, showdown with the Soviet Navy at sen, what would be your prediction as to the outcome? A This is, of course, a very speculative question, but I think that no matter who does the analysis he would con- clude that if the U. S. continues to reduce and the Soviet Union continues to increase, it's got to be inevitable that the day will come when the result will go against the U. S. Mr. Nixon pointed out in a press confereneC on July 30, 1970. a point that I think is most perceptive about sea pow- and that is the dramatic difference between what the 'ix need?as basically a land power?and what we Reed? as basically a maritime power. Their vital interests require a large Army and Air Force to protect the Eurasian heartland. Our vital interests require a 'capability to control and use the seas to hold together the -.maritime alliance of Nvhich we're a part. , The Soviets don't need a Navy superior to ours to protect their vital int crests. They only can aspire to have a Navy Luger tlian ours for imrposes of interfering with our vital interests. - Q Is the Soviet Union doing well in the Mediterranean? challenging our superiority? _ A Yes. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union has just recently?on Max' 27, 1971?negotiated, probably for some very suitable price, a 15-year treaty of friendship and co- operation that may well assure their continued use of IEgyptian naval and air bases in the United Arab Republic. They may not be successfel in communizing the Government r of the U.A.R., but they have been successful in achieving a . very firm geopolitical position. - 0 We keep hearing that the Soviets want to drive east III Suez. into the Indiau Ocean, an area the U. S. has stayed pretty clear of. Is that your appraisal? A Yes. It's exactly what I would be doing if I were run- ning the Soviet empire and if I had the same ideology that they have. They have several goals in going into the intlian Ocean: In the first place, the presence of their ships there in much larger numbers than ours gives them the same opportunity to convert this presence, coupled with an aggressive foreign policy, into the acquisition of port capabilities that they've been able to achieve in the Mediterranean and in the Red Sea. SeCO1ld, it helps them complete the encirclement of Corn- 011111151 China, which I'm sure is a national objective of theirs. ? C) Would opening the Suez Canal help that purpose? A Definitely. It would bring their Black Sea Fleet many thousands of miles closer to its home ports. . Q Wouldn't use of the Suez Canal bring the Indian Ocean closer for the U. S. fleet,- too? A The figures are roughly 9,000 miles closer for the So- viets and roughly 2,000 miles closer frt es. That would he the case if one believes that we could get through the Suez Canal in times of crisis. I'm not sure that we conld. Q Is it also true that some U. S. aircraft carriers are too big to go through the Suez Omni? I A That's also correct. 13 There are reports that, as the Vietnam war winds down, some of our Pacific Fleet may go into the Indian CIRMbPtigt8/064A000200200001-2 YRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A0002002066:01-i A This is a political judgment that has to he macle?and hasn't yet been, made. U. S. naval ships arc able to go any- where any time. O 'What do you have in the Indian Ocean area now? A We have maintained a World War Il seaplane tender and two World War II destroyers there for a number of years. The Soviets have come from a presence much less than that to maintenance, on the average, or eight to nine ships 'at :my one time in the Indian Ocean. O What kind of new base are you building on the atoll of Diego Garcia, south of India? A A very austere communications facility. ? Could it he developed into something more sobstantial if the decision were made? A There are no plans to do so. O When you talk about the presence of our fleet and their fleet in the Indian Ocean, what do these ships do?call at ports and generally show the flag or sail around hi maneuvers? - A They do both. It's the visible presence of naval power that has such tremendous impact on littoral nations. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization n- on the southern flank of Europe all onaninumsly feel that the presence of the U. S. Sixth Fleet is their guarantor against encroachment by the Soviet Union, and that's why it's so desperately important for this country to maintain sufficient naval strength to keep our commitments in the Sixth Fleet?and also in the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific. ? In this regard, it is said that if a situation similar to the 1958 Lebanon crisis recurred, the U. S. Sixth Fleet would not be able to net as forcefully now as it did at that time because of the presence of the Soviets in the Mediter- unman. Do you agree with that? A No. You will recall that during the Jordanian crisis Inst year President Nixon made the decisir to reinforce the Sixth Fleet with a third carrier task foire, and the U.S.S. Guam embarked Marines?arid the crisis abruptly abated. There were, of course, other things that happened at the Sallie time that made a contribution, but it clear to me that, as the President stated on Sept. 29, 1970, "the pOWer and the mobility, the readiness of the Sixth Fleet in this period was absolutely indispensable in keeping the peace in the Mediterranean." This was one of those cases where the capability of the - United States to deploy naval and Marine power on the in- ternational seas, without having to 'obtain base rights from anybody, made the difference. I 0 Admiral, getting back to relative strengths, is it true that the Soviet Navy outguns the U. S. Navy, except for carrier-based aircraft? A Let me answer this Way: If the United States today soddenly decommissioned all of its aircraft carriers, we would lack ani' capability what- soever to control and use the seas. We have a very, very capable weapons system in the aircraft carrier?particularly in the nuclear-propellcd aircraft carrier with its ability to maintain very high speeds at t1I limes and to be constantly rem:y-100 per cent rcady?to go the minute the decision is. -made ;aid ?vitli the capahility La ontrange the surfaee-to-sur- face missile of the Soviet ships. O of the 16 U. S. carriers in commission, how many are imelear-powered? A We have one operating, two building. We badly need a (mirth. We're going k) be making the most vigorous pos- sible case fowiki6ir'sraliglivertii,fi. Illoiroosimp-Oyairo2 thanly both tyowtte Ifn h . Mit% ,orOess. o Do you have enough escort ships capable of keeping pace with these nuelear carriers? A We need more escort ships as well. 0- Do you have :my interest in using helicopter carriers, the Nvay the Soviet Union does? A We're in the process of designing at present a sea- control ship?a ship that will be in the 12,000 to 20,000- ton range and will carry helicopters and vertical-takeoff-and- filed in g a ircraft. These earl in no way be considered a substitute for air- craft carriers. They vill have a very limited?practically 4ero?capability to project our power inland, as our carriers have had to do to save us in Korea and Southeast Asia. But they will make a significant contribution to the protec- tion of convoys and of task forces which are confined to a given geographical arca?by defending against both the submarine and the aircraft, and. the missile coming from either that aircraft or that submarine. .ta Is it possible that weapons arc coming along that will Make the carrier much more vulnerable than it is now? A One of the most overstated claims, in my judgnient, is the vulnerability of the carrier. None of the oldest class of carriers which we have remaining in the fleet today?the Essex-class carriers which were in World War II?was ever Many of them took as many as five or six hits by the first guided_ missile iu history?the Japanese kamikaze aircraft? carrying payloads equivalent to the warheads of the current surface-to-surface missiles. And many of them look several torpedo bits. In every ease, within a relatively slinrt period, they were back in action?frequently an hour later. NVIien the time came, they went back to port for repairs. Since that time, the modern class of carriers. all but three of which are of postwar construction, has been given mulch more protection?heavier armor, more compartmenta- tion, much better damage control?so that, although our car- riers will take 'hits, they will have a very high degree of survivability. The nuclear carrier Enterprise suffered a fire, you will re- call, and nine 1,000-pound bombs exploded. Ilad the En- terprise needed, she could have been back in action within a couple of hours. ? A new nuclear carrier is priced at 800 million dollars. How do you justify spending that much for one ship? A One has to ask oneself how much we. have spent for the privilege of having the equivalent of the aircraft .carrier ?that is, a hind-based airfield?in an overseas area where we need it. For example, Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya had a rela- tively brief lifetime before the U. S. was asked to leave, and yet the costs for that airfield during its lifetime were prob- ably . very comparable to the costs of a mielear aircraft carrier for its 40-year life cycle.. Furthermore, that aircraft carrier has the capability to be anywhere in the world as the geopolitical situation changes, and not just in one portion of the African desert. As wc consciously shift to a posture in which we expect our allies to provide. their own indigenous capability, the best way to have the assets rapidly capable of concentration to support one particular ally which may be beleaguered is to . have your airfields seaborne. O Do most members of Congress share this feeling? ? A No. There are many who do, but many are not convinced. I think the thing the Navy has to do is to continue to make the case. The facts clearly speak for themselves. In the Jordanian crisis, as an example, the only airfields capable C IsCROPTO letiMee0002 0 sW20010Q*12rs. Could I. take two or three minutes- to deal further with r CPYRGHT this? I thi?APPrAYM'OnF9PRPIRWedigfatiiMa tlw Navy has. The first capability is our contribution to the strategic nuclear deterrent of the nation. In the past this has been the Polaris-missile-carrying submarine. It is being converted now to Poseidon, which will give. its an invulnerable com- ponent of the over-all deterrent through the '70s, and we are designing a follow-on system for the '80s. Increasing* in the future, we are going to have to rely on our sea-based systems. We then have conventional mks which we carry out. One is our peacetime overseas presence?the kind of thing we have been talking about: sea control and the projection of power Overseas. We control the seas with our aircraft carriers, capable of sinking surface ships, surfaced submarines, shooting down air- craft and, with our F-14 aircraft, shooting down the missiles from any one of those enemy sources. We use our killer sub- marines, our attack submarines, our destroyers. We project our power also with the aircraft from our carriers capable of projecting '600 and 700 miles inland, with our Marines capable of being projected from our am- phibious force, and with our merchant marine, which in Southeast Asia had to carry 96 per cent of the millions of tons required to support ourselves and our allies and which, even after the completion of the purchase of the very fine C-5A aircraft, will be required to carry 94 per cent of the? logistics to go on the surface of the seas. Even the aviation . gas to get that C-5A aircraft home so that it can carry a usable :load overseas has to go in surface ships. Q Admiral, if the aircraft carrier is so .important, why' don't the Soviets have any? A The Soviets started out way behind. Their first priority' was to scramble frantically to get a capability to deal with our superior Navy. That meant building submarines, and it meant blinding surface ships which would be expendable hut capable of firing a surface-to-surface missile in a first' strike against our carriers?hopefully to create enough dam,' ago that they could try to come in and finish up with sub-1 marines and aircraft. ? We are doing a number of things to negatethis?a whole host of things such as our own surface-to-surface missile. We're working hard on antimissile defense, and of course our carriers have a very high degree of invulnerability. Ct Is the biggest threat still the Soviet submarines? A Yes, because they have 3 times the number of sub- marines that we do, and they are building at roughly 21/ ? times the rate we're building. O What progress has been made in antisubmarine de- fenses? A We continue to improve our techniques. In my judg- ment, we know everything that we need to know in order to deal with the threat. Om problertn is to retain adequate forces to deal with it. We have the antisubmarine aircraft?the aircraft oper- ating from land bases, the antisubmarine aircraft operating from our aircraft carriers?we have the antisubmarine es- corts, we have our attack submarines, all of which are capable collectively of dealing with this threat if we are permitted to retain adequate numbers. O Are you going to have adequate numbers under the budget that you now are preparing? A The Congress reduced the Navy budget submitted by the President by 2 billion dollars in 1971. That represented a serious setback in our capability. There arc indications that the Congress will reduce the President's budget in 1972. If that happens, then once again our capability will take a further reduction. I don't know the size of AroveklePtirAtelehasen14199f019P02 addition we willlose. :CIA0-INGiRlefame4/400000000Mtaerinc force.. make the defense problem vastly more difficult? A Yes. They are faster, they're capable of remaining sub- - merged for longer periods ,of time, and they are therefore more of a threat than the diesel submarines. O Does that suggest that we might be losing ground? A The question has to be answered in two frames of refer- ence: We have made the. qualitative progress, and we have the know-how. The question is whether or not we will be permitted to retain the force levels necessary to do the job-- and that is a question that I can't answer. o Talking about know-how, are you satisfied with, the Navy's research programs? ? A T am. We need to continue always a vigorous research- and-development- program in order to stay ahead, because the Soviets are always making iinprovements in their sub- marine capabilities. But qualitatively I am satisfied with our present superiority. If we had the force levels to go with! it we would have no problem. Cr A couple of ideas have been talked about receollyt first, putting the land-based Minuteman missile at sea and, second, possibly sending our antiballistic missiles to sea to make them less vulnerable to a surprise attack. Do you see any virtue in either of these ideas? A Both of these ideas get into the field of strategic iu- clear balance, and that is something that is currently under ? negotiation in the strategic-arms-limitation talks with the Soviets. I think it would be preferable for me not to dis iss that. ? IN there an official policy against your talking about strategic systems? A None other than the obvious fact that when you have diplomatic negotiations going on, the better part of valor. , for a military man is to keep his mouth shut. 'TRAWLERS THAT NET INTELLIGENCE? I Admiral, what do you think about these Soviet 114%0- ! ers operating off mu. coasts? - A They are I here to collect all kinds of int dligence? everything from the most sophisticated kind of electronics , intelligence to picking lip debris dropped over the skip of our ships. ? What do you mean by "electronics intelligence"? A They record everything that they can hear in the electromagnetic spectrum?that is, our radars, radios anfl so , forth. They're interested in getting information on everything we have, in our order of battle ashore and at sea and in the . ; air: what kinds of radios we use, what kinds of frequencies; what kinds of radars we use, what their frequencies fare? things of that nature. -o tfas the Navy been keeping a pretty close watch on the possibility that the Soviets may still try to build a sub- marine base in Cuba? And why did they try to build one in the first place? A We keep a constantly close eye on it. What the Soviets would have gained had they achieved a base in Cuba is a capability to maintain about one third more missile submarines on station than they are nowl able to maintain. They also would have violated the agreements originally- arrived at between Chairman Khrushchey and Presiden Ken- nedy at die time of the Cuban missile crisis. And, the dare, I think President Nixon took a very important and bo !d and - courageous step in insuring that these understanding were r not violated. , ? Arc you sure that the Soviet Union in fact doesn't have a submarine base in Cuba? : ("114i14149440340(20020060492 of iSoviet ? subs in the Cull of Mexico or off our other coasts? I Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CPYRGHT : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 A 1 think I should limit myself to the statement that we do know that they arc there?that the Soviets do maintain missile Si ibmarines off our coasts. O Are they increasing the number of missile submarines off ow coasts? A They obviously have, since they used to have none and now they have some. They am also building the new Yankee class at a fantastic rate. Q If a Soviet submarine were to fire a missile from 100 miles offshore in the Atlantic toward Washington, D. C., would there be any defense against that kind of attack? A Yes. The best defense is to have your own missiles at sea where they can't be damaged by such an attack. I'm speaking about the threat of retaliation. In my:. judgment, it is the very best answer we have. Q Do you mean that antisubmarine-warfare devices won't really protect you 100 per cent of the time? A No?because it takes time to sink submarines, and it takes only a very few seconds to get missiles off. Therefore, if an enemy na- tion decides to strike first it is going to be able to get its missiles off before you're able to move in for an anti- submarine kill. o On another subject, Admiral: If we go to an all- volunteer military service, is this going to effect the kind of recruiting you've been able to do? Can the Navy mailman) the kind of (milli- at ive improvement you tined about. if there's no draft to encourage men to enlist? A First, it's absolutely clear that we had to have a two-year draft extension. There was zero prospect of achieving an all-volunteer force while continuing to fight the South Vietnam war with the large number of men required at its peak. Second, having gotten the extension, all of the service chiefs must do their very best to try to achieve the capability to get nothing but volunteers ,by 1973. We all know that the three services that are all-volunteer at the ? present time?Navy, Marines :Ind Air Force?arc only all- volunteer because there is a draft. Third, I'm not able to perceive how rapidly the country will recover from its typical, cyclical postwar syndrome. which involves a considerable inumber of mit people having a rather negative image of the military. And unless that is corrected there. will be lots of disinclinatine for the young man to volunteer to join the military force. He's got to feel that it's an honorable, worthwhile profession. Fourth, I don't know whether or not the pay scales will have been noule adequate by that time. Doesn'L the pay-seek increase in the Br 04000 on of the APPIPMA4RctriVtAtome a one? - A The pay increase is very heavily oriented to attracting the new man?and hasn't yet made a significant increase hi the pay el the 111111 who hos finished his first tou and is cote:idyl-Mg whether or not to re-enlist. ? Can you give us any idea of how many men cin re- enlist after completing, (H IC tour? A Dining. Ow las( six months of calendar 19fir it was 9.5 per cent. During the last six months or calender 1970 it was up to 16 per cent. In February and Mardh! of this year ii was 20 or 21 per cent. We need 35 per cent. O I low do you account for the increases so far? A T think its a combination of factors: continuing ens- 'Oasis on the need In improve conditions of life, begun by my predecessor and contineed by me?both of us working for a Secrelary of the Navy who is very interested in this field; in part the result of the economic downtime and in part- the rest& of the fact that there is a certain percentage of men who, when their country gets into the kind of trou- ble we're in, are patriotic enough to decide, "By go1ly6Em going to give it another gor o Are you getting those higher retention rates in the highly skilled ratings. that you need? A No?that's one of ow problems. We're doing better in the less-skilled ratings and not as well in the ratings involv- ing much more technical -education because those? young - met] obviously, cae draw much higher salaries on the outside, ? and it's more difficult to compete with civilian industry. This is true of all the serVices. Q What aboitt the officer corps? A In the officer corps we have three primary categories ? in the line?subioariners, aviators and surface officers. The retention of submarinc officers has been improving as a resnit of some improvements in the conditions of their detail- ing mid as a result of a bonus we're now able to pay nuclear SUbmariners as a result of legislation passed a year or so ago. In I he case of our aviation officers, retention rates ore also improving. As for i hi irfacc officer, tlw retention rates are not im- Famine. These are the officers who take the largest impact 11.,In din continuing long deployments of our surface Ahips ill 101Vigil %staters. "PEACE BY MILITARY STRENGTH"- - Q You spoke a moment ago about a "postwar syedrome" as a Mal ter of concern. Would you elaborate on that? A I hink there is a significant :minority who feels that the military services and military personnel arc simply no longer reit-iv:nit in the modern world. Foot manly, I believe (kit a respectable majority still con- I irmes to imderst and that, as thc President has suggested, yott can only have a generation of peace by maintaining the nec- essary military strength. ? Is this minority feeling gaining ground? A We have been going through- a period when it has been spreading, tin not able to perceive when the pendulem swing back. We do know that historically we've gone through this kind Of period alter each war. Vietnam is now the lengest and most unpopular war in our history. It may take a little longer for the pendolum to swing, but I believe that it clearly will, given the tremendnus efforts that the Prelident :and the Secretary of Defensc. arc making to insure that the people understand, and given the fact that if we conthitue to weaken ourselves it will be quite obvious from the wily in Which the world community begins to destabilize that we must- do more lommintain our military strength. : CIPPRITif07,9-0T110, 009200200001e-2n"?",41 re- futer. your snore estantisnment mut save money %yowl you could net into nen, vcapons systems? A we could and should reduce our shore establish- ment as our fleet comes down in Si7.P. We r:111110i: however, dir,Rtititi4e 119991199/02 s save great Aivirtimille.i year you 15fni-OSt not ting necause tnere are closing cOsts. Alit I would say, as a erysial-ball guess, that if we were able to dose all those bases that we ought to dose. ' we could save something ori the order of a quarter of a bil- lion dollars per year: "WE NOW EXPECT MORE FROM ALLIES"--: o Does the Nixon Doctrine hold out some substantial hope of being able to abandon some of your bases in the Far East, for example? Could you scrap them all and move back to Pearl Harbor? A I would hope that the day would never come when the United States is forced to fall back to Pearl. You remem- ber that's where we started when we had to begin the long, costly fight all the way back across the Western Pacific after the attack against us at Pearl Harbor. The forward basing that we now have is going to change somewhat in concept. That is, under the Nixon Doctrine we've come to expect Pinch more from our allies' contribut- ing to their own strength. But we are always going ItO want bases in some areas overseas as a substitute for a Ouch larger and more expensive number of forces that we would have to maintain in order to keep our ships supplied, and so forth. Q So you're not seriously thinking of falling back over the next three to five years? A No. As far as the Navy is concerned, I believe we're going to want to maintain bases in most of the countries where we're now based. There will be some retrenchments, hitt none of major proportions. O Several years ago there was talk of building some fairly large bases in Australia. has this gone by the hoard? nPYRGHT A There's nothing currently on the horizon with regard : Ciik-RDP7944494A00020020800/N12 snme' ba-se improvements on their own. Some Australians talk about an alliance?a naval group- ing of Japan, Indonesia, Australia?to protect trade routes through the Malacca Strait into the Indian Ocean. Is that at all feasible? A Under the Nixon Doctrine we will make every use of Allied forces that are available in any kind of a crisis situation. if, for example, there were a crisis involving, say, the In- donesian area and if the President determined that our na- tional interest required it, or the Indonesians felt threatened and joined with us in management of that crisis, certainly any forces they had would be welcomed. ? We have treaty commitments with the Japanese and with the Australians, and the President has stated that treaty commitments would be honored. ? Are you happy about the pace at which the Japanese are picking up their naval defenses?' A I think the Japanese Navy has made significant prog- ress. They started from a very, very low figure, as yotOcnow. I would hope to see them do more in the years ahead. ? One final question: Is it not. a fact, Admiral, that the Russian Navy has not been tested in battle since the Russo- Japanese War almost 70 years ago? A Not quite a fact. The Russian Navy had some engage- ments in World War. 1 and in World War II. They did a relatively pitiful job. They have certainly demonstrated a much greater degree of professionalism in the last quarter of a century, and a very rapidly increasing degree of professionalism in the last 10 years. ? I consider them a first-class professional outfit. SWISS REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS August 1971 'Lae Soviet i1ee in Lae ivi,eciitprrankNa4 A.% ??? ? ? ' ? % Arnold Hottmger .g CPYRGHT ? The Soviet-Egyptian pact of May 27 will help .retain for Soviet 'warships their docking, supply and repair facilities in the harbors of Alexandria and Port Said. The Syrian harbor of Latakiya will doubt- less &leo- remain open to them, although on a less secure footing. In Egypt the Soviets. also have,.wtiich are completely in their hands, manned' by Russian trocip's and ground crews. It. is..Icnowp that there are at least four such. bases, three near the Mediterranean coast between Burj al-Arab and Alexandria and at . least one to the south near Luxor. From these bases Soviet pilots, flying Mig aircraft with Egyptian markings, undertake regular flights over the Mediterranean. In an emergency situation they could fill the gap created by the ab- sence of aircraft carriers in the Soviet Mediter- ranean fleet. In Luxor, which is now barred to tourists, the Soviet pilots reportedly begin operations daily at k a. m. and finish at about 4 p. m. Word is also circulating in Cairo about lively construction Approved For RPlease 1999/0 02 ? activity by Soviet- marine engineers near Marsa Matrurr on the coast of the western desert., ,where. Rommel once had his headquarters. This area is also' barred to foreign travellers. It seems that, in' a narrow rocky bay, a harbor is being constructed which could serve as d ref* for submarines. rn addition to the purely Soviet-run facilities there are also joint Soviet-Egyptian airbases, missile stations, training camps and so forth. The Soviet .Union's intentions must doubtless be seen in connection with the old Russian dream I of "access to the warm seas." This is an eminently ' imperialist dream. For the Czarist empire, it meant competing with the great European colonial powers. Colonial policy IN- th6 19 th ten ttiey- 'Wag -Baled -45-n? the proverbialAgunboats..The Russian dream meant that the Czarist empire also wished to send its gun- boats out into. the seas of the world as instruments of expansionist policy. In the 20th century, however, there is no "classical" colonial policy any longer. CIA-RDP79-0119AA000200200001-2 .M.?.P,17f\,1). Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CPYRGHT CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 but there is that which the Soviet ideologues and the politicians of the Third World term "neo-colo- nialism." By this they mean the economic and power superiority which the industrially developed nations have over less developed or underdeveloped lands. The Soviet Union partakes of this superiority. Its navy is an instrument designed to make that supe- riority felt for its own benefit. In the political sphere an ultimate issue is whether the Third World, in the more or less distant future, will attach itself to or incline toward the Soviet power bloc or whether it will prefer and manage to establish' a free political system which would automatically bring it into closer contact with the democratic Western world and make it view the Communist system with mistrust. The presence of a combat fleet of one or another great power near the coasts of developing countries can have an important influence on the decisions taken there. -? 1Tis process is well illustrated by the present ease of the Mediterranean island of Malta. Poor and over-populated, the island is compelled to co- operate with great toreign powers. As long as the ern powers had the Mediterranean to the.m- , selves, Malta was constrained to seek its partner ? in the West despite severe friction between the !Maltese, or at least important groups among them, and their former British colonial masters. Financial support from London could only be obtained, or at least kept at a high level, if 'the Britiih maintained their bases on the island. Now, following a change in government, Malta has decided to regard its agreements about those bases .as null and void. Dom ?Mintoff, the island's new prime minister, can afford to do this because of the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean. Malta's strategic value for Great Britain and NATO is no longer so great today. Sicily is not far off, where airbases arc available free of charge. But there is a serious danger that Malta may eventually give the Soviet Union the right to maintain strategic bases on the island and the NATO powers cannot afford to ignore this possibility. Miritoff is probably trying to exploit this situation in order to extract higher compensation for the use of the 'bases. Great Britain and NATO are faced with the choice of yielding to this blackmail or rejecting it. Without the .Soviet .presence they could easily turn thumbs down?in fact the whole matter would probably never have arisen. Malta is forced to sell its Strategic position in order to live, and the Russians are possible buyers. The island could easily take a "neutralist" course, leaning to- ward Moscow, and finally it might even form an alliance with the USSR based on the Egyptian model. There are other countries in the Mediterranean in whicIAPPPGMICieEQinasilieaS euitnAgAig2 stable so that, in the long run, similar developments might be possible. Aside from the Arab countries, where feelings are getting progressively deeper about Israel and Western support for the Jewish state, there are dictatorially governed states such as Greece and Spain in which, although they are presently dominated by the extreme right, there is always the danger of a domestic political swing to the other extreme, because the moderate forces in these countries are suppressed and in the event of a shake- up would have a much more difficult time gaining prominence than the groups of the extreme left, which are always present and working underground. Turkey too is undoubtedly heading for a difficult period just now and it cannot be predicted with certainty that the moderate forces which are present there and currently dominate in the government .and the military will be able to continue in control. Mt? Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean has an I eminently political task. This means, however, that the Mediterranean itself cannot be its final goal, representing merely a way-station along a route of penetration which runs through the Suez Canal into the Red Sea and on to the Indian Ocean. The number of potential political objectives beyond Suez is incomparably greater. On the Red Sea there is Sudan, if Moscow chooses to make the effort to penetrate such a large and heavily populated country. Saudi Arabia may sooner or later experience a revolution, and this would open the way to the Persian Gulf for whichever great power would be on the spot at the right time and offer its protection to the "revolutionaries" on the Arabian Peninsula or impose it upon them. Further to the south lies restless Eritrea, where a stubborn though small- caliber guerrilla war is already in progress against the Ethiopian emperor ancr his army. In general Ethiopia, one of the last multi-ethnic empires in the style of old Austria, will doubtless be faced by . difficult times when Emperor Haile Selassie dies. And just to the south, the "Issa and Afar" of , Djibouti are waiting for the end of French colonial rule to leap at each other's throats, a conflict in which Somalia wants to have its say. On the western side of the Red Sea, Yemen has ? developed into a momentarily stable country which is ' making rapid progress with Western aid. But in South Yemen (Aden) the Chinese enjoy significant political influence and are using it to maintain a guerrilla movement. in Dhofar (Muscat and Oman) which, should it develop further, cannot fail to have an effect on the already disorderly?and apparently irrevocably so?conditions in the interior of the Persian Gulf, with its antagonistic sheikdoms. And ' beyond there spreads the Indian Ocean. : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001 -2 79 CPYRGHT are at a severe disadvantage because o?Ctileir support 7 of Israel. This might be another reason for America's desire to open the Canal. With Suez reopened, thp struggle for influence would be transferred to regiohs where, aside from the important Arab coasts of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, the Western camp would not be burdened by Arab resentment about Israel. The proposals of Tunisian foreign minister Mas- moudi, which have recently been repeated and which suggest more active economic assistance from the European countries to the Maghreb states, must be understood in the context of the present power struggle. If it would be possible to transplant "European prosperity" to the Maghreb, the possibil- ity of future Soviet influence there would be partially eliminated. Today it seems rasher, a. utopian COTO' cept, but nevertheless a fully prospering Mediter- ranean might become such an unrewarding political objective for the Soviet Union that it could possibly evolve into that "Sea of Peace" about which the advocates of a "European"? or a "neutralist" Mediter- ranean policy speak so avidly. ADDrovcd For Rhc CC13C Once it can salt t rough t e Suez Canal, the Soviet fleet will be faced by an embarrassment of riches in choosing the point at which it should first try to bring Soviet influence to bear in favor of one or another local "progressive" force. But as long as the Canal remains closed there is hardly another part of the world so remote from the Soviet Union as ? the politically promising Red Sea and financially luring Persian Gulf. In view of these rewarding possibilities the Soviets might even tem- porarily reduce their pressure on the Mediterranean if they could thereby pin access to the Red Sea. This may be part of Wg'shington's calculations in an effort to open the Canal.'iThe USA would apparently ? like to thus dampen the 'danger of an explosion h.% the Mediterranean, although this would admittedly1 mean a tremendous expansion of the :Soviet radius of action on the world seas. However, as long as efforts to reopen the Canal remain fruitless the Mediterranean will doubtless continue to be the main field for maneuvering. On the Arab coasts of the Mediterranean the Americans NEWSWEEK 19 July 1971 CPYRGHT Mediterranean Tide Runs for the Russians BY ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE Senior Editor A71.ANTIC OCEAN , .1 ' > c_T r l . ' Q.- ????? Darcelona i i. !. '' PA&AMNIA Cvliz . E ' D ? ?I r Rr?In 4,N lit c.,,r1-....... ft?,,sf - N :?-, Gilmiltar Sinnnel 49 IsIn da la NM* ...ill... Algi-err."--1-? -.Nrnitra ---1'.-1.-7....-, If,rs?err 1, Tunis FRANCE Genoa Nic? EyEa VIllohariche SPAIN RUMANIA YUGOSLAVIA L'?11 '1 5' BULGARIA "- ? Istanbul ? S N ? (GREECE U.S.S.R. tILACK SLA' TURKEY L MOROCCO ALGERIA TUNISIA SOVIET BASE aSOVIET FACILITY SOVIET REQUEST ce FOR FACILITY SOVIET ANCHORAGE 0 LIVPANIfy 0 U.S. SASE ? U.S. FACILITY ImALTA Tripoli I 0 s LIBYA b. 4 . ? "P Kythera cum "Louob tor (e* N ,g4 Benue Tobruk') (Saium Mersa Ma Iskenderini?' latOla cyrrv..ts 1)Ycl LEFIAtIQN ISRAEL ,r E Port Said ruh Alexandria I EGYPT , Russia vs. the U.S. in the Mediterranean: A tireless drive to change the balance of power lb Ohlonon Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 3u , IT 1 n1/.1t Pr.;: PYRGHT ? ,s19w9e,Q,,,,104102 a young naval intelligence officer could hardly contain his admiration for the latest Soviet warships steaming in the Mediterranean .Sea "That's a beau- ty," he said, pointing to a photographic blowup of a Kresta-class guided-missile cruiser. "There's nothing,like it on our side." Standing nearby, Vice Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, the commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, readily agreed. "A humdinger," he said of the Soviet ship. "Only 3,500 tons. But it's got the punch of a pocket battleship." Nowadays, . the Soviet Union packs quite a wallop in the Mediterranean. On a typical day last week, the wall-to-wall situation room (map) at NATO's surveil- lanre headquarters in Naples bristled with symbols for Soviet men-o'-war: 55 versus the 44 in the Sixth Fleet (map). And Russian political influence in the strategically important inland sea has grown apace with its fleet. Last week, the Kremlin dispatched Ambassador Mikhail Smirnovsky to the Maltese capi- tal of Valletta in hopes of securing an embassy in the onetime British posses- sion. Both British and American spokes- men professed to see no throat to the NATO installation on Malta, doubting that its newly elected leftist Premier will turn over those naval facilities to the Russians. But there was no mistaking their fear?expressed also by Israeli De- fense Minister I\ toNhe Dayan last week? that the stwei , ssful Soviet penetration of the Mediterranean is bringing nbont ft fundamemal change in the balance of power in the area. There is no question in my mind that the Russians see America's loss of taste for international leadership as the oppor- tunity to become the dominant power in the Mediterranean and, ultimately, in the entire Eurasian land mass and adjacent oceans. U.S. admirals in the Mediterranean claim to be confident that, in the event of a military showdown, the Sixth Fleet could still overwhelm the Soviet fleet and fulfill its "second strike" nuclear mission against assigned targets in East Europe and southern Russia. This claim to naval superiority is evidently based on the American fleet's two aircraft carriers, ships whose firepower the Soviet fleet cannot matcb on d ship-to-ship basis. But it is worth remembering that the newly installed Russian tactical air force in Egypt?which has recently been dug into 220 hardened sites?can fly cover for the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean and, if need be, attack the U.S. flattops. More- over, some military experts are convinced that the two U.S. carriers have already been effectively neutralized by the latest Soviet guided-missile cruisers to arrive in the sea. Finally, the ships of the U.S. fleet are of much older vintage than the Russian vessels, and at the present rate of the851,11Velplqdlcortlerleasit4999/09/02 : -errancan cot will clear- ly surpass the American armada in po- ? 1 icrpo Al e.flWWi? . est Eitropcans, this expansion of Soviet power is directly re- lated to critical changes in the American home front. Tin Europeans realize that the hitter test o of the Viet nnin war has soured the U.S, on overseas commit- ments, and they, me cooling to believe that they may keen have to fend for themselves. But with the proliferation of Soviet power in the Mediterranean and along Europe's oil-supply routes, Mos- cow hopes to discourage a separate Eu- ropean defense effort as futile, thereby enoeuraging a trend toward West Eu- ropean neutralism. The combination of neo-isolationism in the U.S. and neutral- ism in Europe could be the mix that re- moves the Sixth Fleet from the Mediter- ranean without a shot being fired. Raymond Cartier, one of Europe's most widely respected journalists, re- cently wrote: "America has given Eu- rope a quarter of a century of Invul- nerability but Europe has not had the foresight to transfer some of its opulence to the problem of its own security. The withdrawal of American forces in the relatively near future is a.certainty. The Mediterranean is now blanketed by So- viet naval power lapping against Eu- rope's southern coastline. The northern front has also been outflanked by the same Soviet naval power reaching into the Atlantic." Disarray: If Europe existed as more than a geographic expression, there might be an alternative to U.S. power. But many countries that now might wish to reduce their dependence on one or the other of the two superpowers re- gretfully conclude that there will be no European alternative for a long time to come. The European monetary union project, a prerequisite for an integrated European defense community, was dealt yet another blow in the Franco-German summit meeting last week when Chan- cellor Willy Brandt and President . Ceerges Pompidou failed to reach agree- ment on the status of the floating Deutsche mark (page 69). This kind of Enropean disarray, coupled widi the fact that the U.S. is already in retreat?al least psychologically?means that things will continue to go Russia's Wil y in an area of vital concern to the entire West- ern world, Nlany Western officials and minim. 11- [alms, convinced that gunboat diplomacy is dead in on age of imilti-licaded nu- clear missiles, have dismissed the Soviet effort in the Mediterranean as wasti?ftd and useless. But the Soviets Lnow better. 1,1,'hoti Egyptian President AllWar Sadat piirged pro-Soviet plotters from Ins en- tourage two months ago, Moscow man- aged to morn than offset its losses; it swiftly extracted front Sadat mm new fif- teen-year treaty that tied Egypt even closer to the Soviet (bean. Among the mow reasons that led Sadat to sign the viet presence in the Niediterrimean was visible proof of Mos- '0 041009200200001 -2 ; covvs .?? k.iii CPYRGHT 301-2 vacuum: he same 1,111(1 of gunbthit. di.phuilApprovedf OrRele*Sel 999/09/02 II conntrics alt :ming the iNorth African and European littorals of the Mediterranean in the years to come. Nonalignmeut is tantamount to a power vacuum iii the Soviet hook, and with the itildraWal of 'Western influence from North Africa, the Soviets are making a determined effort to move in. Morocco, the last remaining, monarchy in North Africa, is ripe for revolution?as last week's attempt to remove King Hassan showed?and the Soviets would be hap- py to help. Europe-oriented Tunisia, squeezed between revolutionary regimes in Algeria and Libya?and heavily de-. pendent on ailing President Habib Bour- gniba?would he another likely target. This Soviet power in the Mediterrane- an basin will also make itself felt in the critically important Persian Gulf area once the Suez Canal is reopened. The gulf area supplies 60 per cent of West Europe's and 90 per cent of Japan's fuel needs. The British are phasing out of the gulf later. this year and the U.S. has no intention?or desire?to fill the power gap. Moreover, London's plan for a gulf feder- ation has collapsdd and the oil sheikdoms are about to Opt for independence. "A few modern Soviet warships calling regu- larly at those ports and entertaining im- pressionalde sheiks will work miracles," a longtime gtilf resident told my. "Espe- cially if there ism() conntervailing U.S. force." It won't be long before the sheiks realize where thl: real power lies. T114! Soviets already liave twenty new war- ships on station in the Indian Ocean (as against two U.S. ships). Anticipating the reopening of the l Suez Canal, they have also just completed construction of a new naval base at Port Sudan on the Red Sea (in return for frge MIG's and tanks for the Sudanese), halfway between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Should the Soviets successfully expand their Mediterran3an presence into this part of the world they would be able to exercise addition 1 political leverage on Western Europe by controlling its sources of oil. Detente: No nue suggests that Ulu So-, : OlAsRDP719914V4A100006200 iternmean in wnittever torce they wisn, and in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf for that Mat -er. But what is needed is a credible conntervailing force. In- stead, America is ?tilling out, and Europe is dithering. In the past five years, NATO forces in Central Europe have been al- lowed to run down by 2.5 per cent (in- chiding the loss of 500- aircraft). During the same time, Soviet forces alone, on the same front, I increased by six di visions. Despite U.S..S pledges to maintain and improve its !strength in Europe, it. was revealed two weeks ago that two Air Force squadrsms were pulled out of Europe in 1970 without a word being said to America's European allies. "The very prospects of d?nte," commented the outgoing NATO civilian chief, Manlio Brosio, last week, 'have created a climate in Western opinion in favor of tin ila tenth- ly reducing NATO force levels." Mos- cow, of coo Se, remains unencumbered by the restraints of public opinion, and whenever anyone in the West tries to halt the drift toward a lax defense pos- ture, the Russians fire off accusations that such talk impedes d?nte. EVCII more important than Soviet in- tentions, however, is the American trend toward introspection and isolation. "The steady encroachment of Congress on the President's ability to conduct foreign pol- icy," one of Europe's leading policymak- ers told me recently, "means that a for- mal pledge isn't what it used to be." Moreover, the release of the Pentagon papers has, in a sense, vindicated those in the U.S. who regard power politics as evil and un-American. But, that doesn't mean that the power realities will oblige us by simply disappearing. Under these circumstances, Europeans are keeping their options open. Even Franco Spain and the colonels in Greece are doing what they can to improve rela- tions with Moscow. For by conveying the impression that over the next few years domestic affairs will enjoy priority over foreign affairs, America is, in effect telling Moscow: "This is your round in the Mediterranean. Make the most of it." It is an absolute certainty that the Russians will do just that. 32 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 TIME CPYRGHT 28 June 1971 Soviet Thrust in the Mediterranean NW I he spy will appear," murmured the signal officer of the cruiser Dzerzhitisky as thc Soviet vessel eau- tionsl y approached the Bosporus on its voyage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. "What spy?" asked the man at his side, an keestio correspondent who was aboard the cruiser because Defense Min- ister Andrei Grcchko, Fleet Admiral .Sergei Gorshkov and General Aleksei Yepishev, the top political commissar for the Soviet military, were paying a visit to Moscow's Mediterranean fleet. "The American destroyer," said the signal officer. "It always glues itself to 'us as soon as we pass through these nar- rows." Sure enough, the Dzerthinsky had no sooner passed Istanbul when a Sixth Fleet destroyer, the U.S.S. Rick- etts. took position alongside. Surveil- lance was so close that the exasperated captain of the Dzerzhinsky finally flashed a message: "Sir, this is not Broad- way. Please find a safer place for your promenade." Formidable Force. The skipper of the Rickettx was acting out of habit. Since World War II, the Mediterranean has been an American promenade from the Dardanelles to Gibraltar, 2,330 miles to the west. A formidable task force of warships and combat-ready Marines was posted in the Mediterranean to protect thc southern flank of NATO, to "project force ashore" in thc event of political cri- ses.* and simply to show the U.S. flag. For a long time the Mediterranean was an American lake; any warship sighted was bound to be either friendly, neu- tral or innocuous. Since 1964, however, the U.S. has increasingly had to share its mare nos- ? tram with a constantly growing Rus- sian fleet. Today the two forces arc very nearly equal. The Sixth Fleet, com- manded by Vice Admiral Isaac C. Kidd Jr. (who will shortly move up- ward to become head of the Naval Ma- terial Command and he replaced by Vice Admiral Gerald. E. Miller), con- sists of 45 ships, including three air- craft carriers, along with four sub- marines, 200 planes and 25,000 men. Under Vice Admiral V.N. Leonenkov, the Soviet force, an arm of the Black Sea fleet, consists of 40 to 60 ships, ten to 13 submarines and as many as 10,000 men?but no aircraft except * it happened only once, in 1958, when Ma- those aboard the helicopter carriers Mos- kva ? or Leningrad. U.S. combat ships on the average arc 19 years old; the Rus- sian fleet averages only seven years. Of . all Soviet warships serving in international waters, fully one-half are assigned to the Mediterranean. Says Kidd: "We walk a tightrope of adequacy." In The Baffle Zone. U.S. officers are understandably alarmed by this shifting of balances. Soviet naval strength on all oceans has been growing with re- - markable rapidity for several years now (Timis cover, Feb. 23, 1968). "Nothing stops them," admits Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "They are moving in every- where." Nowhere is this more true than in the Mediterranean. Warns U.S. Ad- miral Horacio Rivcro Jr. the diminu- tive (5 ft. 3 in.) commander of NATO forces in southern Europe: "What was traditionally NATO's southern flank has dtweloped into its southern front. The Mediterranean, which was for NA-1?0 part of the zone of thc interior, a rear area, is now within the battle zone." Con- cern fillers down to officers at sea with the fleet, "There is nn feeling now of being on a second team." says Captain John E. Ilamen, skipper of the 62,000- Ion carrier Froriklin D. Roosevelt. Says Commander Richard. Hopper, who heads the Roos/we/es 75-plane air group; "This used to he a sunshine cruise. Pilots vol- unteered from here for Viet Nam. Now the,act ion is here." The Russians have become a con- stant threat in the Mediterranean be- cause they have learned to keep their hips on station and, as the U.S. does, re- supply them. at sea with the four es- sential. b's?hombs, bullets, beans and black oil. At the same time. Soviet di- plomacy has carved out several im- portant auxiliary pork for the fleet along the Mediterranean coasts. Among them are Latakia in Syria and Alexandria and Port Said in Egypt. The Russians, who now sail the western Mediterranean more frequently. have also shown an in- terest in using the Algerian seaport of Mers-el-Kehir. Last week they got an- other potential port of call when M il ta J ahoy Party won a one-vote ma- jority in dm island's Parliament. Malta has long ['yen the Unsinkable aircraft carrier of I c British Mediterranean de- fense syste -a, but Labor Party Leader Dom Mint 'If won thc election partly rines waded onto Beirut beaches strewn with by promisii the island's 320 000 in- Coca-Colatomor nPoriRrelerseb11999/09fin :w0tA4RD01.7c941194A000200200001-2 ties to protect 'a' pro- estern Lebanese go to?the West The Russians do not real- ernment front a coup. ly need an, her naval base, but they ? may find .irresistible the idea of just . showing the red flag on an island that Ws loag a NATO bastion and won Brit- ain's George Cross for heroism in World War It. : Historic Roles. In connection with Grechko's visit hist week, hvestin em- phasized Russia's ancient historic role in the. Mediterranean, tracing its be- ginnings to a navigation treaty signed ? by the Priniipolity of Kiev in the 10th century. Th :. Russian presence in the Mediterranqin was forcefully reaffirmed in 1770 wh61 Admiral Orlov defeated the Turkish fleet at Tchcsme. Later the :Russians made a series of amphibious landings on the Ionian islands and even captured Corfu in 1799. "No. we arc not guests in this sea," crowed lzgestia. "Many glorious victories of our people .are connected with it." (frycstia con- veniently forgets, of course, that soon af- terward the Russians gave up Corfu and were bottled up behind the Bos- Port's by the Crinican War.) The U.S. is equally insistent on its Mediterranean rights, which date back to Stephen De- catur's arrival in 1803 to fight the Bar- bary pirates. With both superpowers patrolling : the Mediterranean in force, the grim game of surveillance is played in dead earnest. Both sides are particularly vig- ilant for submarines, which arc difficult to &feet in the shallow waters whcrc thermal layers and the screws of some 2,000 meNhantmen on any day dis- tort sound. The watch is most intense at six main "choke points," or "ticket gates," as Admiral Kidd calls them. through which maneuvering submarines must pass. These arc Gibraltar, the sea sonth, of Sardinia and Sicily, and the areas' between Crete and Greece, Crete and North Africa, and Crete and Turltey. Both sides keep watch on the ehoke points. At the same time, surface ships frequently shadow one another. Cruising aboard the Roo- sevelt .e rently, Tim!: Correspondent it.. John Sh; w was Star m tled to come on deck on morning to find that during thc night ,a Soviet Kashin-class destroyer had taken station 500 yds. away. Triple Trailers. The same shadow played aloft, but there arc ial rules. Soviet TU-I6 Bad- crs with Egyptian markings I Cairo West airbase to fol- low the Sixth Fleet and look for Po- laris submarines. Whenever .they gct game Is very spe ger born fly out CPYRGHT near the uAppEaved.FordReleastV979,9142toRVWAngip1 , a alert" is sounded. and Phantom jos on neutralizing the Sixth Fleet. For arc catapulted off the carriers to keep this purpose they have assembled an im- pressive array of missile power aboard their ships. including the 22-mile-range Styx aboard small gunboats, the 100. mile Strela aboard destroyers, and the 400-mile, supersonic Shaddock aboard Soviet cruisers. To defend itself against the Russian missiles, the Sixth Fleet has patched to- gether new responses in recent months. Two 240-ton patrol gunboats superpow- erect by jet engines have 'been trans- ferred from Viet Nam as an experiment. The gunbdats move so swiftly (top speed: 40 knots) that their crews must he strapped into their stations. Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., who is Chief of Naval Operations, has dubbed them "tri- ple trailers" because they are assigned to lurk behind the Soviet vessels that trail U.S. ships. Rethinking Roles. The U.S. is also fit- ting out some ships -with surface-to-sur- face standard missiles that have 35- to the Badgers from getting too close. The Phantoms always approach grad- ually and at an angle. sometimes draw- ing abreast of the Soviet planes. On one such occasion. a Phantom pilot was surprised to sec his Soviet coun- terpart hold up a centerfold from, or all things, Playboy magazine. The two fleets have one mission in common. Kidd estimates that much of his time, like that of the Soviets, is spent in showing the flag around the Mediterranean. Beyond that, however. the two forces have vastly different roles. The U.S. carriers and their Phan- toms still have an offensive nuclear ca- pacity against East bloc targets. Half the fleet's planes are kept in the air at all times in order to make certain that a strprisc Soviet missile attack would not sink the entire Sixth Fleet LoNG[R, A. NATO nieriibers 0 SPAIN ct- itnin 0 Q.. (Its. Peinrii base) (;i1vrtillor (8.) MOROCCO FRANCE (oomoilifori member) qmpontogat tivreetne more efficient Harpoon missiles will he introduced. In addition, in an unusual move for a nation that has traditionally developed its own weapons, the U.S. is .considering buying either the Israeli stir- face-to-surface Gabriel missile or the French Exocet. Ultimately the Navy and the Ad- ministration will have to make some new decisions about the Sixth Fleet's makeup and mission. It now defends NATO'S supply lines, provides a sall but sinewy landing force, supports and protects the Polaris nuclear submarines that operate out of the U.S. bases of Rota, Spain, and Holy Loch. Scotland, .and furnishes a nuclear punch in case of war. With aging ships and outmoded ordnance, it is difficult enough to carry out those assignments. Since the fleet is taking on the added mission .of neu- tralizing the Russians, the job may be .growing close to impossible. AMERICAN LAKE W. GER. ... Worsoof U. S. S. R. : HUNGARY C?"6^i PC41 et ItOdcra ? ' ' , ..s, -' ?' . 1 :? Sevastopol I / ? / Black Sea. le 1?Soviet supply line .. (NATO HO) GREECE /....? '.... ;juul R- K E y , NnOlco ? ?,? ? sr a / ' Corfu? I \ Moho d --"'"'1/4--- ? ? U.S. SIMI ILCET ? 45 ships, 4 mihmtnInos, 700 idicroill, 25,000 mon "' Latatki4 ......4441.......: SOVIET FLEET Me, rt,s.. ISRAEL ? 40 60 shIpi o ,10-13 bmorines, . nikliviAN'A ? ? 7-10,000 mon I TAL'Y RUMANIA 31 I' 41 I a P rat n en ?AlemotT?Kehir (imtrible future Sovint bore) barttrineller ALOE R IA TUNISIA A Soviet port of con 200 A00 mi. T114 r Mop hy V. Nei. LIBYA Cairn Wcat- A 641 (Soviet Sado,' homipers/ '? ? FGYPi 34 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 AIA-pP79-01194A000110n008021-2 UNCTAD III - BUSINESS OR POLEMICS? In the attached backgrounder and press reprints is evidence to support the contention that UNCTAD-III, scheduled for Santiago in mid-April, will produce little but rancor. If anything, with President Allende running the show (and abetted by Cuba, the latest "non-developed" to join the club), this session of UNCTAD promises to be pointedly anti-the-developed and more particularly, anti- U.S. Delegates are expected to come from some 140 countries; the topic has world-wide appeal. During the period between now and the opening of the conference, we suggest exploitation of points made in the backgrounder with the aim of somewhat muting the astring- ent propaganda that can be expected from UNCTAD III: the pro- government and government-controlled media of Chile can be relied on for thoroughly subjective reporting of conference proceedings. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 ''.5?LnimIPPT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY March 1972 UNCTAD III - BUSINESS OR POLEMICS? The third United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop- ment (UNCTAD-III) is scheduled for mid-April to meet in Santiago, Chile, where President Salvador Allende will use the occasion, as he says himself "to break the deliberate campaign of lies and calumnies launched against our people from within and without." That Allende is pouring some $9 million into constructing a theatrical showcase to house the conference is indicative of the importance he attaches to UNCTAD-1110 Allende wants to use the conference to show the world his government's "progress on the democratic road to socialism" and to prove that his government is attacking Chile's economic problems intelligently. Now some Chilean officials are saying that con- struction of the theater-office complex and provision of adequate accommodations -- in less than a year -- is too ambitious an under- taking, particularly given other domestic economic problems. Allende has already called off an international trade fair that was to run simultaneously with the meeting. He had envisioned a sumptuous display of Third World products, but only the developed nations responded. And now, construction of the conference hall is lagging so far behind that there is doubt it can be finished before UNCTAD convenes. In addition to Allende's stated aim of using UNCTAD as a propaganda forum, other new factors are likely to have consider- able bearing on the political climate at UNCTAD. In October, under the sponsorship of Chile and Peru, Cuba joined the so-called "Group of 77" -- made up of the 95 developing countries which participate in UNCTAD. Foreign Minister Raul Roa, Cuba's delegate to the October preparatory meeting of the "Group of 77" held in Lima, told that assembly that Cuba was participating in the Lima meeting "because it was Latin American and Socialist. . .Cuba will continue to support, through international agencies and outside them, the just demands and revolutionary struggles of the peoples of Africa and Asia." The Third World, Roa said, would have to change its structure and outline a proper policy of liberation and development, though this change would not necessarily have to be socialist. Another new factor will be the first delegation from Peking to attend such an international gathering. China's possible influence on the "Group 77" remains a question mark, but at the time of the Lima meeting, New China News Agency said on 5 November that the Group's call for unity against "big-power hegemony" had become the main current of the conference. It also quoted at length from Raul Roa's speech. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 It is anticipated that some 2,600 delegates plus 500 journalists will come to UNCTAD-III representing some 140 countries, 50 inter- governmental organizations and 40 nongovernmental groups. Santiago, a city of three million people, has hotel rooms to house 1,600 delegates. The other 1,000 or so will go to furnished apartments or private homes. A correspondent's visit to UNCTAD headquarters revealed considerable confusion as to who would sleep where or with whom. 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 "program of action." African delegates appeared particularly upset by the re- sults. One said that the that the action program only "pape ?cd over the cracks" of the interregional disputes. The countries represented at the Li na meeting belonged to a loose organization called the .Group of 77. Actually, there are 9! countries in the group- ing, v hich p,ot its natne from :the number of nations repre- sentec at the founding meeting ,in Alt iers four years ago. linens fication of Protectionism' LUNA, :Nov. 8 (AP) ? Dele- gates of the Group of 77 today criticked the "intensification of pr )tectionistn" among the develcped countries and called on the United States to lift its 10 pc ? cent surcharge on im- ports. CPYRGHOProved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 CPYRGHT NEW YORK TIMES 9 November 1971 80 Poor Nations Warn Rich Gap Cannot Remain Indefinitely LTMA, Peru, Nov. 8 (Reuters) ? Developing na- tams or Atrica, Asia ana Latin America told the rick countries today that "indefinite co- existence between poverty and affluence is no longer possible." The warning came in a preamble to a Declaration of Lima, adopted by delegates of 80 countries who have been meeting here since Oct. 25 to develop a joint strategy for the next confrontation with the industrialized nations. The indications were, however, that they have not succeeded in re- solving regional differences to that had been hoped in preparation for the third United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, due in Santiago, Chile, in April. With that conference in mind, the delegates also adopted a CPYRGHT NEW YORK TIMES 21 October 1971 CUBA IS ACCEPTED IN ECONOMIC BLOC Becomes the 95th Member of Influential Group of Developing Countries By KATHLEEN TELTSCH Special to The limo York Times UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Oct. 20?Cuba has been ac- In a program drafted for presentntion at the United Na- tions Conference on Trade and Development in April, they also I called on the developed na- tions to establish a generalized ' system of trade preferences favoring the developing na- tions. The delegates, who asked that any modification of the international monetary system take into account the interests of the developing nations, said they recognized the authority of the International Monetary Fund in dealing with such problems, but they asked for increased voting rights for the developing nations. Lag in Per Capital Income The group pointed out that while average per capita an- nual income increased by $650 in the developed nations dur- ing the nineteen-sixties, it grew by only $40 in the developing countries. The participation of the de- veloping nations in world cae? ports diminished from 21.3 per cent in 1960 to 17.6 per cent in 1970, according to the final document. . The group agreed to intensify efforts in the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity to bring about the re- opening of the Suez Canal, closed since the 1967 Arab-Is- reed war. The Afrikan delegates had sought a demand for the with- drawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territory occupied dur- ing the 1997 war, but Asian and Latin-American nations refused to support the proposal on grounds that it was too poll- dee!. CPYRGHT depted as the 95th member of an influential but loose group- ing of developing countries that seek to formulate a joint strategy to protect their eco- nomic interests. This decision was made last night at a meeting held in a conference room here. How- ever, Israel failed to gain ad- mission because of the oppo- sition of Arab members. veloping countries, they con- tinue to refer themselves as the Group of Seventy-seven, the number that first joined In 1968 to seek a common eco- nomic strategy. They are main- ly from Asia, Africa and Latin America. Yugoslavia is the only European member. The admission of Cuba to the group suggests that her rela- tions with some Latin-American countries have continued to im- prove, but the move ? is not expected to please the United States. ? In 1962, rnabily at the 'urging of the United States, the Organization of American States suspended Cuba from its membership, charging that the Government of Premier Fidel Castro was aiding and instigat- ing revolts in hemisphere c?mn- tries. In 1964, the organization called on its member to, cut diplomatic and trade ties. M lxico did not heed ' the reso ution; Chile resumed rela tioni last November and there haw been clear indications here that others are moving in the same direction. In the e bly m=uNtr8M Vbie3Reieaselill eadc Arrin of Peru deplored the "prolonged isolation"- of Cuba end urged that members of the O.A.S. be free to resume rela- tions with Havana at whatever level they wished. Peru is scheduled to be host to ?the next meeting of the group in Lima beginning Mon- day. Conference planners say that 82 countries have so far said they would send delega- tions headed by government ministers. Cuba reportedly intends to send a 10-member delegation, possibly headed by Foreign Minister Raul Roa. The conference is certain to give, a high priority to the ef- fects of President Nixon's new economic policies and particu- larly the 10 per cent surcharge on Imports?a move most have attacked in speches bete. ? Before last night's session, Peru had sought to persuade Latin members that they could admit Cuba to the group with- out a major political shift for those reluctant to act. The Peruvian formula, which was agreed to, admits Cuba as a developing country to the group but with the understand- ' intiMigtn made up of Latin members or ?% 'I I: the Latin-American caucus, which meets here from time to time on political and other matters. At one point, the negotia- tions were nearly wrecked when Dr. Ricardo Alarcon, Cuba's chief delegate, In an assembly speech attacked Boli- via, Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina. Dr. AlarcOn? who was waq- Ing outside the room where the meeting was held last night, appeared undismayed by the qualified welcome being ex- tended. Invited to enter, he de- livered his first remarks in a moderate tone praised by one Latin listener as "muy tran- quilo." He emerged smiling say- ing that "Cuba's legitimate rights have been recognized and a wrong has been recti- fied." Although United States offi- dals did not comment on the development officialy, it was clear they were unhappy, say- ing that Cuba had not demon- strated any change of policy but continued to aupport sub. versivo groups. 200200001-2 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 CPYRGHT WASHINGTON POST 27 January 1972 Showcase Lags, Allende Frets SANTIAGO ? Chile an President Salvador Allende put on his hard hat recently and lectured construction workers at the site of UNC- TAD III, where 2,600 dele- gates from 140 natiOns are to meet in April: "I came because, despite the persistence and energy of everyone working here, I have been afraid that the promise made would not be kept ... Chile is internation- ally committed. Think what it would be if the confer- ence could not open on the appointed day." The nervous betting here Is that the third United Na- tions Conference on Trade and Development will open April 13 as scheduled, but that it will be close. If there is paint on the theater walls, it will be wet. At the UNCTAD council meeting in Geneva last March, Chile requested that the conference, which will discuss economic problems of developing countries, be held here so that the world could see Allende's progress on the democratic road to socialism. Now some officials con- cede that construction of a theater-office complex and provision of adequate ac- commodations?in less than a year?was too ambitious an , undertaking given other eco- nomic problems here. Allende has called off a trade fair that was to have run simultaneously with UNCTAD. He said that he had envisioned a showcase for Third World industry, but that only developed nations responded. Local difficulties were the tacit and probably .determining factor in the cancellation. Along with Allende and the workers under the bare beams of the UNCTAD thea- ter the other day was the owner of the construction uiu any. "We would be niuc further along if in- stea of 35 per cent volun- tary work in Saturdays, we woul have had 90 per cdnt 'he said. 0 weekdays, 1,100 work- ers sut in three shifts. But to k ep within range of the bud et approved by Con- gre Allende asked the un- ion for voluntary turns on the eekend. V luntary work gets much pUb !city in Chile these day , Yet the attendance has bee slack. "We ought to wor 48 hours . construct- Ing he new Chile," said the site uoss of the Workers' Con- fed ration, the Communist- led right arm of Allende's gov rnment. t hurts me that the fig- I ure for Saturday work is so lo " said Allende. He an: no need that from now on th minister of labor would Pu' in volunteer work at the sit. He added with a smile, as the workers applauded: "I am going to come on a Sa urday, too, and I'm not go g to tell you which Sat- ur ay it will be." hile's committee for the U CTAD preparations is he ded by Felipe Herrera, fo er president of the In- te American ' Development B k in Washington. He to I the several hundred wi kers that there were en- e ies of UNCTAD, and the w to defeat them was to fi sh the building. Ap- pl use. Then he asked for mire voluntary work, and at th t point he had to ask for ap lause. ater Herrera explained so e of the difficulties in th project, which was budg- et d at 100 million escudos ($ million at the official ra e) and $1 million for im- po ted materials. ? ne imported item was as- b tos plates, from the U ited States. "They arrived on time, but by mistake only half were unloaded," he said. , "When we found out, we radioed the ship but it didn't want to return. So the boat was escorted into port in northern Chile. We could have lost months. Herrera said that work schedules are being met, but while the dedication day of the site is to be March 31, he is talking in terms of early April cornpletion. Postponement of the con- ference was out of the ques- -lion, he said, as the prece- dent could be disastrous for future international con- claves. But there is a precedent of sorts. Algeria was to have hosted a meeting of the ; Afro-Asian bloc in 1965 at a , center that was hopelessly ' behind schedule. At that point the Algerian govern- ment fell, the meeting was forgotten and the bloc dis- solved. The first UNCTAD, in Ge- neva in 1964, was a forum for the underdeveloped 1, nations to put their case for preferential trade and as- sistance policies to the in- dustrial states. Four years later, in New Delhi, the same countries met to denounce .the devel- oped nations' failure to re, spond to the needs set forth in Geneva. The conference was lengthy, and even its enthusiasts concede it pro- duced little but rancor. At the meeting here pointed references will be made to the rich countries' previous acceptance of the goal of transferring 1 per cent of gross national prod- uct annually to the develop- ing world?and to the gen- eral failure to meet this UNCTAD standard. Other topics on the agenda are disarmament, shipping patterns, transfer of science and technology,! environmental control and economic integration, all from the point of view of the under,ieveloped world. The closing date, like the opening date, it not certain. , Th P conference could rrn well into May. This will be the first international eco- nomic conclave under the United Nations to be at- tended by Peking's dele- gates. ? A major target of the ire of the underdeveloped coun- tries, and especially of Chile, will be the United States. A fundamental point of Allende's foreign policy Is that U.S. imperialism is the major cause of retarded growth throughout the hem- isphere. 1 The United States will send a delegation, though ? the level of it has not yet been revealed. , Allende said the meeting "will be a great opportunity to break the deliberate cam- paign 'of lies and calumnies launched against our people from within and without." ? Accommodations will be a problem for the visitors. This capital of 3 million pea: pie has hotel rooms to house , 1,660 delegates The other 1,000.or more will be placed ? in furnished apartments and ? private houses. A visit to the UNCTAD offices showed considerable confusion as to who would sleep where. Chileans are paying for the big theater through spe, cial taxes on cars, liquor and luxuries. It is to become a cultural center after the conference. The adjoining 23-floor of- fice building?which was ac. , tually four stories into the air when Chile was named UNCTAD lukst last March? Is part of a renewal project. ? After Chile was named host of the conference the thea- ter was added to the project. Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY March 1972 March DATES WORTH NOTING USSR! International 70th anniversary of the publication of Lenin's What Is TO Be Done. April is the 55th anniversary Of Lenin's "April Theses." March 5 USSR Anniversary of Stalin's death in 1953. March 6- New York 28th session of the UN Arpil 7 Commission of Human Rights. March 8-15 USSR 55th anniversary of the February Revolution (February 23 - March 2, Old Calendar) which over- threw the Tsar, broke up the Tsarist Empire, and started Russia's short- lived attempt at free elections and parliament- ary democracy, which ended with the Bolshevik seizure of power the following November. 13th Party Congress of the Italian Communist Party. March 11 Italy March 19 Poland March 20 USSR March 25 Brazil Parliamentary elections are to be held; the elections will be a year ahead of schedule. 15th Congress of the Soviet All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions. Held every four years. 50th anniversary of the Brazilian Communist Party. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 March 29 USSR 1st anniversary of the arrest of Vladimir Bukovsky on charges of anti-Soviet propaganda. Bukovsky was recently convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in a forced labor camp. He had drawn attention to the Soviet Union's use of psychiatric imprison- ment and 'hedical" torture for sane people who are dissidents. April 13- Santiago UNCTAD III meets (See May 17 article in this issue). April 15 N. Korea Kim Il Sung's 60th birthday, a landmark in Korea. April 28 Japan 20th anniversary of the Japanese Peace Treaty (World War II). The treaty did not resolve the status of the Northern Territories seized by the USSR in the closing days of the war. By contrast, Okinawa is to revert from the U.S. to Japan on May 15. 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 ApprRyig4AFdRORMacn1a9n09/02:CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 March 1972 SIVRT SUBJECTS UNCENSORED RUSSIA Two March events can serve as pegs for focusing attention on the Human Rights Movement in the USSR and on the official Soviet disdain for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. One, the publication in London of "Uncensored Russia" and the other, the 28th Session of the United Nations' Commission on Human Rights which opens in New York on 6 Mardi. "Uncensored Russia," edited and with an introduction by British author and Sovietologist, Peter Reddaway, was pubiished:by Jonathan Cape, 30 Bedford Square, London (1,5.00). It is the documented story of the Human Rights Movement in the USSR -- the annotated text of the unofficial Moscow journal "A Chronicle of Current Events" (no.'s 1-11). In his introduction, Peter Reddaway describes the growth of samizdat in the USSR over the last few years, stimulated partly by the tightening of censorship. He shows how contacts have formed between the different factions of dissent as they are revealed in the pages of the "Chronicle." Each chapter has an introduction by Mr. Reddaway, linking its theme to related passages; the items on a given subject appear chronologically and the text is generously annotated. A special feature of the book is its unique collection of 78 illustrations; photographs taken under difficult and dangerous conditions, in camps and prisons and during civil disturbances and smuggled out of Russia at considerable risk to the couriers. "This is a most important book," writes Leonard Schapiro. "Mr. Reddaway's work lays finally to rest any doubts that anyone may have harboured about the authenticity of this material, which no student of Soviet society, or indeed anyone who follows the survival of the human spirit in diversity can now ignore." Enough said (Watch "Press Comment" for reviews. U.S edition to be published in March by American Heritage, $100(h) ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY PROTESTS TREATMENT OF JOURNALISTS -IN PRAGUE The Italian Communist Party was the only major party in the West to unequivocally condemn the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Since that time, it has continued to criticize the new Czech leader- ship for its dogmatism and for its repression of the freedoms enjoyed under Dubcek. Prague has again aroused the ire of the Italian comrades by its heavy-handed treatment of Italian journalists, including an Italian correspondent of l'Unita, a party member since 1938, who was arrested and summarily expelled from Czechoslovakia. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 The official daily of the Italian Cammunisty Party (PCI), in its 9 February issue under the heading "An Absurd Court Order" protested the expulsion from Czechoslovakia the first week in February of its Prague correspondent, Ferdi Zidar. Zidar -- who is also a member of the secretariat of the International Organization of Journalists, a Communist front headquartered. in Prague -- was charged by Czech security organs with contacting farmer party members now accused of an "anti-state activity." Emphasizing that Zidar was doing no more than carrying out his newspaper duties as instructed, l'Unita wrote: "As an activist of our party, comrade Zidar adhered-most strictly to the political line of the Italian Communist Party... Our protest is sharp and resolute." l'Unita pointed out that Zidar has been a PCI activist since 1938 and that he had previously been imprisoned by Italian fascists and by the Nazis. Presumably, this allusion to Zidar's other jailers was not lost on Czech (and Soviet) authorities. The following day, 11 February, l'Unita ran a lengthy news item reporting the steps taken by the Italian National Press Federation on behalf of Valerio Ochetto, a left-wing journalist employed by Italian radio and television, who was arrested in Prague in early January. An Italian "Committee to Free Valerio Ochetto," supported by the Communist-dominated CGIL among other labor and media organizations, appealed to international public opinion through large ads in Le Monde and the New York Times. The ads said that Ochetto is probabfy the only journalist in the world who is in prison because of his work. As a result of this pressure Ochetto was finally released in mid-February. Another l'Unita article on 11 February served to raise the temperature level between Rome and Prague by several degrees. This time the PCI took Prague to task for the way it treated its own intellectuals and journalists. Quoting the PCI theoretical monthly, Rinascita, l'Unita wrote: "We know some of the comrades who were attacked, for example, Karel Kosik, Karel Batosek, Karel Kaplan and Milan Hbebel, and we consider them to be communists by training and by their activist spirit, by their rich contribution to the search and the struggle for ideas free from dogmatism, as intellectuals of high Stahdards sttongly.cotmitted:to.7.6Hsocialist .o.cietyTinTCzethosloVakia. BUt,the serious hews from. Prague raises-4uestions of a 'broader-nature. When the new methods (Bd.': a reference to the Prague "spring") came to an end, we did not approve -- and expressed our dissent in these columns -- with methods which tried to resolve severe political disagreement by exile, by the humiliation. of-Communit activists who were forced to find whateverwork they could in order to live. In all this difficulty, one point appeared to have been gained: the pledge that there would be no reprisals and that no political trials would take place. Do the arrests this week mean that this pledge is to be defaulted? Do they presage the triumph of a rationale the price of which has already been so high? 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Certainly, the class struggle is a bitter one and the confrontation between imperialisM and socialism harsh. The task of socialist change is difficult in any country. But precisely because we have a clear awareness of this, because we know how many positive things have been set free for humanity through communist achievements, we believe that a critical examination of the past and present is worthwhile. Worthwhile because it tells us that force used by the working class in power can never be the arbiter, that the moment of coercion must never betray the substance and form of socialist legality, that revolutionary discipline must never aim at silencing dissent, particularly where -- as in this case -- events have been somewhat unusual." P.S. TO SOLJENITSYNE Year in the Life of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn," which was included in the February Perspectives called special attention to Leopold Labedz' excellent compilation of documents pertaining to the Solzhenitsyn case, published by MaCMillan. The same work is also available in French, entitled "Soljenitsyne Accuse" and published in Paris, 1971, by Dominique Wapler. The French edition was translated by Guy Piquemal and also includes an introduction by Armand Lanoux of the Acad6mie Goncourt. 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 l'UNITA, Rome 9 February 1972 Measures taken against Comrade Zidar by the Czech Security authorities An Absurd Court Order CamradeFerdi Zidar, member of the secretariat of the International Organization of Journalists, headquartered in Prague, last week was arrested and subsequently asked to leave Czechoslovakia. This happened after comrade Zidar had been asked (on the basis of Article 16 of the Public Security Law) to explain his connections with former members of the Czech Communisty Party who previously occupied leading positions and who now have allegedly been accused of anti-state activity. Comrade Zidar firmly rejected the accusation of having participated in any illegal activity and of having in any way abused the hospitality of the Czech state. Since Comrade Zidar was called upon to be a member of the secretariat of the International Organization of Journalists in his capacity as a democratic Italian journalist and since he comes from the editorial staff of l'Unita, our newspaper asked the International Organization of Journalists to protest vis-a-vis the Czech security authorities responsible for this incident. comrade' Zidar has been an activist in our Party since 1938; he was jailed first by the Fascists and then deported' to Buckenwald by the Nazis. He has been working for the Communist press since 1943 and since August 1969 has been on the secretariat of the International Organization of Journalists. We strongly hope that -- as could have happened -- the action taken vis-a-viscomrade Zidar was unauthorized. However, even in such a case, our protest is firm and sharp. Comrade. Zidar has always carried out his assignments with the greatest integrity even in the recent difficulties concerning the case of the journalist Ochetto. As a PCI militant, comrade Zidar -- as was his duty -- has adhered most loyally to the political line of our Party in all circumstances. This line includes non-interference in the internal political affairs of other parties. Approved For Release 1999/09/9: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2 I ' UNITA, Rome 9 February 1972 Preso contro ii compagno Zidar da parte della autorita di sicurezza cecoslovacche Un assurdo provvedimento CPYRGHT II compagno Ferdi Zidar, membro della segreteria del- Organizzazione internazio- nate del glornalisti che ha sede a Praga, 6 stato nella settimana scorsa ferrnato e quindl invitato a lasciare Ia Cecoslovacchia. CIO ?vve- nuto dopo che al compagno Zidar sono stati chlesti chia- rimenti (in base all'art. le della legge di pubblica slcu- rezza) suI rapport1 avuti con ex membri del Partito comunlsta cecoslovacco quail ebbero In passato fun - eon] dirigentl e sarebbero oggi accusati di svolgere atti- vita antistatale. II compa- gno Zidar ha respinto con fermezza l'accusa di aver partecipato a qualstasi attivi- tit in contrast? con le leggi cecoslovacche e di avere in qualsiasI modo abusato della ospitalita dello Stato ceco- slovacco. Poiche 11 compagno Zidar era stato chiamato a far par- te della segreteria dell'Orga- nIzzazione Internazionale,..del, glornalisti nella sua qualita dl glornalista democratic? Ita- liano e proviene dalla redszione 11 nostro giornale si 6? rivolto alla Or- ganizzazione internaztonale del glornalisti perche esprIma la sus protests verso quelle I autorlta di slcurezza che so? no responsabili di questo epi- sodio. II compagno Zidar militante del nostro Partlto dal 1938, 6 stato incarcerato e conflnato dal fascisti prima,' 6 stato ? poi ? deportato a Buchenwald dal nazistl. Egli lavora nella stampa comunl- sta dal 1943 e dall'agosto del 1889 era membro della segre- Lelia dell' OrganizzazIone inf ternazionale del Glornallsti. Not c auguriamo vivamen, te che, com'd possibile che accada, fa misura assunta nei confronti del compagno Z. dar sia U frutto d una inizia- rtva tneontrollata. Aftoe m ta caso, tuttavia, la 1ptra. protesta a ferma e recfsa. II compagno Ztdar ha aiiolto sempre i corn pits cui e stet- to chiamato con to scrupolo pi? assoluto, anche nella re. cente. vicenda riguardante U caso del giornalista Ochetto. In quango militante del PCI, compagno Zidar ha naturalmente mantenuto ? com'era suo dovere ? a fe- deUet pi? terma alla linea Utica del nostro Part ito in ogni circostanza. Di questa linea la parte /a non ingeren- tra negli aLlari interni degU altri partiti. ? Approved For Release 1999/09/a : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200200001-2