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February 1, 1972
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200 1 0001 -1 Propaganda PERSPECTIVES ON ELIMINATING DISSENT THE BUKOVSKY CASE: A TRAVESTY OF JUSTICE ONE YEAR IN THE LIFE OF ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN TOKYO AND MOSCOW WRANGLE OVER THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES VIEW OF BANGLADESH A MESSAGE FOR REVOLUTIONARIES DATES WORTH NOTING SHORT SUBJECTS A COLD WINTER IN PRAGUE USSR'S REPORTED OFFER OF CREDITS TO CHILE A NEW YEAR'S GREETING FROM THE FCP THE NEW ADMIRALS 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY February 1972 Shimoda Treat of 1855 Established Czarist Russia-Japanese borders and declared Kunashiri and Etorofu Japanese possessions. The disposition was never questioned by the Czars, nor the Soviets after the 1917 revolution until 1945 when the Soviet Army occupied Kunashiri and Etorofu Yalta A reement of Februaar 1945 In which leaders of Soviet Union, the U.S. and Great Britain agreed, among other things, that the southern part of Sakhalin (Japanese name is Karafuto) and the Kuril Islands were to be transferred from Japanese to Soviet possession. Potsdam Declaration of July 1945 In which the U.S., the Republic of China and Great Britain stated that Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and "such minor islands as we determine." San Francisco Treaty of 1951 peace treaty with Japan signed by the U.S. and 48 other non-Communist nations. The treaty laid the basis for the eventual return of Okinawa and the other Ryukyu: Islands to Japanese rule. Reversion of Amami Islands Returned to Japanese control by U.S. in early 1950's. Japanese-Soviet Declaration of 1956 Japan and the USSR signed dadeclaration on 19 October 1956 ending a technical state of war and outlining a Soviet commitment to return Shikotan and the Habomai Chain to Japan after a peace treaty has been concluded between the two countries. Reversion of Bonins, etc. On 26 June t e U.S. returned to Japanese control the Bonin Islands, the Volcano Islands (including Iwo Jima) and Marcus Island, all taken during World War II. Nixon-Sato A reement Concluded 6 January 1972, at San Clemente, and provided that Okinawa and the other islands of the Ryukyus will revert to Japan- ese rule on 15 May 1972. Geography (See map attached): The Northern Territories are Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 islands which lie between Japan and the USSR in the Sea of Okhotsk. They are composed of: the Kuril Island Chain (stretches between Japan's northernmost main island and the southern tip of the Kamchatka Peninsula) the southern half of Sakhalin (Karafuto is Japanese name) the islands of Shikotan and Etorofu (an important Soviet military base) Kunashiri (protects Etorofu geographically from Japan) the archipelago of Habomai (lies just north of Japan's northernmost island of Hokkaido) The Kurils were handed over to the Soviets under the terms of the Yalta Agreement and have since been incorporated into the RSFSR (largest Soviet republic). The remaining islands comprising the Northern Territories were occupied by Soviet army personnel in 1945 after Japan was defeated, Shikotan and the Habomais are the islands to which Japan has the best claim for they are neither geographically nor geologically part of the Kuril Island Chain but like the Kurils have been under continuous Japanese dominion since 1798. Etorofu and Kunashiri are claimed by the Japanese as a northern extension of Hokkaido; the Soviets claim they are the southernmost tip of the Kurils and thus covered under the Yalta Agreement and the San Francisco Treaty, However, they, too, have been continuously under Japanese dominion since 1798 and have been traditional Japanese fishing grounds for centuries. The Okinawa Reversion arrangements provide for: --Transfer to Japan of full responsibility for civil govern- ment functions which the U.S. has exercised since the end of World War II. --Japan's assuming responsibility for the defense of Okinawa, including ground, air and maritime patrol, search and rescue, not later than July 1, 1973. --Transfer to Japan of those physical assets and properties in the Ryukyus appropriate to the responsibilities Japan will assume upon reversion, with provision for Japan's reimbursing the United States for certain of the facilities' improvements and developments effected during the period of U.S. administration and Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 for costs incurred by the U.S. under the agreement. --Application of U.S.-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty provisions and related arrangements to the Ryukyus area without change or modification. --U.S. commercial interests now operated in Okinawa to con- tinue their businesses and professions there and to conduct business also in Japan proper, subject to applicable Japanese laws and regulations. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 20 January 1972 Gro ykko to air Soviet p The Russians are wooing. Japan with re- newed vigor. Against the backdrop of shifting political balances in Asia, Moscow is- for one thing -soft-pedaling its once frequent theme of Japanese militarism. Several other developments point toward Moscow's seeking netiy influence in Tokyo: 0 Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko at long last is headed Japan-ward for regular political consultations. He is scheduled to arrive in Tokyo Jan. 23. e A meeting of the joint Soviet-Japanese Economic Committee, which should have been held last year, will take place in Tokyo, in February. C Kenzo Kono, president of the Japanese Diet's upper house, has been visiting the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Su- preme Soviet, Shortly before his scheduled departure Wednesday he had a meeting with Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny: Mr. Gromyko's visit will be his first to Japan since 1966, and the joint ministerial talks will be the first since 1969, when Jap- anese Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi stopped in Moscow briefly en route to the United Nations. Though economic relations between the two nations have spurted forward since that time, political problems have remained in the background. These now will come to the fore. The very fact that Mr. Gromyko has finally decided to go to Japan clearly re- flects the confusingly changing scene in Asia. Diplomatic observers believe that, with the United States gradually withdrawing. .from the region and China expanding its influence there, Moscow seeks to avoid a Japanese defection into a Sino?American "understanding" that would leave the Soviet Union out in the cold and to en- courage Tokyo to pursue a policy of balance in its relations with the big powers. A related problem is that of Japanese fishing rights in the southern Kuriles, which used to be'one of Japan's richest fishing areas. The Russians insist 'on a .12-mile limit for territorial waters and arrest fishing boats found s *W*F6prRe4ei; By Charlotte Saikowski .Staff correspondent of 1999/09/02 Z CIA-RD x9 CI. CPYRGHT CPYRGHT are o ing more an a shermen. The Japanese also hope to make progress on a cultural-exchange program. Technical problems have held up a formal govern- ment agreement, although exchanges do take place on an informal basis. While detailed economic talks will be left .to the joint meeting in February, Mr. Gro- myko is expected to bring up the broad subject of Soviet-Japanese cooperation in the development of Siberia. Among the projects the Russians are promoting are the construction of a pipe- line from Irkusk to the port of Nakhodka, through which they would supply Siberian oil to Japan. They are also interested in development of the southern Yakut coal fields- and the natural gas on Sakhalin Island, as well as an expansion of coastal trade. ;; . Siberian pace slow Soviet-Japanese cooperation in' Siberia generally has not grown as fast as once an. ticipated, largely because the Russians are asking for long-term credits that Japanese business is not in a position to give. Whether this obstacle can be surmounted now re- mains to be seen. Meanwhile, the Soviet press has been soft. pedaling its treatment of Japan of late, The long diatribes about Japan's growing mili- tary budget and the danger of militarism have disappeared for the moment. Even articles of Tokyo's currency and ex- port difficulties with the United States seem fairly moderate in tone, suggesting that Mos- cow would prefer Japan to remain more closely allied with Washington than to be- come too friendly with Peking. *Izvestia summary All in all;. the current Soviet mood is summed up by an Izvestia commentator in these words: "Soviet-Japanese relations have now reached a level where both countries stand face to face with new quantitative and qualitative improvements of their ties. And the only requirement for turning possibili- ties into reality is to eliminate the obstacles standing in the way of full normalization and thereby open the way to genuine good- 'neighborliness. "The objective. conditions require this. ~A%Vl 02 W 1 f , ' co r'e want it." - ' Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 THE WASHINGTON POST 20 January 1972 Stanley Karnow Groniyko's Tri p To Japan Eyed SOVIET Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko is sched- uled to visit Japan for a week starting this Sunday, and his trip could have a significant impact on the ,rapidly changing balance of power in East Asia. The Russians and Japa- nese are both concerned about the' outcome of Presi- 'dent Nixon's forthcoming trip to Peking. Thug they are beginning to explore the chances of an accommeda- lion that might serve as a 'counterweight to a possible reapprochment b e t w e e n the United States and China. This confirms that East Asia is currently shifting Into a, complex array of alignments that will involve the United States, Cnlna, the Soviet Union and Japan. It means, moreover, that the old designations of "free world" and Communist bloc have become obsolete-if, Indeed, they ever had any validity. After treating them badly for years, the Russians are eager at present to warm up to the Japanese. As in all' their endeavors, the Rus?. grans are mainly motivated by an obsession to outf?ank the Chinese. THE KREMLIN'S DRIVE to encircle China made tre- mendous gains in the recent war between India and Paki- stan, which strengthened So? viet sway on .the Indian sub- continent. The Russian, are also believed to be increas- Ing their Influence in Hanoi as a result of North Viet- namese irritation with China's decision to welcome' Mr. Nixon. Now, in an obvious effort to tighten the noose around China, the Russians are seeking to reinforce their position in Japan. Severely Jolted by Presi dent Nixon's move to visit Peking without consulting them beforehand, the Japa- nese are currently worried by the prospect of a U.S.; reconciliation with China that leaves them out in the cold. Hence they are searching for other links, and it would be logical for them to cozy up to the Russians. , The outstandirg issue that, divides the Russians and Japanese is the status of Ha. bomai, Shikotan and ether' Islands north of Japan The .Russians occupied these Is- lands at the end of World War II and expelled their inhabitants. ' Pointing to the return of Okinawa by the United States, the Japanese con. tend that the time has come for the Russians to give them back the disputed Is :lands. That gesture, they' say, would pave the way for' the signing of a peace treaty between Japan and the So. viet Union. The treaty offi. cially ending their World War II hostilities has never been signed. THE RUSSIANS REAL- IZE that, ? by returning the Islands to Japan, they would make themselves vulnerable to territorial demands from countries as far-ranging as Romania and China. But Gromyko may in fact accede to Japanese claims on the grounds that the political, advantages of such a settle- ment outweigh the problems it would create elsewhere for the Kremlin. Another move that Gro- Tokyo would be to ease the. Panese in the coming week conditions for Japanese in will therefore i n d c a t e vestment in Siberia. The So- ' whether a marriage of con. viet Union and Japan have ; venience is in the adfing. CPYRGHT talked at length about joint, development of the region, but Russian terms for such development have been too tough to suit Japanese' firms. By way of improving Sovi et-Japanese atmospherics, Gromyko is expected to In-' vite Japanese Prime Minis. ter Eisaku Sato to Moscow, and propose that Soviet Pre? mier Kosygin visit Japan. A visit to Moscow by Sato would be the first trip to the Soviet Union by a Japanese Prime Minister. A compact between Japan and the Soviet Union would have Important psychologi. cal repercussions-at mini. mal cost to both the Rus- sians and the Japanese. It would Jolt the Chinese. It ,would also arouse those In the United States who have warned that President Nix- on's approaches to Peking might drive Japan into the, Kremlin's arms. Thus the rapanese an(;, the Russians are in a posi.` Lion to counter the Sino-` American romance with a Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For.Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000=200210001-1 SAIGON POST 20 December 1971 gavlogs Stand Pat By WIRATMMO' SUKITO NUSANTARA The agree. island before M're1i 1973. later Japan aces that i,% irir. ment for returning Okinawa The number- will rise to 600 ?luence in Asia is being resto- Island to Japan - the in :dart h 1973 at the curl or. red: But through the return of Okinawa Ileversiron Pact- Japan's Fourth Defense Bull. Oklnaws aas agreed to by signed in Tokyo and Washing due Pr??urani? both governments the middle Inn last July 17 by . Koiehi President Nixon recently of year, the return does Alchi and -William Rogers, urged the U.S. Senate to rati. not mean that Japan will was ratified on November fy the agreement in order to assumr respnosibility for 10th by the U.S. Senate, re* improve U.S. relations whir Asia's security. Tue US has quiti+rg a two third majority Japan, When tile agreement not turned Its back on Japan vote In do so. An exchange of Was discussed in Senate, Seri Relation% are thawing with. Instruments of ratification William Fulbright, cuairruan China. So without creating a will soon be held In Toky.i Of the Foreign RelationsCuui confrontation between China between Japan and Lite' U.S. mince, warned that failure and Japan, the isla id of Oki- Under article IX of` to ratify the agreement could nawa will be returned to reement the' ?"? return cause fundamental dauurrge Japan. of Okinawa (..rid other Ryu? to U.S, Japantse relations. kyu Islands) to Japan will "As i% known, at the end of For Japan, the return of come Into effect two months the Pacific war, Okinawa O.Iuawn wi'l . inspire the after the exchaii a of the do- was a scena of major filth- demands for the return of cunlent?i of ratification in ling, following the landing of suulh Sakhalin and the Kuri. Tokyo. This, means that nest U.S. troops near Kerania on le islands occupied by the year Japan will assume re%. 2G March 1943. When the US Soviet Union since the end poniibility on the Island; but gained complete control of of the Pacific, war even under the Japanese.U,S. Se. the island mail Japaneie its thmrgh Moscow and Tokyo curity Pact which in 1970 istance? broke on 23 June enteico into a 10 year non. was extended fur another ten 1945, the U.S. and lost 12.281 trg+tressiun ag, cement In 1941 years, the U.S. is permitted to men, killed or wounded. It (tire purpose r.1 this agiec- statron 50,000 American per. can he imagined how much- 'lent was to prevent Japan's sonnet on Okinawa for com. the U.S. sacrificed to capita- attack Of Russia while Russia bat purposes with the "prior re the island. was at War with Gel many approval of the' Japaooso ill Europe and Russia agreed goVerumeDt. Okinawa became important to attack Japan white to the U.S. after the Korean not Japan was at war u Ilh the war broke out in. 1950 in con. US and Br itain in the Pa.?ifie. The Okinawa' Reversion neciion with The Cnld War. At the aconference(d?ti Pact is one of the logicni con. With China, At the end of tare last decade there was a hint February 1945);. President St:rluenres of ilia Peace Trea? ty with Japan signed in San that the U.S.would hand over Roosevelt made a concei?l?)n its Asian security res onsi? to Stalin When he agreed that Francisco on Sept. 19;1. p Soviet so.errignty over Rus. bility to Japan which has Sian territories seized by Ja. According to ASAHI SHIM. revived as a strong Asian pan In the by DUN (November 9) which nation. war of 194(-1903 would be quolert defense sources, soon restored. including over the after the return. Japan . will After Japan surrendered to CPYRGHT possible. Nevertheless, the S?ivletUnion did not attack Japan immediately 1) c-co lisp the 1941 non-aggression pact would canse emharras~n?ent. In July 1945 Japah?asked the. Soviet Uninn to mediate its4 confliet with the'U.S. (Pull Britain) In end the Pacific war, but the Soviet Union' refuted and informed the U.S. and Britain or the Ja- panese request. Yet the- Sn. viet Union still dirt not at- lack Japan. Only`aftcr_Japan had no hope to wih? the war did the Soviet Union launch an attack on 18 August 1945 which resulted in the easy, capture. of South Sakhalin and' the Kurile Islands. (Pre. silent Truinal, who realized'. ,the U.S,,could rlereat Japan `ivithuut? Soviet participation warned` the ilosviane not to Occupy the Kurile Islands but the Russians reminderl the U.S. of the Yalta agretnient that the fact that Kurile Is- lands were to he handed over to the Soviet Union.) When we compare how the Soviet Union wor South Sa. khaltn and Kurile Islands with how the U.S. w.,n Okinawa, we see that the Soviet Union wanted onlyto kin the cream from the milk. It was with the underaitandtng that rho Soviet Union would already have attacked', JS lion be] 01-C the U.S. attacked Okinawa that the U.S. made the cones. fuse l~p~"OV~d t1R+aun~tel~a~6lAa49~98/~~s:tWIA ~ 0 q~~~ a Kurile ISlsradS, at the Sov a i1nlun 1.1 th e CPYRGHT U.S. sacrifice 141prcnied-F%R-@Jgf-?tt 1J9,P9JAP/, 2 : Prime A-RD ~P79 01194A0002002 chairman 10001 lac ;~apanese viCetnen In Okinawa first. khalin) to Japan. According toed him that he would con Socialist Party Narita visited N l onethe ess the U.S. finally returns , Okinawa to Japan while the Suvjet Union does not want to return the Kurile JAPAN TIMES 28 October 1971 Wei vC.fLt ," se-SrJv e Re1~iozs 2 Opposing, Reports on Northern Territories Mystifying Public By MINORU SHAiIZU Will the Soviet Union, which is desirous of better relations with Japan, change its strong attitude toward the question of the northern territories? There were two missions to Moscow recently within a single month. They have returned from Moscow with two opposing views concerning the Russian attitude toward the northern is- lands issue. One is that the Russians have begun to adopt a flexible' policy line while the other is that their attitude re- mains unchanged. The former view was er-- pressed by Kenji Miyamoto, chairman of the presidium of the Japan Communist Party, who visited Moscow toward the end of September. The other was expressed by Tokusaburo Kosaka, a Liberal-Democratic Dietmen, who visited Moscow in the middle of October. The problem of the northern territories, is an important issue pending since the restoration of diplomatic relations of the two nations in 1956, In the Japan- Soviet joint declaration of that year, the Soviet Union promised that two islands, .liabomai and Shikotan, would be returned to Japan when a peace treaty was concluded between the two countries, Subsequently, in 1960 when the new Japan-U.S. Seeur- to Jdpane%e Foreign dli.dster sider the Japanese islands to ~Mtescow, tbeSoviet Untun told Takeo Fukuda, when visiting the north(furreturn to Japan) bins that the lsianda in the the Soviet Union as Mlnimcr once the U.S. returns Okina. north cannot ha d1.cussed fur Agriculture and Forestry, wa. But when in July the any wore: ity Treaty was concluded be- Security Treaty. tween Japan and U.S., the, this statement by Miyamoto Soviet Union sent a memo- was received as a sensational randum to the Japanese Goverfi-- indication of bright prospects ment stating; that it would not for the return of the northern return the islands to Japan un- territories. less the American forces with-. The JCP? launched a colorful drew from Japan. campaign in early October Japan, on the other hand, as- through its organ "Akahata," Berlin ; that. not only 1Tabornail claiming that Miyamoto's Mos- and Shikotan but also Kunashiri cow visit had achieved a great and Etorofu are inherent terra-? success. However, it was short-, tories of Japan, has been strong- lived. ly demanding that the Soviet A mission of LDP Dietmen, Union return them to Japan. including Kosaka returned with Ritter Confrontation t h e had news. They said, When we mentioned the report The Russians have been reite- by Miyamoto to N.N. Rodi- rating that the territorial issue nov, Deputy Foreign Minister of concerning Kunashiri and Eto- the Soviet Union, he simply dis- rofu has been settled. More- m i s s e d it as a misunder- over, they have proposed condi- standing and the: Russians did tions for the return of Habomai not change their attitude to- and ' Thus, a bitter ward the issue of the northern 'confrontation has continued be- territories." tween the two nations for over 10 years. Kosaka's Report In a press interview held im- In an interview, Kosaka told mediately after his return from This writer: "The Soviet Union's Moscow, the JCP chairman attitude toward the issue of the said that Soviet Communist, northern territories remains Party leaders would consider' stiff. The Russians do not rec-? the return of Habomai and ognize Miyamoto's view." Shikotan after the signing of a Government leaders, in- peace treaty between ' the two eluding ?'r^oreign , Ministry ' offi- nations and also that they cials, are of the opinion that it. would take up the return of is unthinkable that the Soviet Kunashiri and Etorofu as a dip- Union had adopted a flexible at- lomatic issue following the titude toward the northern ter- termination of the Japan-U.S. ritories at this time. CPYRGHT What appears to be most strange is that the JCP has not shown any reaction to Kosaka's report, remaining quiet. The JCP . should clarify whether ;?tiyartoto's report is true, since it publicized it as a great achievement. On Oct. 19, , the Foreign Min- isters of Japan and the So- viet Union exchanged telegrams congratulating each other un the 15th anniversary of . the signing of the Japan-Soviet Union joint declaration and re- joicing in their friendly rela- tions. There has been great im- provement in the two nations' relations through the expansion of trade and cultural exchanges during the past 15 years. But the two nations' confrontation concerning the issue of the northern territories has been hampering their true friend- ship: Government and LDP leaders as well as the people at large are. now turning their attention toward the issue of the rarthern territories now that the return of Okinawa is scheduled for 1972. Consequently, if the Soviet Union persists with-its adamant attitude toward the issue, it will' cast a dark cloud over the cur- rent amicable atomosphere in the Japan-Soviet relations. Approved For Release 1999/09/024: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 February 1972 ON ELIMINATING DISSENT In the Soviet Union, January was a very bad month for the voices of reason and the defenders of human rights and constitut- ional legality: 5 January: One-day trial of Vladimir Bukovsky, out of which came one of the harshest sentences ever given a Russian dissident. (See "The Case of Vladimir Bukovsky," this issue,) 12-13 January: KGB raids in Lvov and Kiev resulting in the arrest of at least thirteen Ukrainian dissidents, apparently on suspicion of nationalist activity, The arrestees are said to be held under an arti- cle of the Ukrainian criminal code that prohibits the distribution of "deliberately false fabri- cations defaming the Soviet state." Five Ukrainians were reportedly arrested in Kiev, among them the literary critic Ivan Svitlichny. The Ukrainian underground samizdat publication, Ukrainsl Visnyk, has name SSvitlichny as one of several intellectuals whom the KGB is trying to discredit, Eight other arrests were reportedly made in Lvov, including former TV journalist, Vycheslav Chorno-? vil, Chornovil, in his 30's, was first arrested in 1967 after he had compiled and circulated as samizdat a documented account of KGB methods used in mass arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals in the mid-1960's. Also believed arrested in Lvov was another literary critic, Ivan Dzyuba. Dzyuba was a cosigner, along with Chornovil and author Boris Antonenko-Davydo- vich of a letter dated 21 September 1971 (which circulated in samizdat) written in defense of Valentyn Moroi. Moroi, historian and author, was arrested in June 1970 and in November of the same year was sentenced to nine years imprisonment, the period to be divided between prison and enforced labor in a "strict regime" camp, and to five years exile --- a total fourteen years. Moroz, was charged with "writing several literary-publicist Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 r I& Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 articles on questions dealing with the preservation of the nation's cultural and spiritual values" (i.e., Ukrainian nationalism). 16 January: The KGB raided the homes of nine Moscow dissidents to confiscate sacks of books and papers which they said "were needed for an investigation in progress." Reliable Moscow sources said the KGB took over 3,000 documents, articles, clippings, tapes and booklets, including a. copy of George Orwell's "1984" from the apartment of Pyotr Yakir, Yakir, a young historian regarded by the KGB as the leader of a loose group of dissidents who call themselves "The Democratic Movement," has been quoted as saying that the KGB told him that only the reputation of his late father had protected him from arrest for "anti-Soviet deeds." Yakir's father, Major-General Iona Yakir, was liquidated in Stalin's 1937 purge of the General Staff and then "rehabilitated" under Khrushchev,. 18 January: An article in Izvestiya attacked Valeriy Chalidze, cofounder with rey Sakharov of the Soviet "Com- mittee for Human Rights," for his allegedly "nefarious" meeting in Moscow with U.S. Congress- man James Scheuer. This was the first critical comment on Chalidze to have appeared in the Soviet press; the article merely referred to him as "a certain V.N. Chalidze." 19 January: Reports of additional arrests and searches in the Ukraine gave rise to speculation that the militant stand assumed by the Ukrainian Communist Party against Ukrainian nationalists may have triggered a nation-wide crackdown. The Ukrainian KGB chief, Fedorchuk, is reportedly one of those in the Ukrainian leadership who favors harsh treatment of the voices of dissent, whatever their origins. Among those whose homes were searched 19 January was Ukrainian author Viktor P. Nekrasov, who first gained fame with a popular World War: II novel, "In the Trenches of Stalingrad." Nekrasov came under sharp attack in 1963 for favorable comments he made on life in the West in an account he wrote of his travels to the U.S., Italy and France, "Both Sides of the Ocean," 19 January: In Moscow, the KGB took in for questioning and detained mathematician Yuri Shikhanovich and astronomer Kronid Lyubarsky. Other arrests were Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 reportedly feared. Shikhanovich's name appeared among the names of 95 Soviet mathematicians who in March 1968 signed a petition protesting the arrest of poet and mathematician Yesenin-Volpin, a strong supporter of the human rights movement who had been incarcerated in a mental institution. February: ?? Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 a Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 CPYRGHT WASHINGTON POST 16 January 1972 U.S. Recalls Attacked Aide From Russia A' U.S. Air Force attache reportedly assaulted by Rus- sians at an airport is being reassigned to the United States, the Pentagon said; yesterday,. A Defense Department! spokesman said Capt. Elmer L. Alderfer, 33, was enroute ,;from the Soviet Union. He Is being assigned to the Air Force Institute of Tech- nology at Wright-Patterson ''Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio. His.-parents five In Telford. Pa. The State Department said Friday that Alderfer, an assis-' tant attache at the U.S. Em-, bassy in Moscow, was attackedi by more than a dozen Rus Glans, Jan. 5, at the Riga air-' port. At the time, Aiderfer+, was visiting Riga on a trip ap- proved by Soviet officials, the. State Department said. The U.S. Embassy in Mos- cow on .an. 6 orally "strongly protested this violation of di- plomatic Immunity," a State Department spokesman said. The embassy's complaint, citing the failure of local au- thorities to prevent the as- sault on the U.S. officer at al 1 public airport and the failure to arrest the attackers, was rejected by the Soviet foreign ministry pending investiga- said. The spokesman said another protest was lodged with the Soviet Embassy In Washing- ton Jap. 10, but no reply has been r ceived. He $aid the United States considers the incident serious and does not intend to let it drop. (More often, however, the attache Is retained in his post until such matters are resolved.) NEW YORK TIMES 16 January 1972 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT SCHEUER DECRIES OUSTER BY SOVIET LONDON, Jan. 15- -Repre-sentative James H. Scheuer, the ronx Democrat expelled from the Soviet Union on the ground of "Improper activities," said here tonight that his ouster was "pointless and drrational" The step apparently was designed' to discourage Americans from private contacts with Soviet citizens. Mr. Scheuer, who arrived here from Leningrad, denied that be had carried any material 1, for distribution in the Soviet' Union and that he had sought to encourage Soviet Jews toI migate to Israel. He said he~ tour of educational i ad th-e- 6nnr mr.ntinaa with! remained there I ... scientists wno nau u=n U UI .U "ended Wednesday. the right t4 emigrate but that Explaining his private con- such meetings "are not against tacts, Mr. Scheuer said that he the law." ` had carried with him the names "It you call sympathetic con- of six or seven Jewish scien. cern with the plight of such tists denied permission to emi- grate subversive activity, to Israel and the names people as of those Jews jailed after Lenin- then I am guilty," he added ;grad trials last year at which Ina telephone interview from they were accused of having his hotel. 1plotted to hijak a Soviet air- Visited with 'Study Groups -liner. He said the names had been Mr. Scheuer, who represents !provided by several sources In the heavily Jewish 22d Congres- New York, including Leonid sional District in the Bronx, Rigerman, who emigrated t went to the Soviet Union as the United States from the a member of it Congressional' Soviet Union last year after kstudy group for a two-week' long struggle. claiming Ameri can citizenship. Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00020021006elYRGHT WASHINGTON POST 13 January 1972 CPYRGHT Police in Moscow Detaiii. . Scherer for an Hour By Robert G. Kaiser Waahlnaton Post Forelen Service police detained an American congressman for nearly an~ hour tonight after telling his Soviet hosts they were look- ?ing for a criminal disguised as a foreigner. he congressman, Rep. James H. Schcuer (D.N.Y.), said after the incident he was sure it was no accident, though he couldn't say for certain why he was detained. The most likely reason, Schcuer said, was his interest in the status of Jews in the Soviet Union. Schcucr was having dinner tonight in the apartment of Prof. Alexander Lerner, a Soviet Jew and computer spe- cialist who lost both his job and his Communist Party membership when he applied ,for permission to emigrate to Isreal. Until last October, Dr. Ler?. ncr served as director of the department' of large-scale Sys- tems in Moscow's Institute of Control Sciences and was also professor at the Science and Technical University. It was the first time that a visiting U.S. congressman was detained in the Soviet capital.' The incident coincided with) ,the opening in Washington of a Soviet arts and crafts exhibi- tion at the Corcoran Gallery. '(Story on Page E1.) It recalled the earlier coinci- dence of Yale professor Frede- rick Barghoorn's arrest in Mos- cow in October, 1963, at a time, like the present, when there were signs of imminent improvement in Soviet-Amerl- can relations. ,ton, State De- [In Washing partment officials refused to- comment on the incident, say- ing they were awaiting details Soviet desperado in the neigh- borhood in the gui~;c of a for- " would therefore have to take .into custody anyone looking like a foreigner. Scheuer said he was with a group of about half a dozen Jewish scientists, and he was the only obvious outsider. "I showed them my Diners'. Club card, but that didn't im- press them," Schcuer said in a light-hearted mood afterward. "I showed them my Ameri- can Express card, but that didn't impress them either. I showed them my air travel' card stamped 'international' I. ,told them with that, Kosygin could fly to Buenos Aires. but 'even that didn't impress them. I showed them my congression- al I.D. card, with my picture on it, and they said, 'oh, artists can make those up.' " Scheuer said his passport would identify him beyond any doubt as a United States con- gressman, but that he had left, it in his hotel room. The police, he reported, said they would have to take him to the hotel to find the passport. Instead, according to Scheuer, the police took him and the 26-year-old son of his host (who speaks English) to "the pokey"-a neighborhood police station. "They put us in a little room with one light bulb, Schcuer said by telephone tonight. "We were in there about half an hour, 40 minutes. All of it up to now had been Informal, not too serious. Now, this first' iirutenant drew himself up Ad made a speech-now it's a United Nations' session, and be asked Vladimir (the 26- year-old) to translate every sentence to me. "I wish to inform the con' pressman; he said. pausing tip AV%. Magill tA all. .11 1. .,men visiting Moscow. We have. found that there is a Congress And we think you are that r cuer. With that, the police agreed to release him, Schcucr said. They offered to take him and, Young Vladimir back to the Lerner apartment, but the congressman decided he should first see someone from the U.S. Embassy here. The police had allowed him to call Cie embassy from the station. So the police got Scheuer a taxi, he related. and went with Vladimir to his hotel, where several embassy p e r s o n n e l were waiting. After telling their store, the two intended to return to their dinner at the Lerner apart- ment, but the police again picked up Vladimir to grill' him about what he told the Americans," Schcucr said, "I waited for him another hour,, Scheuer added. But lie did eventually get back to Lerner'sl apartment, from which he talk ed to this correspondent by telephone. For once, the Lcrncrs had some exciting news to convey to their friends In Chicago. ~ Schcucr said he didn't see how the arrest could have. been an accident. The arrest. ing officers had sufficient evi- dence that he was an Ameri- can congressman, he said. "It they didn't know what that meant, they could have picked up the phone and called head quarters to ask," he added. He noted that he had raised the question of the position of Jews In Soviet society In several meetings with Soviet officials during the past 10 days. lie is here with a House education subcommittee. lie also had one three-hour dis. cussion on the Jewish question with Alexander B. Chakovsky, editor of the important week- men, two policemen appeared t hat we have made extensive ly Literary Gazette, 'and him. at Lerner's apartment at about self a Jew. All these discus- 8.30 p.m. and We have found that relaxed and friend. 'eI~F IrOv/i nd'Fdl+1Rte ease 199 ~/a~JTo ?t:'V.:gA-'ftb I9-O Si184 were @00210001-1 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 NEW YORK TIMES 19 January 1972 Tighter Soviet Internal Security. Is Seem By IIEDRiCK SMITH MOSCOW, Jan. IR--Western diplomats believe that the So- viet Union is tightening Inter- nal security and seeking to shore up !Ideological vigilance among So'ie_t citizens to offset possible side effects of its pot. Icy of rcldxing tensions with the West. , They cite indications that So- viet security agencies are en-, gaged In a campaign against' domestic dissidents, especially those having contact with for- eigners. Some diplomats consider this no more than one of the peri- odic "vigilance campaigns" that the Kremlin sanctions from time to time. Others sus- pect that the security agencies may be intending to deal a more crippling blow to major elements of the dissident move- ment, which has functioned here for several years. Conviction, Arrests, Rnlde Since a call in December to ICoironunist party members for greater vigilance al*ainst the dangers of subversion and hos- tile propaganda from foreign travelers, residents and radio stations, there have been the following developments: Vladimir K. Bukovsky, a 29- year-okl dissident, was con-; victcd Jac. 5 of anti-Soviet agitation god propagandizing' and given ,the maximum sen-! tence, seven years in prison and five in rxile. His summary one-day trial was used by the newspaper Vechernaya Moskva to warn of the dangefs of hav- ing chntact with foreign cor-? respondents here. Thirteen Ukrainians were ar-' rested last week in Kiev and. Lvov for nationalist activities.] The 13 included Vyacheslav Chornovil, a journalist jailed In 1967 after having prepared an account of political trials In the Lfl raine, and two liter- ary critcs, Ivan Svitlychny and Ivan Dzyuba. The homes o nine Moscow dissidents were raided by se- curity, police Jan. 14 as part of an investigation of suspect- ed "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." More than 3,000 documents, articles, clippings, eluding a copy of Orwell's "1984," were reported taken, from the apartment of Pyotr Yakir, a historian regarded bye, the police as the leader of the, loose group of dissidents who; call themselves the Democratic ;Movement. Further Arrests Feared Two of the nine, Yuri Shi- khanovich, a mathematician, and Kronid Lyubarsky, an as- tronomer employed at the Chornogolovka Institute of Solid State Physics near Mos- cow, were called in subse- quently for questioning and de- tained by the K.G.B., or secret police. Dissidents say that they fear further arrests. Agents in Kiev searched the apartment of Viktor P. Nek- ,rasov, a noted Ukrainian au- thor. He gained fame with a popular World War II novel, "In the Trenches of Stalin- grad " and was sharply at- tacked in 1963 for favorable comments on life in the West in a book, "Both Sides of the Ocean," his account of a visit to the United States, Italy, and: France. In an attack on the activities of visiting American Congress- men, the Government news ;paper Izvestia charged yester- day that Representative James H. Scheuer, Democrat of the Bronx, had been following in- structions of the "American Secret Service." It contended that four intellectuals whom he met were ."the kind of people relied upon by those across the ocean" who plan to create sub- versive organizations "the aim of which is to incite Soviet citizens to come out against the existing regime and Soviet Government." The Soviet Union' expelled Mr. Scheuer last Fri-' day. accusing him of "Improper activities." LOSE Ineir 33511 The four men cited by Izves- tia were V. N. Chalidze, a phys- icist who is a member of the small Soviet Committee on uman Rights, and three Jew- ish intellectuals who have lost their jobs since they applied to emigrate to Israel, Aleksandr Y. Lerner, a computer specialist, and his son, Vladimir, and Vik- tor 0. Polsky, an electronics specialist who formerly headed a laboratory. Diplomatic observers empha- sized that the steps taken re- cently were still very minor compared with the purges of the purges of the thirties or ;even later crackdowns. and 'Moscow Intellectuals insist that the general atmosphere is a far .cry from the Stalinist period. Nonetheless, the latest ac- tions are widely regarded as the most pronounced internal security tightening in at least a year and perhaps longer. The last notable crackdown was the trial in Leningrad in 1970 of Jews and others accused of having conspired to hijack a Soviet commercial airliner. The latest wave of police ac- tion was preceded in November by a speech by the Ukrainian party leader, Pyotr Shelest, urg- ing party workers not to le the policy of detente weaken their ideological vigilance. There was also an article last cal stnihple with the west be cause of the policy of peacefu !coexistence. The article sal, Western countries sought t use detente to try to undermin socialism through political an from arrests or raids In kee Ing with the comparative moderate policy of allowin many Jews to emigrate afte bureaucratic delays provide that they do not take awa Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 WASHINGTON POST 26 January 1972 CPYRGHT Vladimir Bukovsky's Harsh Sentence Was the First Sign of... A New Soviet Crackdown on Political Dissent Otful Of it 130.10 cal police crackdown is in the frosty Moscow air this January. A series of arrests, harass- ments and articles in the official press have provided a steady stream of "crackdown" sto- ries for the Western' news organizations here-the single most attentive audience to the confusing spectacle of political dissent`. in the Soviet Union. Abrupt changes in the political tempera- ture recur periodically here. Old hands can remember dozens of them. For newer ob- servers the process is bewildering and fasci- nating. Bewildering because it Is so hard to. know what such a crackdown really means. Fascinating because it revives one of the basic questions about this society: How does it change, and why? By actual count, the current crackdown has directly touched less than 35 people (as- suming its full dimensions are known, which is proble'matical.) Nineteen of these were ar- rested In the Ukraine on charges of national- ist agitation, perhaps in connection with the arrest of a Belgian tourist in the Ukraine at the same time. The others affected by the crackdown are,, mostly Moscow dissidents, friends of Pyotr Yakir, the 43-year-old son of a Soviet general killed in a Stalin purge, and now Moscow's most active political renegade. Yakir's col- league Vladimir Bukovsky was sentenced to seven years in prison and five more in exile, By Robert G. Kais?r "Abrupt changes in the political temperature recur. periodically here. Old hands can remember dozens of them. For newer observers, the pro- cess is bewildering and fasci- nating. Bewildering because it is so hard to know what such a crackdown really means. Fasci- nating because it revives one of the basic questions about this Society: Ilow does it change, and why?" a harsh punishment which was the first sign of the new crackdown. The 'apartments of Yakir and seven friends were searched. The Moscow correspondent of the London Times from public criticism. - nored by the Soviet press for most of a year, several of the biggest Western chanceries in, ence says it is wrong to look for such an elaborate explanation. "Evens In the freest One Westerner with many years experi- and woefully depressing picture of medieval, Russia, Its cruel princes and wild Tartar in- poaiF~KTsYYlkii s?'F~u~/09/024 CCIA- ilea ~`~~A, ~n il. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 ous references to the arbitrary and silly use of state power, Rublev's tormented debate bout an artist's role in society. t troubling, the film is an Indi- vidual and unusual work, a piece of creativ- ity unstilted by party line or official dicta.. Muscovites have been flocking to see It, and the film is said to be opening all over the country. c+J HOW DOES one movie-or one small wave of arrests and harassments--affect the spirit of a Soviet citizen? For an outsider living here, that is the most Intriguing but most unanswerable of questions. The party ideologists apparently fear something, akin: to the "Prague Spring" of 1968, but what could bring that sort of phenomenon to the Soviet Union? What are the signals that a Soviet intellectual feels most strongly, that can make him change his ways of thinking and living? Recent Soviet history suggests that the one really powerful signal is terror. Stalin kept "foreign" influences out of the Soviet Union by enforcing appalling penalties on those who fell under their sway. Soviet art, music and, literature shriveled to the point of death under Stalin, because artists were afraid to challenge the official standards. The terror ended in the early 1950s, and by the late 1950s the poetry readings which gave birth to the dissident movement had begun. Pasternak finished "Doctor Zhivagb," Solzhenitsyn published "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich." Voznesensky and Yev The Soviet Union is not. shutting itself off from the outside world. Intourist, the state tourist organization, is working hard to reverse a de. cline in the number of tour. ists here in 1971 . The ,Soviet government is courting other countries ardently, and shows every indication of a keen desire to be admired by outsiders . . ." tushenko brought life back into Russian po- etry, a few directors partially revived the .Russian theater and movies. The mood has relaxed and tightened In turn, .but Stalinism has not reappeared. New boundaries of permissable behavior have been drawn, far outside the tiny circle lm- posed by Stalin (though still woefully short of anythin'" that would be acceptable in the West). Soviet Intellectuals have occupied the AA anew territory that has been opened to them. "Andrei Rublev" sems proof that the Rus- sian creative impulse is alive and strong, if hidden much of the time. It Is hard to see how the political police could restore the old sterility and ? silence-unless the Stalinist terror was restored too. The KGB and the government can control the most obvious manifestations of intellec- tual life. They can ban books, movies and plays, jam foreign broadcasts. By threaten- ing to deprive people of jobs and privileges, .they can also control open expressions of unacceptable opinions. They are doing all of these regularly. But this is not the same as the complete subservience of the intellectual class, which the terror did maintain. ' Without complete subservience, some de- gree of courageous (if foolhardy) open dis- sidence seems inevitable. Even a foreigner can quickly learn that numerous Soviet in- tellectuals are frustrated by censorship and a heavy-handed bureaucracy. This corre- spondent has had several startling experi- ences with responsible Soviet officials, trusted members of the Communist Party, who indicated unhappiness with censorship or controls on foreign travel. The police are as unpopular a group among the Soviet In- telligentsia as they are with the American intellectual left. If thoughts like these are widespread, a tiny fraction of those who -share them are likely to act eventually on their beliefs. Such action is dissidence In the contemporary Soviet Union. cvr A SOVIET citizen contemplating active par 'ticipation in the dissident movement might well be deterred when he hears about Vladi- mir Bukovsky's harsh prison sentence, or -the raids on the apartments of Pyotr Yakir and his friends. Probably because of arrests and stiff prison sentences In the past, the dissident movement is smaller today than if ,was in the mid-1960s.- At the same time some startling things have happened in this country. Jews havit conducted successful sit-ins In official of fives. Scientists' protests have forced the re lease of a prominent biologist from a mental' hospital. Alexander Solzhenitsyn lives openly and is writing a new book. The Soviet Union is not shutting Itself off, from the outside world. Intourist, the state tourist organization, is working hard to re. verse a decline in the number of tourlst,' here In 1971, a decline attributed to 1Vestert' reaction against Soviet treatment of Jewil and perhaps dissidents. The, Soviet. govern' ment is courting other countries ardentlyr and shows every Indication of a keen desirr' to be admired by outsiders. The tolerance oft proved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001 r CPYRGHT Solzhenitsyn and the decision to permit sub. dtantial Jewish emigration seem to be evi, dence that the Kremlin now.responds to for sign opinion In a way Stalin would have laughed at. None of this is liberalism. From a liberal point of view it may not even be hopeful. So' Viet Intellectuals may be willing to IM. within the current boundaries, permitted at" occasional "Andrei Rublev" and their pri? vate frustrations, but nothing more. Eaci year, no doubt, a few will be unwilling, wil' join the active dissidents, and will probably end In jail. There isn't even a hint that tht great mass of citizens cares about censor ship, foreign travel or civil rights. Brezhnev and his colleagues may havt' achieved a new status' quo-ahead of Stu lin's, well behind Khrushchev's at his mos liberal, and by all appearances stable. Per; haps its susceptibility to foreign pressure It a weakness that will lead to change, but tha "is only speculation. The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia seems to confirm that nt amount of foreign- disapproval could dis suade the men in' the Kremlin when then' are really afraid. 6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY February 1972 1943: Born; parents were respected Communist Party members. 1960: Expelled from Moscow High School No.59 where, in his senior year, he publ.ished'Martyr, an underground magazine of humorous satire in protest against the repression and injustices of the Soviet system. 1961-1962: Enrolled at Moscow University and studied biophysics for a year in spite of an official ban against his ever studying in a Soviet university. When his identity was eventually learned, he was expelled and then worked as handyman at a museum, while con- tinuing to meet with a group of his contemporaries for evening discussions against the system they all opposed. (This group is considered the forerunner for the present day dissident movement ) 1962: Organized illegal art exhibition featuring works of proscribed artists. When exhibition was drdered closed, Bukovsky escaped arrest by joining archaeological expedition to Siberia for six months. Early 1963: Returned to Moscow and worked as computer programmer. May 1963: Arrested by KGB and charged with having in his possession two copies of the book, The New Class, by Milovan Djilas. He was sent to Serbsky P syc Tat- ric Institute where he was declared insane. Dec 1963: Transferred to prison asylum in Leningrad, Feb 1965: Released and returned to Moscow where he again became involved in the dissident movement. Dec 1965: Arrested and sent to Serbsky Institute for organi ing demonstration demanding an open trial for writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel. Aug 1966: Released. Jan 1967: Arrested for organizing demonstration on behalf, of Aleksandr Ginsburg and Yuri Galanskov. Convicted and sentenced to three years in the Borr labor camp Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210004 -1 in Voronezhskaya district, 300 miles south of Moscow. Jan 1970: Released, and in poor health, including heart mur- mur and rheumatic ailments. Mar 1971: Arrested and held incommunicado, part of the time in Serbsky Institute, for sending abroad an open letter asking that Western psychiatrists investi- gate Soviets' use of mental hospitals to detain dissident intellectuals, and for his continued contacts with foreign journalists. Jan 1972: At one-day trial, Bukovsky was convicted of "anti- Soviet agitation and propaganda," and given the maximum twelve-year sentence under Article 70 of the Russian Criminal Code: two years in prison, five years in a labor camp and five years in exile (or enforced residence in a remote area desigrtated by Soviet authorities). 20 Jan 1972: Andrei Sakharov wrote Communist Party chief Leonid Brezhnev requesting Bukovsky's release. Pointing out that the trial had been closed and the defense prevented from calling witnesses, Sakharov said that everyone who knew of Bukovsky's activities "justifiably assumes that the real reason for the extremely strict sentence was his self-sacrificing struggle for human rights," and that "healthy forces in the leadership of the country and among the people are concerned. . ." Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 CPYRGHT WASHINGTON POST 6 January 1972 By Robert G. Kaiser wanhloaton rots Foreign Service MOSCOW, Jan. 5--A A1os? cow court tonight sentenced Ylndlmir Rukovsky, a prom- inent Soviet dissident, to sev- en years in a "strict regimen corrective labor colony" and five additional years In exile. It was one of the harshest I,r.ntcnces ever given to a well- known member of the tiny and shrinking dissidents commu- Inity. Iukovsky was charged with ".activity aimed at undermin. ing and weakening Soviet power" under article 70 of the Soviet criminal code. A seven. yenr prison sentence Is the maximum provided by this .etatute. The c.mirt ruled to. right that flukevsky should sl,enrl two years In Jail, five in a labor ramp and then five more in exile., probably In some place like Siberia. Rukovsky 28, has. already spent nearly seven years in Soviet prisons and mental hos. pitals for past political trans. gresstaiis. lie now suffers from heart trouble. He has always displayed his opposition to the Soviet regime openly' some. times brazenly. Ile also cut. tivated the friendship of West.! ern journalists, something So-1 vlet off4Finls constantly dis. courage. [its, severe sentence chin- cities - with nn Increasingly popular theory In 5loscow's Russiaii Dissideiit. Gets Prison, Exile 1t'cstcrn: diplomatic commu- go 431P !!a@@ the Soviet Union Is beginning a new crackdown. on domestic oppositidn as n complement to Moscow# current diplomatic offensive abroad. One West- to the outside world protected by tightenltag the screws at home.'" The theory, assumes that the Soviets fear the domestic im- pact of increased contact with foreigners, even on an official level. It is easier to postulate such a theory than to test it. Outsiders have not been able to perceive any signifi- cant degree of opposition to the regime here. Figures like Bukovsky seem to be rare exceptions, not representatives of any large movement. Bute outsiders are in no position to judge the state of Soviets society. According to Tast, the gow ernment news agency, the prosecutor in the fukovsky rg8e today accused him of try. Ing to smuggle a printing press Into the Soviet Union, of "dis- seminating slanderous lies about the ,social and govern- ment system of the U.S.S.R.," and of trying to persuade two soldiers to disobey orders and help him. Tass said Bukovsky "did not deny the facts cori. cerning the actions for which he was tried" when he ad- dressed the court. According to friends, I3ukov. ski told the court that he only little" for freedom In the So- viet Union while he was Iast++ out of prison-from January, 1970, until last April, when he was arrested on the charges which led to today's one-day trial. Western newsmen were barred from the trial, which Tass described as open. The dissident movement of which Bukovsky has been a fixture apparently reached the apex of its. influence after the 1905 trials of two writers, An- drel Sinyavsky and Yuli Dan- set. Their seven- and five-year prison terms aroused wide- spread indignation and an un precedented-thnugh still tiny -amount of public protest. But those protests (Bukov- sky organized one, and- went to jail for it) were to no avail. Later criticisms of the invasion of Czechoslovakia were simi- larly fruitless.. By their own admission, the dissidents lost' much open support, and' in thei last year or, so they have openly bemoaned their fate{ and their failures, More Cautious d One prominent opponent of the regime shad not long' ago, that people who. might stave' joined: a protest or signedt r petition Live years ago are more cautious now. "They see that petitions dbn't have much effect," this' )person said. One group of disscntcrs re? tar 't ~t..,? and has hat cess-the Jews. Perhaps. as many as 12.000 Jews were al: lowed' to. leave the Soviet Union for Israel during 197I.1 more- than in all previous -usagr have an adiantage," one dissi- dent noted. "They have a goal to work for--i.e. cmigratio` to Israel. ;,. , And. if the dissidents have;. lost some following and manv leaders, they have two. promi- nent and apparently perms nent allies who, so far at least, I seem, beyond the reach of thel police authorities. They are Andrei Sakharov, a distln- guished physicist known as father of the Russian' hydra gcn bomb, and Alexander Soiz- henitsyn, the Nobel prize-win ping novelist. Sakharov is founder of the unofficial. committee for hu- man right, lie regularly circulates letters of protest against arbitrary government actions. lie has several times. protested on Bukovsky's be., half, and he was barred from the courtroom today. nlzhnnilsvn takes no known active rote In dissident affairs, but he has become a symbol of the Russian intellectual who endures his government rather than supporting it, His every, public utterance Is now widely reported. in the West, and then by short-wave rarii-, back -W1 .the Soviet Union. BALTIM)RE SUN 6 January 1972 Soviet court decals harshly with dissident fly DEAN attrt,s CPYRGHT MOSCOW-A Soviet court found years' exile in - ria. There were few details avail- Industrial section of southeast Vladimir K. Bukovsky, a civil The sentence. which followed able yesterday regarding the Moscow, but they were r,fused rights activist, guilty of "anti-. a speedy, one-day trial, is ex- 12-hour trial, except for short entrance. Among them was An-' Soviet agitation and propagan-., traordinarily harsh, even for official versions by Tass, the drei Sakharov, the nuclear da" yesterday and handed him dissident cases. It carried an official news agency. physicist who helped, build the the maximup~,poss Ig" a cue tgt~y e h ~Q80O2OO2l Ot40* 4 bomb and -seven ye4 b~w%io hip 0'11 p n yT"'criti `9ukovs 's suppporters gathered a co- Dander of an unofficial t.ti.- -__ t,ahead 1w fivw rize the svstm-n. otitside the courthouse, in an human rights committee. CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 The only details of Mr. Bu. kovsky's own statements avail. able yesterday were his closing words to the court. In a refer. ence to his human-rights activi. ties between the time he was released from a previous son= tence in 1970 and his arrest on the new charges last March, he reportedly said: "I regret very much that in one year, three months, and three days, I did very little." Mr. Bukovsky, 29, who has* been confined several times to: various Russian mental hospl. this himself, campaigned par. icularly fervently ngainst the practice of incarcerating politi. cal prisoners In such institu. tions, lie gave interviews to Western correspondents and wrote letters to. Western author. Ries on the question, He said during his brief pert. CEJICAGO TRIBUNE 6 January 1972 One S 2. Two Soviet military offs-i cers testified that the defendant had tried to persuade them to "betray their oath of enlist. ment." The officers testified, according to Tass, that he had asked them to disobey orders from the command and per. suade the privates, to do the same" after meeting them In 11 Afnscow cafe. There was no explanation of %iiat kind of or,'^rs r,crn involved. 3. There were, said Tass, "several foreign citizens with whom Bukovsky had meetings with illegal aims in view." The single concrete charge .againSt hint, mentioned by Tas4 was' that i he disseminated "anti-Soviet materials" pub. lished by the People's Labor Union, an anti-Soviet Russian ;emigre o-'ganization based in Western Europe. 4 CPYRGHT viet Became 40,30 1 eil 2 By Frank Starr WAMINGTON-They threw the book at Vladimir Bukovsky oh Wednesday- ,putting him away for 12 years, If he serves it all, as it seems likely he will, e longest stretch of freedom he will have known between the ages of 20 and 42 will have been 15 months. His reaction: "I very much regret that in one year, three months, and three days, I did very little." Violated Criminal Code What this 29-year-old son of the Soviet intelligentsia had done, according to official accounts, was to violate a broadly worded article of the criminal code prohibiting !'anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" by seeking to smug- gle portable printing equipment into the oviet Union, persuading acquaintances o smuggle information abroad, and ying to enlist two army officers t~ elp him smuggAppt'1~4t19id"dj.te od of freedom that, whatever the official charges against app has wread a series and him, it would be for this that through to leaders here ands her would in an at- Soviet authorities would arrest tempt to free the him son. His friends said "" u111~IC v1 we nussian yesterday Federation Criminal Code un- that excerpts from the filmed der which Mr. Bukovsky was interview he gave the Columbia tried prohibits "agitation on Broadcasting System's former propaganda- aimed at subvert. Moscow correspondent; Bill ing or weakening Soviet power" Cole, were shown in court. and the preparation, or posses- The woman prosecuting attor. Sion of literature containing I'll ney, Aza Bobrushko, also cited . belous fabrications" against th as evidence against him favora Soviet system. ble references to Mr. Bukovsky The specific acts with which In broadcasts by the Voice of he was charged, according to America and the British Broad- Tass, seemed to be, In Western ;casting Corporation. terms, not W much acts as Mr. Bukovsky apparently thoughts: .withstood the trial well, the 1. "Bukovsky was going, to friends said. But his sister, use the assistance- of one of his Olga, fainted at one point. His 'foreign acqunintanees (to)'. mother, Mrs. Nina Bukovsky, smuggle a portable printshop, was in "very bad condition" Into the country." (Private citi after the sentence was pro. zens are not allow p# to own any' wM.Mnna 116-v ...&A 1!_ D..1. ~. 1_1 . He took seriously the United Nations be where he is now, in a tape-recorded Declaration of Human Rights -providing interview with me when I had the good for free flow of information across na- fortune to know him well during his tional boundaries and the Soviet con- 15 months of freedom. That freedom stitution's article 125, which reads: ended with his arrest last March. "In conformity with the interests of "For my generation-10 to 12 years the working people, and in order to old when Stalin died-he [Stalin] w ;s strengthen the Socialist system, the the personification of Soviet rule," Bu- citizens of the U. S. S. R. are guar- kovsky had said. "We were raised in anteed by law freedom of speech, free- this spirit by the newspapers, our par- don of the press, freedom of assembly, ents, the schools, and by our total en- including the holding of mass meetings, vironment. demonstrations. -"~ Strong Deification Concept "These civil rights are insured by "Even tho it was never said outright, placing at the disposal of the working there was a religious feeling toward people and their organizations printing Stalin, and the concept of his deification presses, stocks of paper, public build- was strong. We children, for example, ings, the streets, communications facili- saw a mysterious aspect in the signa- ties, and other material requisites for tures of V. I. Lenin and J. V. Staligr-an the exercise of these rights." otherworldly power. Vladimir Bukovsky made clear the "Try then, to imagine StaIin's sudden ajj9i3~ 2rgvGf -lb[R79-0dkHt9*-M2i)Q24MQ~4ib1e that st u on to im, and how he came to Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 CPYRGHT God is mortal. There was great confu- sion even among.those people whom we had grown accustomed to regarding as strong people-our teachers and parents. "They were bewildered; they did not know what to say or how to behave. Teachers sobbed during lessons and our parents cried their hearts out at home. All this was perfectly sincere, not the 'least artificial. The whole country was united in a desperate feeling of catas- trophe. "Just imagine, after this profound experience of our childhood, the death of a god. Literally two or three years later came the unmasking of that god. And suddenly it was revealed that this was not god but a . terrible monster; a Moloch who had devoured millions of people, and had irretrievably perverted everything. "Just as before, when Stalin and Soviet rule and Communism symbolized to us everything that is beautiful; to which everyone owed allegiance, now by that analogy the image of Stalin and the understanding of Communism and Soviet rule in our minds became the symbols of evil, force, and destruction. This occurred quite mechanically, as a matter of course, and it occurred simul- taneously in millions of minds. System of Lies "Naturally, we who were young at that time, 15 or so, being impulsive and craving generalizations, came to the firm conclusion that the whole system was oppressive and evil, a system of lies and falsehoods. "It turned out that all those who understood this had lied all their lives, starting with the state and ending with one's own friends. It turned out that the whole structure was by no means man- kind's ccntpries-old dream. It turned out evcrytng had been fabricated. It turned out that nature, people, state, and society had{becn raped. All those who contradicted` were eliminated. It became obvious to us that there could not be any truth or justice in general in such a system and that it had to be changed radically. ' "A second fact which I regard as a turning point was the rebellion in Hungary in 1956. Corning so quickly after the unmasking of our god, this caused a quick and acute. reaction." By 1957, when he was 15, he was already in a spontaneous, and therefore illegal, organization--a loose association of youngsters who thought alike but Two years later he saw the Soviet' the first time. He edited a satirical magazine in school, unbeknownst to officials, called Martyr-a play on words. Uchenik in Russian means stu- The Communist Party Central Com- mittee building was near the school, and news of the magazine reached the com- mittee quickly. The director of the school was fired immediately. An effort to gain a general condemnation of the magazine from the student body failed, but Bukovsky was expelled. He was Interviewed by officials, who refused even to say he would. So he was study he would-have to "stew in the laborers' caldron to understand 'what writer and confirmed Communist and whose mother was a journalist for Radio Moscow but who since has defended her son, was deeply affected by this experi- ence. He was already on his way to becoming a hardened, devoted leader of what would eventually be the Soviet again, I shall organize other demonstra- tions-always, of course, like this one, in perfect conformity with the law." Works Hard After Release ' After his release, he did indeed work hard, seeing as his chief objective in= forming the world and the Soviet people in as much detail as possible of the use of psychiatric institutions against dissi- dents, of every instance of official legal abuse. According to the authoritative but clandestine journal of the derio- cratic movement, Chronicle of Currxmnt Events, he succeeded just before his arrest last March in sending to the West clinical findings in a series of psychi- atric cases involving dissidents. During his 15 months of freedom, I knew him well. He was a remarkably optimistic and cheerful young man but at the same time intensely devoted to .his own objectives and courageous be- yond the limit of many of his associates and beyond the belief of many of his foreign friends. Muscular, square-jawed, and tough, Bukovsky was always polite, sometimes brusquely businesslike. In the 15 months I knew him he never once asked for anything for himself, as many Russians who saw the opportunity for otherwise unavailable consumer goods did. During that 15 months he told 13i11 Cole, an American television correspond- ent, in a clandestinely filmed interview: "I, am often asked what hope there making and distributing copies of the Yugoslav writer Milovan Djilas' book, again for organizing a demonstration against the arrest of writers Andrei Sin- to psychiatric wards again until August, "He was a remarkably optimistic and cheerful young man but at the same time intensely devoted to his own objectives." for organizing another street demonstra- - tion in defense of those who'd been ar- rested for compiling an account of the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial and was sent to labor camps until January, 1970. At that trial, Bukovsky made a final plea that has become a landmark in the dissident movement. Speaking for two mendous sense of personal dignity" and "with legal erudition" his right to the Bukovsky concluded by saying. "I . Approved For ReleasegMd% 00 -01194A000200210001-1 Is for change in. this country and how many sympathizers we have. That's an understandable question but a difficult one to answer. First, one must under- stand the essence of our struggle, which in my opinion, is a struggle with fear, the fear which gripped society in Stalin's time, which still does not subside, and thanks to which there still exists a dic- tatorial system of oppression. It is against precisely this fear that we con- centrate our efforts, and in this struggle the personal example has great sig- nificance CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 194A000200210001-1 struggle." That Bukovsky was tried in the course of one day in a small courtroom on the outskirts of Moscow from which foreign correspondents were barred but fed one-sided accounts thru the official press agency, that he was given the maximum sentence Soviet law will al- "One Must Struggle" ' "I personally did what I believed in, protested when I wanted to. And I am alive. Now I am sitting here, not in prison. I can walk about; I can live. For me 'and for many people, that is a very Important fact. That fact shows that one can struggle, that one must DAILY TELEGRAPH., London 8 January 1972 SOCIETY SIK low-seven years Imprisonment followed by five years of exile-where apparently be was not accused of passing secrets but simply "slanderous" informat;or, that Soviet authorities hive decided to risk international censure by creating an intellectual martyr must be a meas- ure of the fear they have of him. ITH FEAR,, SAYS BUKOVSKY. By 04YID' FLOYD LADIMIR BUKOVSKY, 29, the Russian dissident sentenced to seven years' hard abour on Wednesday for " anti-Soviet activity," turned his , final speech into. 'a denunciation of the methods used by the police and judiciary to silence him. The full text of his speech was smuggled out of Civil rights movement Bukovsky was presumably re- ferring to the activity on his be- half by the civil rights movement in Russia, in which prominent intellectuals such as Academician Sakharov play an important part. They have kept the outside world aware of the treatment being meted out to Bukovsky and court and -passed by other dissidents to foreign corre? other dissidents. spondents in Moscow. " I will never renounce my convic- Bukovsky said that in Sep- ternbcr learn-t that the ions," he said. m edical lcommission apprAnted Under the right given me But the Process of the spirit- to examine him intended to pro- nounce him incapable of stand- )y Article 125 of the Soviet ual recovery of our society has ing trial. onstittttion, I shall continue already begun and it cannot be o communicate them to all stopped. "It was only on Nov. 5, after ho wish to listen to me. Bukovsky revealed that the pr,?ssure had been exerted by K G B (secret police) had tried ' the Public, that a new medical "I shall fight for legality and to have him certifird insane so commission pronounced me fit. nstice and, my only regret. is that there would have been no "There you have clear proof hich I was at liberty--one year His opposition to this and called slanderous In this court, access to secret case proce- 'o months and three days--I th It pwchiatric reprisals are dune," uccecded in doing too little for public interest in his case made organised against dissenters on " s cause." the impossible. Bukovsky commented: "One orders of the KGB." wnmtere what kind of secret Held in jail Bukovsky was last arrested in March. Since when he has been held mostly in hefortovo jail, Moscow. In 1963 ite was confined to, a mental institution, though later second time the authorities had being tried for anti-Soviet pro- tried to have him certified paganda?" insane. "Ti lany case where and In " And so." be continued, what Soviet law is this cele- "on Nov, 5 I was dcc!ared brated ' access' set out? No- sane, put into prison again where" and the breaches of legal pro- cedure continued." was sentenced to three years no need to prove a crime had Among the beaches of SOY- in a prison camp. been committed. The man is just let law with which Bukovsky Whenever he was free he sick, mad , . " charged the anthorities were: resumed his campaign of There would also have been police persecution, criticism of the Soviet regime. no sentence as a reprisal against Provocation in prison. IIe has played a leading part in him and he could not have made exposing the Soviet authorities' his final speech to the court. Refusal of defence lawyer. use of commmeatalns s of mental hos- pitals ?They would have triad me in "Before my arrest there was pitals as a m absentia,'had it not been for the constantly a ' tail' on_me. I was. opponents of the regime. influence of intensive interven- followed, threatened with mur- "Our society is still sick," he tion by the public." der and one of the people follow- told the court on Wednesday. ing me lost his self-control suffi- , to threaten me with his "It is -sick with a fear which ciently. Stalin era, A has come. dowp tpoproved "Pe Release 1999/09/02 : C9*=RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 4 ment of the KGB very much wanted me to be found not responsible for my actions," Bukovsky told the court, in the Moscow suburb of Lyublino. "How convenient that would have been. Then there would have been no case against me, CPYRG It was after Bukovsky com- plained about this that the police' called for an inquiry into his "psychological conditjon," Stool pigeon Ike said: "The police put a stool pigeon into the cell with me-a certain Trofimov-who admitted to me that he had been instructed to carry on anti :Soviet conversations with me with the idea of provoking me to make similar remarks; For this he was promised early release from prison." Bukovsky asked to be repre- sented by Mme. Dina Kamin- skaya, a Moscow lawyer known for, her--vigorous defence of other dissidents. His application was rejected Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 WASHINGTON POST 10 January 1972 a of Viadhnir .eme brans s Btikovsky, Soviet Dissident By Anthony Astrachan THE LAST TIME I saw Vladimir Bukov- Ginsburg and Yuri Galanskov, two writers sky, the Soviet dissident sentenced last who had been arrested after taking up the Wednesday to seven years in prison and cause of Sinyasky and Daniel. At that trial, labor camp followed by five years' exile, it Bukovsky read aloud Article 125 of the So- was in his Moscow apartment. The heart viet Constitution, guaranteeing freedom of murmur and rheumatic ailments that he had speech, the press, meeting and assembly, acquired in Soviet psychiatric clinics had re- and marching and demonstrating in the curred and made him too ill to deseend four streets. Isn't the Constitution the basic law flights of stairs to greet friends at the street In our country?" he asked. door. Over Fcups of tea he predicted he The trial proceedings were recorded by would soon be in jail again. And a few Pavel Litvinov, a grandson of the prewar So- weeks later, at the end of March, he was. viet foreign minister, and published in the But neither Illness nor his unending strug- West. Litvinov was exiled to Siberia for live gle could dim the talents and energy that years in 1968 for protesting the Soviet inva- had enabled him to learn English in a Soviet sion of Czechoslovakia. In Bukovsky's one- prison camp. They could not quench his laughter when two secret police teams, one following him and one following a corre- spondent, met on his street and failed to rec- ognize their common employer. Nothing in- stilled fear f him or lessened his capacity to love frieds, family, women. , I thought, over the tea, that it was a tragic waste for Volodya to spend his whole life fighting a system he could not change signif- icantly in that lifetime. But Bukovsky him- self did not regard his life as wasted. Every battle against public fear was its own vic. tory, in his view. Every confirmed report of repression that he helped make public by passing information to Western newsmen in Moscow, prevented a Stalin-like terror from building up on its ow; secrecy. He seldom agreed with foreigners who said the dis idepts would never be able to bring about gnificant change in the Soviet system. But ;he sometimes agreed with ob- servers who said the Soviets treated the dis- 1 t s harshly because they kept the pos- s o CPYRGHT after my release, more material for a read' interview. Early in 1971, Bukovsky sent abroad ap-, peals to western psychiatrists, asking them to put the forcible hospitalization of pollti? cal dissidents on the agenda of International. psychiatric congresses. But The World Pay chiatric Association decided just last month that it had no procedural basis on which it could condemn the Soviets. In September, 1971, the Soviets showed their real concern over dissident publicity by having the KGB (secret police) interroa gate two western correspondents, James R. Pelpert of the Associated Press and Andrew Waller of Reuter, as part of the pre-trial in- vestigation of the Bukovsky case. They were told it was a prison offense to reveal any. thing about the interrogation. This changed the unwritten rules of the journalistic game in Moscow, where the usual actions against foreign correspondents had previously been official warnings, attacks in the official So- viet press, and expulsion. er-~ LEAKS TO DISSIDENTS during Bukov sky's pre-trial Investigation indicated that his dealings with the foreign press were part of the Soviet case against him. Vechernaya Moskva said specifically last Thursday that Bukovsky's TV interview with CBS corre- spondent William Cole was part of the pros- ecution's case. In that interview, he said, The essence of the struggle Is the struggle against fear in which personal example plays a great role." Many people may feel that Bukovsky's personal example will be lost, now that he is , back in prison. Despite the waste of talent and spirit that/his prison sentence means, I am not so sure. I cannot get out of my head an Image from a short story that Volodya wrote in his earlier literary days. The story is about a little boy whose grandmother repeats an old Russian nursery rhyme to him: What proud man can lift Tsar-bell Or move the huge Tsar-cannon's weight Or be slow to doff his cap At the Kremlin's holy gatel We. sibility of change alive, and that this alone VLADIMIR B11'KOVSKY wits more than the authorities could toter day trial this year, the authorities made sure ate, no friend of his was making a transcript. ACCORDING TO his own account, Bukov- sky was one!,of the original literary radicals whose gathef ings in Moscow's Mayakovsky Square in 1938 and 1959 were the precursors of today's dissidence: He was then 16. Bukovsky was sent to psychiatric hospitals in 1963 for organizing an Illegal art exhibit and in 1965 for organizing a demonstration protesting the arrest of writers' Andrei Siny- asky and Mull Daniel. Bukovsky was sentenced to three years In the Moscow prosecutor's office and warned prison camp in January, 1967, for organizing that he could be put on trial for the inter la demonstrator on behalf of Alcksandr view. Bukovsky replied, "Is that a threat? Don't threaten me. I am not afraid. If one trial is not sufficient, if my last speech was 'not enough, there a second one-and "I always tried to imagine that proud man," Bukovsky wrote. "There he was, standing at the Spassky gate, hands on hips and looking up, with his head flung so far back that his cap almost fell off. And he looked so valiant!" Bukovsky was seeing himself, -hie friends Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A0OA2?0210001-1 After emerging from prison, Bukovsky got, to know foreign correspondents in Moscow.` In May, 1970, he gave an interview to Holger Jensen of the Associated Press, which was published in The Washington Post. It was the just detailed account of the treatment of: political inmates in Soviet psychiatric hospi- tals, it also described conditions he had seen Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-tPYRGHT INFORMACIONES, Madrid 12 January 1972 T, NN estos dias, 14 Prensa interiurcional se estd ocu- Jui pando del caso, ya tipico, de un escritor sovietico. Vladimir Bukovski, el escritor en cuestion, es un in- telectual de modesto relieve, pero con un signo de re. beldia compartida con otros escritores de su genera. citin. Dukovski ha silo acusudo coma aculpuble de actor tendentes a perjwiicar el poder sovietico y a de- bilitarlon, y, en eonsecuencia, acaba de ser condenado por tun Tribunal de MMoscic a siete ands de privacion' de libertad,'de los cuales los dos primeros habra de pasarlos en una prisidn de reha.bilitacivn, y el resto, como deportalo. PI process so ha dcsarro- nado in la presents de eorresponsafes de Prensa extranjcros tit tampoco to ha sido pcrmitida la asts- tcncia at mismo at acadd- mico sovidlico Zakh.arov. {" iico do prestigio internac o- val y fundador de un Co tnitd de Derechos del llont- brc (no rcconocido Legal- nrentc), que habia inicrve- nido pubticamcnte a favor de Bukovski. Los cargos qua pesaban sobrc dste. sc- giin la agencfa Tass, Bran haber incitado a ios milita- res a la desobediencfa yy ha- te' tratado do diIundtr es- crttoa clandestinos y con. testatarfos, en contacto con otgunos extranjeros. No vamos a ser nosotros, deade luego, qufenes juz- oitemos >uevamente el caso Dukovski, pero ai cabe rc- sefiar que fate es uno mds de la ya large iista forrna- da por Los Sintavski, Da- "let, Tarsi3, Babftski, Drodski. Litvinov. Amairik, Pasternak, Kuznetaov Y Sulzhenttsyn, entre otros. Como algunoa de ellos, Bu- ltovski ha pasado tambidn. antes de esta condone, por cAnicas psiquidtricas espe- ciales, ese tratamiento, tan especLai tam bit n de la Union Sovidtica, reservado Lya familiar Para los inte- etuales Rdivergentes>s. Tampoco pretendemos in- siatir on Ottos casos. bas- tante aircados aun desor- titados, sepun las autorida- dea de Moscu, que no.tar- dan en hablar de ecampa- antisovfeticass occiden- tales. Lo cierto ea, six em- NEW YORK TIMES 13 January 1972 ma aovitticn, Pero. como ve- mos, este. Uega a morderse la cola. Si el grado de tibertad creadora - y critfea.- de loa arttstas e intelectualea ha stdo stempre un buen critcrio Para juzgar el indu- ce de trsaludn interns de una cociedad, of baremo tarnbien dehe aplicarse con todo derecho a la U.R.S.S. Una U. R. S. S., ademas. octralmente empciwada en fa rclajacibn de todas Las tensione3 con el Oeste eu- ropeo. Pero esas tensfones -tampoco hat que, otridar. Lo- rristcn, estdn ahf, co- mo Las dispositivos villita- res, par algo. Las fuerzas m.ilitnres opuestas entre Los dos bloques son, sin duda, la mejor, ea,presidn de as tenstones, ta.nto como una ccusa de ellas, aunque no (a iinica. Genera l m e n t e con las tropes tar que vie- nen dotrds de las tensions,/ no a la inversa. Pues buen, sl la U.R.S,S, desea con tanto intcrds que se allanen obstdculos den- iro de la gran Europa cde At!dntico a loo Uralesi,, no parece que baste para ello una simple retirada de so!. dados. Para que era Europa quede en calma es prectso quo so lumen tambiCn otros contrastes que estdn en la base de todas as tenstones. En otras palabras, antes da to gran Oita europea a que invita la U. P. S. S. es ne- cesarto arreglar Ia casa por dentro prcviamente. Y la represidn de la aintelligent. sias, como de ordinarto eualquler represidn, dice poco a favor de coma an dab Zas cosas de puertax adetttrtt on is U. B. S..S S. gt.ieran o no, su actitud, acaba iem.pre voli?idiidose- contra el orden vigente en' su pais. E1 escritor, conto el tnte- tectuat en general, es 71m v aprectado socialrnente en la Union Soviettca. El pu@blo rttso, uno 'dg ins que Inds icon en el mundo, requiere eseritores en abundancia. Ese a/an cultural ?ue pro- movido por el propio siste- bargo, que esos casos se st- guen productendo y que fox mi mos encausadoa son Los primeros en saber quo a trcnudo son u1llizaclo3 con- tra su pais. Pose a todo, at- pue habfeiido escritorea amaldit.osn on la U. R. S. S. V se sfgue luiblando de ellos, can to que el hecho ha pasndo a la categoria de un /enbmeno habitual y it- to. Debe a r ea p tai tan- to. buds importante - no solo pat atencibn a la proble- indtfoa interna de la U. R. S. S. lQud ocurre con Los ea- critores, artistes e inietec tuales de talante rnds o me- nos aconiestatarion en la U. R. S. S.? La respuesta parece di/ieft -no siempre se puedc reuntr, par ejem- plo, un buen co,,:;-auto de datos-, comp tampoco puc- de hacerse sin mati4a c i o- nes. Pero, on general, es ya de suyo significative que todas estos fntelectuales, que ordinariamente no re- rEnfegan do la ideotogta sociaiista, no d u d e n en a/rontar las penas y la eoi- dcnie persecucid> de que son objeto por carte de Las autorkiades aopittkas. Lo `Our Society Is Still Sick' CPYRGHT BY VLADIMIR K. BUKOVSKY MOSCOW-Before my arrest there the number of the official car in which was constantly a tail on me. I was these people traveled around behind pursued, threatened with murder, and me and presented other facts which one of those following me lost his made it possible for them to be sought self-restraint to such an extent that ouHowever, I never received an, answer he threatened me with his service to this request from those depart- an giving me an answer, sent me to the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry for medical examination. The investigation department of the K.G.B. very much wanted me to be found irresponsible. How convenient. Then there would be no case about weapon. While under investigation I peti ments to which I sent it. me, no need to construct a charge tioned for a criminal case to be insti- As far as the detective is concerned, and here there would be no need to tuted against t se eo le. I v n gave he, instead of examining my complaint prove the fact of commission of a Approvea or Release 1999/09/02 (BIA-RDP79-011914A00020,i .i 0210,Q01,-,1 , ~ ? ~ .____?__._., .. ..... __ .. ...: ,.,'R n t. .., t Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 CPYRGHT crime. The man is just sick, mad. And only on Nov. 5, after pressure was exerted by the public, a new medical commission pronounced me healthy. There you have trustworthy proof of my assertion-which is called slan- derous here in court-that on the in- structions of the K.G.B. psychiatric reprisals are set up against dissenters. In accordance with my right to de- fense, I demanded that the lawyer Dina Isakovna Kaniinskaya be invited for my defense in court. No lawyer was given me. It took my 12-day hunger strike, a complaint to the prosecutor general, to the Justice Ministry and the Com- munist party Central Committee, and also new, active intervention by mem- bers of the public before my legal. right to defense was finally fulfilled and I was given lawyer Shveisk, who was invited by my mother. The trial proceedings today have also been conducted with numerous procedural infringements. The indict- ment, in which the word "slanderous" is used 33 times and the word "anti- Soviet" 18 times, contains no con- crete indications of which facts are slanderous among those I communi- cated to Western correspondents and which materials which I allegedly dis- tributed are anti-Soviet. I allegedy handed over these ma- terials in the presence of Volpin and Chalidze [Aleksandr . Yesenin - Volpin, son of poet Sergei Yesenin, and Valera Chalidze, a physicist and member of an unofficial Soviet civil rights com- mittee]. However, my demand that these two people be called as witnesses was not met. Furthermore, not one of the eight people I called who could confirm the authenticity of my assertions on the facts of confinement and conditions of detention of people in special psy- chiatric hospitals was summoned to the court. What were all these provocations and crude procedural violations needed for, this stream of slander and un- founded accusations? What was this trial needed for? Only to punish one CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 14 January 1972 ~CPYRGHT 'person? No, there is a "principle," a kind of "philosophy" here. Behind the ac- cusation presented, there stands an ,other, unpresented. With the reprisal against me they want to frighten those who try to tell the whole world about their crimes. Our society Is still sick. It is sick' with the fear which has come down to us from the Stalin era. But the process of the public's spiritual en- lightenment has already begun and cannot be stopped. And however long I have to spend in detention I will never renounce my convictions and I will express them,, availing myself of the right given me by Article 125 of the Soviet Consti- tution, to all who want to listen to me. I will fight for legality and justice., And I regret only that over the short period-one year, two months and. three days-during which I was at liberty, I managed to do too little for' this cause. The irrepressible last word The Soviet Union cannot escape the torship of the literary magazine Novy by keeping his Nobel Prize from him and consequences of its attempts to force polit- Mir: "There are many ways of killing a : making him a nonperson, a Tvardovsky ical "uniformity" upon its writers and. poet -- the method chosen for Tvardovsky for a consistently liberal viewpoint. The thinkers. was to take away his offspring, his pas- irony of course is that these men, though This was the import of young Vladimir Sion, his journal.... But you need to be in different ways, were showing that the 3ukovsky's response when sentenced last deaf and blind to the last century of Rus- system - of "hospitals" and "mental In- week to seven years in prison and labor sia's history to regard this as a victory stitutions" and "prisons" 'plus the courts amp, and another five years in exile. and not an irreparable blunder! Madmen! and official press - meant to enforce a "The process of spiritual enlightenment When the voices of the young resound, uniform doctrinal line only demonstrates of (Soviet) society has already begun, and keen-edged, how you will miss this pa- its Inherent ruthlessness. it cannot be stopped. Society already tient critic, whose gentle admonitory understan4s that the criminal is not the voice was heeded by all. Then you will Life can be desperate for men of free person whp washes dirty linen in public, be set to tear the earth with your hands mind in the Soviet Union. Prison or si- but the person who dirties it." for the sake of returning Trifonovich." lenee or ill health seems to be forced upon x them. How remarkable, then, that they And it was the Import of Alexander Strong words of moral judgment. can see past their own difficulties to the Solzhenitsyn's prose poem written in It is not surprising then that the Soviet', process of spiritual enlightenment at memory of his friend Alexander Tvardov- Union would want to silence a pukovsky work. It is the voices of conscience that ky, who died in December just six by sending him to prison, a Solzhenitsyn get the last word. months after being forced out of his edt- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 THE ECONOMIST 15 January 1972 Und a rest rn eyes a g n other communist states, is ruled by a few ageing men. They can count on the docility of a great part of a nation long accustomed to despotism, and only now achieving the transition to a mainly urban society from a very backward rural one. But they have no illusions about their popularity. The past few months' have seen a rising accumulation of evidence of that, up to the imprisonment last week of Vladimir Bukovsky ; and the evidence has been made available to people outside Russia by the regular appearance of the illegal, but apparently unstoppable, underground publications, such as " Chronicle of Current Events." The leaders of the Soviet Union rule with less` of an iron hand than Stalin did so years ago, but they dare not face an organised opposition. The average Soviet citizen lives better (han he did in Stalin's -time ; but his masters know that appetite grows with eating, and that when the sheer struggle to survive is no longer all- absorbing people's surplus energies may overflow into dangerous channels. So they are still forced to maintain a huge, costly and cumbrous apparatus of political policing ip order to curb manifestations of dissent. And this. apparatus is not working well. Ritually, at intervals,' the people are marshalled to go through the motions of elections ' whose results are fixed., and known, in advance. Ritually, they are like-' wise required to attend " discussions," in which their role is in practice equally limited ; all important questions are decided at the top, irreversibly. A population that is increasingly literate and sophisticated is ceasing to regard these rituals as forms of participation in politics in any real sense. And it is irked by its rulers' neurotic seeretiven so much so that, on the occasions when -Pravda tells the truth, many Russians suspend belief until they can check its version by listening to foreign broadcasts. Russia's " silent majority" is silent for a sufficient reason. ,(,ny exercise of the right of free speech that is, in theory, guaranteed by the Soviet constitution means trouble. Speaking one's mind may lead to loss of promo- tion, of a job, of a chance to get a flat, of social security benefits, or of the right to further education. Persistence in speaking out brings harsher punishments : harassment, smearing accusations, transfer to degrading work in remote regions, persecution of the offender's - relatives and friends, and, eventually, imprisonment in conditions so cruel that many. victims do not survive it. In these circumstances, what is surprising is that any sounds of protest are heard 'in Russia at all. ? In tsarist times the. grip of the Russian police state was weaker than in Stalin's time because the political police were less efficient, because -a well-born young dissenter was sometimes protected' by . his influential relatives or friends, and because ? the regime veered between bouts of severe:reprtssion and'attempts to relax A roved For Release 1999/09/02 the pressure in hope of 'letting off some of the steam harmlessly. Some of these conditions. now seem to be reappearing. Last week a searing account was published of the cruelties being inflicted on Andrei Amalrik, who has been sent to one of the notorious, Kolyma prison camps in north-eastern Siberia after .writing a book (banned, of course, in Russia) called "Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984 ?" . In some ways the more relevant approaching date ,for Russia now seems to be 1905. That was the year when the tsarist facade cracked. The veering tendency is again visible. In 197 r nearly 14,000 Jews were allowed to leave Russia. Never before have the Soviet rulers pgrmitted any such number of their subjects to leave the country. Their purpose in doing so was evidently to reduce the -pressure not only of the, Jewish Russians' wish to emigrate to Israel but also of the protest movement as a whole. Throughout last year the regime also tolerated the, existence of the human rights committee that had been formed in November, 1970, by a group of distinguished scientists, of whom Andrei Sakharov is the best known. Its mem- bers protested repeatedly-at acts of injustice that flagrantly violated the Soviet constitution itself. They suffered some harassment, and of course the Soviet press frionopoly gave its readers no hint of their existence ; but the authorities failed to stop them circulating their protests abroad and, clandestinely, inside Russia too. Last week Mr Sakharov was refused admission to the cruel farce of a " trial " at which the young writer Vladimir Bukovsky was given a '12-year sentence for protesting at the Soviet use of mental. hospitals as places where political prisoners are confined -and tortured. Nevertheless, the Sakharov committee's protests about the rigging of the trial were made widely known irl the scientific and intellectual circles whose sympathy for the committee's aims inhibits the ruling group whenever it is tempted to try to squash these nuisances. The KGB is more efficient, and less concerned not to violate the forms of law, than its tsarist predecessor, the Okhrana, was. But, like the Okhrana, it now finds it wise to inquire into a suspect's .connections with influential .people before taking drastic action against him. And it must be getting worried at the way it is ,now being repeatedly defied, even by people who have already been scarred by its claws. The more punishment is meted out to those who circulate forbidden material, the more such material is circulated. It is all uncom. fortably ;reminiscent. of the way things were going 70. years ago. The Russian opponents of despotism may still appear as weak and dispersed as they did at the time when Joseph ;Conrad wrote " Under Western Eyes," but there is little comfort ir4 that comparison for the KGB and its masters. The hammer flinches As the ,20 BCIA-RDP79-0119s4A0r00 u1i0~f '~he screws Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 CPYRGHT proceed, rather hysterical notes are being sounded by the hacks who serve the political police in the Soviet press. Literaturnaya Gazeta has solemnly tried to discredit Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Nobel Prize-winning author of " One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich," by acsert- ing that his grandfather owned a large sheep farm. (George Orwell could tell who owns it now.) The Novosti agency, whose comment on the Bukovsky trial was unusually stomach-turning even by its own standards, is becoming shrill about alleged attempts to subvert army officers. It seems to be getting harder to find anything. to say that will not put undesirable ideas into people's heads. If one contrasts the few small visible signs of dissent with the colossal apparatus of repression that overhangs them, it is not easy to understand why the repressors should show such nervousness. It is as if a steam hammer .were to .'get the jitters on being con- fronted ;with, a nut. But perhaps this particular steam hammer knows something about. the nut that we don't know... NEW YORK TIMES 19 January 1972 Tights y riet Internal Security. Is ? Seen MOSCOW, Jat. 18-Western` diplomats believe that the So s,~gipq, laightening inter- ii}l[yii and seeking to shore up ideological vigilance ,among Soviot citizens to offset possible side effects of its pol- icy of relaxing tensions with the West. They cite indications that So. viet security agencies are en- gaged in a campaign against, domestic dissidents, especially those having contact with for-: eigners. . Some diplomats consider this no more than one of the peri- odic "vigilance campaigns" that the Kremlin sanctions from time to time. Others sus- pect that th security agencies may be intiending to deal a more crippling blow to major elements of the dissident move. ment, which has functioned here for several years. Conviction, Arrests, Raids Since a call in December to Communist party members for greater vigilance against the dangers of subversion and hos- tile propaganda from foreign travelers, residents and radio stations, there have been, the following developments: Vladimir K. Bukovsky, a 29- car-old dissident, was con- .icted Jan. 5 of anti-Soviet gitation and propagandizing nd given the maximum sen? ence, seven years in prison nd five in exile. His summary ne-day trial was used by the ewspaper r Vechernaya Moskva l to warn of the dangers of hay- ith tacked in 196 for favorable cents were still verv minor W respondents here- mmen s on a an the West in a book, "Both Sides of the compare with the purges of the purges of the thirties or Thirteen Ukrainians were ar- rested. last week in Kiev and Ocean, " his account of a visit even. later crackdowns, and Lvov for nationalist activities. to the United States, Italy, and France. Moscow intellectuals insist that the general atmosphere is a far The 13 included Vyacheslav Ch 1, ornovi a journalist jailed In an attack on the activities cry from the Stalinist period. in 1967 after having prepared 1 of visiting American Congress-, 'men the Government news Nonetheless, the latest as tions are widely regarded as an accounj of pniit*r~i t.11,11 , - in the Ukraine, and two liter- ary critcs, Ivan Svitlychny and Ivan Dzyuba. The homes of nine Moscow dissidents were raided by se- curity police Jan. 14 as part of an investigation of suspect- ed "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." More than 3,000 documents, articles, .clippings, letters, tapes and booklets, in cluding a copy of Orwell's' "1984," were reported taken from the apartment..of Pyotr Yakir, a historian regarded by the police as the leader of the loose group of dissidents who call themselves the Democratic Movement. Further Arrests Feared Two of the nine, Yuri Shi- khanovich, a mathematician, and Kronid Lyubarsky, an as- tronomer employed at the Chornogolovka Institute of Solid State Physics near Mos- cow, were called in subse- quentjy for questioning and de- tained by the K.G.B., or secret police. Dissidents say that they fear further arrests: Agents in Kiev searched the apartment of Viktor P. Nek- rasov, a noted Ukrainian au? thor. He gained fame with a popular World War U novel, "In the Trenches of Stalin. grad," and was sharply at- tia were V. N. Chalidze, a phys- icist who is a member of the small Soviet Committee on Human Rights, and three Jew- ish intellectuals who have lost their jobs since they applied'to emigrate to Israel, Aleksandr Y. Lerner, a computer specialist, and his son, Vladimir, and Vik- tor G. Poisky, an electronics specialist who formerly headed a laboratory. Diplomatic observers empha- sized that the steps taken re- security tightening in at least 'a year and perhaps longer. The last notable crackdown was they trial in Leningrad in 1970 of{ Jews and others accused of having conspired to hijack a Soviet commercial airliner. The latest wave of police ac tion was preceded in November by a speech by the Ukrainian party leader, Pyotr Shelest, urg- ing party workers not to let the policy of detente weaken their ideological vigilance. There was also an article last month in the Communist party monthly that urged party faith- ful not to slacken the ideologi- cal struggle with the west be- cause of the policy of peaceful coexistence. The article said Western countries sought to use detente to try to undermine socialism through political and economic means and intelli- gence operations. Jewish activists, however, apparently have been exempted from arrests or raids in keep- ing with the comparatively moderate policy of allowing many Jews to emigrate after bureaucratic delays provided that they do not take away needed skills. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1CPYRGHT NEW YORK TIMES 21 January 1972 IBREZHNEV IS URGED' TO FREE DISSIDENT MOSCOW, -Jan. 20 -- Andrei D. Sakharov, the Soviet phy- sicist and civil-rights advocate? has petitioned the Kremlin for! the release of a 29-year-oldl dissident, Vladimir K. Bukov-I sky, ort hie ground that his recent trial had not been public and that the defense had been given no opportunity to call its witnesses. The petition, addressed to Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Com- munist party leader, suggested that there might be ~"healthy forces" in the Soviet leadership that were not. in agreemetn with the current campaign against political dissent. There was no indication in Ithe appeal whether the refer- SAIGON POST 10 November 1971 fence to "healthy forces" re- flected special knowledge about official positions or merely Mr. Sakharov's wishful thinking. ~ Mr. Bukovsky was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment, ,to be followed by five years' enforced residence in a remote place, after having been found guilty in a summary one-day By JOHN SCOTT There are strong political ,7 Ic reasons why bdth``1 c' 'French and the Suvict govornuients should have wished lrezhnev s visit to Paris to meet with every .po,ssible success. The Soviet press has been publishing lengthy articles recently on the increasingly warni rc15 Lions between France and I he USSR, and this has hcen reciprocated to a large exicnt in French newspapers. The French Ministry of the Inrc. tier , ordered 5.`t possible troublemakers to leave Paris for is duration of the Soviet Coniutunist Party leader's visit? Eveii tile Israeli eoniinkinity in France was courted by Ambassador Abr.sintuv, Who invited some 60 of its n)euib,v~ to the embassy in u,'dcr to expl.iin -lu I,hcni that Jews in the US51t shared tutu equality of ?rights and ut,ligat-unbs with otter Suvict t:utzc.13? Not everyone; howev#,r, co.,siders national interests more vitut than tile %Veitate t.f 1111:1rown fatuity, as be. came apparent from the ap? .peat addie+acd to hiadatne Putupiduu by ' one Soviet mother. Her son, Vladimir :Bukovakp, is st present Ueing detained in a p~y~lUaG It h ,e? ,pitai, and bite wisued . the. french President's who to interveuo on his behalf , wi-h the Soviet leader. Site ? wrote that, being certain - of the, innocence of her sou, she hoped that Madame 'rPonipi' don would use every - legal means possible in his defers. ,CC and especially her perso. nal eout?cts with the ?Soviet ruler. Mothers everywhere, of Couree, tend to claim that the whole regiment is out of- step when their sot% tuarcues off on that wrong root, slid ifew are likely to believe that their own son Is insane. lluch that B kuvsky said In an interview last year with the Auiericaii journ.+Iist, U11- hoot Cu;e, could be repre., seoted'as I,ers*Culion Mania. ,RI in continually btattg fo1- arrwcd; ,uy t elephone Is aiway tapped; dnrl I at" conscious, all the' tituc of being under, the obscrcation of the aulho- rirt. s.? it ce of Vladia'fr Bukovsky. Expulsion Born in 1912, the on or ti 'successful S.-vict journalist, ,and with both parent in the tCuntatunist Patty, one might b ve expected Bukuvsky to have grown up as a contented, member of privileged class, of Soviet society. In 1060,:, however. he was expelled. from school for publishing ,an unofficial satirical journal,. and a year later, continual; his career as a free thinker., by be! .g expel from school for an . unofficial, satirical journal. and a year late continued his - career as a free t'vinker by being ezpel. led from Moscow University as one of the organisers of or the underground journal PF.ocu:x, Athough he was attacker; in Jan.rai y 19(12 for ,his literary activities in the Soviet press. the particular article adtuiled, albeit sarca- stically, that the 19 year-old Bukov sky stand o+it among his companions as a trgiatit of theoretical thoaght.r To escdpe' arrest rot having organised an ur.offical exltitii? Approved or Release 1999/09/0 __ IP79-0119 1. trial on charges of anti- ov e activities. The sentence is being appealed. He was accused in particular of having sent detailed docu- mentation abroad to show that Soviet mental institutions were being used for the incarceration of sane persons with political views opposed to those of the Government. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-011.94A000200210001-1 CPYRGHT tion of abstract painting, ho disappeared for six months on a geological expedition. On returning to Moscow he continued his unorthodox behaviour. He was arrested Io May 1003 and was confined without trial in the Serbsky Institute of Fcaanzic Pay. eiiIntry, being later transrcrrcd to a psychiatric hospital in Leningrad. Ile later described this establishment as being a pi a. revolutionary prison, full of muhicrers slid the criminally insane; there aterc, however, some either Inniates?political prisune's, dissidents for whom no article in the trim. anal code could bin found.' Armin(; his companions in the asylum were the prize-win- ning Leningrad geophysicist NIkolal Sansonuv, and a French Communist or Iiun a. nian extraction who had come to the. USSR t:- ice how Co-ninunisrn wnrkod in prac. tics. They were kept in locked cells and had one hour's excrrisn a day. They were allowed visitors once a month one letter a month to rela. Lives and one parent a month. The doctors themselves reali. -zed that It wits more of a rpreson than a hospital and sometimes even said so open. ly. The inmates war punished for misbchavioitrby doses of +drngs which either .depres- sed the nervous system, or induced a state of feverish ?lestlessness for several days. Bunkpvsky also claims that 'hey ere tortured by being wropOed tightly in strips or wet ciinvas which ahraok as It drlgd. When be was relQasod In February 1965 he immediately became Involved in passing to foreign aorrraponderits rm ton on the. v o a .nn human rights In the USSR. Indeed, Vladimir Bukovsky has shown ?uch a cunsi'lcnt disregard for his own wellbe that his more cautious compatriots could , he for. t1ven for considering ilia foolhardiness of his curago a kind of smadnesdo. Bukovsky's Involvement in the defence of the writers` Daniel and Sinyvaky and can. aequcntly of Ginzburg and Galauskov resulld in his being borought to trial in February 1ti7. Ho was sentor,.^ed to three years corrective labour for a-Ilegal dcwonslration.a His clever citing during the trial of ilia Soviet Cu.-stitu- Lion which guarantees a'ho. right of street proses., sions and denionstrationse, did not endcar him to the judge lie was freed In 1970 without having rcno., unced his viewscStalinist file.. thods no longer work. The authorities don't want a big scandal They have to main-1 lain a scnibiancc of legality-a. In January of this he wroto an open letter to tVe.,turn' p.ychiatrlsts askinng then' to study -hc diagnosis InndC On scuts' dissident inieilcctuala in order to decide if the ccldonce' Justified iso sting, them rro'i sdetety in wouttil, inslitu[loos. Marco Arrant Bukovsky knew what to expect, and was in fact ar. rested !u Marc sounh, after his bettor hall been dopivered to the Faris press. Last month he - was tran%terred to a mental institution. Bukovsky is only one among hundreds of Soviet Intellec iuals who are reported to share his rate or indefinite Internment in a psyciislric hospital. Andros Atualrik. tile yonng Russian historian who wrote wi,1 tha Soviet Ui.lon Suroiue until 1984.-,says that he personally knows ,several normal, sane pcnple who have been confined In such institutions. It stems to me that this is a clear' example of toe ideological capitulation of this regime before its opponents, if the` only thing it can find to do with is to declare them insano s One of ilia best known is Goneral Grigorunko, who has been held to Chornyalchovrk, mortal hospital au-cc June 1J70.--atf you co.isidor that ilia only mental Soviet eiti. is one who sul-mits n-eclcly to evy letrrspotic aet commit ted by the bureaucr+.ts, (lien I atn, of course, abnonual.a Last year the biologist Jau. res Ued-cdev was interned In mental hospital for ? thrco months for his dissident wri-' inks, but wasp freed after strong protests byintellectuals both in the USSR and the West. On this occasion the Nobel-prize winning author' Alexander Solzhenitsyn wro to t alt is Iin-c to think clearly: the incarceration of frce?iliinking, healthy people in madhouses is spiritual . hter- ders if is a variatinn on the gas chamber, but it Is even more cruel - the torture of the people belof. killed Is ,more n-,rluciuus and more iprului.bcd.s At Utc beginning of October sonic 50 iniellectuais, inctnd. ing Academician Sakharuv, the leading Soviet physicist, signed it petition asking that Bukovsky be freed. Perhaps a mare direct, perscinal ap- proach by Madame Pompiclou may yet succeed whore t ho,? bttav failed - FWP Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 11 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 THE PROGRESSIVE January 1972 TNT C'EE^J AGE OF SOVIET DISSENT GEORGIE ANNE GEYER That night, the rain swept in blinding, towering sheets across the gray rooftops of Moscow. It hammered at the windows of the old room where we sat, rattling a skull that sat grinning incongruously at us from be- tween long shelves of books. It was the room of a Soviet scientist, but not any ordinary Soviet scientist. This was the one-room home of Valery Chalidze, thirty-two-year-old Soviet physicist and dissident. "Why should Russian scientists be interested in hu- man rights?" I asked this darkly handsome man-half Russian, half Georgian-who ranks next to the famous physicist Andrei Sakharov in the scientific dissent com- munity. Chalidze ran his long fingers through straight, coal- black hair nearly shoulder-length and fixed his dark eyes on some remote spot above my head. "Because science demands an exact logic," he began. "We feel that the study of human rights also demands an exact logic. As scientists have logical minds, they are used to dealing in absolutes. They bring a special expertise and a special knowledge to the study." On November 4, 1970, Chalidze, backed by Andrei Sakharov (father of the Soviet H-bomb) and several other leading scientists, began the U.S.S.R.'s first Hu- man Rights Committee "to consult with government agencies on human rights and to study how human rights are guaranteed by Soviet law and practice and compare them with international laws." "I and the committee feel that law should be based on law alone, with nothing ideological to precede the law," Chalidze said. "And if a person is sent away be- cause of his political beliefs, it follows that human rights arc not adequately protected." To many Westerners, this forming of a "committee" might seem a normal, innocuous thing. But in the So- viet Union it is a daring, hitherto unheard-of thing. It has broken taboos, both by the act of forming the Com- mittee and by the fact that it has been made a mem- ber of the International Committee for the Rights of Man, al consultative body to the United Nations. (So- viet citizens are not permitted to form voluntary asso- ciations and then ally them to international groups.) Moreover, the Human Rights Committee has al- ready begun studying such forbidden topics as the Soviet's incarceration of political prisoners in insane asylums and the place, of the defense attorney in po- litical and other cases. Also, despite warnings from the government, dismissals from jobs and sackings of scien- tists' apartments by the secret police, the KGB, these Committee A ga9dtfartRLvp6betrl'/AW02 CPYRGHT sidents in the larger "democratic dissident movement" that has grown in the last five years to something of genuine importance. It is even, Sovietologists assert, approaching the scope of a "movement." "This conception of a movement is entirely new," Edward Keenan, Soviet specialist at Harvard Univer- sity, told me in an interview. "It is also important that there is a kind of cooperation among the various na- tional and religious groups. A national approach in the past has been unheard of. People now have a sense of being together with their countrymen." Who are the dissidents? What do they stand for? Have they actually had any positive effect on society -or will they, by arousing the ancient Russian fear of anarchy, only set back liberalization within the Soviet Union? Pyotr Yakir is a dissident. He is a rotund man of forty-eight with a wild beard and dancing eyes. He is, at present, the leader of the "democratic" central co- ordinating group. "The basic thing is to educate yourself and. your friends," Yakir said one night, as we walked along the promenades by the Moscow River. "I am a pathological optimist. I am sure that in the long run society will change." "Why?" I asked him. "Through what techniques?" "Under Stalin, we called it the 'Iron Curtain," Yakir went on, "But now this has changed. Today, with regard to dissidents, the KGB occupies itself with one major goal-to sec that information does not go out to the West. At this time in the country's history, the government is trying to put on a facade of com- plete democracy, of freedom of the press. It is try- ing to take its place among the countries of the world, and anything that destroys that illusion is dangerous." To break this facade, Yakir's group gets information on political trials, religious persecutions, and any breaches of civil rights to the Western press in Moscow. The group trusts these correspondents to get this mate- rial printed in the West and then broadcast back to Russia through the BBC and the Voice of America. Group members also picket, sit-in, demonstrate, and send petitions to Soviet leaders on the occasions of trials and "special events." In effect, they have tried to force a psychiatric experience, bringing all the con- tradictions within Soviet society to the surface, where they can be dealt with. "Why do we reach across the border 'in this way?" Yakir asked, as a warm breeze blew in over the river orld trri~8 c~y - A1c~. lYie ~~`ot Ameerca1and Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 the BBC are a kind of bullhorn for us. Our job is to et as much information to them as we can. Then it rcRibThurc, and people from Siberia to the Urals know about it. They may not know us by name, but they are listening to information sent back by us." Yakir's group, while it is the closest thing to a coor- dinating group that there is in the country, is only one of the strange, mystic (and very Russian) brother- hood of groups that today comprise "dissent." There. are the scientists; the disaffected nationality groups like the Jews, the Crimean Tatars, the Armenians, the Caucasian Turks, and the Ukrainians; the religious dis- sidents, such as some Baptists, Evangelicals, and Ortho- dox; the strict legalists, the anti-Stalinists, and the sim- ple, decent young people who are tired of everything. While there are, at any one moment, only hundreds who might picket or write nationalistic poems (which can be a reason for a three-year sentence to Siberia), there are certainly, according to the Sovietologists who have studied the "movement," tens of thousands of So- viets, particularly young people, who sympathize be- cause they, too, want to be able to read, to know, and to speak out. Yakir says, probably correctly, that the movement is "like an iceberg." You see only the few at the top, but there is a huge mass underneath that to some degree is sympathetic. These supporting elements are not only occasionally and curiously intertwined organizational- ly, they are also spasmodically intertwined ideologically. Their 1 iotives ranee from anti-Stalinism to fighting ideological interference in science to demanding rights for nationalities to anti-Russianism and to desires for strict legalism. Many of the dissidents are wholly new types of hu- man beings for the Soviet Union. They go off to serve sentences in Siberia, then they come back to join the movement again. ("I absolutely do not repent having organized this demonstration," Vladimir Bukovsky, one of the most defiant dissidents, said in his court case. "When I am free again, I shall again organize dem- onstratiqns.") There is none of the willingness of the 1930s to express self-condemnation or to confess to crimes never committed. Instead, the dissidents stand up against the state, telling it that it is wrong. There is a sacrificial joyousness about many of them-they seem strangely free of the fear that has in the past paralyzed Russians. "Sacrificial populism, mingled with Jacobin- ism," the American Sovietologist Sidney Monas has written, "is part of the tragedy of Russian history." With all their diverse complaints, what, basically, do the dissidents want? "They want a humanizing of soci- ety," one Sovictologist told me. "They want a return to the moral and ethical bases of society. Somehow values have to be found for the masses." Lewis Feuer, the perceptive professor of sociology at the University of Toronto who has studied Russian student militants throughout history, finds a "philos- ophy of cternalism" among today's dissidents-a philos- ophy that has somehow s1 phoned through the cracks in thaA{J Nr truths are relative. It is a belief that there are ethical truths which are eternally valid for all men. Considering the enormously restrictive society, both politically and psychically, that all Soviets are raised in, it is astonishing that any Soviets should have the inner and outer courage to speak out and resist. But a look at the personal experiences of some of these men and women and a look at the times at least partially explain why. "I was fourteen when they arrested me in 1937," Yakir explained that night, as we walked along the river. That was also the year his illustrious father, Major General Iona E. Yakir, was executed in Stalin's purges of two-thirds of the top officers of the Red Army -purges which left Russia supine in the early stages of the Nazi invasion. "I sat fora long time in the con- centration camps," Yakir went on. "Sixteen years. I saw many horrible things with my own eyes. I saw many good, honest people die in the camps. Those people died not because of anything they did wrong, but be- cause of an arbitrary government." Once the Khrushchev "thaw" came in 1956, Yakir, like tens of thousands of other innocent survivors, was "rehabilitated." tic was even chosen to travel around the country speaking about the Stalin years. He gave' some 300 speeches before Khrushchev was demoted and the "thaw" turned to another freeze. Men like him, anti-Stalinists who had seen too much, had little to lose -they formed the core of the dissidents. But the real beginning of organized dissent was the 1966 trial of Daniel Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, the two writers convicted of publishing "anti-Soviet" writ- ings abroad. Khrushchev was out, and the trial was to be a warning to the young that the lid was going back on. But it was too late-there had been ten years of relative freedom, and there was no going back. Instead, the trial generated anger and defiance. For the first time, all the dissatisfied individuals and groups began to seek one another out, to know and to support one another. Trial followed political trial, and the picketing dis. senters drew closer together. They sent petitions to their leaders asking for redress and for the basic freedoms guaranteed by Soviet law and the Soviet constitution. "White boe ks" were published underground, giving exact proceedings of the trials, and then were pub- lished abroad. Different dissenters, in turn, were ar- rested, and new ones came to take their place. But by far the most amazing document is the under- ground journal Cronika or Chronicle of Current Events, a typewritten, terse, objective compilation of C IA-tea $4469 Q?&2O IQi@) igits, biograph- This "philosophy of eternalism," of course, is in total opposition to Marx's dialectical viewpoint that ethical teal sketches of dissenters, dissident literature, and 13 news ' of deportations. It has come out-in carbon Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 copies-for forty months and, amazingly, it gets around- that vast country rapidly. It is passed from hand to hand on the street and on trains and planes. pygl@HTs another such publication, Political Diary, which is less well known but equally important; it cir- culates among the higher echelon in the government and the intelligentsia and focuses more on forbidden political, social, and economic ideas that could not be published elsewhere. Western students of dissent in the Soviet have come to the conclusion that these publications must be put out by people deep "in" and "up in" the society, simply because no one else could know as much as the people who put out these journals obviously know. There is ,always the suspicion that the KGB might be putting them out itself-in order to watch who is drawn to them-but in the last analysis that makes no sense because the publications cause the government and the KGB so much trouble and embarrassment. Rather, Sovietologists believe that Cronika, in partic. ular, is put out by people in the scientific community- because they are the only ones who could have access to so much information. All of this indicates, of course, that there is some high-level collusion or at least sym- pathy with the dissidents, particularly the scientists. Unquestionably, the scientists are the most interest- ing and important group.of dissidents. Of a Soviet sci- entific community estimated at 400,000, some objective analysts estimate that perhaps as many as sixty per cent syn1pathize with or are dissidents. Moreover, the scientists -are respected and needed. It is impossible to call them "hooligans" when they have so well served their country. The Soviet state hesitates before sending a Soviet scientist to Siberia. Men like Chalidze have lost their jobs, but they have not been arrested as yet because they have been meticulous about staying within the law. No one knows exactly why Yakir is still at large, bit it is generally believed that it is because of posthumous respect for his famous father. But have the dissenters really accomplished any- thing? Will they ever really change anything? Dissi- dents still go to Siberia and to insane asylums, where they are incarcerated because the Soviet officials want to tell them (and apparently genuinely believe) that anyone who dissents is mentally ill. Masses of "respect- able" Soviet citizens still consider them "traitors." The state is as powerful as ever. Isn't it even possible that the dissenters, by challenging injustices too soon, might set back `,the glacially slow but steady liberalization of the Soviet Union? There `-is more evidence to the contrary, reason to believe that the dissidents have had a surprising effect. Writers such as Bulat Okhudzhava, Alexander Galich, and the famous Alexander Solzhenitsyn now publish abroad without being tried at home. Chalidze's Human Rights 11 Committee continues its investigations, even though members are harassed. This summer a friend of Solzhenitsyn was beaten up at the writer's summer home; the KGB formally apologized to Solzhenitsyn for, the "error" (there were no apologies in Stalin's time). Soviet bureaus to secure permits lasted two or three days). "Even in the last five years I have noticed a change," Yakir said. "Before, they would arrest you for standing outside a courtroom during a trial. Now even Tass (the Soviet News Agency) is forced to provide infor- mation on some of the trials. A lot of foreigners, raised in different traditions, can't realize the signif- icance of five people demonstrating in Red Square. But to us, it's extraordinary." "Yakir's right," Peter Reddaway, the Soviet specialist at the London School of Economics, told me in a re- cent interview. "Many taboos have come down, and they won't come again. The authorities won't go back to the old terror. They can't do it again." There are, as the Soviets would say, "objective fac- tors" at play. Slowly bui gradually, the Soviet govern- ment is beginning to respond to its people; public opinion is becoming an operative force. As the govern- ment becomes increasingly sensitive to foreign criticism, it is faced with a vexing dilemma-as it becomes, more and more, a "respectable" world power, it must more and more act respectably at home; it can no longer indulge in the boorish behavior it has historically lav- ished upon its own citizens without some loss of respect as a world power. It must be remembered, too, that the dissidents are not opting for another system or advocating the over- throw of the government. The vast majority are liberal Marxists who want political democracy within Marx- ism. They are challenging their country to be what it says it is. And-perhaps most important, they have broken, by their sheer numbers and determination, the government's assurance that anyone who disagrees with the official catechism is a "traitor" in the pay of a for- eign government. It must deeply disturb the Soviet of- linked with a foreign anti-Soviet emigre organization As to the future, Soviet specialist Reddaway believes -and I concur-that the movement "will go on as before" but that "the field will become more differenti- ated. At the ends, groups will form that are quite mcnt will remain the mainstream, with fragmentation around the edges. There is bound to be an increase in the underground groups," Reddaway went on, "and some arc bound to be violent because the government cannot possibly keep up with everything the young Rus- sians want and because every society has certain violent proclivities which are not easily bought off by material- change." Perhaps, in the end, the dissidents' greatest value is the degree to which they have broken the chain of "eternal" fear and hatred of the outside world, a fear that seems to come in the blood. For centuries attacked, invaded, and massacred by marauders from all sides, the Russians turned in upon themselves. They clung to each other with a communal, collective passion that long preceded Marxism. To them, outsiders were dan- Tcn thou&addr% Ve 9b 4902 ; G~F~`-` 9~ 1 A t~`2 0 '~"-~'r. It Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 CPYRGHT is only today-with this generation, the first to have a genuine inner and outer security and relative afflu- ence-that this is changing. Today's young Russians are trying to talk rationality and not blood fears, law instead of terror, and objectivity instead of xenopho- bia. And it is not easy. Yakir tells a story about the Chechens, a tribe that lives in the northern Caucasus and has always hated GUARDIAN/LE MONDE WEEKLY 15 January 1972 Russians. "There was a Russian boy raised in a Chechen village," he said. "He was very close friends, with a Chechen boy-they were like brothers. One day they were walking single-file down the pathway to a wedding when suddenly the Chechen, who was walk- ing behind, said, 'Oh Vanya, you'd better walk behind. It's in my blood to kill you.' "Well, that's the way it is between the dissidents and the KCB," Yakir said. "It is in their blood to hate us." CPYRGHWhere dissent t8 Moscow .courts are tough. A 29-" year-old Russian, Vladimir Bukovsky; accused of "having committed acts' Intended to weaken Soviet authority," was given last week the maximum, sentence, for those who oppose thei regime - seven years' detention, two of them' in prison, the balance In a, corrective labour camp. He will then be under house arrest, outside Moscow, for a further period of five' years. The accused man, according to TASS, admitted all the charges made against him. In truth, Bukovsky never made s' secret of what he was doing. He had already served thee years in a labour camp for agitation In favour of the' writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yull' Daniel. The experience did not bring him to mend his ways. As soon as he. was freed he resumed the struggle for the defence of persecuted intellec- tuals and distributed a document on the Soviet practice of Interning dis sidents In psychiatric institutions. It was presumably to this aspect of Bukovsky's work that the Public- Prosecutor referred when he charged him with "having distributed untrue' information which was used by anti-" Soviet organisations abroad." Vladi- reason; mir Bukovsky had assumed the task' of keeping the West posted on the, protest movements in his country., As in previous trials, no foreign journalists were permitted to be present. It was clear, right from the tl start, that the court was determined", to give a sentence severe enough;'. to serve as a warning to all those who pass on information illegally, though not surreptitiously. The Soviet police often turn a blind eye to suchi1 activities, and they had known for'' a long time what Bukovsky wash doing. From time to time, however, they pounce on 'someone engaged in,' such activities in the hope of per-, suading the other "offenders" toy" aecept the Soviet facts of life. This as been the method adopted since,, Leonid. 'Brezhnev came to power.:ti Moscow can count on the world- losing interest as the . trials are*' repeated. The arrest of Daniel and ~l Sinyavsky,: for example, caused a,? worldwide reaction, but public opinion finally got used. to these tactics c1 which, In any event, are far less cruel ; , than those practised In Stalin's time.10. In any ? case, the S7ovlet authorities d have so,far refrained from prosecut-.u , ing internationally known ' figures, t/ like the Soviet academician Andrei Sakharov, who.can thus continue his courageous fight for the rights of man.' Others who are less well known abroad and don't : carry the same weight in Soviet society take part in these struggles In, the knowledge that they. will in all probability pay a heavy price. . The dissenters are clearly- only a' tiny handful and quite apart from a society which hardly seems to share their longing for freedom. Yet their obstinacy irks, possibly even worries, a regime unaccustomed to being questioned. At these trials, the "rebels" usually admit the charges brought against them; but refuse to plead guilty, on the grounds that the Soviet Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and action. As far as immediate results go, the activities of the dissenters seem hopeless, for they' run the risk of being crushed by a'regime which has a powerful secular arm at Its disposal. Many of them have already done time In prison camps or psychiatric wards, but they persist In their struggle. They are alone; sustained only by the astonishing strength of men who have overcome their fear. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 Clf RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release I 999/09/02 : 1194AO 0 ' Y I ( Oi -1 ONE YEAR IN THE LIFE OF ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN In early January it was announced in Stockholm that Alexander Solzhenitsyn would receive his Nobel Prize gold medal at a private ceremony in Moscow this spring, Along with the attached Back- grounder are included. reprints of various media commentary on the Solzhenitsyn affair describing among other things his travails under constant and mounting KGB harassment. Together they include sufficient material to exploit the situation whether Solzhenitsyn does or does not get his Nobel medal. For those able to use additional background we particularly recommend "Solzhenitsyn: A Documentary Record," edited by Leopold Labedz (Harper $ Row, 1971, $7.95). Labedz' skillful assembly of virtually all the known documents in the Solzhenitsyn "case" covers the author's rise to fame with the publication of "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich" and what Labedz calls Solzhenitsyn's "road to Calvary" --- from official criticism and theft of his manuscripts by the KGB, prohibition from publishing his works or even mentioning his name, to the tawdry, official condemnation of the Nobel Prize. Attachments include a review of the Labedz book and a reprint of its table of contents. See, also, page 4 of the Backgrounder. Even though not himself an activist in the Soviet Human Rights or dissident movements, for many in the Soviet Union --- too many as far as the Politburo is concerned. --- Solzhenitsyn has become the symbol of those movements. For that reason the KGB seeks in all possible ways to besmirch his character, his talents as an author, and his credentials as a loyal Russian. In this connection, see the excellent article, "Solzhenitsyn: The Obsession of Morality," by Abraham Rothberg, reprinted from Interplay, final attachment. In commentary on the award or non-award of the Nobel medal., it would not be amiss to take a few swipes at the Swedish Govern- ment's timorousness in not allowing Solzhenitsyn to accept his well-deserved award in a small ceremony on the grounds of the Swedish Embassy in Moscow in the first place! Approved For Release 1999/09/0ZCJA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY February 1972 ONE YEAR IN THE LIFE OF ALEXANDER'SOLZHENITSYN The Swedish Academy has announced that it will present to Alexander Solzhenitsyn the Nobel Prize for literature, for which he was selected in October 1970, at a private ceremony in the USSR in spring of 1972, more than a year after the official ceremonies took place in Stockholm without him, The year between began with Solzhenitsyn's declining to go to Stockholm for his prize. The Soviet government, which sentenced him to ten years of penal servitude and exile for privately criticising Stalin, which refused to publish most. of his work and which sent a former Nobel Prize winner* to Stockholm to work against his selection for the 1970 award, was quite capable of preventing Solzhenitsyn's return home if he should leave. Ekaterina Furtseva, Soviet Minister of Culture, confirmed at a press conference while visiting the U.S. in January 1972, that the Soviet government would indeed have done just that. The Swedish government then refused to allow its Moscoir Embassy to be used for the presentation for,fear of offending the Soviet Union! And so the Soviet Union which had bitterly denounced the award as politically motivated, seemed to carry the day. Sol.zhenitsyn's subsequent correspondence with the Stockholm committee reflects his ironic view of himself as the victim in this bureaucratic tangle, rather than the honoree. The impasse was resolved only after Prime Minister Olaf Palme's defense of the Swedish position had publicly embarrassed his government. Most of the world saw the Nobel award as proper recognition of a major talent, albeit with some political overtones because Solzhenitsyn's works were proscribed in his own country. The Italian newspaper Corriere Della Serra conducted a poll among literary critics oT-qT countries on continents before the Nobel award was announced. Only the Argentinian Jorge Luis Borges topped 'Solzhenitsyn -- and by only two votes. Much of the independent Communist press agreed. Vittorio Strada, Italian Communist writer said in his party's'Rinascita, 16 October 1970, "there is no doubt that it is not consistent to we come the prize * Mikhail Sholokhov, establishment author and winner of the 1965 Nobel Prize for Literature. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 when it is conferred on a Soviet writer who is officially favored and to become indignant when the same prize is given to no less significant a Soviet writer who is not." Moscow correspondent for the Italian Communist Party's L'Uriita called Solzhenitsyn one of "the most notable writers of our tire'' Kommunist, the Yugoslav Party weekly of 22 October 1970, supported t e o e award and declared, "It is not Solzhenitsyn who is to be blamed that the truth he describes has been so dark. The facts are dark and indeed, he has not invented them." At the same t mi the~French Communist L'Humanit6, 10 October 1970, called Solzhenitsyn "one of the most remarkable novelists of our time." The French Communist weekly, Les Lettres Franaises of 14 October, declared that "the choice o exaner o z enitsyn is one of those which justify the existence of the Nobel Prize for Literature." Strada also spoke in Rinascita of the "great prestige which, in spite of everything, he enjoys In is own country." "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich," published during the brief de-Stalinization period under Khrushchev, gave most Soviet readers their first look at the infamour labor camps and at the way political prisoners were degraded in their peoples' democracy. It is the only one of Solzhenitsyn's novels published in the Soviet Union* The others are reportedly circulating in samizdat --- painstakingly typed and illegally distributed. Thus the censors ip-ri den Soviet people keep informed -- at great personal risk -- about what is actually happening in their own country and are able to read literature which is officially disapproved. Banning these books has boomeranged against the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: the stories are now widely read in samizdat; they are promoted abroad on the basis of their forbidden-7-Fa-racier; world opinion has again been shocked by Communist treatment of its intellectuals (not only the author but other brave and principled men who have protested their government's repression of thought). In effect the political content of his books has become as important as their literary value solely because of the CPSU's fear of free expression of opinion. In addition to "One Day," the foreign press has snapped up all of Solzhenitsyn's available writings to publish editions in English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish. The main works published abroad include: "August 1914," in Russian only, 1971, YMCA Press: the first of a trilogy concerning Russia's role in World War I. See comments below. "Stories and Prose Poems," 1971, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux: See comments below. "For The Good of The Cause," 1970, Praeger: a novella of callous bureaucracy, And it is now banned in the USSR Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 "First Circle," 1968, Harper and Row: a novel about the exploitation of political prisoners with technical skills, based on the author's own experience. "Cancer Ward," 1968, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux: a novel of the life and attitudes of doctors and patients facing death in a Soviet hospital as was Solzhenitsyn. August 1914 Solzhenitsyn's newest novel, the first in a projected trilogy, was published in June 1971 by the YMCA press, a Russian-language p';ublishing house in Paris. It deals with the heroic efforts and agonies of the Russian people as individuals and as a nation during the first ten days of World War I. Acclaimed by its early readers for its epic sweep, "August 1914" was described in a review written from London by Anatole Shub as a "work that may well herald the most important Russian literary masterpiece of the 20th Century." Shub describes Solzhenitsyn's epic as the author's "attempt to fix, shape, and color for the consciousness of future generations, the primal upheaval of recent Russian history with the same finality that Tolstoy depicted the Napoleonic wars ... and, like Tolstoy, Solzhenitsyn brings the social fabric and cultural atmosphere of civilian Russia to the battlefield through a rich variety of characters both historic and completely ficticious." Paris Le Monde, 12 June, reported that "August 1914" had been circulating inoviet Union as samizdat for some three months before it appeared in the West. Kon tantin Simonov, author and one-time editor of No Mir, was among those who believed that "August 1914" should e published at home since there was nothing in the book that could rem y be considered as an attack on the Soviet Union. It was just a week after the Swedish Academy had announced that Solzhenitsyn would be awarded his Nobel gold medal and diploma at a private ceremony in Moscow, that the city's officialdom took :note of "August 1914" with a highly critical article in the 12 January 1972 issue of the Soviet Writers Union journal, Literary :Gazette. That journal described "August `1914" as having "turned out to be very helpful for anti-Soviet elements of every description." This has aroused suspicion that some official action against the Nobel Prize winner might be contemplated. Stories and Prose Poems Also published for the first time in translation in 1971, this work contains twenty-two novellas, short stories and prose poems of widely varied style and color. When two of the stories, "Matryona's House" and "An Incident at Krechetovka Station" were first published in the USSR in 1963, the reviewer for the Soviet Writers Union wrote in Literary Gazette: "His talent is so individual and so striking Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 that from now on nothing that comes from his pen can fail to excite the liveliest interest..." How ironic. Solzhenitsyn's "Stories and Prose Poems" give the foreign reader a vivid view of subsistence living in a poor village; of hooligans drawn to a religious ceremony by curiosity and contempt; of the inefficient inhumanity of minor bureaucrats The 16 prose poems are brief lyrical passages; a chained puppy as the symbol of the Russian people; a tribute to a poet who created beauty from a peasant's hut; the decay and desecration of old churches. Most are autobiographical, at least in part, All prove the author's knowing eye and compassionate heart. All are part of his continuing dissection of Soviet society fifty years after the revolution which was to free the worker and peasant from the tyrant. Here, only the tyrant has changed. The translation, done by Michael Glenny, unfortunately abounds in British colloquialisms. The works have also been published in German as Im Interesse der Sache, 1970, by Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, West er 1nc. Solzhenitsyn: A Documentary Record Also in 1971, Harper & Row published "Solzhenitsyn: A Documentary Record," edited by Leopold Labedz, It is . brilliantly conceived selection of Solzhenitsyn documents which, in essence, chronicle the Soviet Union's public and private response to the appearance in the USSR of "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich." (See attach- ments). Included are state documents and letters to and from Solzhenitsyn and about him. They begin with his 1956 release from exile following the terrible prison camp described in "One Day." They include discussions leading to his expulsion from the Soviet Writers Union and end with the address given in his absence at the Nobel Festival in December 1970, Throughout is the absurd spectacle of official attacks on the fourth Russian* to win the Nobel Prize for Literature only to be denounced by his own government! Courageous letters of defense and praise from his colleagues are included as are moving comments from former prison camp inmates. A Writers Union discussion on the publishing of "Cancer Ward" reveals the conflict of all writers under Communism between their literary judgement and their state-imposed political responsibilities. The latter inevitably wins. As a member of the Union of Soviet Writers declares, "...the works of Solzhenitsyn are more dangerous to us than those of Pasternak: Pasternak was a man divorced from life, while Solzhenitsyn with his animated, militant, ideological temperament, is a man of principle." * Mikhail Sholokhov, 1965; Boris Pasternak, 1958; and Ivan Bunin, 1933. 4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For'Re-lease 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01I94A000-200210004--1 THE NEW REPUBLIC 16 October 1971 L/ rare So1zhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn: A Documentary Record . Edited by Leopold Labedz CPYRGHT Since 1962, when Alexander Solzhen- itsyn broke the stupefying silence about Stalin's ' iconcentration camps, I'a f faire ;Solzhenitsyn has generated controversy. Masses of documents have accreted to his short novel, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich.. Most of These documents are extraliterary:. manifestoes and counter-manifestoes, protests and rebuttals, eulogies and de- nunciations. Premier Khrushchev was guided by political motives when he ordered the publication of the novel in 1962. Then under fire in the Kremlin for his de- Stalinization policies, he hoped to strike a blow at his competitors. Liberals in Russia misread his action as a signal that the crimes of the Stalin era would at* last be fully and publicly exposed, together with some of their most wicked executioners. But Khrushchev, and his successors, gradually began to per- ceive that such disclosures inexorably pointed to their own complicity. One Day, Solzhenitsyn's only major work. to be published in Russia, was removed from libraries and reading rooms, and its topic officially declared a "danger- ous th#me." LeopQd Labedz' brilliantly conceived selection, of Solzhenitsyn documents is, in esse -ce, a chronicle of Russia's pub- lic anct private response to One Day, and to the coruscating issue of Stalin- Ism. i n one level, the Soviet press registered the reflex of instant and ex- travagant; compliance to the order of the day that is automatic among bu-. reaucrats, journalists and critics who ac- quired their professions under Stalin. Since the appearance of One Day seemed to promise punishment for those immediately responsible for the imprisonment of writers like Solzhen- itsyn, Isaac Babel, Osip Mendelstam,. Boris Pilnyak and thousands of others, these persons were the first to speak up. The archetypal response came from the critic Vladimir Ermilov, the most notori- ous of Stalin's "literary" denunciators. Ermilov declared in Pravda: "in our literature there has come a writer gifted with a rare talent, and as befits a real artist, he has told us a truth that can- not be forgotten, that must not be for-, gotten, a truth that is staring us. in the face." Khrushchev's recognition of his folly in having published One Day, and Brezhnev's subsequent ban on all Solzhenitsyn's work, have resulted in an increasing flow of polluted ver- biage that threatens, like the efrlier praise, to engulf the genuine writer con- cerned. Even Americans, benumbed by the invective and obscenity in our own literature, must be impressed by the singular squalor of this journey through modern Soviet letters. But apart from the official cant and the vituperation, there exists a deep under- lay of genuine feeling, both for and against Solzhenitsyn in the private .sphere. Testifying to this is a remark-' able document, edited by Solzhenitsyn, that circulates. from hand to hand in Russia. It is a selection from some of the personal letters the author-received in response to ? One Day. Half the. cor- -respondents are former or present-day prisoners in Soviet ~ camps. The others. are former ? or present-day camp guards and other Soviet security police per- sonnel. These letters constitute a sotto voce; dialogue between victims and executioners that is likely to be carried on in Russia for some time. It is ac- companied by Solzhenitsyn's own brief and often sardonic commentary. In writing to Solzhenitsyn, many ex- prisoners literally identify themselves with the characters in the novel: "ivan Denisovich. That's me, SZ-208. /bpd I can give all the characters real names." Others offer thanks: "It has so much life, so much pain, that one's heart. might stop beating. People who have not been there exclaim in horror. Now, just a little sympathy for those who perished is beginning to penetrate such people." On "I am astonished that they have not yet put you and Tvardovsky away." (Alexander Tvardovsky, the editor'of Novy Mir, was the first to publish One Day. He was dismissed from his post in 1970.) Solzhenit- ,syn's . comment: "We are surprised too." The prisoners writing from today's camps are generally angry. One writes: "You at least were allowed to receive parcels and earn extra bread. Why does no one deign to come to a camp and see who is inside? Once you have decided to reveal the truth, you should take it through to the end." There follow the letters from "prac- tical workers." Who? Solzhenitsyn ex= plains: "It turns out that this is how camp guards style themselves. The des- cription is, priceless." Hete there is no .trace of the artificially generated inclig- nation that prevails in the Soviet press only pure, spontaneous hatred: "He deliberately incites the people against the organs of the Security Police Min- istry. It's a disgracet" Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-011.94A000200210001-1 y A O 'p 00 K,y Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 N OO " In 0 v .OwO ,0.. tt1~~V b ooo N ~Z;' p J t~l1 - CR 2 J p O a O p O D b ~y; oho ..i ON v 00 ~ v 00 00 v N o n N NN N N u _ N_ y N N_ %O 00 tip A O 'D ~? x ~ O 0 o N l~Nn ro `r1~+ a --~ U D Sy rn w 00 QK W A.~ V d~ lr W 000 N O O_`UO v z O h'1 r M n ro z0 ,roy N A ON -+ . -. Oo `1 N of O n m O O? 70 a~ K v'. ii G^, to N 00 g o v Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 3 A mago lease 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 CPYRGHT 18 August 1971 ! Solzhenitsyn'$- Challenge to the Police Following it the text of the letter Nobel' Prize winner Alexander Solzhe- nitsyn sent Aug. 13 to Yuri V. Andropot', head of the Soviet police: To the minister of government security of the U.S.S.R. Andropov For many years I have borne In silence the lawlessness of your employees: the Inspection of all my correspondence, the confiscation of half of it, the search of my correspondents' homes and their official and administrative persecution, the spying ,around my house,-the shadowing of visitors, the tapping of telephone conversations, the drilling holes in ceilings, the placing of re- cording apparatus in my city apartment and warden plot, and a persistent slander cam- paign against me from speakers' platforms when they are offered to employees of your .inistry. But after the raid yesterday I will no longer be silent. My country house village of 'Rozhdestvo, Naro-Fominsky Rayon was empty, and the eavesdroppers counted on ,my absence. Having returned to cause I was taken suddenly ill, 1 ,had asked my friend Alexander Gorlov to go out to the country house for an automobile part. But it t'arned out there was no lock on the house rnd voices could be heard from Inside. Gor? lov stepped Inside and demanded the rob. ,bars' documents. In the small structure, where three or four can barely turn around, -there were about ten of them, In plain clothes. On the command of the senior officer "To. the woods with him and silence him"-they bound Gorlov, knocked him down, and -dragged him face down into the woods and 'beat him cruelly. Simultaneously, others were running by a circuitous route through ,tae bushes, carrying to their car packages, !papers, objects perhaps also a part from the apparatus they had brought themselves. However, Gorlov fought back vigorously and ie1~ed, summoning witnesses, neighbors from other garden plots came running in re- .sponse to his shouts and barred the robbers' ,way to the highway and demanded their dos uments. Then one of the robbers them pass. They led Gorloy ?bie face mutt. dated and his suit torn to the ear. "Fine methods you have," be said to those& "We are on an operation, and on an opera-, tion we can do anything." Captain-according to the documents he presented to the neighbors-Ivanov, accord. Ing to his personal statement first took Gor6t by to the Naro-Fominsky milita, where the local officers greeted "Ivanov" with defer-,' trice. There, "Ivanov" demanded from Gor-. by written explanation of what had hap- pened. Although he had been fiercely) beaten, Gorlov put In writing the purpose of his trip and all the circumstances. After that the senior robber demanded that Gorlov, sign an oath of secrecy, Gorlov flatly re- fused. Then they set off for Moscow and on the read the senior robber bombarded Gorlov, with literally the following phrases: "If Sol. zhenitsyn finds out what took place at' the' Dacha, It's all over with you. Your officiat career [Gorlov is a candidate of technical sciences and has presented his doctoral dis- sertation for defense, works In the Institutes Giprotis of Gosstroya of the U.S.SS.R.] will go: no farther, you will not be able to defend did not give in to them, refused to sign the pledge, and now he is threatened with re prisal. ..I demand from you, citizen minister, the, public naming of all the robbers, their pun- ishment as criminals and an explanation of this incident. Otherwise I can only beltev that you sent them. 13 August 1971. To the Chairman of the Council of Minis ters U.S.S.R., A. N. Kosygin. . I am forwarding you a copy of my letter( to the Minister Of State Security. For all of, the. enumerated lawless actions I consider him personally responsible. If the govern-, went of the U.S.S.R, does 'not, share in these actions of Minister Andropov, I will expect[ -- - -- ' A. SOLZHENITSYN. 1 . e% 1_ ,; ' . 1g August 1i~1, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 NEW YORK TIMES 13 September 1971 Swedish Rebuff to So1zheniLsyn w cored Special to The New York Times STOCKHOLM, Sept. 12-The Swedish Government has been sharply criticized for its re- fusal to ;x11ow the 1970 Nobel Prize fog Literature to be handed over to Aleksandr Sol- handed over to.. Aleksandr: I. Solzhenitsyn in its Moscow Em- The attack was made in a book, "Middle Man in Mos- cow," published here last week by Per Egil - Legge, a Norwegian journalist and a former corre- spondent in the Soviet capital. According to Mr. Hegge, who was expelled from the Soviet Union in February, he had been in touch with several of Mr. Solzhenitsyn's friends in the summer of 1970. He was the first journalist to interview the Soviet writer after the Nobel Prize announcement was made early. in October. . On Oct. 28, Mr. I-Iegge was approached by one of Mr. Solzhenitsyn's friends. Mr. Hegge refers to him by a cover name of Ivanov. Ivanov said that the prize-winner wanted to come to the Swedish embassy to discuss with the Ambassador, Dr. Gunnar V. Jarring, whether he would be able to go to Stock- holm for the Nobel Prize cere- mony. Dr. Jarring had at that time temporarily left his mis- sion as United Nations mediator in the Middle East and was Mr. Solzehnitsyn would. not back on his regular post as receive an invitation to the Swedish Ambassador in MOs- embassy but that the Ambas- rir. Hegge and Mr, Solz- COW. sador would see shim if he came henitsyn walked toward the Sought Moscow Ceremony there without invitation. "A" ,Swedish embassy. Mr. Hegge Ivanov also said that Mr.' also said that a Nobel Prize said that the author was not Soizhenitsyn wanted to know ceremony at the embassy was bitter nor even surprised at the whether the embassy could ar- impossible. Swedish decision. Mr. Sol- range a Nobel Prize ceremony This decision had been made; zhenitsyn said that since he in Moscow for him if he was, 'on a high Government level in would receive no invitation and unable to gQ to Sweden. ' stockholm. "A" said that he since the embassy did not ilT- A few days later Mr. Hegge) understood that this "did not tend to give him the prize be look very heroic," but that the ;took a walk in Moscow with a first duty of the embassy was saw no reason for any further Swedish diplomat, whom he talks with the Swedish diplo- calls "A." "A" said he had to) !still to keep up good relations mats. He was said to be dis- forward these inquiries to the) with the Soviet Union. appointed however, that he Swedish Foreign Ministry in the Mr. dip lomat Hegge tha said he Nobel Prizes reminded would not be able to see the Stockholm. He added that he had been presented to Soviet "famous Gunner Jarring." . personally thought that it would winners previously by Swedish Later Mr. Solzhhnitsyn was be difficult to arrange a Nobel Ambassadors. He mentioned said to have asked the embassy Prize ceremony in the Swedish ,the literature winner, Mr. Mi- via Mr. Hegge whether the embassy. Ithail A. Sholokhov in 1965 embassy could possibly foie "Remember we are here to and Lev D. Landau, the winner ward a letter from hiln to the maintain good relations with (in physics in 1962. Secretary of the Swedish . The Soviet authorities and a cere-I I erny, Karl Ragnar Gie Gierow The mony for the sharply criticized Mr. Hegge said that It the embassy reportedly first said )author Solzhenitsyn might be Swedish decision became) no but then reluctantly gave in it known outside the Soviet] -on the condition that the letter embarrassing," he is reported Union the behavior of the that the cm- to have said. be unsealed so Swedish embassy would be bass could check its contents. .Mr. Hegge said he could y widely regarded as diplomatic The letter eventually reached )understand, that but since the. prize was normally given to- winners by King Gustaf VI Adolf in Stockholm, the Am- bassador, who was the king's personal representative.- might also be able to do it. In November, Mr. Hegge and "A" met again. "A" said 4hat NEW YORK TIMES 24 September 1971 CPYRGHT servility. Mr. Gierow. On Nov. 20 Mr. Hegge final Commenting on Mr. Hegge's ly met Mr. Soizhenitsyn in book, Premier Olof Palma said person. The meeting was ar- that Mc. Solzhonitsyn could ranged in cloak-and-dagger certainly have received his fashion. Ivanov came first to prize at the embassy if he had the meeting place, and after !consented to do it without a making sure that no suspicious ceremony, '` The Rebuff of Soizilenit,ylt To the Editor: 1 Premier Olof Pahno of Swcddn is' wrong in maintaining In his Sept. 17 letter that "a represcntative of Sol- zhenltsyn's publishers" proposed a' :cereniolty in the Swedish 'Embassy in Moscow..As my hook "Go-Between ins Moscow" makes clear, and is the Swedish Embassy in Moscow notes, It: was tho Nobel laureate himself who,' through me, at an early stago Inquired t, whether presentation of the award at the embassy was possible. The answer to this was no. At the salvo time' the embassy ro- fused to give him an Invitation card to' 1` tho embnssy for a conversation, stat- ing as the reason that the embassy, cannot invite private Soviet citizens. to my. view, Mr. Palma should answer the following question: How does he envisage the presentation of the Nobel Prize In an embassy that ;:flatly refuses to Invite the laureate? PER EGIL HEGGE' s' ' l + ? Oslo, Norway, Sept. 17,1971. CPYRGHT persons, were aroun r. O- Appro+ed For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 I94A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 DAILY TELEGRAPH, London 20 October 1971 Solzhenitsyn Rejects Secret 'Prize-giving' rtLEXAN1)JSR Solzhcnit- syn, winner of last Spear's Nobel Prixe for liter- ature, has insisted that :?e should receive his diploma and gold medal at a public ceremony in Moscow. . A requset by the Soviet writer to receive the. awards at a sere. ninny in the. Swedish Embassy in Moscow and drliverr his Nobel lecture has already been turned down by Dr Gunnar Jarring, Ambassador to llussia. present the award privately- ON' rlY so as not to offend the Soviet authorities. Snlzhrnitsyn, 52, has written NEW YORK TIMES 24 December 1971 I to Per t:gil Ileggr, a Norwegian journalist expelled from ilussia earlier this year, saying that to agree in such a proposal " would mean degrading the. prize, rc- f tircling it ss something shame. ul which must be hiden." "Stolen goods?`1 The writer also expressed sure rise at \1r Olof Palme, the Swedish Prime Minister, who wrote to the New York Tinrrs to .iuslify his Government's decisinn? "Is the Nobel prize really stolen I;nads that mist be pre. settled behind closed doors and without witnesses?" hr asked. ' ` ?' And why was he (Mr Palmr) Sn sure in advance Ihat my CPYRGHT CPYRGHT 'ext of Solzheinitsyn Letter to, the Swedish Academy,, r..nw4 to The tt>. .. CPYRGHT (state, its acting president, Syed Nazrul Islam, said In Dacca that he would welcome relations with the United States if President Nixon changed his policies. Meanwhile, Dr. A. M. Malik;. the former Pakistani civilian governor In East Pakistan, made his first public appear- ance to deny reports that he had been turned over to Bang- ladesh authorities for trial as, a war criminal. In an Interview with UPI,. Malik confirmed that he and other West Pakistani officials were being held in an Indian military garrison on the west- ern outskirts of Dacca to pro. tect them from r e p ri s a l s from Bengalis. He said he was being well treated by the In. dians. Subcontinent. Bhutto is scheduled to stay in Ankara for a day before` s said to plan to visit Morocco, Liberia, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. olitical life of the country." Independence. for talks with Turkish govern- Britain and Iran, with the. In a report from Dacca, ( ment leaders on bilateral reTa- United States as an associate ravda noted th Singh also assailed China A0PP ~d For Release 1999/09/'2 . . 4 9LVg" AA00 ?F0001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 WASHINGTON STAR 22 December 1971 CPYRGHT DAVID LAWRENCE People on Other Side !deed Facts The Soviet Union doesn't make public its annual budget., but there is every Indication that the situation in Asia Is going to ost the Kremlin more moncyc -especially by an ..increase in the amount of mill- tary assistance to he distribut- As a result of the India- :Pakistan conflict, the Soviets feet that they now should ex- tend their military strength In various parts of Asia. The alli- ance with India is just, the be- glnning of a movement to break down the prestige of Red China and build up naval bases for Russian ships along the southern coast of the conti- nent. The real expense for the So- ,Viet Union in such a policy of expanding its Influence in the world is that of furnishing arms, military equipment and supplies for the land, sea and air forces of certain nations. Among these are the Arab states-notably A 1 g e r I a, `Egypt, Syria and Iraq-Cuba, Eastern Europe, North Korea .and, of course, North Vietnam. 'These countries and others which the Kremlin seeks to bring under its wing are look- ing to Moscow for economic 'nsAlstanco of the typo called "defense support"-roads, rail facilities, ;port equipment, merchant shipping and the like. Russia's latest venture in Asia made It possible for India to invade and dominate East Pakistan. This could not have been done without Soviet back- ing. Although the new Bengal 'istato Is theoretically being granted Independence, East Pakistan is an abysmally poor area and will need all kinds of help. Since India cannot afford to provide it-the Indians say they, fought the war to get the Bengal refugees back into East - Pakistan from India- this, too, will be up to Moscow. There Is a feeling now that, while Russia may allow the Vietnam war to come to what Americans will call a "con- clusion," North Vietnam will in due time be given enough military support to take over Indochina. The assumption is that the United States is not going to be involved again in wars in Asia. The Soviets, on the other hand, are inclined toward more military en- croachment on that continent. There is talk of reducing the number of American troops in the North Atlantic Treaty Or- ganization, and the Russians are pushing hard for this step. They are willing to promise to withdraw some of their forces from the satellite countries. But the truth is they want the United States to take its troops back across the Atlantic so that the Kremlin will have vir- tually a free hand In the fu- ture. With a cloud overhanging Asia, there are also beginning to be worries as to what will occur when the strength of NATO has been weakened. Its army at present is very small compared to the large units which can be mobilized cur- rently by the Soviets. The key to the whole prob- lem of war and peace in Rus- sia rests with the people. Mil- lions of Individuals are in mili- tary service, and the standard of living generally has not im- proved materially to anything like Western norms. Many persons are unhappy and some day will express. their discon- tent In an outbreak against to- talitarianism. The big task, now Is not merely to stress in the United Nations the Importance of maintaining. world peace, but' to convey te facts to the peo- ples behind the Iron Curtain. In this era of new ways of scientific communication, o- ples everywhere can findpoub what is blocking the road to peace. SWISS REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS October 1971 India and the New Tsarism Ernst Ku x The rea question s: When are the people In the satellite countries and in the Soviet Un- ion going to learn that major wars are keeping them from getting the income they de- serve? When will they unite to. stop Intrusion in the lives of, peoples on other continents? The United States alone can- not offset what the Soviets are planning to do with funds ob- viously intended for military purposes. The Red Chinese are not likely to become entangled in a war with Russia because they are at a military disad- vantage-they do not have the nuclear strength to combat the enemy. So the Soviets are enabled through the India-Pakistan quarrel to get a stronger hold on Asia. They soon will in- crease their military threats to some of the other countries and obtain privileges for their navy and military units which certainly will be used to tight- en the Soviet grip on the weak-, er nations in Asia. All this is an expensive mat-' ter for the Russians. But un- less it is thoroughly exposed and the Soviet people learn the' facts by radio, the dropping of leaflets and other methods, there Is no way to generate the. natural influences.that lead to liberation movements. CPYRGHT With the Indian alliance, cemented by the pact of campaigns in Persia in 1717 to open the road for a friendship signed on August 9, Moscow is continuing Russian march on l idia, was part of a Russian dream a policy initiated by the Tsars. Brczhncv's expansion of world supremacy. With astonishing clear-sighted- towards the Middle East and the Indian Ocean seems ness, Marx associated Russian operations in Af- oddly familiar to those who have studied Karl ghanistan and Persia and her rivalry with England Marx's analysis of the Tsars' policy of imperialism. ovcr India with Gorchakov's plans in the Baltic and In M4#*p r dn$Rraf tleaSeorta9ig/QWD& : ClAmR 9s?OfLA 94 280 490i@ilugncc in Central Asia, which began with Peter the Great's Europe-an association which it would be well not P9-01194A0.00200210001-1 to overlcicppr9XX?egF.oreReleaseth199A9/09/02 : %c PRI eoe s cmocracy. As in o per span countries back as 1858 Eng:ls was forecasting that "within 10 or 15 years we ,.hall hear the Muscovites beating at the gates of India." As Engels wrote proleptically at the time, fore- seeing the interdependence of Russia's policy towards India and China, "It is a fact that Russia will soon be the leading power in Asia and will rapidly put England in the shade in that Continent. The conquest of Central Asia and the annexation of Manchuria ex- pand her territories by an area as big as the whole of Iruropc if the Russian Empire is excluded, thus converting the frozen wastes of Siberia to a temperate jonc. in a short time, the valleys of the Central 4sian rivers and of ..he Amur will have been popu- I.sted by Russian colonists. The strategic positions li'nis gained arc as important to Asia as are those in Poland to Europe. The possession of the Turan is a threat to India and that of Manchuria is a threat to china. Yet China and India, with their 450 million inhabitants, arc at present the most important coun- tries in Asia." Lenin regarded India and China less as objectives of Russian conquest than as centres of world revolu- tion which, he claimed, would march from Peking on Paris via Delhi. The "final decision in the world struggle" between the "counter-revolutionary impe- rialist West and the .-evolutionary and nationalistic East" depended in the !ast analysis, prophesied Lenin in his last pamphlet "L ss but Better" in March 1923, on the fact that Russia, India and China represented the overwhelming majority of the world's population. In reality, the Bolsheviks were more interested in the reconquest of the furthest-flung colonies of the Tsarist Empire in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Far East than in actively supporting colonial revolu- tion by the workers of th,- East. The first Soviet Foreign Minister, Chicherin, referred in an article dated August 12 1919 expressly to Gorchakov's as- sessment that Russia's future lay in Asia. It was no coincidence, thcr:fore, that the newly-fledged Soviet Republic entered into its first diplomatic relations with Persia, Afghanistan and Turkey, following this up in early 1921 with treaties of friendship and al- liance. After the failure of his China policy, Stalin con- centrated on Europe and even declined to take up Hitler's offer, 'made to Molotov in November 1940, by which the Soviet Union would have joined the Three Power Pact and concentrated its expansion towards the south, seeking its outlets in the area of the Persian Gulf instead of the Mediterranean. It is not known how Stalin reacted to Roosevelt's sugges- tion at Teheran in 1943 that the Indian question should be solved "by reforms roughly on the Soviet plan." After the British withdrawal and India's ac- quisition of independence, Stalin, through the Comin- form, called upon Communists there to seize power by, force an5kMj1" RyrWW69ssn19QW0?fn2 : that had achieved independence, communist riots controlled from Moscow took place in India during the summer of 1948, but they were suppressed by Nehru. Stalin had never fully understood the trans- formations effected by decolonialization or the desire of the new states for neutrality, and for him Nehru remained "a marionette of imperialistic colonialism." When diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and India were taken up in April 1947, they re- mained cool and of little importance. India's protests against the Chinese occupation of Thihet in 1950 were ignored by Moscow. In view of these historical facts it sounds suspect, to say the least, whcd Gromyko speaks in Delhi to Indians of the un- changing and consistently friendly peaceful policy of the Soviet Union and implores them to revive the spirit of Nehru. The spectacular tour of India, Burma and Afghan- istan undertaken by Khrushchcv and Bulganin in November 1955 demonstrated Moscow's growing interest in southern Asia. In the new policy of "peaceful coexistence" towards the non-aligned states of the Third World, India was selected as exhibition piece. Khrushchev went back there in February 1960, flattered Nehru and strove by means of development aid, including a complete steelworks, to win over the Indians to the Soviet model. Khrushchcv's moves towards India were not only part of the rivalry with the West; they were also a reaction to China's grow- ing activity in Asia and Africa initiated by Chou En Lai and Nehru with their declaration of coexistence and their joint participation in the Bandocng Confer- ence of April 1955. There are grounds for believing that Khrushchev had agreed to a delimitation of spheres of influence with Mao and that India had been allocated to the Soviet sphere. The shooting on the China-Tndia border in Sep- tember 1959 and the breakdown of Khrushchev's American policy were a sign of conflict between Moscow and Peking and the start of their rivalry in India and the Third World generally. India's Com- munist Party was one, of the first to split into a pro- Soviet and a pro-Chinese wing. During the Himalaya skirmishes with China in October 1962, for the. out- break of which India was not entirely blameless, Moscow, pre-occupied with the Cuba crisis at the time, maintained a "neutral" attitude and thus disap- pointed both Peking and Delhi. India, her position shaken by defeat in this border war, received support and help from both the Soviet Union and the United States and the beginnings of Soviet-American co- operation in containing China began to emerge. To combat th-s "holy alliance of imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries", Peking put out feelers to Pakistan, herself disconcerted by the friendly ~ attitude of her mc1 j g ~'t gl~n't"t 'toy ter PYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 CPYRGHT into the most tenuous relations with one of the Com- munist superpowers automatically results in involve- ment in the conflict between Moscow and Peking. With the fall of Khrushchev and the death of Nehru in 1964, the personalized propaganda phase of Soviet-Indian coexistence ended. Khrush- chev's successors, who began by seeking a reconcilia- tion with Peking, aimed at a neutral position on the Indian sub-continent.,Kosygin, by his arbitration in tlte Indo-Pakistan border war over the Rann of Cooch at the Tashkent meeting between Shastri and Ayub Khan iji January 1966, was able to secure the posi- tion of'irefcrce and strove to develop this by subse- qucnt visits to Karachi and Delhi. Moscow's woohig of Ayub; Khan and the Soviet economic and military id to Pakistan led to violent anti-Soviet reactions in India and to a temporary cooling-off of relations. lYhcn Indira Gandhi succeeded Shastri at the head the Indian Government, she began by continuing tie policy of non-alignment alongside Nasser and Vito, but steadily built up closer links with Moscow. Vo foreign head of government has visited the Soviet Union as often as Mrs. Gandhi in the last six years, while Kosygin has repeatedly been to India, the heads of state have exchanged visits, and delegations are constantly travelling to and fro. In important ques- tions of foreign policy such as the Middle East conflict,and the Indo-China war, Delhi has taken up position's identical to those of Moscow. Since 1965 Soviet collaboration has been evolved further. The ion has built a second steelworks, provided ion roubles in credit for the 4th Indian economic plan and last December signed a commer- cial treaty with India covering 1971-75 and synchro- nized with the 5-year. plans of the Soviet 'economy and C nccon. At t c same time, military collaboration has been intensified. In March 1967, General Staff Chief Zakharov visited India; in September 1967 and Octobci 1968 the then Indian Defence Minister Swaran Singh (now Foreign Minister and cosigna- tory with Gromyko of the recent pact) went to Moscow for negotiations; in March 1969 Marshal Grechkc was a guest in Delhi and a delegation under Grand admiral Gorshkov inspected Indian harbours, The So'ict Union has supplied armaments, aircraft,. warship4 and submarines to India and according to Chinese' reports is to set up naval bases at Visakha- patnam, Bombay, Cochin, Mosmugao and Port Blair., With the British withdrawal from East of Suez, the run-down of the American engagement in Asia and the weakening of China through the Cultural Revo- lution, Moscow saw its chance to press forwards into the Indian? Ocean and exploited it by dispatching Chineessej border conflict. The most critical point of diploma PE n s~iIRT [l 91PER?fn 19 t~. ' 2 : CIAi ~tct it, ~C1bSe'tbt' fs" v '1f"t h~ exPamirs, treme ""he Indo-Soviet friendship pact, though long in ti preparation, is mainly intended as a counter- move to American and Chinese "ping-pong" diplo- macy. By its means Moscow is showing its determina- tiori, to prevent a displacement of the world power situation to its disadvantage through sectional colla- boration between Peking and Washington, such as might be represented by support for Pakistan. But instead the result might well be that the American- Chinese rapprochement, in. which developments in East Pakistan are probably playing an accelerating role, could now proceed more quickly and go further. There arc even indications, such as the unexplained absence of foreign policy expert Suslov at the hurriedly-arranged ratification of the treaty, that this step has not met with approval everywhere in the Soviet union. At first sight it is of course a success and the fulfilment of ancient Russian dreams when Brczhnev and his emissary Gromyko bind India more closely to them and reap the reward of long years of not entirely smooth and effective work by Soviet diplomats, economic experts, soldiers and propagan- dists. By embracing India in the Soviet treaty system, which already- covers Eastern Europe with bilateral agreements and extends to Cuba and Egypt, Moscow has obtained political and logistic foundations for its move forward into the Indian Ocean. But against this Moscow has ? lost the position as arbitrator between India and Pakistan it won at Tashkent and has been forced more or less to write off its past work to win over Pakistan. It is doubtful whether the pact with India will make Brezhnev's plan for collective security in Asia or Soviet proposals for regional economic cooperation any more attractive to other Asian states. Although the Russians acknowl- edge India's policy of non-alignment, this pact none- theless represents a limitation of India's sovereignty in the form of an obligation to consult on all interna- tional questions, to refrain from any other military alliances, to dissociate herself from the West in the "struggle against colonialism and racialism"; and it is thus in fact the end of Nehru's non-alignment. Furthermore, this alliance, like the similarly-worded treaty with Egypt, makes it clear that Moscow in the era of the Brezhnev Doctrine is no longer interested in tolerating non-alignment and neutralism in the Third World, as Khrushchev pretended to be. The non-aligned countries are coming more and more into the slipstream of the global triangle of forces. With the Moscow alliance, India has practically abandoned her neutrality in the Soviet-Chinese conflict. Delhi might find itself invited by Moscow at some stage, under reference to Article 9 of the treaty, to take "effective steps" in the case of some new Soviet- 11 case may never arise, Moscow is hardly likely to CPYRGHApproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 neglect the opportunity of exploiting the alliance with India to encircle China from the south. For some time now, Moscow has been playing, up the Thibet question, and this region has taken on addi- tional strategic importance from the posting there of Chinese nuclear and rocket installations previously in Sinkiang. R ussia's pressure towards India is no longer aimed against the British Empire, as Marx foretold, but against Communist China. A calcula- tion which may seem attractive to the Soviet leaders is that the Soviet Union with its 250 million inhabit- ants now joins with 550 million Indians to form a 'counterbalance to 800 million Chinese. But account must also be taken of the fact that volatile under- developed, loosely-cohering India represents an ad- ditional millstone round the Soviet neck, already encumbered with Eastern Europe, Cuba and the Middle east. The cost of the alliance with India in political, economic and military currency may quickly prove to be higher than expected and higher than the Soviet infrastructure is capable of bearing. Over- extension increases the dangers and uncertainties for Moscow's power, however demonstratively it may be displayed. Even Russia's communications with India cannot be regarded as sure, for to avoid trackless Central Asia and the Himalayas they must pass either through the Suez Canal or along China through Siberia and the Yellow Sea. In spite of his apparent success, Brezhnev may one day find himself to have been duped. Stalin extended Russian sway to the Elbe and achieved an alliance with Mao's China. Khrushchev derived not inconsiderable advantages from his rapprochement with America, even though he had to pay for it with upheavals in Eastern Europe and the break with Peking. But Brezhnev, in the global triangle of power, has neither China nor America on his side, and Cuba, Egypt and India can never compensate for that. Approved For Release 1999/09/9?? : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/0 P79-01194AftO'2i01-1 A MESSAGE FOR REVOLUTIONARIES The message comes from Pierre Vallieres, ideologue of the Canadian revolutionary Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ): he has publicly stated that terrorism has no place in the struggle for an independent Quebec. Vallieres' words should have particular iheaning for such organizations as Guatemala's F . A. R. , the Eritrean Liberation Front in Africa, or other guerrilla activists anywhere who advocate kidnappings, and other terrorist tactics to reach their goals. Vallieres' message may also be of interest to the urban-university variety of revolutionary everywhere, whose enthusiasm may cause them to confuse what should be with what is. Attached to the backgrounder is an article by Vallieres which appeared in the 13 December issue of the Montreal newspaper, Le Devoir. In a detailed Marxist-revolutionary analysis of the situation in Quebec, Vallieres concludes that, given the "objective conditions" which prevail, the FLQ is counter-productive and no longer has any raison d'etre. Approved For Release 1999I09/02rZ #.1A-FPP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY February 1972 Pierre Vallieres, ideologue and inspiration of the Canadian Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) which for a decade has been responsible for political kidnappings and other acts of terror in the Montreal area, has publicly stated that terrorist tactics .are outmoded, that the legal aspects of the struggle must be paramount, and the FLQ no longer has any raison d'etre. In a 27-page essay which was published in the 13 and 14 December issues of the Montreal newspaper, Le Devoir, Vallieres reaches some of the following conclusions regarding the role of the Quebec terrorist organization: a) "No one can arrogate to himself, in the name of a theoretical principle, the right to engage an entire people in a confrontation which stands an excellent chance of resulting in greater repression for the masses.." b) "The political error of the FLQ is to consider itself a sort of revolutionary foyer which will liberate the people by the contagion of its ideas and acts, by the spontaneous propaganda of its tactics, and by the microbic radiation of its "cells" on the social tissues of the population." c) "The mass struggle in Quebec utilizes the electoral process and will continue to utilize it as long as that process appears to be the right method for attaining political power and for realizing its priority objectives: national independence and economic, social and cultural transformation." d) "The FLQ is outmoded because the situation has changed and because armed agitation is not suitable to the present situation. Because this struggle must lead an entire people to victory and not defeat, the duty of FLQ members today is to put an end to FLQ activity in all its form ..and to continue the struggle according to the best interests of the Quebec people." Vallieres called upon his FLQ comrades to support the Parti Quebecois (a party represented in the Quebec provincial legislature which is also dedicated to gaining independence for French Canada through strictly legal processes). Valli6res points out that FLQ activities have become counter-productive since they furnish the authorities with a pretext to intervene in Quebec affairs and would lead to the suppression not only of the FLQ itself but of all other "progressive elements" such as the trade unions, citizens Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 committees and above all the Parti Quebecois to which the people look for leadership in their struggle for a separate state. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 LE DEVOIR, Montreal 13 December 1971 WHY THE FLQ TODAY NO LONGER HAS ANY RAISON D' ETRE by Pierre Valli ores CPYRGHT In a letter to the publisher of Le Devoir, M. Pierre Vallieres announces that he will soon publish an essay entitled 1 'Ur erice de'Choisir, comprising four chapters.. In the second chapter entitled "The FLQ and the Important Lessons of October 1970," the text of which is attached to this letter, Vallieres explains why he is breaking definitively with the Quebec Liberation Front and urging its members to return to democratic practices. Here is the complete text of this chapter. An analysis of the evolution, over the last ten years, of the struggle methods, the organizational machinery and the increasingly precise definition of political, economic, social and cultural objectives, as well as of the basic premises of this evolution have led us to the following principal conclusions: 1) under present circumstances, and taking account of objective conditions, the main strategic, political force in the liberation struggle is and can only be the Parti Qudbecois; 2) the creation of a second mass party (worker or Marxist) would only be a source of diversion and division for the Quebec masses, and at the same time would retard the development of the struggle in which the Quebec people are engaged in a total, that is inseparable, manner on what is called the "national" as well as on what is known as the "social" plane. 3) the "contents" of independence are shaped at the base (trade unions, citizens committees, local chapters of the Parti Qu6becois, the liberation front of Quebec women, etc.) and must integrate with the political initiatives of the Parti Qu6becois (party of the masses), the makeup of which, in reality, overlaps .with the "joint front" of labor unions, citizens' committees and progressive intellectuals. Oft the political level, the division between a party which claims to be leading this so-called social "front" and the Parti Qudbecois (which one is too inclined to reduce to a purely "national" or nationalist "front"), would constitute an internal division within the same mass struggle, would compromise the chances for success of this struggle and, in short, would strengthen the incumbentregime. In such a division, the people of Quebec would stand to lose enormously from every point of view. Approved For Release 1999/09%02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 CPYRGHT In the light of these conclusions, is an FLQ necessary? The problem is not to determine whether or not the FLQ possesses at present the technical means for carrying out actions similar to those of October 1970, but to decide whether, politically, these actions are necessary for the Quebec liberation struggle and whether they will be necessary in the foreseeable future. To answer this question, it is useful first of all to ask whether the current situation is revolutionary and, consequently, whether armed struggle is justified. For a situation to be revolutionary and for armed struggle to constitute a politically valid means of struggle for the masses, the following objective conditions must exist: 1) total inability of the regime in power to satisfy popular aspirations and demands ; 2) the suppression of democratic and civil liberties; 3) a permanent state of repression and of political, economic and social crisis; 4) Antagonisms embittered to the point that they can be resolved only by armed confrontation; 5) the objective impossibility of a mass struggle developing in the election process; i.e., that a mass party could attain'political power through elections; 6) the objective need for the people to have recourse to armed struggle (or guerrilla warfare) in order to realize their political, economic and social objectives. Is it possible to conceive of an intermediate situation in which armed struggle would be just another formula and in which the electoral struggle would remain predominant? Certain Quebec revolutionaries imagine such a situation. They believe that the FLQ and the Parti Quebecois should complement each other. They know very well that the present situation is not yet revolutionary and that therefore the struggle of the masses must assume an electoral form. Moreover they note that the incumbent regime, threatened with disintegration, daily t i ides increasingly toward fascism. They foresee that in the face of e threat posed by the Parti Quebecois, the unions and the citizens tomnittees, the authorities will obstruct the electoral process and will install in Quebec a dictatorship of the Greek or Uruguayan variety. They describe the present situation as pre-revolutionary. And, in reality, the political implications of the people's dissatisfaction today include an enormous potential for explosion. However, this is not enough to touch off a revolution. Rather, it Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00200210001-1 CPYRGHT leads to con ron a ions in , MkU use of stronger and stronger repressive measures. If the Parti Qu6becois did not exist and if it were not making an effort to channel this growing dissatisfaction toward a specific objective (independence and the basic transformation of the economic and social structure) capable of mobilizing the great majority of the Quebec people, the counter- offensive would already have had tragic and baneful consequences for the development of the liberation struggle (which is a revolutionary struggle) and for the workers of Quebec. The risks of widespread demobilization and a retreat into darkness would, in such circumstances, be great. It would constitute a decisive victory for Canadian colonialsim and American imperialism. This is why the authorities, more and more openly, are seeking a confrontation which they hope will provide an opportunity to forcibly crush the Quebec people by destroying the organizations which the people created in order to free themselves: the Parti Quebecois, the unions, the citizens' committees, etc. The October 1970 crisis provided the authorities with the occasion for a "dress rehearsal" of this classic scenario at a time when the organization which by its actions had provoked the crisis did not have the resources for an extended offensive against the authorities nor to offer the Quebec people the strategy and weapons which would have enabled them to resist repression, still less the techniques of revolutionary action which would have enabled it to achieve its ends: winning political power and constructing a new society. Had it not been for the combined action of the Parti Qu6becois, the workers' groups and all of Quebec's progressive forces, the "ever-present danger of reaction and retreat which always hangs over a transitional society" would have occurred and the FLQ would have had to take the odious responsibility before history of having given the exploiters of the Quebec people the opportunity of striking them a possibly fatal blow. Fortunately, the irreparable did not occur because the authorities, taken ,by surprise, reacted too slowly and were not really able to resolve the "contradictions which existed between the various decision-making levels and within each of these levels. But the crisis would have provided the authorities with the opportunity not only to scare people but also and especially to resolve some of its own contradictions by uniting around the central government the exploiters of the Quebec people. If ever the FLQ were to offer the authorities a new opportunity to invoke the War Measures Law against Quebec, this time all levels of the state would be prepared, whereas the PLQ again would have no control over the process it had set in motion. As in October 1970, it would be obliged to leave to the Parti Qu6becois and to the unions the task of resisting the repression which would be carried out against everyone. In short, it would condemn the people to the defensive, to retreat and to fear. In fact, it would have to swallow what it claimed to combat: 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO0020021 0001 -1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 CPYRGHT repression. Worse, it would condemn the entire population to a loss of initiative, to passive acceptance of the state's counter-attack and to dependence on the mercies of the authorities. One cannot challenge, in the name of the people, the army of a regime when one does not oneself possess an army in which the people can find itself, become part of consciously and through a collective fight, take the road to political power and the realization of their social objectives. And in order for such a people's army to organize, develop and triumph, it is necessary first of all that the people have no choice but to take up aims, that they know this and that in their midst there have developed a leadership capable of assuming the historic responsibility of guiding an entire people toward certain victory. No one can assume -- like a self-awarded diploma -- the task of being the avant-garde of a people on the way to liberation. Above all, no one can arrogate to himself, in the name of a theoretical principle, the right to engage an entire people in a confrontation which stands an excellent chance of resulting in greater repression for the masses and, for the revolutionary and progressive forces, attrition if not total annihilation. Actions such as those of October 1970 reduce the revolutionary struggle to a series of isolated tactics, of flashy initiatives which depend on special circumstances and are without any strategic significance. At the level on which they occur, such actions, even if they arouse the people from their lethargy, compromise in the long run the security and militancy of the most politically aware elements of the population, and thus the nation as a whole. The fact that an important part of the population up to now has sympathized with FLQ' initiatives, supported its October Manifesto, admire its acquisition of political prisoners etc. does not mean that the FLQ automatically represents for the masses an alternative for attaining political power. If the masses confuse so easily "felquistes" (FLN members) and "pequistes" (Parti Qu6becois adherents), it is because or them the FLQ represents the "radical element" of a liberation movement hose prime mover remains the Parti Qu6becois. In the eyes of the Quebec masses and also in the eyes of the uthorities, it is the Parti Qu6becois which constitutes the real ternative to power. It is neither the trade unions, nor the citizens ommittees nor the FLQ. The FLQ is regarded by the people as shock troops n the struggle for independence and socialism. This subjective view of the FLQ is closer to the truth than that, also subjective, which the FLQ embers have of themselves when they characterize themselves as a Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 CPYRGHT guerrilla army around which the other political, trade union and social forces in the Quebec liberation struggle will allegedly radicalize. This subjective and erronious view of themselves is not shared by all FLQ members. The October 1970 Manifesto, for example, gives a definition of the FLQ which corresponds approximately to the way the masses see it. In any case, it should be very difficult for the FLQ -- at best -- to be more than a tactical support-for_a . broad, mass movement whose main strategic strength is supplied by the Parti Qu6becois. The political and subjective error of the FLQ, maintained and fed by the authorities and the information media, is to consider itself a sort of revolutionary foyer which will liberate the people by the contagion of its ideas and acts, by the spontaneous propaganda of its tactics and by the microbic radiation of its "cells" on the social tissues of the population -- all this simply by the political- magical effect of its violence, its courage, its generosity and its good intentions. This biological interpretation of urban guerrilla activity confuses one center among others of social agitation with an authentic guerrilla activity, which in a given situation acts as the motivating force in a people's war because there exists no other popular struggle strategy which can lead the masses to the realization of their objectives. In Quebec there is no doubt that armed agitation has nothing to do with the armed struggle, which is a mass struggle. The FLQ has engaged in armed agitation; it has never engaged in an armed struggle because in Quebec the mass struggle can utilize the normal electoral process and does use it. The electoral process and armed struggle cannot be used at the same time, since the mass struggle cannot have two heads and two strategies without repudiating itself. In reality, armed mass struggle and electoral mass struggle cannot coexist. The masses cannot at one time become part of two different strategies, as if they were living at the same time in two different situations. The masses can and should change political strategy once the situation itself has changed and requires a different struggle method than that which corresponded to the conditions of the previous situation. A strategy never develops by itself and each people has to forge one of its own by its efforts, its sacrifices, its errors, its defeats, its battles won or lost,which the people must experience in order to discover it [the strategy], master it and apply it. In this domain; even failures, by the experience and knowledge they generate, are often more tempering than successes too easily won. The mass struggle in Quebec -- whether or not this pleases those who only concede revolutionary value to armed political action -- makes use of the electoral process and will continue to make use of it as long as that process appears to be the right method and formula for Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00020021M 'fl? HT attaining political power and realizing its priority objectives: national independence and the economic, social and cultural changes that are the concomitants of independence. The mass struggle will commit itself to another approach only if the situation is radically changed by -- let us say -- the outlawing of the Parti Qu6becois, censorship, permanent military occupation, the suppression of the present election process or by a marked limitation of its "normal" operation. In his book Guerrilla Warfare, One Method (1961), Che Guevara emphasizes that one must never exclude a priori that revolutionary change in a given society can begin through the election process. So much the better, one must add, if this change can take place completely through this process. Armed struggle, as revolutionary strategy and method for mass political action, cannot be undertaken nor develop if the masses think they can realize their goals through the electoral process. A revolutionary is one who finds the strategy and tactics appropriate to the objective situation which exists and who is capable of forseeing those conditions which will obtain whenever this or that modification in the objective situation drastically changes the balance between the forces involved and concomitantly demands that the masses develop new methods of action, either for seizing political power or for defending what they have already won. In the present situation, it would be an unforgiveable error for the advocates of a real social revolution in Quebec to underestimate or worse deny -- that the Quebec people can profit by the strategy of the Parti Qudbecois. For it is this strategy which, for the first time in Quebec, has permitted large segments of the population to participate directly in a process aimed at attaining political power and, through a collective effort, to understand its mechanisms, implications, limitations, dangers and possibilities; in a word, to become aware of the strengths and weaknesses of their resources, of the importance of their unity and solidarity in the face of those who threaten them indiscriminately and seek to divide them in order to better dominate and exploit them. Who can deny the sound basis of Rene L6vesque's statement that in- Quebec "the struggle for national emancipation must develop in the classic confusion of a social revolution" and that consequently we must find a way of carrying out simultaneously the struggle for national liberation and the struggle for social liberation "remembering that without national freedom we will have neither the maturity nor the means'to accomplish a social, economic and cultural rennaissance which is not incomplete or illusory." Le'Devoir,-29 November 1971). If it is not in the interest of the majority of the Quebec people at present for the trade unions to set up a second party of the masses (which would differ from the Parti Qu6becois only by its phraseology and which, moreover, by its rivalry with the Parti Qu6becois, would Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 CPYRGHT retard the political and social emancipation of Quebec and,tfie historic process which is taking place), is it in the interest of the-Quebec people that the FLQ continue its action begun in 1963 and which in October 1970 provoked the crisis that everyone is familiar with? Is it in the interest of the Canadian people that FLQ armed agitation, such as it has carried out in Quebec for the last eight years, continue to present itself, mythically, as armed struggle, when in reality it possesses none of the basic characteristics of a true armed struggle and when objective conditions at present neither permit nor require the development of such a struggle? One must reply categorically no. Even if the political, economic and social objectives of the FLQ are based on the real aspirations of the Quebec people, its actions have always been more or less spontaneous, irregular and dependent on circumstances. Except for its violence, nothing distinguishes it politically from the agitation of other angry exploited and colonized groups:` Mouvement de Libdration Populaire, Front de Libdration Populaire, Mouvement de Lib6ration du Taxi, Ligue pour 1'Integration Scholaire, Rassemblement pour l'Independance National (in its early years). This agitation has been useful. It has made aware and given a political viewpoint to an ever increasing number of Quebec citizens. Above all it has been responsible for the emergence of an organized mass movement, the Parti Qu6becois, and has contributed to the radicalization of the trade unions. Only one form of coherent political activity, one real alternative road to power for the "white niggers" of Quebec has come from the social struggle and political efforts of the last few years: the Parti Qu6becois. That this party is not perfect, none will deny. But if it were to disappear without having accomplished its task and without having taken advantage of all the possibilities which unquestionably the democracy in power (no matter how sick) still offers, it is certain that, in uch a case, so much effort over the past ten years in so many different Melds of activity, would be lost for a long while in defeatism, fatigue and discouragement, especially if such a premature and catastrophic disappearance were to be caused (consciously or not) by ideological ;quarrels based more on theories from books (devoting little attention .to th& study of history) than on a concrete, constantly re-examined understanding of a specific ever-evolving situation. The consequences !would be ever more severe if the Parti Qu6becois were crushed or paralyzed by a savage' campaign. of repression occasioned by, or for which the pretext was provided, by some flashy act of the FLQ. The advocates of armed action and of "autumn offensives" should learn the.main lesson of October 1970 and draw fran it practical, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : tIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 & CPYRGHT politically justified conclusions, in the interest of the people of Quebec and of their liberation struggle and not thinking -- egoistically, aristocratically and isolatedly with no regard for the most elementary sense of responsibility -- of preserving their "principles" and their nucleus of an organization for armed agitation under the pretext that sane day, inevitable, a peoples war situation will exist in Quebec, or that the program of the Parti Quebecois is not revolutionary enough. The principal lesson of October 1970 is the following: the authorities consider that they are threatened first and foremost, not by the FLQ whose real importance they understand, but by the joint political activity of the Parti Qu6becois, the labor unions and the citizens' 9~mittees, political activity which is basically radical because it 41ims objectively -- and with increasing awareness -- at the rupture Of the colonial and imperialist relations from which the Anglo-Canadian bourgeoisie, its American masters and the "ddbris of elites" who make up the rickety French-speaking "business" bourgeoisie all profit to the detriment of the development of the Quebec people, its economy, its own institutions, its culture, its creativity, its freedom and its dignity. Now the regime in power portrays itself as a liberal democracy and t,aa s surrounded itself with political and legal institutions which conform the liberal ideology that the Anglo-Sazons value so highly (for them- Ives, first of all). Therefore, it is with the greatest anxiety that the regime observes the use which the Quebec separatists make of the political instruments that the regime itself has forged.... How to oppose the "historic process" which, under the present political system, the Parti Qu6becois and the forces which support it have the legal right to accomplish by electoral means? Even though 4.n a democracy, the expression of separatist "ideas" is tolerated, can a federal state, no matter how liberal, allow one of the members of the federation to undertake separatist actions? Even if such a political pocess were allegedly carried out by legal, democratic means? How to avoid the dilemma already presented by the prospect of the accession to power in Quebec of the separatist Parti Quebecois and, moreover, driven to the wall by popular pressure (particularly that of the unions and the itizens' cornittees) to undertake economic and social changes, as the truggle for independence develops, in the words of Rend Lesveque, "in he classic disorder of a social revolution?" [sic] If the separatists, on the one side, hope to win political power in Quebec, the Canadians, on their side, cannot resign themselves to seeing Quebec free itself politically (and even less economically) from their domination and proclaiming itself a sovereign people. Already, even the possibility that the Parti Quebecois might soon succeed in 8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 CPYRGHT this operation has .provoked a large-scale crisis throughout Canada. Often in history, such basic antagonisms could be resolved only by armed confrontation. However, the reputation of being an "advanced democracy" which Canada enjoys at home and abroad obliges its good federalist "democrats" to use a bit more political finesse- than one would expect from a - dictatorship of gorillas. The federal government -- beyond any doubt -- seriously plans armed intervention. However, what it needs in the present situation -- and taking into account Anglo-Canadian views regarding civil liberties -- are pretexts, opportunities to intervene militarily in Quebec using the expedient of an-all-out war against "terrorism." The possibility of Canadian military intervention against a Quebec which is attaining.its independence by the electoral process must be clearly faced, without, however, forgetting the fact that for English Canada such intervention would be extremely costly from the political viewpoint. English Canada's objectives would be much better served if an opportunity were provided (by an illegal group) to crush the Parti Quebecois and the forces capable of reestablishing or replacing it BEFORE this mass party had won the elections and achieved legitimacy within the country, as well as abroad -- and has attained the authority which would make it both. 1) The authentic and unchallengable spokesman of the people of Quebec, with which the central authorities would have to negotiate the forms of independence (negotiations which it would be in Ottawa's interest to prolong, if its objective were, by paralyzing such negotiations, to stimulate in Quebec a political and. social climate which, in the eyes of English Canada would-justify the "discovery" of an insurrection and the invoking of the famous Law re emergency war measures); and 2) "the new social nerve structure," to use the expression of Jean-Claude Leclere, of a proletarian nation which expects from independence something more than a change of "cliques," - expects nothing less than a basic transformation of the economic and social structures and the development of new social relations. Thus, for English Canada, for the central authorities, the objective is to create a pretext for intervening against the separatist and progressive forces in Quebec before the Parti Qu6becois has acquired legitimacy through democratic elections and, if possible, before it has acquired even that popular legitimacy which historically often precedes the election, the ballot and the accession to power. But will the central authorities bring about this confrontation which will permit it to take the offensive?... Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : Cll -RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 f r Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00020021000t-FIYRGHT There is no doubt that the authorities are making every possible use of the "FLQ menace" to put its police and military shock troops on a permanent war footing in order to restrict civil liberties and increase the number of repressive laws. Since October 1970, the "FLQ menace" has been the handiest political justification for bludgeonings searches, spying, proclamations, anti-demonstration regulations, emergency laws, large-scale army maneuvers across Quebec territory, plot rumors, conspiracies, imaginary plans for selective assassinations, fake political trials etc... If, for one year, the "FLQ menace" has constituted the leitmotiv for the public pronouncements of the "authorities," it is because the October crisis showed them how much they had to gain from the brilliant feats of the FLQ which were without strategic revolutionary significance, but which ould be credibly represented as being part of a long-range offensive in I genuine revolutionary armed struggle campaign, when in reality these initiatives were nothing of the sort. In these circumstances, every FLQ act, no matter how small or limited, every communication bearing the FLQ seal, no matter how hair-brained, every FLQ "message;" sham or real, acquires a political importance which only helps those who use the permanent "FLQ menace" as additional pretexts to bludgeon the liberation movement of the Quebec masses, while waiting for one "major" opportunity which would furnish the pretest for marshalling 411 its resources in order to definitely break the back of the liberation movement... If, up to October 1970, FLQ armed agitation was the radical expression of the spontaneous and anarchic character which every national liberation movement experiences in the beginning, today it has become in fact, the unconscious but objective ally of the repressive strategy of the regime, and thus, far from constituting a tactical support for the struggle of the Quebec people, stands to contribute to the crushing of that struggle d to the liquidation of its momentum. The intellectual conviction that armed confrontation is inevitable ,(even if founded on a serious analysis of the world situation) can IN NO WISE 'justify the recourse to armed agitation in the present situation as modified by the October crisis. If ever in the past, it was warrented as a means of calling attention to condtions of,domination and stimulating a firm resolve to escape it, today armed agitation (as well as the non- armed,agitation of those who confuse breaking a glass window with a conscious, positive and mobilizing political act) is counter-revolutionary... For these reasons, which are based neither on opportunism, sentimentality nor even less on fear of action, but solely on an objective analysis of a specific situation, one must not hesitate to state clearly and vigorously that the FLQ ("symbol" of liberation more than the organization of liberation, and guerrilla "myth" more than popular resistence), today no Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 CPYRGHT longer has any raison d'etre. And, for my part, having reached such a conclusion, to be satisfied to break definitively with the FLQ and withdraw from it every kind of support (including facile sympathy) without publicly stating the well-founded reasons for my decision, would be inexcusable. The FLQ is outmoded because the situation has changed and because armed agitation is not suitable to present conditions. However, the struggle itself continues. Because this struggle must lead an entire people to victory and not defeat, the responsibility and political duty of FLQ members today is to put an end to FLQ activity in all its forms, including verbal FLQ-ism and to continue the struggle in the best interests of the Quebec people... All that has gone into making popular heroes and myths of FLQ members does not exempt them from self-criticism or from the responsibilities inherent in all revolutionary activity. On the contrary, it demand it of them to an even greater extent since the need is greater. They cannot escape this high and urgent obligation except by renouncing their convictions and ideals, and replacing them with. the illusion that they, are the sole possessors of revolutionary truth. Approved For Release 1999/09/021aCIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 LE 13 FSvl 1 elease 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO0020021 OOO1-1 ber 1971 "L'urgence de choisir" ~(GU[r~QO~OG~'L`L ,8s1 on ruis dix ans, des formes de Iut e, des instruments oreanisa I pius en plus precise des object (us politiques, economiques , sociaux et culturels, ainsi que des bases de depart de cette evolution, nous a conduits (...) aux principales conclusions sus- vantes: I-i que dins la conjoncture actuelle, compte tenu des condi- tions objectives, la principale force politique stratcgiquc de la tulle de liberation est et ne peut titre que le Parti quebe- cots; 2'- que la creation d'un dcuxicme parti de masse (ou- vrier ou bien marxiste) he Tell- version elre qu'un facteur de di- version et de division au sein des masses qucbccoises, et du meme coup constituerait in frein au developpement de Ia title que les Quebecois li- vrent de manicre inseparable, done clobale, au plan dit "na- tional' comme a celui dit "so- cial" ; 3't que le "contenu" de I'in- dependance se definit a la ba- se (syndicats, comitfs de ei- toens. qr anisations locales du' P.Q., Jront de liberation des femmes quebecoises, etc.) et dolt s'mtegrer a I'action polilique du Patti quebecois (parti de masse) dont la com- position est, en realitC la meme que recouvre le "front commun" des centrales syn- dicates, dew comitfs;decitoyens et des intellectuels progressis-, tes. Une division au plan politi- sue. entre in parti prC:tendant coiffer" cc front" dit so- cial el le Parti qucb&ois qu'on a trop tendance a redui- re a un "front" purement "na- tional" ou natinnaliste, consti- iucrail on realite uric division a l'intmricur dune meme tulle U1 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT CPYRGHT If I a,pfas,do urdipffi, - Vallieres annonce qu'd publiera bientot un essai, "L'ur- gcnce de choisir", compose de quatre chapitres. Cest Bans le 2e cbapitre, inhtul0 "Le F.L.Q. et Ics grandes lerions d'octobre 1970', texte annexe a sa lettre, que Vallic'res explique pourquoi Il rompt dt;finitivement avec le Front de liberation du Quebec it lui retire tout appui, exhortant les membres actoels do mouvement a revcnir I faction dCmocratique. Void It texte Integral de cc cbapitre. Compte tenu de ces conclu- 6) la neccssite objective pour lions. tin F.L.Q. csf-ii n&N- le ?a.,uc? La gdcstion nest pas la lutte larmce (ou guerre de de savoir si le F.L.Q. possede guerilla) pour realiser ses? ob- ou non, presentement, les lectifs politiques, economigties moyens techniques de reali- et sociaux. ser des actions comme celles Peut?on imaginer une silUa- d'octobre 1970, mail de decider Lion intermediaire dans laquelle at politiquement ces actions la lutte armee serait une for- sont neccssaires aujourd'hul mule parmi d'autres et of la au developpement de la lutte lutte electorate demeurerait de liberation des Quebecois et prcdominante, en attendant si tides seront necessaires yu a son tour la lutte armee dans un avenir revisible. devienne he mode d'action po- Pour repond're a cette ques- Iitique predominant? Certams Lion, it convient d'abord de se revolutionnaires quebecois demander si la situation actuel- imaginent ainsi la situation. he est revolutionnaire et, par Its croient que le P.Q. et le F.- consequent, si la lutte armed L.Q. doivent We complemen- est justifies. Pour qu'une situa- sire I'un de 1'antre. 1P, save,it tion soit revolutionnaire et pour bien que la situation save 1 t que la lutte arml constitue nest revolutlonnal- le mode de de lutte poli tiqucment ent pas encore juste pour les masses it Taut re et que la lutte des masses qu'existent les conditions ob- emprunte done le mode electo- jectives suivantes: ral. D'autre part, ils constatent t) I'incapacite absolue du que, menace de desingregra- C ouvoir en place de satisfaire tton, le regime en place glisse s aspirations et les reven- chaque jour davantage vers lei dications populaires; . fascisme. II prevoient que, tot 2) la suppression des liber- ou tard, face a la menace que ids civiles et democratiqques; representent ensemble he P.Q. 3) un Ctat rmanent de rd- les centrales syndicates et tes pression et deecrise politique, comites de citoyens, les tenants economique et sociale; actuels du pouvoir vont bloquer 4) ]'exacerbation d'antagonis- le processus electoral et ins- mes ne pouvant se resoudre taurer au Quebec mine dictature que dans et par un affronte- de tyyppee grec oil uruguayen..ils ment arms; yyualifient to situation presente 5) l'impossibilite objective de re?revolutionnaire. qu'une lutte de masse puisse Et, en effet, ('implication po- s organiser et se developper' Iitique de I'agitation populaire chances de succes de cette lutte dans le processus electoral et, comporte au~ourd'hui un enor- et renforcerait, en definitive, par consequent, qu'un parti de me potential de rupture. Cela frontements auxquels le pou- voir, a tons ses paliers, oppo- sera une repression de plus-en 9u e. cois n'existait pas et s it ne faisait.ptis l'effort de canaliser vers un objectif precis (indN pendance et transformation en profondeur des structures. economiques et sociales) capa- ble de mobiliser I'inimense majorite des Quebecois, la contre-offensive aurait deja' des consequences tragiques et nefastes pour he dcveloppement de la lutte de liberation (qul est une lutte revolutionnaire) et done pour 1'enscmble des tra- vailleurs quebecois. Les ris- ques de demobilisation genera- le et d'un retour a la grande noirceur seraient alors consi- derables. Ce pourralt We une vic!oire decisive pour he cola nlsalisme canadlen et I'impe- rialisme americain. Cest pourquoi, de plus en plus ouvertement, he pouvoir recherche on affrontement ui, espere-t-il, Iii fournira 1j occasion d'ccraser par la force le peuple quebe cois en de- truisant les organisations qu'il s'est donnees pour s'affran- chir: le P.Q., les centrales syndicates; les comity de ci- topens, etc. La crise d'octobre 1970 a fourni au pouvoir hoc- casion dune "repetition gene. rale" de ce scenario class: ue, a in moment ou l'organisai on qqui avait, par son action, di` denche la crise ne j>ossedait aucun moyen do soutenir une offensive de longue duree con- tre he pouvoir ni d'offrir au peu le quebecois la strategic et les acmes qui lui auraient permis de resister a la repres- sion et encore moins la me- thode d'action revolutionnaire qui lui aurait permis d'arri- ver a ses fins: la conqucte du pouvotr et la construction d'une nouvelle sociCte. N'cOt etel'action conjointe du quebecois y per rail enormd. v i 1~'t - j - `" ~t or es progres- menta t,nts Ics p~caafed Ft oWKWI@ e~'r9f9/ 5102 : CM IF s Q6ftt%M002 7bE Inges permanent - CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200210001-1 de reaction et de recul qu i Pot- to toujours sur une socicc cn transition" (Rene Levesque, Le Devoir, 29 nov. 1971) se serait concretise et le F.L.Q. aurait eu a assumer devant I'histoire I'odieuse responsabi- lite d'avoir offert aux expplol- tours du peuple queb6cois i'oe- casion reuse de lui porter un coup peut-titre fatal. ? L irreparable heurcusement ne s'est pas produit, parce quo lc pouvoir a etc pris par surgrS?e, a roes trop & temps a rea3Ir et n a vratment reus- si a resoudre les contradictions qui existent entre ses difterents palters de decision et a I'inte- rieur de chacun de ces paliers. Mais la crise lui aura quand meme fourni l'occaslon non scu- lement de "faire peur an mon- de" macs egalemcnt et surtout de rcx.oudre cert.aines de ses F ropres contradictions en rca- sant, autour de I'Etat central, l'union sacrec des exploitcurs contre Ii population qucbccoise. Si jamais to 17.1,.Q. dcvait offrir an pouvoir une nouvelle occasion de romulguer contre to Quebec lra Loi des mesn- ' res de guerres, loos Ics pa- tios du pouvoir scraicnt, cette lois hien prepares, alors que to I' .L.Q., de son cote, ne pourrait one tots de plus avoir aucun controls sur is proses- sus qu'il aurait dcclenche. 11 devratt, comme on octobre 1970, s en remettre au P.Q. et aux centrales syndicates du coin de resister a la repression ui s'excrccrait contre tous. En somme, it condamnerait le people a la defensive,'au repli et a la pour. II avaliserait en fait ce qu'il pre'tendrait com- battre: la repression. Pire, it condamnerait la population cntiere a perdre touts forme d'initiative, a subir passive- ment la contre-attaque du pouvoir et a dependre du bon, vouloir des nutgritcs. On no provoque pas an nom du peuple I'armee du pou- voir on place quand on ne pos- sCde pas soi-meme une arniee dans laquelle un peuple pout se reconnaltre, s'rntegrer cons ciemment et. par un combat collectif, s'acheminer vers la conquete du uvoir politi- quc et la realisaipn de scs ob- eclifs sociaux. Et pour qu'une tells armce du peuple puisse s'organiser, se developper et vaincre, it taut d'abord que to people ne puisse objective- ment avoir d'autre choix que de prendre ics armcs, qu'il en At conscience, qu'il ait de- vcleppe en son spin tine direc- tion politique et militaire plei- nement capable d'assumer la lourde responsabilde histori- Petsonne ne ppoeut solliciter corrme un diplome qu'il se donne a lui-memo la charge d'etre 1'avant-garde d'un peuple en voie de liberation. Person- no surtout ne pout s'arrogcr to droit, au nom de principes theeoriqucs, d'engager tout un peuple daps un affrontement qui a toutes les chances de se solder) pour les masses, par une repression accrue, et pour les forces revolutionnaires et progressistes, par I'usure, si- non I'Ecrascment total. Des ac- tion3 comme celles d'octobre 1970 reduisent la lutte revolu- tionnaire a one succession de tactiques isolees, de coups d'e'- clat 'circonstanciels", pries de toute portee strategique. Sur le plan oil elles se situent, ces actions, meme si titles tirent la population de sa torpeur, compromettent a long terme la sccurite ct la combativite des secteurs les plus politises de I i population et, par le fait mi roe. de la nation tout entiere. Cc n'cst pas parse qu'une partie importante do la popula- tion, jusqu'a maintenant, a sym- rthise aver des actions du L.Q., qu'cllc a a~puyc le coolenu de son Manifeste d'oc- tohre, qu'elle admire les pri- sonnicrs politiqyues, etc., que to F'.L.Q. constitue automati qucment une alternative de pouvoir pour les masses. Si Ics masses confondent si facile- ment les felquistes avec les pcq~ istes, c'cst que pour elles lell, F'.L.Q. regroupe one "sec- tion mdirsala d'im mm+v4mnpt de liberation dont le principal moteur derneure, pour elies, le (, est to P.Q. qui, aux yeux des masses quebecoises et aux ycux aussi du present regime, constitue ('alternative recite de pouvoir. Cc ne sont ni les syn- dicats, ni lei comites de ci- toyms, ni to F.L.Q. Le F.L.Q. est percu par le peuple comme on groupe do shoe de la luttt pour i'indcpendance et 1 socirlisme. Cette perception subjctive du F.L.Q. est plus prorhe de la vcrite que celle, subective ells aussi, qu'ont d'c x-memos ics feiquistes qui so klinissent comme une ar- mce de guerilla autour do la- quelle se radicaliscraient les autms forces ppoolitiques, syn- peuple s'en forge une a meme ble pour les partisans dune dicalcs et sociales dans la tulle es efforts, les sacrifices, les veritable revolution sociale au de liberation des Quebecois. erreurs, ley defaites, les ba- Quebec de sous-estimer ou, Cette perception subjective et. tailles gagne~es ou perdues aux- pire, denier ce que to peuple erronce de soi nest toutefois quels ii a du consentir pour Ia quebecois peut gagner ~rar la pas commune a loos Ics fel decouvrir, la maitriser et l'ap- strategic definie par he I Q. et quistes. Le Manifeste d'octo- pliquer jusqu'au bout. Et dans qui a permis, pour la premie-re 1970, par exemple, donne ce domaine, Ics echecs eux- re fois au Quebec, a de tres du F.L.Q. une definition qui cor? eridme s constit'ient des trem- larges secteurs de la popula- respond a peu pre a la re- plms: souvent plus ennem'- tion de participer directement presentation que les masses sants dexperience et de savoir a un processus visant a la s'en font. De touter facons, it que certain succes trop tact- conquete du pouvoir et, par diffi t be il F LQ f ti ll ti 1~' en e an . . c ve, i que co ec en lutte de masse all qui cette pra ender a victor a a,- se ne APO I ec~ F`on RelpYkAMp IA-I> R7~As0e1a11~49QE@( 100 'I'E'ldpF- mecantsmes, tactigne a in vaste inouvement de masse dont la force strate- gique principale eat constituee par le P.Q. L'erreur subjective et politi- que du F.L.Q., entretenue et oultivee d'ailleurs par le pou- voir et les medias d'rnlorma- tion, eat de se croire one es- pece de "foyer" revolution- naire qui liberera le peuple par la contagion de ses idees et de ses actions, par la pro- pagande spontanee de ses tacti- ques, par l 'irradiation micro- bienne de ses "cellules" sur les tissus sociaux de la popu- lation, tout cela par le simple effet politico-magique de sa violence, de son courage, de sa generosite et de ses bonnes intentions. Celle interpretation biologique do Ii guerilla ur- bainc confond no foymer panne d'autres d' a itation sociale aver one authentique guerilla qui, dans une situation dctermmee, est appelec a devenir he moteur d'une guerre du peuple parce .Witn y existe aucune autre strategie de lutte ppoopulaire qui puisse conduire les masses a la realisation de leurs objectifs. Au Quebec, it no fait aucun doute que ('agitation armee n'a rien a voir aver la lutte armee qui est une lutte de mas- se. Le F.L.Q. a fait de I'agi- tation armee, it ne s'est Ja- mais engage dans une lutte armee parce qu'au Quebec la lutte de masse pout emprunter he processus electoral normal et i'emprunte eflectivement. Elie no pout emprunter a la fois to rocessus electoral et celui de Ia lutte armee, car la lutte de masse ne saurait We bice- phale et bistrategique sans se nier elle-meme. Darts les faits, lutte armce des masses et lutte electorate des masses ne peuvent done coexister. Les masses ne peuvent s'integrer en meme temps a dcux strate- gies diflerentes comme A elles vivaient simultanement deux situations globales differentes. Elles peuvent et meme doivent changer de strategic politique lors que la situation elle-me- me a change et impose on autre mode de lutte que celul correspondant aux conditions specifiques do Ial situation an- (encure. Unc strategic n'est jamais donnce naturellement et chaquc a ceux qui n'actordent de va- Ieur revolutionnaire qu'a 1'ac- tion politique armee -, em- pruntc fe processus clrrfofAl et continuera do I'empr ter Cant et aussi longtemps que ce processus lui apparaitra la methods a suivrc ? la formule a utiliser pour la prise du pouvoir et la realisation de son objectif prioritaire: I'inrlepen- dance nationals et to; change- ments economiques, sociaux et culturels qu'elle attend do cette indcpendance. La lutte de masse nc s'enga- gera dins on autre processus quo si la situation est radica- lement modifies par, disons, la mise hors-la-loi du Parti quebccois, l'etablissemcnt de la censure. t'occu ation mili- taire permanente. la repression sans pitie des sync t---1 cats et .de toules les forces d'opposi- tion; bref, par la suppression du processus a ectoral actuel ou encore par une limitation considerable de son lonction- nemcnt"normal"' Dans La guerre de guerilla: une methode (1961) Che Gue- vara soul' a qu'il tie faut jamais exe ore a priori qu'un cnangement rcvolutionnaire dans une societc donna puisse ,commencer par on processus electoral. Tint mieux, taut-il ajouter, si ce changement pout se realiser totalement par ce processus. La lutte armce, on tant que strategic revolution- naire et mode d'action politi- que de masse, no pout titre amorcce ni so developper si les masses croient pouvoir realiser lours aspirations par un processus electoral donne. Le revolutionnaire est celui qui pout trouver la stratcgie et les tactiques adequates pour la situation objective existante et qui est capable do prevoir cellos qui to scront lorsque tel ou tel changement de la si- tuation objective modificra. radicalement to rapport des forces on presence ct, du meme coup, imposera aux mas- ses de nouveaux modes d'ac- tion, soil pour s'emparer du pouvoir politique, soit pour d~ fendre cc qu'elles auraient de- la conquis., Darts la situation actuclle, ce serait one errcur impardonna- Is- CPYRGHT A pproved Forr. R~lease 199%jg9t02 : C'A Rp~P.79-01t194A0091~002t1(~001a-'~ t pa no e d to utili- Ies implication 'Tes hmites, liberation ropulaire, u re (p rases ogiqucmen par- en un mot, do prendre cons- en cience do la force et de la fai- blessq do Icurs moyens d'ac- ?tion, le ('importance do lour unite et do lour solidarite face a cc qui les menace indistine- tement et cherche a Ies divi- ser,pour micux les dominer et les 'exploiter. Qt i nicra is bicn-fonde de Leves- ('affir'mation de Rene Leves- que suivant laqucile au Quebec que lutte pour l'emancipation nationale dolt se pours uivre dans )e, desordre classique dune revolution sociale" et qu'en donsequcnce nous devons trouvcr le moyen de mener de front Ii lutte de liberation na- ?tionale let la lutte de libera- tion soc .e "en n'oubliant pas que sans la iiberte nationale nous n'aprons m la maturite ni les instruments qu'il taut pour mener a bien aucune re- novation sociale, economiqque ou culturelle qui ne soit illu- soire ou tronquee"? (Lc De- voir, 9 nov. 1971) Sit nest pas dans l'intcrd do la majonte des Quebecois que less centrals syndicalcs mettent sur pied prsentcment un dcuxibme party de masse qui se distinguerait du P.Q. par sa scale phraseologie et qui, do plus, par son opposi- tion au P.Q., constitucrait on frcin a ('emancipation politi- quo et sociale de la collectivite quebecoise et au precessus historique on cours, est-il dans l'intcrct du people qucbe- coi$ quo to F.LQ. poursuive ('action entreprise depuis 1963 et qui a servi do detonateur, en octobre 1970, a la crise que l'on sail? Est-il dans i'interet du peu- pie qucbecois quo ('agitation armce du F.L.Q., telle qu'elle a etc pratiquee au Quebec de- puis huit ansi continue do s'af- finner mythiquement comme Wile armcc, alors qu'en rea- lite dlc no possbde aucunc des caraet:eristiques fondanienta- les d't ne veritable lutte armec ct q0 les conditions objecti- ves nC permetlint pas et n'cxi- gent 'pas le dCveloppement dune idle lutte dans la con- Joncture actuellc? II faut reporldre par un non catcgorique. Meme si Ies ohjectifs poll- tiqucs, Ceonomiques cl sociaux poursuivis par to F.L.Q. s'ap- puient stir les aspirations rccl- Ies des Quebecois, son action fat toujours plus ou moins spontance, pcriodi ue, cir- conslancielle. A part son ca -tr,re violent, pen no la uisungue poliliquement do l'a- ' autres gitation provoquce par d grouper d exploits et de colo- nises en colbre: Mouvement de ment de liberation du taxi, Li- land. We pour )'integration scolaire, La grande lecon d'octobre assemblement ur I'inde- 1970 est la suivante: le you pendance nationale (dans ses voir so sent ct se salt d'abord annees d'apprentissage)? et principalement menace, Cette agitation a eu son uti- non par to F.L.Q. dont it con- 10. Elle a permis de sensi- nait 1'importance reclle, mais biliser et de politiser on nom- par la pratiquc politique con- bre sans cesse croissant de vergente du Parts quebecols, Quebecois. Elie a surtout per- des centrals-, syndicates et mis ('emergence d'un mouve- des corttites de citoyens, pra- ment de masses structure, le tique politique au depart ra- Parti quebecois. tout en favo- dicale puisqu'elle vise objec- risant Ia radicalisation des tivement - et de plus en pplus syndicats. En fait, de la con- consciemment - I'eclate- frontation permanente de lut- ment des rapports coloniaux tes sociales et de crises poli- et imperialistes dont profitent tiques au Quebec, depuis use la bourgeoisie anglocanadien- dizaine d'anne'es, n a surgi ne, ses maitres americans et qu'une forme d'action polio- Is "debris d'elites" qui com- que coherente, qu'une alterna- posent la rachitique bourgeoi- live redle do pouvoir pour les sie "d'affaires" francophone, "negres blancs" guebecors: au detriment du developpe- et c'est le Parti quebecois. ment de la societe quebecoise, Que cc parti soit imparfait, de son economic, de ses insti- personne no le niera. Mats que tutions proppres, de sa culture cc parti vienne a disparaltre de sa creativite-, de sa liberty avant d'avoir etc au bout de et de sa dignite. son action et d'avoir epuise le mouvement independan- toutcs Is possibililes que lui ,tiste, qui est on memo temps off re inrnntestahlement enco= re la democratic en place (si mouvement de liberation so- malade soil-clle), et 11 est ciale, releve clairement d'une certain qu'alors taut d'efforts volonle collective de struc- deploycs depuis dix ans, dans turation d'un Etat quebecois les milictix?les plus (livers, se fibre politiquement et d'une perdraicnt pour bn temps economic quebecoise radica- dans to dcfaitisme, la iassitu- lement transformee. Expres- do et to decouragement, stir- sion consciente de I'ensem- tout si eette disparition pre- ble complexe des' antagonjs- maturec et catastrophique de- mss on endre's par la situa- vait We provoquee (cons- lion glnhale do domination de ciemment ou non, peu impor- la nation quebecoise par 1'im- te) par des qucrelles ideologi perialisme, le colonialisme et cues s'appuyant davantage sur to capitalisme, cc mouvement des theories issues dune eru- do liberation nationale menace dition livresquc (faisant pea directement les assises poli- do place a ('etude do l'histoi- Glues et economiqacs de nos' concrete, toujduneours remise "debris d'elites" et surtout ise a jour, dune situation concrete Is intercts economiques et en pcrpctucrlc evolution. Les politiques de (eux qu'ils (prin- conscouences en seraient en- eipal(ment les Liberaux) re- core plus dramatiques si le presentent aux divers palters P.Q. devait etre ecrase ou de gouvernement. L'affirma- seulement paralyse par une Lion la plus coherente, la plus repression sauvage dont I'oc- strurt'Ir'? pnlitiqucmcnt, de casion nu'ie pretexte serail un Viii roi,cctivc de Ii- coup d'ictat du F.L.Q. beration :t