CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES JANUARY 1972

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000200220001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 84
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
WASHINGTON POST
? 2 November 1971
? Co inmunique
'Hints Softer
Cuban Line
By Dusko Doder
Washington Post Staff Writer
HAVANA, Nov. 1?Cuba
and the beviet Union today,
made public a communique
expressing their support for
the leftist regimes in Chile
and Peru as well as for other
Latin American governments:
seeking political and economie ;
independence from the United
States.
The communique was inter-
preted by some senior West-
emn diplomats here as in-',
dicating that Soviet Premier
Alexci Kosygin, who ended.
his four-day visit to Cuba Sat-
urday, has persuaded Premier
Fidel Castro to abandon his
policy of trying to exp or t
armed revolution around Latin
Ameriea.
. This would formally mark a
'inajor departure in Cuban poli-
cy, although some. Cuban offi-
cials expressed reservations
about the extent to which Hay-
titi baCittl Moitcow'a effortii to
court Latin regimes regardless
.of their political complexion.
? Published in the Cuban
Communist Party newspaper
G ran m a, the communique
voiced support for Panarna's
demands for sovereignty over
the Canal Zone, condemned
the U.S. trade blockade of
Cuba and "acts of piracy" and
vio1ation:3 of Cuban airspace
as well as what it termed the
"illegal U.S. presence at Guan-
tanamo" naval base.
It made only passing refer-
ence to tile revolutionary situ-
ation in the hemisphere that
"inereasin ;ly confronts with
greater strength the domina-
tion of North American imper-
ialism an i oligarchies allied
with it.
"In thit context," the 'corn-,
munique continued, "the two
sides exp .essed their solidar-
ity with the government of
Popular t nity led by Salvador
Allende ill Chile and with the
structural changes and trans-
formation whieh the govern-
ment of P ru is carrying out.
"Likewi e the two ,parties
expressed their resolute sup-
port for economic and social
measures which are being ap-
plied in tlese Latin American.
countries that are moving to-
ward the distribution of their.
riatIonel .vealth and tewerd
consolidation of their political
and econo rile independence," ?
Cuban Economic Problems
Western diplomats here said
that Castro, who is now more
.depeedent on Soviet aid than
ever before, has chosen to ac-
cept the Moscow line because
of his preoccupation with do-
mestic economic problems.
The diplomats said that the
Cubans have practically ceas-
ed exporting revolution in the
past two years, although they
were reluctant .to admit it
publicly.
Today's communique stands
in sharp contrast to Cuba's po-
sition in 19674968, when Cas-
tro contended that any eco-
nomic or other cooperation
with non-Communist regimes
in Latin America' in fact
helped suppress revolutionary
movements in the hemisphere.,
Castro was also against
Communist parties' forming
united fronts with nationalist,
groups in order to weaken1
America's position, a policyl
advocated by Moscow.
Earlier Visit
Differences on this point
were such that no commu-
nique was issued after Kosy-
gin's first visit to Cuba In,
1967.
?But last week the Soviet
premier was received warmly!,
and the communique described'
his conversations with Castro
as "friendly and cordial." It
asserted that both men "af
firmed their mut iial aspiration
to continue strenethening and
developing by all means that
fraternal friend: hip" between
the two nations.
Iensygin said the Soviet
Union would continue to er?
tend aid to Culei, but there
were no specific references In
any additional subsidies.
Cuba's acceptance of the So-
viet line is said to have been
based on a gullying feeline
here that Havana Is slowly
breaking the diplomatic 'sole-
tion Imposed by the United
States.
Peru Link Expected
? In ? addition to diploniatle
ties with Mexico and Chile,
Cuba has, a lure trading of-
fice in Peru. Cuban ?Ukiah; I
-here said that a formal estah-
lishment of diplomatic rein!
tions between Tiavana and 1
Lima is expectrd within the
?next few weeks.
Cuban sources also said that
Kosygin has reresured Castro
?that the Soviets will make no I
,deals with President Nixon nt
'Cuba's expense. These sources
,said that Castro hi turn sought
, to impress upon the Soviets
that any such deal would be
usiacceptabic to his regime.
? While the communique was
largely devoted to generalities
.111(51at Gu?..Avla
IZVESTIYA, Moscow
24 November 1971
CPYRGHT
torrinfinnnt IIi9 It reinrin
only a passing reference to
China, with both sides ex-
pressing satisfaction over Pe-
king's admission lo the United
Nations.
SOLIDARITY WITH CUBA
[Text] It can be said without exaggeration that the visit to Chile of Fidel Castro,
Cuban Communist Party Central Committee first secretary and Cuban Revolutionary Govern-
ment prime minister, has become the number one event in the current political life of
Latin America. One has only to glance at the front pages of the leading newspapers
of the countries of this continent to be convinced that the warm reception accorded
by the Chilean people to the emissaries of heroic Cuba is being appraised not only
as a demonstration of the feelings of fi.lendship of the two countries' peoples but
also as a new stage in the relations between revolutionary Cuba and the other Latin
Ameri
d Fr Ftelb* 141 itTle difie2R002%2611194ACHT020022000114Vr
EL PO "Ogled, means clef n co apse.of Cuoa s solation from the continent and
I s a wtimulus for the intensification of the liberation process in these countries."'
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000200220001-0
Moreover the response evoked by the visit is proof of the acknowledgement of the
revolutionary merits of the Cuban people and of their successes in building the founda-
tions of socialism, for socialism is being developed in Cubit under the difficult and
complex conditions of an economic and political blockade imposed by U.S: imperialism.
For more than 7 years Cuba has been artificially isolated from the other Latin American
countries, and, as F. Castro has repeatedly stressed on previous occasions and 'during
his visit, had it not been for the vast aid and support of the Soviet Union and the
other socialist countries, Cuba would have had to face its bitterest enemy alone. But
4uba_was..not-left-alaney-and-all-the-armed4 Tom vadatt dhg-iiiid'intii4entrairoWiiiGf 16;d " ? "
failure.
Tod?y it can be said that Washington's entire political policy with regard to Latin
America is also suffering failure. Cuba's revolutionary influence, as the imperialist
strategists had feared, has broken through the blockade and shown other countries the
way to national independence and freedom from the U.S. diktat and from domination of
their economies by the North American monopolies. A vivid example of this is the
victory of the Popular Unity bloc in Chile, the progressive social and economic reforms
in Peru, and the upsurge of the revolutionary movement in many countries of this
truly turbulent continent. There is no doubt that Cuba's successes had a considerable
effect on the development of events in Chile, where public opinion has always beer
sympathetically inclined toward the heroic island of freedom.
It is characteristic that the bourgeois press, unable to keep silent about F. Castro's
visit to Chile and the interest shown by the Latin American countries in it is trying
to dictate to them what policy they should pursue in the future with regard to Cuba.
American newspapers and news agencies, as if by arrangement, reiterate that the
Organization of American States (OAS) must "display firmness and inflexibility," in
other words, ignore Cuba as hitherto. Such advice nowadays seems naive, to say the
least, but the main thing is that it is useless, for everyone is well aware that
throughout Latin America the movement to establish diplomatic and other relations
with Cuba is broadening and many counries are already on the way to doing it, and
the Cuban Government's opinion of the OAS as an obedient weapon of U.S. imperialism
.is widely shared.
The Soviet people follow Fidel Castro's visit to Chile with great interest.. The
USSR, a true friend of Cuba, has always been.on its side, has done everything tq
support its socialist achievements, and has always rejoiced in its successes and
the growth Of its political prestige in the world. This is why the present visit is
regarded in our country as yet another proof of the tremendous magnetic force of
socialism,. which is Strengthening the unity of the Latin American peoples and their
solidarity in the struggle against imperialism and reaction. .
CPYRGHT
MIAMI HERALD
15 November 1971
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ByNATHAN A. HAVERSTOCK
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CPYRGHT
.
iyo-
0
oi,aces anu to ccallengii U.n. ledoer.hlp
in the hemisphere.
Castro's brief stop in Lima, and his
meeting with General Juan Velasco Ah
varado, head of Pru's military juntl, is
THE VISIT 01 Cupan' eremier rice
Castro to Chile isviewed in Washington
'as; the scan: Apt' an atterutrbz
forge a newPiPirAWAtelx117 rISMea
-in, opposition to the United, States.
iy soilmiyms
government and that o, Salvador Al-
lende. his Marxist counterpart in Chile,
hoes to sot up a base that other
no nationalist governments can
.Castxo
.leftist
SOW
140
irvIrgiiiikiritsist61944tiovAtIlbottiNi dli-ecticin:
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CPYRGHT
* SOME authorities believe. that the
Soviet Union is lending its active en-
couragement to. the Cuban' initiative.
' eeeeo,t et: ! neee.O
? \ 'The failure of Cuban-led
guerrillas in, Bolivia,
and Allender} !egUirn cite
electoral victo;-y
have g rerz:ly sirc,q1;_;t1ieized ?
the Sovf posifiou
. . ? rze:azezmeeoLee:tieeri:eio:;:eiee, oee
One such expert, James Theberge of the'
Georgetown University Center. for Stra-
tegic and International Studies, recently
noted that "The Soviet Union and Cuba
are both interested in gaining allies out-
side of the Caribbean area ? whiCh is
'still generally friendly to the United
States. ? in 'order to enable Cuba to
break out of the diplomatic and econom-
ic blockade imposed by the OAS mem-
ber states in 1964. And the Marxist gov-
ernment of Chile is .providing such en
opportunity.".
Theberge emphasizes that Allende is
a willing ally in the Cuban diplomatic
thrust. "Allende clearly aims at estab-
lishing a broad foreign policy re-align-
ment in favor of Cuba, Russia and other
"friendly Socialist states!' .agairise the
United States, Brazil and other members'
of the OAS opposed to a policy change
toward Cuba. The purpose is to .solit the
OAS into antagonistic political blocks,
end Cuba's political .and economic isola-
tion and enhance Communist and anti-
American influence in the hemisphere." .
IN RECENT months, Castro has re-
peatedly denounced the OAS, and has
rejected all suggestions that Cuba might
eventually return to active membership
in the Organization: Most recently,
Cuban foreign minister Raul Roe celled
the OAS "the colonial ministry of the
U.S. State Department," and said his.
government would never consider reoc-
cupying its OAS seat.
Instead, Roa suggested, a new hemi-
sphere organization, free from U.S. dom-
ination, should be set up in the near fu- -
ture. Presumably, such an organization
would also exclude Latin .America's
right-wing iniiitary governments.
Jt.is believed by observers here that
the Soviet Union ? is encouraging the
Cuban initiative because it seems to ad-
here to the Soviet line that peaceful pen-
- etration- of Latin America is possible.
The new Cuban stance represents a
sharp change in the previous Cuban sup-
port for anti-government guerilla move-
ments in Latin America. The failure of
Cuban-led guerrillas in Bolivia,. and Al-
lende's legitimate electoral victory in
Chile have greatly strengthened the So-
viet position in Latin America. .
SOVIET influence, has been rising
noticeably in Chile since Allende's victo-
ry. The Soviets have offered aid for
Chilean port ,development, and have ex-
tended a $50 million credit for the pur-
chase of arms. ,Cultural missions have
.anrled out across the country, teaching
Russian and presenting Soviet-films :atici
literature.
There has also been a marked - in-
crease in the Soviet presence in Cuba
Soviet Premier Alexei Kosyein toured
the island last month. Cuba receiveti a
shipment of &via jet fieliters, its flirSt
shipment of planes in four years..TI he
Soviet naval presence has also under-
gone significant expansion. Some 20 to
30'deep ' sea fishing trawlers novi oper-
ate out of Havana, from facilities devel-
oped with Russian aid funds.
- The signs of rising' Soviet influence
are evident in several areas, according
to Washington sources, but the Soviets
nonetheless are expected to stay in the
background during Castro's visit to
Chile. A primary reason is that the trip
is something of a personal triumphal
tour for the Cuban. Premier. He has
come to South America es a celebrity
and the Chilean government has mount-
ed a celebrity's welcome.
U.S. officials are not worried, they
say, by the cheering crowds and the,
'mass enthusiasm for the bearded revolu-
tionary. Much more serious is the inten-
sive diplomatic campaign now being
launched by Cuban and 'Soviet repre-
sentatives, aimed at weaning away the
growing number of Latin governments
who show eigns of disaffection for the
United States.,
WASHINGTON STAR
9 Decea:ther 1971
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CPYRGHT
Castro's parting word
to Ch;11-e's Communist rulers
was a warning: The exploiters
are going to bag your revolu-
tion if you keep playing by the
old rules.
The ahem dictator put
aside, in a startling farewell
- speech, the tactful reticence
which bad guided his behavior
during a three-week visit to
Chile. He was leaving, he said,
"more radical, more extre-
mist" than he came because
he had seen how the Chilean
revolutionaries are being
thwarted by e_mistaken defer-
ence to democratic traditions.
AnachronlAPProVedif,or
Congress, frecaorn of the press
are doomed by history, Cas-
tro declared, aecl they "exist
as long as the: 7)cople do not
have enough s tir ength to
change them." Democracy. is
just a stage in the evolution of
man, he said, and its institu-
tions must crumble to make
roorn for the new social order.
Castro's key point was that
the Chilean oligarchy is wily
and experienced, so much
tougher than the opposition he
faced in Cuba that it may
manage, . if democratic free-
doms continue to be tolerated,
to win the ideological struegle
for the support of the middle
classes.
Ironically, he epte;e, of the
"brutal and batibe or es_forms"
Release499/9/0WG2 i.
day M whieh Chilean soldiers,
acting on orders from Presi-
dent Allende, used gims to ds-
parse a protest march by
some 5,060 'women carr?ing
empty pots. "Tho la5elAs,"
Castro said, "are trying to go
into the streets to win the mid-
dle classes."
Fidel is reviving an old and
bitter debate over the "peace-
ful road" to power. His claim
that force is the only alterna-
tive once angered most Chile-
an Communists, who saw huge
differences between the cul-
tures of Chile and Cuba. "Aft-
er all," Allende remarked five
years ago, "C a s tr o took..
charge of a brothel."
that the Alienk;..; r 'me ;Inds
few real answeys
limits of its critistitiorial pow-
er 10 an awest.,!-!, array of
economic ;orobichis.
The -indirect's:,
democratic let! :
proved to be clLfficilit. c4).
position can still be heard
through tee ter-7ity with
which the
El Mercurio, I. in kept
alive. Wheil the -..c.reramut,
recently moved COZ,trOi
of the newspriat ..,it.ccr5 the
stockholders rahie to .$UCCeed
in keeping the slot in private
har.ds.
But nevertheless, the Cohan The Marxists' at!,erripts to
exam:Au has consistently had 4'-i,. .M0?
CIA-
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an OnlinUELLS and it may he battled ;oy its rec: Dr. Ld-
gare..o Borniinger.
oven more persuasiVo mw
CPYRGHT
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en toe seninnciit necessy to
force a plebiscite to dciarmine
whether the University C3c.1
wili be. left, in Alarxisi Cohtrol.
Tho university...or.f.retemps,
now a burning riatior.id
illustrates Aliende's dilemma.
Hs Socialist backers, warn
that the plebiscite will go
against them so he must settle
the dispute by force. Sut the
price of the high-hantiness
will be widespread -violence so
the Com rr.unisti faction of his
government keeps pressing for
a couipromisc solution.
Castro has bistory On his
side in arguing that Marxists
, have, never kept power by
compromising with dernocra-
ey_ They resort always in the
end to the destruction of
pie and Institutions who. en
lenge ineir &ann.& 0 the loy&P y
of the working class.
So Chile is ineacitif: :
its ur.avoidable
of :faith in. its , .
ditfons that will exert a lieir.v
influence on the future of com-
munism in many:nations.
CPYRGHT
0 ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, Sao Paulo
24 October 1971
? ?
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0 V C.J1
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CPYRGHT
, Ai e!.01
u. pyi?:(..ii?o-teino:tro
atuaimente .passcan.
do no Cali, segairil,
atsnaracio urn "cc-
Vito Coraissilo C:ntral do
Partido pcmunista Cuban?
e rdo govcrno revolaciona-
rio -de Cuba" para ?srlstar
lina de Cabtro. Kajj foi
pre.cerlido e7.1
Latcrabro por
Novikoff, rice-presi-
dente do Conf.A-lho dr., Minis-
tr 0 s cl a URS. No fin: co
rmlls chezard a Cuba ama
r.ora-tarela da Marinha
Guerra sovictica, icy:mark,
par seis navios, entre ()S.
qUaIG 0i:11402C:3 ,arillaCi 03
corn fl);UCt.Cf3 0 cicstroleres,
bera con Dor sulona-
71110S, flaViOS an ti-Stib
inn navio- do a.habte-
clmento. Esaa (lemon.raci;r,
In a C 'kV.. do Interesso. don so-
vleticoa era Cuba con firma,
por urn lade, a opinil-,o don
observadores intcrnacionals,
setando a u al ILA, algurn
tempo Moscon resolv,n; fill .1)-
motor a, politica, a -cconornia
o
memo a administrayao
regime castrista a ou cnn-
trolo dlreto rigid; por
.outro lado, intensifica as es-
peculactles E6bre o clestiLo
politico do "chefs supremo
da ravoluio cabana".
0 jornal 'fiempo, de IA-
.
ern nc.LIO
V11 VOlt 111(rC,; ter..17)
!ii
;401 thi?I'.,Approvec
?,?,.?.,
:?,)6?;cou. quo
,conast;ula subrovivor aos ox-
pargon castristas. quo ap6s
1062 dmarnm a Vona
Guarda do PC cubano. As es-
TreculacZ5es tamban sho all-
mentadan polo tato do ft. vi-
olin tin Kow.igin a, Tlavana
prcocdor a s;;;;-:.?,,I,
to 'Lento()
?tro no Chili.. C'-',"o
j.ava .jr,JLi, ir r,I.;I:,}I-.1i
31:111Cip:11
. 1.o de n alo e!r!
r,o, confirm:.ndo . saa inja-
gem co:no o Eder ineontes-
tado do mo-imento
olonario da America Lati-
ns. Todavia, duranto todo o.
zner, on .russon
cxerceram p)sadas press64n
r7Obro o lidor cubano por
ttrrn:zdto do Carlon Rafael
Ro4r5.7ucz, I.aul Castro o
N'icclay Eay)akov, vice-pri-
ntoiro-mlnint.o o presidento
do GOSPLAN, QUO vlsitou
7.-Tart.na, Dar% convencer Can-
tro dr. COD.7011ncz de'desit7.-
ttr do ctun DIV.7105. UM nstu-
to lider. coriunisto. chtleno,
Te telboint,
con a Cr.(str? quo tnarIt
orsCi1, a: tor de. v!an'era
do Allende. ",
;77(ina(.7.or ro Peru, serfs.
Dolltira extor-
na 7,11 br.to to-
ola do "plumlismo idcoIor;l-
eo" r.-? do co nbate tr. "fron-
2t1rft."; idcolsgicas". r,fltarA,
Cantro rend( cubmctido
noval prorsref... parr. desintir
da num clecirao ir a San-
tiaro? Ntio 'ar?aze s' part
torutr: trlibztitule.o, du-
rant TIFLA`Cril, for Raul
Castro cu ptr Carlon Rafael
Rodruer.1'On terneria ter
relor:ado um panel /nail
rtpar,:e.do lide.ranqa, con-
formo augenra alr-,urs seto- it ilha.rldIrt?Irrinados
.d.r;
Flocls.:;7ta SrlIvrdor Al-
lende? De qualquer forma,
'as enpecu1ac,.(5en don
vador,ea intornacionain s()bro
sr. politica interns. .de Cubs.
tno Tarladars o fantasio-
sas como as cue so fazern 56-
bro a China. Dcsdo 27 471s so-
tornbri), Castro .n.r.1.0 apart,-
? em publico,-tem mosmo
no funeral don quo tornl)a-
ra!rn na luta contra cs
dos desombarcadon rta noite
de 12 de outubro. Erse fate
05timulm ai r,gpnculacd^.s st)-
bre Feu estado de !Iambs e o.
declinlo num estrela no-
? 'Man ouk itruort.r.
realidade rao,?cula-
c5es ere torno da realidad.o.
0 fate (5 a c7esconte deport-
.d'ancla-e.e. Cuba do .controle
cod: 7C7.rni rigido e dire-
to quo cla cxerce Mos-
COU. 1 conscquenciaii-
tate, 4 a ro,luclo do papel
do liticranca, quo, corn ba-
se cm ce,a carisr.r.a, .Catro
0 cornunics.de
russo-cubano ? publicado no
c'ius Ilaul
o c;i?s,nc..?ler Cazt,l'o,
no rim