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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 25X1C10b Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 December 1971 CHILE'S DETERIORATING ECONOMY 1. Chile's growing economic problems were acknowledged by Allende himself in his first anniversary speech on 4 November. Although the bulk of the speech was devoted to claims of the government's material accomplishments, Allende did note a number of the problems. He admitted there were scarcities of food and consumer goods, that mining production was off and that miners' wages would be tied to gains in production. In foreign economics he said his goverment was the 'Snort heavily indebted in the world" on a per capita basis. Five days later Allende announced that the Popular Unity government would seek to renegotiate Chile's huge foreign debt of some $4 billion and tried inaccurately to blame Chile's current-.balance-of -payments crisis on economic mis- management by previous administrations and "unilateral actions" by the U.5. government. 2. The real reason for this crisis in the Chilean economy lies in the fact the Allende government has continued expansion- type policies contrary to its own Central Bank recommendations that it curtail deficit spending (now estimated at thirty per cent of government expenditures), raise prices charged by nationalized enterprises, allow pr. ices on luxury goods to rise, reassure private investors and devalue the escudo to stimulate exports and reduce imports. 3. When the Allende government took over one year ago, Chile's foreign reserves amounted to almost $400 million, but because export earnings from the nationalized copper industry have declined, food import requirements have increased and foreign lines of credit have dried up, these reserves have now plunged to just above $100 million. a) Large-scale foreign aid and credits during the past decade sharply increased Chile's external debt (to approxi- mately $2.3 billion), with the heaviest repayments scheduled during the next few years (an average $330 million annually during 1971-1973). Nevertheless, Chile could have covered its debt service obligations if copper production had increased by some forty per cent as it was expected to do under the U.S. companies' expansion program. b) Instead, the nationalized mine operations have suffered from inefficiency, absenteeism and a lack of labor discipline, and therefore the actual increase has been only a little over four per cent. This, combined with a twenty-two per cent drop in international copper prices, has reduced the expected copper export earnings by about one-half billion dollars, with indications the gap will b~:;? even greater in 1972. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 c) The administration's agrarian reform policies, with resulting shortfalls in agricultural production, have led to a sharp rise in import reQuirements. There have been wide- spread embarrassing shortages of food and other consumer goods imports in spite o#: more than double the 1970 foreign exchange expenditures for these very items. d) Chile's inability to meet its foreign debt obligations is also a result of the Allende administration's radical policies and the subseQuent decline ~n Chile's credit rating. Foreign lines of credit have dried up and few new loans have been extended. The Communist loans have all been tied to specific projects and cover purchases of goods and services only from the creditor country. 4. Likewise, basic facts and figures belie Allende's alle- gation that U.S. "unilateral actions" are in part responsible for his country's foreign exchange crisis. The U.S. ten per cent surcharge affects only 5.7 per cent of Chile's exports to the United States and less than 0.7 per cent of its total. exports. Although U.S. economic aid was substantial in the early years of the Frei government, it was reduced to less than $25 million in 1970 because of Chile's high copper earnings and rapidly increasing foreign reserves. Since no new aid projects were scheduled for 1971, the aid cut-off has little economic effect. S. Allende also erred when he claimed that Chile's per capita external debt is the world's highest. Cuba has the highest foreign debt: $3.3 billion or $390 per capita as compared to Chile's $2.3 billion or $250 per capita. Furthermore, Chile might well bear in m~.nd that ninety per cent of Cuba's debt is with the Soviet Union, a~~factor which has limited Cuba's freedom of action in both the economic and political spheres. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 ~~~~~~~~~~g 199.9/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 .~ cto er 1971 CPYRGHT 1'~1HE international politics A or extracting ,natural resources is rarely tranquil, and the case of Chilean cropper may yet rival bhe oil of the Middle East for intrigue and complications. Besides the main adversaries, Chile and the United; States, the French arc peri~jherally involved 'and the Soviet Union has plaYCd a fascina- ting if sa far limited role. The US Government came iuto conflict with Chi)e when President Allende made clear that in nationalising copper lie did not intend to pay American-based cotrtpanics anything like what t)tey felt vvas the value of their hold- ings. Senor Allende announced this intention the day that Congress unani- znously approved the Constitu- tional amendment enabling nationalisation. On what is now known as " the Day of \Tational Dignity," July 11, Senor Allende accused the com- panies Anaconda and Kenne- cott ~af havin.g misritanaged the copper mines and taken out excess profits. To sustain the mismanagement charge he referred exclusively and exhaustively to investiga- t.ions by a French firm "~of indisputable prestige " as well as by a Soviet team. Ewer Senor AlIende's resumd of those studies gave a picture ~of bum?bling and breed by the companies that would cost Chile dearly in its future development of the topper mines. An eager -press was told that the French and Soviet ,~~tudies would not ?be made Public. The team of the I~`rench il2ining Society - in vvhich the French 'Govern- rnent has a majority holding -- had departed iuithout leav- ing a .copy with lts gown P~.mbassy. But secret -papers are a't lcas~t as vulnerable in .Santiago as In Washington, ~a.nd the French report was passed to the Opposition newspaper " iVlercurio." The All~rc~~ii~r~~lease 199/~`i~t't`~~~'~,~~~~-0119~1~~`~t~t~n~~~t znin,ec om tie repo ocu- t o iii, ~- o went, i~t had undergone satisfaction in the role played to be delivered. by tlto Soviet study in atflic- ting the American com- panies, the Communists must have been perplexed by what .happened next. On Tuesday, Senator Frank Church (Democrat, Idaho) revealed that at the very moment when the Soviet experts' report was being used against the companies in July, Mr Iiosygin was propos- ing that the companies should extract copper from Siberia. The Soviet study had said "The decision taken by the Chilean Government to carry out total nationalisation of the big copper companies and the creation, in this way, of a State direction of copper activity, is a transcendental step in the task of organising copper Production . . ' But Mr Kosygin was tell- ing David Rockefeller, of the Chase 1lnanhattan Bank, that American companies could come in alone in association with Soviet teams to thine the copper, anct could ta':c their pay in the copper itself. i~'or Chile, such a develop- ment would mean contpcti- tian for major export, and a possible immediate effect on the already weakened price of copper. 1t also suggested that the Soviet expcri had not found the ,perfort~t::r~cc I;~? the American cotnpat~tes so deplorable after all. The next day, the Chilean Minister of Mines said there was piers ,y of room in the market for everybody, and added that Chile's Ambassa- dors in Washington and 1los- cow vverc asking for more ini'ormation. D In Washington i4Ir Itoget~s let it be known over the weekend that the US is pre- pared to invoke the so-called Hicl.enlooper Amendment if Chile persists in its re~Fasal to compensate the copper com- panics. Pf that happened - .and it would be the first time that the US had used the special Bowers voted by Con- gress iq 1964 - it would mean that all direct Ameri- can aid and some aid given through international organisations to Chile would be cu't off. At the moment Chile is expecting same $20 millions of US aid that is now in the pipeline On top of that . compendium of criticism and wish to cut all market and there is another six or seven praise of the mines. If Senor credit ties with tite United milllion dollars in food aid severe refining. The use made of the >'rench report has become an issue in Paris as well ?as in Santiago (no one has denied the authenttcrty ~of the " Mercurio " text), and it it understood that this will be the last such undertaking by .the French tl4ining Society. In the partisan press it was suggested that the French 'experts were :few and were at the mines barely a month, and their firm was not all that expert in topper anyway. At this point, the Com- munist Party paper, "' El Siglo," published the text of the Soviet 5nvestigation of the mines. It was highly Critical of the past perform- ance Hof the American com- panies and many ~of the Presi- ilent's denunciations seem to have come directly from it. So d~i~d tike C=overnrznent's. case to the Comptroller for su~btra~cting m'vlPions of dolilars from the book value o'f the mines because of adlegcd nl~isma~na,~ement. The Opa~osibion press sug- gested that the Soviet Cxpcrts, who t'hemsclves ~verc at the mines less than a m~on't:n, tack most of that time owercom7ng the language !barrier'~and the rest pirating ideas from the A~me>'tcan machinery far application at home. " El Stila " saw the report as saving C'hille in the nick of time :by the a~p!p~lica- tion of superior Soviet tech~ nolo';^y. In any case, on Ociaber it the Comp~trolle~r issued his finding That tlrr anajor Anacon?da arrd l~ennecoft ho'idings fell -far short of deservirng any indemnity whatever. ~~~ract The American Secretary of State, il'Ir Rogers. hinted at ~e~conom~ic reprisals, and the Chilean Government in turn threatened measures to Counter ,any fitreign interfer- encc. To unany Cihileans and Americans it soun'de'd like fhe start o'f the Cwban sequence 12 years aigo when Fidel Castro took over American interests amd turned to iVloscow after US sanctions. There are Communists in the Allende Government who NEW YORK TIA~S 2g ~~~'~v~c~~~or Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 CPYRGHT c?~?~.~c ~'ri~~s ~~ ~h~Ie SANTIAGO, Chile, Oct. 28- . n ec nom political implications is being grudgingly recognized as a reality by Chile's left-wing Government, as well as by Opposition parties and business sectors. President Salvador Allende Gossens, in a sometimes angry talk to heads of Government departments recently, said that without a greater sense of re- sponsibility in public 'manage- ment "we are headed for an irremediable failure in the short run." Luins Corval~, secretary gen- eral of the Communist party, which forms part of Mr. Al- lende's Popular Unity coalition, said there were signs that Chile's revolutionary regime was losing public support. The National Council of the Christian Democratic party, Chile's major Opposition force, declared after a weekend meet- ing called to analyze the politi- cal situation that Chile faced "the worst economic crisis in her history." Businessmen Pessimistic An assembly here of busi- nessmen and industrialists from all over Chile found prospects for the survival of private enter- prise very uncertain even in areas that Dr. Allende has said should remain outside of state ownership. The speakers who drew the most applause at a meeting of Chile's Confederation of Com- merce and Production were those calling on businessmen and workers who do not want to be state employes want to "political action" against the establishment of a full Marxist regime. The recent signs of official concern over the political con- sequences of the economic crisis grow out of some situa- tions of which the public has been aware for some time and' of others that are perceived mainly by technical analysts. Economic stress is most ap- parent in the shortages that have developed in some con-; Sumer goods. The problem is discussed constantly here in markets, in homes and on buses, and is a daily topic in the Opposition newspapers .and; in radio commentaries. The shotages are most; noticeable in markets. Beef is A p~ r~~-e dl ~ c~ ~ e ~e its month and poultry :.ud c~;hs are ently not to be found. Dai products and canned goo s are often missing from; stor shelves. Supplies of cloth; hav been irregular since tex- the ills were nationalized. Black Market Is Busy ere are many signs of black, mar et operations. Chickens and ggs are delivered at homes in he wealthier districts at pric s well above .those set by the rice control agency. Small dre makers .and producers of met 1 goods are paying well abo a official prices for supplies the obtain from middlemen wh have access to unregulated sou ces. rlier this year, after the Go ernment authorized wage inc ased of 40 to 60 per cent an put controls on the prices of ost consumer goods, Chi- les swent on a buying spree. is was a period of great po larity for Dr. Allende and his coalition. In April, Popular Un y candidates won nearly 50 er cent of the votes cast in mu icipal elections, well above; -the 36.3 per cent won by Dr,~ Alt nde in the Presidential elec-~ do of September, 1970, in a! thr a-way race. e`Government's attempt to fro prices down is now under se re pressure because of in- fla ionary money, wage and ere it policies that have been fol wed since November. The m ey supply has risen 75 per ce t since December and the Go ernment has an enormous de cit. The official cost of liv- in index shows a 14 per cent ris in prices during the first ni months of the year, but thi is not regarded as an ac- cu ate reflection of the price sit anon, nor of the growing pr ssures. mong these is a dificit in th balace of payments ?that m reach $200-million by the' en of the year. Lust year Chile' ha a favorable balance of $132- mi lion he immediate effect is a new pu h by labor for wage in- cr ases. Dr. Allende flew today to the nationalized copper mi es at Chuquicamata and El 5a vador, formerly owned by; A aconda, the United States m ing company, to try to talk th 'workers out of demanding, a 0 per cent raise this year. r; Allende has disclosed that th cost of producing copper in 19 /0'9~1-~2 ".a~:?~'i~'-~b~l -01r ~ `l 0~30~020Pa'~"~az1 CPYRGHT ,May has risen to an average of 47 cents a pound. The intcrna- tional market price is 49 cents ~a pound. i This leaves Chile with a very marrow profit margin from cop- per exports, which account for 80 per cent of foreign income 'and a major part of Govern- ment revenues. Recent elections in student associations, some unions, and professional groups have been lost by candidates identified with Popular Unity. Two By-Elections Due The death of a Christiana Dernocr:itic Senator last weeks and the departure for Australia of a Federal Deputy for the Opposition National party will offer a new opportunity in January for voters to express' their preferences between Popu-? lar Unity candidates and thel ';Opposition. These by-elections will be in the senatorial district covering the provinces of O'Higgins and Colchagua and' ~in Linares. Both districts have been the scene of rural violence this spring in which radical revolu-. tionary groups, particularly thr; Revolutionary Peasant Move-~ ment led by pro-Cuban stu- dents, have been invading .properties not taken over by 'repdiated violent seizures and asked patience while large properties are taken over under the reform program. Further south, in cautdin province, one of a group of Mapuche .Indians who invaded la farm was killed by the owner in a gun fight last week. The farm owner's nephew was critically wounded. Twenty-two persons are under arrest in the latest of a serious of incidents involving violence over land seizures in recent weeks. This rural violence is another factor that perturbs the Popular Unity coalition. Dr. Allende has repudiated violent seizures and asked for patience while large properties are taken oven under the reform program. But the Government has shown little initiative in arrest- ing the radical activists who push these invasions, partly,bc- cause the Socialist party in the governing coalition is demand- ing more political militancy,. asking, for example, that the :present Congress, now con- A'c~,YIF~'~e~~salse 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 1 Novem er 1 1 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT SANTIAGO, 'RTOV. 9-Presi-i dent 5alvadar Allende an- nounced today that Chile will call in .its creditors to renego- tiate $3 billion in foreign debt, over half of which is owed to the United States. Blaming the debt service crisis on the borrowing poll- cies of past governments, Al- lende said his year-old govern- ment "has resolved to renego- tiate the external debt with the abject of satisfying adequate- ly the interests of the country and its creditors." The $3 billion figure does not include another $728- mil-~ lion in debts accrued by the. government when it national- ized American-based copper companies. tyhile Chile in- tends to pay no indemnization for the major mines, it has in-'! dicated that most of their in- herited debts. would be hon- t ored. Allende made the announce- ment on television and later at a news conference dominat- ed by the one story absorbing all of Chile's press-the ar- rival Wednesday of Cuban pre- ~ mier Fidel Castro. Chile has the world's highest per .capita debt along with Israel, according to Allende,! and recent economic difficul- ties have made its renegotia- tion widely expected. Indeed, the more militant wing of Allende's Socialist Party includes many members who have called for repudi- ation of the debt. i But Allende chose the con.l ciliatory stand of negotiation.? He put it this way: j "'i'he government under- stands that any state, in ex-' ~Ci~~~~~~ ~Y ~~~~s else of its sovereignty, cant a cl oug~~t. to talce measures.; t nding to protect its develop-? ent and level of living of its' p ogle. The United States, to c nfront its own balance of p ,yment crisis, has adopted u ilateral measures with this a the object. "The government of Chile,' n vertheless, prefers not to use at approach" Thus, he said, Chile asks the c editors to negotiate to per- i s of payment and to con- s lidate the debts. Attende referred to numer- o sprecedents for the action, i eluding renegotiations ''by a 1968 by Peru. However,, ru at that time was on1y~ a le to renegotiate about 30 p r cent of its outstanding, d bt. Negotiations of this type u wally are drawn out and a e seldom satisfactory to the d bt-ria'r]en country. Frequent- ] the result is that the debt. i extended but the interest c arges are increased. Iowever, bankers point out t at given the widely held view: t at Chile might repudiate its d bt, the d5sposition to negoti- a emight find the lenders also f rthcoming. An official in the S. ATD mission termed Al- l ode's statement as concilia- t ry. An official ;overnment ac- c unting at the end of last y ar put the debt at $2.8 bil- l n, not including private d bt. Of that, about $550 mil- l n was in AID loans, $335 illion in export-import Bank 1 ins and $.400 million in lend= i g by private U.S. institu-! t' ns to the Chilean govern- ~ ent. 'Phere a;?e several precedents f r the A~ renogatiating debts of this. sort, and a Chilean opposition leader just back from New York said he found the private banks there disposed to take the same position. Among the reasons Allende gave for Chile's difficulties were the closing of credit lines on the order of $190 million be- cause of failure to meet oblit;a- tions by the private Edwards Bank .here. The, bank- denies -this allegatioa. Allende wore his most serf- ous expression during his ex~ position of the debt situation, but he lightened up on the' question of Castro's visit. After arrival on Wednesday, the? Cuban leader is to leave Friday for the northern de- Bert to visit copper and nitrate mines. Ile then will turn south to Concepcion, center of the steel industry and home of the most radical student groups calling for violent revolution -Allende pointed out care- fully that while he admires greatly the Cuban revolution it is not the same as that desired here. Finally, Castro is to go> by boat through the channels of the extreme Chi- lean south to the city of Puntal Arenas on the Straits of Magel-'; lan. Allende is an old friend of Castro and the. entire left of this ever more leftist country considers itself to be a friend equal.iy. Although Allende had de- clared last Thursday that he would submit to congress to- day his~proposai for amending the constitution so as to re- place -the bicameral congress with a one?house body, he failed to put that bill in. It ap- parently got cost in the rush to prepare for Castro. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 3 CPYRGHT ,prrclglgr Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-CPYRGHT 10 October 1971 ran king economic o :cia President Salvador Allende Gossens's Government re- cently took part in a semi- nar for lawyers discussing the technical ways and means of expropriation in Chile. The official apologized to the lawyers for his lack of legal expertise, but he as- sured them of one thin;: the motivation behind every im- portant economic decision by Chile's Marxist-oriented Gov- ernment is political. That may be true in any country, but in Chile the pol- itics are socialist and the economy is still capitalist. As the country approaches its first anniversary under Marx ist management, the Chilean economy is an odd amalgam of relatively high employ anent and consumer short- ages, price controls and infla- tion struggling to get away, high consumer spending and rapidly falling reserves of foreign exchange. To understand the some, times confusing picture of ah economy in transition from 'capitalism to socialism with. ill a traditional legal frame- work, it helps to bear in mind the political uses of economic policy. President Allende's Admin- istration has used economic policy to make its electorate happy with more money to spend, as well as to destroy the economic power base of its political enemies in bank- ing, textiles and farming. It has declared its independence from ',.he United States, thb "imperialist enemy" that was once the prime source of Chile's foreign credit and capital, by making it clear that little or no compensa- tion will be paid for Ameri- can equity in nationalized copper interests. The Government has raised wages, held prices, national- ized banks, farms, textile rinills prid other plants all by 1-.sing existing; 1eg;isl Lion and the pressuro power of org,un- camp.iniCs in fivo _copper ici;isiation - a spceia1 con- sliuhlianal aniondment w,hs 1ia51.ild un nimously in ; Cuii- gress do inatcd by the op- Chilean l bor and tax legis- lation an the.,strong discre- against i s 49 per cent inter-, est in th El Teniente copper tionalizcf. Companies that unions I d by a confedera- tion do mated by the Com- munist nd Socialist parLies. Presider Allende's coalition Govern nt. The other mem- bers of he coalition are the carry ba is, has been good- if the mpany involved is national (Telephone, and Tele- pany,. afd General Motors, First N tional City Bank, are on t e way out or looking for a wa out. Oil and pharmaceutical compani s, as well as Gen- eral El tric, ? General Tire, have stayed. - v .. v The Government,_ committed process, we have gotten such h uttingg socialism without s - ------------------- - Approved For ago banker. 'The profit mar- gin is. down,. but sales are up'll As a result'of this kind of policy, unemployment in the industrial, area centered in SanLia;o has fallen from 6.4 per cent last September to -4.8 per cent this month. Chile's limited industries are working at near capacity to ;supply consumers on a spend in1, spree, and production of the Economy, declared in may incrcasc by 10 per cent an interview last week. Us- this year. ing very cautious phrasing. Yet there has been little Mr. Vuskovic, talked about or no nc:w irvestruent. Agri- Government economic strat- cultural production has been egy at the end of his normal crippled by political uncer- ! working day. It was 9 P.M. tainty followed by t'be eti- The minister, a Marxist propriatior. of 1,400 farms for agrarian reform, and food im- ports have riser. by 60 per cent thus far this year., ? ? - The Society for Industrial Development, the Chilean couivaient of the National Association of Manufacturers economist without party af- filiation, said that he fore- saw two tactical changes within the same economic strategy for 1971. Wage in- creases well beyond inflation, used to rcdistributs ir,;:;,r:o vri11 prob,'r.,iy ;o this year , predicted in a technical re- rL'.hCatitfi n?"X1: yea;r, a;I,iiuu; in port dehverec to the Govern- incrcl;lyL'.s Will in 11.0 cii:,c f: it went last week that this year's below in.i~ction. lnvestrmc-rlt, budget deficit would be a virtyally nonexistent, will record 11-billion escudos, ($1.38-billion) or about one third of the budget. The same report estimated that foreign- Chile off 'i'rons the rest of the world the way the SovQet Union, Cuba and China had been, says no. "There is no possibility that Chile will declare a unilateral moratorium on her foreign debts unless a situation is created for us with no nor- mal renewal of credits and no new inputs of capital," Pedro Vuskovic, the Minister havej to be increased. irts of large-scale credits from the Soviet nion. But the Allende disclosures were ~e first significant mention of the 'Lull scope these credits. ' What the Chilean President did. not say his first state-of-the-nation address could rove more important than what he actually d say. This would certainly seem to be the case regard to his comment on issues invol . Or^a.'`- L e r u e ~ E3: tire ;.; 's ' ;c~ Dr. Allende did come back over and over the United States. Although he defended < file's nationalization of American copper , There were several disclosures of im again to the theme that his Marxist-oriented gmpanies and the decision to pay no direct gortanc: in his speech. government is embarked on a real revolu iI )mpensation, he sidestepped any reference o, He said he would submit to Conggress tion "by tze Chilean way" and that "road serious disagreement with Washington determined to push Chile along the road the issue. soon his long-promised proposal to set up a to socialism." unicameral legislature in. place of Chile s I present two-house Legislature. This proposal He made two references to the impending i aiiy problems Skirted has bee visit of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, but r. expected. , the references were short and generally At the same time Dr. Allende skirted many 4 He a;air, called for an increase in the f the problems his government feces-toe r.oncair.iutal. Approvea or a ease CHILE AID-SEESAW SEEN: RUSSIA UP, U.S. DOWN CPYRGHT ill- - 1. sci?.ure. o: land by 11::i1 E. S pcasa'Cts f rn Licuiariy in U.3x1e':i ,slit`'., the shortages of some consumer itao'is, including meat, which are; more pronounced, and the liar e?sea1e printing cf paper money to 'quit more purchaein; power into the hands of Chic;;ns, sreein here as a long-range infla- tic:iary factor. 3r, llilseorle d,id, howe=ver, come to grips with some of the current problems facing this nation on o-,ith t merica's Pacific_c,aast. _i r Al for .:[ of t.1L Wage wo' Meru in We na- tioi: .zad Ca~:ugice:rice, cc-peer mine in northern t'^ihile. Using tine forum o atiG+7,? wide address, he urged the miners to tone down their demands in line with the nation's economic needs. size of Chile's, carabianeros, police, so they' can more e: dive y cover r.+. . every part of the country. comment here following; the speech That Ile almost sounded like a law-and-order candi- date. Much of his nearly two-hour address was a rehearsal of Chile's prasser1L e: i .:omie position and what he regards as his overn- ;ni;nt's successful economic performance to date. 'He ticked o i one issue after another- incr ased industrial production, a major increase: in t:;e gross national product, louvered unemployment figures, a halving of the nation's inflationary spiral-to prove that conditions have improved in Chile dur- ing his first year in office. Revoa^utao iary athenie CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 18 NovAtPP Q- 1J For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 CPYRGHT PULP-PAPER INDUSTRY FIGHTS FOR FREEDOM Almost lost. amid the din and uproar sur? roundin the visit of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro is a battle between the government a.nd opposition here for control of Chile's pulp and paper industry. In the long run, the issue could prove the most crucial encounter yet between supporters of Marxist President Allende and the coalescing opposition forces. Moreover, Chile's tradition of pluralistic free press could be at stake. The whole affair centers around govern- ment efforts to buy control of the Com- naxiia vianufacturera de Papeles Cartones, the last remaining major pulp and paper manufacturer in private hands in Chile. To opponents of the government, the bid by Dr.; Ailende's government to buy up enough shares to get control of the firm, amounts to a major threat to freedom of the ^ress. The government denies that this is w case, but says that key industries in Chile iould be under state control-and pulp and ap' r is one of those industries. The concern among government oppo? tints is that a free press will be dificuit to :?2intain if it must rely on the government or newsprint supply. r`Je I"."~ ~;r , x?3a ',-.:tan > ?r -zap. E he government bid to purchase shares in .u Papalera, as the pulp and paper firm is lied, has net resistance on the local stock market, although the government is offering a premium for the shares - paying up to 4.2 cents per share, while the stock in recent weeks has been trading at about seven-tenths of 1 cent per share., it is estimated that the government now may hold about 15 percent of the total shares, having purchased some 5 percent in the first week of trading at the inflatcd price and Acquiring another 10 percent or so by ,default when it recently purchased controlling interests in most major banks here. Z', ork s in La Papalerzt have voted to oppose the government and are buying up shares themselves to keep the firm from passing into government hands. Moreover, the Christian Democrats have introduced a aroad constitutional amend- ment into the Congress that, among other tl 7n-,s, would have the effect of nu lifying tie government's of shares in 11i r'apalera. Christian Democratic Sen. Juan a.ri l`on s; id the amendment wet~'d require 5.. "J"iTyrfi~v.:_?-!1.^. vet ~4i1 t r purchased if the amendment passes and be- comes a part of the constitution. The government's action in La Papelera case becomes all the more critical because of other recent d::velopments here. This week, Chile's major news magazine, the respected #rcilla, ,announced that it would soon appear on nevasprint rather than the special imported glossy stock it has used for years. The magazine has blamed the government-controlled firm which prints the magazine for not maintaining an ad- equate supply of the imported paper, despite a contract. The opposition also points to the recent reassignment of radio frequencies which' last week resulted in the shutting down of. Radio Balmaceda for most of a day. The station belongs to the Christian Democratic Party. The Radio Balmaceda frequency was given a new station representing a Com- munist-controlled labor union, while Balma- ceda was assigned a less desirable fre- quency. There is some evidence that the shutting down of Radio 3almaeeda for the day may have been a mixup on the part of the gov- ernment. VJilile some opposition forces are prepared to accept the government's com- ment on the situation, they point out that the incidents, however, came at a bad time not to arouse suspicion. Approved For Release 1999/09/022: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 25X1C10b Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 -MAUAU~71 UM December 1971 SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE QUESTION OF POWs On 28 October the South Vietnamese government announced that it was honoring National Day and the start of President Thieu's second term in office by releasing 618 Viet Cong prisoners now and 2,284 more over the next few months. Mr. Thieu's gesture, although dramatic, may not inspire the North Vietnamese regime to anything beyond the polemics which have historically greeted any initiatives on prisoner exchanges. Even recently, when Saigon bettered its previous POW offers by promising to send badly injured prisoners back to North Vietnam without a quid pro quo, Hanoi showed very little interest, It is hard to accept the possibility that this most recent Saigon POW initiative may meet the same fate as its predecessors. Hanoi is demonstrably sensitive to world opinion on the POW issue and surely realizes that the release of some 3,000 Viet Cong prisoners cannot be effectively answered by Communist denunciations of "fraud" and "a meaningless propaganda gesture," To be sure, Thieu coupled his humanitarian act with considerable tub-thumping.-- and why not? As The Economist's correspondent pointed out in this connection, "a gesture oesn t have to be ingenuous to be effective," Regardless of the benefits to the Saigon regime, however, the importance of the prisoner release cannot be ignored, nor can the weak and waspish Communist reaction be justified. Hanoi's waspishness, in fact, could be taken in some circles as an indication that her leadership recognizes the Thieu govern- ment's sense of security in carrying out such a prisoner release as well as the government's assurance in announcing a programmed succession of additional releases over the next few months. Saigon's demonstration of security and confidence is in the nature of a challenge and Hanoi's leaders, being no fools, may find it awkward to bypass the well-publicized release of Communist prisoners without a more closely equivalent response than polemics. What's more, each successive prisoner release by Saigon over the next few months could make Hanoi's position even stickier. North Vietnamese leaders must also find it increasingly awkward to ignore the generous offers of neutral nations to serve as temporary internment areas for North Vietnamese and U.S. POWs,. Austria, Cyprus, Norway, Sweden and Lebanon have all made such proposals recently and Lebanon then repeated its earlier proposal through the United Nations Political. Committee. There are signs that other neutral nations are likely to come forward with similar proposals for POW sanctuary in the near future. Each time such a Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 proposal has been made by a neutral country the U.S. has been quick to respond positively. Hanoi has not yet responded, Both Vietnam and the U.S., incidentally, were signatories to the 1949 Geneva Con- vention on POWs which specifically permits third-country internment. International accords aside, the Hanoi regime itself is remiss with regard to North Vietnamese troops fighting in South Vietnam. Despite its admonitions to the North Vietnamese people (Hoc Ta , July 1971) that "the policy towards the war invalids, demobilize service- men, families of the war dead and families of troops consists of constantly insuring that they are materially secure and spiritually happy," the regime falls short of practicing what it preaches. Should it seriously examine its own shortcomings, it might stumble upon some way of helping North Vietnamese fighting men who have been captured on South Vietnamese battlefields. The regime could start, for instance, with a response to Saigon's October POW initiative honestly aimed at securing the release and repatriation of at least a few hundred of the 9,000 North Vietnamese troops now incarcerated in South Vietnam. In this connection it might be profitable for North Vietnamese leaders to speculate on 66 of their North Vietnamese Army troopers who recently came to public attention in one of Saigon's six POW camps. It happened at the end of October when the South Vietnamese government permitted a group of foreign correspondents to tour Saigon's POW camp at Cantho in the Mekong Delta. When the visiting newsmen inquired about the makeup of the camp's 3,007 POW population, they learned that 66 of the prisoners were North Vietnamese Army troops who had been captured in South Vietnam., These 66 men, like the remainder of the NVA personnel in POW camps, can hope for release only by Presidential order, or through the type of POW exchange the North Vietnamese government seems unwilling to undertake, In discussions with newsmen on this possibility, members of the camp staff expressed the view that the North Vietnamese POWs would prefer the relatively comfortable existence of POWs in the South to the hazards and austerities of the North. Newsmen may ? have taken this view with a grain of salt, but it is a factor that Hanoi's leaders must take into consideration if they ever weigh out seriously the possibility of POW exchanges. The consensus of the foreign newsmen who visited Cantho was that although the camp had obviously been spruced up for their tour, it was generally well run and its 3,007 inmates better cared for and living better than they did as Viet Cong guerrillas. Regular inspections by the International Red Cross are, of course, a factor in ensuring proper facilities and treatment for the camp's POW population. Like other POW-related factors, International Red Cross scrutiny is one which Hanoi's leaders seem unwilling to risk. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 THE ECONOMIST 30 October 1971 Vietnam A gesture doesn't have to be ingenuous to be effective. The South Vietnamese government announced on Thursday that it will celebrate the start of President Thieu's second term on Sun- day by releasing 618 Vietcong prisoners now and 2,284 more over the next few months. The idea of an exchange of prisoners between Saigon and Hanoi was floated a long time ago, but the North Vietnamese showed very little interest even when Mr Thieu bettered his offer and, promised to send badly injured prisoners back without a quid pro quo. Now he has made an even more dramatic unilateral gesture, and it is one of the few propaganda victories he has been able to pull off lately. Some come out 1 November 1971 App and mark the first major move toward settlement of the POW problem. The announcement from Saigon was followed immediately by rumors that some 200 American prisoners were on their way home from North Vietnamese .camps. It's a possibility, but a remote one. For one thing, the rumor was promptly and vehemently denied by var- ious interested parties in Washington. For. another, any such large-scale re- lease of Americans or South Vietnamese would be preceded by considerable beat- ing of the propaganda drums. It must be recognized, too, that Pres- ident Thieu has coupled the humani- tarian gesture with considerable politi- cal tub-thumping of his own. The re- lease was timed to serve as a part of his second inaugural gala. The 618 prison- ers who will, be released outright are, 0 It is hard to believe that the Com- munist characterization of the release of some 3,000 Viet Gong prisoners as an "impudent maneuver" is to be their only reaction to the South Vietnamese initia- tive. Despite the Paris negotiators' at- tempts to write off President Thieu's act as a meaningless propaganda- gesture, the mass release could looser the logjam CPYRGHT The sceptics will be quick Ito observe that the released men are a small pro- portion of the 4o,ooo-odd prisoners that the South Vietnamese have in their hands ; that 176 of the first batch are in very poor health ; and that most of the others are now prob- ably regarded as " rehabilitated." But this biggest release yet will help Mr Thieu. It could well make it a bit easier to get Congress in Washington to accept the Administration's aid programme. And it will strengthen President Nixon's position if he plans to announce something short of a. programme for complete American withdrawal when he makes his next Vietnam statement cw CPYRGHT through the "Open Arms" program, which means a brief period of ideo- lcgical indoctrination and a promise to work for the Thieu goverment a-s propagandists and intelligence gather- ers after their release. So the prisoners are being handed over with a few strings attached. That does not, however, negate its importance or justify the weak and waspish Commu- nist response. The move is a demonstra- tion of confidence and security on the part of the Thieu government. And for that reason alone, it seems unlikely that the Communists can let it pass without some more closely equivalent response. It is not impossible that Hanoi and the VC will decide that the, only way to save face is a reciprocal release of prisoners-an "anything-you-oan-do-I- can-do-better" maneuver. If so, a mu- .. tual exchange program could be es- tablished that would, sooner or later, involve the U.S. prisoners. Such a program would, it is true, be based more, on bravado than on reason or humani- tarian considerations. But regardless of motivations, President Thieu deserves gratitude and congratulations for mak- ing g the first major move in a process rci~ecal8~'Zie t~s eaCl~a~~rw0~ted~001-1 Tema Wing , CPYRGH-Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 NEW YORK TIMES 29 October 1971 WASHINGTON, Oct. 28 - Administration o day that they had no reason to expect the release of any Americans by the enemy in return for the freeing this Sun- day of 'nearly 3,000 Vietcong prisoners in South Vietnam. Although the State Depart- ment issued a statement this morning welcoming the move by the Saigon Government and expressin ghope that it would lead to reciprocity, officials in bot lithe State and Defense departments said they were aware of no imminent release' of any of the 400 Americans believed to be held prisoner in Southeast Asia. Administration officials sought to quash speculation in some dispatches from Saigon sugesting that the release of .the Vietcong to 'mark the in- auguration of President Ngu- yen Van Thieu Sunday was possibly part of a secret deal. This speculation was stirred by a report in The Chicago Tribune this morning that an Army hospital in Denver had NEW YORK TIMES CPYRGH 9 October 1971 U. S. Doubts Foe Will Free Captives in Reciprocal Act By BERNARD GWERTZMAN Special to The New York Times een alerted to handle up to nited States prisoners. T tine Dispatch Denied But the White House, the State Department and the ,Penta n all issued prompt statem nts asserting that The Tribun report was inaccurate. Jerry W. Friedheim, Penta- gon sp kesman said: "Th e is absolutely nothing to The Chicago Tribune story. The D artment of Defense has no inf rmation at all concern- ing an 7 imminent release of U.S. isoners. Neither Fitz- simons ? General Hospital [in Denver nor any other hospital has been alerted in any man- ner for any imminent return.of U.S. pr oners." A sp kesman for the Denver hospita said: "We have no knowle ge here of any mass release of P.O.W.'s in Vietnam. There s a contingency plan present under way which is prepari g general hospitals for such a thing if it comes to pass." "This is a staff study,. but I feel it is nothing but wishful. thinking," he said. "We are not planning to receive any- thing ore than the war casualties, which we have been getting all along." Officials involved in prisoner matters expressed anger over speculation that some American might be released soon. 'Very Cruel Thing' "It is a very cruel thing, be- cause of the hopes it gives rise to among families of the prison- ers," one aide said. The Pentagon said that the Army last night called every next-of-kin family to tell tl:em that The Tribune report was in- accurate. State Department specialists on Vietnam said that all signs at present suggest that the North Vietnamese have not changed their attitude on pris- oners. The Hanoi position has been that no American prisoner will be released until the United States accepts the Vietcong 'peace plan, which calls for com- 1plete withdrawal of American Tforces. In Saigon, officials said that 618 Vietcong prisoners would be released outright and 2,320 )others turned over to the chieu 1hoy or "open arms" program for "political rehabilitation" be- fore being released. CPYRGHT Unilaterally, the Vietcong have released 24 Americans ;since 1965 and the North Viet- namese have released 9. ' A spokesman at Hickham Air Force Base in Honolulu denied that increased air activ- ity there in the last two days had anything to do with a re- turn of prisoners from Vietnam. He said the activity at the iairfield was due to the move- ment of a squadron of Phantom jets from the 389th Tactical Squadron, which was beings withdrawn from Vietnam to the United States. amount of helicopter activity There also' was an unusual at the nearby Tripler Hospital. But a spokesman said this was partly a civil defense exercise and was not related to prisoner return. 'Farce,' Vietcong Charge Special to The New York Times PARIS, Oct. 28 - The Com- munist delegations to the Viet- nam peace talks refused today to accept the liberation of pris- oners by the Saigon Govern- ment as a gesture of goodwill, and instead condemned it as a "farce." CPYRGHT ;:oath Vietnam Lets Reporters. Visit P.O.W. Camp By FOX BUTTERFIELD Special to The New York Times CANTHO, South Vietnam,. Oct. 28 - As part of its stepped-up efforts to demon- strate what it terms a "humani- tarian" policy on the prisoner- of-war issue, the South Viet- namese Government allowed a group of newsmen today to tour its prisoner-of-war camp here at Cantho in the Mekong' Delta. i Approved F The visit, the first that the! South Vietnamese have permit- ted to a prisoner camp in over a year, was timed to coincide th the Government announce- nt that 2,938 Vietcong pris- ers of war would be released Sunday in Honor of Presi- t Nguyen Van Thieu's in- uration. merican officials in Saigon sald today they welcomed ScluI th Vietnamese announce- &R ment, describing it as "a nia- I jor humanitarian gesture." The American officials point- ed out that Saigon's action was the largest such release of the war and that it involved al- most 10 per cent of the 37,000 prisoners of war in South Vietnam. Hanoi's Reaction Awaited The officials added that they certainly do not expect any immediate reciprocal action on the part of North Vietnam, though they are "hopeful" that this gesture may encourage some flexibility in Hanoi on the prisoner issue. The camp here at Cantho, 90 miles southeast of Saigon, is one of -six run by the South Vietnamese. It holds 3,007 pris- oners, including 66 North Viet- namese, in a complex of low, corrugated iron barracks on the flat and muddy delta plain. Although there have been rumors in Saigon of killings and revolts inside the prison CPYRGHT Apprt verl FAr Release 1999/09/09 ? C_IA_RDP79-01194AO00300090001-1 camps, the Cantho comman-, data, k'iaj. Hoang Dinh Hoat,. said there had been no majpr' disturbances and no escapes at' the camp since he took it over din 1969. Major Hoat, a slender man with a narrow face and large, !sad-looking eyes, said: "The !prisoners sometimes complain: about having to work too long ? outside the camp, but we have set up channels for them to, express their grievances and there has been no trouble." The 30 newsmen who toured the camp were not allowed to talk to the prisoners, but were permitted to walk freely among them and photograph CPYRGHT BALTIMORE SUN 29 October 1971 them. At one point some of the visitors, unaccompanied by guards, entered the barracks occupied by North Vietnamese officers. The prisoners, dressed in ma- roon pajamas, stared at the newsmen, but they neither] spoke nor made any gestures.' Their simple belongings, issued by the South Vietnamese Gov. ernment, lay piled neatly on their wooden sleeping racks. They included a mosquito! net, a blanket, a sleeping mat, a canteen, spoon, toothpaste and a brush, a towel and soap. According to Major Hoat, who was trained as a military most of them from wounds they had suffered before they came to Cantho. He denied that his guards used any form of vio-. lence to discipline the prisoners. Three hundred and ten of then prisoners have decided to be- come hoi chanh, or "returnees" to the Government. They wear black pajamas and have. certain; privileges and duties like those" of trusties in American prisons. If, after a screening processd the returnees are accepted by the Government, they will be sent to a chieu hoi or "open arms" center for six to eight weeks' indoctrination and will ) be freed. CPYRGHT policeman in the United States, the prisoners are allowed week- ly visits by their families and, are permitted to send and re- ceive mail. The camp's sta- tistics showed that 1,250 men had visitors last, month. 62 Died in 4 Years A small, whitewashed build-, ing, one of the camp's few buildings afforded.the luxury of tree shade against the blistering delta sun, serves as a dispensary. A group of 20 prisoners squatted on their heels, waiting to see the doctor. Major Hoat said that 62 prisoners had died in the camp isince it was built in 1967, Can Tho, Vietnam (1P1- an s rifle now do needlepoint. Last year's guerrilla is this year's volleyball champion. He may have lost his free- dom when he donned the ma- roon pajamas of a prisoner of war, but he gained privileges' and a full belly. He's encircled by barbed wire and no one is shooting at him. If he's lucky he will be freed next week to mark President Nguyen Van Thieu's inaugura- tion and South Vietnam's Na- tional Day. If not, it's back to the volleyball court. The government has an- nounced 618 Viet Cong will be freed and 2,300 others will be accepted into its "Open Arms" program. The POW camp here ob- viously had been spruced up for a, government-sponsored tour by foreign newsmen yes- terday, but in any case its 2,994 inmates live better than they did as Viet Cong guerril- las. New arrivals are given hair- cuts, sprayed with insecticide and issued two pairs of paja- mas, a mosquito net, a blan- ket, a straw sleeping mat, cooking utensils, a spoon, toothpaste, towel comb and soap A,i They `ls'ddPEPMA lmpn to a buildinv. Tlie platforms in tin barracks, 80 c om- day vo U/ L~j b modations are crude by West- POW's at the Can Tho facility, ern st ndards, but luxurious one of six in the country, were compar d to the swampy sane all captured in the Mekong Del- tuaries they once inhabited in ta. Most are Viet Cong local- the Me ong Delta, force guerrillas with homes and The aily food allowance for relatives in the surrounding 16 each i equivalent to 13 cents, provinces. Technically they are enough to buy rice, fish and a eligible for release after one little m at. Vegetables grown in year if they guarantee loyalty to the pr son garden and fish the Saigon regime. raised ' two prison ponds sup- The selection process is stiff, plemen` the diet. however. Only 283 prisoners Priso ers who behave are al- have been freed since the Can meters, and it is not reaLy Isola- tion since it sometimes holds four or five men. "It is rarely used. We have had a few minor diswurtances but nothing serious. T.-lc men are allowed to make corllplaints through their supervisors. Some- times they complain when sup- plies are delayed. I don't. mean food; supplies, they n r 3 never late, but personal ?hints like tooth brushes and soap." lowed o work on road gangs Tho camp was established four. Isections The camp is divided into two and co struction projects cut years ago. More than 10,000 for "docile" F.nri ": tub- side th, camp for a daily wage hrae been transferred to Phu born" POW's. There s r:h)re of 8 pi asters,or 3 cents. They Quoc prison island. barbed wire arnunri t it tub can sp aid this in a small post The 66 North Vietnamese pris- born barracks bloc!., t ; ..erns exchan e that stocks soy sauce, oners at Can Tho can hope for and activit-es there ;e conden ed milk and canned release only through a rare the same as in the doses masker 1. POW exchange or by presiden- The oldest inmate is 69, the Recr tion facilities include tial order. But the government youngest 13. Thirteen women volleyb 11 and shuttlecock claims most of them prefer the live in a separate section. courts, a drama theater and a comfortable existence as a POW The camp has a small dispen- !reading room. POW's can learn in the South to the hazards and sary and hospital staffcc by one reading and arithmetic in the austerity of the North. doctor and 10 assistants. Major camp chool, they can do car- Viet Cong prisoners are al- Hoat said 62 prisoners have died pentry n the workshop and they lowed to correspond with their in four years, "mostly from ma- can pu chase needle-point kits laria and heart attacks." families, have visitors for 30 to whil away the monotony of minutes once a week. and accept The camp command.;nt has impriso ment. food parcels. one United States adviser, SFC A coi munal television set is Jerry E. Kaufman, 33, from All, switche on every evening. Oc- Isolation cell gusta, Ga. He admits to 11i, caaiona y there are movies. years' experience in running The imp commandant, Maj. Those who misbehave receive POW camps. one warning without punish- i can onl tell you this is one Huang inh Hoat, claims there. ment. Second offenders lose vis y y is no po tical indoctrination. of the best damn POW camps "We have no mission to iting rights, parcel and PX priv- I've ever seen," he said. "It's ileges for varying periods. Re- ut in an isolation certainly the most comforter change heir Communist convic- -+o- are p rs cell for u w ovUdyo. p soners have es- "It t id M H " oa . ajor sa release the same, is 1"A - CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 THE PHILIPPINES HERALD CPYRGHT 17 October 1971 ? n?~ 'a a e' / 1 eaw k t prop en's, By GEORGE ESPER Asaj,,icred Preas SAIGON - (AP) - In a surpris- i en its people to task for not car- ing enough for North Vietnamese war victims and their families. It calls this "a great problem." Apparently acknowledging hea- vy casualties in the Indochina war, Hanoi called for quick repair of North Vietnam's "many cemete- ries" for the battlefield dead. It purged Increased production of ar- tificial limbs for the wounded. H1oc Tap (Studies), the official: journal of North Vietnamese Wor- kers' Party, said the country's po- licy toward war victims and their families is "still replete with shortcomings and weaknesses." The self-criticism appeared in the July issue of the official Dar- ty journal, just translated here. It. was made public by the Joint Uni- ted States Public Affairs Office. which noted: "The problem of the proper care of wounded veterans and their families has been cover- ed extensively In the Hanoi press. but this article is the broadest and most definitive treatment to appear to date." Hoc Tap said: "One of the most important shortcomings and weak- nesses is that many organs. Indus- trial enterprises. cooperatives. ca- dres and party members do not understand how to properly carry out this policy. "Many places have not . been thoroughly imbued with, the view- points of the party and the state on the task specified in the noli= cy." Hoc Tap said that at present "the majority of war invalids are classified as slightly and moder- ately disabled. Most of them are Young, have acquired adequate AbprW IF6'r?K asW4919' 10,E ly have a high political and ideo- logical level as a result of their being trained in combat." "The combat requirement of the Implementation of the policy to- ward the war invalids, demobilized servicemen, servicemen transfer. red to the production sector, fami- lies of the war dead, and families of troops consists of constantly In surfing that they are materially, secure and spiritually happy and a chance to participate in activi- ties to benefit society. ' :. , It is necessary to see to It that the livelihood of the war in-valids, of the families of the war dead, and of :the families of troops is stabilized. The level of their' livelihood must be either eauj1 to or above that of the persons and families that have average labor output." The party iournal said it is im-; perative to give financial assist ante to war victims and their fa.., mikes and that the state has pro mulgated a system of payments. r Hoc Tap said the greatest efforts. must be made to meet the' cultu- ral and spiritual needs of war vic- tims, "to grant them political rights, and to wholeheartedly care for them in other fields including marriage and the bringing up, of children so that they can be con; stantly spiritually happy." Of the battlefield dead. the par ty journal said: "To show grata tude to those who have sacrificed their lives, many veterans cemete ries have been built. Many ceme: teries are large and beautiful and .are landscaped with flower gardens and trees. However, many ceme. teries have not been properly built. They must be quickly repaired. We. must strive to grow flowers In the cemeteries in order to turn them -'01194A0003000200 1-1 AQprp ed Fpx RqWise 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 December 1971 DATES WORTH NOTING December 6 Poland The Polish Party Congress is to meet, and must deal with Poland's serious economic and social problems. December 10 Worldwide Human Rights Day, comrnemorat- USSR ing the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the UN General Assembly in 1948. In 1970 the unofficial Soviet Human Rights Committee was formed by Sakharov and other Soviets who said their independent organization would be guided by the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. December 14 Poland 1st anniversary of the December Workers riots follow- ing the Gomulka regime's sudden increase in consumer prices. The riots brought about Gomulka's fall from power and his replacement by Gierek. December 19 Indochina 25th anniversary of the beginning of the French Indochina War. December 21 USSR Anniversary of Stalin's birth, 1879. The way the Brezhnev regime handles this day will be watched for signs of renewed Stalinization in the USSR. December 26 China Mao Tse-tung's 78th birthday. December 31 New York Expiration of U Thant's term as UN Secretary General. U Thant has announced he is retiring. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 January 2 Chile 50th anniversary of the Chilean Corrnnunist Party, founded 1922. February 14 USSR/CPR Anniversary of the Sino- Soviet Friendship Pact, signed in 1950. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 A roved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 FUR Mb-&.U~~X TT 1, 7 December 1971 SHORT SUBJECTS Soviet Contempt for Yugoslavia. Soviet contempt for Yugoslavia manifesto; itself aimost before tfie ink was dry on the joint state- ment issued after the Brezhnev-Tito summit meeting 22-25 September. Pravda's 4 October editorial comment on the meeting gave a grossly ls~' torted:interpretation of the significance of the encounter. Pravda portrayed Yugoslavia as no more, nor less a Satellite than Bu garia and Hungary, ignoring all references in the joint state ment to the importance of mutual respect for independence and sovereignty among "socialist" nations. (See Pravda editorial attached.) When it suits the Soviets' purposes, they are willing to describe Yugoslavia as a "socialist" country, but it must be clear to all that this is little more than a verbal game. The Yugoslav newspaper V'esnik (30 October) pointed out that Soviet Premier Alexei KoSygin omitted Yugoslavia from a list of countries he described as "having gained socialism." Whether Kosygin's omission was inadverent or deliberate, it indicates how lightly the Soviets regard Yugoslav claims, Brezhnev's Paris Debut. The recent visit of Soviet Party Secretary Leonid rez ev to France (25-30 October), though surrounded by an atmosphere of good will and accomplishment, produced few changes of position on either side. However, as a high-level public relations exercise, it was useful politically to both parties. Since General de Gaulle's trip to Moscow (1966), the French have claimed a special relationship with the USSR and East Europe. This concept has fit in well with France's desire for a more independent role in Europe and, in turn, has been used by the USSR in an effort to drive a wedge in the Western alliance, Emphasizing his close relations with Paris at this time also suits Comrade Br.ezhnev's current efforts to portray the Soviet Union as the protagonist of pan-European detente. Brezhnev did not get French'agreement for the friendship treaty he sought and was obliged to settle for a joint statement known as "Principles of Cooperation." The document produced no surprises. Also signed was a ten-year agreement providing for each country to help build industrial plants in the other. In this case, too, the document added little to an agreement on the same subject which has been in effect for five years. Even if the meeting was short on substantive accomplishment, it did provide Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Brezhnev with a forum from which to hawk Moscow's latest wares, particularly the Soviet program for a general European detente. The French public was largely indifferent to Brezhnev -- in contrast to the welcome given Khrushchev in 1960 -- but Soviet media praised his initiative and exaggerated his accomplishments. Meanwhile, the French Communist Party, which was unable to produce any mass turnout for their distinguished visitor, was generally ignored by the Soviet leader. For Pompidou, the visit provided an opportunity to exploit the special French-Soviet relationship in an effort to balance Bonn's Ostpolitik. While conceding little of substance, the French Presi- dent, by his cordial reception of the Soviet leader, also made it more difficult henceforth for the French Communists to criticize his government. President Pompidou, despite his accommodating attitude, made it clear -- as he did during his visit to Moscow a year ago -- that France remains firmly in the Western alliance. Where is the Dedicated Communist Warrior Of Yesteryear? A series o articles in the o fIETEial Morietnamese Army newspaper, Quan Doi Nhan Dan offers an interesting counterpoint for the usual paeans to t He tireless dedication of Communist warriors. On July 7th the newspaper described the leaders of the North Vietnamese Army (PAVN) as "often lax in disciplining subordinates and failing to set a proper example." The troops were described, in turn, as "unwilling to carry out orders or accept criticism." Later that month awn Doi Nhan Dan criticized "poor relations between leaders and men which le to inefficiency and discord." Lack of enthusiasm was the theme of an article on August 5th and two days later the army newspaper complained that "PAVN troops are not training or studying hard enough, and are not showing enough resilience in the face of the difficulties and hardships of war." Party members "have a duty to instill fervor and patriotism into the men and help them overcome erroneous and passive thoughts." By the 12th of August the newspaper had concluded that "worse than the lack of discipline itself is the fact that it is tolerated by the leaders." Some men, even when they volunteered for certain duties, "fail to carry them out efficiently or even to understand fully the nature of the duties." On September 17th the newspaper suggested that increased attention to the soldiers' physical and mental welfare might help to solve some of the problems for "if the men were physically fitter, morale might be better." In October an Doi Nhan Dan's theme was the misuse of weapons. Rules a been-Broken, men were using their weapons for hunting and fishing or lending them out without authorization. The newspaper urged that "equipment inspections be carried out regularly and thoroughly in order to avoid more accidents where Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 weapons had not been properly maintained" and "to eliminate situ- ations where weapons needed urgently could not be found." Either an unusually cantankerous staff is manning the editorial desks of Hanoi's axmy newspaper or the stories circulating in Vietnam are true about the concern among the North Vietnamese leadership regarding the lack of discipline and low morale among PAVN troops. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 PRAVDA, Moscow 2 October 1971 The socialist world is gathering new forces and developing with optimism and confidence in its.-historical prospects. The socialist countries are united by community of-the sociopolitical system, coincidence of fundamental interests and aims, and loyalty to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. By coordinating their actions and agreeing on positions on the main foreign policy questions the fraternal countries are exerting an increasingly active and decisive influence on the international situation and on the course of the modern revolutionary forces' common struggle against imperialism and for peace, democracy and socialism. Cooperation allows them. by enriching each other's experience, jointly to solve the fundamental problems of socialist and communist building, to find the most rational forms of economic ties and colleetive];y to determine a common line in foreign policy activity. The recently concluded friendly visits which Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, made to Yugoslavia, Hungary and Bulgaria,were a weighty contribution to the cause of further strengthening the unity of the socialist countries. The talks in Belgrade, Budapest and Sofia were an important step on the path of the increasingly close coordination of the fraternal parties' and countries' foreign' policy activity and of their extensive and multifaceted cooperation. Speaking to Yugoslav workers in Zemun, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev said: "The Soviet Union has believed and believes that under modern conditions, when the antagonism between the forces of reaction and progress and the. forces of capitalism and socialism is not ceasing in the world arena, the socialist states' active and coordinated policy must be couuterposed to the actions of imperialism and reaction." The line of further strengthening the unity of the socialist community countries found its specific embodiment in the results of L.I. Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia. New prospects for developing mutually advantageous and truly fraternal cooperation were revealed as a result of the fruitful talks. As is noted in the joint statiement adopted at the talks, cooperation between the USSR and Yugoslavia is based on community of the bases of the social system and adherence to the principles of socialist internationalism. The results of the visit showed that the peoples of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are united by common class interests and by unity of ultimate aims. In the worldwide historic struggle against imperialist aggression and for the consolidation of peace and the triumph of freedom and progress the peoples of our countries stand on the Name side of the barricade as comrades and brothers in arms. The viewpoints of Yugoslavia and the Soviet pinion proceed from common vital interests in. creating a reliable system of European security, holding a pan-European conference and strengthening stable peace and security in the Balkans. The USSR and Yugoslavia support the heroic struggle of the peoples of Indochina, in- sisting firmly on the immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops and those of their allies from this region, they confirm their decisive support for the Arab peoples, struggle to liqui- date the consequences of Israeli aggression, and they support the implementation of ~.: .'? practical measures in the field of disarmament and demand the liquidation of all vestiges of colonialism. An important and, comradely exchange of 'opinions took place in Budapest and in Sofia. The meetings and talks, conducted in a cordial atmosphere, showed the strength and inviolability of the fraternal, friendly ties and the unity of views. Soviet people are profoundly satisfied with the results of L.I. Brezhnevoa visit to Hungary and ,Bulgaria. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 sovietVdA~I s~/@t~9-r~p~i~~1s'Oy~4, 401-1 combining rapid economic and scientific and technical growth with the flourishing of socialist culture and an upsurge in the people Is well-being. With warm sympathy they follow the successful development of fraternal. Hungary and Bulgaria, the fulfillment by the communists.and all working people of these countries of the tasks set by the recently held party congresses, and the struggle to implement the Leninist ideas on building the new society. They are truly gladdened by any success and any achieve- ment on the part of the fraternal peoples. The numerous instances of constantly developing economic ties are making them aware of the creative enthusiasm with which the working peoples of these countries have entered into the fulfillment of the comprehensive program adopted at the 25th CEMA session. The community of socialist states is the reliable stronghold of the peoples in the struggle against imperialism and for socialism, peace and social progress. Its role in preserving and strengthening peace in Europe is particularly great. The pan- European conference, the ratification of the treaties between the USSR and the FRG and between Poland and the FRG and the reduction of armaments and armed forces in Europe must become important landmarks on the path-of consolidating a stable peace on our continent. The meetings in Budapest and Sofia demonstrated once more the unity of views on urgent problems of the international situation, and above all on problems of European security. _ For peoples Bulgaria these fall days will remain memorable also because it's loyal son Todor Zhivkov was awarded the order of Lenin. Todor Zhivkov was given this high award for outstanding services in the development of friendship and cooperation between the peoples of our countries and in the consolidation of peace and socialism. and for many years of active participation in the world communist movement. By creatively applying the teaching of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and by interacting in an extensive and comprehensive manner and'strengthening their political and economio unity still further, the socialist countries are moving forward. Our party ana state and the entire Soviet people are doing-everything to insure that they walk side by side,: as a united friendly family, helping each other, that the edifice of'fraternal coopera tion is bright and stable, and that an atmosphere of sincerity, cordiality,,and mutual"' and profound trust reign in it. Unity and cohesion multiply the forces of socialism. The firmer this unity and the stronger and deeper the alliance and interaction of the world socialist system with the working class of the capitalist countries and the national liberation movement, the more effective its influence on the development of world history. 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 CPYRGHT LE M yrq ,ec5For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A0003000200d;1 ,YRGHT 2 November 1971 Voici le texte integral de l'enonce des principes de la cooperation entre la France at l'Union des republiques soeia- listes sovietiques a signe par` ' MM. Pompidou 'at Brejnev qui, a ate public le 30 --oetoi re a Paris, a l'issue des entretiens franco-sovietiques: M. Georges Pompidou, presi-. dent de Ia Republique frangaise, et M. Leonid Brejnev, secr6taire general du comite central du parti communiste .de - l'Union; sovietique, membre "du presidium! du Soviet supreme de 1'U,1;i,.S.S. S'appuyant sur. Ia. longue. tra dition d'amitie qui existe. entre les deux pays, Resolus a donner un nbizvel " elan a la cooperation fructueuse qui s'est etablie. entre la France et l'Union sovietique depuis Ia visite faite an U. R. S. S. par. le general de Gaulle en' 1i66, Animas du desir de renforcer la contribution des deux pays a, la cause de la paix cn, Europe at dans le monde, et de concourir au developpement de la cooperation entre tous lee Etats, adopte les principes suivants sur Icrquels repose in cooperation politique. entre les deux pays 1) La cooperation enure. la France: at I'U.R.S.S. repond aux, aspirations communes at a l'in- terL't mutual des deux peuplcs at doit care fondee sur la redipro cite des avantages at des otiliga-' tions de chacun des deux pays. Un factour permanent de Ia vie internationale 2) Cette cooperation n'est diri- gee contre lee intdrets d'aucunr peuple at n'affecte an riec lee engagements assumds, par,.les_ deux pays a l'egard d'Etats tiers.,. 3) La politique d'entente et de cooperation entre la France ate l'U.R.S.S. sera poursuivie, elie est, appeleo a devenir une: consfanle. ' dans leurs relations et un facteu;., permanent de Ia vie,'internatio-,, nale , 4) La cooperation p o I i t i q u e entre les deux pays restera fondee sur be respect des principes et des stipulations de la charte' des Nations unies. Elie a pour obj ectif de contribuer au retour a. la paix dens les zones' de conflit, a la reduction de In tension interna- tionale, au reglement des dif- ferends par des moyens pad-, fiques, ainsi qu'au developpement econonnique et a 1'amelioration des conditions de vie dans ' le monde. L'enonce des principes re eats c e au c dw cow ` r .$ (oil. 5) En vue de collaborer active ment no renforcement de la secu rite en Europe at dons be monde at au developpement de in cooperation pacifique des Etats, lndependamment de leers sys- tomes sociaux, les consultations politiques entre les deux gouver- nements seront developpes aussi bien par les canaux diplomatiques habituels que par les rencontres speciales de lours representants, sur Ia base du protocole Franco-, sovietique du 13 octobre 1970, qui a marque une etape importante dans l'organisationr- de c e t t e cooperation. De telles consul- tatioris devront notamment per- mettre de recherch(!r la possibilite d'actions concertces. v eom_oris au sein des organisations ou confe-r rences internationales, dans les. can oft, de l'avis co nmun des deux parties, in cause do in paix pour- 1 raft y gagner. Les respoxabilies des deux pays au Conscil d.) securite 6) Cette coop("rction politique' trouvera on particulPor son appii ,cation,, compte d uuient tenu des droits at prerogatives des autres puissances interessees, dans 1'exer- cice des' responsabilites que les deux pays assument dans le monde, an tant que membres per- manents du Conseil de securite des Nations unies at en Europe a . Is suite de in seconde guerre mondiale. Au cas oft surgiraient des situations creant, de 1'avis des deux, parties, une menace pour Ia paix, one violation do in paix, ou provoquant une tension interna- tionale, Ia France et 1'Union sovietique agiront conformement au protocole du 13 octobre 1970. 7) Une grande importance s'at. (ache a ce. que In France of .1'U.R.S.S. cooperon:: etroitement en Europe, do concert avec les Etats inferesses, au maintien de Ia paix? et a Ia poursuite de la detente, a l'ameiioration do la securite, .. ainsi qu'au renforce ment des relations pacifiques et de is cooperation entre foes les Etats europeens, dans be respect rigoureux des pr.+,ncipes suivants : linv.iolabilite des frontieres actue7Ies - Non-ingerence dans les at- faires in.erieures - Egaiite Independance -- Non-recours a Ia force ou a 'la menace.' 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A 8) La. France at 1'U.R.S.S. sont convaintues que in cooperation de tons' les peuplcs europeens, en ce qui: concerne le developpe- ment de lour potentiel industricll 1'echange d'experiences et de connaissances at in protection de 1'environnement, peut permettre a 1'Europe d'accroitre 1e rythme du progres economiquie, scientifique et technique. 9) La France at 1'U.R.S.S. s'em- ploicront, dans les regions oft 14 paix est troublee, it ce que soft obtenu au plus vite un reglement politique dans. linter@t do Ia paix generale. .10) Lies deux parties contribue- ront 'dans, toute la mesure du possible a resoudre les probiemes du desarmement g e n e r a l et complet,, et avant tout du desar- znement nucloalre, a surmonter. Ia. division, du, monde en blocs, 'A accroitre le role de 1'Organisa tion des Nations unies, confor moment aux dispositions do sa charte. , 1'61argisseme:7f conlinu 'cs echailael cullurds 11) La France ct 1'U.R.S.S. ed;- fieront leurs relations biioter:.l,'s dans tous les domaines, de fa4on qu'elles servent d., bon example de cooperation d'egal it Cal entre Etats it . syste'mes sociaux difft- rents. 12) Le developpement des echanges economiques at com- merclaux sur la base des accords an vigueur compictes par l'1c- cord du 27 octobre 1971, in coo,i,:- ration pour Ia miss an valour Acs ressources naturelles, l'f~(,,hanrge d'experiences dans le domrcne industriel at technique rev~a:r,t un interet essential pour re s:n - rer lcs liens qui existent entre les deux pays.' 13) Tout cc qui pout contribu.uer it i'enrichissement mutuel dans ie domaine intellectual et au ddre- loppement des moyens d'amelio- rer eonstamment la connaissance, par les peuplcs francais at sovii~- tique, de lours cultures at acti- vites respectives sera encourage, compte tenu de leurs anciennes relations en ce domaine, de leers traditions et ? de leur amitie. L'elargissement c o n tin u des echanges universitaires, scienti- fiques et artistiques, de Ia dif- fusion de l'information, des contacts entre, les organisations des deux pays, et notamment des organisations de jeunesse, ser- vira it atteindre cos objectf.;. Cola s'appliquera e,alement sex contacts entre les hommes, y compris lea rencontres de ,jeunes, it titre collectif ou individuel, i~lnp~ll~ fufvR-nlaeseevront evrorit ce s T le CPYRGHT LE M co jor Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 2 November 1971 r p F- If L. i ' i ti+,:rs's CPYRGHT ... . _.r p x ( : declaration franco - sovietique I tionsTr, 'invitation de M. George Pompidou, president de la repu blique frangaise et du gouverne rent frangais, M. L. I. Brejnev, secretaire general du comite cen- tral du parts' communiste de i'Union sovietique, membre du presidium du Soviet supreme de I'U.R.S.S., a etc l'hote de la France du 25 au 30 octobre 1971. M. Brejnev etait accompagne de M. V. A: Kirilline, vice-president du conseil des ministres de 1'U.R.S.S., president du comite d'Etat du conseil des ministres de M.R.S.S. pour la science et la technique ; de M. A. A. Gromyko, ministre des affaires etrangeres de l'U.R.S.S., et de M. N. S. Pato- litchev, ministre du commerce exterieur de M.R.S.S. M. Brejnev et les personnalites tie sa suite ont visits Paris et Marseille. Its ont pu prendre connaissance de la vie du peuple frangais dans ses divers aspects. Un accuell particulierement ami- cal et chaleureux lour a etc reserve. M. Brejnev a eu des entretiens avec le president de la Republique et a eggalement rencontre le pre- mier ministre et plusleurs mem- bres du gouvernement frangais. ni re ; M. Schumann, ministre de affaires etrangeres ; M. Gis- ca d'Estaing, ministre de I'eco- sec etaire general' du ministerre des affaires etrangeres ; M. Sey- dot ambassadeur de France en U. .S.S. ; M. de Beaumarchais, din cteur des affaires politiques du ministre des affaires etran- gcr s, et M. Ralmond, conseiller tee nique auprPs du secretariat gen ral de la presidence de la Re ublique ; me tionnees. N.D.L.R.): M. Abras sim v, ambassadeur de M.R.S.S. en rance ; Al. Tschukanov, assis- tan du secretaire general du ministre de s affaires etrangeres ; mi8 section europeenne du mi- nist re des affaires etrangeres. cc Line cli$mosp o' ct den ca Lea entretiens se sont derouIes dans une atmosphere de confiance et de cordialite conforme aux relations amicales qui existent entre les deux pays. Its ont etc marques par une volonte com- mune de faire progresser la cause de la detente et de renforcer les rapports entre la France et M.H.S.S. M. Pompidou et M. Brejnev se sont felicites du developpement de la cooperation franco-sovfe- tique dans tous les domaines, et .notamment dans le domaine poli- tique. En application du protocole franco-sovietique du 13 octobre 1970, les deux pays ont des consul- tations politiques sur l'ensemble des grands problemes qui se posent dans le monde. Les deux parties ont Teaffirme la grande e e. confiance prob ernes de I'actualite interna- facti n, apres la signature, en 1970, des traites entre 1'U.R.S.S. et 1 R.F.A., et la Pologne et la R.F. ., de nouveaux sines encou- ran e, 1'U.R.S.S., les Etats-Unis t Ia Grande-Bretagne, on vertu es esponsabilites qu'elles par- Importance de ce document pour Ies rapports franco-sovietiques et lour souci commun de lui confe-, rer une efficacite croissante. Es t i m a n t quo lea resultats obtenus ces dernieres a n n e'e s dans le developpemont des- rela-tions franco-sovietiques permet. tent de les porter a un niveau plusr Cleve, M. Pompidou at M. Brejnev ont decide de donner a la cooperation entre la France of PU.B.S.S.. at particuliorement a lour cooperation politique, qui est exclusivoment au service de buts pacifiques, une base encore plus large at plus solids. A cette fin, ils oni signs un - enonce des principes de la cooperation entre la France of 1'Union des repu: bliques socialist as sovietiques,.. Passant en revue les Brands volonte de faire disparaltre les sources de tension au centre de I'Europe et constitue un pas vers la detente en Europe et dans le monde. M. Pompidou et M. Brej- nev ont exprime le souhait que cet accord soft complete par les arrangements prevus et par le protocole final. Les progres ainsi realises at lea resultats que l'on pout afiendre des efforts entrepris pour une normalisation generate des rap- ports entre la R.F.A. at la R.D.A.. l'admission. par voie de 'conse- quence, de ces deux Efafs a 1'Or- ganisafion des Nations unies, ou- vriront de nouvelles perspectives pour 1e renforcement de la secu- rife, le developpement des echan- ges at I'elargissement de la co- operation entre tous lea Etats on Europe. La cenfSrence sur is se'curifie europeenne M. Pompidou of M. Brejnev ont ges culturels et scientifiques, des reaffirms l'importance qu"ils atta- contacts entre les hommes. Les client It la reunion dune confe- peuples pourront ainsi, en se renco sur la securite of Is coops- connaissant mieux et en benefi- ration an Europe. La rgalisatfon Giant mutueIlement des fruits de daps un avenir proche de c lour travail, de lour art et de projet, quo favorise I'evolufio a lour pensee, prendre davantage reconte de ' la situation, dolt, conscience de la solidarite qui lea a lours yeux, contribuer a trans- former progressivement lea rela- tions entre Efafs europeens de Celle sorts quo puisse titre sur- montee ]a division du continent en blocs. Lune de ses principales filches dolt efre un renforcement de la securite europeenne par la creation d'un systeme d'engage_ menis qui exclue tout recours a la menace cu it I'usage do la force daps lea relations mutuelles entre Etats et qui assure le respect des principes de 1'integrite ierriio. riale des Etats, do la non-inge- rence dans leurs affaires inta- rioures, de 1'egalite at de l'inde- pendance do tour les Etats, Une telle conference dolt ega- ut: ]a paix, de 1'amitie et dejla~co operation. En rappelant leur vmu de voir s'ouvrir des que possible a Hel- sinki, en accord avec les Etats interesses, la preparation multi- laterale de la conference, M. Pom- pidou et M. Brejnev ont marque qu'a. lour avis cette reunion pre- Iiminaire multilaterale doit per- mettre de s'entendre sur le con- tenu de l'ordre du jour de la conference, la procedure de ges travaux, les modalites et ]a date de sa convocation. Les deux parties sont conscien- tes de l'importance qui s'attache a ce que cette Conference reponde Pleinement aux espoirs eveilles dans l'opinion publique et qu'elie se traduise, dans les domaines suptiement entre tous les dont elle aura a traiter, par des rat on qui y participeront des echan- ment 1'espooir que la pr Ar eseparation re ges econamiques et commereiaux, de la conference se d@roulera de coo dustriel etatechnique, des elan ch n- satire nir ene1972. cede-ci puisse Approved For Release 1999/09/62 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 CPYRGHT M. Pompidou eln Mw evoque la question du dbsarme- mint. Its ' ont constate que la France et 1'U.R.S.S. se pronon- cent en faveur d'un desarme- ment general et complet sous un contr6le international efficace. Its ont reaffirms lour conviction qu'une conference des cinq puis- sances nucleaires constituerait -utie mesure appropriee a cette fin. Les deux parties considerent, on offal, que 1'etude du desarme- ' rent nucleaire dolt titre entre- prise an priorite. Elles entendent continuer a no negliger aucun Soutien a AIM', rIqVr9*II*4A00*3000;20*&l:* tours a cure ytqj? u a u i c lt~t. quinquennal sur la coo eration actuelle A cette occasion le m 1::ilcs examinent, dens cei esprit at de facon positive, le projet so- vietique de conference mondiale du desarmement. Les deux parties out constate qu'elles poursuivaient le merne objectif en matiere d'armes chi- miques et bacteriologiques (bio- logiques). Elles ont formula le souhait qu'il soft possible d'abou- tir a l'interdiction de la fabrica- tion et a, la destruction de ces deux categories d'armes dans des conditions satisfaisantes pour la communaute internationale tout entiere. la mission ,scarring et a VON. Exprimant lour inquietude de- vant le maintien de la tension an Proche-Orient, Ies deux parties constatent qu'aucun progres n'a encore ate accompli pour arriver cer sans tarder, en application de la resolution du Conseil. de securite du 22 novenfbre 1967, la negotiation qui dolt conduire ~ 1'etablissement d'une paix juste et durable, comportant le retrait des forces israeliennes de tous les territoires occupes, la reconnais- sance et le respect par chacun des pays interesses de la souve- rainets, de l'independance poll- tique et de l'integrite territorlale de tous lest pays de cette region. La France at 1'Union sovietique continueront avec energies an uti- lisant toutes les possibilites poll- fiques dorit elles disposent, no- tamment la concertation a qua- ire, a rechercher le moyen d'aboutir sans retard a un regle- ment au Proche-Orient. Au tours de ces consultations, les principes mutuellement accep- tables d'un systeme de garanties de ce reglement devront, en parti- culier, titre examines avec atten- tion. La France et 1'U.R.S.S. se pro- noncent pour la cessation de 1'in- terveniion etrangere, qui so poursuit encore on Indochina, at pour un reglement politique dans cette region, qui reponde aux in- terets des peuples qui y vivant. Elles continueront it deployer leurs efforts en vue de contribuer it un tel reglement par des nego- ciations qui assureraient aux peu- pies de cdlte region, sur la base ,a un reglement politique du con- flit. Elles jugent necessa.ire clue M. Jarring, representant special du secretaire general des Nations unies, soft mis de relnn- des accords de Geneve de 1954 et do i902, la possibilite de decider eux-memes de lour sort, sans aucune ingerence etrangere. M. Pompidou et M. Brejnev out examine les divers aspects de la dangereuse situation qui sect creee dans le sous-continent indien, it la suite des evenements du Pakistan-Oriental, et affirme lour volonte de poursuivre leurs efforts en vue du maintien de la paix dans la region. Its out exprime lour comprehension des difficultes auxquelles se heurte le gouvernement indien en raison de l'afflux massif de refugies. Les deux parties ant exprime 1'espoir que sera rapidement realise un reglement politique des problemes qui ont surgi au Pakistan-Orien- tal, do facon it permettre, notam- ment. le retour des refugies. Confirmant 1 e u r fidelite aux buts at prindipes de la charto des Nations unies. dont les possibi- lites concernant le mainfien de la paix at le reglement des diffe- rends lour paraissent devoir titre utilisees pleinemont, lee d e u x parties proclament lour deir commun de poursuivre at d'ap- profondir lours consultations an vue d'un fonctionnement plus e f f i c a c e de l'Organisation des Nations unies. Elias soulignent ie role utile qua joucnt aux Nations unies la comprehension snutueile at les consultations entre les des:x pays. Les relations bilcatereales M. Pompidou et M. Brejnev out examine les differents aspects des relations bilaterales. Its so sont felicites du developpement de ces relations depuis le voyage du complis dans be domaine de 1a cooperation economique et indus- irielle. president de la Republique en U.R.S.S., en octobre 1970. Les deux parties out marque leur satisfaction des progres ac- parties ant exprime le vceu do mettre an ecuvre un certain nom- bre do grands projets, dent 1'ela- p . , s 26 mats 1969, les relations com- faction les importants resultats merciales ant continue it se de- obtenus, notamment on ce qui velopper. On a note avec satis- concorne la construction on faction 1'accroissement sensible cette annoe, des importations de produits sovietiques an France, et dans ces importations la, part croissante des. machines et des equipements. Union sovietique d'un puissant complexe d'industrie forostiore at le role considerable quo dolt jouer l'industrie automobile fran- caise par sa participation a la construction dune usine de ca- mions an U.R.S.S. Les deux parties ont reaffirms qu'elles avaient pour but de dou- bler le volume du commerce franco-sovietique de 1970 it 1974, comrne prevu par l'accord sur la cooperation economique et com- merciale. Dans ce but, elles out decide do donner une nouvelle impulsion au developpement du commerce enire les deux pays. Elles s'effor- ceront, an particulier, d'accroiire les fournitures de matieres pre- mieres par 1'Union sovietique et d'augmenter Is part de materiel industrial sovietique dans les im- portations francaises. Les deux Le gouvernement francais continuera, de son cote, 4 encou- rager la participation d'orga- nismes sovietiques a la construc- tion en France de ce 'tains complexes industriels. Los deux parties sont tombees d'acdord sur Pinter@t mutuel que presentent be vente du gaz naturel sovietique it la France et l'achat it la France d'equipetnents et do materiels destines it l'industrie du gaz de I'Union sovietique. E I 1 e s se concerteront sur les moyens de donner it l'accord qui s'est de- gage sur ce point une suite pra- tique dans its delais les plus rap- proches. La sc'vnce et' la tecimkp e Les deux parties ont reaffirms 6galement 1'interet quo pre- sente la participation d'entrepri- ses frangaises it la realisation de prp,jets de moyenne importance pouvant titre menes a bien dans de brefs delais. Les deux parties ont reaffirms in grande importance que revet. it leurs yeux, la cooperation franco- sovietique dans le domaine de ip, science et de la technique. Eller out note avec satisfaction les suc- ces obtenus dans ce domaine de- puis In signature de l'accord du 30 juin 1966 et ont apprecie favo- rablement, on particulier, les re- sultats des travaux de la sixieme session de la commission mixte permanente franco-sovietique qui a eu lieu it Moscou du 22 au 24 juillet 1971. A cette occasion, on a constate lea sueces importants de la coope- ration dans le domaine de Vex- ploration de 1'espace, de l'uiili- sation de 1'energie atomique it des fins pacifiques at aussi de lu physique des hautes - energies.L.n particulier : 1'installation sur *'lo Lune d'un refleeteur laser francais, la mire on service de 'a chambre a bulles francaise < IMii- rabelle ,, sur l'accelCratour de p..olons sovietique do Serpou- khov, le central franco-sovi tigve sur Yenrichissement en Union sovietique d'uranium natural francais. La cooperation a donne egale- ment des resultats fructueux dans le domaine de 1'agriculture, de be construction et de l'architecture, des problemes de 1'eau, de la re- cherche m6dicale, des transports ferroviaires, de la meteorologic et de i'oceanographle. Les deux parties sont convenues cooperation dans le dnm~nine des recherches tent fondacnientales qu'appliquees, et it encourager lour extension it d'autres proble- mes actuels, en particulier l'envi- ronnement, la biochimie ct la biophysique, et la construction de grands appareils scientifiques. Afin de donner it la cooperation economique, technique et indus- trielle un caractere phis stable et durable, les deux panic;; out conclu un accord sur le t.evelop- pement de in cooperation econo- mique, technique et indi.s;rielie d'une duree de dix ans., 'L favoriser la miss en c.:nvre dun vaste 'programme de coala'ration profitable aux dcux pay:;. 'Les deux parties out .le poursuivre les echant;e;; du visitcs entre elements des forces a: mees des deux pays. Les deux parties ant rf. t:invo lour resolution d'approfo::dSr lea relations cullurelles e a i r ` la France at I'U.R.S.S. 1=iicc out constate avec satisfaction les pro- gres realises, on parficu'ii r en ce qui concerns 1'enseignemest tie la langue russe? an France ct de la langue fra:.Yaise an U. l.a. ;., of sort convenues d'intensil er i'ef?? =ort entrepris. Elles declarent qu'elles conti- nueront it encourager 10:; &hs:nges clans tous les nutres doma.ines cui- turels, tels que ceux de :a radio, de is telev:Sion, do 1'x-t, du ci- nCma, de 1'education, ce I'ensei- gnement, du sport et tie 1'infor-, mation, ainsi que les contacts entre personnes et, en particuller, lee echanges entre organisations de jeunes. Elles sont tombees d'ac- cord pour reconnaitre qu'en depit des progres accomplis it restait, dans ces divers domaines, des pos- sibilites considerables d'elargir Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 CPYRGHT Les deux parties constatent avec satisfaction que is visite de M. Brejnev a permis de confir- mer 1'extension continue et 1'ap- profondissement de la coopera- lion entre les deux pays, de memo que le caractere particulier des liens d'estime et d'amifie qui existent entro les peuples de France et d'U.R.S.S. Celts visits LE MONDE, Paris 28 October 1971 . 0%~iV~iVL vlr~-rwr donnera de nouvelles dimensions a rentente et a la cooperation franco-sovietiques, placees au ser- vice de la paix. . 0 ERRATUM. - Dans nntre edition datee dimanche 31 octo- bre - lundi 1 novembre, deux lignes sautees en premiere page out rendu illisible le premier. Le oomph rren(lu commrrir 103 Se so ni fl, r"q~"n ~R. M . ~7 R e7re r '12 Voici le texte du compte rendu commun qui a ate publie mardi soir par les services de presse de 1'Elysee et ceux de la delegation i sovietique. A l'issue de i'entretien on tote a t@te de MM. Brejnev et Pompidou : e Les 25 et 2G octobre, des entretiens prolonges out eu lieu entre M. Georges Pompidou, pre- i silent de la Republique irangaise, et Al. Leonid Brejnev, secretaire general du parts communiste de i'U.R S.S. s Iis out ports sur un large dornaine de questions d'interet commun. > Durant ces deux fours, 12 a ate proced6 4 un echanrte d'in formations de la part de M. Brej- nev sur la situation interieure do t'U.R.S.S.. son developpement dconomique ct lee objectils de so politique exterfeure. > De son cOte, le president de in Republique, Al. Georges Pam- pidou, a informs. M. Brejnev du developpement de la France et ,de certains aspects de sa poli- tique (5,trangere. u La grande importance de la cooperation economique, scienti- -Pique, technique et culturelle entre les deux pays a ate consta- tee dans l'intereC de leur progres. )i Des mesures pour. appro/on- dir et developper Bette coopera- tion out ate envisagees. Dans le domaine de leurs relations mu- tuelles, les principes dot develop- peinent de celles-ci out ate dis- putes. LE MONDE, Paris 28 October 1971 Voici le texte de l'accord sur le developpement de la cooperation economique, technique et indus- trielle entre les gouvernements franc.ais at sovietique, signs le 27 octobre par MM. Giscard d'Estaing at Patolitchev : ARTICLE PREMIER. - Les deux gouvernements continueront a deployer leurs efforts p o u r contribuer au developpement et au renforcement de la coopera- tion economique, scientifique et technique qui constitue un fac- teur de progres pour les d e u x pays. ART. 2. - Its ont decide, a cet effet, d'encourager les organisa- tions et lea entreprises de chaque pays a participer a la realisation des p 1 a n s quinquennaux en vigueur, ainsi que des plans ulte- rieurs de I'autre pays. ART. 3. - Les deux gouverne- ments definiront d'un commun accord les differents secteurs dans lesquels. 1'elargissement de la cooperation e s t souhaitable, notaminent en consideration des besoins et des ressources de cha- cun des deux pays en matieres premieres, equipements at tech- niques, cos besoins et ces res- sources etant apprecies sur one longue periode. T o u s les secteurs presentant des perspectives de developpement favorables au regard des res- sources at des possibilites de cha- cune des deux parties feront 1'objet d'une attention particuliere. ART. 4 - lee deux gouverne- ments favoriseront la cooperation entre les organisations et les en- treprises interessees des deux pays, ainsi que la conclusion, conformement a la legislation en vigueur dans les deux pays. d'ac- cords et de contrats, en particu- lier a long terme, entre les per- sonnes physiques et morales francaises et les organisations sovietiques correspondantes, no- tamment en vue d'assurer la par- ticipation d'entreprises sovieti- CPYRGHT ques a a realisawUll ensembles industrials en France et in cooperation de l'industrie francaise a la construction en U.R.S.S. de complexes Industrials, ainsi qua la modernisation et a 1'extcnsion des industries legeres productrices de biens de grande consommation. Lee deux parties faciliteront la conclusion de contrats a long terme portant en particulier su la li vraison des matieres premie- res clout in France a besoin pour son approvisionnement. AIZT. 5. - Les deux gouverne- ments ont en outre decide de re- chercher de maniere coordonnee dams les pays tiers, les points d'application de cette cooperation ART. 6. - La commission mixt( p e r m a n e fi t o de cooperation franco - sovietique est charge) d'organiser in mise en ceuvre de, articles precedents... ART. 7. - Le present accorl est conclu pour une duree de di: ans. Ii entrera on vigueur des 1 jour de sa signature. ~F/'1VVVJVVVLVVV 1-1 alinea dU commentaire sur le sejour de M. Brejnev a Paris. Il fallait lire : a La derniere mani- festation mondaine du sejour de M. Brejnev avait ate, vendredi soir, in reception a 1'ambassade d'U.R.S.S., o11 l'on avait note la' presence du corps diplomatique au dre grand eproesefta t chinois ouialba- nais. N CPYRGHT En matiere de politique exte- rieure, les deax homntes d'Etat out parle des a/lets du proiocole, signs en 1970, sur la consultation politique, t'Europe at certaines questions de se.curite europe.enn.e. a A ' propos dc cos problemes, tears points de vice communs se sont degages, refletant les into-, nets du peuple frangels it da people sovietique. a Ces conversations sc soul d6- roulees dans un climat de fran- chise, de comprehension. de cor- dialite et dans un esprit d'a.mitie. Les entretiens portant sur cos themes, sur d'autres questions de politique etrangere et sur in cooperation economique sc pour- suivront dans les fours d venire Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 CPYRGHT LE MONDE, Paris 28 October 1971 .Fa Frce no t I'.f1S.S. ery scar d'Estaing a signe mercredi matiij avec M. Nicolas Patolitchev; mi- nistre sovietique du commerce exterieur, un accord de coope- ration economique a long. terme (dix ans). Cot accord doit titre un des trots principaux docu- ments signes entre les deux pays a l'occasion de la visite de M. 13rejnev a Paris, lea deux autres etant le communiques com- mun et le texte politique. En outre, MM. Giscard d'Estaing et Patolitchev ont assiste dans 1a memo matinee a la signature de 1'accord sur la participation de la regie Renault a la construc- tion de la gigantesque usine de camions de la Kama (le Monde du 27 octobre). L'accord porte sur 1'ingenierie do cette usine ; c'est le premier a titre zigne par les Sovictiques avec une. firme etrangere pour cette affaire. L'accord de cooperation a long terme Porte sur une periode de- LONDON OBSERVER, London 31 October 1971 cennale et i1 marque la volonte des deux pays d'associer leurs g r a n d e s entreprises respectives au developpement economique du pays partenaire. L'exemple de la. participation do Renault a la construction de l'usine de. la Kama montre que la raise au point de projets aussi gigan- tesques exige une longue prepa- ration et qu'en consequence, ii est tout simplement realiste de porter jusqu'a 1'annee 1981 1'examen en commun des possibilites offertes dans le domaine de la cooperation Industrielle. L'U.R.S.S. est deja actuellement le plus Important client de la France pour les equi- pements lourds et les usines livrees a clef on main u. Les difficultes que souleve la participation sovietique a l'en- s e m b 1 e industrie) de Fos ne decouragent nullement les deux gouvernements. Les Sovietiques out deja fait part de Pinter@t qu'ils portent a plusieurs autres w' U It a fi, 8 grand.;'projets francais et, notam- ment, a la construction du metro de Marseille, pour laquelle ifs pourraient offrir des solutions techniques appropriees. Dans I'autre sons, 1'accord do cooperation a long terme devrait faciliter la bonne fin des projets associant des firmcs francaises a I'essor industriel de I'U.R.S.S. La France, comme on le snit, a le souci de s'assurer des sources de matieres premieres (c u i v r e, nickel...) en participant eventuel- lement it la raise en valour des enormes ri.chesses minerales de 1'Oural et de la Siberie. Mats d'autres projets sent en tours d'examen. C'est ainsi que Pechi- ney envisage la construction d'un atelier d'anodes (industrie de I'alumine) et d'usines de trans- formation de 1'aluminium. Chacun de ces deux projets porte sur une valeur de 250 millions de francs. - P. F. CPYRGHT r Dole from "BORIS E CIDEL: Paris, 30 October ,'1 1,114- UUTCOME of the talks here between Mr Brezhnev. the Soviet leader, and President Pompidoui'sccros distinctly an anticlimax;, Lis-joint dcclaratioil_ nor thc_staicnient cLirinciplcsgovernina Franco- Suviet rc,l, lions smiled today, brake new ground. Mr Btezhitcv had originally hoped Yci.'cxtract a friendship treaty from the French. But M. Pompidou. far more con- , coned tlnuj Gcnerai do Gaulle i about prespruing France's cons mitments To NATO. firmly re-' sisted ihcsc Soviet suggestions. 111CIll. le e',vcrnmcnts of col signed P s' i nt ttti%idou. the %so Cie, manys are still quarrel r 'ling over details hilt a final sale rn os ow last lean. Aain the lion is c\pected before Christmas. 1"'o Ic ulcrs agreed that their As \1r Rrerhncv Ilew from Paris Governments should intensify their In Fast Berlin the. afternoon conwltations. Soviet Officials firmly denied that So far. at least until (he very cue he would be exerting prrssurc on of Mr Brczhncv's visit here, the the t.ast German leaders to hasten Russians hardly ever bothered to agreement on Berlin, Fast Gar Inform or consult the French many, these olliciafs said, was -a Government about their diplomatic sovereign nation' and the master moves. Today the two leaders Of its own decisions, aflinnco that tilt policy of friend. An additional l dilliculty has now ship apd co-operation bethscen emerged. As d Brczhn indi- their two countries was destined catcd hcrc, the Russians will not to become a constant feature of sign the Berlin agrecmcnt until their relations and a pcrmancnt West Germany has formally factor in international rclations.' notified the ratification of tho For Chancellor Brandt, with his Soviet-German turfy si:z,jc,l list slim parliamentary majority. this year. The (wo actions must be Soviet demand creates a major year. problem Until now h h l a . e as a w ys ancous. >h Brcrhncv is +rcunty conference, which the said that the signing of the Berlin Soviet, have been seeking for a reported to have laid the French. agreement must recede ratifica. v?cw to;;'~i#~ t ctrl _ ,e, X79-0119 00 0R2 ~a1y want lease__ far i'-==s" t actua rnctrumcnts of ratifica- ground as Uie~rancn COVret rgto- tion deposited at the same time The holding of a European CPYRGHT as they sig1AppJQMedsFsQr Release4999189fiO2ir GJArRDP79-011 0003OO020001-ige? oRicials asserted that M. Pompidou Pa4lacc. he nervously wiped his Soviet officials tried to portray him if this ;s month with a handkerchief as 'ha as far more open minded than his had accented their s,; r, e e . Germans are listened to President l'omsridou's confirmcd, the certain to regard ii as an unfriendly address, Unused to speaking with- cture. out notes at public functions, Tfr; On his first visit to the West Mr Brczhnev forgot the key sentence zhnev managed to arouse no of his speech urging the French Rre . to raise than tepid public interest. tse their relations with the It was very different when Air His Soviet 1rpterpretreter inserted the higher missing ng Khrushchcv came to France in sentence into his translation. 1 160. "hen thousands turned out Still Air Brcrhnev evidently to cheer or to catch a glimpse of atta'alaiect~reaLji~cirtancg o he the Soviet leader. This time, prc- visit For him it meant the formal sunably exp:cting a meagre rcs- consecration o~~iis` talc as tho txsnse, the leaders of the French may-irori',ovret`Torete policy. ('ommunist Party made no deter- 07rflzinaTly Ii1 Pompidou had mined effort to mobilise their invited all the Moscow 'troika,' supporters. Mr Brczhnev, President Podgorny. Leonid Brczhnev has none of and Premier Kosygin, to visit \lr Khrushchev's boisterous flan- Frarkar By homing alone Nfr boyance. To the French public he Brczhnev confirmed his dominant came across as a humdrum party position in the Soviet leadership. bureaucrat who lapses into harrali- Very distinctly Mr Brczhnev had tics whenever he departs from [ho set out to strike here the pose of a safety of his prepared speeches. sober statesman preoccupied by Clearly at first he was somewhat peace and by friendship with daunted by his venture into the : France. He carefully avoided Mr Western world. During the wel- Khrushrhev's verbal excesses. In a public relations drive designed to NEW YORK TIMES 31 October 1971 CPYRGHT LI yore Red. .;y C.L. SULZI3ERGER "though he wants the party in the Soviet Union to remain ideologic- ally strong and united, they said he .was In fact willing to accept less conformism and more experiment. particularly in the cultural fields. But he could not always execute his own wishes. Mr Breihncv was not the sort of leader who, imposed his will. Rather than become involved in showdowns with his' colleagues, he preferred to rule hs' consensus. He was pictured as a modest man who had lived with his family in the same apartment block since his arrival in Moscow 19 years ago. The only difl'erence, it was said, was that nowadays lie had five rooms instead of three. The Soviet leader came to Paris accom- panicd by his wife, Victoria. a former gynaecologist. who appeared to be overwhelmed by her first journey to the West and all the pomp laid on by the French, 1ags CPYRGHT FoR IGN AFFAIRS " rance (appears to feel that Russia is now satisfied with Inc extent of its territorial domain and i's no longer ; expansionist that ... it''strive's to'have'. tie state quo accepted everywhere; , :: a?11IS--Ono must keg certain U 8erlying truths in mind when asses - Inc, the importance of Mr. Brezhnev visit here, during which red flagit were as notable in Paris as In th days of the 1870 commune. 'The Russian policy of the FIN French Republic has always been mixe up with France's internal political sit uation. and there has been a tendenc to give the?,appearance of diplontati concessions to Moscow and thus out I'lank from the left the powerful Cotii munist party here. Likewise, the Ifremlin, when ad dressing France. in recent years, -ha sour ht to obscure the fact that i hoped to use French influence as card to be played in two differen mes: That which the Soviet Union s been slowly elaborating in tier- any and the even more important maneuver of trying to diminish United ates influence in Europe. . By 'displaying Russia's traditional f iendship for France, Mr. Brczhnev e ?idently sought to stimulate roaction .d alarm in Bonn. If consequently Ii~ can prod Willy Brandt, who got it Isobel Peace Prize for warming up te- 1 tions with 'the East, into a.still more a ;able attitude, BrezhneV . cleatiy h 5pes the disenchanted United. States Ill show less faith and confidence in rope and place even more emphasis o its expanding dialogue with the etnlin. . The Pompidou-Brezhnev dialogue represented, at least in part, an effort by the French President to cement his political position at home whereas tor. the Soviet boss it represented an effort . to strengthen Russia's diplomatic po- sition abroad. But aside from the domestic aspect, *h,^ French viewpoint on the strategic ;lions of the meeting is of great i.r. re:;t since Paris' interpretations' of Soviet intentions have value and ? im-. portance to the entire Western world. France appears to feel that Russia is now satisfied with the extent of its territorial domain and is no longer expansionist; that therefore it strives to have the status quo accepted everjr- where. Moscow thus favors signature Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 CPI RGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00030002 001-1 by Bonn of agreemc;its delimiting East. West borders (as are now being worlieil out) arid it hopes that c.venLually i'~r ldnfi %V111 Howe', tilii 1rtitdn of o;;lsting 'fronulors with the U.S.S.R. in Asia. The French nevertheless perceive that Soviet policy encompasses poten. tially unstable situations: China does not yet recognize its Soviet border de lure, and German recognition of the Eder Neisse line is due only to the existing balance of forces in Europe. Although highly unlikely, were Ger. mahy- ever again to become great and powerful, it might once more .feel at- tracted territorially' eastward. Russia, aware of these possible dan? ,gers, favors coexistence, detente and status glib-and- France agrees. Tho Soviet Union is also aware of its strength as a world power'-as telaN tively neW an expetlence for MoscoW A& It is for ?Washingtom As . Russia, expands its 'global iiiflU?- ence, primarily through its fleet and air force, it penetrates everyWhere and this creates "frictions. But Whenever such frictions seem capable of pro. ducing trouble, Moscow is inclined to, halt its penetration: As far as the United States.i? .con- cerned, Franco feels the Russians Want a kind of equality with America; a' partition of power in the contemporary. sense. While thb Russians are not prey pared to retreat on the ideological front and there are mahy tobLradid tions in , these various impulses, the. French bell&Ve that in the end Mos- cow, 'eager to avoid conflict, will. restrain or accommodate abrasive sit. 'rations. With respect to his own policy, president Pompidou apparently seems to thihk yfaitce becomes Closer to the United States as U.S. superiority Over the U.S.S.R. diminishes. As a logical consequencoi the expression of French policy-today Is less anti-American than it Was under de Gaulle because Artier'. can superiority has petdeptibly de- clincd. Furthermore, it is felt here that Paris and Washington are now less far apart oh the Middle FaSt, are ap? preaching harmony on Vietnam as the, U.S.A. 'withdraws, and that they-have. reached a position Where de Gaulle's intervehtioli in North American af- fairs, via French Quebec, .has ended. It is improbable that any real dip- lomatic developments material1al~d from Brezhnev's interesting if rCther staid trip. Pompidou, a clever politic clan, subtly used it to stress the Isola tion of the Comthunlst. l5drty here an 2 as a statesman, to nvr,id new: and dotiniitivo entangling enf;agemonts, ' Brezhnev,. for his part, established. his role as the 'number one Soviet ?leadet abroad,. as well as at home, and did his best to. stir up new doubts and responses in Bonn and Washing- ton. Time will demonstrate how suc- cIssful the latter action is. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CJA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 25X1C10b Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Aaaroved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 December 1971 KGB/GRU OPERATIONS ABROAD The Soviets' flagrant and clumsy abuse of their diplomatic privileges in England left the British authorities late last September no alternative to expelling 10S Soviets from the country. The Soviets were expelled for engaging in espionage and subversion as officers of the Soviet intelligence organizations known as the KGB and its military intelligence counterpart, the GRU. The 105 expellees represent about 20% of all Soviets posted to Britain. Although the British had twice warned the Soviet government to put an end to the activities of the KGB and GRU in England, the expulsions seem to have been precipitated by the revelations of Oleg Lyalin, a KGB officer in London who had defected a short time before. In mid-October, a similar case came to public attention in Belgium. This, too, seems to have been precipitated by the defection and subsequent revelations of Anatoli Chebotarev, a high level officer in the GRU stationed in Belgium. Chebotarev sought and found asylum in the United States. Unlike the British, the Belgian authorities have revealed little of the case, but the Belgian press has ferreted out information which is proving reliable. Out of some 120 Soviets stationed in Belgium under one cover another, Belgian newspapers confidently assert that from 30-40 KGB or GRU officers, or more than 25% of the Soviet community there, have been implicated and will be expelled. (As of this writing, ten have been identified; see list attached). The Belgian case is only the most recent in a growing number of instances where free' world governments have exposed Soviet subversion and espionage in their countries. Still fresh in memory are the cases in the single year of 1971, which include subversion attempts in Mexico last March, in the Sudan and Ecuador in July, and espionage in the Congo, Ghana, and Italy. The recent British and Belgian cases are especially instructive in that they illustrate the massive scale of Soviet intelligence operations in the free world. The two cases are instructive in a number of other ways as well, offering many insights into the real functions of the Soviet official representation in foreign countries, most particularly how this representation is used as a mechanism for hiding its primary mission of espionage and subversion. Below are recounted some of the issues raised by the British and Belgian cases. The Soviet "Official" Representation in a Foreign Country Every Soviet abroad for a tour of duty or for an extended period is part of the official Soviet government representation, regardless of the organization or activity he purports to Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Approved Forl Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 represent. ere is no such thing as a private ovlet citizen living abroad for personal reasons (as is the case with tens of thousands of Westerners who reside abroad for private business reasons, for purposes of study, or merely for pleasure). Every Soviet citizen is abroad to accomplish a mission for the oo viet government. These officials work for innumerable orgpn- izations, some of the more common of which are the Embassy, Consulates, Trade Missions, Aeroflot (the Soviet airline), press representatives, Inturist (tourist organization), various specialized Soviet export-import and other commercial organizations, and local "Friendship" societies. The Size of the Soviet Official Community Abroad Many, if not most, Soviet missions abroad are disproportion- ately large in comparison to the amount of legitimate diplomatic, trade, corrm~ercial, cultural etc. activity with which they are tasked. The disproportion is accounted for by the large number of KGB and GRU personnel assigned to Soviet Embassies. It is instructive, for example, to note that the total of 105 Soviet intelligence officers expelled from Britain exceeds the entire British official representation in Moscow. The Proportion of KGB/GRU in Official Missions In Britain, the 105 KGB/GRU officers expelled represented about 20% of the official Soviet mission, in Belgium, about 25%. But it should be remembered that there remain in each of the two countries a number of additional officers known to the authorities in the host countries as members of Soviet intelligence. These officers will not be expelled for the time being. Thus, the 20-25% figure is merely a fraction of the total Soviet KGB/GRU personnel in each of the countries. In addition to those members of the Soviet mission who are genuine officers of the KGB or GRU, an indefinite number of the Embassy personnel work for the KGB or GRU in addition to or instead of their nominal or real assignments. Such persons are "co-opted" to work on intelligence tasks, determined by and under the control of the KGB or GRU. The famous Soviet GRU officer, Oleg Penkovsky, who was tried and shot in the Soviet Union in 1963 for smuggling secret information to the West, described this facet of Soviet intelligence operations as follows: "The proportion of KGB staff officers to the rest of Soviet embassy personnel is usually two men out of five. GRU staff officers number one man in five. There are generally fewer GRU men, but we must be counted separately because our 'neighbors' and we rarely work together. In most embassies it can be stated without error that 60 per cent of the embassy personnel are serving officers in intelligence, either KGB or GRU. Obviously most of the other Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 embassy employees are regularly co-opted for intelligence purposes."* Types of KGB/GRU Cover Soviet intelligence officers conceal their real missions by making a show of working in (i.e. under cover of) some legitimate capacity in the official Soviet cammunity. Oleg Penkovsky gave a rather formidable list of cover organizations under which the KGB and GRU operated during his time. The list will serve as an example of the variety and diversity of Soviet cover organizations used all over the world: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Byurobin (now the UPDK)--the office providing services for the Diplomatic Corps in Moscow Ministry of Foreign Trade Inturist (almost 100 per cent KGB, only a few GRU officers) All-Union "International Book" Association (almost 100 per cent KGB) All-Union Chamber of Commerce State Committee for the Co-ordination of Scientific Research Work State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries Council for the Affairs of Religious Sects, under the Council of Ministries, U.S.S.R. Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church TASS (The Soviet Union Telegraph Agency) Union of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Sovieties Committee of Soviet Women Ministry of Culture, U.S.S.R. Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace Committee of Youth Organizations, U.S.S.R. The. Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (Ango-Soviet Friendship, Soviet- Indian Friendship, etc. Over forty such societies.) Soviet Committee of the World Federation of Trade Unions Soveksportfilm Sovimportfilm The Moscow Post Office, 26 Kirov Street Central Telegraph, 7 Goriy Street The Academy of Sciences, U.S.S.R. Lomonosov State University He goes on to say: "This list is not complete - it could be made much longer. e Penovs Papers, by Oleg Penkovsky, Doubleday Co. Garden City, New orb, p. 67 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 In short, there is no institution in the U.S.S.R. that does not have in it an intelligence officer or agent of either the GRU or KGB. Furthermore, the majority of the personnel in Soviet embassies abroad are KGB and GRU employees."* In light of the above, it would be well (as British businessmen are now doing) to act on the assumption that every member of the Soviet official community is a KGB/GRU officer (or co-optee) until convincing evidence to the contrary is forthcoming. Repercussions of Soviet Subversion Activity Soviet embassies and trade missions do have legitimate and non-intelligence functions, though their importance is apt to be small in comparison with the intelligence mission. One of the unfortunate consequences of these recent examples of Soviet abuse of the functions of official missions abroad is that it damages and undermines the necessary and useful interchange that is conducted between two nations via their foreign represent- atives. Thus, Soviets abroad who actually have as their real missions the promotion of trade and exchange of goods, promoting cultural exchange, representing their government's political views, etc. etc, are understandably viewed with suspicion by foreign governments and by the population at large. People who have dealings with Soviet diplomats and other officials are justified in questioning these same individuals' real work in the country. And although the KGB and GRU exercise such power in Soviet embassies that little takes precedence over their espionage and subversion missions, the legitimate employees of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MIT) are understandably annoyed that they should be tarred with the KGB/GRU brush. It is an open question whether MFA and MFT complaints will now or ultimately result in reducing the priority of the.;KGB'.s mission, abroad. An even more unfortunate consequence of the London and Belgian spy exposures, for the Soviets at least, is that the KGB/GRU's indiscreet operations carry the danger of vitiating the current Soviet detente campaign being pursued so assiduously in the worldwide travels of the top Soviet leaders. (The spy scandals may indeed have contributed to French President Pompidou's firm refusal to consider a friendship treaty with the USSR, a treaty that Brezhnev was working very hard to achieve during his recent visit to France). If the Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgorny triumvirate of travelling salesmen either will not or cannot curb the sub- versive programs of their fellow Politburo member and KGB'Qhief, Yuri Andropov, there is good reason for the free world to question the good faith of Soviet detente policies. ffI d_, p.37 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 (Attached is a selection of the more comprehensive and reliable press accounts of the British and the more recent Belgian case which can be compared with the observations made above and which also can be used as some sort of measure of what may well be going on in various other countries). Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 24 November 1971 SOVIET OFFICIALS PUBLICLY IDENTIFIED IN THE PRESS AS BEING EXPELLED FROM BELGIUM Country of Origin (USSR) and Name LEONTYEV, Konstantin Ivanovich GLUSHENKO, Oleg Ivanovich PARFENOV, Yuri Yefimovich KRUGLYAKOV, Vladimir Borisovich MASHIN, Anatoliy Georgyevich SEREDA, Aleksey Milovich TRISHIN, Boris Ivanovich ZAYTSEV, Valentin Aleksandrovich FEKLENKO, Vladimir Nikolayevich KORINFSKIY, Georgiy Mikhaylovich Type of Assignment Commerical Commercial (Aeroflot) Commercial (Aeroflot) Commercial (Sovflot) Attache Commercial Mission Diplomatic Attache Commercial Diplomatic Military Attache Diplomatic Country From Which Expelled Month Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium Oct Oct Oct-Nov Oct-Nov Oct-Nov Oct-Nov Oct-Nov Oct-Nov Oct-Nov -Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020008F'YRGHT THE WASHINGTON POST 17 October 1971 j Z C?t.y o .?.112 By Thomas A. Donovan The writer was chief of the political section of the American embassy in section of the U.S. mission in Berlin before retiring from the Foreign Serv- ice in 1969. He is now doing research r -XHE SOVIET diplomatic service is living through uncomfortable' times. More than a hundred Soviet em bassy and trade mission personnel in London have lately been sent home in an unprecedented display of vigor by a generally easy-going British Foreign Office. This miniature diplomatic Bay of Pigs was no "deliberately stantin Umanski called on Stalin be- fore Umanski's departure for NVashing- ton, they found in the room a 30-year- old man whom neither had ever seen. to an end, the director motioned the young man forward and told Litvinov and Umanski that this was Andrei Gro- my o, who would accompany. Umanski to Was ington as his deputy and would later ke his place as ambassador. Ac- tually itvinov, who was soon to be dismis d as foreign commissar, was 1941, aid Gromyko had to wait for his How Rany Spies? planned provocation" by a reactionary rNVIE SOVIET foreign service over British government, as a Pravda com- li. w1 h; Gromyko now presides, like mentator charged. Rather it was the the fo eign services of many other result of the carelessness of the Soviet countri s, includes many bearers of leadership in letting its undercover op- diplom tic passports and diplomatic' eratives run their shady affairs with- titles w ose actual responsibilities are out outside supervision. not to e foreign ministry but to the This state of affairs goes back to Commi ee on' State Security, the KGB 1938, when the bulk of the old Soviet and, to lesser extent, the intelligence diplomatic corps which Maxim Litvi- director to of the armed forces. Some nov had trained and directed was dis- have sp nt their entire careers in the posed of and their places taken by employ ent of the intelligence agen- party and security service careerists cies. Ot ear began in the regular diplo rnen sufficiently in the manner of V.M. mattes rvice, only later to be" co-opted .eryone around them was being packed Preci e figures are hard to come by, i i n off to Siberia. The reconstituted M s- for eve knowledgeable Soviet defec- try of Foreign Affairs continued to re- tors ha e often not known how many cruit its own staff for diplomatic busy- 4 of their colleagues have had organiza- it work but little else. The ministry n s tional yalities different from their present shape, an unhappy amalgam of nev- low-prestige professional diplomats, nominal ones. It seems certain, erthless that rather more than than half of half of and of high-powered secret police oper- the em loyees of Soviet diplomatic atives and political proteges, is thus missionf are now primarily responsible one of the more enduring Institution- to the cret police rather than to the building achievements of Stalin and foreign ministry. Aleksander Kazna- eign minister, is a product of the Sta- has wri ten that two-thirds of the 36 lin-Molotov era. His first foreign as- employ s at the mission were mem- signment was as deputy chief of mis- bers of Soviet intelligence, responsible sion In Washington in 1939. The cir- directly o intelligence headquarters in_ cumstances under which Litvinov first Moscow. met Gromyko are suggestive of the Col. nkovsky, from observation of' .changed situation in the Soviet foreign his coil gues in Ankara where he was service after the onset of the purges. a milit y attache and from his experi- His foreign service subordinates are Woen Litvinov and Ambassador Icon- ence ow ilitar intelli-, 1b61bffddhdi ti as from (lase a _1A_ nE?ZS- U4_ Approved For Rel gence hierarchy, concluded that 3,000 of the approximately 5,200 Soviet repre- sentatives stationed abroad in 1961 were professional intelligence officers.' This figure did not include employees, of the regular foreign service or of other non-intelligence agencies who were co-opted for intelligence work after having been recruited and sent abroad. Kaznacheez was such a regular diplomatic officer. He did not begin to work for Soviet intelligence until after he had already taken up a regular overseas assignment under the foreign ministry. In his case and in others like It, the co-opted officer remained on the regular foreign service payroll and re- ceived his promotions in the regular foreign service hierarchy, with appro- priate assistance from intelligence serv- ice headquarters in Moscow when needed. The general accuracy of these esti- mates of the size of the secret police presence in the regular diplomatic es- tablishment can scarcely he doubted. Nothing else could explain how numer- ous and how varied have been the dip- lomatic titles of Soviet embassy per- sonnel apprehended in the cours(*of clandestine intelligence work by West- ern counter-espionage services. With dreary regularity, Soviet embassy functionaries whose formal positions have been in cultural, trade, press, eco- nomic, or consular work have been shown to be busy servicing dead letter drops, surreptitiously passing money In public toilets to various kinds of friends of the Soviet Union, or other- wise engaged in the costly and exciting but politically unimportant game of testing the vigilance of the security services of other countries. The Lowly Ajiibassador ICE WHOLESALE subtraction of I foreign service personnel from regular diplomatic work has damaged, :the standing of the soviet ambassador, by leaving him ill-equipped to compete. with the intelligence organizations for- the ears of the authorities in Moscow. Approved For Release 1999/09/0.2: CIA-RDP79-01194A0003000206y-Y1RGHT associating freely with foreigners, and! so are cut off from access to essential non-secret information about condi tions in their country of assignment. The employees of the security services,, on the other hand, are encouraged to. roam about reasonabiy widely as a part of their Intelligence mission. Inev- itably, therefore, security service per- sonnel tend to be better informed than their regular diplomatic colleagues. The great lead which the collectors of clandestine intelligence have in pro- viding Moscow with foreign policy in- formation has this important conse- quence:.It makes the Soviet leadership depend for policy guidance on reports from the security services rather than from the regular diplomatic' hierarchy. The typical Soviet ambassador, there- fore, unless he be a man with the ex. ceptional professional expertise of Am- bassador Ivan Maiski in wartime Lon- don, is in no position to win the ear of his superiors, even were he inclined to look at foreign matters differently from his nominal subordinates in the secret police. His political reporting, accordingly, can seldom be more than a pale reworking of such Intelligence material as his surly intelligence agency associates have allowed him to see.' The regular Soviet diplomat is also handicapped by his constant need, if he is to protect his career, to avoid in- curring the disapproval of the security hierarchy. Diplomats of all countries must occasionally guard against being thought excessively tolerant of foreign viewpoints, and Soviet diplomats more than most have reason to worry about such suspicions. In Soviet society, they can best protect themselves by es- pousing policy positions congenial to the institutional interests of the secret police. Such careerist considerations would be quite sufficient, for example, to ac- count for the notorious haste with which Ambassador Stepan Chervo- nenko in Prague began to urge military intervention in Czechoslovakia when it became evident that the Czechoslovak party's reformers were beginning to move against Czechoslovak agents of the Soviet secret police. In Chervonen,- ko's case, an elementary careerist need. to take up a hostile attitude toward the Czechoslovak deviation must have been particularly pressing, for Chervo- nenko could hardly have wished to have his Prague tour end as unsatisfac-. torily for the Soviet Union as had his The readiness of ambassadors, acting out of weak-minded regard for their own careers, to look to outside agen- cies for support and advancement is,. of course, no new thing in the Soviet service, as elsewhere. In the Soviet diplomatic service, however, this proc- ess has been taken one step further, by rewarding with ambassadorial assign, merits men who have had service in the intelligence apparatus. The new style Soviet amhassador is not just a man who can he counted on to per- form as the secret police hierarchy would wish; he may well be: a career intelligence officer. For there is strong reason to believe that a considerable minority of Soviet ambassadors are in' fact up-graded employees of the intelli- gence services rather than represents-. tives of the Ministry of Foreign Af- fairs. The best known example is Alek- sandr Paniushkin, who was Soviet am- bassador to Nationalist China from. 1947 to 1952, and to Communist China from 1952 to 1953. Paniushkin's police connections were brought to light by Nikolai Khokhlov, an MVD agent sent out to assassinate a Russian emigre in West Germany in 1954. Khokhlov re- ceived the detailed instructions for his mission from Paniushkin at the secret police headquarters in Moscow. Sergei Kudryavtsev, who was Soviet ambassa-' dor i~ Havana in 1960, is another whose career, while nominally a suc- cession of regular diplomatic and for- eign ministry assignments, was proba= hly always with the intelligence serv- ices. Kudryavtsev helped set up one of the early spy rings uncovered in Can- ada with the defection of Igor Gouz.- enko from the Soviet embassy in Ot- tawa. For Little Gain I' is COMMONLY argued in non- Communist countries that the intensive intelligence effort carried on by personnel assigned In Sovietcliplo- matic missions, though here and there overdone or done clumsily, has at any rate permitted the Soviet leadership to foresee the political future With. more confidence than their Western coun- terparts. In fact, however, this. is far from being the case. The historical record suggests rather that Soviet in- telligence can have been little more successful than western in providing advance information on developments of political importance. For all their massive investment by. surprise as often as their Western rivals. They did not expect that Nkrumah would be overthrown in Ghana or that Sukarno would fall from, power so quickly in Indonesia. They did not believe that Syria would break away from the United Arab Republic or that Israel would defeat Egypt. They did not foresee that the United. States would learn of the missiles In Cuba or would react to them as It did. They did not anticipate the June, 1953, uprising in East Berlin-Khokhlovf re- ported that the Central Committee or- dered a high-level, CIA-style post rmor- tem to find out why the MVD had known so little of what was going on in East Germany-and they have been no better informed about important devel- opments elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Yet in all. of these countries the Sovi- ets had large and expensive Intelli- gence collection programs and in some of them they even controlled the local intelligence apparatuses. Spectacular instances of Soviet suc- cesses in the recruitment of well-in- formed officials of other countries-of Alger hiss from the State Department, of Burgess and MacLean from the Brit. ish Foreign. Office, or of Philby from the British Secret Service-seems not to have saved the Soviets from politi- cal surprises. The use which the Sovi- ets have been able to make of informa- tion from such Informants appears most likely to have been limited to scoring points over Western intelli- gence agencies. Philby is said to have given away an Anglo-American intelligence operation against Albania. This was no douut an inconvenience for the Western intelli- gence organizations involved, and worse still for the operatives sent to Albania, but the Soviet coup in un- covering the operation w a s not very profitable for the Soviet Union. Nor wen Its failure any national hardship for Britain and the United States. Albania has gone its own way, as it would have anyway, and this is, pretty much what can he said of all of the causes and controversies In which knowledgeable officials turn out to have worked for the other side. As for the recruitment of Alger Hiss, the most that can be said for it from the Soviet side is that this particular espionage effort perhaps helped put the Demo- crats out of office in 1952 and, in the end, made Richard Nixon President in 1968 . previous assignment, as ambassador in of men and money in intelligence evemcts, of M Peking. Approved For Release '1~91&911O9/G2 ,G~IAkRD1Pg9O4h194A 1090P ,reign policy CPYRGHT nasen on sucn1ernsn arramsra nlt'rmatmy" satisfactory is less certain. For in the evaluation of political probabilities, a bureaucratically organized intelligence organization, with even the best-placed agents, is still an unsatisfactory substi- tute for the judgment of the shrewd in- dividual observer who is intellectually Independent of the institution or or- ganization he serves. And it has been the misfortune of the Soviet diplomatic service that its upside-down internal organization almost guarantees that there will be a lack of such Indispen- sable, disinterested and objective ob. servers. The present generation of Soviet leaders presumably does not consider the absence of such observers to be a weakness of the Soviet diplomatic service. In their operational concep- tions of the nature of the diplomatic profession, the prosperity of the Intel-' licence organizations h is s priority over the uncomfortabe and unflatter- ing kind of reports they might receive from old-fashioned kinds of diplomats. Khrushchev, it may be, saw the con- ventional and orthodox servility of his foreign affairs apparatus as a defi- ciency, for he made no secret of his scorn for Gromyko: If he were to ask his foreign minister to take off his trousers and sit on a block of ice, Gro? myko would have to comply, Khru- shchev remarked to Prime Minister Macmillan in Moscow in 1959. But Khrushchev's successors are more com- fortable with the foreign affairs appa- ratus they inherited from ther prede- cessor. For them, the claims of the or- affairs establishment and of the Intel- ligence cadres who constitute the priesthood of this state church are ac- cepted without challenge. To compare Soviet intelligence with the priesthood of a secret re- ligious cult, a new kind of voodooism, is not at all far-fetched, for ritualized behavior of the professional intelli- gence officer has much In common with jungle magic..The intelligence of- ficer uses another name than his own, has a peculiar and stylized manner of communication with his fellows, and generally is obligated to conduct him- self in accord with a set of formal rules having little relation to the actual needs of the larger society which sup- ports him. When the MVD rezident at Rangoon decided that he needed to have Kazna/ cheev translate stolen Burmese docu- merits for him, Kaznacheev was not told of the new assignment until he'd been called to come to a Moscow hotel room for an interview. And when he returned to Rangoon, it was explained, he was not to mention the matter to anyone, but to wait until some un- named person (who of course was the rezidert whom he'd known all" along) addressed him with the words, "Greet- ings from Peter." Kaznacheev was to answer, "Do you know him?", after which he could go to work making his translations. The hocus pocus of pro- fessional intelligence has thus added a new dimension of absurdity to the prac-~ tice of foreign affairs,'much surpassing the innocuous silliness of the railing card ceremonial of old-fashioned diplo- U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 11 October 1971 E-n BRITAIN: The damage done to the effective op-' eration of the Soviet diplomatic mis- sion by this childish internal rigamo role is trivial enough, however, when compared with the harm done to So- viet Interests by Russian preoccupa- tion with the game of intelligence. Al- ienation of foreigners who might be friends of the Soviet Union by the clumsy and crude methods of Soyiet intelligence is perhaps not counted-I1s a loss in the Soviet calculus of costs, but an immense loss it nonetheless surely is. For any observer with experi- ence in these matters who is not pro. fessionally committed to the aggran- dizement of the intelligence profession knows very well that authentic infor- mation about other countries-or, what is more important than detailed information, an accurate insight into the dynamics of the foreign govern- ment and society-is far more easily come by in frank and open exchanges of opinion with foreigners than In the furtive meetings favored by Soviet in. telligence professionals. And it is just this Soviet preference for secret police methods which makes it so difficult for, the bearers of Soviet diplomatic pass- port$ to acquire this essential under- standing of the ways of other. coun- tries. It is unlikely that the present Soviet leadership will learn anything from the mischief done by its operatives in London. It is not too late, on the other hand, for the managers of U.S. foreign policy to put a brake on the empire- building ambitions of our own profes. sional collectors of clandestine intelli- gence. CPYRGHT OING ALL OVER WORLD Latest disclosures in London underscore this fact: Kremlin "diplomats"-by the thousands -are out stealing secrets in every corner of the globe. Reported from WORLD CAPITALS Britain's crackdown on 105 Russian spies in late September was the biggest single strike ever made against Soviet espionage agents-but it exposed only the tip of a massive iceberg. Western intelligence authorities re- port that thousands of other Soviet "dip- lomats"-possibly 1 out of every 2 Rus- sians sent abroad-are still at work on spy missions. Top French security officers believe that 50 per cent of all 1,000 Communist- bloc representatives in Paris are espi- onage agents. Over the past eight years, France has tried 58 spy cases, 45 involv- ing Red nations. Officials of West Germany estimate that 10,000 Communist informants are operating in that country alone, chan- ncling their wares to the Riissians, pri- maril . They say this is a "rock hot torn" figs sir. Publicly cited: 140 Reds. A world- wide survey by "U. S. News & World Approved For ReleAcP 1 qqq/nq/n2 - (IA_RfP7q_fl11 MAnnnAnnn9nnn'I.1 T RED SPIES CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-O1194AO00300020001-1 Report" discloses that since the begin- on charges n financing The switch game. The Russians ring of 1969 alone, more than 1110 Com- labor-union elements who have fey' qualms about switching their monists,, all but a handful of them wanted to overthrow the foreign representatives from one role to Russians, have been publicly accused of Government, another. Take the case of Aleksandr Ivan- 1f 9 - _ spying. Some specific cases: ? Aleksandr Tikhomirov, a translator at the United Natinlls since 1965, was expelled in February, 1970, after being arrested in Seattle on charges of al- tempt iug to bribe a U. S. Air Force sergeant to get information on anli- aircraft and missile defenses in the Pacific Northwest. 0 A "Pravda" correspondent in New York, Boris Orckliov, was told to leave for engaging in what the U. S. termed "nonjournalist activities hostile to the interest of the U. S." ? Igor Andreyev, Soviet counselor at the U. N., was kicked out by the U. S. in July, 1969, accused of espionage. ? Last July, the Congo expelled 20 Soviet and East European officials on charges of being involved in student riots. Iii August, the Sudan expelled the 11 1 A I 1 I the Sovi ?t I l at nl n IIlt l place Aleksey Belyakov, Ambassador to Finland, last I~cbriIaiv because he allegedly helped to plot a general strike. Many more than 1.10 Russian agents have been caught-but expelled qui- etly because host countries believed it was in the na- tional interest to avoid worsening relations with the Soviet Union through public spats. Deliberate exposure. some nations deliberately allow Soviet spies to know they have been di.rcovercd in hopes they will leave the country without fore. jug the Government to make a diplomatic issue tiS . 11 I,. I tan In . of the case. Embassy counselor for allegedly, lhelping Comma nisi planters %% -]to tried and failed For all Moscow's exprri- to take over the Covc?rnnac,rlt? ence in espionage, Russian ? Au Iii tourist official and a Soviet as are often described trade-delegation member were caught in as crude. Time after time, s Argentina last November with microfilm a Soviet agent exposed , of military and industrial installations, a spy in one country will ? Two Soviet Embassy officers and a surface in another as a Russian member of the U. N. bnterna- diplomat-even as ambas- tional Telecomrnrnlicthe: s Union in sailor. Sometimes Russia 'tries to return Switzerland were expelled for collecting agents to a country that has once thrown Swiss identity papers for use by spies them out. Y pY British For(iign Secretary Sit- Alec in Switzerland and out. Douglas- I tome cited an example of this ? Lebanon declared two Soviet Em-: in a letter to Soviet Foreign Minister bassy officials perscrraa non grain in Oc- Andrei Gromyko complaining of Bus- tober, 1969, for attempting to persuade sian spy activities. an Air Force pilot to steal' a French- According to Sir Alec, Moscow nom- made Mirage fighter plane and fly it to mated is First Secretary of the Russian the Soviet Union. Embassy in London :t 'm'in who, while ? Ecuador sent home two 'top Soviet a member of the Soviet hale delegation Embassy officials and the chief econo- years before, had alleniptt?rl to bribe a mist of the Russian trade mission in July British businessman to obtain military etpripinent. Britain refused hire re-entry. Fidel Castro's Cuba. Ile now is corrc- spondent for Russia's Novosti news serv- ice in Chile and Pena. Western experts on Russia say this is not I demotion. According to Western authorities, So- viet agents sent abroad operate under a variety of "cover" jobs-embassy chauf- feur as well as ambassador, trade-union official, interpreter, newsman, airline official, military attacht', the Intourist man who arranges vacations in Ihissin, the labor .spacialisl at nn international Irnde-anion confcrcurc, or till, "ioterlna- lionnl civil servant" it talc ll. N. Dual targets. Tai gels of tlussinn agents are as varied as their covers and include anyone who ran give Own) nnil- itary or political informal ion. Moscow gives top priority to industrial espionage In an effort 1o keep tuh?icetl of new Western wcutioils and III c?alc?11 rip in coin- pltler and other indristrial technology. Some nuthoiities cite the case of till- British-French Concorde supersonic transport as an example of Soviet mans. trial espionage. Several Russian nllieials were tspelted from 11'rstcrn i;in?ni/r for utlcnIpl ing to Irani I lie (:oncnutl,'s cet Irh. Ellrlgeari rtcsvspapr rs have m;rint.ninon for years that the Itiissians arlually sltc?- cccdrd it) stealing data on tilt` Conclude enabling ahem to heat Britain and France into the air with the TI tT-141 SST. Tile TU-14.1 looks so much like Ilan Concorde that sonic major West l out- pcan publications call it the "Con vich" or Lite "Concordslo. Dozens upon dozens of sclntrlito t'?tst'ti of Soviet espionage Nought to lio:11t since early 1969 make it elcar that hilt' aim is not the only target of Socirt agents. Russian spies are bus}' t t rv where-from Canada to Argentinai. '[,,m Japan to the Ivory Coast--;1,:1theriio in- formation to serve the Kremii !. I:::00) 7tP NII~STHGGERRMANY Russia Details of P DAILY TELEGRAPH, London 27 September 1971 CPYRGHT MISSIONS FROM MOSCOW CPYRGHT In FRANCE Ibere are 350 Soviet officials. Seventyrtiiuc are tiil)JO1Lais, enjoying lull diplo- matic iuununity,. Most of the Russians work at The. Sovittl k:nlbassy, in the Rue d.e Urcntcllc, on the Jell; Bank. Undoes are cmployed at. UNESCO- in the Place do 1,outcnoy, the Russian cousu- lale, the oaliees i'ot Acrollol, Lite Soviet airline, at Le Bout .s,ctii toe stauus or privilege Norwegian diplomats in A4os- ."ill" s. ~ i ,. 9' 0002004,111. !n Itenmark e e a RUSSIA : liah a j- j at emlta sa as a . II sinus all over the worn lucre a I e 30 1llLSSlilll tll,ttJ t0- Soviet 't'rade Mission and In? gainst six Danes n and. t ie heads of Aeroflot mats, a formal inn tnflirn and t Bonn, a trade mission ill verified exactly ,yesterday, but Cologne, a Black Sea and the embassy stall is under- Baltic Sea transport. insur- , stood to be similar to Ilhat in establishment in Hant- Brussels -about :.0. 'burg newspaper ollices and In ITALY there arc 4.1 Itussians l all itourisl office in West will, diplunialic slatds Berli t . These rsiitu{:ions ai'e estimated tci eta Jloyn-ltogeilter--200 people, 13:1. of : them ournalisi.s. i igh v-six diplomats and wives tYe 1 slut olhcially in 1301111 as nicni ei-s- - of the . Russian shins at oilier missions ;are enibr sy staff. estimated to nunmber 70. In BE IUM there are 50 Rus- : In NORWAY there arc 25 I1us- ion ew ALrency. hornet There, " ire Ihuu;;ht 10 .be over 410 ltussiaits working for other missions in Italy, ' There are 36 accredited linsslaq CPYRGHT for early in the new year, on tile basis that this visit could pcrliaps inaugurate a new era of better Anglo-Soviet relations.. provided the spy situation Is dealt with now, once and fo:' ill, At the same time, the Foreign Office here is braced for the possibility of reprisal expulsions against the staff of the British Embassy in Moscow. There are 78 altogether, of whom 40 are accredited is. diplomats. , Files for Britain The terns of the expulsion of the Soviet diplomats in London were spelt out in a terse? torehly worded Aide llemoire, which was handed to the Soviet: (.'har.gc here, Alr Ippnlitov, lie was summoned to the F''oveig,n Oflicc yesterday by Sir Donis Greenhill. head of the diplomatic service. The 410 diplomats-)Host from the embassy, but some working' for the trade delegation and other organisations in London -have been given two weeks to leave Britain, From now on, the Aide. ',Wnloire said, " the numbers of Soviet ollicials in the: various cate',ories . , will he limited to the level at which they will stand after the with drawal of the persons referred to (and) if a Soviet official is required to leave the country in future. as a result of hi,_ having been detected in intel ligence activities. the ceiling in: that category wil be rechrce(1 by one." (Among the Soviet, or;,,anisations with sizeable staffs in Britain are Aeroflot : the government wood delega- tion ; the Moscow Narodny Bank ; Intourist : and A1M0 Plant. Last night the Foreign Office would not comment on )tow many employees of these firms were affected by either the expulsion orders or the warnings. The Aide MOnoire also stressed that, as part of the clearing operation, the re-entry visas of certain Soviet officials now overseas were no longer valid. Other major points made during yesterday's meeting between the Soviet Charge and 'Sir Denis Greenhill were : Whilehall has refused visas to a number of officials nomi- nated to posts in Britain dur- ing, the past year by the Soviet Government " on account of their previous activities." The number of Soviet offi- cials already in Britain-"and the proportioin of them engaged in intelligence work "-has been causing "grave concern " for some time. A lengthy - and equally strong-worded - Forei,,n Ofrice statement recalled that the size of the Soviet Enth;i;"y' w'a" limited in November, 14105, "hut the numbers in other categories continued to grow. 550 officials "The total is now over 550, which is higher than the coni- p.arlhle figure for Soviet offi- cials appointed to any other Western country-, including the United Slates." The statement said that In the lust 1'2' months, several Soviet officials have NEW YORK TIMES 2'5 'September 1971 CPYRGHT liven withdrawn at the request 01' the Voreign Office, "alter having been detected in intel- ligence activities: others have left the country of their own accord, after'bc'in;r so detected before their withdrawal coul(i be requested. In addition," the Foreign Office said, " a number of,Soviet officials have applied to conic to Britain in various capacities, but have been refused visas because they are known to be intelligence officers." Much of the statement was devoted to the rule of the K(;13 agent who defected a few weeks ago : " Further evidence of the scale and nature of Soviet espionage in Britain, conducted under the auspices of the Soviet Embassy, the trade delegation, and other organisations, has been provi? (led by a Soviet official who recently applied for, and was given, permission to remain in this country. "This man, an officer of the KG13, brought with him cer- tain information c n d u? a o d ntcnts, including plans for also took with him two satchels Agents of all British security services-1115, A111i, AI17 Ili( the Special Branch-have taken part in the operation against the Soviet spy rings. Spread over the past nine months, the counter-espionage eanipair:n was unique for this country in peac'ctiule. It was discovered that 'Soviet agents were attempting to establish cells in a number of naval and at'uty.estltl)lishntcnls in tile South of England, but these Were " rendered harm less" by swift action by the British agents who infiltrated the rings. It is believed that the defect- ing KGB man proved of crucial importance to the opera- tion. lie was able not only to provide details of the networks of espionage agents, their covet' identities, and areas of opera. tion, but he was also able to p r o v i d e counter-intelligence with a precise " league table " of KGB operatives in this country The Foreign Office refused to reveal any details about the man last night, but It is believed he was, initially, encouraged to defect. early this year. 110 made a , final decision about r,vvcn weeks ago, and since then ha,; been under close guard ;,c it Secret Service "bolt hole " ut the ]tome Counties. Front there, workio . Willi British agents, he ;lclped in piecing together (he complete picture of Soviet espionage In Britain. Whin he defected, ho clanlmc(I with fles. Instruction sheets, and papers detailing his country's spying operation here. But. even before he left the service of the Soviet Govern. Merit, he is believed to have supplier] British agents with information described phler- nwtically last night as " invaluable." The British Government Is now cracking down on a scale unprecedented in all the diplo- matic history of the two countries, strctchin:; Dark to the 'tincus of i'ctrr the Great. CPYRGHT BRITISH EXPEL 90 RUSSIANS FOR ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES; LONDON IS BLUNY. Moscow will riot be allowed to replace those expelled or. excluded, and if anyone is sittt- r~} iit''}~ n ~t llarly expelled in future, his f1IG.B. Defector Gave, place, must remain unfilled. It was the most drastic clip-, Data That Became .lomatic action in memory, here r Action sit c; IJl;%V1ICI' 21F;l111Ib 6 111L1-111- Basis t or Action Bence agents in Soviet missions, which have 550. officials in Britain. It was taken on the villay ot( (. r .( vie cpre- 5C1 itatlves to leave because of By' ANTHONY LEWIS basis of information. supplied LONDON,'. Sept. 24--Britain lncinber of the Soviet secret olice, Along with the extraordinary published the texts of a note' the matter with Moscow. and two letters to Moscow and. The decision to take sweeps of a Foreign Office statement.! ' ing action followed a dramatic Link to European Talks coup for British counterintcl- The note, an icy document,: :Jigence early this month, when called on the Soviet Union to 'the defect: or, a high official of end "operations against the ?the K.G.D., the Soviet secret security of this country." It police, got In touch with British said that the halt should conic. agents outside this country and before preparations for the' arranged to come to London. Be European security conference brongjit with hint a list of Soviet desired by the Russians. espionage personnel in .itnitain. Soviet espionage has worried ' The formal Foreign Office British officials for, years, The Statetlfent t,sid this about the foreign Secretary, Sir Alec defector: 'boughs-Monte, said two "Farther evidence of (lid espionage actly its and barrfi t c oaths I th r d 1 cJ c of 50- thc return of 1AX{ P~'(a+lp(IQk1 't' 0004200111711 )rItnIn cot- ,temporarily away. untness. The Foreign Office ithe Government was pressing ducted under till, nuspicrs, of he , vt ?, ra.. a ( other oragniz ration and tl~ ~r~,yy{{~}}yyiiT__ n y4t~U t has been prot'RlQM>'v`hViNle~ tt , 1 official who recently applied certain what proportion of these for and was given permission are intelligence officers," In remain in this country, Sir Alec mentioned a recent "This man, an officer of the attempt to send an intelligence K.G.B., ; brought with him ccr- operative here. He said a visa lain Information and docu- had been sought for B. G. Glush- menu, including plans for in- chenko as First Secretary in filtration of agents for the pug.- the embassy, though he, was pose of sabotage," caught here years ago trying The suggestion of sabotage, to bribe a businessman. to ob .with its ring of , wartime tain details.: of secret, -Military activity, was especially surpris- equipment. ~ , '" ' i ing. British sources would say "This is the matt whbhi some' nothing more on this point, or ;;Deign organization has nolili? on the whereabouts, name or nated to serve n' first Secre- history of the defector. Lary at your embassy," Sit' Alegi One piece of information said scdrnfuil}},.Ills reference,to brought by the defector is said "sonic orgiuhizatlon'' evidently to he a Soviet plan for infil- hncant tile which Is utt? tration of the Navy. A partieu- derstood to have large numbers lar target was the secret re- of places In all embassies. ; search establishment at Port- Mr. Grontykrh's failure to an: land, on the south coast, from swer was taken badly in the which secrets were stolen be-i Foreign Office doubtless tween 19-55-,and 1961 by a spy worse than the Russians ex- 'The letters published by the Foreign office, to which no re ply has been received, were! from Sir Alec to the Soviet For-' eign Minister, Andrei A. Gro- myko. The first, dated, Dec. 3; 1970, was written, Sir Alec said, at Mr. Gromyko's request: after the matter was raised prl-I vately with him during a visit; to London. The. second. was dated Aug. 4. Direct and Sarcastic The letterA contained lan- guage that would have to 'be called undiplomatic in its direct. ness and even sarcasm. "I take it'+ 'Sir Alec wrote' Mr. Gromyko last month, "that you yourself are fully informed ,of the Scale of Soviet intelli-I gence activities in this country? "You are no doubt aware', that the total number of Sbvict! officials on, the' staff of.Soviet! ,diplomatic, commercial ands NEW YORK TIMES CPYRGHT1 October 1971 Soviet Agent fwo Defected Identified by London By ANTHONY LEWIS +1e1 to Tbs. New York TlmeI LONDON. Sept. 30 - The Foreign Office t_n5_y Identified! the Soviet agent who defectedi to Britain early in September; as Oleg Lyalin. Mr. Lyalin, who is 34 yearsi old, was an obscure member of the Soviet trade delegation here.' He gave the British .evidence of Soviet espionage and sabotage plans that brought last week's pected. it wan n It the Government had 5cl aime;, which It displayed promi- nently In early editions today. The Foreign Office then de- cided, that it must rush every- The order has brought angrYl protests from Moscow and hints of early retaliation. It has also beg n to come under some crit- icis here, as having been han- died In so sensational a man- ner that It might harm East- We relations. Bat Prime Minister Heath's Gov rnment has ruled out any retr at, whatever the con- seq ences. It can be said cate- gori ally that the Soviet offi- CPYRG}=4T ~epCt~ti Rnie~dif'Wi *0 0304?1ejectlons I A~ Since 1960 Britain has de- A reprisal could be expected manded the Immediate recall now, but it need not come ?in of.27 Soviet officials reliably equivalent terms and in fact reported to have been found in could not because there are so active espionage. In the: same many fewer Britons in Moscow. period 12 British subjects have What might happen is a Soviet been convicted of spying ? for move on some other front, such the Soviet Union. as British tourism. More than 40 visa applica= The view -here is that the Lions by Soviet officials for possibilities of Soviet retalia- posting In London have also don are limited by one diplo- been rejected since 1960 on the matic fact: The Russians need grothd'that the applicants were British , agreement to get the intelligence agents. The Soviet E opean security conference Union has, withdrawn sopme' of they have wanted for so long. f its representatives; The embassy staff consists of Iing asked because It knew they 40 diplomats and 38 secretaries were compromised., ` . r. and aides. There are said to he The Soviet Ambassador; In 20 ether British nationals in London, Mikhail N. Smirnov-1 Moscow, including half a dozen sky, is' on leave in Moscow. In ibusinessmen and some dozen his absence .tlhe charge :d'af- journalists-a total of about faires, Ivan Ippolitov, was 110, ` called to the Foreign Office, to or the 550 Russians here, 146 receive the note from the are In the embassy. The othersi permanent Under Secretary, Sir ,are attached to the large trade Denis Greenhill. delegation, to Intourist, the The note said that "inadmis travel agency, , to the airline sible activities" by Soviet of. Aeroflot and to other coillmer- ficials here were "a matter of cial enterprises. I serious concern to Her "-Maj-) The embassy has been limited esty's Government," The re- to 150 In staff since a Royal Air curring need to expel officials, Force technician, Douglas Brit- or deny them visas, it said, put; ten,'pleaded guilty: In. 1963 to a strain on relations. I having passed security data to The lists of the 105'Russians' the Russians for ilk years, He `said to be engaged In Intel- said 'he' had been blackmailed ligence activities were attached. and threatened. The embassy Was requested to There has been no ccillnH on ',have those still here leave with= (hr, trade and commercial df- In two weeks. fh,es and they have mush? Sir Alec'will depart tomorrow roomed; the total was 138 In ,for,the United Nations General 1950 and 2411 as recently as :Assembly session in New 'York;' 1960. There are more Soviet where he expects to Meet. Mt.' officials In Britain than in the Gromyko. United States, If the Unltcd'Na4 Sir Alec Is also due to pay tions delegation' is excluded,'an 'a visit to the Soviet, Union more than In any other country. early In the new year., Ne I ' Shtcc trade. has been stag? would still like to go bait It ft+ rant, the British Government an. open question whether the has no doubt that many of the Invitation will stand. supposed commercial employes CPYRGHT deadline, one week from tomor- tage. For example, the United row. States has recently completed Plans for Sabotage a massive Installation at Orford The Government was moved Ness, on the cast coast of to early action by the informa- Britain, to detect missiles. tion brought by Mr. Lyalin. Informed quarters say the de- Especially shocking, among the cision to act on such a large (papers he took with him, were scale was not intended to dam- 1highly detailed plans for sab- age the progress' of d'tcnto In lotage. (Europe. Any damage now, it is Early warning systems for argued, would be the result of a `detection of approaching ballls- ,deliberate Soviet policy decision to retaliate. decision to expel 90 Soviet of-' Icial on the expulsion list will ` W`It ""i"11j; Ltic The wide publicity for the spy! *MbVW )~ ge 1 ' 'c . c caused some ficials and baA CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 ? ClP1 p ;i941,1N"03013020 illd not be sure embarrassm roved here. But it is the Soviet Embassy to The insisted that the mass expulsion the express, he held his thumb who had defected. Thus many Daily Express. The leak to that and forefinger about an inch might have feared that their was ordered only when quiet right-wing paper was managed apart to indicate a small story. names had been turned over diplomacy had obviously failed. in a curiously stagey manner. On Aug. 31, The Express to the British. One factor In the Govern- Two Express reporters were carried a 10-line item to the The publication o fMr. Lya- ~ment's decision to act without talking yesterday at the em- effect that Oleg Lyalin, a "Rus- Iln's name and picture thus further diplomatic approaches bassy with a diplomat just or- Sian trade delegate," had been could set some persons' minds rived from Moscow, Vladimir. arrested on a drunken driving at rest. That is thought to have to the Soviet was Mr. Lyalin s Pavlinov. For a long time Mr. charge. He was released on been one reason for the Soviet defection. Pavlinov parried their questions bail of $120, to appear in court move in leaking the name. There had long been knowl- about the mysterious defector Sept. 30-today. Another motive might have with a smile. Reporters jammed the magis- been to begin painting the ttates' court at Marlborough, source of so much British in- edge of Soviet attempts at I espionage. But the extent of the Name'In Your Newspaper Street this morning to await; formation as a drunk. The activities shocked Prime Minis- Then, as The Express story Mr. Lyalin, but he never came. Russians have also dd;pribed ter Heath and his colleagues, described it, Mr. Pavlinov let lThen, at mid-day,c the Foreign' him as a lady's man. it drop that the missing Soviet; Office confirmed his name. It But whatever Mr. Lyalin's and prepare some, official had been in the trade did so with what seeme dto personal characteristics, his in- mission. lie added that the) some reluctance or annoyance. formation is regarded as ex- evidence of efforts to mission. future sabotage. I gentleman had recently been in-~ British counterintelligence ',tremcly weighty. The British Mr. Lyalin's name was con- volved in a traffic accident. ( was believed to feel that while ;Government has already acted firmed officially today after it "His name, gentlemen, was Mr. lyalin's name remined se- on it to move against domestic had been carefully leaked by in your newspaper, Mr. Pay-I Icret. Any local contacts of So- (contacts of Soviet agents. NEW YORK TIMES 17 October 1971 CPYRGHT Special to The New York Times BRUSSELS,, Oct. 16-Belgian press reports M773-337=15 Anatoly Tchibotarev, a 38-year- old member of the Soviet trade! mission here who disappeared) k s ago from his home two wee had exposed a Soviet spy net- work that had been eavesdrop- ping on telephone conversations at headquarters of the North 42 Soviet Agents' 'Reported Exposed In Spying or, NATO .Atlantic Treaty organization ere and at Supreme Hcadquar- ers Allied Powers Europe in earby Mons. Forty-two Soviet agents, embers of the K.G.B. or its ilitary equivalent, the G.R.U., re reported to have been made, own to United States in-telli- ence officials. SPECIAL, Brussels 6 October 1971 refused to, comment on the re ports. The Soviet spies are alleged, to have smuggled phone-tap- ping equipment into the coun- try in diplomatic bags. Some) reports say that. the spy ring' -spreads beyond Belgium and: into West Germany and the Netherlands. Acording to reports, Mr. Tchibotare hase gone into hid- 'ing with United States inteli- CPYRGHT Europe. There was speculation that he had fled to Britain earlier this month when his car was :found near the port of Zee- brugge, from which boats run to Britain. It is believed this was a ruse intended to mis- lead Soviet agents. No one. was available at the Soviet Embassy here tonight for comment. Tf U -,Y SPY ON US, ' TOO When 105 Soviet nationals, all of them with more or less official statics, are publicly expelled from British territory for the crime of espionage, is this an isolated event, an accident, or a specific phenomenon,.? One begins to wonder on reading, days later in the true-blue France-Soilr, that there are 10,000 agents actively working for the :;ast inside Prance now. Ten thousand is a very large number. The article that this is a rough guess at the size of he informer operated more or less directly Ly about 1,OJO or so Eastern from one end of France to the other. What about here at home is this something we ought to worry about, too? .re our s.. 'eets I- awling with Soviet spies? dust to get our sights sp aighu, condition you accept a kind of arithmetic that is logical, though deoatable, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :9CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 we mA i oQ?M F&IRRI&MY[999YM02 :cQ 79-O I94 OGOOOD OO1c4- plete by t.--.e English secret services would briskly banish from Brussels to tneir alma maters in the KGB or GRU barracks a score or so of Soviet citizens. Ole, Lyanin $peaks Vie did not just grab this figure out of the air. To get it, we simpler recalled the fact that the spectacular roundup is Great Britain drought swift repatriation to a little less than ?_ pE:- cen-c of all Soviet citizens accredited by Her Gracious Tau,; ty' s government as diplomats, journalists, tourist agents or export experts. These are the traditional covers preferrec by Moscow's honorable informants. In Belgium, as in England ._Ld n France, they work behind the facades of the embassies, the ary and economic missions, the press offices, the tourist cies, and the so-called mixed corporations -- so-called bee. .use they consist of Soviet trade specialists and local business...en -- quite openly and visibly. Excellencies, military attaches, news- papermen, tourist delegations, businessmen and trade representa- tives -- there were still 550 of them a few days ago, moving about in the fogs of London. Since then, one out of every five of them has been branded "undesirable" on information from one Oleg Lyani1 X1ClOb Lyanin is a defector from the'KGB, a former member of the Soviet trade delegation in London. What he has to tell the British ser- vices may w'Ji trigger quite a bit of agitation across the West- ern European espionage chessboard for some time to come. In the view of the experts, though, the coverage of the British Isles by spies coming in from the cold is a long way from being disturbed by this super-sweep. First, because there is every reason to believe that Moscow had more than twice that many agents on the job, and second, because in addition to the Russian spies proper, you have to reckon -- and very seriously -- with their Czechoslo- vak, Romanian, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian colleagues. Two out of Five Are Spies The generally held opinion in Western counter-espionage circles is that one of every two Soviet citizens strolling the streets of our capitals is an intelligence agent on a mission. But this does not in any way mean that a Soviet national who is not officially a spy would hesitate to inform the USSR of what- ever he learns, discovers, and sees in those Western European circles where spies find it easier to gain admittance if they be- long to the sacrosanct ranks of the press, or tourism, or business. The rules of reciprocity require that Soviet diplomats request Approved For Release 1999/09102 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 p"s~?929aFzrnI"p Jr9qg1-tP~t~i~1Jc'~At3~0a -they are posted in the West; but these rules do not apply to spies whose cover is the press, tourism, or business. In Belgium right now, there are 113 Soviet officials, 45 of them working in the privileged area of the embassy and 33 in the commercial representation. It is not a very daring guess to say that a good 50 of these are full-time spies. The others oc- casionally come up with some usefi25X h1~Obf 1r=Wkon. Turning-Point in History Whenever you meet two Russians, you are talking with at least one spy: this axiom holds for the 45 comrades who live in the em- bassy and the Avenue de Fre, the 33 who serve on the trade delega- tion, the 11 attached to press offices, tourist bureaux, and air,. lines, and the 24 experts in the ways of mixed-economy corpora- tions. This, in terms of numbers, is the official Soviet delega- tion on the job here ;..n Belgium, side by side with another 172 of- ficials from the other Eastern countries. This representation has greatly expanded since 1967, when, although the staffs of the em- bassy and the economic mission were just about the same as they are today (42 and 30, respectively), the number of journalists, Intourist and Aeroflot agents was a great deal smaller (4 in 1967 as compared with 11 today). In those days there was a lot less Russian spoken in the mixed-economy companies (10 as against 24 Russian-speaking personnel).' So 1967 was a turning-point in the history of tie Soviet representation in Belgium. The proof: in 1960, the staff strength at the embassy, the commercial offices, and the press office was 16, 25, and 2, respectively. At that time there were no mixed corporations, and it is interesting to note that the official USSR delegation to Britain in those days amounted to 249 souls. Like Icebergs In the course of the last 10 years, a number of espionage cases involving Soviet residents have come to public attention. This of course does not mean that the official published statis- tics account for all the spies our counter-espionage services have unmasked. From 1960 to 1971, London expelled 27 Soviet nationals on charges of spying. Here in Belgium, seven spies met the same fate. They were: Vladimir Cheretuni (of Aeroflot) who took too keen an interest in the Belgian army's affairs; Anatoli Trifonovich Oborodnikov, a newsman with Tass; Vitali Dimitriy'eiich Balachov, second secretary at the embassy; Oleg Alekseyevich Semikov, a film expert who was caught red-handed on SHAPE grounds; Aleksandr Selikh, and Anatoli Kassolapov, who were deeply involved in a ring of "illegals" (agents who had no legitimate cover), all OAPOR*OVFOr1 62_4e aPM 9M1'&led I I b0 94VP 0MOM2O 6I-4eft hurriedly for "indefinite leave in the Soviet Union." Apr~L~~r~t4ir~~?2vrgRi7~031r 1970 was a commercial engineer with the Scaldia-Volga corporation. His sales area had a little tiny bit to do with trucks and a whole lot to do with SHAPE and our national defense. The fact that no expulsion action was taken against Russian officials prior to 1967 in no way indicates that the counter-espionage services had been indifferent to Soviet espionage activities in the years before NATO and SHAPE. We might say that, at that time, these agencies-were just keeping a close and quiet eye on the [Russian] networks, and carefully refraining from anything that might up- set them, pending a broader sweep with far more important results. Besides, in the battle of the special services, the visible part -- like the tips of icebergs -- is the least; the main part is underwater, invisible. Ahead of Paris and Bonn As you can well imagine, the way these intelligence people go about their business bears no resemblance -- in style or in resources -- to the doings of James Bond and his thriller peers. Intelligence of a military nature, if indeed it still interests their government, is no longer in the top rank of their concerns and quests. it is still the exclusive domain of the GRU, which is the intelligence arm of the Red Army. But intelligence and in- formation relating to industry or economics or politics are the choice tidbits that bring the big money to the KGB agents. Before NATO moved into our country, estimates placed the number of men these two agencies had on mission at a round thirty or so officers among the 80 or so Soviet officials installed in Belgium. It is a fair estimate today that there are at least twice as many. Their missions have to do primarily, of course, with the "areas" of SHAPE, NATO, and the Common Market. This three-fold top-rank target explains why the post of ambassador to Brussels is consi- dered in Moscow as the most important in Western Europe, even ahead of Paris and Bonn. The fact is that the kind of espionage that marked the '40s is practically a thing of the past. The whole concept has set, along with that of the cold war itself. Since the planning now is for total war, espionage has grown and adapted to the new re- quirements. Becoming an intensive, everyday operation, it looks into everything that might, in case of a conflict, ensure a people's survival, and from there into whatever enables that same people to live in time of peace. This explains why espionage has been taken out of the hands of the military little by little, as its objectives gradually broadened into the areas of politics, econo- mics, industry, science, and sociology. Lie Low,Till Time to Re-Surface For the same reasons, its area of activity is no 1c-ger con- fined to plumbing the heart and soul of the.potential adversary. Approved For Release 1999/09162 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 It is just as important now to build up a construct of chaos, bit by bit, wl i_ch will maY:e it pU/.~siale to wipe the enemy out in a hidden, underground, but irreversible way. This is psycholo- gical warfare in all its intensity and all its refinement. The idea, to take just one of a hundred possible examples, is to in- filtrate demonstrations and protest marches and, if need be, to provoke them in order to manipulate them more neatly in the de- sired direction. This is why the facets of current-day espionage are almost innumerable. It has become a subtle art, in which those great chess-players, the Russians, have had two generations to become past masters. Their basic resources are the greed or vulnerability of their partners, the informers whose number the experts put at 10,000 in France. On that basis, there ought to be between 1,500 and 2,000 of them here in Belgium. They are generally in it because spying pays, or because they are being 'blackmailed. In the hands of the "legal" agents -- the diplomats, newsmen, officials, or export-import advisers -- they constitute an invisible network, but one which is both sturdy and effective. But we should have no illusions about these people: agents are almost never recruited from the gutter or from the disinherited classes of the society. The spymasters bar no class or stratum, so long as the would-be agent has access to information. They are among us right now. They are pleasant company, good listeners. They are eager to tap their business and personal relationships for information to be sent off to Moscow through their handler, whose only professional risk consists in perhaps having to pack his bags in a great hurry some fine morning, like his comrades Yuri Khozhayev, the film exporter, and Victor Karyagin, the cul- tural attache, both of whom were swept out of England with the other 103 undesirables. After that, he will simply have to low till the time comes to pop up to the surface again,' somewhere else in the world. 1967 - Vladimir Cheretuni - 35, deputy head of the Brussels office of Aeroflot (the Soviet airline), was arrested 25 January -:967 at Hever just after he had taken delivery of documents cor.-taining military matter. The Soviet agent's special assignment was a double one: to get into the military control tower at Yelsbroak, and to open a cafe near the NATO installation at Evere designed to attract the patronage of personnel from NATO. Cheretun was neutralized before he could complete this assignment, and left Belgium on 3 February 1967. 1967 - Aleksandr Selikh, Anatoli Ko.ssolapov Selikh was the re- presentative of SOVFLOT in Belgium, and Kossolapov the Baltic Line delegate here. On two occasions, they received the "illegal" Soviet agent Yuri Nikolayevich Loginov, 35, alias Edmund Trinka, alias Paul Serson), who was paying occasional visits to the UAR and to South Africa so as to build up a background for him-el-," in bQ places that would stand up against any US intelligence check. Approved For Release 1999/09/021:3CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Login4Acppt*v RL d999/OWO2rcrA4;-1DFPT9 -'4el 94MOONOMOD01 top spy. Had he not been taught by the great Russian master spy, Rudolf Abel? Loginov's first trip occurred in 1964. He landed from the Soviet ship azin at Antwerp, posing as an ordinary seaman, and took rooms at the Hotel IJetropole in Brussels. The second time, in December 1966, he landed again at Antwerp from the Soviet cargo ship Kamensk. Selikh and Kossolapov put him up in Brussels in a quiet, out-of-the-way room. When ,oginov was neutralized in September 1967, Selikh and Kossolapov, their covers burnt, had to leave Belgium. 1967 - Ogorodnikov - Balachov, Semikov Anatoli Trifonovich Ogorodnikov headed the Tass news agency's Brussels bureau, and was known to the Belgian press corps as a very fine, very polite fellow. Neutralized on 18 April 1967, near his residence at 85 Rue General Lodz in Uccle. While he was being held in Saint Gills prison pending expulsion, the USSR embassy in Brussels denounced his arrest as "an illegal provocation." Two other Soviet nationals were taken with Ogorodnikov: Vitali Dimitriyevich Balachov (whose come-over agent, Madame X, said of him: "He looks like a pig, he eats like a pig, and he behaves like a pig,"), third secretary in the Soviet embassy at Brussels, and Oleg Alekseyevich Semikov, commercial attache for the Soveksportfilm Company, she same that imported the Russian version of War and Peace to Belgium. Balachov left Belgium 2 May 1967 for a "vacation" from which he has yet to return. The three Soviet agents were to work on "madame X," an embassy employee upon whom they hung that sobriquet, and who had been posted first to Turkey (where they had recruited her) and then to Brussels. Ogorodnikov was the only one arrested, but the other two felt the heat of burning covers and quickly ?aft Belgium. The Soviet target in this particular affair was SHAPE. 1970 - Savich Boris Savich, rharried and father of two sons, was born in Zhitomir (Ukraine) in 1934, and came to Belgium in October 1967. he lived at 56-68 Avenue de la Woluwe in Diegem. Officially he was a specialized engineer, in charge of sales for the Scaldia- Volga truck firm. His real job was espionage, and his inte ec-.s centered on Belgian military bases (including Florennes) and on SHAPE-NATO 9including its base at Baronville). More specifically, he was after detailed information about the Mirage fighter plane, its deployment, and its manufacturing components. He was arrested on 25 March 1970 in a little inn at Linkebeek, and shipped home on Friday 3 April 1970 aboard Aeroflot's Tupolev registry number coop 42397. Approved For Release 1999/0ch62 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT SPECIAL, Brussels 6 October 1971 ILS NOUS ESPiONNENT AUSSI Cent et cinq sujets sovietiques au statut plus ou moins officici publique- ment expulses du territoire britanni- que pour crime d'espionnalge, est-ce 14 un evenement isole, un accident, un phenomene specifique ? On est tents d'en douter quand on apprend en lisant, quelques jours plus tard, dans le feal t< France-Soir >> que; dix mule agents travaillant pour I'Est operent cn France a 1'heure qu'il est. Dix mille, c'est un chiffre enorme. En fait dans le contexte, ii est cens6 denombrer la masse indeterminable des informateurs manipules plus ou moins directement, d'un bout a l'autre de I'Hexagone, par les agents de I'Est au nombre d'un millier. Et chez nous, faut-il prendre le probleme au serieux ? Les espions sovietiques cou- rent-ils nos rues ? Pour fixer les Wes, au prix d'une mathematique logique mail discutable, disons qu'un coup de filet comparable a celui que vien- nent de reussir les services secrets anglais renverrait brutalement de Bru- xelles une vingtaine de citoyens sovie- tiques dans les casernes du KGB et du GRU oii ils ont fait leurs classes. OLEG LYANIN PARLE Le quotient n'et pas mentionne au hasard. Pour le determiner, it s'agit de tenir compte du fait que la razzia spectaculaire operee en Grande-Bre- tagne condamne a un rapatriement brusque.,un peu de moins de 20 p.c. de l'effectif des residents sovietiques accredit6s par le gouvernernent de sa Gracieuse Majeste aux titres de diplo- mate, de journaliste, de promoteur touristique ou d'expert en import- export. Ce sont la en effet, classique- ment, les . Balachov adjoi ,nt de I agence bruxelloise de I'Aeroflot (compagnie aerienne sovietique), est inter- marin (il loge a 1'h6tel Metropole a Bru- xelles). La seconde foil, en decembre 1966, quitte la Belgique le 2 mai 1967 pour des o vacances n dont it ne revient pas Les pelle le 25 janvier 1967 - a Hever (17 knt de Louvain) - alors qu'il vient prendre a Anvers toujours ii debarque du cargo sovietique Kamensk. Selikh et Kossolapov . trois Sovietiques devaient faire o chanter o Mme X - pseudonyms dont est affublee livraison de documents d'interet militaire. Le Sovietique avait pour objectifs particu- le logent a Bruxelles dans une chambre tranquille et isolee. Lorsque Loginov est une employee d'ambassade qui a ete succes- sivement en poste a Tunis (lieu ou elk a ete Tiers la penetration de la tour de contr6le militaire de Melsbroek et 1!ouverture d'un ' ' neutralise - en septembre 1967 - Selikh et Kossolapov v brules o ont a quitter is ' recrutee) et a Bruxelles. Seut Ogorodnikov est interpelle, les deux autres quittent la cafe a proximite du lieu d implantation de l'OTAN a Evere, cafe qui aurait ete concu Belgique. Belgique se sentant manifestement br3les. ' ' pour attirer le personnel de cette organisa- 1967 -Ogorodnikov-Balachov-Semikov Dans cette affaire, les Sovietiques s interes- saient au Shape. lion. Cheretoune est neutralise avant d'avoir pu mener a bien ce travail et quitte Anatoli Trifonovitch Ogorodnikov, re- 1970 - Savitch la Bee la Bel gique le 3 fevrier suivant. presentant de 1'agence Tass en Belgique et Boris Savitch, mane, deux garSons, nE a 1967 - Selikh - Kossolapov connu au scin de la presse beige comme un garcon d'une gentillesse extreme et d'une Jitomir (Ukraine) en 1934, arrive en B lgi- quc en octobre 1967. Il reside 56-58 avdnue Alexandre Selikh, representant de is SOVFLOT en Belgique, et Anatoli Kosso- education parfaite, cst neutralise le 18 avril 1967 a proximite de sa residence, 85, rue de la Woluwe a Diegem. Officiellement it est ingenicur-specialiste charge de la vente lapov, delegue de is Baltic Line dans notre General Lodz a Uccle. Alors qu'il attend , de camions de la firme Scaldia-Volga. Ses pays, accueillent a deux reprises ]'espion u illegal > sovietique Youri Nikolayevitch a la prison de Saint-Gilles d'etre expulse, I'ambassade d'URSS a Bruxelles qualifie activites reelles sont l'espionnage et dans Ic cadre de celui-ci it s'interesse aux bases Loginov (35 ans, alias Edmund Trinka et son arrestation d' < illegale o et (< a carac- militaires beiges (dont Florennes) et au Paul Serson) se rendant tant6t en RAU tere provocateur n. Avec Ogorodnikov deux Shape-Otan (dont la base de Baronville) 1ant6t en Afrique du Sud pour s'y creer tine personnalite devant pouvoir resister autres Sovietiques sont compris : Vitali Dimitrievitch Balachov (dont Mme X, son . Plus particulierement, it cherche a rassem- bier des informations sur I'avion a Mira- aux investigations des services de securite americains. Loginov est en effet destine a agent c< retourne >, dit : < 11 ressemble a un cochon, it mange comme un cochon et ge >, sur ('utilisation de cet avion et sur ses elements de fabrication aller vivre aux USA. C'est un espion de classes. N'avait-il pas eu comme professeur ' it agit comme un cochon >), troisierne secretaire de I'ambassade d'URSS a Bru- . Le 25 mars 1970 it est arrete dans une petite auberge de Linkebeek et est expulse ( espion sovietique Rudolf Abel ? Le pre- xelles, et Oleg Alekseievitch Setnikov, le vendredi 3 avril 1970 a bord du Tupolcv mier passage de Loginov a lieu en 1964. attache commercial de la firme, Soveksport- Aeroflot seep 42397. 'SP CIAL Brussels 3 November 1971 Import - Export Espionage in Lace When two Soviets, comrades Oleg Ivanovich Gluchenko (34 years old, with an 11-year-old daughter) and Yuri Yefimovich Parfenov (40 years old, with a 17-year-old daughter), who were employed by the Brussels office of Aeroflot (Soviet air transportation company), left Belgium at the beginning of last week - having been made the subject of expulsion measures because of the revelations made by 'Rhebotarev - a third Soviet, Konstantin I. Leontiev, was forbidden to reside in this country. Officially, Leontiev was the commercial director of the Belgo-Soviet import-export firm of Belso. Leontiev, by the way, is not an ordinary person. Likehebotarev, he too is a high-ranking GRU officer, with one difference: he was superior to the defector T:hebotarev. The cover which Leontiev had chosen - that of a businessman, the manager of Belso - made his work as an intelligence officer easy. In that way he benefited from complete freedom of movement, which is useful for any operational spy. Such covers are becoming more and more commonplace. It is worth mentioning that there are four com- panies of this "mixed" type in Belgium at present, including Belso and Scaldia Volga. For the latter two, the mask has been ripped away. Approved For Release 1999/O9/O2 1 ~ CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Approved For Release 199N019/0?s: Cil~q-R9PY_0 %4493 QQ01-1 A proved execut ve in a ego- ov to his Soviet colleague over certain commercial policies which had been employed, and received the following answer: "We don't establish ourselves in Belgium in order to make a profit." Does this attitude also apply to Belso? The statement of profit and loss for that company's 1970 operations reveals a net profit of 135,621 francs (1969: 159,209 francs) for general expenditures of 29,711,753 francs (1969: 22,903,621 francs), does it not? Since the disappearance, on 3 October 1971, of Anatolij Tchebotarev from the Soviet trade representation offices in Brussels, some people have seen a similarity between that affair and that in London, where Oleg Lyalin was the principal actor. Oleg Lyalin, whose ostensible job consisted of selling feminine clothing - "babydolls", articles made of nylon and assorted negliges - for the Rasno firm, an Anglo- Soviet import-export company, was - secretly - the brain of the Soviet sabotage network in Great Britain. Konstantin Doesn't Answer Any More We now know that Anatolij Tchebotarev was not the equivalent in the hierarchy of the GRU in Belgium, of Oleg Lyalin, but that in reality that position was occupied by Konstantin I. Leontiev, the commercial director of the Belgo-Soviet import-export company Belso, the Belgian equivalent of Rasno. We also know that, in addition to his official position, Leontiev was a colonel in the GRU (Soviet military intelligence service) and that he also worked under the cover of a buyer of textiles destined to be sold eventually in the Soviet Union. r Leontiev was born on 19 December 1921 - so he is 50 years old - and he previously held a position in Belgium from July 1957 to December 1963 as an engineer with the Soviet trade representation. He returned to this country in late 1969, and he and his wife - his two children (Olga, 14 years old, and Vladimir, 18 years old) remained in Moscow - occupied a luxurious apartment in the Pacific apartment building on rue Scaiquin, at Saint-Josse-Ten-Noode. When the gendarmes went to Belso last week to inform him of the .expulsion order to which he was being made subject, Leontiev had al- ready left Belgium. He had left for Moscow. However, he is forbidden to reside in this country, nevertheless. In the official portion of the work he did here, the Soviet colonel organized exhibitions and style shows on a number of occasions which were for the purpose of familiarizing the Belgian public with the Soviet products which are sold, more particularly, in the "Maison de Russie" (House of Russia), whose salesrooms are located on the ground floor of the Tour Madou (Madou Tower) in Brussels. The "Maison de Russie" is also the retail outlet for products imported into Belgium by Belso. This import-export company, with a capital of 10 million Approved For Release 1999/09/081 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Belgian francs, is a Belgo-Soviet commercial firm founded on 4 May 1966, with central offices at 31 chaussee de Gand, Molenbeek-Saint- Jean., which location it then left, moving to 1-2, avenue des-Arts, Brussels. Le Charme Slave (Slavic Charm) The business interest of the firm is principally the import-export business and the sale of Soviet products at retail. Among the products it offers are samovars, porcelain from Leningrad, watches, radios, cameras, folk costumes, typically Soviet food and drink (vodka) specialities and fur coats made of furs of Soviet origin but styled by Italian and French specialists in order to make them more competitive with the products of the Belgian furriers. The colonel, incidentally, was very proud of these fur coats, and he recently had four good-looking Soviet mannequins make the trip from Moscow to Brussels to present the winter collection. A Brussels newspaper did not hesitate to entitle that occasion "Le Charme Slave" [Slavic Charm]. The four girls were natives of Riga, or at least that is what was said at the time. Did the man who was responsible for "Slavic Charm" - like Lyalin in England - run a sabotage network in Belgium? This is a question which may well be asked. In addition to the "Maison de Russie" in Brussels, Belso also operates a similar establishment in Anvers [Antwerp] which is called "Kalinka". This branch was opened this year. Soviet government organizations hold 50% of the stock of Belso. They are the following: Vneshposyltorg, which sells a considerable range of manufactured products and Soviet food products at wholesale in small amounts, and it also sells orders for admission to nursing homes and rest homes in the USSR to foreigners on behalf of their relatives living in the USSR (address: 32/34 Smolenskaya-Sennaya, Moscow). Prodintorg, which, more particularly, exports food products (address: 32/34 Smolenskaya-Sennaya, Moscow). Vostokintorg, which normally is an organization specializing in -import-export trade with the People's Republic of Mongolia, Afghanistan, Iran, Aden, Turkey and Yemen (address: 32/34 Smolenskaya-Sennaya, Moscow). It should be mentioned that a former engineer with the trade repre- sentation in Brussels, Mr. Yuri Straborovski, and the former director of Scaldia Volga, Mr. Vladimir Cherkasov, each own a share. The remaining 50% are owned by Belgians. When the company was founded, the part of the capital in the hands of Belgians was represented by two Greeks and three Belgians (two of whom have since died). The administrative council of the company at present is made up of five people: Anatoli Bobrik, Youri Kostrov,.Vladimir Kovalchuk and Konstantin Leontiev, all four of whom are Soviets, and one Belgian, Louis Loncin, former director Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : lA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 ofAppveved oPIRe1eaS?M/4W0: ClA 4R 9tfl 94 A90t200G1-1 Commerce exterieur - OBCE]. The committee members [commissaires] of the firm"are Dimitri Muratov, a Soviet from Moscow, and Henry Pirlet, a Belgian. As for Rasno, that company, the English equivalent of Belso, was established in 1969, with its creation being announced at a cocktail party given by the Embassy of the USSR in London. The firm comes under the Soviet Department of Trade and Industry, which provides it with a capital of 5,000 pounds. Thus, Rasno in London is entirely in the hands of Rasno, Moscow, a governmental commercial agency. The last reports on the company presented in July 1971 reveal that three of the four directors are Soviets, that its capital reached'40,000 pounds in 1970 with a profit of 8,326 pounds, taxes not deducted. Oleg Lyalin was said to be one of the directors of the company. One of the three Soviet directors of Rasno - he received 4,000 pounds per year - left the United Kingdom when the Lyalin affair was made public, and he did so in spite of the work which had been done very recently in his house on Makepeace Avenue in Highgate... Serge MONIER SPECIAL, Brussels 3 November 1971 IMPORT-EXPORT L'CSPlOhlNAGE Ef~! DENTELLES AIMS que eux ovietiques, es ca- cont e so et Scaldia o ga. Pour cars. marades Oleg Ivanovich Gluchenko deux dcrnizrc's. le masque- asque est tombs:. (34 ans, une file de I1 ans) et Yuri Un administrateur beige d'une socirte" Yefimovich Parfenov (40 ans, une Clle belgo-sovietique protestant rccennnettt: de 17 ans), membres du bureau bruxel- aupres de son collegue sovietique de la lois de ]'Aeroflot (compagnie aerienne nruiicre dont certaines pc>Iitiques com- sovietique) quittaient la Belgique en merciales avaient etc choisics, s'entcndit debut de semaine derniere - ayant etc rcpondre ]'objet d'une mesure de renvoi due aux . un troisieme Sovictique, Konstantin Cette rcflexion s'adressait-elle aussi 1. Leontiev, etait declare interdit de a Belso? Le compte de pcrtes et profits sejour dans noire pays. Leontiev etait de 1'exercice 1970 de cette societe ne officiellement directeur commercial de revcle-t-i1 pas un benefice net de 135.621 la frme d'import-export beigo-sovieti- F (1969 : 159.209 F) pour des frais que Belso. Leontiev nest d'aillcurs pas generaux de 29.711.753 F (1969 un personnage banal. Comore Tche- 22.903.621 F). botarev, it cst aussi officier superieur Depuis la disparition, le 3 octobre du GRU, a une difference pres : iii dernier, d'Anatolij Tchebotarev de la etait superieur au transfuge Tchebe? representation commercials sovietique tarev. A Bruxelles, certains ont vu un rappro- La couvcrture que Leontiev avtt chement entre cette affaire et celle de choisie - celle d'un homme d'affaires,. Londres ou Oleg Lyanin tint la vedette. dirigeant de la Belso - lui facilitait s.; Cet Oleg Lyanin dont le travail officiel travail d'officier de renseignement. 1111 consistait a acheter des vetements femi- beneficiait ainsi d'une entiere liberte & nins - babydolls, articles en nylon et niouvement, utile a tout espion opera- negliges divers - pour ]a firme Rasno. tionnel. De telles couvertures sont & societe anglo-sovietique d'import-ex- plus en plus courantes. 11 faut savoiir port, et qui, clandestinement, etait le qu'il existe actuellement en Belgigse: cerveau des rescaux de sabotage sovie- , quatre societes de cc type < mixte >> tiquc en Grande-Bretagne. presentes a Belso' afin de lui signifier Approved For Release 1999/09/ : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 CPYRGHT Nous savons maintenant qu'Anatolij Tchebotarev n'etait pas, dans la hicrar- chic du GRU en Belgique, ]'equivalent d'Oleg Lyanin mais qu'en realite cc poste etait occupe par Konstantin I. Leontiev, directeur commercial de la societe belgo-sovietique d'import-export Belso, consaeur beige de Rasno. Qu'ou- tre sa fonction officielle, Leontiev etait colonel du GRU (service de renseigne- ment militaire sovietique) et que lui aussi ccuvrait sous la couverture d'ache- teur de textiles destines a titre revendus ensuite en Union Sovictique. Leontiev est ne le 19 decembre 1921 - it a done 50 ans - et avait deja etc en poste en Belgique de juillet 1957 a decembre 1963 comme ingenieur a la representation commerciale sovietique. De retour en fin 1969 dans notre pays. it habitait depuis avec son spouse - ses deux enfants (Olga, 14 ans, et Vladimir, 18 ans) etant restes a Moscou - un luxueux appartement de la residence Pacific, rue Scalquin a Saint-Josse- Ten-Noode. Lorsque, dans le courant de la se- maine derniere les gendarmes se sont CPYRGHT T ApRroveron lFavalt or Re~e~se 1999/09/2 : CIA-RDP791-01194A000300020 'et, Leontiev avait deja quitte to tuei- giquc`. Direction : Moscou. 11 n'en reste cependant pas moins interdit de sejour dans notre pays. Dans la partie officielle de son tra- vail, le colonel sovietique await, a plu- sieurs reprises, organise des exposi- tions et defiles de mode ayant pour but de familiariser le public beige aux pro- duits sovietiques vendus notamment a la Maison de Russie > dont les locaux sont installes au rez-de-chaussee de la Tour Madou, a Bruxelles. a Maison de Russic >> qui est d'ailleurs i'organisme de vente au detail des produits importes en Belgique par Belso. Cette societe d'import -export, all capital de dix mil- lions de francs belges, est une firme com- mercials betgo-sovietique fdndee le 4 mai 1966 avec comme siege social be 31, chaussee de Gand a Molenbeek-Saint- Jean, siege qu'elle a quitte ensuite pour venir s'installer all 1-2, avenue des Arts, a Bruxelles. La raison sociale de la firnie est prin- cipalenient ]'import-export et la vente au detail de produits sovietiques. Parmi les produits qu'elle propose, on trouve des samovars, de la porcelaine de Le- ningrad, des montres, des radios, des catneras, des costumes folkloriques, des specialites alimentaires et des boissons (vodka) typiquement sovietiques, et des manteaux de fourrure. confectionnes avec des fourrures d'origine sovietique mais stylises par des spccialistes ita- liens et francais at-in de les rendre plus compotitifs aux productions des four- reurs beiges. Le colonel etait d'ailleurs trey fier de ces manteaux de fourrurc et, receinment. it fit faire a quatre jolis mannequins sovietiques le voyage de collection d'hiver. Un journal de la capitale n'hesitant pas de titrer a cette occasion a LE CHARME SLAVE Les quatre lilies etaicnt originaires de Riga, du moins c'est cc qui fut affirnie a 1'epoque. Le responsable du a charnie slave > dirigeait-il - comme Lyanin en Angleterre -- un rescau de sabotage en Belgique'? C'est une question qui peat titre posec. La Bclso, outre la a Maison de Rus- sie > a Bruxelles, alimente un etablis- sement similaire connu a Anvers sous be nom de a Kalinka > . Cette succursale a ete ouverte cette annee-nienie. Le capital de la Belso est detenu a 50 p.c. par des organisnies d'Etat sovie- tiques : 0 la Vnechposi?liorg, qui vend en demi- gros une gamine de produits manu- factures et de produits alimentaires so- vietiques mais qui, en outre, vend aux strangers des bons de sejour dans des maisons de cure et de repos d'URSS a l'intention de leurs parents residant en URSS (adresse : 32/34 SmolenskaYa- Sennala, Moscou); ^ la Prodintorg qui, notamment, exporte des denrees alimentaires (adres- se : 32,34 Smolenskaia-Senna'ia, Mos- cou) ^ la Vostokiniorg qui est normale- ment une organisation specialisoe dans be commerce d'import-export avec la Republique populaire de Mongolic, ]'Afghanistan, I'lran, Aden, la Turquie et be Yemen (adresse : 32;34 Smolens- kaia-SennaYa, Moscou). 11 est a noter qu'un ancien ingenieur de la representation commerciale a Bruxelles, M. Yury Straborovski, et I'ex-directeur c(e Scaldia Volga, M. Vla- dimir Tcherkasov, possedaient chacun des Beiges. Lors societe, la parti mains des Beige deux Grecs et t sont decodes de ministration act constitue de cinq toll Bobrik, Yo Kovaltchouk et toes les quatre Beige, M. Louis teur des exposi du Commerce commissaires de mitri Mouratov, cou, et Henry Et Rasno? scour anglaise d bassade d'URS depend alors du la pourvoit d'un Rasno-Londres aux mains de conunerciale go niers rapports en juillet dernie quatre directeur le capital a attei avec tin benefi pots non dedu decly re comme societe. Un des tiques de Rasn livres par an - Bretagne alors q de realiser dans peace Avenue a CPYRGHT 01-1 ant sont detenus par la constitution de la de capital dans les is Beiges (dont deux iis). Le conseil d'ad- 1 dc la societe est i Kostrov, Vladimir onstantin Leontiev, Sovietiques, et d'un oncin, ancien direc- ns de l'Office j elge lirnie sont MM. Di- n Sovietique de Mos- et, tin Beige. Iso, a ete lancee en ayant ete annoncee 1 organise par l'ani- a Londres. La firnie epartement du Coin- ustrie sovietique qui apital de 5.000 livres. st ainsi entierement :rnenientale. Les der- r la societe presentes revelent que trois des sont sovietiques, que 40.OOQ livres en 1970 de 8.326 livres, im- Oleg Lyanin etait - it touchait 4.000 a quitte la Grande- I'affaire Lyanin etait Et ceci, malgre des s recents qu'il venait LA LANTERNE, Brussels 5 November 1971 They were denounced to the Tchebotarev, the employee of the Soviet mission in Brussels. They are: two employees of Aeroflot, a commercial director of the Belso company, three members of the Soviet trade mission, two diplomats, and the representative of a photographic products firm. These Russians were on the list (much longer still) of Soviet spies working in Belgium-particularly in the constant surveillance of NATO telephone communications. The list was given to the Americans by Anatole Tchebotarev, himself a secret agent and an employee of the Soviet trade mission in Brussels, who defected to the West one month ago. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 AppfQ fiicA6 k4s#ajg9 9P/49ft ~t7 O~r1e9 i~~~Q-@O1-1 names of eight of them. This evening they will miss the big reception given at the Embassy of the USSR for the anniversary of the October Revolution. The other 24 secret agents on Tchebotarev's list will no doubt be among the guests. Nine Soviet Spies Expelled from Belgium After the Revelations of Tchebotarev There will be some absentees from the big reception being given this evening at the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (66 Avenue De Fre in Uccle-Brussels) on the occasion of the anniversary of the October Revolution. Nine Soviets (La Meuse - La Lanterne is able to disclose eight names today) have been expelled from Belgium as a result of the Tchebotarev affair: two employees of Aeroflot, a director of the Belgian-Soviet Commercial Company ("La Maison de Russie" in Brussels and "Kalinka" in Antwerp), three emmbers of the Soviet trade mission (former colleagues of the defector Tchebotarev, two diplomats, and the representative of an important photographic products firm. Other departures are expected within the next few days. Two employees of the Brussels agency of Aeroflot (the Soviet airline company) left Brussels-National--very discreetly-on Tuesday, 26 October, on board a Tupolev aircraft of Aeroflot, bound for Moscow. They were thus the first Soviets hit by an expulsion measure taken by the Belgian authorities. They were Oleg Ivanovich Gluchenko (34) and Yuri Yefimovich Parfenov (40). During the same week, a third Soviet--Colonel Konstantin Leontiev of the GRU (military intelligence service), a director of the "Societe commerciale belgo-sovietique, S.A.", or "BelsoSi for short (1-2 Avenue des Arts in Saint-Josse-ten-Noode) since 20 May 1970--was forbidden to remain in our country. The police- men assigned the duty of notifying Leontiev of his expulsion could not find him; he had already left Belgium. At the end of the week, five more Soviets returned to the USSR, thus lengthening the list of "undesirables". They are: - Anatoly Mashine, attache of the trade mission; - Vladimir Krugliakov, delegate of "Sovflot" in the trade mission; - Aleksey Sereda, Embassy attache; - Boris Trichine, attache of the trade mission; - Valentin Zaitsev, counselor in the Embassy. In addition to these five Soviets and Parfenov, Gluchenko, and Leontiev, a ninth Soviet has also left Belgium. He was a commercial delegate in an important firm specializing in photo- graphic products. Approved For Release 1999/09/0 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00300020001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 "To see" and,"to see again" Thus the Soviet espionage strength in Belgium has been reduced by nine operational units. Now Tchebotarev turned over to the American security services a definitely longer list of names of Soviet spies. Thirty-three of them are of direct concern to Belgium. Therefore, there are still two dozen intelligence specialists sta- tioned in our country. This evening they will. undoubtedly be at the Embassy of the USSR in Brussels, where many Belgians and foreigners have been invited. These are "selected" Belgians and foreigners, since the list of guests is always drawn up jointly by the chief of protocpl of the Embassy and the GRU and KGB "residents" (this is confirmed by all intelligence officers who have sought asylum in the West). The list of persons "to see" and perhaps "to see again", which each Soviet intelligence officer keeps memorized for such occasions, will be lengthened by several names. That is all. But the process will remain the same. Spies have their traditions, and they stick to them. The departure of the nine Soviets from Belgium was prepared, it seems, by several actions undertaken by G. Korinfski, second secretary of the Embassy of the USSR. These actions had taken the diplomat to several Brussels firms specializing in packing and baggage, particularly near the port of Brussels. Moreover, he had not concealed the fact that he was a diplomat nor his intention of obtaining used crates at a good price. He pushed his car Shortly thereafter, Parfenov and Gluchenko left Belgium. Parfenov had attracted the attention of his neighbors by maneuvers which were "too discreet". He would regularly leave his lodgings around 0500 hours and push his car for several tens of meters before starting it. It is doubted that the purpose of this maneu- ver was to avoid disturbing the sleep of his wife. The measures of expulsion taken against the nine Soviets show the importance of mixed companies, tourist agencies, press agencies, and travel agencies for Soviet espionage,. which seems to prefer them for its cover. Do not such activities permit their members complete freedom of movement? For example, the personnel of Aeroflot claim both commercial status and semidiplomatic status, because they be- long to a government company. There are many cases in which an Aeroflot employee crosses over into the privileged domain of diplo- macy and vice versa. The Soviets do not hesitate to assign to a diplomatic post one of their intelligence officers who has been previously compromised elsewhere. This was the case with Konstantin Alekseyevich Aksenov, second secretary at the Embassy of the USSR in Brussels from 1952 to 1955, who had to leave that post because of the discovery-of one Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 4PK i g v @ g . ff . R~. ~v~~9~~~ ~ Q ~ r Y~i' r J 7 a g 1 t 1 o 9 ~ ~ g O a Q 9 O t 4 0001-1 infiltration of circles of anti-Communist Russian exiles. The affair created a big stir at the time. Nevertheless, the same Aksenov turned up as chief of Aeroflot in Morocco, where, from his office in Rabat, he applied himself to collecting information con- cerning American economic and military cooperation. "Lightning promotion" In Ceylon, Yan Akimovitch Grechko, in addition to his clandes- tine activities, was noticed because of his promotion which can be characterized as lightning-like--an ordinary commercial employee, he became overnight the first secretary of the Embassy of the USSR in Ceylon. It should be added that Grechko was a colonel in intelligence and that in 1950 he had been military attache of the USSR in People's China. This is not the first time in Belgium that an Aeroflot employee has been involved in an espionage affair. In 1967 there was the Cheretoune affair, named after the deputy chief of the Brussels office of Aeroflot, who was caught when he was about to receive intelligence of military interest from his "contact". . In 1969 did not Konstantin Parfenov, who was then chief of the Soviet trade mission in Brussels, declare that, among the fundamen- tal principles of Soviet trade policy in Belgium, respect for the sovereignty of the host state was in first place? A few weeks later, a Soviet engineer of "Scaldia-Volga" was expelled. He was a spy; 1 i (box) On the roof On 3 October, Anatoliy Tchebotarev (38), counselor in the Soviet trade mission in Brussels and field-grade officer of the GRU, disap- peared. Trace of him was lost for several days. The Belgian author- ities state that Tchebotarev has not asked to enjoy the right of asylum. In fact, he is in the United States, where he is talking very rapidly, denouncing his KGB and GRU colleagues whom he knew not only in Belgium from 1968 (when he arrived in our country) to 1971, but also those whom he knew throughout his entire career as a spy. Tchebotarev had the clandestine mission in Brussels of listening to NATO radio communications. The antenna of his interception system is concealed in a small on the roof of the USSR trade mission, Boule- vard du Regent, and not on the roof of the "Scaldia-Volga" firm, where there also are antennas. Approved For Release 1999/09/ 42 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 CPYRGHTApproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 LA LANTERNE, Brussels 5 November 1971 CPYRGHT Its ont eta denonces aux Americains par Tchebotarev, 1'employ6 de la mission sovi6tique de Bruxelles Ce s nt : deux >mp oyes de I Aeroflot, in dire.c- teur commerc al de la sodi td B e I s , trois me ores de Ii I mission co erciale ovidti- que deux d plomates et repre enfant d'u e firme de pro- dult photoq aphiques Ces usses figur ent sur la. liste beaucoup plu longue en- core) des espion sovietiques tray llant en Belgique, - no tamp ent i1 la sur illance per- man to des co nunications telep oniques de IT T.A.N. * La lists etc donee aux Ameri- cains par Anatole . ehebotarev, lui- "me agent s ret et em- ploy' de la mission commerciale sovie ique a Brux es, qui est pass' a 1'Ouest it a un mois. Ces neuf espi ns vien- nen de quiff la Bel giq e : nous p blions les no s de 8 d' nfre eux Its anqueront, a soir, la gran e reception o Eerie a 11am- bass a d'U.R.S.S. pour l'anni- vers a de Ia Rev lution d'Oc tobr * Parmi les invites figu- reroilt sans doute : les 124 autr4 agents secrets de Id liste de LES ESPIONS RUSSES GLASSES Cc soir, i I'aml>assade de I'Union des Republiqucs So- cialistes Sovietiques (66, ave- nue De Fre a Ucc1c-Bru- xelles), it y aura des absents a la grande reception offerte a 1'oecasion de i'anni.versaire de Ia revolution d'octobre. Neuf Sovietiques (c G.R.U. et K.G.B. (ceci est confirms par tous les trans- fuges du renseignement ayanL cherche asile a 1'Ouest). La liste des personnes < a voir - et peut-titre t a revoir que chaque officier de rensei- gnement sovietique a en memoi- re pour de telles occasions, se sera allongee de quelques noms. C'est tout. Mais le processus res- ters le meme. On a ses tradi- tions chcz les espions et on y tient. I depart des neuf Sovietiques de Belgique a etc prepare, scm- bie-t-il, par plusieurs detnarclies entreprises par M. G. Korinfski, deuxieme secretaire de 1'ambas- sade d'U.R.S.S. Ces demarches avaient mene le diplomatte au- pres de plusieurs firmes bruxel- loises specialisees dans le condi- tionnement et les bagages, no- tamment a proximite du' port Sur le toit Le 3 octobre dernier, Ana- tolij Tchebotarev (38), consciller it Ia representation commerciale sovietique a Bruxelles, et officier supc- rieur du G.R.U., disparait. Pendant plusicurs jours, sa trace est perdue. Les auto- rites beiges affirmcnt que M. Tchebotarev n'a pas deman- ds a beneficier du droit d'asile. En fait, it esL aux Etats-Unis oil it park tres rapidement, denoncant ses collegucs du K.G.B. et du G.P.U. qu'il a comm nnon seulement en Belgique de 1968 (annee de son arrives dans notre pays) a 1971. mais allssi ecux qu'il a corms tout au long do sa carricre d'espion. Tchebotarev avail pour mission clandestine :r Bru- xelles, d'ccoutcr les radlo- communications do 1'O a.n. L'antennc de son systems de captation est dissimulcc dans un petit baraqucmcnt en bois instal16 slur Ic toil de la represeut?.Lion Commerciale de I'U.R.S.S., boulevard du Regent, et non pas silr Ic toit do Ia firme a `?c ddia- Volga >> oft ii y a aus. i des antennes. Pcu de temps apres, P:,rlenov et Giuchenko quittaieni .:t Bel- gique. Cc Parfenov qul - pair des manoeuvres :< trop diycrf Ley r - avait attire 1'attention de ses voisins. 11 lui arrivait couram- ment de quitter son lo;,ement tres tot lc matin - very 5 heu- res - et de pousser pendant plusieurs dizaines de metres sa voiture avant de mettre le! contact. oil doute quo cette ma- noeuvre alt eu pour but d'eviter de troubler le sommeil de son spouse. Les mesures de renvoi dont les neuf Sovietiques ont Lte l'ob- jet montrent l'importastce des firmes mixtes, des agences de tourisme, de presse et de voyage pour I'espionnage sovietique qui semble en faire sa couverture de Bruxelles. 1I n'avait d'ailleurs vacs- ne lalssent-ewes pas a lours C > 11 Ii~t d 6QLL~i}I~3b~~j~~t~lliberts de motl- 1 1 > ) e i Aero{lot, pal- exem- L bon prix des caisses de recu- pie. Son personnel se reclan e peration. CPYRGHT Apprt yed Fnr Release 1999/09/09 ? CIA-PDP7Q-01 194AO0030009 194AO a la fois du statut commercial et sit statut semi-diplomatique etant donne son appartenance a une colnpagnie uouvernemen- taie. Nombreux sent les cas ou un employe de )'Aeroflot ;aesa Bans le domaine privilegie de la diplomatic. et vice versa. Les Sovietiques n'hesitent pas a affecter a I'll poste diplo- ma.tique un de leurs c'ficiers de renseignement compromis anterieurei,ient ailleurs. Ce Lit ainsi le cps de Konstantin Alek- seyevich Aksenov, deuxieme se- cretaire a l'ambassade d'U.R.S.S. a Bruxelles, de 1952 a 1955, oui dut quitter ce poste a la suite de la decouverte d'un de ses agents. Aksenov avait pour mis- sion en Belgique d'organiser )'infiltration des milieux des exi- les cusses anti-communistes. L'affaire fit grand bruit a l'epo- que. N'empeche qu'on retrouva le meme Aksenov comme chef de )'Aeroflot au Maroc, oil, de- puis son bureau . de Rabat, i1 s'attachait a reunir des infor- mations concernant la coope- ration america.ine tant econo- mique que militaire. ((Promotion r oudroyani a m, A Ceylan, ce fut Yan Akimo- vitch Grechko qui, outre ses ac- tivites clandestines, fut :emar- que pour sa promotion ciu'on peat qualifier de foud,royante - qui fit de lui, simple employe commercial, du jour au lende- main, le premier secretaire de i'ambassade d'U.R.S.S. A Coy. Ian. II faut ajouter que Grechko etait c.ilonel du re.nsei;nemuciit et qu'il avait etc, en 1950, atta- che militaire d'U.R.S.S. en Chi- ne populaire. En Belgique, ce n'est pas la premiere fois qu'un employe de )'Aeroflot est compromis Bans tine affaire d'espionnage. 11 y eut ainsi, on 19G7, 1'affaire Ch^- retoune, du nom du chef adjoint du bureau bruxellois do cette conipan,nie, iuterpelle alors qu'il s'appretait a recevoir, de son contact n dcs renseignements d'interet militaire. En 1969, M. Konstantin Parme- nov, qui etait alors le chef de la representation cortinercia'.e sovietique It Bruxelles, ne,decla- rait-il pas que, parmi les prinei- pes fondamentaux de 1al. poli- tique cornmerciale sovietiqque en Belgique, se trouvait en pt Mier lieu le respect de la souveranete do 1'Etat hote. Quelques semaines plus' tard, un ingenieur sovietiqu!~ de' Scaldia-Volga' etait ckpulse. C'etait un espion ! SPECIAL, Brussels 10 November 1971 The list of Soviets who have departed Belgium as a result of the Tchebotarev affair (Attache at the commercial representation who last 3 October chose to defect to the West) has lengthened by six since we announced last week the "discreet" departure of three Soviet intelligence officers, the Comrades Oleg Ivanovitch Gluchenko (born 12 February 1937) and Yuri Yefimovitch Parfenov (born 2 May 1931), both employees of Aeroflot, and of Konstantin I. Leontiev (born 9 December 1921), Commercial Director of the Belgo-Soviet Import-Export Company Belso. These departures have in effect been followed by those of six; other Soviets: one counsellor for scientific and technical questions at the Soviet Embassy (Valentin Zaitsev), one attache of the same embassy (Aleksei Sereda), one Sovflot representative attached to the commercial representation (Anatoliy Mashine and Boris Trichine) and one Soviet working as a commercial representative in an important firm producing photographic products. The strength of Soviet espionage in Belgium has been reduced by nine operational units, an appreciable reduction, but in reality clearly inadequate when one knows that there remain in our country twenty Soviet intelligence specialists directly compromised by the Tchebotarev affair. It is however probable -- according to some sources -- that in the next few days new departures from among the official Soviet representation in Belgium will be announced. The nine departures for Moscow represent only a prologue to a series of departures either more important in number or directed at more important personalities. The number of Tovariches assigned to Brussels as of this date is 102 (Tchebotarev and Volkov have been subtracted) -- 43 members of the Embassy, 29 from the commercial representation, 8 from the press, travel and airlines (two from Aeroflot), one intourist, one Tass, two Novosti, one Isvestia and one Pravda, 22 in the mixed firms (Scaldia Volga and Belso). Approved For Release 1999/09/0: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 A few months ago, a high-level British functionary summarized in four points the precautions needed to limit the loss of industrial secrets during Soviet-British encounters. 1) All Soviets visiting factories and business offices must be considered "a priori" as intelligence officers and only "a posteriori" as commercial agents. 2) The commercial secrets and the details of industrial procedures should be locked up whenever Soviet visitors are in the area. One should not permit delegations to enter design departments where new models are being prepared. 3) During the negotiations and even after the signature of export contracts, the Soviets should not be authorized to inspect anything more than the indispensable minimum of the different stages of production. 4) The Directors of firms should avoid showing prototypes, even if there is a promise of purchase. This same high functionary noted also the large discrepancy which exists on the one hand between the number of members of a permanent commercial representation and on the other hand the number of members of visiting commercial delegations. "I have always noticed;'he added, "that the size of this latter delegation is always larger." CPYRGHT SPECIAL, Brussels 10 November 1971 La liste des Sovictiqucs qui ont quitte In Belgique suite A I'affaire Tchci)otarev - 1'at- tachc A la representation cuminerciale qui, le 3 octohre dernicr, choisit de passer a I'Ouest - s'est altongce de six unites de- puis title noun aeons annonc , la seinaine dernicrc, Ic depart a discret a de trois offi- cierS do renseigncmcnt sovictiques, Ics en- ntarades Oleg Ivanovitch Oluchcnko (nc le 12 fevricr 1937) et Yuri Yetirnovich Par- fcnov (oe le 2 ntai 1931), toils deux employes de I'Acrotlot, ct de Konstantin 1. Leontiev (nc le 9 dcccntbrc 1921), directeur corunrer- cial de In socicte bclgo-sovictiquc d'inrport- export Belso. Ces departs ont en effet etc suivis de ceux de six autres Sovictiqucs : d'un con- sciller aux questions scicntilIques et tech- niques do I'ambassade d'U BSS (Valcutin %aitsev), d'un attache de la mane ambas- sade (Aleksey Screda), d'un dcleguc the la Sovtlot .to seen do In representation corn- mcrciale (Anatolij Mashine ct Boris Tri- chine) et d'un Sovictique travaillant comme dclcguc commercial Bans tine importante pLS( aQph r it Mascou, uric ving- taine do Sovietiques dont les noms out 6galement et6 cites par Tche- botarev. On va done assister dans les prochaines semaines it d'impor- tantes mutations parrot le person- nel sovietique accredits en Belgi- que. Si Moscou decide de mainte- nir en Belgique quelque 110 fonc- tionnaires on employes, 11 lui fau- dra, on effet, remplacer un tiers de ces effectifs. . Resto it voir, maintenant que I'affairc est 6bruitee, quelles so- ront les reactions sovietiques. Un silence persistant ou des represait- les? Aux. Affaires 6trangeres bei- ges on so contente de nous decla- rer qu'aucun Clement nouveau n'est intervenu clans cette affairs d'espionnage a. Autrement dit, ruo des Quatre-Bras on se, refuse a. prononcer to mot 4r expulsion do memo que celui; do .t gentlemen's agreement r. 11 est vrai qu'en nia- ticro d'a.;pionnage 1'expressivn doit ttro a&gcz inusit6e. L/AURORE, Paris 19 October 1971 A RUSSIAN MASTER SPY IN PARIS by Philippe Bernert 105 Soviet spies expelled from Great Britain, 40 Soviet spies counted in Belgium and threatened with expulsion. Might France be spared this sort of pollution? Because of the special relationship between Paris and Moscow, and in consider- ation of the forthcoming visit of Leonid Brezhnev, might the Kremlin have decided: "None of that for our French friends?" We may even imagine -- it is pleasant to dream -- that the Russians send us from time to time, at the end of a very full and slightly faded career, one of those good secret agents who has grown old in his job. Not to spy on us -- oh no! -- but to reaccustom himself to a more pleasant way of life, to forget his job somewhat. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 App ed FWct e q 9f0&Q2tiCqA 71~? 'f Abo Od a6oi -1 Let's take a very precise case. On 30 August 7 t e new permanen delegate of the Soviet Union to UNESCO arrived in Paris -- His Excellency Serge Mikhaylovich Kudryavtsev. We say His Excellency because Kudryavtsev was the Soviet ambassador to Cuba and to Cambodia before being appointed to Paris, to this very restful job. His name won't tell you very much, of course. Yet in Canada it still makes certain high officials grow pale with anger. And in the "White Paper" published in 1946 by the Ottowa government to disclose part of the atomic espionage conducted by the Russians between 1942 and 1945, you would find the name of S. E. Kudryavtsev listed quite frequently. For in Canada where he started as first secretary of the embassy, Kudryavtsev was one of the leaders of Soviet espionage. He established contacts with the well-known English physicist Allan Nunn May, who stole uranium for the Russians, gave them many related secrets, and was finally sentenced to 10 years in prison in 1947. The Cuban Missile Man At that time a defector broke up the Soviet spy network. A code clerk of'the USSR embassy in Ottawa, Igor Guzenko, went to the west with his wife and a bag full of documents. All the Russian agents were identified. Kudryavtsev did not wait to be expelled. His chiefs appointed him to the embassy in London, where he remained for several weeks, long enough to see how the issue was taking shape in Canada, then he went back home to Moscow. At that time Kudryavtsev was "exposed," as the spies put it. But the Russians felt he was too valuable to be retired to a Moscow office. "Impossible, for the moment,ito appoint him to another of our embassies in the west," said his chiefs. "He might be declared persona non grata. But there is a way of getting around this." This way around which, as you will see, was to be used again much later, was to infiltrate a secret agent like Kudryavtsev into an international organization -- the United Nations. For there each delegation is free to bring members of its own choice. The UN is very agreeable. Even crammed full of spies, its rules forbid it from getting rid of them. So it was under U,N cover that the astonishing career of Serge Kudryavtsev was to continue. The United Nations sent him to Greece on an investigation mission. lie held a desirable place on the UN commission on the Balkans. Then during the second session of the UN General Assembly, he was seated at the side of the Soviet delegate, Andrey Gromyko. 1:haL was already a bit much. But tneu1 tnC~..,~ well known to all the western secret services became an ambassador. Not just anywhere, you will note, but in a capital that could not reject him, even if he were the devil himself -- Havana. That was the time when-Castro was totally under the thumb of the Russians, and couldn't refuse them anything. They 'set him up against the United States, they promised Castro missiles, and without their economic aid, Castroism could not have survived. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 This means that the real boss in Cuba was Kudryavtsev. He set up a solid KGB apparatus there, got Kennedy, the CIA,-and the anti-Castro people to fall::. into'the?Bay of Pigs trap, and organized the installation of - nuclear -missiles aimed at the heart of the United States. .-He-was an extremely rare case -- he was both the representative of the USSR and the chief of its spies. Normally Moscow tries to separate the two types, and it is often the doorman, the driver, or a vague attache in the embassy who is actually the real boss. Kudryavtsev is this rare bird, capable of playing all roles. A performance that he was to renew, 1967, in Cambodia, where he watched very closely the too unsteady Sihanouk. -As-ambassador and'KGB chief, Kudryavtsev then conducted, at the same time*as his rivals in the CIA, a subtle game aiming at dumping the pro-Chinese Sihanouk in favor of General Lon Not. This was successfully done. Would Kudryavtsev then rest on his laurels? 25 years after the Ottawa affair, his chiefs decided to try an experiment, and to test the "short memory" of the west. "We are going to try to infiltrate Kudryavtsev again in a western capital. London or Washington would still be too difficult. But Paris seems perfect. Especially if we appoint him as the head of a delegation of an international nature, like UNESCO, for example. The Quai d'Orsay, which is a real stickler for its rules,.can only approve, since we have the right to choose whomever we want." This explains why, when Soviet agents have been having a bad time in the west, S.E. Kudryavtsev was able to get settled along the Seine. In his "Brussels Letter," an information sheet published monthly in the Belgian capital, and closely followed in NATO circles, my colleague Pierre de Villemarest mentions this incredible matter. The Belgians are astounded. But in Paris no one seems aware of what is going on. L'AURORE, Paris 19 October 1971 ~JH ii. i . .4ti. {:?.~. +. ..e r . ~. 105 "pinnn envirtinnec eha?.ses de Grande-13rcta_ne, 40 es:pions sovie tiques dcnnmhrcs on ltrlsiryue, et menaces a lour tour d'expulsion. La France scrait-clle cparCnee par Bette pollution d'un autre genre ? rn vertu des liens sh4tciaus etc Paris et Nloscou. et en consideration. de la tres proche visite do LQonid l3rejncv, le Kremlin aurait-il decide Pas do ca chcz nos amis francnis 9 a CPYRGHT 11 est niche i la ricucur 'un cas biro precis. Lo '0 ,Milt pal:r de coicre ccriains ha-j:.; , ,s 1^ cci?l,. Ic , i ysicirn ar._ a permis Wiro:riner - c'est dower arrivait i Park., is toncnonnaires. Et d:.ns Ic N11an Nunn flay: nu. V0., Sir beau de,rcver -- quc let Rus- nouveau dclezue pormanfnt ? I ivre?bianc , edits en 1?4b 1'uranium ;.cur 1e 1 .sec. scs noun envoicat, do temps cif ITnion sovletique ai;pres par le gouvornement ci'Ott.. a autre. Ail terms dune car- de 1'LiNESCO, San I cellenco wa. pour d~.coiler tine part' f lcur pass, a- non O se- ricrc lien rfmpiic et-un p^u Serge \1.k11oIIovitch Krnl- de 1'csp:onndic atoni.que me- cress nudca:res aliiis et tut defraichie, tin de ^es bons driatsev. .ous disen3 Son ne mar lc. Ru.s.c.c entre 191 2ina,ement con danine, en 194-,, a dix ans de prison. agents secrets blanchti , . sous ie $Sretlf.lee. - .ar Cf. qo Boll- Ct 1945, \-us t. ouverie>. ie harnois. Pas pour ",its es- driatsev tut ambassadcur to- note do S.:..? Koudr;atsev, et n ionnei'. ?iuste, ma:= amour victi ue i Cuba et nu Cam. tcr z , p ~ q mcmc abnndnmmcnt cite. L ~5 FL~J D : UvH se rocomqi.r a tine Set nine bode, avant d'etre n?ntmc a Car. au Can;oda. nit ii fit douccur de vivre, pour au- Paris, i cc poste de tout re- ses dchuts de premier socre- Ci:S I LU1 blier un peu le metier. pos. taire d'a:nbo