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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 74
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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December 1971
CHILE'S DETERIORATING ECONOMY
1. Chile's growing economic problems were acknowledged by
Allende himself in his first anniversary speech on 4 November.
Although the bulk of the speech was devoted to claims of the
government's material accomplishments, Allende did note a number
of the problems. He admitted there were scarcities of food and
consumer goods, that mining production was off and that miners'
wages would be tied to gains in production. In foreign economics
he said his goverment was the 'Snort heavily indebted in the
world" on a per capita basis. Five days later Allende announced
that the Popular Unity government would seek to renegotiate Chile's
huge foreign debt of some $4 billion and tried inaccurately
to blame Chile's current-.balance-of -payments crisis on economic mis-
management by previous administrations and "unilateral actions"
by the U.5. government.
2. The real reason for this crisis in the Chilean economy
lies in the fact the Allende government has continued expansion-
type policies contrary to its own Central Bank recommendations
that it curtail deficit spending (now estimated at thirty per
cent of government expenditures), raise prices charged by
nationalized enterprises, allow pr. ices on luxury goods to rise,
reassure private investors and devalue the escudo to stimulate
exports and reduce imports.
3. When the Allende government took over one year ago, Chile's
foreign reserves amounted to almost $400 million, but because
export earnings from the nationalized copper industry have declined,
food import requirements have increased and foreign lines of credit
have dried up, these reserves have now plunged to just above
$100 million.
a) Large-scale foreign aid and credits during the past
decade sharply increased Chile's external debt (to approxi-
mately $2.3 billion), with the heaviest repayments scheduled
during the next few years (an average $330 million annually
during 1971-1973). Nevertheless, Chile could have covered
its debt service obligations if copper production had
increased by some forty per cent as it was expected to do
under the U.S. companies' expansion program.
b) Instead, the nationalized mine operations have suffered
from inefficiency, absenteeism and a lack of labor discipline, and
therefore the actual increase has been only a little over four
per cent. This, combined with a twenty-two per cent drop in
international copper prices, has reduced the expected copper
export earnings by about one-half billion dollars, with
indications the gap will b~:;? even greater in 1972.
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c) The administration's agrarian reform policies, with
resulting shortfalls in agricultural production, have led to
a sharp rise in import reQuirements. There have been wide-
spread embarrassing shortages of food and other consumer goods
imports in spite o#: more than double the 1970 foreign exchange
expenditures for these very items.
d) Chile's inability to meet its foreign debt obligations
is also a result of the Allende administration's radical
policies and the subseQuent decline ~n Chile's credit rating.
Foreign lines of credit have dried up and few new loans have
been extended. The Communist loans have all been tied to
specific projects and cover purchases of goods and services
only from the creditor country.
4. Likewise, basic facts and figures belie Allende's alle-
gation that U.S. "unilateral actions" are in part responsible for
his country's foreign exchange crisis. The U.S. ten per cent
surcharge affects only 5.7 per cent of Chile's exports to the
United States and less than 0.7 per cent of its total. exports.
Although U.S. economic aid was substantial in the early years of
the Frei government, it was reduced to less than $25 million in
1970 because of Chile's high copper earnings and rapidly increasing
foreign reserves. Since no new aid projects were scheduled for
1971, the aid cut-off has little economic effect.
S. Allende also erred when he claimed that Chile's per
capita external debt is the world's highest. Cuba has the
highest foreign debt: $3.3 billion or $390 per capita as
compared to Chile's $2.3 billion or $250 per capita. Furthermore,
Chile might well bear in m~.nd that ninety per cent of Cuba's debt
is with the Soviet Union, a~~factor which has limited Cuba's
freedom of action in both the economic and political spheres.
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.~ cto er 1971 CPYRGHT
1'~1HE international politics
A or extracting ,natural
resources is rarely tranquil,
and the case of Chilean
cropper may yet rival bhe oil
of the Middle East for
intrigue and complications.
Besides the main adversaries,
Chile and the United; States,
the French arc peri~jherally
involved 'and the Soviet
Union has plaYCd a fascina-
ting if sa far limited role.
The US Government came
iuto conflict with Chi)e when
President Allende made clear
that in nationalising copper
lie did not intend to pay
American-based cotrtpanics
anything like what t)tey felt
vvas the value of their hold-
ings. Senor Allende
announced this intention the
day that Congress unani-
znously approved the Constitu-
tional amendment enabling
nationalisation.
On what is now known as
" the Day of \Tational
Dignity," July 11, Senor
Allende accused the com-
panies Anaconda and Kenne-
cott ~af havin.g misritanaged
the copper mines and taken
out excess profits. To sustain
the mismanagement charge
he referred exclusively and
exhaustively to investiga-
t.ions by a French firm "~of
indisputable prestige " as
well as by a Soviet team.
Ewer
Senor AlIende's resumd of
those studies gave a picture
~of bum?bling and breed by the
companies that would cost
Chile dearly in its future
development of the topper
mines.
An eager -press was told
that the French and Soviet
,~~tudies would not ?be made
Public. The team of the
I~`rench il2ining Society - in
vvhich the French 'Govern-
rnent has a majority holding
-- had departed iuithout leav-
ing a .copy with lts gown
P~.mbassy.
But secret -papers are a't
lcas~t as vulnerable in
.Santiago as In Washington,
~a.nd the French report was
passed to the Opposition
newspaper " iVlercurio." The
All~rc~~ii~r~~lease 199/~`i~t't`~~~'~,~~~~-0119~1~~`~t~t~n~~~t
znin,ec om tie repo ocu- t o iii, ~- o
went, i~t had undergone satisfaction in the role played to be delivered.
by tlto Soviet study in atflic-
ting the American com-
panies, the Communists must
have been perplexed by what
.happened next.
On Tuesday, Senator Frank
Church (Democrat, Idaho)
revealed that at the very
moment when the Soviet
experts' report was being
used against the companies in
July, Mr Iiosygin was propos-
ing that the companies should
extract copper from Siberia.
The Soviet study had said
"The decision taken by the
Chilean Government to carry
out total nationalisation of
the big copper companies and
the creation, in this way, of a
State direction of copper
activity, is a transcendental
step in the task of organising
copper Production . . '
But Mr Kosygin was tell-
ing David Rockefeller, of the
Chase 1lnanhattan Bank, that
American companies could
come in alone in association
with Soviet teams to thine the
copper, anct could ta':c their
pay in the copper itself.
i~'or Chile, such a develop-
ment would mean contpcti-
tian for major export, and a
possible immediate effect on
the already weakened price
of copper. 1t also suggested
that the Soviet expcri had
not found the ,perfort~t::r~cc I;~?
the American cotnpat~tes so
deplorable after all.
The next day, the Chilean
Minister of Mines said there
was piers ,y of room in the
market for everybody, and
added that Chile's Ambassa-
dors in Washington and 1los-
cow vverc asking for more
ini'ormation.
D In Washington i4Ir Itoget~s
let it be known over the
weekend that the US is pre-
pared to invoke the so-called
Hicl.enlooper Amendment if
Chile persists in its re~Fasal to
compensate the copper com-
panics.
Pf that happened - .and it
would be the first time
that the US had used the
special Bowers voted by Con-
gress iq 1964 - it would
mean that all direct Ameri-
can aid and some aid given
through international
organisations to Chile would
be cu't off.
At the moment Chile is
expecting same $20
millions of US aid that is now
in the pipeline
On top of that
.
compendium of criticism and
wish to cut all market and there is another six or seven
praise of the mines. If Senor credit ties with tite United milllion dollars in food aid
severe refining.
The use made of the
>'rench report has become an
issue in Paris as well ?as in
Santiago (no one has denied
the authenttcrty ~of the
" Mercurio " text), and it it
understood that this will be
the last such undertaking by
.the French tl4ining Society.
In the partisan press it was
suggested that the French
'experts were :few and were at
the mines barely a month,
and their firm was not all
that expert in topper anyway.
At this point, the Com-
munist Party paper, "' El
Siglo," published the text of
the Soviet 5nvestigation of
the mines. It was highly
Critical of the past perform-
ance Hof the American com-
panies and many ~of the Presi-
ilent's denunciations seem to
have come directly from it.
So d~i~d tike C=overnrznent's.
case to the Comptroller for
su~btra~cting m'vlPions of
dolilars from the book value
o'f the mines because of
adlegcd nl~isma~na,~ement.
The Opa~osibion press sug-
gested that the Soviet
Cxpcrts, who t'hemsclves ~verc
at the mines less than a
m~on't:n, tack most of that time
owercom7ng the language
!barrier'~and the rest pirating
ideas from the A~me>'tcan
machinery far application at
home. " El Stila " saw the
report as saving C'hille in the
nick of time :by the a~p!p~lica-
tion of superior Soviet tech~
nolo';^y.
In any case, on Ociaber it
the Comp~trolle~r issued his
finding That tlrr anajor
Anacon?da arrd l~ennecoft
ho'idings fell -far short of
deservirng any indemnity
whatever.
~~~ract
The American Secretary of
State, il'Ir Rogers. hinted at
~e~conom~ic reprisals, and the
Chilean Government in turn
threatened measures to
Counter ,any fitreign interfer-
encc. To unany Cihileans and
Americans it soun'de'd like fhe
start o'f the Cwban sequence
12 years aigo when Fidel
Castro took over American
interests amd turned to
iVloscow after US sanctions.
There are Communists in
the Allende Government who
 NEW YORK TIA~S
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CPYRGHT
c?~?~.~c ~'ri~~s ~~ ~h~Ie
SANTIAGO, Chile, Oct. 28-
. n ec nom
political implications is being
grudgingly recognized as a
reality by Chile's left-wing
Government, as well as by
Opposition parties and business
sectors.
President Salvador Allende
Gossens, in a sometimes angry
talk to heads of Government
departments recently, said that
without a greater sense of re-
sponsibility in public 'manage-
ment "we are headed for an
irremediable failure in the short
run."
Luins Corval~, secretary gen-
eral of the Communist party,
which forms part of Mr. Al-
lende's Popular Unity coalition,
said there were signs that
Chile's revolutionary regime
was losing public support.
The National Council of the
Christian Democratic party,
Chile's major Opposition force,
declared after a weekend meet-
ing called to analyze the politi-
cal situation that Chile faced
"the worst economic crisis in
her history."
Businessmen Pessimistic
An assembly here of busi-
nessmen and industrialists from
all over Chile found prospects
for the survival of private enter-
prise very uncertain even in
areas that Dr. Allende has said
should remain outside of state
ownership.
The speakers who drew the
most applause at a meeting of
Chile's Confederation of Com-
merce and Production were
those calling on businessmen
and workers who do not want
to be state employes want to
"political action" against the
establishment of a full Marxist
regime.
The recent signs of official
concern over the political con-
sequences of the economic
crisis grow out of some situa-
tions of which the public has
been aware for some time and'
of others that are perceived
mainly by technical analysts.
Economic stress is most ap-
parent in the shortages that
have developed in some con-;
Sumer goods. The problem is
discussed constantly here in
markets, in homes and on
buses, and is a daily topic in
the Opposition newspapers .and;
in radio commentaries.
The shotages are most;
noticeable in markets. Beef is
A p~ r~~-e dl ~ c~ ~ e ~e its
month and poultry :.ud c~;hs are
ently not to be found.
Dai products and canned
goo s are often missing from;
stor shelves. Supplies of cloth;
hav been irregular since tex-
the ills were nationalized.
Black Market Is Busy
ere are many signs of black,
mar et operations. Chickens
and ggs are delivered at homes
in he wealthier districts at
pric s well above .those set by
the rice control agency. Small
dre makers .and producers of
met 1 goods are paying well
abo a official prices for supplies
the obtain from middlemen
wh have access to unregulated
sou ces.
rlier this year, after the
Go ernment authorized wage
inc ased of 40 to 60 per cent
an put controls on the prices
of ost consumer goods, Chi-
les swent on a buying spree.
is was a period of great
po larity for Dr. Allende and
his coalition. In April, Popular
Un y candidates won nearly
50 er cent of the votes cast in
mu icipal elections, well above;
-the 36.3 per cent won by Dr,~
Alt nde in the Presidential elec-~
do of September, 1970, in a!
thr a-way race.
e`Government's attempt to
fro prices down is now under
se re pressure because of in-
fla ionary money, wage and
ere it policies that have been
fol wed since November. The
m ey supply has risen 75 per
ce t since December and the
Go ernment has an enormous
de cit. The official cost of liv-
in index shows a 14 per cent
ris in prices during the first
ni months of the year, but
thi is not regarded as an ac-
cu ate reflection of the price
sit anon, nor of the growing
pr ssures.
mong these is a dificit in
th balace of payments ?that
m reach $200-million by the'
en of the year. Lust year Chile'
ha a favorable balance of $132-
mi lion
he immediate effect is a new
pu h by labor for wage in-
cr ases. Dr. Allende flew today
to the nationalized copper
mi es at Chuquicamata and El
5a vador, formerly owned by;
A aconda, the United States
m ing company, to try to talk
th 'workers out of demanding,
a 0 per cent raise this year.
r; Allende has disclosed that
th cost of producing copper in
19 /0'9~1-~2 ".a~:?~'i~'-~b~l -01r ~ `l 0~30~020Pa'~"~az1
CPYRGHT
,May has risen to an average of
47 cents a pound. The intcrna-
tional market price is 49 cents
~a pound.
i This leaves Chile with a very
marrow profit margin from cop-
per exports, which account for
80 per cent of foreign income
'and a major part of Govern-
ment revenues.
Recent elections in student
associations, some unions, and
professional groups have been
lost by candidates identified
with Popular Unity.
Two By-Elections Due
The death of a Christiana
Dernocr:itic Senator last weeks
and the departure for Australia
of a Federal Deputy for the
Opposition National party will
offer a new opportunity in
January for voters to express'
their preferences between Popu-?
lar Unity candidates and thel
';Opposition. These by-elections
will be in the senatorial district
covering the provinces of
O'Higgins and Colchagua and'
~in Linares.
Both districts have been the
scene of rural violence this
spring in which radical revolu-.
tionary groups, particularly thr;
Revolutionary Peasant Move-~
ment led by pro-Cuban stu-
dents, have been invading
.properties not taken over by
'repdiated violent seizures and
asked patience while large
properties are taken over
under the reform program.
Further south, in cautdin
province, one of a group of
Mapuche .Indians who invaded
la farm was killed by the owner
in a gun fight last week. The
farm owner's nephew was
critically wounded. Twenty-two
persons are under arrest in the
latest of a serious of incidents
involving violence over land
seizures in recent weeks.
This rural violence is another
factor that perturbs the Popular
Unity coalition. Dr. Allende has
repudiated violent seizures and
asked for patience while large
properties are taken oven under
the reform program.
But the Government has
shown little initiative in arrest-
ing the radical activists who
push these invasions, partly,bc-
cause the Socialist party in the
governing coalition is demand-
ing more political militancy,.
asking, for example, that the
:present Congress, now con-
 A'c~,YIF~'~e~~salse 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1
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CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
SANTIAGO, 'RTOV. 9-Presi-i
dent 5alvadar Allende an-
nounced today that Chile will
call in .its creditors to renego-
tiate $3 billion in foreign debt,
over half of which is owed to
the United States.
Blaming the debt service
crisis on the borrowing poll-
cies of past governments, Al-
lende said his year-old govern-
ment "has resolved to renego-
tiate the external debt with the
abject of satisfying adequate-
ly the interests of the country
and its creditors."
The $3 billion figure does
not include another $728- mil-~
lion in debts accrued by the.
government when it national-
ized American-based copper
companies. tyhile Chile in-
tends to pay no indemnization
for the major mines, it has in-'!
dicated that most of their in-
herited debts. would be hon-
t ored.
Allende made the announce-
ment on television and later
at a news conference dominat-
ed by the one story absorbing
all of Chile's press-the ar-
rival Wednesday of Cuban pre-
~ mier Fidel Castro.
Chile has the world's highest
per .capita debt along with
Israel, according to Allende,!
and recent economic difficul-
ties have made its renegotia-
tion widely expected.
Indeed, the more militant
wing of Allende's Socialist
Party includes many members
who have called for repudi-
ation of the debt. i
But Allende chose the con.l
ciliatory stand of negotiation.?
He put it this way: j
"'i'he government under-
stands that any state, in ex-'
~Ci~~~~~~ ~Y ~~~~s
else of its sovereignty, cant
a cl oug~~t. to talce measures.;
t nding to protect its develop-?
ent and level of living of its'
p ogle. The United States, to
c nfront its own balance of
p ,yment crisis, has adopted
u ilateral measures with this
a the object.
"The government of Chile,'
n vertheless, prefers not to use
at approach"
Thus, he said, Chile asks the
c editors to negotiate to per-
i s of payment and to con-
s lidate the debts.
Attende referred to numer-
o sprecedents for the action,
i eluding renegotiations ''by
a 1968 by Peru. However,,
ru at that time was on1y~
a le to renegotiate about 30
p r cent of its outstanding,
d bt.
Negotiations of this type
u wally are drawn out and
a e seldom satisfactory to the
d bt-ria'r]en country. Frequent-
] the result is that the debt.
i extended but the interest
c arges are increased.
Iowever, bankers point out
t at given the widely held view:
t at Chile might repudiate its
d bt, the d5sposition to negoti-
a emight find the lenders also
f rthcoming. An official in the
S. ATD mission termed Al-
l ode's statement as concilia-
t ry.
An official ;overnment ac-
c unting at the end of last
y ar put the debt at $2.8 bil-
l n, not including private
d bt. Of that, about $550 mil-
l n was in AID loans, $335
illion in export-import Bank
1 ins and $.400 million in lend=
i g by private U.S. institu-!
t' ns to the Chilean govern- ~
ent.
'Phere a;?e several precedents
f r the A~
renogatiating debts of this.
sort, and a Chilean opposition
leader just back from New
York said he found the private
banks there disposed to take
the same position.
Among the reasons Allende
gave for Chile's difficulties
were the closing of credit lines
on the order of $190 million be-
cause of failure to meet oblit;a-
tions by the private Edwards
Bank .here. The, bank- denies
-this allegatioa.
Allende wore his most serf-
ous expression during his ex~
position of the debt situation,
but he lightened up on the'
question of Castro's visit.
After arrival on Wednesday,
the? Cuban leader is to leave
Friday for the northern de-
Bert to visit copper and nitrate
mines.
Ile then will turn south to
Concepcion, center of the
steel industry and home of the
most radical student groups
calling for violent revolution
-Allende pointed out care-
fully that while he admires
greatly the Cuban revolution
it is not the same as that
desired here. Finally, Castro
is to go> by boat through the
channels of the extreme Chi-
lean south to the city of Puntal
Arenas on the Straits of Magel-';
lan.
Allende is an old friend of
Castro and the. entire left of
this ever more leftist country
considers itself to be a friend
equal.iy.
Although Allende had de-
clared last Thursday that he
would submit to congress to-
day his~proposai for amending
the constitution so as to re-
place -the bicameral congress
with a one?house body, he failed
to put that bill in. It ap-
parently got cost in the rush
to prepare for Castro.
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 CPYRGHT
,prrclglgr Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-CPYRGHT
10 October 1971
ran king economic o :cia
President Salvador Allende
Gossens's Government re-
cently took part in a semi-
nar for lawyers discussing
the technical ways and
means of expropriation in
Chile.
The official apologized to
the lawyers for his lack of
legal expertise, but he as-
sured them of one thin;: the
motivation behind every im-
portant economic decision by
Chile's Marxist-oriented Gov-
ernment is political.
That may be true in any
country, but in Chile the pol-
itics are socialist and the
economy is still capitalist. As
the country approaches its
first anniversary under Marx
ist management, the Chilean
economy is an odd amalgam
of relatively high employ
anent and consumer short-
ages, price controls and infla-
tion struggling to get away,
high consumer spending and
rapidly falling reserves of
foreign exchange.
To understand the some,
times confusing picture of ah
economy in transition from
'capitalism to socialism with.
ill a traditional legal frame-
work, it helps to bear in
mind the political uses of
economic policy.
President Allende's Admin-
istration has used economic
policy to make its electorate
happy with more money to
spend, as well as to destroy
the economic power base of
its political enemies in bank-
ing, textiles and farming. It
has declared its independence
from ',.he United States, thb
"imperialist enemy" that was
once the prime source of
Chile's foreign credit and
capital, by making it clear
that little or no compensa-
tion will be paid for Ameri-
can equity in nationalized
copper interests.
The Government has raised
wages, held prices, national-
ized banks, farms, textile
rinills prid other plants all by
1-.sing existing; 1eg;isl Lion and
the pressuro power of org,un-
camp.iniCs in fivo _copper
ici;isiation - a spceia1 con-
sliuhlianal aniondment w,hs
1ia51.ild un nimously in ; Cuii-
gress do inatcd by the op-
Chilean l bor and tax legis-
lation an the.,strong discre-
against i s 49 per cent inter-,
est in th El Teniente copper
tionalizcf. Companies that
unions I d by a confedera-
tion do mated by the Com-
munist nd Socialist parLies.
Presider Allende's coalition
Govern nt. The other mem-
bers of he coalition are the
carry ba is, has been good-
if the mpany involved is
national (Telephone, and Tele-
pany,. afd General Motors,
First N tional City Bank,
are on t e way out or looking
for a wa out.
Oil and pharmaceutical
compani s, as well as Gen-
eral El tric, ? General Tire,
have stayed. - v .. v The Government,_ committed process, we have gotten such
h
uttingg
socialism without s
- ------------------- -
Approved For
ago banker. 'The profit mar-
gin is. down,. but sales are
up'll
As a result'of this kind of
policy, unemployment in the
industrial, area centered in
SanLia;o has fallen from 6.4
per cent last September to
-4.8 per cent this month.
Chile's limited industries are
working at near capacity to
;supply consumers on a spend
in1, spree, and production of the Economy, declared in
may incrcasc by 10 per cent an interview last week. Us-
this year. ing very cautious phrasing.
Yet there has been little Mr. Vuskovic, talked about
or no nc:w irvestruent. Agri- Government economic strat-
cultural production has been egy at the end of his normal
crippled by political uncer- ! working day. It was 9 P.M.
tainty followed by t'be eti- The minister, a Marxist
propriatior. of 1,400 farms for
agrarian reform, and food im-
ports have riser. by 60 per
cent thus far this year.,
? ? -
The Society for Industrial
Development, the Chilean
couivaient of the National
Association of Manufacturers
economist without party af-
filiation, said that he fore-
saw two tactical changes
within the same economic
strategy for 1971. Wage in-
creases well beyond inflation,
used to rcdistributs ir,;:;,r:o
vri11 prob,'r.,iy ;o
this year
,
predicted in a technical re- rL'.hCatitfi n?"X1: yea;r, a;I,iiuu; in
port dehverec to the Govern-
incrcl;lyL'.s Will in 11.0 cii:,c f: it
went last week that this year's
below in.i~ction. lnvestrmc-rlt,
budget deficit would be a virtyally nonexistent, will
record 11-billion escudos,
($1.38-billion) or about one
third of the budget. The same
report estimated that foreign-
Chile off 'i'rons the rest of the
world the way the SovQet
Union, Cuba and China had
been, says no.
"There is no possibility that
Chile will declare a unilateral
moratorium on her foreign
debts unless a situation is
created for us with no nor-
mal renewal of credits and
no new inputs of capital,"
Pedro Vuskovic, the Minister
havej to be increased. irts of large-scale credits from the Soviet
nion. But the Allende disclosures were
~e first significant mention of the 'Lull scope
these credits. '
What the Chilean President did. not say
his first state-of-the-nation address could
rove more important than what he actually
d say.
This would certainly seem to be the case
regard to his comment on issues invol . Or^a.'`- L e r u e ~ E3: tire ;.; 's ' ;c~ Dr. Allende did come back over and over
the United States. Although he defended <
file's nationalization of American copper , There were several disclosures of im again to the theme that his Marxist-oriented
gmpanies and the decision to pay no direct gortanc: in his speech. government is embarked on a real revolu
iI
)mpensation, he sidestepped any reference o, He said he would submit to Conggress tion "by tze Chilean way" and that "road
serious disagreement with Washington determined to push Chile along the road
the issue. soon his long-promised proposal to set up a to socialism."
unicameral legislature in. place of Chile s I
present two-house Legislature. This proposal He made two references to the impending
i aiiy problems Skirted has bee visit of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, but
r. expected. ,
the references were short and generally
At the same time Dr. Allende skirted many 4 He a;air, called for an increase in the
f the problems his government feces-toe r.oncair.iutal.
Approvea or a ease
CHILE AID-SEESAW SEEN:
RUSSIA UP, U.S. DOWN
CPYRGHT
ill- - 1. sci?.ure. o: land by 11::i1 E. S pcasa'Cts
f rn Licuiariy in U.3x1e':i ,slit`'., the shortages
of some consumer itao'is, including meat,
which are b_coin.in; more pronounced, and
the liar e?sea1e printing cf paper money to
'quit more purchaein; power into the hands of
Chic;;ns, sreein here as a long-range infla-
tic:iary factor.
3r, llilseorle d,id, howe=ver, come to grips
with some of the current problems facing
this nation on o-,ith t merica's Pacific_c,aast.
_i r Al
for .:[ of t.1L Wage
wo' Meru in We na-
tioi: .zad Ca~:ugice:rice, cc-peer mine in
northern t'^ihile. Using tine forum o atiG+7,?
wide address, he urged the miners to tone
down their demands in line with the nation's
economic needs.
size of Chile's, carabianeros,
police, so they' can more e: dive y cover
r.+. .
every part of the country.
comment here following; the speech That Ile
almost sounded like a law-and-order candi-
date.
Much of his nearly two-hour address was
a rehearsal of Chile's prasser1L e: i .:omie
position and what he regards as his overn-
;ni;nt's successful economic performance to
date. 'He ticked o i one issue after another-
incr ased industrial production, a major
increase: in t:;e gross national product,
louvered unemployment figures, a halving of
the nation's inflationary spiral-to prove
that conditions have improved in Chile dur-
ing his first year in office.
Revoa^utao iary athenie
 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
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CPYRGHT
PULP-PAPER INDUSTRY FIGHTS FOR FREEDOM
Almost lost. amid the din and uproar sur?
roundin the visit of Cuban Premier Fidel
Castro is a battle between the government
a.nd opposition here for control of Chile's
pulp and paper industry.
In the long run, the issue could prove
the most crucial encounter yet between
supporters of Marxist President Allende and
the coalescing opposition forces.
Moreover, Chile's tradition of pluralistic
free press could be at stake.
The whole affair centers around govern-
ment efforts to buy control of the Com-
naxiia vianufacturera de Papeles Cartones,
the last remaining major pulp and paper
manufacturer in private hands in Chile.
To opponents of the government, the bid
by Dr.; Ailende's government to buy up
enough shares to get control of the firm,
amounts to a major threat to freedom of the
^ress. The government denies that this is
w case, but says that key industries in Chile
iould be under state control-and pulp and
ap' r is one of those industries.
The concern among government oppo?
tints is that a free press will be dificuit to
:?2intain if it must rely on the government
or newsprint supply.
r`Je I"."~ ~;r , x?3a ',-.:tan
> ?r -zap. E
he government bid to purchase shares in
.u Papalera, as the pulp and paper firm is
lied, has net resistance on the local
stock market, although the government is
offering a premium for the shares - paying
up to 4.2 cents per share, while the stock in
recent weeks has been trading at about
seven-tenths of 1 cent per share.,
it is estimated that the government now
may hold about 15 percent of the total
shares, having purchased some 5 percent
in the first week of trading at the inflatcd
price and Acquiring another 10 percent or
so by ,default when it recently purchased
controlling interests in most major banks
here.
Z', ork s in La Papalerzt have voted to
oppose the government and are buying up
shares themselves to keep the firm from
passing into government hands.
Moreover, the Christian Democrats have
introduced a aroad constitutional amend-
ment into the Congress that, among other
tl 7n-,s, would have the effect of nu lifying
tie government's pJ.reha.se of shares in 11i
r'apalera. Christian Democratic Sen. Juan
a.ri l`on s; id the amendment wet~'d require
5.. "J"iTyrfi~v.:_?-!1.^. vet ~4i1 t r
purchased if the amendment passes and be-
comes a part of the constitution.
The government's action in La Papelera
case becomes all the more critical because
of other recent d::velopments here.
This week, Chile's major news magazine,
the respected #rcilla, ,announced that it
would soon appear on nevasprint rather than
the special imported glossy stock it has
used for years. The magazine has blamed
the government-controlled firm which prints
the magazine for not maintaining an ad-
equate supply of the imported paper, despite
a contract.
The opposition also points to the recent
reassignment of radio frequencies which'
last week resulted in the shutting down of.
Radio Balmaceda for most of a day. The
station belongs to the Christian Democratic
Party. The Radio Balmaceda frequency was
given a new station representing a Com-
munist-controlled labor union, while Balma-
ceda was assigned a less desirable fre-
quency.
There is some evidence that the shutting
down of Radio 3almaeeda for the day may
have been a mixup on the part of the gov-
ernment. VJilile some opposition forces are
prepared to accept the government's com-
ment on the situation, they point out that
the incidents, however, came at a bad time
not to arouse suspicion.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1
-MAUAU~71 UM December 1971
SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE QUESTION OF POWs
On 28 October the South Vietnamese government announced that
it was honoring National Day and the start of President Thieu's
second term in office by releasing 618 Viet Cong prisoners now and
2,284 more over the next few months. Mr. Thieu's gesture, although
dramatic, may not inspire the North Vietnamese regime to anything
beyond the polemics which have historically greeted any initiatives
on prisoner exchanges. Even recently, when Saigon bettered its
previous POW offers by promising to send badly injured prisoners
back to North Vietnam without a quid pro quo, Hanoi showed very
little interest,
It is hard to accept the possibility that this most recent
Saigon POW initiative may meet the same fate as its predecessors.
Hanoi is demonstrably sensitive to world opinion on the POW issue
and surely realizes that the release of some 3,000 Viet Cong
prisoners cannot be effectively answered by Communist denunciations
of "fraud" and "a meaningless propaganda gesture," To be sure,
Thieu coupled his humanitarian act with considerable tub-thumping.--
and why not? As The Economist's correspondent pointed out in this
connection, "a gesture oesn t have to be ingenuous to be effective,"
Regardless of the benefits to the Saigon regime, however, the
importance of the prisoner release cannot be ignored, nor can the
weak and waspish Communist reaction be justified.
Hanoi's waspishness, in fact, could be taken in some circles
as an indication that her leadership recognizes the Thieu govern-
ment's sense of security in carrying out such a prisoner release
as well as the government's assurance in announcing a programmed
succession of additional releases over the next few months. Saigon's
demonstration of security and confidence is in the nature of a
challenge and Hanoi's leaders, being no fools, may find it awkward
to bypass the well-publicized release of Communist prisoners without
a more closely equivalent response than polemics. What's more,
each successive prisoner release by Saigon over the next few months
could make Hanoi's position even stickier.
North Vietnamese leaders must also find it increasingly
awkward to ignore the generous offers of neutral nations to serve
as temporary internment areas for North Vietnamese and U.S. POWs,.
Austria, Cyprus, Norway, Sweden and Lebanon have all made such
proposals recently and Lebanon then repeated its earlier proposal
through the United Nations Political. Committee. There are signs
that other neutral nations are likely to come forward with similar
proposals for POW sanctuary in the near future. Each time such a
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1
proposal has been made by a neutral country the U.S. has been quick
to respond positively. Hanoi has not yet responded, Both Vietnam and
the U.S., incidentally, were signatories to the 1949 Geneva Con-
vention on POWs which specifically permits third-country internment.
International accords aside, the Hanoi regime itself is remiss
with regard to North Vietnamese troops fighting in South Vietnam.
Despite its admonitions to the North Vietnamese people (Hoc Ta , July
1971) that "the policy towards the war invalids, demobilize service-
men, families of the war dead and families of troops consists of
constantly insuring that they are materially secure and spiritually
happy," the regime falls short of practicing what it preaches. Should
it seriously examine its own shortcomings, it might stumble upon some
way of helping North Vietnamese fighting men who have been captured
on South Vietnamese battlefields. The regime could start, for
instance, with a response to Saigon's October POW initiative honestly
aimed at securing the release and repatriation of at least a few
hundred of the 9,000 North Vietnamese troops now incarcerated in
South Vietnam.
In this connection it might be profitable for North Vietnamese
leaders to speculate on 66 of their North Vietnamese Army troopers
who recently came to public attention in one of Saigon's six POW
camps. It happened at the end of October when the South Vietnamese
government permitted a group of foreign correspondents to tour
Saigon's POW camp at Cantho in the Mekong Delta. When the visiting
newsmen inquired about the makeup of the camp's 3,007 POW population,
they learned that 66 of the prisoners were North Vietnamese Army
troops who had been captured in South Vietnam., These 66 men, like
the remainder of the NVA personnel in POW camps, can hope for release
only by Presidential order, or through the type of POW exchange the
North Vietnamese government seems unwilling to undertake, In
discussions with newsmen on this possibility, members of the camp
staff expressed the view that the North Vietnamese POWs would prefer
the relatively comfortable existence of POWs in the South to the
hazards and austerities of the North. Newsmen may ? have taken
this view with a grain of salt, but it is a factor that Hanoi's
leaders must take into consideration if they ever weigh out seriously
the possibility of POW exchanges.
The consensus of the foreign newsmen who visited Cantho was that
although the camp had obviously been spruced up for their tour, it
was generally well run and its 3,007 inmates better cared for and
living better than they did as Viet Cong guerrillas. Regular
inspections by the International Red Cross are, of course, a factor
in ensuring proper facilities and treatment for the camp's POW
population. Like other POW-related factors, International Red Cross
scrutiny is one which Hanoi's leaders seem unwilling to risk.
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THE ECONOMIST
30 October 1971
Vietnam
A gesture doesn't have to be ingenuous
to be effective. The South Vietnamese
government announced on Thursday
that it will celebrate the start of
President Thieu's second term on Sun-
day by releasing 618 Vietcong
prisoners now and 2,284 more over
the next few months. The idea of
an exchange of prisoners between
Saigon and Hanoi was floated a long
time ago, but the North Vietnamese
showed very little interest even when
Mr Thieu bettered his offer and,
promised to send badly injured
prisoners back without a quid pro quo.
Now he has made an even more
dramatic unilateral gesture, and it is
one of the few propaganda victories
he has been able to pull off lately.
Some come out
1 November 1971
App
and mark the first major move toward
settlement of the POW problem.
The announcement from Saigon was
followed immediately by rumors that
some 200 American prisoners were on
their way home from North Vietnamese
.camps. It's a possibility, but a remote
one. For one thing, the rumor was
promptly and vehemently denied by var-
ious interested parties in Washington.
For. another, any such large-scale re-
lease of Americans or South Vietnamese
would be preceded by considerable beat-
ing of the propaganda drums.
It must be recognized, too, that Pres-
ident Thieu has coupled the humani-
tarian gesture with considerable politi-
cal tub-thumping of his own. The re-
lease was timed to serve as a part of his
second inaugural gala. The 618 prison-
ers who will, be released outright are,
0
It is hard to believe that the Com-
munist characterization of the release
of some 3,000 Viet Gong prisoners as an
"impudent maneuver" is to be their only
reaction to the South Vietnamese initia-
tive. Despite the Paris negotiators' at-
tempts to write off President Thieu's act
as a meaningless propaganda- gesture,
the mass release could looser the logjam
CPYRGHT
The sceptics will be quick Ito observe
that the released men are a small pro-
portion of the 4o,ooo-odd prisoners
that the South Vietnamese have in
their hands ; that 176 of the first
batch are in very poor health ; and
that most of the others are now prob-
ably regarded as " rehabilitated." But
this biggest release yet will help Mr
Thieu. It could well make it a bit
easier to get Congress in Washington
to accept the Administration's aid
programme. And it will strengthen
President Nixon's position if he plans
to announce something short of a.
programme for complete American
withdrawal when he makes his next
Vietnam statement
cw
CPYRGHT
through the "Open Arms" program,
which means a brief period of ideo-
lcgical indoctrination and a promise
to work for the Thieu goverment a-s
propagandists and intelligence gather-
ers after their release.
So the prisoners are being handed
over with a few strings attached. That
does not, however, negate its importance
or justify the weak and waspish Commu-
nist response. The move is a demonstra-
tion of confidence and security on the
part of the Thieu government. And for
that reason alone, it seems unlikely that
the Communists can let it pass without
some more closely equivalent response.
It is not impossible that Hanoi and
the VC will decide that the, only way to
save face is a reciprocal release of
prisoners-an "anything-you-oan-do-I-
can-do-better" maneuver. If so, a mu- ..
tual exchange program could be es-
tablished that would, sooner or later,
involve the U.S. prisoners. Such a
program would, it is true, be based more,
on bravado than on reason or humani-
tarian considerations. But regardless of
motivations, President Thieu deserves
gratitude and congratulations for mak-
ing g the first major move in a process
rci~ecal8~'Zie t~s eaCl~a~~rw0~ted~001-1
Tema Wing ,
 CPYRGH-Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1
NEW YORK TIMES
29 October 1971
WASHINGTON, Oct. 28 -
Administration o
day that they had no reason
to expect the release of any
Americans by the enemy in
return for the freeing this Sun-
day of 'nearly 3,000 Vietcong
prisoners in South Vietnam.
Although the State Depart-
ment issued a statement this
morning welcoming the move
by the Saigon Government and
expressin ghope that it would
lead to reciprocity, officials in
bot lithe State and Defense
departments said they were
aware of no imminent release'
of any of the 400 Americans
believed to be held prisoner in
Southeast Asia.
Administration officials
sought to quash speculation in
some dispatches from Saigon
sugesting that the release of
.the Vietcong to 'mark the in-
auguration of President Ngu-
yen Van Thieu Sunday was
possibly part of a secret deal.
This speculation was stirred
by a report in The Chicago
Tribune this morning that an
Army hospital in Denver had
NEW YORK TIMES
CPYRGH 9 October 1971
U. S. Doubts Foe Will Free
Captives in Reciprocal Act
By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times
een alerted to handle up to
nited States prisoners.
T tine Dispatch Denied
But the White House, the
State Department and the
,Penta n all issued prompt
statem nts asserting that The
Tribun report was inaccurate.
Jerry W. Friedheim, Penta-
gon sp kesman said:
"Th e is absolutely nothing
to The Chicago Tribune story.
The D artment of Defense has
no inf rmation at all concern-
ing an 7 imminent release of
U.S. isoners. Neither Fitz-
simons ? General Hospital [in
Denver nor any other hospital
has been alerted in any man-
ner for any imminent return.of
U.S. pr oners."
A sp kesman for the Denver
hospita said: "We have no
knowle ge here of any mass
release of P.O.W.'s in Vietnam.
There s a contingency plan
present under way which is
prepari g general hospitals for
such a thing if it comes to
pass."
"This is a staff study,. but I
feel it is nothing but wishful.
thinking," he said. "We are
not planning to receive any-
thing ore than the war
casualties, which we have been
getting all along."
Officials involved in prisoner
matters expressed anger over
speculation that some American
might be released soon.
'Very Cruel Thing'
"It is a very cruel thing, be-
cause of the hopes it gives rise
to among families of the prison-
ers," one aide said.
The Pentagon said that the
Army last night called every
next-of-kin family to tell tl:em
that The Tribune report was in-
accurate.
State Department specialists
on Vietnam said that all signs
at present suggest that the
North Vietnamese have not
changed their attitude on pris-
oners. The Hanoi position has
been that no American prisoner
will be released until the United
States accepts the Vietcong
'peace plan, which calls for com-
1plete withdrawal of American
Tforces.
In Saigon, officials said that
618 Vietcong prisoners would
be released outright and 2,320
)others turned over to the chieu
1hoy or "open arms" program
for "political rehabilitation" be-
fore being released.
CPYRGHT
Unilaterally, the Vietcong
have released 24 Americans
;since 1965 and the North Viet-
namese have released 9. '
A spokesman at Hickham
Air Force Base in Honolulu
denied that increased air activ-
ity there in the last two days
had anything to do with a re-
turn of prisoners from Vietnam.
He said the activity at the
iairfield was due to the move-
ment of a squadron of Phantom
jets from the 389th Tactical
Squadron, which was beings
withdrawn from Vietnam to
the United States.
amount of helicopter activity
There also' was an unusual
at the nearby Tripler Hospital.
But a spokesman said this was
partly a civil defense exercise
and was not related to prisoner
return.
'Farce,' Vietcong Charge
Special to The New York Times
PARIS, Oct. 28 - The Com-
munist delegations to the Viet-
nam peace talks refused today
to accept the liberation of pris-
oners by the Saigon Govern-
ment as a gesture of goodwill,
and instead condemned it as a
"farce."
CPYRGHT
;:oath Vietnam Lets Reporters. Visit P.O.W. Camp
By FOX BUTTERFIELD
Special to The New York Times
CANTHO, South Vietnam,.
Oct. 28 - As part of its
stepped-up efforts to demon-
strate what it terms a "humani-
tarian" policy on the prisoner-
of-war issue, the South Viet-
namese Government allowed a
group of newsmen today to
tour its prisoner-of-war camp
here at Cantho in the Mekong'
Delta. i
Approved F
The visit, the first that the!
South Vietnamese have permit-
ted to a prisoner camp in over
a year, was timed to coincide
th the Government announce-
nt that 2,938 Vietcong pris-
ers of war would be released
Sunday in Honor of Presi-
t Nguyen Van Thieu's in-
uration.
merican officials in Saigon
sald today they welcomed ScluI
th Vietnamese announce-
&R
ment, describing it as "a nia-
I jor humanitarian gesture."
The American officials point-
ed out that Saigon's action was
the largest such release of the
war and that it involved al-
most 10 per cent of the 37,000
prisoners of war in South
Vietnam.
Hanoi's Reaction Awaited
The officials added that they
certainly do not expect any
immediate reciprocal action
on the part of North Vietnam,
though they are "hopeful" that
this gesture may encourage
some flexibility in Hanoi on
the prisoner issue.
The camp here at Cantho, 90
miles southeast of Saigon, is
one of -six run by the South
Vietnamese. It holds 3,007 pris-
oners, including 66 North Viet-
namese, in a complex of low,
corrugated iron barracks on
the flat and muddy delta plain.
Although there have been
rumors in Saigon of killings
and revolts inside the prison
 CPYRGHT
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camps, the Cantho comman-,
data, k'iaj. Hoang Dinh Hoat,.
said there had been no majpr'
disturbances and no escapes at'
the camp since he took it over
din 1969.
Major Hoat, a slender man
with a narrow face and large,
!sad-looking eyes, said: "The
!prisoners sometimes complain:
about having to work too long
? outside the camp, but we have
set up channels for them to,
express their grievances and
there has been no trouble."
The 30 newsmen who toured
the camp were not allowed to
talk to the prisoners, but were
permitted to walk freely
among them and photograph
CPYRGHT
BALTIMORE SUN
29 October 1971
them. At one point some of the
visitors, unaccompanied by
guards, entered the barracks
occupied by North Vietnamese
officers.
The prisoners, dressed in ma-
roon pajamas, stared at the
newsmen, but they neither]
spoke nor made any gestures.'
Their simple belongings, issued
by the South Vietnamese Gov.
ernment, lay piled neatly on
their wooden sleeping racks.
They included a mosquito!
net, a blanket, a sleeping mat,
a canteen, spoon, toothpaste
and a brush, a towel and soap.
According to Major Hoat,
who was trained as a military
most of them from wounds they
had suffered before they came
to Cantho. He denied that his
guards used any form of vio-.
lence to discipline the prisoners.
Three hundred and ten of then
prisoners have decided to be-
come hoi chanh, or "returnees"
to the Government. They wear
black pajamas and have. certain;
privileges and duties like those"
of trusties in American prisons.
If, after a screening processd
the returnees are accepted by
the Government, they will be
sent to a chieu hoi or "open
arms" center for six to eight
weeks' indoctrination and will )
be freed.
CPYRGHT
policeman in the United States,
the prisoners are allowed week-
ly visits by their families and,
are permitted to send and re-
ceive mail. The camp's sta-
tistics showed that 1,250 men
had visitors last, month.
62 Died in 4 Years
A small, whitewashed build-,
ing, one of the camp's few
buildings afforded.the luxury
of tree shade against the
blistering delta sun, serves as
a dispensary. A group of 20
prisoners squatted on their
heels, waiting to see the doctor.
Major Hoat said that 62
prisoners had died in the camp
isince it was built in 1967,
Can Tho, Vietnam (1P1-
an s
rifle now do needlepoint. Last
year's guerrilla is this year's
volleyball champion.
He may have lost his free-
dom when he donned the ma-
roon pajamas of a prisoner of
war, but he gained privileges'
and a full belly. He's encircled
by barbed wire and no one is
shooting at him.
If he's lucky he will be freed
next week to mark President
Nguyen Van Thieu's inaugura-
tion and South Vietnam's Na-
tional Day. If not, it's back to
the volleyball court.
The government has an-
nounced 618 Viet Cong will be
freed and 2,300 others will be
accepted into its "Open
Arms" program.
The POW camp here ob-
viously had been spruced up
for a, government-sponsored
tour by foreign newsmen yes-
terday, but in any case its
2,994 inmates live better than
they did as Viet Cong guerril-
las.
New arrivals are given hair-
cuts, sprayed with insecticide
and issued two pairs of paja-
mas, a mosquito net, a blan-
ket, a straw sleeping mat,
cooking utensils, a spoon,
toothpaste, towel comb and
soap A,i
They `ls'ddPEPMA
lmpn to a buildinv. Tlie platforms in tin barracks, 80
c om-
day vo U/ L~j b
modations are crude by West- POW's at the Can Tho facility,
ern st ndards, but luxurious one of six in the country, were
compar d to the swampy sane all captured in the Mekong Del-
tuaries they once inhabited in ta. Most are Viet Cong local-
the Me ong Delta, force guerrillas with homes and
The aily food allowance for relatives in the surrounding 16
each i equivalent to 13 cents, provinces. Technically they are
enough to buy rice, fish and a eligible for release after one
little m at. Vegetables grown in year if they guarantee loyalty to
the pr son garden and fish the Saigon regime.
raised ' two prison ponds sup- The selection process is stiff,
plemen` the diet. however. Only 283 prisoners
Priso ers who behave are al- have been freed since the Can
meters, and it is not reaLy Isola-
tion since it sometimes holds
four or five men.
"It is rarely used. We have
had a few minor diswurtances
but nothing serious. T.-lc men
are allowed to make corllplaints
through their supervisors. Some-
times they complain when sup-
plies are delayed. I don't. mean
food; supplies, they n r 3 never
late, but personal ?hints like
tooth brushes and soap."
lowed o work on road gangs Tho camp was established four. Isections The camp is divided into two
and co struction projects cut years ago. More than 10,000 for "docile" F.nri ": tub-
side th, camp for a daily wage hrae been transferred to Phu born" POW's. There s r:h)re
of 8 pi asters,or 3 cents. They Quoc prison island. barbed wire arnunri t it tub
can sp aid this in a small post The 66 North Vietnamese pris- born barracks bloc!., t ; ..erns
exchan e that stocks soy sauce, oners at Can Tho can hope for and activit-es there ;e
conden ed milk and canned release only through a rare the same as in the doses
masker 1. POW exchange or by presiden- The oldest inmate is 69, the
Recr tion facilities include tial order. But the government youngest 13. Thirteen women
volleyb 11 and shuttlecock claims most of them prefer the live in a separate section.
courts, a drama theater and a comfortable existence as a POW The camp has a small dispen-
!reading room. POW's can learn in the South to the hazards and sary and hospital staffcc by one
reading and arithmetic in the austerity of the North. doctor and 10 assistants. Major
camp chool, they can do car- Viet Cong prisoners are al- Hoat said 62 prisoners have died
pentry n the workshop and they lowed to correspond with their in four years, "mostly from ma-
can pu chase needle-point kits laria and heart attacks."
families, have visitors for 30
to whil away the monotony of minutes once a week. and accept The camp command.;nt has
impriso ment. food parcels. one United States adviser, SFC
A coi munal television set is Jerry E. Kaufman, 33, from All,
switche on every evening. Oc- Isolation cell gusta, Ga. He admits to 11i,
caaiona y there are movies. years' experience in running
The imp commandant, Maj. Those who misbehave receive POW camps.
one warning without punish- i can onl tell you this is one
Huang inh Hoat, claims there. ment. Second offenders lose vis y y
is no po tical indoctrination. of the best damn POW camps
"We have no mission to iting rights, parcel and PX priv- I've ever seen," he said. "It's
ileges for varying periods. Re-
ut in an isolation certainly the most comforter
change heir Communist convic- -+o- are
p
rs cell for u w ovUdyo. p soners have es-
"It
t
id M
H
"
oa
.
ajor
sa
release the same,
is 1"A -
 CPYRGHT
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THE PHILIPPINES HERALD CPYRGHT
17 October 1971
? n?~ 'a a e' / 1 eaw
k t prop en's,
By GEORGE ESPER
Asaj,,icred Preas
SAIGON - (AP) - In a surpris-
i
en its people to task for not car-
ing enough for North Vietnamese
war victims and their families. It
calls this "a great problem."
Apparently acknowledging hea-
vy casualties in the Indochina war,
Hanoi called for quick repair of
North Vietnam's "many cemete-
ries" for the battlefield dead. It
purged Increased production of ar-
tificial limbs for the wounded.
H1oc Tap (Studies), the official:
journal of North Vietnamese Wor-
kers' Party, said the country's po-
licy toward war victims and their
families is "still replete with
shortcomings and weaknesses."
The self-criticism appeared in
the July issue of the official Dar-
ty journal, just translated here. It.
was made public by the Joint Uni-
ted States Public Affairs Office.
which noted: "The problem of the
proper care of wounded veterans
and their families has been cover-
ed extensively In the Hanoi press.
but this article is the broadest
and most definitive treatment to
appear to date."
Hoc Tap said: "One of the most
important shortcomings and weak-
nesses is that many organs. Indus-
trial enterprises. cooperatives. ca-
dres and party members do not
understand how to properly carry
out this policy.
"Many places have not . been
thoroughly imbued with, the view-
points of the party and the state
on the task specified in the noli=
cy."
Hoc Tap said that at present
"the majority of war invalids are
classified as slightly and moder-
ately disabled. Most of them are
Young, have acquired adequate
AbprW IF6'r?K asW4919' 10,E
ly have a high political and ideo-
logical level as a result of their
being trained in combat."
"The combat requirement of the
Implementation of the policy to-
ward the war invalids, demobilized
servicemen, servicemen transfer.
red to the production sector, fami-
lies of the war dead, and families
of troops consists of constantly In
surfing that they are materially,
secure and spiritually happy and
a chance to participate in activi-
ties to benefit society.
' :. , It is necessary to see to It
that the livelihood of the war in-valids, of the families of the war
dead, and of :the families of troops
is stabilized. The level of their'
livelihood must be either eauj1 to
or above that of the persons and
families that have average labor
output."
The party iournal said it is im-;
perative to give financial assist
ante to war victims and their fa..,
mikes and that the state has pro
mulgated a system of payments. r
Hoc Tap said the greatest efforts.
must be made to meet the' cultu-
ral and spiritual needs of war vic-
tims, "to grant them political
rights, and to wholeheartedly care
for them in other fields including
marriage and the bringing up, of
children so that they can be con;
stantly spiritually happy."
Of the battlefield dead. the par
ty journal said: "To show grata
tude to those who have sacrificed
their lives, many veterans cemete
ries have been built. Many ceme:
teries are large and beautiful and
.are landscaped with flower gardens
and trees. However, many ceme.
teries have not been properly built.
They must be quickly repaired. We.
must strive to grow flowers In the
cemeteries in order to turn them
-'01194A0003000200
1-1
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December 1971
DATES WORTH NOTING
December 6 Poland The Polish Party Congress is
to meet, and must deal with
Poland's serious economic
and social problems.
December 10 Worldwide Human Rights Day, comrnemorat-
USSR ing the adoption of the
Universal Declaration of
Human Rights by the UN General
Assembly in 1948. In 1970
the unofficial Soviet Human
Rights Committee was formed
by Sakharov and other Soviets
who said their independent
organization would be guided
by the principles of the
Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
December 14 Poland 1st anniversary of the
December Workers riots follow-
ing the Gomulka regime's sudden
increase in consumer prices.
The riots brought about
Gomulka's fall from power
and his replacement by
Gierek.
December 19 Indochina 25th anniversary of the
beginning of the French
Indochina War.
December 21 USSR Anniversary of Stalin's
birth, 1879. The way the
Brezhnev regime handles this
day will be watched for signs
of renewed Stalinization in
the USSR.
December 26 China Mao Tse-tung's 78th birthday.
December 31 New York Expiration of U Thant's term
as UN Secretary General. U
Thant has announced he is
retiring.
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January 2 Chile
50th anniversary of the
Chilean Corrnnunist Party,
founded 1922.
February 14 USSR/CPR
Anniversary of the Sino-
Soviet Friendship Pact,
signed in 1950.
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FUR Mb-&.U~~X TT 1, 7
December 1971
SHORT SUBJECTS
Soviet Contempt for Yugoslavia. Soviet contempt for Yugoslavia
manifesto; itself aimost before tfie ink was dry on the joint state-
ment issued after the Brezhnev-Tito summit meeting 22-25 September.
Pravda's 4 October editorial comment on the meeting gave a grossly
ls~' torted:interpretation of the significance of the encounter.
Pravda portrayed Yugoslavia as no more, nor less a Satellite than
Bu garia and Hungary, ignoring all references in the joint state
ment to the importance of mutual respect for independence and
sovereignty among "socialist" nations. (See Pravda editorial
attached.)
When it suits the Soviets' purposes, they are willing to
describe Yugoslavia as a "socialist" country, but it must be clear
to all that this is little more than a verbal game. The Yugoslav
newspaper V'esnik (30 October) pointed out that Soviet Premier
Alexei KoSygin omitted Yugoslavia from a list of countries he
described as "having gained socialism." Whether Kosygin's
omission was inadverent or deliberate, it indicates how lightly
the Soviets regard Yugoslav claims,
Brezhnev's Paris Debut. The recent visit of Soviet Party
Secretary Leonid rez ev to France (25-30 October), though
surrounded by an atmosphere of good will and accomplishment,
produced few changes of position on either side. However, as a
high-level public relations exercise, it was useful politically
to both parties. Since General de Gaulle's trip to Moscow (1966),
the French have claimed a special relationship with the USSR and
East Europe. This concept has fit in well with France's desire
for a more independent role in Europe and, in turn, has been used
by the USSR in an effort to drive a wedge in the Western alliance,
Emphasizing his close relations with Paris at this time also suits
Comrade Br.ezhnev's current efforts to portray the Soviet Union as
the protagonist of pan-European detente.
Brezhnev did not get French'agreement for the friendship
treaty he sought and was obliged to settle for a joint statement
known as "Principles of Cooperation." The document produced no
surprises. Also signed was a ten-year agreement providing for
each country to help build industrial plants in the other. In
this case, too, the document added little to an agreement on the
same subject which has been in effect for five years. Even if the
meeting was short on substantive accomplishment, it did provide
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1
Brezhnev with a forum from which to hawk Moscow's latest wares,
particularly the Soviet program for a general European detente.
The French public was largely indifferent to Brezhnev -- in contrast
to the welcome given Khrushchev in 1960 -- but Soviet media praised
his initiative and exaggerated his accomplishments. Meanwhile, the
French Communist Party, which was unable to produce any mass turnout
for their distinguished visitor, was generally ignored by the Soviet
leader.
For Pompidou, the visit provided an opportunity to exploit the
special French-Soviet relationship in an effort to balance Bonn's
Ostpolitik. While conceding little of substance, the French Presi-
dent, by his cordial reception of the Soviet leader, also made it
more difficult henceforth for the French Communists to criticize
his government. President Pompidou, despite his accommodating
attitude, made it clear -- as he did during his visit to Moscow a
year ago -- that France remains firmly in the Western alliance.
Where is the Dedicated Communist Warrior Of Yesteryear? A
series o articles in the o fIETEial Morietnamese Army newspaper,
Quan Doi Nhan Dan offers an interesting counterpoint for the usual
paeans to t He tireless dedication of Communist warriors. On July
7th the newspaper described the leaders of the North Vietnamese
Army (PAVN) as "often lax in disciplining subordinates and failing
to set a proper example." The troops were described, in turn, as
"unwilling to carry out orders or accept criticism." Later that
month awn Doi Nhan Dan criticized "poor relations between leaders
and men which le to inefficiency and discord."
Lack of enthusiasm was the theme of an article on August 5th
and two days later the army newspaper complained that "PAVN troops
are not training or studying hard enough, and are not showing
enough resilience in the face of the difficulties and hardships of
war." Party members "have a duty to instill fervor and patriotism
into the men and help them overcome erroneous and passive thoughts."
By the 12th of August the newspaper had concluded that "worse than
the lack of discipline itself is the fact that it is tolerated by
the leaders." Some men, even when they volunteered for certain
duties, "fail to carry them out efficiently or even to understand
fully the nature of the duties." On September 17th the newspaper
suggested that increased attention to the soldiers' physical and
mental welfare might help to solve some of the problems for "if the
men were physically fitter, morale might be better."
In October an Doi Nhan Dan's theme was the misuse of
weapons. Rules a been-Broken, men were using their weapons for
hunting and fishing or lending them out without authorization.
The newspaper urged that "equipment inspections be carried out
regularly and thoroughly in order to avoid more accidents where
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1
weapons had not been properly maintained" and "to eliminate situ-
ations where weapons needed urgently could not be found." Either
an unusually cantankerous staff is manning the editorial desks of
Hanoi's axmy newspaper or the stories circulating in Vietnam are
true about the concern among the North Vietnamese leadership
regarding the lack of discipline and low morale among PAVN troops.
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PRAVDA, Moscow
2 October 1971
The socialist world is gathering new forces and developing with optimism and
confidence in its.-historical prospects. The socialist countries are united by
community of-the sociopolitical system, coincidence of fundamental interests and aims,
and loyalty to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. By
coordinating their actions and agreeing on positions on the main foreign policy questions
the fraternal countries are exerting an increasingly active and decisive influence on
the international situation and on the course of the modern revolutionary forces' common
struggle against imperialism and for peace, democracy and socialism. Cooperation allows
them. by enriching each other's experience, jointly to solve the fundamental problems
of socialist and communist building, to find the most rational forms of economic ties
and colleetive];y to determine a common line in foreign policy activity.
The recently concluded friendly visits which Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, CPSU Central
Committee general secretary, made to Yugoslavia, Hungary and Bulgaria,were a weighty
contribution to the cause of further strengthening the unity of the socialist countries.
The talks in Belgrade, Budapest and Sofia were an important step on the path of the
increasingly close coordination of the fraternal parties' and countries' foreign' policy
activity and of their extensive and multifaceted cooperation. Speaking to Yugoslav
workers in Zemun, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev said: "The Soviet Union has believed and
believes that under modern conditions, when the antagonism between the forces of reaction
and progress and the. forces of capitalism and socialism is not ceasing in the world
arena, the socialist states' active and coordinated policy must be couuterposed to the
actions of imperialism and reaction."
The line of further strengthening the unity of the socialist community countries found
its specific embodiment in the results of L.I. Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia. New
prospects for developing mutually advantageous and truly fraternal cooperation were
revealed as a result of the fruitful talks. As is noted in the joint statiement adopted
at the talks, cooperation between the USSR and Yugoslavia is based on community of the
bases of the social system and adherence to the principles of socialist internationalism.
The results of the visit showed that the peoples of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are
united by common class interests and by unity of ultimate aims. In the worldwide
historic struggle against imperialist aggression and for the consolidation of peace and
the triumph of freedom and progress the peoples of our countries stand on the Name side
of the barricade as comrades and brothers in arms. The viewpoints of Yugoslavia and
the Soviet pinion proceed from common vital interests in. creating a reliable system of
European security, holding a pan-European conference and strengthening stable peace
and security in the Balkans.
The USSR and Yugoslavia support the heroic struggle of the peoples of Indochina, in-
sisting firmly on the immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops and those of their allies from
this region, they confirm their decisive support for the Arab peoples, struggle to liqui-
date the consequences of Israeli aggression, and they support the implementation of ~.: .'?
practical measures in the field of disarmament and demand the liquidation of all vestiges
of colonialism.
An important and, comradely exchange of 'opinions took place in Budapest and in Sofia.
The meetings and talks, conducted in a cordial atmosphere, showed the strength and
inviolability of the fraternal, friendly ties and the unity of views. Soviet people
are profoundly satisfied with the results of L.I. Brezhnevoa visit to Hungary and
,Bulgaria.
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 sovietVdA~I s~/@t~9-r~p~i~~1s'Oy~4, 401-1
combining rapid economic and scientific and technical growth with the flourishing of
socialist culture and an upsurge in the people Is well-being. With warm sympathy they
follow the successful development of fraternal. Hungary and Bulgaria, the fulfillment
by the communists.and all working people of these countries of the tasks set by the
recently held party congresses, and the struggle to implement the Leninist ideas on
building the new society. They are truly gladdened by any success and any achieve-
ment on the part of the fraternal peoples. The numerous instances of constantly
developing economic ties are making them aware of the creative enthusiasm with which the
working peoples of these countries have entered into the fulfillment of the comprehensive
program adopted at the 25th CEMA session.
The community of socialist states is the reliable stronghold of the peoples in the
struggle against imperialism and for socialism, peace and social progress. Its role
in preserving and strengthening peace in Europe is particularly great. The pan-
European conference, the ratification of the treaties between the USSR and the FRG and
between Poland and the FRG and the reduction of armaments and armed forces in Europe
must become important landmarks on the path-of consolidating a stable peace on our
continent. The meetings in Budapest and Sofia demonstrated once more the unity of views
on urgent problems of the international situation, and above all on problems of European
security. _
For peoples Bulgaria these fall days will remain memorable also because it's loyal son
Todor Zhivkov was awarded the order of Lenin. Todor Zhivkov was given this high award
for outstanding services in the development of friendship and cooperation between the
peoples of our countries and in the consolidation of peace and socialism. and for
many years of active participation in the world communist movement.
By creatively applying the teaching of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and by interacting in
an extensive and comprehensive manner and'strengthening their political and economio
unity still further, the socialist countries are moving forward. Our party ana state
and the entire Soviet people are doing-everything to insure that they walk side by side,:
as a united friendly family, helping each other, that the edifice of'fraternal coopera
tion is bright and stable, and that an atmosphere of sincerity, cordiality,,and mutual"'
and profound trust reign in it.
Unity and cohesion multiply the forces of socialism. The firmer this unity and the
stronger and deeper the alliance and interaction of the world socialist system with
the working class of the capitalist countries and the national liberation movement,
the more effective its influence on the development of world history.
2
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 CPYRGHT
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2 November 1971
Voici le texte integral de
l'enonce des principes de la
cooperation entre la France at
l'Union des republiques soeia-
listes sovietiques a signe par` '
MM. Pompidou 'at Brejnev qui,
a ate public le 30 --oetoi re a
Paris, a l'issue des entretiens
franco-sovietiques:
M. Georges Pompidou, presi-.
dent de Ia Republique frangaise,
et M. Leonid Brejnev, secr6taire
general du comite central du
parti communiste .de - l'Union;
sovietique, membre "du presidium!
du Soviet supreme de 1'U,1;i,.S.S.
S'appuyant sur. Ia. longue. tra
dition d'amitie qui existe. entre
les deux pays,
Resolus a donner un nbizvel "
elan a la cooperation fructueuse
qui s'est etablie. entre la France
et l'Union sovietique depuis Ia
visite faite an U. R. S. S. par. le
general de Gaulle en' 1i66,
Animas du desir de renforcer la
contribution des deux pays a, la
cause de la paix cn, Europe at
dans le monde, et de concourir au
developpement de la cooperation
entre tous lee Etats, adopte les
principes suivants sur Icrquels
repose in cooperation politique.
entre les deux pays
1) La cooperation enure. la
France: at I'U.R.S.S. repond aux,
aspirations communes at a l'in-
terL't mutual des deux peuplcs at
doit care fondee sur la redipro
cite des avantages at des otiliga-'
tions de chacun des deux pays.
Un factour permanent
de Ia vie internationale
2) Cette cooperation n'est diri-
gee contre lee intdrets d'aucunr
peuple at n'affecte an riec lee
engagements assumds, par,.les_
deux pays a l'egard d'Etats tiers.,.
3) La politique d'entente et de
cooperation entre la France ate
l'U.R.S.S. sera poursuivie, elie est,
appeleo a devenir une: consfanle.
' dans leurs relations et un facteu;.,
permanent de Ia vie,'internatio-,,
nale ,
4) La cooperation p o I i t i q u e
entre les deux pays restera fondee
sur be respect des principes et des
stipulations de la charte' des
Nations unies. Elie a pour obj ectif
de contribuer au retour a. la paix
dens les zones' de conflit, a la
reduction de In tension interna-
tionale, au reglement des dif-
ferends par des moyens pad-,
fiques, ainsi qu'au developpement
econonnique et a 1'amelioration
des conditions de vie dans ' le
monde.
L'enonce des principes
re eats
c e au c dw cow ` r .$ (oil.
5) En vue de collaborer active
ment no renforcement de la secu
rite en Europe at dons be monde
at au developpement de in
cooperation pacifique des Etats,
lndependamment de leers sys-
tomes sociaux, les consultations
politiques entre les deux gouver-
nements seront developpes aussi
bien par les canaux diplomatiques
habituels que par les rencontres
speciales de lours representants,
sur Ia base du protocole Franco-,
sovietique du 13 octobre 1970, qui
a marque une etape importante
dans l'organisationr- de c e t t e
cooperation. De telles consul-
tatioris devront notamment per-
mettre de recherch(!r la possibilite
d'actions concertces. v eom_oris au
sein des organisations ou confe-r
rences internationales, dans les.
can oft, de l'avis co nmun des deux
parties, in cause do in paix pour- 1
raft y gagner.
Les respoxabilies
des deux pays
au Conscil d.) securite
6) Cette coop("rction politique'
trouvera on particulPor son appii
,cation,, compte d uuient tenu des
droits at prerogatives des autres
puissances interessees, dans 1'exer-
cice des' responsabilites que les
deux pays assument dans le
monde, an tant que membres per-
manents du Conseil de securite
des Nations unies at en Europe
a . Is suite de in seconde guerre
mondiale.
Au cas oft surgiraient des
situations creant, de 1'avis des
deux, parties, une menace pour Ia
paix, one violation do in paix, ou
provoquant une tension interna-
tionale, Ia France et 1'Union
sovietique agiront conformement
au protocole du 13 octobre 1970.
7) Une grande importance s'at.
(ache a ce. que In France of
.1'U.R.S.S. cooperon:: etroitement
en Europe, do concert avec les
Etats inferesses, au maintien de
Ia paix? et a Ia poursuite de la
detente, a l'ameiioration do la
securite, .. ainsi qu'au renforce
ment des relations pacifiques et
de is cooperation entre foes les
Etats europeens, dans be respect
rigoureux des pr.+,ncipes suivants :
linv.iolabilite des frontieres
actue7Ies
- Non-ingerence dans les at-
faires in.erieures
- Egaiite
Independance
-- Non-recours a Ia force ou a
'la menace.'
1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A
8) La. France at 1'U.R.S.S. sont
convaintues que in cooperation
de tons' les peuplcs europeens, en
ce qui: concerne le developpe-
ment de lour potentiel industricll
1'echange d'experiences et de
connaissances at in protection de
1'environnement, peut permettre a
1'Europe d'accroitre 1e rythme du
progres economiquie, scientifique
et technique.
9) La France at 1'U.R.S.S. s'em-
ploicront, dans les regions oft 14
paix est troublee, it ce que soft
obtenu au plus vite un reglement
politique dans. linter@t do Ia
paix generale.
.10) Lies deux parties contribue-
ront 'dans, toute la mesure du
possible a resoudre les probiemes
du desarmement g e n e r a l et
complet,, et avant tout du desar-
znement nucloalre, a surmonter.
Ia. division, du, monde en blocs,
'A accroitre le role de 1'Organisa
tion des Nations unies, confor
moment aux dispositions do sa
charte. ,
1'61argisseme:7f conlinu
'cs echailael cullurds
11) La France ct 1'U.R.S.S. ed;-
fieront leurs relations biioter:.l,'s
dans tous les domaines, de fa4on
qu'elles servent d., bon example
de cooperation d'egal it Cal entre
Etats it . syste'mes sociaux difft-
rents.
12) Le developpement des
echanges economiques at com-
merclaux sur la base des accords
an vigueur compictes par l'1c-
cord du 27 octobre 1971, in coo,i,:-
ration pour Ia miss an valour Acs
ressources naturelles, l'f~(,,hanrge
d'experiences dans le domrcne
industriel at technique rev~a:r,t
un interet essential pour re s:n -
rer lcs liens qui existent entre les
deux pays.'
13) Tout cc qui pout contribu.uer
it i'enrichissement mutuel dans ie
domaine intellectual et au ddre-
loppement des moyens d'amelio-
rer eonstamment la connaissance,
par les peuplcs francais at sovii~-
tique, de lours cultures at acti-
vites respectives sera encourage,
compte tenu de leurs anciennes
relations en ce domaine, de leers
traditions et ? de leur amitie.
L'elargissement c o n tin u des
echanges universitaires, scienti-
fiques et artistiques, de Ia dif-
fusion de l'information, des
contacts entre, les organisations
des deux pays, et notamment des
organisations de jeunesse, ser-
vira it atteindre cos objectf.;.
Cola s'appliquera e,alement sex
contacts entre les hommes, y
compris lea rencontres de ,jeunes,
it titre collectif ou individuel,
i~lnp~ll~ fufvR-nlaeseevront evrorit ce
s T le
 CPYRGHT
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r p
F- If
L. i ' i ti+,:rs's
CPYRGHT
... . _.r
p
x ( :
declaration franco - sovietique I tionsTr,
'invitation de M. George
Pompidou, president de la repu
blique frangaise et du gouverne
rent frangais, M. L. I. Brejnev,
secretaire general du comite cen-
tral du parts' communiste de
i'Union sovietique, membre du
presidium du Soviet supreme de
I'U.R.S.S., a etc l'hote de la
France du 25 au 30 octobre 1971.
M. Brejnev etait accompagne de
M. V. A: Kirilline, vice-president
du conseil des ministres de
1'U.R.S.S., president du comite
d'Etat du conseil des ministres de
M.R.S.S. pour la science et la
technique ; de M. A. A. Gromyko,
ministre des affaires etrangeres
de l'U.R.S.S., et de M. N. S. Pato-
litchev, ministre du commerce
exterieur de M.R.S.S.
M. Brejnev et les personnalites
tie sa suite ont visits Paris et
Marseille. Its ont pu prendre
connaissance de la vie du peuple
frangais dans ses divers aspects.
Un accuell particulierement ami-
cal et chaleureux lour a etc
reserve.
M. Brejnev a eu des entretiens
avec le president de la Republique
et a eggalement rencontre le pre-
mier ministre et plusleurs mem-
bres du gouvernement frangais.
ni re ; M. Schumann, ministre
de affaires etrangeres ; M. Gis-
ca d'Estaing, ministre de I'eco-
sec etaire general' du ministerre
des affaires etrangeres ; M. Sey-
dot ambassadeur de France en
U. .S.S. ; M. de Beaumarchais,
din cteur des affaires politiques
du ministre des affaires etran-
gcr s, et M. Ralmond, conseiller
tee nique auprPs du secretariat
gen ral de la presidence de la
Re ublique ;
me tionnees. N.D.L.R.): M. Abras
sim v, ambassadeur de M.R.S.S.
en rance ; Al. Tschukanov, assis-
tan du secretaire general du
ministre de s affaires etrangeres ;
mi8 section europeenne du mi-
nist re des affaires etrangeres.
cc Line cli$mosp o'
ct den ca
Lea entretiens se sont derouIes
dans une atmosphere de confiance
et de cordialite conforme aux
relations amicales qui existent
entre les deux pays. Its ont etc
marques par une volonte com-
mune de faire progresser la cause
de la detente et de renforcer les
rapports entre la France et
M.H.S.S.
M. Pompidou et M. Brejnev se
sont felicites du developpement
de la cooperation franco-sovfe-
tique dans tous les domaines, et
.notamment dans le domaine poli-
tique. En application du protocole
franco-sovietique du 13 octobre
1970, les deux pays ont des consul-
tations politiques sur l'ensemble
des grands problemes qui se
posent dans le monde. Les deux
parties ont Teaffirme la grande
e e. confiance
prob ernes de I'actualite interna-
facti n, apres la signature, en
1970, des traites entre 1'U.R.S.S.
et 1 R.F.A., et la Pologne et la
R.F. ., de nouveaux sines encou-
ran e, 1'U.R.S.S., les Etats-Unis
t Ia Grande-Bretagne, on vertu
es esponsabilites qu'elles par-
Importance de ce document pour
Ies rapports franco-sovietiques et
lour souci commun de lui confe-,
rer une efficacite croissante.
Es t i m a n t quo lea resultats
obtenus ces dernieres a n n e'e s
dans le developpemont des-
rela-tions franco-sovietiques permet.
tent de les porter a un niveau
plusr Cleve, M. Pompidou at
M. Brejnev ont decide de donner
a la cooperation entre la France
of PU.B.S.S.. at particuliorement
a lour cooperation politique, qui
est exclusivoment au service de
buts pacifiques, une base encore
plus large at plus solids. A cette
fin, ils oni signs un - enonce des
principes de la cooperation entre
la France of 1'Union des repu:
bliques socialist as sovietiques,..
Passant en revue les Brands
volonte de faire disparaltre les
sources de tension au centre de
I'Europe et constitue un pas vers
la detente en Europe et dans le
monde. M. Pompidou et M. Brej-
nev ont exprime le souhait que
cet accord soft complete par les
arrangements prevus et par le
protocole final.
Les progres ainsi realises at lea
resultats que l'on pout afiendre
des efforts entrepris pour une
normalisation generate des rap-
ports entre la R.F.A. at la R.D.A..
l'admission. par voie de 'conse-
quence, de ces deux Efafs a 1'Or-
ganisafion des Nations unies, ou-
vriront de nouvelles perspectives
pour 1e renforcement de la secu-
rife, le developpement des echan-
ges at I'elargissement de la co-
operation entre tous lea Etats on
Europe.
La cenfSrence sur is se'curifie europeenne
M. Pompidou of M. Brejnev ont ges culturels et scientifiques, des
reaffirms l'importance qu"ils atta- contacts entre les hommes. Les
client It la reunion dune confe- peuples pourront ainsi, en se
renco sur la securite of Is coops- connaissant mieux et en benefi-
ration an Europe. La rgalisatfon Giant mutueIlement des fruits de
daps un avenir proche de c lour travail, de lour art et de
projet, quo favorise I'evolufio a lour pensee, prendre davantage
reconte de ' la situation, dolt, conscience de la solidarite qui lea
a lours yeux, contribuer a trans-
former progressivement lea rela-
tions entre Efafs europeens de
Celle sorts quo puisse titre sur-
montee ]a division du continent
en blocs. Lune de ses principales
filches dolt efre un renforcement
de la securite europeenne par la
creation d'un systeme d'engage_
menis qui exclue tout recours a
la menace cu it I'usage do la force
daps lea relations mutuelles entre
Etats et qui assure le respect des
principes de 1'integrite ierriio.
riale des Etats, do la non-inge-
rence dans leurs affaires inta-
rioures, de 1'egalite at de l'inde-
pendance do tour les Etats,
Une telle conference dolt ega-
ut:
]a paix, de 1'amitie et dejla~co
operation.
En rappelant leur vmu de voir
s'ouvrir des que possible a Hel-
sinki, en accord avec les Etats
interesses, la preparation multi-
laterale de la conference, M. Pom-
pidou et M. Brejnev ont marque
qu'a. lour avis cette reunion pre-
Iiminaire multilaterale doit per-
mettre de s'entendre sur le con-
tenu de l'ordre du jour de la
conference, la procedure de ges
travaux, les modalites et ]a date
de sa convocation.
Les deux parties sont conscien-
tes de l'importance qui s'attache
a ce que cette Conference reponde
Pleinement aux espoirs eveilles
dans l'opinion publique et qu'elie
se traduise, dans les domaines
suptiement entre tous les dont elle aura a traiter, par des
rat on
qui y participeront des echan- ment 1'espooir que la pr Ar eseparation
re
ges econamiques et commereiaux, de la conference se d@roulera de coo dustriel etatechnique, des elan ch n- satire nir ene1972. cede-ci puisse
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 CPYRGHT
M. Pompidou eln Mw
evoque la question du dbsarme-
mint. Its ' ont constate que la
France et 1'U.R.S.S. se pronon-
cent en faveur d'un desarme-
ment general et complet sous un
contr6le international efficace.
Its ont reaffirms lour conviction
qu'une conference des cinq puis-
sances nucleaires constituerait
-utie mesure appropriee a cette
fin.
Les deux parties considerent, on
offal, que 1'etude du desarme-
' rent nucleaire dolt titre entre-
prise an priorite. Elles entendent
continuer a no negliger aucun
Soutien a
AIM', rIqVr9*II*4A00*3000;20*&l:* tours a cure
ytqj?
u a u i c lt~t.
quinquennal sur la coo
eration actuelle
A cette occasion
le
m
1::ilcs examinent, dens cei esprit
at de facon positive, le projet so-
vietique de conference mondiale
du desarmement.
Les deux parties out constate
qu'elles poursuivaient le merne
objectif en matiere d'armes chi-
miques et bacteriologiques (bio-
logiques). Elles ont formula le
souhait qu'il soft possible d'abou-
tir a l'interdiction de la fabrica-
tion et a, la destruction de ces
deux categories d'armes dans des
conditions satisfaisantes pour la
communaute internationale tout
entiere.
la mission ,scarring et a VON.
Exprimant lour inquietude de-
vant le maintien de la tension an
Proche-Orient, Ies deux parties
constatent qu'aucun progres n'a
encore ate accompli pour arriver
cer sans tarder, en application
de la resolution du Conseil. de
securite du 22 novenfbre 1967, la
negotiation qui dolt conduire ~
1'etablissement d'une paix juste
et durable, comportant le retrait
des forces israeliennes de tous les
territoires occupes, la reconnais-
sance et le respect par chacun
des pays interesses de la souve-
rainets, de l'independance poll-
tique et de l'integrite territorlale
de tous lest pays de cette region.
La France at 1'Union sovietique
continueront avec energies an uti-
lisant toutes les possibilites poll-
fiques dorit elles disposent, no-
tamment la concertation a qua-
ire, a rechercher le moyen
d'aboutir sans retard a un regle-
ment au Proche-Orient.
Au tours de ces consultations,
les principes mutuellement accep-
tables d'un systeme de garanties
de ce reglement devront, en parti-
culier, titre examines avec atten-
tion.
La France et 1'U.R.S.S. se pro-
noncent pour la cessation de 1'in-
terveniion etrangere, qui so
poursuit encore on Indochina, at
pour un reglement politique dans
cette region, qui reponde aux in-
terets des peuples qui y vivant.
Elles continueront it deployer
leurs efforts en vue de contribuer
it un tel reglement par des nego-
ciations qui assureraient aux peu-
pies de cdlte region, sur la base
,a un reglement politique du con-
flit. Elles jugent necessa.ire clue
M. Jarring, representant special
du secretaire general des Nations
unies, soft mis a.meme de relnn-
des accords de Geneve de 1954 et
do i902, la possibilite de decider
eux-memes de lour sort, sans
aucune ingerence etrangere.
M. Pompidou et M. Brejnev out
examine les divers aspects de la
dangereuse situation qui sect
creee dans le sous-continent
indien, it la suite des evenements
du Pakistan-Oriental, et affirme
lour volonte de poursuivre leurs
efforts en vue du maintien de
la paix dans la region. Its out
exprime lour comprehension des
difficultes auxquelles se heurte le
gouvernement indien en raison de
l'afflux massif de refugies. Les
deux parties ant exprime 1'espoir
que sera rapidement realise un
reglement politique des problemes
qui ont surgi au Pakistan-Orien-
tal, do facon it permettre, notam-
ment. le retour des refugies.
Confirmant 1 e u r fidelite aux
buts at prindipes de la charto des
Nations unies. dont les possibi-
lites concernant le mainfien de la
paix at le reglement des diffe-
rends lour paraissent devoir titre
utilisees pleinemont, lee d e u x
parties proclament lour deir
commun de poursuivre at d'ap-
profondir lours consultations an
vue d'un fonctionnement plus
e f f i c a c e de l'Organisation des
Nations unies. Elias soulignent ie
role utile qua joucnt aux Nations
unies la comprehension snutueile
at les consultations entre les des:x
pays.
Les relations bilcatereales
M. Pompidou et M. Brejnev out
examine les differents aspects des
relations bilaterales. Its so sont
felicites du developpement de ces
relations depuis le voyage du
complis dans be domaine de 1a
cooperation economique et indus-
irielle.
president de la Republique en
U.R.S.S., en octobre 1970.
Les deux parties out marque
leur satisfaction des progres ac-
parties ant exprime le vceu do
mettre an ecuvre un certain nom-
bre do grands projets, dent 1'ela-
p
.
,
s
26 mats
1969,
les relations com-
faction
les importants resultats
merciales
ant
continue it se de-
obtenus,
notamment on ce qui
velopper.
On
a note avec satis-
concorne
la construction on
faction 1'accroissement sensible
cette annoe, des importations de
produits sovietiques an France, et
dans ces importations la, part
croissante des. machines et des
equipements.
Union sovietique d'un puissant
complexe d'industrie forostiore
at le role considerable quo dolt
jouer l'industrie automobile fran-
caise par sa participation a la
construction dune usine de ca-
mions an U.R.S.S.
Les deux parties ont reaffirms
qu'elles avaient pour but de dou-
bler le volume du commerce
franco-sovietique de 1970 it 1974,
comrne prevu par l'accord sur la
cooperation economique et com-
merciale.
Dans ce but, elles out decide do
donner une nouvelle impulsion
au developpement du commerce
enire les deux pays. Elles s'effor-
ceront, an particulier, d'accroiire
les fournitures de matieres pre-
mieres par 1'Union sovietique et
d'augmenter Is part de materiel
industrial sovietique dans les im-
portations francaises. Les deux
Le gouvernement francais
continuera, de son cote, 4 encou-
rager la participation d'orga-
nismes sovietiques a la construc-
tion en France de ce 'tains
complexes industriels. Los deux
parties sont tombees d'acdord sur
Pinter@t mutuel que presentent be
vente du gaz naturel sovietique
it la France et l'achat it la France
d'equipetnents et do materiels
destines it l'industrie du gaz de
I'Union sovietique. E I 1 e s se
concerteront sur les moyens de
donner it l'accord qui s'est de-
gage sur ce point une suite pra-
tique dans its delais les plus rap-
proches.
La sc'vnce et' la tecimkp e
Les deux parties ont reaffirms
6galement 1'interet quo pre-
sente la participation d'entrepri-
ses frangaises it la realisation de
prp,jets de moyenne importance
pouvant titre menes a bien dans
de brefs delais.
Les deux parties ont reaffirms
in grande importance que revet. it
leurs yeux, la cooperation franco-
sovietique dans le domaine de ip,
science et de la technique. Eller
out note avec satisfaction les suc-
ces obtenus dans ce domaine de-
puis In signature de l'accord du
30 juin 1966 et ont apprecie favo-
rablement, on particulier, les re-
sultats des travaux de la sixieme
session de la commission mixte
permanente franco-sovietique qui
a eu lieu it Moscou du 22 au
24 juillet 1971.
A cette occasion, on a constate
lea sueces importants de la coope-
ration dans le domaine de Vex-
ploration de 1'espace, de l'uiili-
sation de 1'energie atomique it
des fins pacifiques at aussi de lu
physique des hautes - energies.L.n
particulier : 1'installation sur *'lo
Lune d'un refleeteur laser
francais, la mire on service de 'a
chambre a bulles francaise < IMii-
rabelle ,, sur l'accelCratour de
p..olons sovietique do Serpou-
khov, le central franco-sovi tigve
sur Yenrichissement en Union
sovietique d'uranium natural
francais.
La cooperation a donne egale-
ment des resultats fructueux dans
le domaine de 1'agriculture, de be
construction et de l'architecture,
des problemes de 1'eau, de la re-
cherche m6dicale, des transports
ferroviaires, de la meteorologic et
de i'oceanographle.
Les deux parties sont convenues
cooperation dans le dnm~nine des
recherches tent fondacnientales
qu'appliquees, et it encourager
lour extension it d'autres proble-
mes actuels, en particulier l'envi-
ronnement, la biochimie ct la
biophysique, et la construction de
grands appareils scientifiques.
Afin de donner it la cooperation
economique, technique et indus-
trielle un caractere phis stable
et durable, les deux panic;; out
conclu un accord sur le t.evelop-
pement de in cooperation econo-
mique, technique et indi.s;rielie
d'une duree de dix ans., 'L
favoriser la miss en c.:nvre dun
vaste 'programme de coala'ration
profitable aux dcux pay:;.
'Les deux parties out .le
poursuivre les echant;e;; du visitcs
entre elements des forces a: mees
des deux pays.
Les deux parties ant rf. t:invo
lour resolution d'approfo::dSr lea
relations cullurelles e a i r ` la
France at I'U.R.S.S. 1=iicc out
constate avec satisfaction les pro-
gres realises, on parficu'ii r en ce
qui concerns 1'enseignemest tie la
langue russe? an France ct de la
langue fra:.Yaise an U. l.a. ;., of
sort convenues d'intensil er i'ef??
=ort entrepris.
Elles declarent qu'elles conti-
nueront it encourager 10:; &hs:nges
clans tous les nutres doma.ines cui-
turels, tels que ceux de :a radio,
de is telev:Sion, do 1'x-t, du ci-
nCma, de 1'education, ce I'ensei-
gnement, du sport et tie 1'infor-,
mation, ainsi que les contacts
entre personnes et, en particuller,
lee echanges entre organisations
de jeunes. Elles sont tombees d'ac-
cord pour reconnaitre qu'en depit
des progres accomplis it restait,
dans ces divers domaines, des pos-
sibilites considerables d'elargir
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 CPYRGHT
Les deux parties constatent
avec satisfaction que is visite de
M. Brejnev a permis de confir-
mer 1'extension continue et 1'ap-
profondissement de la coopera-
lion entre les deux pays, de memo
que le caractere particulier des
liens d'estime et d'amifie qui
existent entro les peuples de
France et d'U.R.S.S. Celts visits
LE MONDE, Paris
28 October 1971
. 0%~iV~iVL vlr~-rwr
donnera de nouvelles dimensions
a rentente et a la cooperation
franco-sovietiques, placees au ser-
vice de la paix. .
0 ERRATUM. - Dans nntre
edition datee dimanche 31 octo-
bre - lundi 1 novembre, deux
lignes sautees en premiere page
out rendu illisible le premier.
Le oomph rren(lu commrrir
103 Se so
ni fl,
r"q~"n ~R. M . ~7 R e7re
r '12
Voici le texte du compte rendu
commun qui a ate publie mardi
soir par les services de presse de
1'Elysee et ceux de la delegation
i sovietique. A l'issue de i'entretien
on tote a t@te de MM. Brejnev
et Pompidou :
e Les 25 et 2G octobre, des
entretiens prolonges out eu lieu
entre M. Georges Pompidou, pre-
i silent de la Republique irangaise,
et Al. Leonid Brejnev, secretaire
general du parts communiste de
i'U.R S.S.
s Iis out ports sur un large
dornaine de questions d'interet
commun.
> Durant ces deux fours, 12 a
ate proced6 4 un echanrte d'in
formations de la part de M. Brej-
nev sur la situation interieure
do t'U.R.S.S.. son developpement
dconomique ct lee objectils de so
politique exterfeure.
> De son cOte, le president de
in Republique, Al. Georges Pam-
pidou, a informs. M. Brejnev du
developpement de la France et
,de certains aspects de sa poli-
tique (5,trangere.
u La grande importance de la
cooperation economique, scienti-
-Pique, technique et culturelle
entre les deux pays a ate consta-
tee dans l'intereC de leur progres.
)i Des mesures pour. appro/on-
dir et developper Bette coopera-
tion out ate envisagees. Dans le
domaine de leurs relations mu-
tuelles, les principes dot develop-
peinent de celles-ci out ate dis-
putes.
LE MONDE, Paris
28 October 1971
Voici le texte de l'accord sur le
developpement de la cooperation
economique, technique et indus-
trielle entre les gouvernements
franc.ais at sovietique, signs le
27 octobre par MM. Giscard
d'Estaing at Patolitchev :
ARTICLE PREMIER. - Les
deux gouvernements continueront
a deployer leurs efforts p o u r
contribuer au developpement et
au renforcement de la coopera-
tion economique, scientifique et
technique qui constitue un fac-
teur de progres pour les d e u x
pays.
ART. 2. - Its ont decide, a cet
effet, d'encourager les organisa-
tions et lea entreprises de chaque
pays a participer a la realisation
des p 1 a n s quinquennaux en
vigueur, ainsi que des plans ulte-
rieurs de I'autre pays.
ART. 3. - Les deux gouverne-
ments definiront d'un commun
accord les differents secteurs
dans lesquels. 1'elargissement de
la cooperation e s t souhaitable,
notaminent en consideration des
besoins et des ressources de cha-
cun des deux pays en matieres
premieres, equipements at tech-
niques, cos besoins et ces res-
sources etant apprecies sur one
longue periode.
T o u s les secteurs presentant
des perspectives de developpement
favorables au regard des res-
sources at des possibilites de cha-
cune des deux parties feront
1'objet d'une attention particuliere.
ART. 4 - lee deux gouverne-
ments favoriseront la cooperation
entre les organisations et les en-
treprises interessees des deux
pays, ainsi que la conclusion,
conformement a la legislation en
vigueur dans les deux pays. d'ac-
cords et de contrats, en particu-
lier a long terme, entre les per-
sonnes physiques et morales
francaises et les organisations
sovietiques correspondantes, no-
tamment en vue d'assurer la par-
ticipation d'entreprises sovieti-
CPYRGHT
ques a a realisawUll
ensembles industrials en France
et in cooperation de l'industrie
francaise a la construction en
U.R.S.S. de complexes Industrials,
ainsi qua la modernisation et a
1'extcnsion des industries legeres
productrices de biens de grande
consommation.
Lee deux parties faciliteront la
conclusion de contrats a long
terme portant en particulier su
la li vraison des matieres premie-
res clout in France a besoin pour
son approvisionnement.
AIZT. 5. - Les deux gouverne-
ments ont en outre decide de re-
chercher de maniere coordonnee
dams les pays tiers, les points
d'application de cette cooperation
ART. 6. - La commission mixt(
p e r m a n e fi t o de cooperation
franco - sovietique est charge)
d'organiser in mise en ceuvre de,
articles precedents...
ART. 7. - Le present accorl
est conclu pour une duree de di:
ans. Ii entrera on vigueur des 1
jour de sa signature.
~F/'1VVVJVVVLVVV 1-1
alinea dU commentaire sur le
sejour de M. Brejnev a Paris. Il
fallait lire : a La derniere mani-
festation mondaine du sejour de
M. Brejnev avait ate, vendredi
soir, in reception a 1'ambassade
d'U.R.S.S., o11 l'on avait note la'
presence du corps diplomatique au
dre grand eproesefta t chinois ouialba-
nais. N
CPYRGHT
En matiere de politique exte-
rieure, les deax homntes d'Etat
out parle des a/lets du proiocole,
signs en 1970, sur la consultation
politique, t'Europe at certaines
questions de se.curite europe.enn.e.
a A ' propos dc cos problemes,
tears points de vice communs se
sont degages, refletant les into-,
nets du peuple frangels it da
people sovietique.
a Ces conversations sc soul d6-
roulees dans un climat de fran-
chise, de comprehension. de cor-
dialite et dans un esprit d'a.mitie.
Les entretiens portant sur cos
themes, sur d'autres questions de
politique etrangere et sur in
cooperation economique sc pour-
suivront dans les fours d venire
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1
CPYRGHT
LE MONDE, Paris
28 October 1971
.Fa Frce no t I'.f1S.S.
ery scar d'Estaing
a signe mercredi matiij avec
M. Nicolas Patolitchev; mi-
nistre sovietique du commerce
exterieur, un accord de coope-
ration economique a long. terme
(dix ans). Cot accord doit titre
un des trots principaux docu-
ments signes entre les deux pays
a l'occasion de la visite de
M. 13rejnev a Paris, lea deux
autres etant le communiques com-
mun et le texte politique. En
outre, MM. Giscard d'Estaing et
Patolitchev ont assiste dans 1a
memo matinee a la signature de
1'accord sur la participation de
la regie Renault a la construc-
tion de la gigantesque usine de
camions de la Kama (le Monde
du 27 octobre). L'accord porte
sur 1'ingenierie do cette usine ;
c'est le premier a titre zigne par
les Sovictiques avec une. firme
etrangere pour cette affaire.
L'accord de cooperation a long
terme Porte sur une periode de-
LONDON OBSERVER, London
31 October 1971
cennale et i1 marque la volonte
des deux pays d'associer leurs
g r a n d e s entreprises respectives
au developpement economique du
pays partenaire. L'exemple de la.
participation do Renault a la
construction de l'usine de. la
Kama montre que la raise au
point de projets aussi gigan-
tesques exige une longue prepa-
ration et qu'en consequence, ii est
tout simplement realiste de porter
jusqu'a 1'annee 1981 1'examen en
commun des possibilites offertes
dans le domaine de la cooperation
Industrielle. L'U.R.S.S. est deja
actuellement le plus Important
client de la France pour les equi-
pements lourds et les usines
livrees a clef on main u.
Les difficultes que souleve la
participation sovietique a l'en-
s e m b 1 e industrie) de Fos ne
decouragent nullement les deux
gouvernements. Les Sovietiques
out deja fait part de Pinter@t
qu'ils portent a plusieurs autres
w' U It a fi, 8
grand.;'projets francais et, notam-
ment, a la construction du metro
de Marseille, pour laquelle ifs
pourraient offrir des solutions
techniques appropriees.
Dans I'autre sons, 1'accord do
cooperation a long terme devrait
faciliter la bonne fin des projets
associant des firmcs francaises a
I'essor industriel de I'U.R.S.S. La
France, comme on le snit, a le
souci de s'assurer des sources de
matieres premieres (c u i v r e,
nickel...) en participant eventuel-
lement it la raise en valour des
enormes ri.chesses minerales de
1'Oural et de la Siberie. Mats
d'autres projets sent en tours
d'examen. C'est ainsi que Pechi-
ney envisage la construction d'un
atelier d'anodes (industrie de
I'alumine) et d'usines de trans-
formation de 1'aluminium. Chacun
de ces deux projets porte sur une
valeur de 250 millions de francs.
- P. F.
CPYRGHT
r
Dole
from "BORIS E CIDEL: Paris, 30 October
,'1 1,114- UUTCOME of the talks
here between Mr Brezhnev. the
Soviet leader, and President
Pompidoui'sccros distinctly an
anticlimax;, N.ci.th Lis-joint
dcclaratioil_ nor thc_staicnient
cLirinciplcsgovernina Franco-
Suviet rc,l, lions smiled today,
brake new ground.
Mr Btezhitcv had originally
hoped Yci.'cxtract a friendship
treaty from the French. But
M. Pompidou. far more con-
, coned tlnuj Gcnerai do Gaulle
i about prespruing France's cons
mitments To NATO. firmly re-'
sisted ihcsc Soviet suggestions.
111CIll. le e',vcrnmcnts of col signed P s' i nt ttti%idou.
the %so Cie, manys are still quarrel r
'ling over details hilt a final sale rn os ow last lean. Aain the
lion is c\pected before Christmas. 1"'o Ic ulcrs agreed that their
As \1r Rrerhncv Ilew from Paris Governments should intensify their
In Fast Berlin the. afternoon conwltations.
Soviet Officials firmly denied that So far. at least until (he very cue
he would be exerting prrssurc on of Mr Brczhncv's visit here, the
the t.ast German leaders to hasten Russians hardly ever bothered to
agreement on Berlin, Fast Gar Inform or consult the French
many, these olliciafs said, was -a Government about their diplomatic
sovereign nation' and the master moves. Today the two leaders
Of its own decisions, aflinnco that tilt policy of friend.
An additional l dilliculty has now ship apd co-operation bethscen
emerged. As d Brczhn indi- their two countries was destined
catcd hcrc, the Russians will not to become a constant feature of
sign the Berlin agrecmcnt until their relations and a pcrmancnt
West Germany has formally factor in international rclations.'
notified the ratification of tho For Chancellor Brandt, with his
Soviet-German turfy si:z,jc,l list slim parliamentary majority. this
year. The (wo actions must be Soviet demand creates a major
year.
problem
Until now h
h
l
a
.
e
as a
w
ys
ancous. >h Brcrhncv is
+rcunty conference, which the said that the signing of the Berlin
Soviet, have been seeking for a reported to have laid the French. agreement must recede ratifica.
v?cw to;;'~i#~ t ctrl _ ,e, X79-0119 00 0R2 ~a1y want
lease__ far i'-==s" t actua rnctrumcnts of ratifica-
ground as Uie~rancn COVret rgto- tion deposited at the same time
The holding of a European
 CPYRGHT
as they sig1AppJQMedsFsQr Release4999189fiO2ir GJArRDP79-011 0003OO020001-ige?
oRicials asserted that M. Pompidou Pa4lacc. he nervously wiped his Soviet officials tried to portray him
if this ;s month with a handkerchief as 'ha as far more open minded than his
had accented their s,;
r,
e
e
.
Wc.st Germans are listened to President l'omsridou's
confirmcd, the
certain to regard ii as an unfriendly address, Unused to speaking with-
cture. out notes at public functions, Tfr;
On his first visit to the West Mr Brczhnev forgot the key sentence
zhnev managed to arouse no of his speech urging the French
Rre
.
to raise than tepid public interest. tse their relations with the
It was very different when Air His Soviet 1rpterpretreter inserted the higher missing
ng
Khrushchcv came to France in sentence into his translation.
1 160. "hen thousands turned out Still Air Brcrhnev evidently
to cheer or to catch a glimpse of atta'alaiect~reaLji~cirtancg o he
the Soviet leader. This time, prc- visit For him it meant the formal
sunably exp:cting a meagre rcs-
consecration o~~iis` talc as tho
txsnse, the leaders of the French may-irori',ovret`Torete policy.
('ommunist Party made no deter- 07rflzinaTly Ii1 Pompidou had
mined effort to mobilise their invited all the Moscow 'troika,'
supporters. Mr Brczhnev, President Podgorny.
Leonid Brczhnev has none of and Premier Kosygin, to visit
\lr Khrushchev's boisterous flan- Frarkar By homing alone Nfr
boyance. To the French public he Brczhnev confirmed his dominant
came across as a humdrum party position in the Soviet leadership.
bureaucrat who lapses into harrali- Very distinctly Mr Brczhnev had
tics whenever he departs from [ho set out to strike here the pose of a
safety of his prepared speeches. sober statesman preoccupied by
Clearly at first he was somewhat peace and by friendship with
daunted by his venture into the : France. He carefully avoided Mr
Western world. During the wel- Khrushrhev's verbal excesses. In a
public relations drive designed to
NEW YORK TIMES
31 October 1971
CPYRGHT
LI
yore Red.
.;y C.L. SULZI3ERGER
"though he wants the party in the
Soviet Union to remain ideologic-
ally strong and united, they said he
.was In fact willing to accept less
conformism and more experiment.
particularly in the cultural fields.
But he could not always execute
his own wishes. Mr Breihncv was
not the sort of leader who, imposed
his will. Rather than become
involved in showdowns with his'
colleagues, he preferred to rule hs'
consensus.
He was pictured as a modest
man who had lived with his family
in the same apartment block since
his arrival in Moscow 19 years
ago. The only difl'erence, it was
said, was that nowadays lie had
five rooms instead of three. The
Soviet leader came to Paris accom-
panicd by his wife, Victoria. a
former gynaecologist. who appeared
to be overwhelmed by her first
journey to the West and all the
pomp laid on by the French,
1ags
CPYRGHT
FoR IGN AFFAIRS
" rance (appears to feel that Russia
is now satisfied with Inc extent of
its territorial domain and i's no longer ;
expansionist that ... it''strive's to'have'.
tie state quo accepted everywhere; ,
:: a?11IS--Ono must keg certain U
8erlying truths in mind when asses -
Inc, the importance of Mr. Brezhnev
visit here, during which red flagit
were as notable in Paris as In th
days of the 1870 commune.
'The Russian policy of the FIN
French Republic has always been mixe
up with France's internal political sit
uation. and there has been a tendenc
to give the?,appearance of diplontati
concessions to Moscow and thus out
I'lank from the left the powerful Cotii
munist party here.
Likewise, the Ifremlin, when ad
dressing France. in recent years, -ha
sour ht to obscure the fact that i
hoped to use French influence as
card to be played in two differen
mes: That which the Soviet Union
s been slowly elaborating in tier-
any and the even more important
maneuver of trying to diminish United
ates influence in Europe.
. By 'displaying Russia's traditional
f iendship for France, Mr. Brczhnev
e ?idently sought to stimulate roaction
.d alarm in Bonn. If consequently
Ii~ can prod Willy Brandt, who got it
Isobel Peace Prize for warming up te-
1 tions with 'the East, into a.still more
a ;able attitude, BrezhneV . cleatiy
h 5pes the disenchanted United. States
Ill show less faith and confidence in
rope and place even more emphasis
o its expanding dialogue with the
etnlin.
. The Pompidou-Brezhnev dialogue
represented, at least in part, an effort
by the French President to cement his
political position at home whereas tor.
the Soviet boss it represented an effort .
to strengthen Russia's diplomatic po-
sition abroad.
But aside from the domestic aspect,
*h,^ French viewpoint on the strategic
;lions of the meeting is of great
i.r. re:;t since Paris' interpretations' of
Soviet intentions have value and ? im-.
portance to the entire Western world.
France appears to feel that Russia
is now satisfied with the extent of
its territorial domain and is no longer
expansionist; that therefore it strives
to have the status quo accepted everjr-
where. Moscow thus favors signature
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by Bonn of agreemc;its delimiting East.
West borders (as are now being worlieil
out) arid it hopes that c.venLually i'~r
ldnfi %V111 Howe', tilii 1rtitdn of o;;lsting
'fronulors with the U.S.S.R. in Asia.
The French nevertheless perceive
that Soviet policy encompasses poten.
tially unstable situations: China does
not yet recognize its Soviet border de
lure, and German recognition of the
Eder Neisse line is due only to the
existing balance of forces in Europe.
Although highly unlikely, were Ger.
mahy- ever again to become great and
powerful, it might once more .feel at-
tracted territorially' eastward.
Russia, aware of these possible dan?
,gers, favors coexistence, detente and
status glib-and- France agrees. Tho
Soviet Union is also aware of its
strength as a world power'-as telaN
tively neW an expetlence for MoscoW
A& It is for ?Washingtom
As . Russia, expands its 'global iiiflU?-
ence, primarily through its fleet and
air force, it penetrates everyWhere and
this creates "frictions. But Whenever
such frictions seem capable of pro.
ducing trouble, Moscow is inclined to,
halt its penetration:
As far as the United States.i? .con-
cerned, Franco feels the Russians Want
a kind of equality with America; a'
partition of power in the contemporary.
sense. While thb Russians are not prey
pared to retreat on the ideological
front and there are mahy tobLradid
tions in , these various impulses, the.
French bell&Ve that in the end Mos-
cow, 'eager to avoid conflict, will.
restrain or accommodate abrasive sit.
'rations.
With respect to his own policy,
president Pompidou apparently seems
to thihk yfaitce becomes Closer to the
United States as U.S. superiority Over
the U.S.S.R. diminishes. As a logical
consequencoi the expression of French
policy-today Is less anti-American than
it Was under de Gaulle because Artier'.
can superiority has petdeptibly de-
clincd.
Furthermore, it is felt here that
Paris and Washington are now less
far apart oh the Middle FaSt, are ap?
preaching harmony on Vietnam as the,
U.S.A. 'withdraws, and that they-have.
reached a position Where de Gaulle's
intervehtioli in North American af-
fairs, via French Quebec, .has ended.
It is improbable that any real dip-
lomatic developments material1al~d
from Brezhnev's interesting if rCther
staid trip. Pompidou, a clever politic
clan, subtly used it to stress the Isola
tion of the Comthunlst. l5drty here an 2
as a statesman, to nvr,id new: and
dotiniitivo entangling enf;agemonts, '
Brezhnev,. for his part, established.
his role as the 'number one Soviet
?leadet abroad,. as well as at home,
and did his best to. stir up new doubts
and responses in Bonn and Washing-
ton. Time will demonstrate how suc-
cIssful the latter action is.
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December 1971
KGB/GRU OPERATIONS ABROAD
The Soviets' flagrant and clumsy abuse of their diplomatic
privileges in England left the British authorities late last
September no alternative to expelling 10S Soviets from the country.
The Soviets were expelled for engaging in espionage and subversion
as officers of the Soviet intelligence organizations known as the
KGB and its military intelligence counterpart, the GRU. The 105
expellees represent about 20% of all Soviets posted to Britain.
Although the British had twice warned the Soviet government to put
an end to the activities of the KGB and GRU in England, the
expulsions seem to have been precipitated by the revelations of
Oleg Lyalin, a KGB officer in London who had defected a short
time before.
In mid-October, a similar case came to public attention in
Belgium. This, too, seems to have been precipitated by the
defection and subsequent revelations of Anatoli Chebotarev, a
high level officer in the GRU stationed in Belgium. Chebotarev
sought and found asylum in the United States. Unlike the British,
the Belgian authorities have revealed little of the case, but the
Belgian press has ferreted out information which is proving
reliable. Out of some 120 Soviets stationed in Belgium under one
cover another, Belgian newspapers confidently assert that from
30-40 KGB or GRU officers, or more than 25% of the Soviet
community there, have been implicated and will be expelled. (As
of this writing, ten have been identified; see list attached).
The Belgian case is only the most recent in a growing number
of instances where free' world governments have exposed Soviet
subversion and espionage in their countries. Still fresh in
memory are the cases in the single year of 1971, which include
subversion attempts in Mexico last March, in the Sudan and
Ecuador in July, and espionage in the Congo, Ghana, and Italy.
The recent British and Belgian cases are especially instructive
in that they illustrate the massive scale of Soviet intelligence
operations in the free world. The two cases are instructive in
a number of other ways as well, offering many insights into the
real functions of the Soviet official representation in foreign
countries, most particularly how this representation is used as
a mechanism for hiding its primary mission of espionage and
subversion. Below are recounted some of the issues raised
by the British and Belgian cases.
The Soviet "Official" Representation in a Foreign Country
Every Soviet abroad for a tour of duty or for an extended
period is part of the official Soviet government representation,
regardless of the organization or activity he purports to
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represent. ere is no such thing as a private ovlet citizen
living abroad for personal reasons (as is the case with tens of
thousands of Westerners who reside abroad for private business
reasons, for purposes of study, or merely for pleasure).
Every Soviet citizen is abroad to accomplish a mission for the
oo viet government. These officials work for innumerable orgpn-
izations, some of the more common of which are the Embassy,
Consulates, Trade Missions, Aeroflot (the Soviet airline), press
representatives, Inturist (tourist organization), various
specialized Soviet export-import and other commercial organizations,
and local "Friendship" societies.
The Size of the Soviet Official Community Abroad
Many, if not most, Soviet missions abroad are disproportion-
ately large in comparison to the amount of legitimate diplomatic,
trade, corrm~ercial, cultural etc. activity with which they are
tasked. The disproportion is accounted for by the large number
of KGB and GRU personnel assigned to Soviet Embassies. It is
instructive, for example, to note that the total of 105 Soviet
intelligence officers expelled from Britain exceeds the entire
British official representation in Moscow.
The Proportion of KGB/GRU in Official Missions
In Britain, the 105 KGB/GRU officers expelled represented
about 20% of the official Soviet mission, in Belgium, about 25%.
But it should be remembered that there remain in each of the two
countries a number of additional officers known to the authorities
in the host countries as members of Soviet intelligence. These
officers will not be expelled for the time being. Thus, the
20-25% figure is merely a fraction of the total Soviet KGB/GRU
personnel in each of the countries. In addition to those members
of the Soviet mission who are genuine officers of the KGB or GRU,
an indefinite number of the Embassy personnel work for the KGB
or GRU in addition to or instead of their nominal or real
assignments. Such persons are "co-opted" to work on intelligence
tasks, determined by and under the control of the KGB or GRU.
The famous Soviet GRU officer, Oleg Penkovsky, who was tried
and shot in the Soviet Union in 1963 for smuggling secret information
to the West, described this facet of Soviet intelligence operations
as follows:
"The proportion of KGB staff officers to the rest
of Soviet embassy personnel is usually two men out of
five. GRU staff officers number one man in five. There
are generally fewer GRU men, but we must be counted separately
because our 'neighbors' and we rarely work together. In
most embassies it can be stated without error that 60 per
cent of the embassy personnel are serving officers in
intelligence, either KGB or GRU. Obviously most of the other
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embassy employees are regularly co-opted for intelligence
purposes."*
Types of KGB/GRU Cover
Soviet intelligence officers conceal their real missions by
making a show of working in (i.e. under cover of) some legitimate
capacity in the official Soviet cammunity. Oleg Penkovsky gave a
rather formidable list of cover organizations under which the
KGB and GRU operated during his time. The list will serve as an
example of the variety and diversity of Soviet cover organizations
used all over the world:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Byurobin (now the UPDK)--the office providing services for
the Diplomatic Corps in Moscow
Ministry of Foreign Trade
Inturist (almost 100 per cent KGB, only a few GRU officers)
All-Union "International Book" Association (almost 100 per
cent KGB)
All-Union Chamber of Commerce
State Committee for the Co-ordination of Scientific Research
Work
State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations
State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries
Council for the Affairs of Religious Sects, under the Council
of Ministries, U.S.S.R.
Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church
TASS (The Soviet Union Telegraph Agency)
Union of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Sovieties
Committee of Soviet Women
Ministry of Culture, U.S.S.R.
Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace
Committee of Youth Organizations, U.S.S.R.
The. Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University
Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations
with Foreign Countries (Ango-Soviet Friendship, Soviet-
Indian Friendship, etc. Over forty such societies.)
Soviet Committee of the World Federation of Trade Unions
Soveksportfilm
Sovimportfilm
The Moscow Post Office, 26 Kirov Street
Central Telegraph, 7 Goriy Street
The Academy of Sciences, U.S.S.R.
Lomonosov State University
He goes on to say:
"This list is not complete - it could be made much longer.
e Penovs Papers, by Oleg Penkovsky, Doubleday Co. Garden
City, New orb, p. 67
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In short, there is no institution in the U.S.S.R. that does not have
in it an intelligence officer or agent of either the GRU or KGB.
Furthermore, the majority of the personnel in Soviet embassies
abroad are KGB and GRU employees."*
In light of the above, it would be well (as British businessmen
are now doing) to act on the assumption that every member of the
Soviet official community is a KGB/GRU officer (or co-optee)
until convincing evidence to the contrary is forthcoming.
Repercussions of Soviet Subversion Activity
Soviet embassies and trade missions do have legitimate and
non-intelligence functions, though their importance is apt to be
small in comparison with the intelligence mission.
One of the unfortunate consequences of these recent examples
of Soviet abuse of the functions of official missions abroad is
that it damages and undermines the necessary and useful interchange
that is conducted between two nations via their foreign represent-
atives. Thus, Soviets abroad who actually have as their real
missions the promotion of trade and exchange of goods, promoting
cultural exchange, representing their government's political views,
etc. etc, are understandably viewed with suspicion by foreign
governments and by the population at large. People who have dealings
with Soviet diplomats and other officials are justified in questioning
these same individuals' real work in the country. And although
the KGB and GRU exercise such power in Soviet embassies that
little takes precedence over their espionage and subversion missions,
the legitimate employees of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) and of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MIT) are understandably
annoyed that they should be tarred with the KGB/GRU brush. It is
an open question whether MFA and MFT complaints will now or
ultimately result in reducing the priority of the.;KGB'.s mission, abroad.
An even more unfortunate consequence of the London and
Belgian spy exposures, for the Soviets at least, is that the
KGB/GRU's indiscreet operations carry the danger of vitiating
the current Soviet detente campaign being pursued so assiduously
in the worldwide travels of the top Soviet leaders. (The spy
scandals may indeed have contributed to French President Pompidou's
firm refusal to consider a friendship treaty with the USSR, a treaty
that Brezhnev was working very hard to achieve during his recent
visit to France). If the Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgorny triumvirate
of travelling salesmen either will not or cannot curb the sub-
versive programs of their fellow Politburo member and KGB'Qhief,
Yuri Andropov, there is good reason for the free world to
question the good faith of Soviet detente policies.
ffI d_, p.37
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(Attached is a selection of the more comprehensive and reliable
press accounts of the British and the more recent Belgian case
which can be compared with the observations made above and which
also can be used as some sort of measure of what may well be going
on in various other countries).
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24 November 1971
SOVIET OFFICIALS PUBLICLY IDENTIFIED
IN THE PRESS AS BEING EXPELLED FROM BELGIUM
Country of Origin
(USSR) and Name
LEONTYEV, Konstantin
Ivanovich
GLUSHENKO, Oleg
Ivanovich
PARFENOV, Yuri
Yefimovich
KRUGLYAKOV, Vladimir
Borisovich
MASHIN, Anatoliy
Georgyevich
SEREDA, Aleksey
Milovich
TRISHIN, Boris
Ivanovich
ZAYTSEV, Valentin
Aleksandrovich
FEKLENKO, Vladimir
Nikolayevich
KORINFSKIY, Georgiy
Mikhaylovich
Type of
Assignment
Commerical
Commercial (Aeroflot)
Commercial (Aeroflot)
Commercial (Sovflot)
Attache Commercial
Mission
Diplomatic
Attache Commercial
Diplomatic
Military Attache
Diplomatic
Country From
Which Expelled Month
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Oct
Oct
Oct-Nov
Oct-Nov
Oct-Nov
Oct-Nov
Oct-Nov
Oct-Nov
Oct-Nov
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 CPYRGHT
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THE WASHINGTON POST
17 October 1971
j
Z
C?t.y o .?.112
By Thomas A. Donovan
The writer was chief of the political
section of the American embassy in
section of the U.S. mission in Berlin
before retiring from the Foreign Serv-
ice in 1969. He is now doing research
r -XHE SOVIET diplomatic service is
living through uncomfortable'
times. More than a hundred Soviet em
bassy and trade mission personnel in
London have lately been sent home in
an unprecedented display of vigor by
a generally easy-going British Foreign
Office. This miniature diplomatic Bay
of Pigs was no "deliberately
stantin Umanski called on Stalin be-
fore Umanski's departure for NVashing-
ton, they found in the room a 30-year-
old man whom neither had ever seen.
to an end, the director motioned the
young man forward and told Litvinov
and Umanski that this was Andrei Gro-
my o, who would accompany. Umanski
to Was ington as his deputy and would
later ke his place as ambassador. Ac-
tually itvinov, who was soon to be
dismis d as foreign commissar, was
1941, aid Gromyko had to wait for his
How Rany Spies?
planned provocation" by a reactionary rNVIE SOVIET foreign service over
British government, as a Pravda com- li. w1 h; Gromyko now presides, like
mentator charged. Rather it was the the fo eign services of many other
result of the carelessness of the Soviet countri s, includes many bearers of
leadership in letting its undercover op- diplom tic passports and diplomatic'
eratives run their shady affairs with- titles w ose actual responsibilities are
out outside supervision. not to e foreign ministry but to the
This state of affairs goes back to Commi ee on' State Security, the KGB
1938, when the bulk of the old Soviet and, to lesser extent, the intelligence
diplomatic corps which Maxim Litvi- director to of the armed forces. Some
nov had trained and directed was dis- have sp nt their entire careers in the
posed of and their places taken by employ ent of the intelligence agen-
party and security service careerists cies. Ot ear began in the regular diplo
rnen sufficiently in the manner of V.M. mattes rvice, only later to be" co-opted
.eryone around them was being packed Preci e figures are hard to come by,
i
i
n
off to Siberia. The reconstituted M
s- for eve knowledgeable Soviet defec-
try of Foreign Affairs continued to re- tors ha e often not known how many
cruit its own staff for diplomatic busy-
4 of their colleagues have had organiza-
it
work but little else. The ministry n
s tional yalities different from their
present shape, an unhappy amalgam of
nev-
low-prestige professional diplomats, nominal ones. It seems certain,
erthless that rather more than than half of
half of
and of high-powered secret police oper- the em loyees of Soviet diplomatic
atives and political proteges, is thus missionf are now primarily responsible
one of the more enduring Institution- to the cret police rather than to the
building achievements of Stalin and foreign ministry. Aleksander Kazna-
eign minister, is a product of the Sta- has wri ten that two-thirds of the 36
lin-Molotov era. His first foreign as- employ s at the mission were mem-
signment was as deputy chief of mis- bers of Soviet intelligence, responsible
sion In Washington in 1939. The cir- directly o intelligence headquarters in_
cumstances under which Litvinov first Moscow.
met Gromyko are suggestive of the Col. nkovsky, from observation of'
.changed situation in the Soviet foreign his coil gues in Ankara where he was
service after the onset of the purges. a milit y attache and from his experi- His foreign service subordinates are
Woen Litvinov and Ambassador Icon- ence ow ilitar intelli-,
1b61bffddhdi ti as from
(lase a _1A_ nE?ZS- U4_
Approved For Rel
gence hierarchy, concluded that 3,000 of
the approximately 5,200 Soviet repre-
sentatives stationed abroad in 1961
were professional intelligence officers.'
This figure did not include employees,
of the regular foreign service or of
other non-intelligence agencies who
were co-opted for intelligence work
after having been recruited and sent
abroad. Kaznacheez was such a regular
diplomatic officer. He did not begin to
work for Soviet intelligence until after
he had already taken up a regular
overseas assignment under the foreign
ministry. In his case and in others like
It, the co-opted officer remained on the
regular foreign service payroll and re-
ceived his promotions in the regular
foreign service hierarchy, with appro-
priate assistance from intelligence serv-
ice headquarters in Moscow when
needed.
The general accuracy of these esti-
mates of the size of the secret police
presence in the regular diplomatic es-
tablishment can scarcely he doubted.
Nothing else could explain how numer-
ous and how varied have been the dip-
lomatic titles of Soviet embassy per-
sonnel apprehended in the cours(*of
clandestine intelligence work by West-
ern counter-espionage services. With
dreary regularity, Soviet embassy
functionaries whose formal positions
have been in cultural, trade, press, eco-
nomic, or consular work have been
shown to be busy servicing dead letter
drops, surreptitiously passing money
In public toilets to various kinds of
friends of the Soviet Union, or other-
wise engaged in the costly and exciting
but politically unimportant game of
testing the vigilance of the security
services of other countries.
The Lowly Ajiibassador
ICE WHOLESALE subtraction of
I foreign service personnel from
regular diplomatic work has damaged,
:the standing of the soviet ambassador,
by leaving him ill-equipped to compete.
with the intelligence organizations for-
the ears of the authorities in Moscow.
 Approved For Release 1999/09/0.2: CIA-RDP79-01194A0003000206y-Y1RGHT
associating freely with foreigners, and!
so are cut off from access to essential
non-secret information about condi
tions in their country of assignment.
The employees of the security services,,
on the other hand, are encouraged to.
roam about reasonabiy widely as a
part of their Intelligence mission. Inev-
itably, therefore, security service per-
sonnel tend to be better informed than
their regular diplomatic colleagues.
The great lead which the collectors
of clandestine intelligence have in pro-
viding Moscow with foreign policy in-
formation has this important conse-
quence:.It makes the Soviet leadership
depend for policy guidance on reports
from the security services rather than
from the regular diplomatic' hierarchy.
The typical Soviet ambassador, there-
fore, unless he be a man with the ex.
ceptional professional expertise of Am-
bassador Ivan Maiski in wartime Lon-
don, is in no position to win the ear of
his superiors, even were he inclined to
look at foreign matters differently
from his nominal subordinates in the
secret police. His political reporting,
accordingly, can seldom be more than
a pale reworking of such Intelligence
material as his surly intelligence
agency associates have allowed him to
see.'
The regular Soviet diplomat is also
handicapped by his constant need, if
he is to protect his career, to avoid in-
curring the disapproval of the security
hierarchy. Diplomats of all countries
must occasionally guard against being
thought excessively tolerant of foreign
viewpoints, and Soviet diplomats more
than most have reason to worry about
such suspicions. In Soviet society,
they can best protect themselves by es-
pousing policy positions congenial to
the institutional interests of the secret
police.
Such careerist considerations would
be quite sufficient, for example, to ac-
count for the notorious haste with
which Ambassador Stepan Chervo-
nenko in Prague began to urge military
intervention in Czechoslovakia when it
became evident that the Czechoslovak
party's reformers were beginning to
move against Czechoslovak agents of
the Soviet secret police. In Chervonen,-
ko's case, an elementary careerist need.
to take up a hostile attitude toward the
Czechoslovak deviation must have
been particularly pressing, for Chervo-
nenko could hardly have wished to
have his Prague tour end as unsatisfac-.
torily for the Soviet Union as had his
The readiness of ambassadors, acting
out of weak-minded regard for their
own careers, to look to outside agen-
cies for support and advancement is,.
of course, no new thing in the Soviet
service, as elsewhere. In the Soviet
diplomatic service, however, this proc-
ess has been taken one step further, by
rewarding with ambassadorial assign,
merits men who have had service in
the intelligence apparatus. The new
style Soviet amhassador is not just a
man who can he counted on to per-
form as the secret police hierarchy
would wish; he may well be: a career
intelligence officer. For there is strong
reason to believe that a considerable
minority of Soviet ambassadors are in'
fact up-graded employees of the intelli-
gence services rather than represents-.
tives of the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs.
The best known example is Alek-
sandr Paniushkin, who was Soviet am-
bassador to Nationalist China from.
1947 to 1952, and to Communist China
from 1952 to 1953. Paniushkin's police
connections were brought to light by
Nikolai Khokhlov, an MVD agent sent
out to assassinate a Russian emigre in
West Germany in 1954. Khokhlov re-
ceived the detailed instructions for his
mission from Paniushkin at the secret
police headquarters in Moscow. Sergei
Kudryavtsev, who was Soviet ambassa-'
dor i~ Havana in 1960, is another
whose career, while nominally a suc-
cession of regular diplomatic and for-
eign ministry assignments, was proba=
hly always with the intelligence serv-
ices. Kudryavtsev helped set up one of
the early spy rings uncovered in Can-
ada with the defection of Igor Gouz.-
enko from the Soviet embassy in Ot-
tawa.
For Little Gain
I' is COMMONLY argued in non-
Communist countries that the
intensive intelligence effort carried on
by personnel assigned In Sovietcliplo-
matic missions, though here and there
overdone or done clumsily, has at any
rate permitted the Soviet leadership to
foresee the political future With. more
confidence than their Western coun-
terparts. In fact, however, this. is far
from being the case. The historical
record suggests rather that Soviet in-
telligence can have been little more
successful than western in providing
advance information on developments
of political importance.
For all their massive investment
by. surprise qu.it.e as often as their
Western rivals. They did not expect
that Nkrumah would be overthrown in
Ghana or that Sukarno would fall from,
power so quickly in Indonesia. They
did not believe that Syria would break
away from the United Arab Republic
or that Israel would defeat Egypt.
They did not foresee that the United.
States would learn of the missiles In
Cuba or would react to them as It did.
They did not anticipate the June, 1953,
uprising in East Berlin-Khokhlovf re-
ported that the Central Committee or-
dered a high-level, CIA-style post rmor-
tem to find out why the MVD had
known so little of what was going on in
East Germany-and they have been no
better informed about important devel-
opments elsewhere in Eastern Europe.
Yet in all. of these countries the Sovi-
ets had large and expensive Intelli-
gence collection programs and in some
of them they even controlled the local
intelligence apparatuses.
Spectacular instances of Soviet suc-
cesses in the recruitment of well-in-
formed officials of other countries-of
Alger hiss from the State Department,
of Burgess and MacLean from the Brit.
ish Foreign. Office, or of Philby from
the British Secret Service-seems not
to have saved the Soviets from politi-
cal surprises. The use which the Sovi-
ets have been able to make of informa-
tion from such Informants appears
most likely to have been limited to
scoring points over Western intelli-
gence agencies.
Philby is said to have given away an
Anglo-American intelligence operation
against Albania. This was no douut an
inconvenience for the Western intelli-
gence organizations involved, and
worse still for the operatives sent to
Albania, but the Soviet coup in un-
covering the operation w a s not
very profitable for the Soviet Union.
Nor wen Its failure any national
hardship for Britain and the United
States. Albania has gone its own way,
as it would have anyway, and this is,
pretty much what can he said of all of
the causes and controversies In which
knowledgeable officials turn out to
have worked for the other side. As for
the recruitment of Alger Hiss, the most
that can be said for it from the Soviet
side is that this particular espionage
effort perhaps helped put the Demo-
crats out of office in 1952 and, in the
end, made Richard Nixon President in
1968
.
previous assignment, as ambassador in of men and money in intelligence
evemcts, of
M
Peking. Approved For Release '1~91&911O9/G2 ,G~IAkRD1Pg9O4h194A 1090P ,reign policy
 CPYRGHT
nasen on sucn1ernsn arramsra nlt'rmatmy"
satisfactory is less certain. For in the
evaluation of political probabilities, a
bureaucratically organized intelligence
organization, with even the best-placed
agents, is still an unsatisfactory substi-
tute for the judgment of the shrewd in-
dividual observer who is intellectually
Independent of the institution or or-
ganization he serves. And it has been
the misfortune of the Soviet diplomatic
service that its upside-down internal
organization almost guarantees that
there will be a lack of such Indispen-
sable, disinterested and objective ob.
servers.
The present generation of Soviet
leaders presumably does not consider
the absence of such observers to be a
weakness of the Soviet diplomatic
service. In their operational concep-
tions of the nature of the diplomatic
profession, the prosperity of the Intel-'
licence organizations h is s priority
over the uncomfortabe and unflatter-
ing kind of reports they might receive
from old-fashioned kinds of diplomats.
Khrushchev, it may be, saw the con-
ventional and orthodox servility of his
foreign affairs apparatus as a defi-
ciency, for he made no secret of his
scorn for Gromyko: If he were to ask
his foreign minister to take off his
trousers and sit on a block of ice, Gro?
myko would have to comply, Khru-
shchev remarked to Prime Minister
Macmillan in Moscow in 1959. But
Khrushchev's successors are more com-
fortable with the foreign affairs appa-
ratus they inherited from ther prede-
cessor. For them, the claims of the or-
affairs establishment and of the Intel-
ligence cadres who constitute the
priesthood of this state church are ac-
cepted without challenge.
To compare Soviet intelligence
with the priesthood of a secret re-
ligious cult, a new kind of voodooism,
is not at all far-fetched, for ritualized
behavior of the professional intelli-
gence officer has much In common
with jungle magic..The intelligence of-
ficer uses another name than his own,
has a peculiar and stylized manner of
communication with his fellows, and
generally is obligated to conduct him-
self in accord with a set of formal rules
having little relation to the actual
needs of the larger society which sup-
ports him.
When the MVD rezident at Rangoon
decided that he needed to have Kazna/
cheev translate stolen Burmese docu-
merits for him, Kaznacheev was not
told of the new assignment until he'd
been called to come to a Moscow hotel
room for an interview. And when he
returned to Rangoon, it was explained,
he was not to mention the matter to
anyone, but to wait until some un-
named person (who of course was the
rezidert whom he'd known all" along)
addressed him with the words, "Greet-
ings from Peter." Kaznacheev was to
answer, "Do you know him?", after
which he could go to work making his
translations. The hocus pocus of pro-
fessional intelligence has thus added a
new dimension of absurdity to the prac-~
tice of foreign affairs,'much surpassing
the innocuous silliness of the railing
card ceremonial of old-fashioned diplo-
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
11 October 1971
E-n
BRITAIN:
The damage done to the effective op-'
eration of the Soviet diplomatic mis-
sion by this childish internal rigamo
role is trivial enough, however, when
compared with the harm done to So-
viet Interests by Russian preoccupa-
tion with the game of intelligence. Al-
ienation of foreigners who might be
friends of the Soviet Union by the
clumsy and crude methods of Soyiet
intelligence is perhaps not counted-I1s
a loss in the Soviet calculus of costs,
but an immense loss it nonetheless
surely is. For any observer with experi-
ence in these matters who is not pro.
fessionally committed to the aggran-
dizement of the intelligence profession
knows very well that authentic infor-
mation about other countries-or,
what is more important than detailed
information, an accurate insight into
the dynamics of the foreign govern-
ment and society-is far more easily
come by in frank and open exchanges
of opinion with foreigners than In the
furtive meetings favored by Soviet in.
telligence professionals. And it is just
this Soviet preference for secret police
methods which makes it so difficult for,
the bearers of Soviet diplomatic pass-
port$ to acquire this essential under-
standing of the ways of other. coun-
tries.
It is unlikely that the present Soviet
leadership will learn anything from
the mischief done by its operatives in
London. It is not too late, on the other
hand, for the managers of U.S. foreign
policy to put a brake on the empire-
building ambitions of our own profes.
sional collectors of clandestine intelli-
gence.
CPYRGHT
OING ALL OVER WORLD
Latest disclosures in London
underscore this fact: Kremlin
"diplomats"-by the thousands
-are out stealing secrets in
every corner of the globe.
Reported from
WORLD CAPITALS
Britain's crackdown on 105 Russian
spies in late September was the biggest
single strike ever made against Soviet
espionage agents-but it exposed only
the tip of a massive iceberg.
Western intelligence authorities re-
port that thousands of other Soviet "dip-
lomats"-possibly 1 out of every 2 Rus-
sians sent abroad-are still at work on
spy missions.
Top French security officers believe
that 50 per cent of all 1,000 Communist-
bloc representatives in Paris are espi-
onage agents. Over the past eight years,
France has tried 58 spy cases, 45 involv-
ing Red nations.
Officials of West Germany estimate
that 10,000 Communist informants are
operating in that country alone, chan-
ncling their wares to the Riissians, pri-
maril . They say this is a "rock hot torn"
figs sir.
Publicly cited: 140 Reds. A world-
wide survey by "U. S. News & World
Approved For ReleAcP 1 qqq/nq/n2 - (IA_RfP7q_fl11 MAnnnAnnn9nnn'I.1
T RED SPIES
 CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-O1194AO00300020001-1
Report" discloses that since the begin- on charges n financing The switch game. The Russians
ring of 1969 alone, more than 1110 Com- labor-union elements who have fey' qualms about switching their
monists,, all but a handful of them wanted to overthrow the foreign representatives from one role to
Russians, have been publicly accused of Government, another. Take the case of Aleksandr Ivan-
1f 9 - _
spying.
Some specific cases:
? Aleksandr Tikhomirov, a translator
at the United Natinlls since 1965, was
expelled in February, 1970, after being
arrested in Seattle on charges of al-
tempt iug to bribe a U. S. Air Force
sergeant to get information on anli-
aircraft and missile defenses in the
Pacific Northwest.
0 A "Pravda" correspondent in New
York, Boris Orckliov, was told to leave
for engaging in what the U. S. termed
"nonjournalist activities hostile to the
interest of the U. S."
? Igor Andreyev, Soviet counselor at
the U. N., was kicked out by the U. S.
in July, 1969, accused of espionage.
? Last July, the Congo expelled 20
Soviet and East European officials on
charges of being involved in student
riots. Iii August, the Sudan expelled the
11 1 A I 1 I the Sovi ?t
I
l
at nl
n
IIlt l
place Aleksey Belyakov,
Ambassador to Finland,
last I~cbriIaiv because he
allegedly helped to plot
a general strike.
Many more than 1.10
Russian agents have been
caught-but expelled qui-
etly because host countries
believed it was in the na-
tional interest to avoid
worsening relations with
the Soviet Union through
public spats.
Deliberate exposure.
some nations deliberately
allow Soviet spies to know
they have been di.rcovercd
in hopes they will leave
the country without fore.
jug the Government to
make a diplomatic issue
tiS
.
11 I,.
I tan In
.
of the case.
Embassy counselor for allegedly, lhelping
Comma nisi planters %% -]to tried and failed For all Moscow's exprri-
to take over the Covc?rnnac,rlt? ence in espionage, Russian
? Au Iii tourist official and a Soviet as are often described
trade-delegation member were caught in as crude. Time after time,
s
Argentina last November with microfilm a Soviet agent exposed ,
of military and industrial installations, a spy in one country will
? Two Soviet Embassy officers and a surface in another as a
Russian member of the U. N. bnterna- diplomat-even as ambas-
tional Telecomrnrnlicthe: s Union in sailor. Sometimes Russia 'tries to return
Switzerland were expelled for collecting agents to a country that has once thrown
Swiss identity papers for use by spies them out.
Y pY British For(iign Secretary Sit- Alec
in Switzerland and out. Douglas- I tome cited an example of this
? Lebanon declared two Soviet Em-: in a letter to Soviet Foreign Minister
bassy officials perscrraa non grain in Oc- Andrei Gromyko complaining of Bus-
tober, 1969, for attempting to persuade sian spy activities.
an Air Force pilot to steal' a French- According to Sir Alec, Moscow nom-
made Mirage fighter plane and fly it to mated is First Secretary of the Russian
the Soviet Union. Embassy in London :t 'm'in who, while
? Ecuador sent home two 'top Soviet a member of the Soviet hale delegation
Embassy officials and the chief econo- years before, had alleniptt?rl to bribe a
mist of the Russian trade mission in July British businessman to obtain military
etpripinent. Britain refused hire re-entry.
Fidel Castro's Cuba. Ile now is corrc-
spondent for Russia's Novosti news serv-
ice in Chile and Pena. Western experts
on Russia say this is not I demotion.
According to Western authorities, So-
viet agents sent abroad operate under a
variety of "cover" jobs-embassy chauf-
feur as well as ambassador, trade-union
official, interpreter, newsman, airline
official, military attacht', the Intourist
man who arranges vacations in Ihissin,
the labor .spacialisl at nn international
Irnde-anion confcrcurc, or till, "ioterlna-
lionnl civil servant" it talc ll. N.
Dual targets. Tai gels of tlussinn
agents are as varied as their covers and
include anyone who ran give Own) nnil-
itary or political informal ion. Moscow
gives top priority to industrial espionage
In an effort 1o keep tuh?icetl of new
Western wcutioils and III c?alc?11 rip in coin-
pltler and other indristrial technology.
Some nuthoiities cite the case of till-
British-French Concorde supersonic
transport as an example of Soviet mans.
trial espionage. Several Russian nllieials
were tspelted from 11'rstcrn i;in?ni/r for
utlcnIpl ing to Irani I lie (:oncnutl,'s cet Irh.
Ellrlgeari rtcsvspapr rs have m;rint.ninon
for years that the Itiissians arlually sltc?-
cccdrd it) stealing data on tilt` Conclude
enabling ahem to heat Britain and France
into the air with the TI tT-141 SST.
Tile TU-14.1 looks so much like Ilan
Concorde that sonic major West l out-
pcan publications call it the "Con
vich" or Lite "Concordslo.
Dozens upon dozens of sclntrlito t'?tst'ti
of Soviet espionage Nought to lio:11t
since early 1969 make it elcar that hilt'
aim is not the only target of Socirt
agents. Russian spies are bus}' t t rv
where-from Canada to Argentinai. '[,,m
Japan to the Ivory Coast--;1,:1theriio in-
formation to serve the Kremii !. I:::00)
7tP NII~STHGGERRMANY Russia Details of P
DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
27 September 1971
CPYRGHT
MISSIONS
FROM
MOSCOW
CPYRGHT
In FRANCE Ibere are 350 Soviet
officials. Seventyrtiiuc are
tiil)JO1Lais, enjoying lull diplo-
matic iuununity,.
Most of the Russians work at
The. Sovittl k:nlbassy, in the
Rue d.e Urcntcllc, on the Jell;
Bank. Undoes are cmployed
at. UNESCO- in the Place do
1,outcnoy, the Russian cousu-
lale, the oaliees i'ot Acrollol,
Lite Soviet airline, at Le Bout .s,ctii toe stauus or privilege Norwegian diplomats in A4os-
."ill" s. ~ i ,. 9' 0002004,111. !n Itenmark
e e a
RUSSIA : liah
a j- j
at emlta sa as a . II
sinus all over the worn
lucre a
I e 30 1llLSSlilll tll,ttJ t0-
Soviet 't'rade Mission and In? gainst six Danes n
and. t ie heads of Aeroflot mats, a
formal inn tnflirn and t
Bonn, a trade mission ill verified exactly ,yesterday, but
Cologne, a Black Sea and the embassy stall is under-
Baltic Sea transport. insur- , stood to be similar to Ilhat in
establishment in Hant- Brussels -about :.0.
'burg newspaper ollices and In ITALY there arc 4.1 Itussians l
all itourisl office in West will, diplunialic slatds
Berli t .
These rsiitu{:ions ai'e estimated
tci eta Jloyn-ltogeilter--200 people,
13:1. of : them ournalisi.s.
i igh v-six diplomats and wives
tYe 1 slut olhcially in 1301111 as
nicni ei-s- - of the . Russian shins at oilier missions ;are
enibr sy staff. estimated to nunmber 70.
In BE IUM there are 50 Rus- : In NORWAY there arc 25 I1us-
ion
ew ALrency.
hornet There, " ire Ihuu;;ht 10
.be over 410 ltussiaits working
for other missions in Italy, '
There are 36 accredited linsslaq
 CPYRGHT
for early in the new year, on
tile basis that this visit could
pcrliaps inaugurate a new era
of better Anglo-Soviet relations..
provided the spy situation Is
dealt with now, once and fo:'
ill, At the same time, the
Foreign Office here is braced
for the possibility of reprisal
expulsions against the staff of
the British Embassy in Moscow.
There are 78 altogether, of
whom 40 are accredited is.
diplomats. ,
Files for Britain
The terns of the expulsion of
the Soviet diplomats in London
were spelt out in a terse?
torehly worded Aide llemoire,
which was handed to the Soviet:
(.'har.gc here, Alr Ippnlitov,
lie was summoned to the
F''oveig,n Oflicc yesterday by Sir
Donis Greenhill. head of the
diplomatic service.
The 410 diplomats-)Host from
the embassy, but some working'
for the trade delegation and
other organisations in London
-have been given two weeks to
leave Britain, From now on,
the Aide. ',Wnloire said, " the
numbers of Soviet ollicials in
the: various cate',ories . , will
he limited to the level at which
they will stand after the with
drawal of the persons referred
to (and) if a Soviet official is
required to leave the country
in future. as a result of hi,_
having been detected in intel
ligence activities. the ceiling in:
that category wil be rechrce(1
by one." (Among the Soviet,
or;,,anisations with sizeable
staffs in Britain are Aeroflot :
the government wood delega-
tion ; the Moscow Narodny
Bank ; Intourist : and A1M0
Plant. Last night the Foreign
Office would not comment on
)tow many employees of these
firms were affected by either
the expulsion orders or the
warnings.
The Aide MOnoire also
stressed that, as part of the
clearing operation, the re-entry
visas of certain Soviet officials
now overseas were no longer
valid. Other major points made
during yesterday's meeting
between the Soviet Charge and
'Sir Denis Greenhill were :
Whilehall has refused visas
to a number of officials nomi-
nated to posts in Britain dur-
ing, the past year by the
Soviet Government " on
account of their previous
activities."
The number of Soviet offi-
cials already in Britain-"and
the proportioin of them
engaged in intelligence
work "-has been causing
"grave concern " for some
time.
A lengthy - and equally
strong-worded - Forei,,n Ofrice
statement recalled that the size
of the Soviet Enth;i;"y' w'a"
limited in November, 14105, "hut
the numbers in other categories
continued to grow.
550 officials
"The total is now over 550,
which is higher than the coni-
p.arlhle figure for Soviet offi-
cials appointed to any other
Western country-, including the
United Slates." The statement
said that In the lust 1'2' months,
several Soviet officials have
NEW YORK TIMES
2'5 'September 1971
CPYRGHT
liven withdrawn at the request
01' the Voreign Office, "alter
having been detected in intel-
ligence activities: others have
left the country of their own
accord, after'bc'in;r so detected
before their withdrawal coul(i
be requested.
In addition," the Foreign
Office said, " a number of,Soviet
officials have applied to conic
to Britain in various capacities,
but have been refused visas
because they are known to be
intelligence officers."
Much of the statement was
devoted to the rule of the K(;13
agent who defected a few
weeks ago : " Further evidence
of the scale and nature of
Soviet espionage in Britain,
conducted under the auspices
of the Soviet Embassy, the
trade delegation, and other
organisations, has been provi?
(led by a Soviet official who
recently applied for, and was
given, permission to remain in
this country.
"This man, an officer of the
KG13, brought with him cer-
tain information
c
n
d
u?
a
o
d
ntcnts, including plans for also took with him two satchels
Agents of all British security
services-1115, A111i, AI17 Ili(
the Special Branch-have taken
part in the operation against
the Soviet spy rings. Spread
over the past nine months, the
counter-espionage eanipair:n was
unique for this country in
peac'ctiule.
It was discovered that 'Soviet
agents were attempting to
establish cells in a number of
naval and at'uty.estltl)lishntcnls
in tile South of England, but
these Were " rendered harm
less" by swift action by the
British agents who infiltrated
the rings.
It is believed that the defect-
ing KGB man proved of
crucial importance to the opera-
tion. lie was able not only to
provide details of the networks
of espionage agents, their covet'
identities, and areas of opera.
tion, but he was also able to
p r o v i d e counter-intelligence
with a precise " league table "
of KGB operatives in this
country
The Foreign Office refused to
reveal any details about the
man last night, but It is believed
he was, initially, encouraged to
defect. early this year. 110 made
a , final decision about r,vvcn
weeks ago, and since then ha,;
been under close guard ;,c it
Secret Service "bolt hole " ut
the ]tome Counties.
Front there, workio . Willi
British agents, he ;lclped in
piecing together (he complete
picture of Soviet espionage In
Britain. Whin he defected, ho
clanlmc(I with fles. Instruction
sheets, and papers detailing his
country's spying operation here.
But. even before he left the
service of the Soviet Govern.
Merit, he is believed to have
supplier] British agents with
information described phler-
nwtically last night as
" invaluable."
The British Government Is
now cracking down on a scale
unprecedented in all the diplo-
matic history of the two
countries, strctchin:; Dark to
the 'tincus of i'ctrr the Great.
CPYRGHT
BRITISH EXPEL 90 RUSSIANS FOR ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES;
LONDON IS BLUNY.
Moscow will riot be allowed
to replace those expelled or.
excluded, and if anyone is sittt-
r~} iit''}~ n ~t llarly expelled in future, his
f1IG.B. Defector Gave, place, must remain unfilled.
It was the most drastic clip-,
Data That Became .lomatic action in memory, here
r Action sit c; IJl;%V1ICI' 21F;l111Ib 6 111L1-111-
Basis t or Action Bence agents in Soviet missions,
which have 550. officials in
Britain. It was taken on the
villay ot( (.
r .( vie cpre-
5C1
itatlves to leave because of
By' ANTHONY LEWIS basis of information. supplied
LONDON,'. Sept. 24--Britain lncinber of the Soviet secret
olice,
Along with the extraordinary
published the texts of a note' the matter with Moscow.
and two letters to Moscow and. The decision to take sweeps
of a Foreign Office statement.! ' ing action followed a dramatic
Link to European Talks coup for British counterintcl-
The note, an icy document,: :Jigence early this month, when
called on the Soviet Union to 'the defect: or, a high official of
end "operations against the ?the K.G.D., the Soviet secret
security of this country." It police, got In touch with British
said that the halt should conic. agents outside this country and
before preparations for the' arranged to come to London. Be
European security conference brongjit with hint a list of Soviet
desired by the Russians. espionage personnel in .itnitain.
Soviet espionage has worried ' The formal Foreign Office
British officials for, years, The Statetlfent t,sid this about the
foreign Secretary, Sir Alec defector:
'boughs-Monte, said two "Farther evidence of (lid
espionage actly its and barrfi t c oaths I th r d 1 cJ c of 50-
thc return of 1AX{ P~'(a+lp(IQk1 't' 0004200111711 )rItnIn cot-
,temporarily away. untness. The Foreign Office ithe Government was pressing ducted under till, nuspicrs, of
 he , vt ?, ra.. a ( other oragniz
ration and tl~ ~r~,yy{{~}}yyiiT__ n y4t~U t
has been prot'RlQM>'v`hViNle~ tt , 1
official who recently applied certain what proportion of these
for and was given permission are intelligence officers,"
In remain in this country, Sir Alec mentioned a recent
"This man, an officer of the attempt to send an intelligence
K.G.B., ; brought with him ccr- operative here. He said a visa
lain Information and docu- had been sought for B. G. Glush-
menu, including plans for in- chenko as First Secretary in
filtration of agents for the pug.- the embassy, though he, was
pose of sabotage," caught here years ago trying
The suggestion of sabotage, to bribe a businessman. to ob
.with its ring of , wartime tain details.: of secret, -Military
activity, was especially surpris- equipment. ~ , '" ' i
ing. British sources would say "This is the matt whbhi some'
nothing more on this point, or ;;Deign organization has nolili?
on the whereabouts, name or nated to serve n' first Secre-
history of the defector. Lary at your embassy," Sit' Alegi
One piece of information said scdrnfuil}},.Ills reference,to
brought by the defector is said "sonic orgiuhizatlon'' evidently
to he a Soviet plan for infil- hncant tile which Is utt?
tration of the Navy. A partieu- derstood to have large numbers
lar target was the secret re- of places In all embassies. ;
search establishment at Port- Mr. Grontykrh's failure to an:
land, on the south coast, from swer was taken badly in the
which secrets were stolen be-i Foreign Office doubtless
tween 19-55-,and 1961 by a spy worse than the Russians ex-
'The letters published by the
Foreign office, to which no re
ply has been received, were!
from Sir Alec to the Soviet For-'
eign Minister, Andrei A. Gro-
myko. The first, dated, Dec. 3;
1970, was written, Sir Alec
said, at Mr. Gromyko's request:
after the matter was raised prl-I
vately with him during a visit;
to London. The. second. was
dated Aug. 4.
Direct and Sarcastic
The letterA contained lan-
guage that would have to 'be
called undiplomatic in its direct.
ness and even sarcasm.
"I take it'+ 'Sir Alec wrote'
Mr. Gromyko last month, "that
you yourself are fully informed
,of the Scale of Soviet intelli-I
gence activities in this country?
"You are no doubt aware',
that the total number of Sbvict!
officials on, the' staff of.Soviet!
,diplomatic, commercial ands
NEW YORK TIMES
CPYRGHT1 October 1971
Soviet Agent fwo Defected Identified by London
By ANTHONY LEWIS
+1e1 to Tbs. New York TlmeI
LONDON. Sept. 30 - The
Foreign Office t_n5_y Identified!
the Soviet agent who defectedi
to Britain early in September;
as Oleg Lyalin.
Mr. Lyalin, who is 34 yearsi
old, was an obscure member of
the Soviet trade delegation here.'
He gave the British .evidence of
Soviet espionage and sabotage
plans that brought last week's
pected. it wan n It the
Government had 5cl aime;, which It displayed promi-
nently In early editions today.
The Foreign Office then de-
cided, that it must rush every-
The order has brought angrYl
protests from Moscow and hints
of early retaliation. It has also
beg n to come under some crit-
icis here, as having been han-
died In so sensational a man-
ner that It might harm East-
We relations.
Bat Prime Minister Heath's
Gov rnment has ruled out any
retr at, whatever the con-
seq ences. It can be said cate-
gori ally that the Soviet offi-
CPYRG}=4T
~epCt~ti Rnie~dif'Wi *0 0304?1ejectlons
I A~ Since 1960 Britain has de-
A reprisal could be expected manded the Immediate recall
now, but it need not come ?in of.27 Soviet officials reliably
equivalent terms and in fact reported to have been found in
could not because there are so active espionage. In the: same
many fewer Britons in Moscow. period 12 British subjects have
What might happen is a Soviet been convicted of spying ? for
move on some other front, such the Soviet Union.
as British tourism. More than 40 visa applica=
The view -here is that the Lions by Soviet officials for
possibilities of Soviet retalia- posting In London have also
don are limited by one diplo- been rejected since 1960 on the
matic fact: The Russians need grothd'that the applicants were
British , agreement to get the intelligence agents. The Soviet
E opean security conference Union has, withdrawn sopme' of
they have wanted for so long. f its representatives withbut.be=;
The embassy staff consists of Iing asked because It knew they
40 diplomats and 38 secretaries were compromised., ` . r.
and aides. There are said to he The Soviet Ambassador; In
20 ether British nationals in London, Mikhail N. Smirnov-1
Moscow, including half a dozen sky, is' on leave in Moscow. In
ibusinessmen and some dozen his absence .tlhe charge :d'af-
journalists-a total of about faires, Ivan Ippolitov, was
110, ` called to the Foreign Office, to
or the 550 Russians here, 146 receive the note from the
are In the embassy. The othersi permanent Under Secretary, Sir
,are attached to the large trade Denis Greenhill.
delegation, to Intourist, the The note said that "inadmis
travel agency, , to the airline sible activities" by Soviet of.
Aeroflot and to other coillmer- ficials here were "a matter of
cial enterprises. I serious concern to Her "-Maj-)
The embassy has been limited esty's Government," The re-
to 150 In staff since a Royal Air curring need to expel officials,
Force technician, Douglas Brit- or deny them visas, it said, put;
ten,'pleaded guilty: In. 1963 to a strain on relations. I
having passed security data to The lists of the 105'Russians'
the Russians for ilk years, He `said to be engaged In Intel-
said 'he' had been blackmailed ligence activities were attached.
and threatened. The embassy Was requested to
There has been no ccillnH on ',have those still here leave with=
(hr, trade and commercial df- In two weeks.
fh,es and they have mush? Sir Alec'will depart tomorrow
roomed; the total was 138 In ,for,the United Nations General
1950 and 2411 as recently as :Assembly session in New 'York;'
1960. There are more Soviet where he expects to Meet. Mt.'
officials In Britain than in the Gromyko.
United States, If the Unltcd'Na4 Sir Alec Is also due to pay
tions delegation' is excluded,'an 'a visit to the Soviet, Union
more than In any other country. early In the new year., Ne
I ' Shtcc trade. has been stag? would still like to go bait It ft+
rant, the British Government an. open question whether the
has no doubt that many of the Invitation will stand.
supposed commercial employes
CPYRGHT
deadline, one week from tomor- tage. For example, the United
row. States has recently completed
Plans for Sabotage a massive Installation at Orford
The Government was moved Ness, on the cast coast of
to early action by the informa- Britain, to detect missiles.
tion brought by Mr. Lyalin. Informed quarters say the de-
Especially shocking, among the cision to act on such a large
(papers he took with him, were scale was not intended to dam-
1highly detailed plans for sab- age the progress' of d'tcnto In
lotage. (Europe. Any damage now, it is
Early warning systems for argued, would be the result of a
`detection of approaching ballls- ,deliberate Soviet policy decision
to retaliate.
decision to expel 90 Soviet of-' Icial on the expulsion list will ` W`It ""i"11j; Ltic The wide publicity for the spy!
*MbVW )~ ge 1 ' 'c . c caused some
ficials and baA
 CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 ? ClP1 p ;i941,1N"03013020 illd not be sure
embarrassm roved
here. But it is the Soviet Embassy to The
insisted that the mass expulsion the express, he held his thumb who had defected. Thus many
Daily Express. The leak to that and forefinger about an inch might have feared that their
was ordered only when quiet right-wing paper was managed apart to indicate a small story. names had been turned over
diplomacy had obviously failed. in a curiously stagey manner. On Aug. 31, The Express to the British.
One factor In the Govern- Two Express reporters were carried a 10-line item to the The publication o fMr. Lya-
~ment's decision to act without talking yesterday at the em- effect that Oleg Lyalin, a "Rus- Iln's name and picture thus
further diplomatic approaches bassy with a diplomat just or- Sian trade delegate," had been could set some persons' minds
rived from Moscow, Vladimir. arrested on a drunken driving at rest. That is thought to have
to the Soviet was Mr. Lyalin s Pavlinov. For a long time Mr. charge. He was released on been one reason for the Soviet
defection. Pavlinov parried their questions bail of $120, to appear in court move in leaking the name.
There had long been knowl- about the mysterious defector Sept. 30-today. Another motive might have
with a smile. Reporters jammed the magis- been to begin painting the
ttates' court at Marlborough, source of so much British in-
edge of Soviet attempts at
I
espionage. But the extent of the Name'In Your Newspaper Street this morning to await; formation as a drunk. The
activities shocked Prime Minis- Then, as The Express story Mr. Lyalin, but he never came. Russians have also dd;pribed
ter Heath and his colleagues, described it, Mr. Pavlinov let lThen, at mid-day,c the Foreign' him as a lady's man.
it drop that the missing Soviet; Office confirmed his name. It But whatever Mr. Lyalin's
and prepare some, official had been in the trade did so with what seeme dto personal characteristics, his in-
mission. lie added that the) some reluctance or annoyance. formation is regarded as ex-
evidence of efforts to
mission.
future sabotage. I gentleman had recently been in-~ British counterintelligence ',tremcly weighty. The British
Mr. Lyalin's name was con- volved in a traffic accident. ( was believed to feel that while ;Government has already acted
firmed officially today after it "His name, gentlemen, was Mr. lyalin's name remined se- on it to move against domestic
had been carefully leaked by in your newspaper, Mr. Pay-I Icret. Any local contacts of So- (contacts of Soviet agents.
NEW YORK TIMES
17 October 1971
CPYRGHT
Special to The New York Times
BRUSSELS,, Oct. 16-Belgian
press reports M773-337=15
Anatoly Tchibotarev, a 38-year-
old member of the Soviet trade!
mission here who disappeared)
k
s ago
from his home two wee
had exposed a Soviet spy net-
work that had been eavesdrop-
ping on telephone conversations
at headquarters of the North
42 Soviet Agents'
'Reported Exposed
In Spying or, NATO
.Atlantic Treaty organization
ere and at Supreme Hcadquar-
ers Allied Powers Europe in
earby Mons.
Forty-two Soviet agents,
embers of the K.G.B. or its
ilitary equivalent, the G.R.U.,
re reported to have been made,
own to United States in-telli-
ence officials.
SPECIAL, Brussels
6 October 1971
refused to, comment on the re
ports.
The Soviet spies are alleged,
to have smuggled phone-tap-
ping equipment into the coun-
try in diplomatic bags. Some)
reports say that. the spy ring'
-spreads beyond Belgium and:
into West Germany and the
Netherlands.
Acording to reports, Mr.
Tchibotare hase gone into hid-
'ing with United States inteli-
CPYRGHT
Europe.
There was speculation that
he had fled to Britain earlier
this month when his car was
:found near the port of Zee-
brugge, from which boats run
to Britain. It is believed this
was a ruse intended to mis-
lead Soviet agents.
No one. was available at the
Soviet Embassy here tonight
for comment.
Tf U -,Y SPY ON US, ' TOO
When 105 Soviet nationals, all of them with more or less
official statics, are publicly expelled from British territory for
the crime of espionage, is this an isolated event, an accident,
or a specific phenomenon,.? One begins to wonder on reading,
days later in the true-blue France-Soilr, that there are 10,000
agents actively working for the :;ast inside Prance now.
Ten thousand is a very large number. The article that
this is a rough guess at the size of he informer operated
more or less directly Ly about 1,OJO or so Eastern from
one end of France to the other. What about here at home is this
something we ought to worry about, too? .re our s.. 'eets I- awling
with Soviet spies? dust to get our sights sp aighu, condition
you accept a kind of arithmetic that is logical, though deoatable,
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :9CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1
 we mA i oQ?M F&IRRI&MY[999YM02 :cQ 79-O I94 OGOOOD OO1c4-
plete by t.--.e English secret services would briskly banish from
Brussels to tneir alma maters in the KGB or GRU barracks a score
or so of Soviet citizens.
Ole, Lyanin $peaks
Vie did not just grab this figure out of the air. To get it,
we simpler recalled the fact that the spectacular roundup is Great
Britain drought swift repatriation to a little less than ?_ pE:-
cen-c of all Soviet citizens accredited by Her Gracious Tau,; ty' s
government as diplomats, journalists, tourist agents or
export experts. These are the traditional covers preferrec by
Moscow's honorable informants. In Belgium, as in England ._Ld n
France, they work behind the facades of the embassies, the
ary and economic missions, the press offices, the tourist
cies, and the so-called mixed corporations -- so-called bee. .use
they consist of Soviet trade specialists and local business...en --
quite openly and visibly. Excellencies, military attaches, news-
papermen, tourist delegations, businessmen and trade representa-
tives -- there were still 550 of them a few days ago, moving about
in the fogs of London. Since then, one out of every five of them
has been branded "undesirable" on information from one Oleg Lyani1 X1ClOb
Lyanin is a defector from the'KGB, a former member of the Soviet
trade delegation in London. What he has to tell the British ser-
vices may w'Ji trigger quite a bit of agitation across the West-
ern European espionage chessboard for some time to come. In the
view of the experts, though, the coverage of the British Isles by
spies coming in from the cold is a long way from being disturbed
by this super-sweep. First, because there is every reason to
believe that Moscow had more than twice that many agents on the
job, and second, because in addition to the Russian spies proper,
you have to reckon -- and very seriously -- with their Czechoslo-
vak, Romanian, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian colleagues.
Two out of Five Are Spies
The generally held opinion in Western counter-espionage
circles is that one of every two Soviet citizens strolling the
streets of our capitals is an intelligence agent on a mission.
But this does not in any way mean that a Soviet national who is
not officially a spy would hesitate to inform the USSR of what-
ever he learns, discovers, and sees in those Western European
circles where spies find it easier to gain admittance if they be-
long to the sacrosanct ranks of the press, or tourism, or business.
The rules of reciprocity require that Soviet diplomats request
Approved For Release 1999/09102 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1
 p"s~?929aFzrnI"p Jr9qg1-tP~t~i~1Jc'~At3~0a -they
are posted in the West; but these rules do not apply to spies
whose cover is the press, tourism, or business.
In Belgium right now, there are 113 Soviet officials, 45
of them working in the privileged area of the embassy and 33 in
the commercial representation. It is not a very daring guess to
say that a good 50 of these are full-time spies. The others oc-
casionally come up with some usefi25X h1~Obf 1r=Wkon.
Turning-Point in History
Whenever you meet two Russians, you are talking with at least
one spy: this axiom holds for the 45 comrades who live in the em-
bassy and the Avenue de Fre, the 33 who serve on the trade delega-
tion, the 11 attached to press offices, tourist bureaux, and air,.
lines, and the 24 experts in the ways of mixed-economy corpora-
tions. This, in terms of numbers, is the official Soviet delega-
tion on the job here ;..n Belgium, side by side with another 172 of-
ficials from the other Eastern countries. This representation has
greatly expanded since 1967, when, although the staffs of the em-
bassy and the economic mission were just about the same as they
are today (42 and 30, respectively), the number of journalists,
Intourist and Aeroflot agents was a great deal smaller (4 in 1967
as compared with 11 today). In those days there was a lot less
Russian spoken in the mixed-economy companies (10 as against 24
Russian-speaking personnel).' So 1967 was a turning-point in the
history of tie Soviet representation in Belgium. The proof: in
1960, the staff strength at the embassy, the commercial offices,
and the press office was 16, 25, and 2, respectively. At that
time there were no mixed corporations, and it is interesting to
note that the official USSR delegation to Britain in those days
amounted to 249 souls.
Like Icebergs
In the course of the last 10 years, a number of espionage
cases involving Soviet residents have come to public attention.
This of course does not mean that the official published statis-
tics account for all the spies our counter-espionage services
have unmasked. From 1960 to 1971, London expelled 27 Soviet
nationals on charges of spying. Here in Belgium, seven spies met
the same fate. They were: Vladimir Cheretuni (of Aeroflot) who
took too keen an interest in the Belgian army's affairs; Anatoli
Trifonovich Oborodnikov, a newsman with Tass; Vitali Dimitriy'eiich
Balachov, second secretary at the embassy; Oleg Alekseyevich
Semikov, a film expert who was caught red-handed on SHAPE grounds;
Aleksandr Selikh, and Anatoli Kassolapov, who were deeply involved
in a ring of "illegals" (agents who had no legitimate cover), all
OAPOR*OVFOr1 62_4e aPM 9M1'&led I I b0 94VP 0MOM2O 6I-4eft
hurriedly for "indefinite leave in the Soviet Union."
 Apr~L~~r~t4ir~~?2vrgRi7~031r
1970 was a commercial engineer with the Scaldia-Volga corporation.
His sales area had a little tiny bit to do with trucks and a whole
lot to do with SHAPE and our national defense. The fact that no
expulsion action was taken against Russian officials prior to
1967 in no way indicates that the counter-espionage services
had been indifferent to Soviet espionage activities in the years
before NATO and SHAPE. We might say that, at that time, these
agencies-were just keeping a close and quiet eye on the [Russian]
networks, and carefully refraining from anything that might up-
set them, pending a broader sweep with far more important results.
Besides, in the battle of the special services, the visible
part -- like the tips of icebergs -- is the least; the main part
is underwater, invisible.
Ahead of Paris and Bonn
As you can well imagine, the way these intelligence people
go about their business bears no resemblance -- in style or in
resources -- to the doings of James Bond and his thriller peers.
Intelligence of a military nature, if indeed it still interests
their government, is no longer in the top rank of their concerns
and quests. it is still the exclusive domain of the GRU, which
is the intelligence arm of the Red Army. But intelligence and in-
formation relating to industry or economics or politics are the
choice tidbits that bring the big money to the KGB agents. Before
NATO moved into our country, estimates placed the number of men
these two agencies had on mission at a round thirty or so officers
among the 80 or so Soviet officials installed in Belgium. It is
a fair estimate today that there are at least twice as many.
Their missions have to do primarily, of course, with the "areas"
of SHAPE, NATO, and the Common Market. This three-fold top-rank
target explains why the post of ambassador to Brussels is consi-
dered in Moscow as the most important in Western Europe, even ahead
of Paris and Bonn.
The fact is that the kind of espionage that marked the '40s
is practically a thing of the past. The whole concept has set,
along with that of the cold war itself. Since the planning now
is for total war, espionage has grown and adapted to the new re-
quirements. Becoming an intensive, everyday operation, it looks
into everything that might, in case of a conflict, ensure a people's
survival, and from there into whatever enables that same people
to live in time of peace. This explains why espionage has been
taken out of the hands of the military little by little, as its
objectives gradually broadened into the areas of politics, econo-
mics, industry, science, and sociology.
Lie Low,Till Time to Re-Surface
For the same reasons, its area of activity is no 1c-ger con-
fined to plumbing the heart and soul of the.potential adversary.
Approved For Release 1999/09162 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1
It is just as important now to build up a construct of chaos,
bit by bit, wl i_ch will maY:e it pU/.~siale to wipe the enemy out in
a hidden, underground, but irreversible way. This is psycholo-
gical warfare in all its intensity and all its refinement. The
idea, to take just one of a hundred possible examples, is to in-
filtrate demonstrations and protest marches and, if need be, to
provoke them in order to manipulate them more neatly in the de-
sired direction. This is why the facets of current-day espionage
are almost innumerable. It has become a subtle art, in which
those great chess-players, the Russians, have had two generations
to become past masters. Their basic resources are the greed or
vulnerability of their partners, the informers whose number the
experts put at 10,000 in France. On that basis, there ought to
be between 1,500 and 2,000 of them here in Belgium. They are
generally in it because spying pays, or because they are being
'blackmailed. In the hands of the "legal" agents -- the diplomats,
newsmen, officials, or export-import advisers -- they constitute
an invisible network, but one which is both sturdy and effective.
But we should have no illusions about these people: agents are
almost never recruited from the gutter or from the disinherited
classes of the society. The spymasters bar no class or stratum,
so long as the would-be agent has access to information. They
are among us right now. They are pleasant company, good listeners.
They are eager to tap their business and personal relationships
for information to be sent off to Moscow through their handler,
whose only professional risk consists in perhaps having to pack
his bags in a great hurry some fine morning, like his comrades
Yuri Khozhayev, the film exporter, and Victor Karyagin, the cul-
tural attache, both of whom were swept out of England with the
other 103 undesirables. After that, he will simply have to l.ie
low till the time comes to pop up to the surface again,' somewhere
else in the world.
1967 - Vladimir Cheretuni - 35, deputy head of the Brussels office
of Aeroflot (the Soviet airline), was arrested 25 January -:967
at Hever just after he had taken delivery of documents cor.-taining
military matter. The Soviet agent's special assignment was a
double one: to get into the military control tower at Yelsbroak,
and to open a cafe near the NATO installation at Evere designed
to attract the patronage of personnel from NATO. Cheretun was
neutralized before he could complete this assignment, and left
Belgium on 3 February 1967.
1967 - Aleksandr Selikh, Anatoli Ko.ssolapov Selikh was the re-
presentative of SOVFLOT in Belgium, and Kossolapov the Baltic Line
delegate here. On two occasions, they received the "illegal"
Soviet agent Yuri Nikolayevich Loginov, 35, alias Edmund Trinka,
alias Paul Serson), who was paying occasional visits to the UAR
and to South Africa so as to build up a background for him-el-," in
bQ places that would stand up against any US intelligence check.
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 Login4Acppt*v RL d999/OWO2rcrA4;-1DFPT9 -'4el 94MOONOMOD01
top spy. Had he not been taught by the great Russian master spy,
Rudolf Abel? Loginov's first trip occurred in 1964. He landed
from the Soviet ship azin at Antwerp, posing as an ordinary
seaman, and took rooms at the Hotel IJetropole in Brussels. The
second time, in December 1966, he landed again at Antwerp from
the Soviet cargo ship Kamensk. Selikh and Kossolapov put him up
in Brussels in a quiet, out-of-the-way room. When ,oginov was
neutralized in September 1967, Selikh and Kossolapov, their covers
burnt, had to leave Belgium.
1967 - Ogorodnikov - Balachov, Semikov Anatoli Trifonovich
Ogorodnikov headed the Tass news agency's Brussels bureau, and
was known to the Belgian press corps as a very fine, very polite
fellow. Neutralized on 18 April 1967, near his residence at 85
Rue General Lodz in Uccle. While he was being held in Saint Gills
prison pending expulsion, the USSR embassy in Brussels denounced
his arrest as "an illegal provocation." Two other Soviet nationals
were taken with Ogorodnikov: Vitali Dimitriyevich Balachov (whose
come-over agent, Madame X, said of him: "He looks like a pig, he
eats like a pig, and he behaves like a pig,"), third secretary in
the Soviet embassy at Brussels, and Oleg Alekseyevich Semikov,
commercial attache for the Soveksportfilm Company, she same that
imported the Russian version of War and Peace to Belgium.
Balachov left Belgium 2 May 1967 for a "vacation" from which he
has yet to return. The three Soviet agents were to work on "madame
X," an embassy employee upon whom they hung that sobriquet, and
who had been posted first to Turkey (where they had recruited her)
and then to Brussels. Ogorodnikov was the only one arrested, but
the other two felt the heat of burning covers and quickly ?aft
Belgium. The Soviet target in this particular affair was SHAPE.
1970 - Savich Boris Savich, rharried and father of two sons, was
born in Zhitomir (Ukraine) in 1934, and came to Belgium in October
1967. he lived at 56-68 Avenue de la Woluwe in Diegem. Officially
he was a specialized engineer, in charge of sales for the Scaldia-
Volga truck firm. His real job was espionage, and his inte ec-.s
centered on Belgian military bases (including Florennes) and on
SHAPE-NATO 9including its base at Baronville). More specifically,
he was after detailed information about the Mirage fighter plane,
its deployment, and its manufacturing components.
He was arrested on 25 March 1970 in a little inn at Linkebeek,
and shipped home on Friday 3 April 1970 aboard Aeroflot's Tupolev
registry number coop 42397.
Approved For Release 1999/0ch62 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1
 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1 CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
SPECIAL, Brussels
6 October 1971
ILS NOUS ESPiONNENT AUSSI
Cent et cinq sujets sovietiques au
statut plus ou moins officici publique-
ment expulses du territoire britanni-
que pour crime d'espionnalge, est-ce
14 un evenement isole, un accident, un
phenomene specifique ? On est tents
d'en douter quand on apprend en
lisant, quelques jours plus tard, dans
le feal t< France-Soir >> que; dix mule
agents travaillant pour I'Est operent
cn France a 1'heure qu'il est. Dix
mille, c'est un chiffre enorme. En
fait dans le contexte, ii est cens6
denombrer la masse indeterminable
des informateurs manipules plus ou
moins directement, d'un bout a l'autre
de I'Hexagone, par les agents de
I'Est au nombre d'un millier. Et chez
nous, faut-il prendre le probleme au
serieux ? Les espions sovietiques cou-
rent-ils nos rues ? Pour fixer les Wes,
au prix d'une mathematique logique
mail discutable, disons qu'un coup
de filet comparable a celui que vien-
nent de reussir les services secrets
anglais renverrait brutalement de Bru-
xelles une vingtaine de citoyens sovie-
tiques dans les casernes du KGB et
du GRU oii ils ont fait leurs classes.
OLEG LYANIN PARLE
Le quotient n'et pas mentionne au
hasard. Pour le determiner, it s'agit
de tenir compte du fait que la razzia
spectaculaire operee en Grande-Bre-
tagne condamne a un rapatriement
brusque.,un peu de moins de 20 p.c.
de l'effectif des residents sovietiques
accredit6s par le gouvernernent de sa
Gracieuse Majeste aux titres de diplo-
mate, de journaliste, de promoteur
touristique ou d'expert en import-
export. Ce sont la en effet, classique-
ment, les . Balachov
adjoi
,nt de I
agence bruxelloise de I'Aeroflot
(compagnie aerienne sovietique), est inter-
marin (il loge a 1'h6tel Metropole a Bru-
xelles). La seconde foil, en decembre 1966,
quitte la Belgique le 2 mai 1967 pour des
o vacances n dont it ne revient pas
Les
pelle le 25 janvier 1967 - a Hever (17 knt
de Louvain) - alors qu'il vient prendre
a Anvers toujours ii debarque du cargo
sovietique Kamensk. Selikh et Kossolapov
.
trois Sovietiques devaient faire o chanter o
Mme X - pseudonyms dont est affublee
livraison de documents d'interet militaire.
Le Sovietique avait pour objectifs particu-
le logent a Bruxelles dans une chambre
tranquille et isolee. Lorsque Loginov est
une employee d'ambassade qui a ete succes-
sivement en poste a Tunis (lieu ou elk a ete
Tiers la penetration de la tour de contr6le
militaire de Melsbroek et 1!ouverture d'un
'
'
neutralise - en septembre 1967 - Selikh
et Kossolapov v brules o ont a quitter is '
recrutee) et a Bruxelles. Seut Ogorodnikov
est interpelle, les deux autres quittent la
cafe a proximite du lieu d
implantation de
l'OTAN a Evere, cafe qui aurait ete concu
Belgique.
Belgique se sentant manifestement br3les.
'
'
pour attirer le personnel de cette organisa-
1967 -Ogorodnikov-Balachov-Semikov
Dans cette affaire, les
Sovietiques s
interes-
saient au Shape.
lion. Cheretoune est neutralise avant d'avoir
pu
mener a
bien ce
travail et quitte
Anatoli Trifonovitch Ogorodnikov, re-
1970 - Savitch
la Bee
la Bel
gique le 3
fevrier
suivant.
presentant de 1'agence Tass en Belgique et
Boris Savitch, mane, deux garSons, nE a
1967 - Selikh - Kossolapov
connu au scin de la presse beige comme un
garcon d'une gentillesse extreme et d'une
Jitomir (Ukraine) en 1934, arrive en B lgi-
quc en octobre 1967. Il reside 56-58 avdnue
Alexandre Selikh, representant de is
SOVFLOT en Belgique, et Anatoli Kosso-
education parfaite, cst neutralise le 18 avril
1967 a proximite de sa residence, 85, rue
de la Woluwe a Diegem. Officiellement it
est ingenicur-specialiste
charge de la vente
lapov, delegue de is Baltic Line dans notre
General Lodz a Uccle. Alors qu'il attend
,
de camions de la firme Scaldia-Volga. Ses
pays, accueillent a deux reprises ]'espion
u illegal > sovietique Youri Nikolayevitch
a la prison de Saint-Gilles d'etre expulse,
I'ambassade d'URSS a Bruxelles qualifie
activites reelles sont l'espionnage et dans
Ic cadre de celui-ci it s'interesse aux bases
Loginov (35 ans, alias Edmund Trinka et
son arrestation d' < illegale o et (< a carac-
militaires beiges (dont Florennes) et au
Paul Serson) se rendant tant6t en RAU
tere provocateur n. Avec Ogorodnikov deux
Shape-Otan (dont la base de Baronville)
1ant6t en Afrique du Sud pour s'y creer
tine personnalite devant pouvoir resister
autres Sovietiques sont compris : Vitali
Dimitrievitch Balachov (dont Mme X, son
.
Plus particulierement, it cherche a rassem-
bier des informations sur I'avion a Mira-
aux investigations des services de securite
americains. Loginov est en effet destine a
agent c< retourne >, dit : < 11 ressemble a
un cochon, it mange comme un cochon et
ge >, sur ('utilisation de cet avion et sur
ses elements de fabrication
aller vivre aux USA. C'est un espion de
classes. N'avait-il pas eu comme professeur
'
it agit comme un cochon >), troisierne
secretaire de I'ambassade d'URSS a Bru-
.
Le 25 mars 1970 it est arrete dans une
petite auberge de Linkebeek et est expulse
(
espion sovietique Rudolf Abel ? Le pre-
xelles, et Oleg Alekseievitch Setnikov,
le vendredi 3 avril 1970 a bord du Tupolcv
mier passage de Loginov a lieu en 1964.
attache commercial de la firme, Soveksport-
Aeroflot seep 42397.
'SP CIAL Brussels
3 November 1971
Import - Export
Espionage in Lace
When two Soviets, comrades Oleg Ivanovich Gluchenko (34 years
old, with an 11-year-old daughter) and Yuri Yefimovich Parfenov
(40 years old, with a 17-year-old daughter), who were employed by
the Brussels office of Aeroflot (Soviet air transportation company),
left Belgium at the beginning of last week - having been made the
subject of expulsion measures because of the revelations made by
'Rhebotarev - a third Soviet, Konstantin I. Leontiev, was forbidden
to reside in this country. Officially, Leontiev was the commercial
director of the Belgo-Soviet import-export firm of Belso. Leontiev,
by the way, is not an ordinary person. Likehebotarev, he too is a
high-ranking GRU officer, with one difference: he was superior to
the defector T:hebotarev.
The cover which Leontiev had chosen - that of a businessman,
the manager of Belso - made his work as an intelligence officer easy.
In that way he benefited from complete freedom of movement, which is
useful for any operational spy. Such covers are becoming more and
more commonplace. It is worth mentioning that there are four com-
panies of this "mixed" type in Belgium at present, including Belso
and Scaldia Volga. For the latter two, the mask has been ripped
away.
Approved For Release 1999/O9/O2 1 ~ CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1
 Approved For Release 199N019/0?s: Cil~q-R9PY_0 %4493 QQ01-1
A proved execut ve in a ego- ov
to his Soviet colleague over certain commercial policies which had
been employed, and received the following answer:
"We don't establish ourselves in Belgium in order to make a
profit."
Does this attitude also apply to Belso? The statement of profit
and loss for that company's 1970 operations reveals a net profit of
135,621 francs (1969: 159,209 francs) for general expenditures of
29,711,753 francs (1969: 22,903,621 francs), does it not?
Since the disappearance, on 3 October 1971, of Anatolij Tchebotarev
from the Soviet trade representation offices in Brussels, some people
have seen a similarity between that affair and that in London, where
Oleg Lyalin was the principal actor. Oleg Lyalin, whose ostensible
job consisted of selling feminine clothing - "babydolls", articles
made of nylon and assorted negliges - for the Rasno firm, an Anglo-
Soviet import-export company, was - secretly - the brain of the Soviet
sabotage network in Great Britain.
Konstantin Doesn't Answer Any More
We now know that Anatolij Tchebotarev was not the equivalent
in the hierarchy of the GRU in Belgium, of Oleg Lyalin, but that in
reality that position was occupied by Konstantin I. Leontiev, the
commercial director of the Belgo-Soviet import-export company Belso,
the Belgian equivalent of Rasno. We also know that, in addition to
his official position, Leontiev was a colonel in the GRU (Soviet
military intelligence service) and that he also worked under the
cover of a buyer of textiles destined to be sold eventually in the
Soviet Union. r
Leontiev was born on 19 December 1921 - so he is 50 years old -
and he previously held a position in Belgium from July 1957 to
December 1963 as an engineer with the Soviet trade representation.
He returned to this country in late 1969, and he and his wife - his
two children (Olga, 14 years old, and Vladimir, 18 years old) remained
in Moscow - occupied a luxurious apartment in the Pacific apartment
building on rue Scaiquin, at Saint-Josse-Ten-Noode.
When the gendarmes went to Belso last week to inform him of the
.expulsion order to which he was being made subject, Leontiev had al-
ready left Belgium. He had left for Moscow. However, he is forbidden
to reside in this country, nevertheless.
In the official portion of the work he did here, the Soviet
colonel organized exhibitions and style shows on a number of occasions
which were for the purpose of familiarizing the Belgian public with
the Soviet products which are sold, more particularly, in the "Maison
de Russie" (House of Russia), whose salesrooms are located on the
ground floor of the Tour Madou (Madou Tower) in Brussels. The "Maison
de Russie" is also the retail outlet for products imported into Belgium
by Belso. This import-export company, with a capital of 10 million
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1
Belgian francs, is a Belgo-Soviet commercial firm founded on 4 May
1966, with central offices at 31 chaussee de Gand, Molenbeek-Saint-
Jean., which location it then left, moving to 1-2, avenue des-Arts,
Brussels.
Le Charme Slave (Slavic Charm)
The business interest of the firm is principally the import-export
business and the sale of Soviet products at retail. Among the products
it offers are samovars, porcelain from Leningrad, watches, radios, cameras,
folk costumes, typically Soviet food and drink (vodka) specialities and fur
coats made of furs of Soviet origin but styled by Italian and French
specialists in order to make them more competitive with the products of
the Belgian furriers. The colonel, incidentally, was very proud of these
fur coats, and he recently had four good-looking Soviet mannequins make
the trip from Moscow to Brussels to present the winter collection. A
Brussels newspaper did not hesitate to entitle that occasion "Le Charme
Slave" [Slavic Charm]. The four girls were natives of Riga, or at least
that is what was said at the time. Did the man who was responsible
for "Slavic Charm" - like Lyalin in England - run a sabotage network in
Belgium? This is a question which may well be asked.
In addition to the "Maison de Russie" in Brussels, Belso also
operates a similar establishment in Anvers [Antwerp] which is called
"Kalinka". This branch was opened this year.
Soviet government organizations hold 50% of the stock of Belso.
They are the following:
Vneshposyltorg, which sells a considerable range of manufactured
products and Soviet food products at wholesale in small amounts, and it
also sells orders for admission to nursing homes and rest homes in the
USSR to foreigners on behalf of their relatives living in the USSR
(address: 32/34 Smolenskaya-Sennaya, Moscow).
Prodintorg, which, more particularly, exports food products (address:
32/34 Smolenskaya-Sennaya, Moscow).
Vostokintorg, which normally is an organization specializing in
-import-export trade with the People's Republic of Mongolia, Afghanistan,
Iran, Aden, Turkey and Yemen (address: 32/34 Smolenskaya-Sennaya, Moscow).
It should be mentioned that a former engineer with the trade repre-
sentation in Brussels, Mr. Yuri Straborovski, and the former director of
Scaldia Volga, Mr. Vladimir Cherkasov, each own a share.
The remaining 50% are owned by Belgians. When the company was
founded, the part of the capital in the hands of Belgians was represented
by two Greeks and three Belgians (two of whom have since died). The
administrative council of the company at present is made up of five people:
Anatoli Bobrik, Youri Kostrov,.Vladimir Kovalchuk and Konstantin Leontiev, all
four of whom are Soviets, and one Belgian, Louis Loncin, former director
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 ofAppveved oPIRe1eaS?M/4W0: ClA 4R 9tfl 94 A90t200G1-1
Commerce exterieur - OBCE]. The committee members [commissaires] of
the firm"are Dimitri Muratov, a Soviet from Moscow, and Henry Pirlet, a
Belgian.
As for Rasno, that company, the English equivalent of Belso, was
established in 1969, with its creation being announced at a cocktail
party given by the Embassy of the USSR in London. The firm comes under
the Soviet Department of Trade and Industry, which provides it with
a capital of 5,000 pounds. Thus, Rasno in London is entirely in the
hands of Rasno, Moscow, a governmental commercial agency. The last
reports on the company presented in July 1971 reveal that three of the
four directors are Soviets, that its capital reached'40,000 pounds in
1970 with a profit of 8,326 pounds, taxes not deducted. Oleg Lyalin
was said to be one of the directors of the company. One of the three
Soviet directors of Rasno - he received 4,000 pounds per year - left
the United Kingdom when the Lyalin affair was made public, and he did
so in spite of the work which had been done very recently in his house
on Makepeace Avenue in Highgate... Serge MONIER
SPECIAL, Brussels
3 November 1971
IMPORT-EXPORT
L'CSPlOhlNAGE
Ef~! DENTELLES
AIMS que eux ovietiques, es ca- cont e so et Scaldia o ga. Pour cars.
marades Oleg Ivanovich Gluchenko deux dcrnizrc's. le masque-
asque est tombs:.
(34 ans, une file de I1 ans) et Yuri Un administrateur beige d'une socirte"
Yefimovich Parfenov (40 ans, une Clle belgo-sovietique protestant rccennnettt:
de 17 ans), membres du bureau bruxel- aupres de son collegue sovietique de la
lois de ]'Aeroflot (compagnie aerienne nruiicre dont certaines pc>Iitiques com-
sovietique) quittaient la Belgique en merciales avaient etc choisics, s'entcndit
debut de semaine derniere - ayant etc rcpondre
]'objet d'une mesure de renvoi due aux .
un troisieme Sovictique, Konstantin Cette rcflexion s'adressait-elle aussi
1. Leontiev, etait declare interdit de a Belso? Le compte de pcrtes et profits
sejour dans noire pays. Leontiev etait de 1'exercice 1970 de cette societe ne
officiellement directeur commercial de revcle-t-i1 pas un benefice net de 135.621
la frme d'import-export beigo-sovieti- F (1969 : 159.209 F) pour des frais
que Belso. Leontiev nest d'aillcurs pas generaux de 29.711.753 F (1969
un personnage banal. Comore Tche- 22.903.621 F).
botarev, it cst aussi officier superieur Depuis la disparition, le 3 octobre
du GRU, a une difference pres : iii dernier, d'Anatolij Tchebotarev de la
etait superieur au transfuge Tchebe? representation commercials sovietique
tarev. A Bruxelles, certains ont vu un rappro-
La couvcrture que Leontiev avtt chement entre cette affaire et celle de
choisie - celle d'un homme d'affaires,. Londres ou Oleg Lyanin tint la vedette.
dirigeant de la Belso - lui facilitait s.; Cet Oleg Lyanin dont le travail officiel
travail d'officier de renseignement. 1111 consistait a acheter des vetements femi-
beneficiait ainsi d'une entiere liberte & nins - babydolls, articles en nylon et
niouvement, utile a tout espion opera- negliges divers - pour ]a firme Rasno.
tionnel. De telles couvertures sont & societe anglo-sovietique d'import-ex-
plus en plus courantes. 11 faut savoiir port, et qui, clandestinement, etait le
qu'il existe actuellement en Belgigse: cerveau des rescaux de sabotage sovie-
,
quatre societes de cc type < mixte >> tiquc en Grande-Bretagne. presentes a Belso' afin de lui signifier
Approved For Release 1999/09/ : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1
CPYRGHT
Nous savons maintenant qu'Anatolij
Tchebotarev n'etait pas, dans la hicrar-
chic du GRU en Belgique, ]'equivalent
d'Oleg Lyanin mais qu'en realite cc
poste etait occupe par Konstantin I.
Leontiev, directeur commercial de la
societe belgo-sovietique d'import-export
Belso, consaeur beige de Rasno. Qu'ou-
tre sa fonction officielle, Leontiev etait
colonel du GRU (service de renseigne-
ment militaire sovietique) et que lui
aussi ccuvrait sous la couverture d'ache-
teur de textiles destines a titre revendus
ensuite en Union Sovictique.
Leontiev est ne le 19 decembre 1921
- it a done 50 ans - et avait deja etc
en poste en Belgique de juillet 1957 a
decembre 1963 comme ingenieur a la
representation commerciale sovietique.
De retour en fin 1969 dans notre pays.
it habitait depuis avec son spouse - ses
deux enfants (Olga, 14 ans, et Vladimir,
18 ans) etant restes a Moscou - un
luxueux appartement de la residence
Pacific, rue Scalquin a Saint-Josse-
Ten-Noode.
Lorsque, dans le courant de la se-
maine derniere
les gendarmes se sont
 CPYRGHT
T
ApRroveron lFavalt or Re~e~se 1999/09/2 : CIA-RDP791-01194A000300020
'et, Leontiev avait deja quitte to tuei-
giquc`. Direction : Moscou. 11 n'en reste
cependant pas moins interdit de sejour
dans notre pays.
Dans la partie officielle de son tra-
vail, le colonel sovietique await, a plu-
sieurs reprises, organise des exposi-
tions et defiles de mode ayant pour but
de familiariser le public beige aux pro-
duits sovietiques vendus notamment a la
Maison de Russie > dont les locaux
sont installes au rez-de-chaussee de la
Tour Madou, a Bruxelles. a Maison de
Russic >> qui est d'ailleurs i'organisme
de vente au detail des produits importes
en Belgique par Belso. Cette societe
d'import -export, all capital de dix mil-
lions de francs belges, est une firme com-
mercials betgo-sovietique fdndee le 4 mai
1966 avec comme siege social be 31,
chaussee de Gand a Molenbeek-Saint-
Jean, siege qu'elle a quitte ensuite pour
venir s'installer all 1-2, avenue des Arts,
a Bruxelles.
La raison sociale de la firnie est prin-
cipalenient ]'import-export et la vente
au detail de produits sovietiques. Parmi
les produits qu'elle propose, on trouve
des samovars, de la porcelaine de Le-
ningrad, des montres, des radios, des
catneras, des costumes folkloriques, des
specialites alimentaires et des boissons
(vodka) typiquement sovietiques, et des
manteaux de fourrure. confectionnes
avec des fourrures d'origine sovietique
mais stylises par des spccialistes ita-
liens et francais at-in de les rendre plus
compotitifs aux productions des four-
reurs beiges. Le colonel etait d'ailleurs
trey fier de ces manteaux de fourrurc et,
receinment. it fit faire a quatre jolis
mannequins sovietiques le voyage de
collection d'hiver. Un journal de la
capitale n'hesitant pas de titrer a cette
occasion a LE CHARME SLAVE
Les quatre lilies etaicnt originaires de
Riga, du moins c'est cc qui fut affirnie
a 1'epoque. Le responsable du a charnie
slave > dirigeait-il - comme Lyanin
en Angleterre -- un rescau de sabotage
en Belgique'? C'est une question qui
peat titre posec.
La Bclso, outre la a Maison de Rus-
sie > a Bruxelles, alimente un etablis-
sement similaire connu a Anvers sous
be nom de a Kalinka > . Cette succursale
a ete ouverte cette annee-nienie.
Le capital de la Belso est detenu a
50 p.c. par des organisnies d'Etat sovie-
tiques :
0 la Vnechposi?liorg, qui vend en demi-
gros une gamine de produits manu-
factures et de produits alimentaires so-
vietiques mais qui, en outre, vend aux
strangers des bons de sejour dans des
maisons de cure et de repos d'URSS a
l'intention de leurs parents residant en
URSS (adresse : 32/34 SmolenskaYa-
Sennala, Moscou);
^ la Prodintorg qui, notamment,
exporte des denrees alimentaires (adres-
se : 32,34 Smolenskaia-Senna'ia, Mos-
cou)
^ la Vostokiniorg qui est normale-
ment une organisation specialisoe dans
be commerce d'import-export avec la
Republique populaire de Mongolic,
]'Afghanistan, I'lran, Aden, la Turquie
et be Yemen (adresse : 32;34 Smolens-
kaia-SennaYa, Moscou).
11 est a noter qu'un ancien ingenieur
de la representation commerciale a
Bruxelles, M. Yury Straborovski, et
I'ex-directeur c(e Scaldia Volga, M. Vla-
dimir Tcherkasov, possedaient chacun
des Beiges. Lors
societe, la parti
mains des Beige
deux Grecs et t
sont decodes de
ministration act
constitue de cinq
toll Bobrik, Yo
Kovaltchouk et
toes les quatre
Beige, M. Louis
teur des exposi
du Commerce
commissaires de
mitri Mouratov,
cou, et Henry
Et Rasno?
scour anglaise d
bassade d'URS
depend alors du
la pourvoit d'un
Rasno-Londres
aux mains de
conunerciale go
niers rapports
en juillet dernie
quatre directeur
le capital a attei
avec tin benefi
pots non dedu
decly re comme
societe. Un des
tiques de Rasn
livres par an -
Bretagne alors q
de realiser dans
peace Avenue a
CPYRGHT
01-1
ant sont detenus par
la constitution de la
de capital dans les
is Beiges (dont deux
iis). Le conseil d'ad-
1 dc la societe est
i Kostrov, Vladimir
onstantin Leontiev,
Sovietiques, et d'un
oncin, ancien direc-
ns de l'Office j elge
lirnie sont MM. Di-
n Sovietique de Mos-
et, tin Beige.
Iso, a ete lancee en
ayant ete annoncee
1 organise par l'ani-
a Londres. La firnie
epartement du Coin-
ustrie sovietique qui
apital de 5.000 livres.
st ainsi entierement
:rnenientale. Les der-
r la societe presentes
revelent que trois des
sont sovietiques, que
40.OOQ livres en 1970
de 8.326 livres, im-
Oleg Lyanin etait
- it touchait 4.000
a quitte la Grande-
I'affaire Lyanin etait
Et ceci, malgre des
s recents qu'il venait
LA LANTERNE, Brussels
5 November 1971
They were denounced to the Americans.by Tchebotarev, the employee of
the Soviet mission in Brussels.
They are: two employees of Aeroflot, a commercial director of
the Belso company, three members of the Soviet trade mission, two
diplomats, and the representative of a photographic products firm.
These Russians were on the list (much longer still) of Soviet
spies working in Belgium-particularly in the constant surveillance
of NATO telephone communications. The list was given to the Americans
by Anatole Tchebotarev, himself a secret agent and an employee of the
Soviet trade mission in Brussels, who defected to the West one month
ago.
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 AppfQ fiicA6 k4s#ajg9 9P/49ft ~t7 O~r1e9 i~~~Q-@O1-1
names of eight of them.
This evening they will miss the big reception given at the
Embassy of the USSR for the anniversary of the October Revolution.
The other 24 secret agents on Tchebotarev's list will no doubt be
among the guests.
Nine Soviet Spies Expelled from Belgium After the Revelations of
Tchebotarev
There will be some absentees from the big reception being given
this evening at the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(66 Avenue De Fre in Uccle-Brussels) on the occasion of the anniversary
of the October Revolution. Nine Soviets (La Meuse - La Lanterne is
able to disclose eight names today) have been expelled from Belgium
as a result of the Tchebotarev affair: two employees of Aeroflot,
a director of the Belgian-Soviet Commercial Company ("La Maison de
Russie" in Brussels and "Kalinka" in Antwerp), three emmbers of the
Soviet trade mission (former colleagues of the defector Tchebotarev,
two diplomats, and the representative of an important photographic
products firm. Other departures are expected within the next few days.
Two employees of the Brussels agency of Aeroflot (the Soviet
airline company) left Brussels-National--very discreetly-on Tuesday,
26 October, on board a Tupolev aircraft of Aeroflot, bound for Moscow.
They were thus the first Soviets hit by an expulsion measure taken by
the Belgian authorities. They were Oleg Ivanovich Gluchenko (34) and
Yuri Yefimovich Parfenov (40).
During the same week, a third Soviet--Colonel Konstantin
Leontiev of the GRU (military intelligence service), a director
of the "Societe commerciale belgo-sovietique, S.A.", or "BelsoSi
for short (1-2 Avenue des Arts in Saint-Josse-ten-Noode) since
20 May 1970--was forbidden to remain in our country. The police-
men assigned the duty of notifying Leontiev of his expulsion
could not find him; he had already left Belgium.
At the end of the week, five more Soviets returned to the
USSR, thus lengthening the list of "undesirables". They are:
- Anatoly Mashine, attache of the trade mission;
- Vladimir Krugliakov, delegate of "Sovflot" in
the trade mission;
- Aleksey Sereda, Embassy attache;
- Boris Trichine, attache of the trade mission;
- Valentin Zaitsev, counselor in the Embassy.
In addition to these five Soviets and Parfenov, Gluchenko,
and Leontiev, a ninth Soviet has also left Belgium. He was a
commercial delegate in an important firm specializing in photo-
graphic products.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1
"To see" and,"to see again"
Thus the Soviet espionage strength in Belgium has been reduced
by nine operational units. Now Tchebotarev turned over to the
American security services a definitely longer list of names of
Soviet spies. Thirty-three of them are of direct concern to Belgium.
Therefore, there are still two dozen intelligence specialists sta-
tioned in our country. This evening they will. undoubtedly be at the
Embassy of the USSR in Brussels, where many Belgians and foreigners
have been invited.
These are "selected" Belgians and foreigners, since the list
of guests is always drawn up jointly by the chief of protocpl of
the Embassy and the GRU and KGB "residents" (this is confirmed by
all intelligence officers who have sought asylum in the West).
The list of persons "to see" and perhaps "to see again", which
each Soviet intelligence officer keeps memorized for such occasions,
will be lengthened by several names. That is all. But the process
will remain the same. Spies have their traditions, and they stick
to them.
The departure of the nine Soviets from Belgium was prepared,
it seems, by several actions undertaken by G. Korinfski, second
secretary of the Embassy of the USSR. These actions had taken the
diplomat to several Brussels firms specializing in packing and
baggage, particularly near the port of Brussels. Moreover, he had
not concealed the fact that he was a diplomat nor his intention of
obtaining used crates at a good price.
He pushed his car
Shortly thereafter, Parfenov and Gluchenko left Belgium.
Parfenov had attracted the attention of his neighbors by maneuvers
which were "too discreet". He would regularly leave his lodgings
around 0500 hours and push his car for several tens of meters
before starting it. It is doubted that the purpose of this maneu-
ver was to avoid disturbing the sleep of his wife.
The measures of expulsion taken against the nine Soviets show
the importance of mixed companies, tourist agencies, press agencies,
and travel agencies for Soviet espionage,. which seems to prefer them
for its cover. Do not such activities permit their members complete
freedom of movement? For example, the personnel of Aeroflot claim
both commercial status and semidiplomatic status, because they be-
long to a government company. There are many cases in which an
Aeroflot employee crosses over into the privileged domain of diplo-
macy and vice versa.
The Soviets do not hesitate to assign to a diplomatic post one
of their intelligence officers who has been previously compromised
elsewhere. This was the case with Konstantin Alekseyevich Aksenov,
second secretary at the Embassy of the USSR in Brussels from 1952
to 1955, who had to leave that post because of the discovery-of one
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 4PK i g v @ g . ff . R~. ~v~~9~~~ ~ Q ~ r Y~i' r J 7 a g 1 t 1 o 9 ~ ~ g O a Q 9 O t 4 0001-1
infiltration of circles of anti-Communist Russian exiles. The
affair created a big stir at the time. Nevertheless, the same
Aksenov turned up as chief of Aeroflot in Morocco, where, from his
office in Rabat, he applied himself to collecting information con-
cerning American economic and military cooperation.
"Lightning promotion"
In Ceylon, Yan Akimovitch Grechko, in addition to his clandes-
tine activities, was noticed because of his promotion which can be
characterized as lightning-like--an ordinary commercial employee,
he became overnight the first secretary of the Embassy of the USSR
in Ceylon.
It should be added that Grechko was a colonel in intelligence
and that in 1950 he had been military attache of the USSR in People's
China.
This is not the first time in Belgium that an Aeroflot employee
has been involved in an espionage affair. In 1967 there was the
Cheretoune affair, named after the deputy chief of the Brussels
office of Aeroflot, who was caught when he was about to receive
intelligence of military interest from his "contact". .
In 1969 did not Konstantin Parfenov, who was then chief of the
Soviet trade mission in Brussels, declare that, among the fundamen-
tal principles of Soviet trade policy in Belgium, respect for the
sovereignty of the host state was in first place?
A few weeks later, a Soviet engineer of "Scaldia-Volga" was
expelled. He was a spy; 1 i
(box)
On the roof
On 3 October, Anatoliy Tchebotarev (38), counselor in the Soviet
trade mission in Brussels and field-grade officer of the GRU, disap-
peared. Trace of him was lost for several days. The Belgian author-
ities state that Tchebotarev has not asked to enjoy the right of
asylum. In fact, he is in the United States, where he is talking
very rapidly, denouncing his KGB and GRU colleagues whom he knew not
only in Belgium from 1968 (when he arrived in our country) to 1971,
but also those whom he knew throughout his entire career as a spy.
Tchebotarev had the clandestine mission in Brussels of listening
to NATO radio communications. The antenna of his interception system
is concealed in a small on the roof of the USSR trade mission, Boule-
vard du Regent, and not on the roof of the "Scaldia-Volga" firm,
where there also are antennas.
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 CPYRGHTApproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1
LA LANTERNE, Brussels
5 November 1971
CPYRGHT
Its ont eta denonces aux Americains par Tchebotarev,
1'employ6 de la mission sovi6tique de Bruxelles
Ce s nt : deux >mp oyes
de I Aeroflot, in dire.c-
teur commerc al de la
sodi td B e I s , trois
me ores de Ii I mission
co erciale ovidti-
que deux d plomates
et repre enfant
d'u e firme de pro-
dult photoq aphiques
Ces usses figur ent sur la.
liste beaucoup plu longue en-
core) des espion sovietiques
tray llant en Belgique, - no
tamp ent i1 la sur illance per-
man to des co nunications
telep oniques de IT T.A.N. * La
lists etc donee aux Ameri-
cains par Anatole . ehebotarev,
lui- "me agent s ret et em-
ploy' de la mission commerciale
sovie ique a Brux es, qui est
pass' a 1'Ouest it a un mois.
Ces neuf espi ns vien-
nen de quiff la Bel
giq e : nous p blions les
no s de 8 d' nfre eux
Its anqueront, a soir, la
gran e reception o Eerie a 11am-
bass a d'U.R.S.S. pour l'anni-
vers a de Ia Rev lution d'Oc
tobr * Parmi les invites figu-
reroilt sans doute :
les 124 autr4 agents
secrets de Id liste de
LES ESPIONS RUSSES GLASSES
Cc soir, i I'aml>assade de
I'Union des Republiqucs So-
cialistes Sovietiques (66, ave-
nue De Fre a Ucc1c-Bru-
xelles), it y aura des absents
a la grande reception offerte
a 1'oecasion de i'anni.versaire
de Ia revolution d'octobre.
Neuf Sovietiques (c G.R.U. et K.G.B. (ceci
est confirms par tous les trans-
fuges du renseignement ayanL
cherche asile a 1'Ouest).
La liste des personnes < a
voir - et peut-titre t a revoir
que chaque officier de rensei-
gnement sovietique a en memoi-
re pour de telles occasions, se
sera allongee de quelques noms.
C'est tout. Mais le processus res-
ters le meme. On a ses tradi-
tions chcz les espions et on y
tient.
I depart des neuf Sovietiques
de Belgique a etc prepare, scm-
bie-t-il, par plusieurs detnarclies
entreprises par M. G. Korinfski,
deuxieme secretaire de 1'ambas-
sade d'U.R.S.S. Ces demarches
avaient mene le diplomatte au-
pres de plusieurs firmes bruxel-
loises specialisees dans le condi-
tionnement et les bagages, no-
tamment a proximite du' port
Sur le toit
Le 3 octobre dernier, Ana-
tolij Tchebotarev (38),
consciller it Ia representation
commerciale sovietique a
Bruxelles, et officier supc-
rieur du G.R.U., disparait.
Pendant plusicurs jours, sa
trace est perdue. Les auto-
rites beiges affirmcnt que M.
Tchebotarev n'a pas deman-
ds a beneficier du droit
d'asile. En fait, it esL aux
Etats-Unis oil it park tres
rapidement, denoncant ses
collegucs du K.G.B. et du
G.P.U. qu'il a comm nnon
seulement en Belgique de
1968 (annee de son arrives
dans notre pays) a 1971. mais
allssi ecux qu'il a corms tout
au long do sa carricre
d'espion.
Tchebotarev avail pour
mission clandestine :r Bru-
xelles, d'ccoutcr les radlo-
communications do 1'O a.n.
L'antennc de son systems de
captation est dissimulcc dans
un petit baraqucmcnt en bois
instal16 slur Ic toil de la
represeut?.Lion Commerciale
de I'U.R.S.S., boulevard du
Regent, et non pas silr Ic
toit do Ia firme a `?c ddia-
Volga >> oft ii y a aus. i des
antennes.
Pcu de temps apres, P:,rlenov
et Giuchenko quittaieni .:t Bel-
gique. Cc Parfenov qul - pair
des manoeuvres :< trop diycrf Ley r
- avait attire 1'attention de ses
voisins. 11 lui arrivait couram-
ment de quitter son lo;,ement
tres tot lc matin - very 5 heu-
res - et de pousser pendant
plusieurs dizaines de metres sa
voiture avant de mettre le!
contact. oil doute quo cette ma-
noeuvre alt eu pour but d'eviter
de troubler le sommeil de son
spouse.
Les mesures de renvoi dont
les neuf Sovietiques ont Lte l'ob-
jet montrent l'importastce des
firmes mixtes, des agences de
tourisme, de presse et de voyage
pour I'espionnage sovietique qui
semble en faire sa couverture
de Bruxelles. 1I n'avait d'ailleurs vacs- ne lalssent-ewes pas a lours
C > 11 Ii~t d 6QLL~i}I~3b~~j~~t~lliberts de motl-
1 1 > ) e i Aero{lot, pal- exem-
L bon prix des caisses de recu- pie. Son personnel se reclan e
peration.
 CPYRGHT
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a la fois du statut commercial
et sit statut semi-diplomatique
etant donne son appartenance
a une colnpagnie uouvernemen-
taie. Nombreux sent les cas ou
un employe de )'Aeroflot ;aesa
Bans le domaine privilegie de
la diplomatic. et vice versa.
Les Sovietiques n'hesitent pas
a affecter a I'll poste diplo-
ma.tique un de leurs c'ficiers
de renseignement compromis
anterieurei,ient ailleurs. Ce Lit
ainsi le cps de Konstantin Alek-
seyevich Aksenov, deuxieme se-
cretaire a l'ambassade d'U.R.S.S.
a Bruxelles, de 1952 a 1955, oui
dut quitter ce poste a la suite
de la decouverte d'un de ses
agents. Aksenov avait pour mis-
sion en Belgique d'organiser
)'infiltration des milieux des exi-
les cusses anti-communistes.
L'affaire fit grand bruit a l'epo-
que. N'empeche qu'on retrouva
le meme Aksenov comme chef
de )'Aeroflot au Maroc, oil, de-
puis son bureau . de Rabat, i1
s'attachait a reunir des infor-
mations concernant la coope-
ration america.ine tant econo-
mique que militaire.
((Promotion
r oudroyani a m,
A Ceylan, ce fut Yan Akimo-
vitch Grechko qui, outre ses ac-
tivites clandestines, fut :emar-
que pour sa promotion ciu'on
peat qualifier de foud,royante -
qui fit de lui, simple employe
commercial, du jour au lende-
main, le premier secretaire de
i'ambassade d'U.R.S.S. A Coy.
Ian.
II faut ajouter que Grechko
etait c.ilonel du re.nsei;nemuciit
et qu'il avait etc, en 1950, atta-
che militaire d'U.R.S.S. en Chi-
ne populaire.
En Belgique, ce n'est pas la
premiere fois qu'un employe de
)'Aeroflot est compromis Bans
tine affaire d'espionnage. 11 y
eut ainsi, on 19G7, 1'affaire Ch^-
retoune, du nom du chef adjoint
du bureau bruxellois do cette
conipan,nie, iuterpelle alors qu'il
s'appretait a recevoir, de son
contact n dcs renseignements
d'interet militaire.
En 1969, M. Konstantin Parme-
nov, qui etait alors le chef de
la representation cortinercia'.e
sovietique It Bruxelles, ne,decla-
rait-il pas que, parmi les prinei-
pes fondamentaux de 1al. poli-
tique cornmerciale sovietiqque en
Belgique, se trouvait en pt Mier
lieu le respect de la souveranete
do 1'Etat hote.
Quelques semaines plus' tard,
un ingenieur sovietiqu!~ de'
Scaldia-Volga' etait ckpulse.
C'etait un espion !
SPECIAL, Brussels
10 November 1971
The list of Soviets who have departed Belgium as a result of the
Tchebotarev affair (Attache at the commercial representation who last
3 October chose to defect to the West) has lengthened by six since we
announced last week the "discreet" departure of three Soviet intelligence
officers, the Comrades Oleg Ivanovitch Gluchenko (born 12 February 1937)
and Yuri Yefimovitch Parfenov (born 2 May 1931), both employees of
Aeroflot, and of Konstantin I. Leontiev (born 9 December 1921), Commercial
Director of the Belgo-Soviet Import-Export Company Belso.
These departures have in effect been followed by those of six; other
Soviets: one counsellor for scientific and technical questions at the
Soviet Embassy (Valentin Zaitsev), one attache of the same embassy
(Aleksei Sereda), one Sovflot representative attached to the commercial
representation (Anatoliy Mashine and Boris Trichine) and one Soviet
working as a commercial representative in an important firm producing
photographic products.
The strength of Soviet espionage in Belgium has been reduced by nine
operational units, an appreciable reduction, but in reality clearly
inadequate when one knows that there remain in our country twenty Soviet
intelligence specialists directly compromised by the Tchebotarev affair.
It is however probable -- according to some sources -- that in the
next few days new departures from among the official Soviet representation
in Belgium will be announced. The nine departures for Moscow represent
only a prologue to a series of departures either more important in number
or directed at more important personalities.
The number of Tovariches assigned to Brussels as of this date is
102 (Tchebotarev and Volkov have been subtracted) -- 43 members of the
Embassy, 29 from the commercial representation, 8 from the press, travel
and airlines (two from Aeroflot), one intourist, one Tass, two Novosti,
one Isvestia and one Pravda, 22 in the mixed firms (Scaldia Volga and Belso).
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1
A few months ago, a high-level British functionary summarized in
four points the precautions needed to limit the loss of industrial
secrets during Soviet-British encounters.
1) All Soviets visiting factories and business offices
must be considered "a priori" as intelligence officers and
only "a posteriori" as commercial agents.
2) The commercial secrets and the details of industrial
procedures should be locked up whenever Soviet visitors are in
the area. One should not permit delegations to enter design
departments where new models are being prepared.
3) During the negotiations and even after the signature
of export contracts, the Soviets should not be authorized to
inspect anything more than the indispensable minimum of the
different stages of production.
4) The Directors of firms should avoid showing prototypes,
even if there is a promise of purchase.
This same high functionary noted also the large discrepancy
which exists on the one hand between the number of members of a permanent
commercial representation and on the other hand the number of members of
visiting commercial delegations. "I have always noticed;'he added,
"that the size of this latter delegation is always larger."
CPYRGHT
SPECIAL, Brussels
10 November 1971
La liste des Sovictiqucs qui ont quitte In
Belgique suite A I'affaire Tchci)otarev - 1'at-
tachc A la representation cuminerciale qui,
le 3 octohre dernicr, choisit de passer a
I'Ouest - s'est altongce de six unites de-
puis title noun aeons annonc , la seinaine
dernicrc, Ic depart a discret a de trois offi-
cierS do renseigncmcnt sovictiques, Ics en-
ntarades Oleg Ivanovitch Oluchcnko (nc
le 12 fevricr 1937) et Yuri Yetirnovich Par-
fcnov (oe le 2 ntai 1931), toils deux employes
de I'Acrotlot, ct de Konstantin 1. Leontiev
(nc le 9 dcccntbrc 1921), directeur corunrer-
cial de In socicte bclgo-sovictiquc d'inrport-
export Belso.
Ces departs ont en effet etc suivis de
ceux de six autres Sovictiqucs : d'un con-
sciller aux questions scicntilIques et tech-
niques do I'ambassade d'U BSS (Valcutin
%aitsev), d'un attache de la mane ambas-
sade (Aleksey Screda), d'un dcleguc the la
Sovtlot .to seen do In representation corn-
mcrciale (Anatolij Mashine ct Boris Tri-
chine) et d'un Sovictique travaillant comme
dclcguc commercial Bans tine importante
pLS(
aQph r it Mascou, uric ving-
taine do Sovietiques dont les noms
out 6galement et6 cites par Tche-
botarev. On va done assister dans
les prochaines semaines it d'impor-
tantes mutations parrot le person-
nel sovietique accredits en Belgi-
que. Si Moscou decide de mainte-
nir en Belgique quelque 110 fonc-
tionnaires on employes, 11 lui fau-
dra, on effet, remplacer un tiers
de ces effectifs.
. Resto it voir, maintenant que
I'affairc est 6bruitee, quelles so-
ront les reactions sovietiques. Un
silence persistant ou des represait-
les? Aux. Affaires 6trangeres bei-
ges on so contente de nous decla-
rer qu'aucun Clement nouveau
n'est intervenu clans cette affairs
d'espionnage a. Autrement dit, ruo
des Quatre-Bras on se, refuse a.
prononcer to mot 4r expulsion do
memo que celui; do .t gentlemen's
agreement r. 11 est vrai qu'en nia-
ticro d'a.;pionnage 1'expressivn doit
ttro a&gcz inusit6e.
L/AURORE, Paris
19 October 1971
A RUSSIAN MASTER SPY IN PARIS
by Philippe Bernert
105 Soviet spies expelled from Great Britain, 40 Soviet spies
counted in Belgium and threatened with expulsion. Might
France be spared this sort of pollution? Because of the
special relationship between Paris and Moscow, and in consider-
ation of the forthcoming visit of Leonid Brezhnev, might the
Kremlin have decided: "None of that for our French friends?"
We may even imagine -- it is pleasant to dream -- that the Russians
send us from time to time, at the end of a very full and slightly faded
career, one of those good secret agents who has grown old in his job.
Not to spy on us -- oh no! -- but to reaccustom himself to a more pleasant
way of life, to forget his job somewhat.
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 App ed FWct e q 9f0&Q2tiCqA 71~? 'f Abo Od a6oi -1
Let's take a very precise case. On 30 August 7 t e new permanen
delegate of the Soviet Union to UNESCO arrived in Paris -- His Excellency
Serge Mikhaylovich Kudryavtsev. We say His Excellency because Kudryavtsev
was the Soviet ambassador to Cuba and to Cambodia before being appointed
to Paris, to this very restful job.
His name won't tell you very much, of course. Yet in Canada it still
makes certain high officials grow pale with anger. And in the "White
Paper" published in 1946 by the Ottowa government to disclose part of the
atomic espionage conducted by the Russians between 1942 and 1945, you
would find the name of S. E. Kudryavtsev listed quite frequently.
For in Canada where he started as first secretary of the embassy,
Kudryavtsev was one of the leaders of Soviet espionage. He established
contacts with the well-known English physicist Allan Nunn May, who stole
uranium for the Russians, gave them many related secrets, and was finally
sentenced to 10 years in prison in 1947.
The Cuban Missile Man
At that time a defector broke up the Soviet spy network. A code
clerk of'the USSR embassy in Ottawa, Igor Guzenko, went to the west with
his wife and a bag full of documents. All the Russian agents were
identified. Kudryavtsev did not wait to be expelled. His chiefs appointed
him to the embassy in London, where he remained for several weeks, long
enough to see how the issue was taking shape in Canada, then he went back
home to Moscow.
At that time Kudryavtsev was "exposed," as the spies put it. But
the Russians felt he was too valuable to be retired to a Moscow office.
"Impossible, for the moment,ito appoint him to another of our embassies
in the west," said his chiefs. "He might be declared persona non grata.
But there is a way of getting around this."
This way around which, as you will see, was to be used again much later,
was to infiltrate a secret agent like Kudryavtsev into an international
organization -- the United Nations. For there each delegation is free to
bring members of its own choice. The UN is very agreeable. Even crammed
full of spies, its rules forbid it from getting rid of them.
So it was under U,N cover that the astonishing career of Serge Kudryavtsev
was to continue. The United Nations sent him to Greece on an investigation
mission. lie held a desirable place on the UN commission on the Balkans.
Then during the second session of the UN General Assembly, he was seated at the
side of the Soviet delegate, Andrey Gromyko.
1:haL was already a bit much. But tneu1 tnC~..,~
well known to all the western secret services became an ambassador. Not
just anywhere, you will note, but in a capital that could not reject him,
even if he were the devil himself -- Havana. That was the time when-Castro
was totally under the thumb of the Russians, and couldn't refuse them
anything. They 'set him up against the United States, they promised Castro
missiles, and without their economic aid, Castroism could not have survived.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300020001-1
This means that the real boss in Cuba was Kudryavtsev. He set up a
solid KGB apparatus there, got Kennedy, the CIA,-and the anti-Castro people
to fall::. into'the?Bay of Pigs trap, and organized the installation of
-
nuclear -missiles aimed at the heart of the United States. .-He-was an
extremely rare case -- he was both the representative of the USSR and the
chief of its spies. Normally Moscow tries to separate the two types, and
it is often the doorman, the driver, or a vague attache in the embassy who
is actually the real boss.
Kudryavtsev is this rare bird, capable of playing all roles. A
performance that he was to renew, starting.in 1967, in Cambodia, where he
watched very closely the too unsteady Sihanouk. -As-ambassador and'KGB
chief, Kudryavtsev then conducted, at the same time*as his rivals in the
CIA, a subtle game aiming at dumping the pro-Chinese Sihanouk in favor of
General Lon Not.
This was successfully done. Would Kudryavtsev then rest on his
laurels? 25 years after the Ottawa affair, his chiefs decided to try an
experiment, and to test the "short memory" of the west.
"We are going to try to infiltrate Kudryavtsev again in a western
capital. London or Washington would still be too difficult. But Paris
seems perfect. Especially if we appoint him as the head of a delegation
of an international nature, like UNESCO, for example. The Quai d'Orsay,
which is a real stickler for its rules,.can only approve, since we have
the right to choose whomever we want."
This explains why, when Soviet agents have been having a bad time
in the west, S.E. Kudryavtsev was able to get settled along the Seine.
In his "Brussels Letter," an information sheet published monthly in the
Belgian capital, and closely followed in NATO circles, my colleague
Pierre de Villemarest mentions this incredible matter. The Belgians
are astounded. But in Paris no one seems aware of what is going on.
L'AURORE, Paris
19 October 1971
~JH
ii. i . .4ti. {:?.~. +. ..e r . ~.
105 "pinnn envirtinnec eha?.ses de Grande-13rcta_ne, 40 es:pions sovie tiques
dcnnmhrcs on ltrlsiryue, et menaces a lour tour d'expulsion. La France
scrait-clle cparCnee par Bette pollution d'un autre genre ? rn vertu des liens
sh4tciaus etc Paris et Nloscou. et en consideration. de la tres proche visite
do LQonid l3rejncv, le Kremlin aurait-il decide Pas do ca chcz nos amis
francnis 9 a
CPYRGHT
11 est niche i la ricucur 'un cas biro precis. Lo '0 ,Milt pal:r de coicre ccriains ha-j:.; ,
,s
1^ cci?l,. Ic , i ysicirn ar._ a
permis Wiro:riner - c'est dower arrivait i Park., is toncnonnaires. Et d:.ns Ic N11an Nunn flay: nu. V0., Sir
beau de,rcver -- quc let Rus- nouveau dclezue pormanfnt ? I ivre?bianc , edits en 1?4b 1'uranium ;.cur 1e 1 .sec.
scs noun envoicat, do temps cif ITnion sovletique ai;pres par le gouvornement ci'Ott..
a autre. Ail terms dune car- de 1'LiNESCO, San I cellenco wa. pour d~.coiler tine part' f lcur pass, a- non O se-
ricrc lien rfmpiic et-un p^u Serge \1.k11oIIovitch Krnl- de 1'csp:onndic atoni.que me- cress nudca:res aliiis et tut
defraichie, tin de ^es bons driatsev. .ous disen3 Son ne mar lc. Ru.s.c.c entre 191 2ina,ement con danine, en
194-,, a dix ans de prison.
agents secrets blanchti , . sous ie $Sretlf.lee. - .ar Cf. qo Boll- Ct 1945, \-us t. ouverie>. ie
harnois. Pas pour ",its es- driatsev tut ambassadcur to- note do S.:..? Koudr;atsev, et n
ionnei'. ?iuste c.cl, ma:= amour victi ue i Cuba et nu Cam. tcr z ,
p ~ q mcmc abnndnmmcnt cite. L ~5 FL~J D : UvH
se rocomqi.r a tine Set nine bode, avant d'etre n?ntmc a Car. au Can;oda. nit ii fit
douccur de vivre, pour au- Paris, i cc poste de tout re- ses dchuts de premier socre- Ci:S I LU1
blier un peu le metier. pos. taire d'a:nbo