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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00030007Q51t10b 25X6A Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 SLI+IAKY OF SOVIET BOOK, THE POLITICAL PARTIES OF AFRICA A new books published in Moscow for alimited readership of Soviet specialists., gives an unusually frank picture of Soviet attitudes to political developments in Africa# The book The PolitLaa a ties ?L Al ricao was passed by the censors last Oetobeftnawa been Issued Lander the auspices of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Africa Institute f in an edition of only 3,700 copies, Presumably because of the restricted readership, the dozen Soviet African experts who collaborated on the book under the editorship of V. G. Solodovnikov, the Africa Institute Director and a former Soviet representative at the United Nations., have been particularly outspoken both about conditions in Africa and previous Soviet analyses cLf the. situation* While African statesmen are criticised for "Utopian" views and other heresies by the Soviet experts, they point out that some of their own colleagues have taken an oversimplified view of African leadersio The book contains biographies of several African leaders to stress that there cannot be any automatic way of "defining political sympathies on the basis of social origin....Like other continents, Africa knows examples of political leaders who have refused to serve their class.... These examples testify to the incorrectness of identifying the aristocratic stratum of chiefs with reactionaries, without any qualifications..-.a view disseminated quite widely in (Soviet) Africanist literatureo" .The book names those "revolutionary-democratic" parties-in Guineas ',Algeria, the UAR, Tanzania, Congo-Brazzaville, Angola, Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique.-which the authors believe-can become "reliable .detachments of the African and international Communist and workerso movement" "Revolutionary.-democratic" parties is the Soviet term for the kind of "national Soci" parties with a mass membership familiar in developing countries& The authors describe how present nationalist parties of a mass nature are to be "transformed" into Communist-type parties. Firstly, "the establishment of a single party system of government is one of the most important political successes of parties of the revolutionary-' democratic type." But the book warns Soviet specialists not to commit themselves to supporting present-day ruling parties of this types since it was "impossible to exclude the possibility of a departure from- -.a single party system": "This system corresponds to the present-day state of social relations in the progressive countries of Tropical Africa. But the social structures of African countries are going through a period of stormy changes, new social forces are emerging on to the historical arenas in particular the political role of the working class is becoming increasingly noticeable. Under these conditions any dogmatism in the evaluation of the single-party system in the concrete historical epoch of a given African country could entail serious miste. see Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Challefige Planned The implication is that Marxist opposition groups may be formed and that leaders now hailed by the Russians as "progressive" may be challenged by them when the time is ripe. The book predicts that the tendency towards onemman rule will inevitably Cede Qt r p "aalthoilgh it w probably be a long time before this problera is fully resolved." There are several references to the fact that opposition continues within and outside the single ruling parties and that although it can be repressed for a time,, "sooner or later the moment of serious upheavals arrives,, as a result of which it becomes clear that the single-party system cannot be regarded as a panacea," Sometimes these "upheavals" have already taken place,, producing a result not favoured by the Soviet authorse They say of the military regimes now existing in Africa: . "The replacement of a regime of mercenary bureaucrats by often incompetent officers does not decids anything itself..., It is clear that it is impossible to implement even correct programmes by relying only on the army and deliberately rejecting political, i.e* party,, forms of leading the masses. The soil for the regrowth of new parties inevitably remains in those countries where mi .itary regamea Groh down politig . W@ in ~~tl~rg~ ati Returning to the more progressive "revolutionary-democratic" parties,, the book says that they have entered a new phase: "These processes are accompanied by a heightening of discussion around ideological questions,, a growing interest towards the Marxist-Leninist teaching, The parties' success in the new phase will greatly depend on the extent to which these new trends will becou consolidated in practice and how quioklyP. the new tendencies will be understood and become the parties# normsae?e "Facts demonstrate that the transformation of the present-day mass popular revolutionary-democratic parties into parties of a vanguard (i.e. Communist) type is being placed on the agenda. One cannot consider that. there is unanimity on this question in the political thinking of revolutionary democrats. Although the process of transforming present-day parties into Socialist vanguard parties has in practice begun,, it is continuing in an extremely slow and contradictory manner,.,, "In conditions whereby the influence of trade unions, the youth move ment and peasant organisations remains strong within revolutionary- democratic parties, the tendency towards their transformation into vanguard parties begins to show increasingly clearly. This process in general corresponds to the logic of the class ware The former antic. colonial front slowly disintegrates and a dilemma arises before revolutionary-democratic parties-to continue to be allied to the bourgeoisie or to take the side firmly of workers and peasants,.., The relative weakness of class contradictions in the towns and the communal survivals (ioee traditional African village life) in the countryside,.,favor the durability of illusions about the possibly lengthy existence of parties common to whole peoplesof Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Class Struggle Here the Soviet long-term opposition to mass nationalist parties is clears even though it is conceded that in Africa the social basis for-the class struggle which the Russians would welcome is not very promising. The authors go on to indicate that., whatever the present situation,. they expect the class struggle to emerges "It remains an indisputable fact that class differentiation is taking its normal course 1p Africa.... This process does not by-pass single- party regimes eithep.... It may be that this struggle is being waged within a formally single party ...but its class basis is undoubted*, Nor can one forget the illegal, extra-parliamentary opposition under conditions of single-party regimes#" Despite the relative lack of class conflict in Africa, the book attacks "revolutionary democrats" who deny that Communism can "have real roots on the African continent,, One does not have to prove that these people are willy-nilly in the same camp as the anti-:Communists and, as a consequence, as the defenders of capitalism." A sign that the Russians are cautious about forcing the pace, thereby jeopardising their long-term plans., is the book's denunciation of "left.' wing extremism." Nevertheless., the fact that a left-wing is emerging in revolutionary-democratic parties such as those in Algeria and Egypt. is welcomed. Discussing a 'number of Marxist.-Leninist parties on the African continent, the book declares: "The basic pxograrrsnatic theses of the revolutionary-democratic parties often coincide with (those) of Marxist-Leninist parties or those related to them. At the same tine, the views of Communists and revolutionary democrats do not always coincide on many other questions This is understandable. The revolutionary-democratic parties are not consistent Marxists. Their basic membership consists of peasants who have -inherited from many years of ao lonial overlordship political and cultural backwardness and religious fanaticism.... However, representa- tives of the African intelligentsia and the young working class, inspired by scientific Socialist ideas... actively work in the central organs of these parties-As well as in their middle and lower ranks." Sudanese Example The book cites the example of the Sudan, where following the takeover in May, 1969, Communists joined the government. It claims: "Communists do not strive for a political monopoly, ruled b3? some sort of egoistical considerations..., This can be seen with particular clarity from the example of the activities of Sudanese Communistsm? But on February 12 President Nimeri attacked the Sudanese Communist Party, claiming that it had been "perpetrating subversion against the production machinery in various ways, including interference with trade union work, ..,wrecking production and disseminating secret pamphlets, disastrous rumours and harmful lies and spreading fear and diem" aapong A apo o~sf ~l a 4MMMAG IA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 He warned that the Sudanese revolution would not allow the creation of a new party, secretly or overtly: "The revolution did not take place to support one-group against another but to support the entire peopled" Pointing out that difficult tasks lie before African Communists, the book ends with interesting insights into recommended tactics. The maim task is said to be for Communists to attract to them not only a reliable and conscious minority, but the mass of the workers as well. Though "extraordinarily 'difficult," the task could be accomplished-.."as the positive experience of Sudanese Communists shows." "The working-out of correct tactics by Communists with regard to ruling revolutionary-democratic parties acquires particular importance.... In entering the ranks of mass revolutionary.-democratic parties and carrying. out daily work within them, Communists revolutionise these parties.... "But entry by CP members into a ruling party is likened by Communists least of all to dissolution within it. On the. contrary,, they strive to raise a mass revolutionary party to the level of a conscious Socialist vanguard, to a close-knit union of genuinely like-ninckd peoples It is natural that in doing this they have to rely mainly on the left.4dng., more revolutionary elements and overcome the resistance of right-wing., nationalist elements.... "The only way of putting an end to ideological pressure on the party by elements hostile to the spirit of Socialism means of periodically purging its ranks of alien and casual elements." The book raises two basic possibilities for Communist takeovers in Africa: firstly, "revolutionising" ruling parties from within by creating "close-knit union(s) of genuinely like-minded people" who proceed to purge their opponents, and secondly, opposition from outside the ruling party: "Making use of the experience of more mature Communist and workers' parties,, African Communists are striving to master different forms of struggle for the basic interests of the workers--from peaceful and parliamentary armed order to be ready for any change in the political situation" Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 TIME CPYR'bAfust 1971 The Sudan in midsummer is an Oven of a land where ternpcraturea soar to 120? day after day and tempers tend to get even hotter. Since he~ took pow- er 26 months ago, Major general Jaa- far Numeiry, 41, leader of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council, has faced eight attempted coups, most of them during the summer months. Last week members of the army elite that gov- erns this equatorial nation of 15 mil- lion staged the most confusing hot- weather spectacular since it won in- dependence from Britain 15 years ago. Inthespaceof?a few, days, rebellious of- ficcrs toppled the government, impris- oned Numeiry, were top led themselves and, as happened in Morocco only a week earlier, were summarily executed. The initial revolt was bloodless, but the countercoup was a running battle that littered the streets of Khartoum with dead and crowded its hospitals with wounded. Though the fighting was confined to the capital and to Om- durman across the Nile, the repercus- sions rippled far beyond the Sudan. The Soviets quickly supported the dis- sidents and were noticeably distressed by Numeiry's countercoup. Libyan Leader Muammar Gaddafi, %the hotspur of the Arab world, barged into the in- ternal problems of another nation for the second time in two weeks: He was more effective than he had been in Mo- rocco, however. By forcing down a Brit- ish jet and kidnaping two rebel leaders, he took much of the spunk out of the anti-Numeiry, forces. Mohammed and Marx. In Khartoum, the principal leader of the coup was Ma- jor Hashem al Atta, 35. Atta and two other Communist sympathizers had been booted off the ruling seven-officer Rev- .olutionary Command. Council by Nu- meiry last November, ostensibly for leak- ing state secrets. Atta, supported by the presidential guard and an armored diyi- sion, skillfully directed the takeover of Numeiry's hea4lquarters and Omdurman radio, which proclaimed that "democrat- ic Sudan has been established." Atta named Lieut. Colonel Babakr al Nour, 37, to be president of a ,revolutionary council, and himself vice president. The rebels, he said, wanted lower liv- ing costs, freedom for Communists and trade unionists. and autonomy for the iron-Moslem rebels of southern Sudan, who have been in revolt ever since inde- p nde idd (TtMtlt, Nitfth 1), Alta wee r o: unforced not only by elements of the Su- dan's 26,000-man army but also by the nation's Communist Party. With 6,000 active members and the support of 200; 000 trade unionists, it is the biggest and most vigorous in the Arab world, large- ly by virtue of its skill at getting Marx and Mohammed to coexist (verses from the Koran are chanted in unison at party meetings). Though he is a leftist, Numeiry is an intense foe of the local Communists-partly because they op- pose his plan to link the Sudan in a fed- eration with Libya, Egypt and Syria, and partly because he is convinced that they want to undermine him. Communist Leader Abdel Khalek Mahgoub wisely kept out of sight last week as sym- pathetic army officers mounted their coup. But there were reports that he mas- terminded the coup from the Bulgarian embassy in Khartoum. Abdel Khalek's brother, Major Mo- hammed Mahgoub Osman, however, was quite visible. Along with Nour and Ma- jor Farouk Osman Hamadallah, he was in London when the coup was staged. Alerted that it had succeeded, the three officers and their aides boarded a BOAC VC10 bound for Khartoum, Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Khartoum airport was closed, but Atta announced that he would open it for the VC 10.' One for the Road. The plane was moving into Libyan airspace and mon- itoring Malta air control when the trou- ble came. Captain Roy Bowyer heard Benghazi break in and order: "You must land at Benina Airport or we shall shoot you down." Some passengers said they saw a fighter buzzing the plane. With 109 passengers aboard,. Bowyer was not inclined to take any chances. Nour agreed to give himself up. Ac- cording to London Daily Telegraph Cor- respondent Brian Silk, a fellow pas- senger, Hamadallah summoned the first- class steward and said: "Libya is a dry country under Gaddafi. We'd better have another whisky while we can." When the plane landed in predawn darkness at Benina, it was met by two se- curity men and a soldier. After a ten- minute conversation with his welcoming committee, Nour told the pilot that he was getting off. Asked Bowyer: "Are you leaving of your own free will?" "No," answered Nour. "We are being forced." He disappeared along with Ma- f1or Hamadatlah (for unknown reason , Mahgotab watt not removed from t plane). Shades of Indonesia. Soon thereafte troops loyal to Numeiry moved out f barracks, and rifle and cannon fire roar through Khartoum and Omdurman. T battle was short but intense; Numei later announced that as the countercou began, 30 of his officers and men we captured and slaughtered by, rebel so - diers. One U.S. Marine was wounds at the American-interests section of t Dutch embassy-the old American e - bassy before the Sudan severed rel. - tions following the 1967 Middle Ea ft war. From an embassy window, a U-1. diplomat saw the bodies of some 15 c - vilians sprawled near the presidents I palace. Before Atta's forces lost t radio station, they broadcast a final me sage: "Hold on to revolutionary gas by the skin of your teeth." Then th radio fell silent. When it returned t the air, the first message was: "N meiry is alive and well." Three hour; later, a weeping Numeiry appeared o TV and radio. Into the streets of Kha toum for a celebration poured many the people who earlier the same da had taken to the same streets in a si ilar demonstration for the rebels. Numeiry moved swiftly once he ha regained power. He telephoned Gadda to thank him for his help, and a nounced that "I am in complete co trol." He sent a similar message t Egypt's President Anwar Sadat, wh was probably considerably relieved th he would not have a Communist-or ented regime on his southern flank. Then Numeiry set about the husines of revenge. "Arrest every Communist, he told the Sudanese. "The Communist are traitors." Whether that order woul lead to an Indonesian-style slaiightc was uncertain; in any case, the gov ernment was taking care of its special en envies. Numeiry established four tribu nals for speedy justice. Atta and thre other rebel officers were shot the flex morning; other executions followed Nour and Hamadallah, who were de livered to Numeiry by Gaddafi's aides may also die. Like Jordan's King Hus sein (see following story), the Sudane leader was using strong measures to con soiidate his power. Like Hussein, h May' be setting in motion forces the could prove difficult to control. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001 b6 5 Approved For,Re,lease 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 TIME CPYF~C '}qust 1971 MIDDLE EAST Revenge in the Sudan Egyptian President Anwar Sadat felt impelled to intervene. He telephoned Su- dan's President. Major General Jaa'far Numeiry, in Khartoum and offered, a hit of advice: spare the life of Shaj'ie Ahmed Sheikh, secretary-general of the Sudan's federation of trade unions, win- ncr of the Lenin Peace Prize and a lead- er of the Arab world's strongest Com- munist Party (6,000 active members). Coolly, Numeiry said he would have been delighted to comply with the Egyp-, tian request except for one , thing Sheikh had been hanged two hours' before the telephone call. Sheikh was one of three top-echelon Communists and eleven Sudanese army officers executed last week. Numeiry was taking bloody revenge for the.iin- successful revolt attempted the week be- fore by Communist-oriented Sudanese army officers (T;Mr., Au j. 2). In the `pro- cess he was virtually declaring war on the Communist Party., "There will, he no, more Sudanese Communists wandering around," vowed a loyalist government minister as rpass arrests and summary trials were carried out. At least 1,000 had been' arrested by week's end. Among those executed were two officers whp had been pulled off a British ,airplane two weeks ago by Libyan Leader Muammar Gaddafi and handed over to Numeiry. Lieut. Col.;' pncl Babakr al Nour, who had been fly- ing, home to Khartoum front London,' denied prior knowledge' of the plot ,against Numeiry. Then why had Nour been named leader of'the new tebel gov ernment? Numeiry asked. "Was it be- cause of your beautiful brown eyes?"Unable to answer, Nour Wad led away and shot at the Shajaia army camp out- side Khartoum. Shortly afterward, the ea o - dan's Communist Party was also found guilty of treason, Abdel Khalak Malh. goub denied that he had advance knowl- edge of the plot. Again Numeiry stepped in to play prosecutor. He held up a sheet of paper listing Cabinet choices in a post-Numeiry government and asked Mahgoub if the handwriting were his. The Communist leader admitted that it was. The military court quickly found Mahgoub guilty of treason and hanged him. Russian Protest. The execrations had international repercussions. The Soviets, could scarcely ignore the attack on an important Middle Eastern Communist party, especially since Communism has such an uncertain hold in the area (see box). Moscow officially warned' Khar- toum against what it called "the im- permissibility of resorting' to ' extreme measures"-a hint that the some '1,000 East bloc technicians working in the SFrdan might be recalled. ' To counter the criticism, Numeiry! convened a press conference in Khar=l toum and described the' treatment he' had received when he was held by the rebels during the coup. "It was rep-' rehensible," he said. "I went to the toi- let only once in four days when I absolutely insisted on it." Then Numeiry put the onus for any breakdown in're- lations on the Russians. "if they want to choose that path, we will have no al- ternative.", Numeiry said-which could mean he may beat the Russians to the punch by expelling the 'adv'isers before the Kremlin could order them to re- turn home. Tripoli Summit. bqq the midst of, the furor over events in''M Sudan, Libya's Gaddafi decided once again to' project himself into the Middle east spotIigbt? He called , together an' h st#itt Arab~stuttt- mit in Tripoli '*It@t a We, * ive guest list. The ree Arab rngs- Morocco. Feisal of Saudi Arabia and Husnain of Jordan-were snubbed. Gad- daft scorns them as too eonservat.ive; moreover, his primary reason for the summit was to discuss Hussein's hard at- tacks on the Arab guerrillas who have long used Jordan as a major base of op- erations. Iraq, everybody's odd man out and the only Arab government to sup- port the Sudanese rebels, was also ignored. Only four of the nine leaders who had been invited showed up. Hussein, sarcastically thanked Gaddafi for "the invitation which I never received" and prayed facetiously that "God may di- rect you on the right path." Sisco in Israel. The disorganized Arab situation was tailor-made for the Israeli government, particularly since U.S. As- sistant Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco arrived in Jerusalem last week for further discussions on the moribund Suez peace proposals. The Israelis ar- gue that with the Arab world in tur- moil. this is no, time to sign a peace agreement with Egypt. Sadat reinforced these arguments by delivering a mil- itant speech promising to break the im- passe before the end of this year with "Political and military" steps and ex- pressing his willingness to sacrifice 1,000,000 men in the effort. If Sisco is not likely to get any- where with his peace proposals, neither are the Israelis with their request for up to 50 more U.S.-built Phantom jets. Washington; fears afresh arms delivery would: wreck any, chance, of a Suez set- tlement. As. one. U.S., official said ,last week,.the Suez proposals are " re- maining diplomatic thread" in the Arab- hruli conflic?. Approved For Release 1999/09/0%: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 CPYRGHT ' 'T Arabs v. Communists:' Thanks gut'No Thanks O"OAIRO is Moscow's foremost client in the Middle East. Yet during the I rief period, two weeks ago when it. okcd as if the Sudan might fall un- er the control of a pro-Communist re= . ime, Egypt's leaders moved swiftly to. revent that from happening. They air- ifted some 2,000 Sudanese troops from ositions along the Suez Canal to Khar- oum to ensure the success of General umeiry's countercoup, flying them here in Soviet-supplied Antonov trans- orts. According to a Cabinet Minister rom neighboring Libya, both Egypt and Libya were preparing to intervene if he countercoup failed. i Thus, once again, a seemingly par- doxical fact was underlined: although the Soviet Union enjoys growing in- fluence in the Arab world, there is strong and sometimes savage resistance toward local Communism. The Soviets have supplied billions in aid to "revolution- ary" Arab governments. They have re- ceived lavish expressions of friendship as well as vital military facilities in re- turn. But they have never been able to in- stall a pro-Communist regime in the area. There are Baathist radicals in Syr- ia and Iraq. and Socialists in Algeria. Egypt, Libya and southern Yemen. But Communists in power? Not a one. That has been true from the first. In the early 1920s, Moscow was on ex- cellent terms with Turkey's Kemal Ata- tiirk. But this did not prevent Atattirk from killing off the leading Communists in his country. Egypt's late Gamal Ab- del Nasser accepted Soviet money, ad- vice and, in some areas, decision-mak- ing. But in 1959 he clapped hundreds of Communists into prison. Throughout the Middle East, the Communist Party is legal only in Lebanon-and, ironically, Israel. 'in Sudan, where it is technically banned but has operated openly, its con- tinued existence is now threatened. Superficially, most Arab states look like perfect targets for Marxist-Leninist exploitation. They have been in a state of constant upheaval for most of this century. They are desperately poot. They" are alienated from the West. Having failed to wrest 'victory from Israel, they have become alarmingly dependent on' Soviet military help. ,Yet the region is not sufficiently i~nd,rstrializer( to support a classic, Russian-style proletarian up- rising, and the illiterate, fatalistic, fel- lahirrof the villages are too conservative, too steeped in the concepts of familial loyalty and the Islamic . faith to become conscripts in a Maoist peasant revolt. ' "What is happening it} the Arab world," former U.S. Ambassador to Cai- ro Raymond Hare explains, "is not a rev- olution but a revulsion." It is a re- vulsion against foreign domination, whether cultural, economic or political -and even unsophisticated Arabs rec- ognize that Communism is a foreign import. Arabs still dream of the time, twelve centuries ago, when their fore- bears dominated a vast sweep of Eu- rope, from the banks of the Indus to the valley of the Loire. They might use Communist help in hopes of restoring that glorious past, but they are not like- ly to accept Communist suzerainty. 0 In recent years. a seemingly endless round of Arab military coups has pro- duced major changes in the power struc- ture at the top level of many countries. But the social structure has remained vir- tually intact. It is a conservative struc- ture, rooted in the family and the tribe. Nationhood is a more recent concept and still an uncomfortable one; the Arab had long been accustomed to thinking smaller (the family) or larger (the Arab world, a supranational notion). Politically, the Arabs do not accept even the concept of multiparty gov- ernment. In most Middle East nations, there is no room for a loyal oppo- sition; the terms are mutually contra- dictory in a society where "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." The idea of an opposition party committed to Moscow rather than Cairo or Tripoli or Khartoum is totally unacceptable. So far, the type of government that Arabs seem to feel most comfortable with is an autocratic one, preferably mil- itary. "Arab politics," comments Leb? anese Political Scientist Elie Salem, "has always ridden on horseback. Salve on Is expected from the army." Ha ng saved a country. . the army is loaf to share power. Even if the rebellious of- ficers had 'won in the Sudan two w s ' ago, outside observers believe, t ey would soon have,turned on the C m- munists who gave them support. Looking at "the dysfunctioning of Arab society," Beirut Social Psyc ol- ogist Halim Barakat says: "Men alien- ated from established orders have al- ternatives." Barakat suggests three al- ternatives-revolution, withdrawal nd resignation-and notes that only the cc- ond and third are acceptable in Arab ul- ture. Revolution against a govern nt is one thing: against the traditional st c- ture of society, it is quite anot er. Islam has much to do with such at- titudes. Religion alone is not strong enough to withstand Communism if th- er conditions are right; Catholic C ba and Confucianist China demonstr, ed that. But Islam has a permeating is- cipline in Arab culture that shapes ol- itics and unites even dissident lea crs like Libya's Gaddafi and Saudi Ara a's King Feisal. Gaddafi subscribes to he same simplistic explanation of the ew order offered by Nasser before his de the "The reason that Arab socialism is if- fferent from Communism is because ur socialism believes in God while C m- munism is atheistic." 0 Every day 90 million Arabs intone the word inshallah-God willing. I is Allah who will reform society, no a Brezhnev or a Mao, and the typ at Arab has little enthusiasm for tinke ng with changes himself. A famous Arab ex- pression is "Bookrah flu mishrrri. i," which means that the apricots will be blooming tomorrow; it indicates a ,a- irana attitude rivaling that of even L tin Americans. In such a culture, C m- munism has slim chance of succeeding. Understanding this, the Soviet Un on up to now has been willing to sacri ce one Arab Communist Party after p- other in return for broader geopolitical gains. It is a cynical trade-off, but iv- en the attitudes of the Arab world, i is the only deal available to Moscow. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Approved For ReaI a 9/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00030007000'1-6 WASHINGTON POST .25 July 1971 The Iris and Outs of Su rt ;' 't'he countercoup In audato,,returning to power' DO SO'ynar.otd ruler, Colonel Qadhefl, a paaaionat o general who had been kicked out three days pan-Arabist whose hatred of communism rises dl rifer, makes it hard to take Sudan very seriously rectly from the Koran, forced down a BOAC air tf her as a country ready to tackle the misery of ' liner carrying two anti-Nimeri leaders back t It own people or as one capable of bringing Influ, Khartoum from London, and kidnaped them. The e ce to bear on the broader regional scene. Osten extent of Colonel Qadhafi's other services for his sl ly, the' man who Is back In, General Nimeri,, Sudanese protege can only be guessed. 'As the late le ned to Egypt and the officers' who are now out Gamal Nasser demonstrated, pan-Arabism provide (a me were quickly executed) leaned to commu- good Ideological cover for suhh Intervention. A ni m. But actually It seems gratuitous to ascribe any, rate, Libya's success in helping to engineer a m ch importance to' any public positions taken in change of government In Sudan Is certain to raise K artoum. j :.Its prestige In the 'Arab world, and to heighten its olitics there consists of the maneuvers o a.few' leaders' arrogance,, too. p pie, a good many of them evidently anipu-' Libya's Prestige in the Arab world, doubtless will Wed from the outside. It Is the curse of m ny poor , be further raised by Its pulling of the British lion's co ntrles suddenly overtaken by the pres ures, and tall in respect to the BOAC plane forced down at an idles of the 20th century that they c nnot field Benina 'airport. Britain quickly protested the act a cal "government" in the sense of a apparatus as. "outrageous" and "inexcusable." But Britain ' th it reaches throdghout the country and tries. to. follows France in its general policy of accommodat- ge things done. Sudan, with 15 mi 'on disparate Ing the Arab states, where its oil and money are, ci zens scattered over an immense million-square' and currently London Is trying to sell more arms ml a territory, suffers from that urse more than ' to Libya. These considerations probably will prr,- m st. s-..tests n __ a_ __ t it ven d ven s from being CPYRGHT ibya's role in restoring Gen ral Nimeri to office seriously pressed. In any case, no satisfaction the Is more Interesting than t restoration. Unlike British might now receive will alter the practical Su an, Libya has a very s all population, Immense effect of Libya's strong-arm Intervention in Sudan, oil reserves and revenue and a strategic location; where the Ins, who even outs for a day or so, are th to differences expl why It cannot be ignored. his again-rand all the real problems remain. NEV YORK TIMES 2 8 July 19 71 CPYRGHT Esc j e Arab world to a group But the vehemence of General Nimeiry's reaction, an 0 visiting Americans last year as "a very large area close the strong support he has received from Cairo an t our borders which cannot be controlled by any power." Tripoli, indicate the depth of anti-Communist feeling eve Events of the last few days in the Sudan should bring . ' among Arab leaders who have been labeled as "progres 11 me the wisdom of that observation to policymakers sive" in Soviet terminology. Intimations of subversio i the Kremlin who appear once more to have allowed in the Khartoum affair, following on the heels of th eir Ideological ambitions corrupt their political judg- recent attempted takeover in Cairo by pro-Soviet ele eat. General Nimeiry's harsh crackdown on local Corn- ments, should impel General Nimeiry, President Sada unists suspected of masterminding, from the Bulgarian and other Arab leaders to re-examine the "fraternal con E nbassy, last' week -'s military coup In Khartoum casts a tacts" with the Soviet Union which have inundated thei s adow over Soviet ambitions not only in the Sudan countries with Soviet aid and advisers under the decep b it throughout the Arab world. tive guise of anti-imperialist (Israel) solidarity. The abrupt suspension of the public trial of Abdel The Russians in turn should recognize the limitation K aliq Mahgoub yesterday after a prosecution witness that Islamic tradition and modem Arab nationalism plat r (fused to confirm charges against the Communist party on any attempt to forge Soviet hegemony throughout th c let may deprive the world of any clear evidence of Middle East In the fires of the Arab-Israeli conflict. mmunist collusion in the Khartoum coup. It Is in fact legitimate Soviet Interest in the stability of this "ve b rely possible that the Sudanese Communists and their large area close to our borders" would better be serve 'Viet friends were actually Innocent, though of course by policies romotin peace between th Arabs an i ereste l1 eq I~ 4~H/A /~0@ : CIA- s7%? Eh"Qi a0QQ7A61&U Volution i iitical u Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6: CPYRGHT CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 28 July 1971: Glum ms,m and the Arb world Sudan's coup and countercoup and the resulting anti-Communist witch-hunt point up once agai the fact that commu- nism has only a very limited ideological base in the. Arab Muslim world. Small Communist parties exist but most of them have to operate clandestinely. Some of the leading so-called Arab radi- cal countries, such as Egypt and Algeria, accept massive military and economic aid from Communist Russia and the pres- ence of hundreds-in Egypt's case thou- sands-of. Soviet advisers, but they do not want communism operating as a po- litical force within their borders. Hitherto. the Sudanese Communist Party has been one of the strongest and most active in the Arab world drawing considerable support from intellectuals and trade unions. Now the reinstated President Nimeiry is rounding up both Communists and suspected Communists mercilessly in the aftermath of the short- lived coup. President Nimeiry's massive retribution has brought forth an angry condemnation from Soviet Russia, which has given Sudan considerable aid, both military and economic, with the usual accompaniment of advisers and technicians: Some observers believe the military offi- cers who led the coup were prompted as much, if not more, by strongly national- istic and anti-Egyptian feelings as by left- ist leanings. But they certainly had Com- munist support and, had the coup suc- ceeded, Sudan would have become the first. Arab country to have a Communist- oriented government. This danger explains why Libya's young revolutionary leader, the strongly anti- Communist Colonel al-Qaddafi, intervened directly in the Sudanese crisis and kid- 'napped two of the rebel leaders from a British airliner. President Nimeiry appears to enjoy con- siderable popular support although he has no broad political power base in Sudan. Last year he crushed what was said to have been an attempted coup by the An- sar, one of the country's two great Muslim sects - the Ansar's religious leader, imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi, was killed in the fight- ing. This action alienated a large section of traditional, conservative opinion from Nimeiry. The result has been that he has had no effective counterweight on the right to balance the leftist forces which staged last week's putsch. And it helps to explain why he has dealt so harshly with the leftists now and why he has turned to Egypt for support. Hitherto Nimeiry has resisted pres- sure on him to join the planned political federation of Egypt, Libya and Syria, but he may feel compelled to go into the club now since both Egypt and Libya have helped him over the crisis, even though this would complicate still more his al- ready tenuous relations with the non- Arab southern Sudan. In the current context the dilemma for Soviet Russia is an acute one. To maintain its present gains in the Middle East it must continue to back Arab revolutionary regimes which are essentially anti-Com- munist. For interests of big power policy, it thus finds itself obliged to stand by and watch while loyal pro-Moscow Commu- nists pay with their lives for their part in the abortive Sudanese revolt. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 NEW YORK TII+ES 28 July 1971 CPYRGHT By RAYMOND H. ANDERSON Specter to The New York Times CAIRO, July 27-A dream of uniting the Arabs from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf has long been a .guiding mys? tique of Arab intellectuals, yearning for the lost grandeur ,of Arable civilization a thou- sand years ago. Seldom, however, has the mystique of Arab unity looked so hollow, and recent events in 'News the Arab world Analysis have underscored the impression that absolute unity of the 100 million Arabs isl probably an unrealizable ob?4 jective. For modern political leaders,) such as the late Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt.) Arab unity' has been. viewed largely as a weapon to regain) Arab dignity and power after long domination and division by foreign conquerors. Efforts toward such unity may have been' renewed fol- lowing last week's communist. ' ra r New Effort Toward Goal Seen Since Coup-In. Sudan munist rebels In Khartoum. Spearhead of Assault. In a swift and well-executed operation, aircraft of Libya and Egypt flew Sudanese troops froQm~ the Suez Canal front to abase outside Khartoum. The troops spearheaded an assault that routed the rebels and re- stored Premier Gaafar . al? Nimeiry to power. The success of this action 1cast a new light on the pro- jected federation of Egypt, Libya and Syria, in September, which General Nimeiry has vowed to join in January. The federation's statutes provide for Intervention against disorders and uprisings in any of the member countries, a threat that can be expected to `cool the ardor of dissidents to seize power. The. swift execu- tions of. the leaders of the coup.i.M the Sudan have demon-I strated the penalties of failure. Unity of 'Arabs A o combat Communism was, stressed' over the weekend by the, Libyan Minister of Interior. Maj. Ku- weildi Hamidi., etat in the' "The Sudanese mutineers! oriented coup d Sudan, crushed within 72 are traitors and agents of hours, in order to provide. Pgktng and Moscow, and. this common defense against a new is the case of Communists all Intruder in the region--Com- over the Arab world," he. said. munist ideology. "Arabs must dedicate their Last Friday, President Anwar sincerity and loyalty to the el-Sadat of Egypt deplored the Arab nation and not import l"co npleto disintegration" of Ideologies such' as, Commu? Arab unity and underlined the nism." complaint by accusing King 711is was perhaps one of the Hussein of Jordan of deceit in few utterances by a member starting a military offensive of the Libyan revolutionary re- which deposed King against Palestinian guerrillas gtme , while at the same time voicing Idris nearly two years ago, that !assurances of abiding by agree- could be approvingly echoed bye ments for a coexistence ore- King Faisal- ' of Saudi Arabia the Jordanian h and other Arab . kings and :tween ,ties and the guerrillas. sheiks. But In the same speech, Mr. j The major pitfall for Comrru? Sadat praised one of the rare 11 nists in the Arab world, is it Instances of effective Arab tion of Egyptians, Libyan and Sudanese to oust the Com- this at intervals in Egypt, Al- Outspoken acclaim by Liby ' geria, Iraq, Syria and, most re- cently, the Sudan. Communists also stir hostility and suspicion among Arabs by their espousal of atheism. Be yond that, Communism is looked upon with dread byl most middle-class Arabs, fear- ful of seizures of land, villas and shops. The Arab-Soclallsm founded by Mr. Nasser and adhered to by Mr. Sadat, Col. Muammar el- Qaddafi of Libya and Premier !Nimeiry proclaims fealty to Is- Ilam, condemns class warfare and guarantees rights to per- sonal property and a private Isector in the economy. True unity has proved Im- possible to achieve among 14 Arab League countries with extreme contrasts in wealth and development and with some, such as Saudi Arabia; under virtually feudal monar- chies and others, such as Egypt and Libya, ruled by revolutionaries proclaiming So- cialism as their objective. One Area of Agreement The one area of agreement among them has been hostility to Israel. But some. are more hostile than others and the Arabs have been divided on tactics and objectives- in the struggle. Militant countries such as Iraq still shout slogans about destroying Israel, but' Burin w hich the countryhas others, including Eggyyppt and been gknown as . the United Jordan, acknowledge that a re- Arab Republic. covory of lands lost. to ; 2sraetl The gap between Arabs on In the 1967 war and a settle- 'a political level was illustrated Iment for Palestinian refugees by the shocked reaction of the represent the only feasible ob- austere young Libyan leader, jectives. Colonel Qaddafi, at a con- The Egyptian-Israeli cease- 1fcrence of Arab leaders in Ra? fire that took effect last Au- bat when he saw Moroccan st, baiting Cairo's costa 'kgn generals and Cabinet ministers gu g y 'kissing the- hand. of King King "war of attrition," appears to Hassan. have weakened even the over. "Good God," he Was reported 44 strong nationalism and abhor-; 'all unity In spirit, allowing a Te- rence of failing subservient to a sur once of old grievances and Communist power. Arab Com- 'differences among Arabs. munlsts have become victims of s attempt ans of an army group on July 10 to overthrow King Hassan-11 of Morocco led to mutual recriminations and an apparent break in relations. The Baathist party regime inl Iraq, shunned by most Arabs, isolated itself even further bvl withdrawing its embassy staff) in Jordan and closing the frontier, ostensibly In anger) over King Hussein's drive'. against the guerrillas. A few days later, after Pre-1 mier . Nimeiry had regained! power, the Sudan broke rela?? itions with Iraq and accused! !the Iraqi leadership of com- Iplicity in the coup. 1 Sunday. Syria also closed, her border with Jordan, crcat-j ing an uneasy situation for the country by cutting off land ac- cess to the Mediterranean. In deploring the absence. of Arab unity, President Sadat warned last Friday, "If we do not gather ourselves together, we shall never be able to face the ferocious drive by the Zionists." He was addressing the national congress of the Arab Socialist Union, Lgypt'sl only political organization. Differences Are Deep Arab unity, in fact, has been increasin ly elusive since the, late nineteen-fifties, and the proud name of Egypt is being to nave exclaimed, does such a thing still exist in the Arab world, .this* kissin of hands In such humility and submission?" Approved For Release 199910910? CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 ,,,r.,? 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Mt p ogres o T ih T 9 ine 1 e rn, Cane and f t tr K. !'ne ar ' " q 'r Cr 1111 ti tai, " 'awe he K its pnwMr th_''tibortitye t'? s. 1,. ?s till toda. a hoTenain1i. 4 9 ell lb~ 1h the Sucl.IS "at, Toast' Eli fe tico Ljdinht2 t}liinnn?~ivlto m ethtli,~ c'ct t-t 7 `i~itt'the- reeettt"thou livbll' T ei'ti?14dl ds `:edt"-tahet! Gen, :Al rity of y titb e e s owe elle l9r,(; tile ' gY rutrhuliNt 'chnilellge, In, I the N co il+as'li~"iilst'ff~nt,ttiat t!{P ulnlneir?V dissnl,diMaior al!Atta, "ce'to Mr Khaliq: art wxtsjbahnrd and 11s i t t elect - 3i Col. , n1u NUr ??id, bI rrrr~~ I L ,.1 I , : , , I ,t i ed members were expelled from ca 1N'+ clbaltt' 'tb' Netting top `th'e' a11ah from tic Cabinet 19,;ttaNov Four ' ~'Qrrf5 , , ? Y;arlla neltt. . went , 1968 the S44tdaa tYCtnthnlnariist Matc on African ! ember,' wind dr??-ubllfs1ed ?ebs5ttt''a C.,gvernnsent to the extcht of 11Lyn rulorx of tiny,.Cont;rl, dr~ien army of. ce3s ~V~tit for. tlteIrl ro? 9UCl in' ncfucvsn~+ indepen= abofasltln~ t11e"graiiitate. lonetitn- Lt ?,luiitl;;,~,rsn Itho, we,t coact 1of Communist lc,pingsr he didpnot dence tt,,18a6, tile pant, trained In etictes, tvh'cli' had, returned the h1 ~':>,,, o l ,c tl thTm .rlve,7,. Kepi,-realize the e).:trit bt" 'Cbiiitnuhf t prestige P "Id member hip, but still Ct n nett tlst ;. Mr Awadellah, then ~:i t, t{fl t icy hav ~ t1tF3,r inEllttvfiiott in he army. Exact fi- rentaired "bit u4toffielai part,, 'It the, Chief jtlviic~; .111Uccnnte the 0%, F4ih+{ of Crym*ndd(44tt tsd li.gures.are not aveilable,l.but it is 1had.t ciurinF;,-Ccntl~bbli Of a iotrsse- olt?hj of,thn Igtt,,et4 enk_; beaoent an ?1t ,'i . tI rir' i'S` tin h` Ct4ti v" itiunsat said, that at. last ,2. D officers is iidgYnPnt which -vent I'u tylidn culvtonce'these.) I tito$uc{ane.c Irnt are card-hp?tare rills from ly'j3 to 1964. against '"jParlinmentts encroach- ,'~11t'},fi4arl~t~s}SS'++ coU7 of JG1~ ?~ ing niethberi oZ slto part,, whi a In dpitel.or.many , hartlettlps, (1t4 ment on ;undajneni,ai, rights. Ile in t4t1411' 4lict"nett Ic,st' lUtii;, liut'it auite"n' lbtb :1i u and abfdie'rs party contirtt>;ed to grow .asnonK rest ned twhcit {hb Gi4vernment pt mrf11}?,nv~,h?li' , -doubt that the the 2}1,b00-n rn' army have often intellrc isal:;. trac~f urilbni t yttd .defied his rutlni He -vas ap- C nrtsundtit 11Iturdl ?is Ia that t e ext~resaed their leyalty to ? the ev4 t fatntcrs.:At on time it: be- pointed Prime' ''M nister by Gen. fr, `q i.ll fl'', trit' itryd, Iftwtoolc Marxi,tliderlogy. ;i camo'a iprhion ifOr ''intellectuals coup, -, lthot., hit, btay. 196y tr, ? to be,?clubbed Coinr-unist M 9. Thq coup ?lathough 1q did not stay t i t"'t ll diremli tt l itta the- pro`SLrO11 LTnit;errlk cc' } 1b~ tli " gprin, ghlice r -;ho Fef{ ~" lie cc, y ?' y IAf Khartoum bpearng 1ana, c 1 r ilt Y;fhh'.111 fsrh11u e 1h9shof 4f} omr ~' ins In ed 'n0 m tv.1115kfAtis IiLMut ?sv 'mililuteg to r1'he Comc stlni,,t' Party of Sudan :ur3)s of lly' 1>i ?a' 1a lad 'b fit~l.: 'i(ZI't'' 1,, n- htnc~ 1llrm.l!vholcF P^h,h to tha was born l: Ip15,.tv(ten ~~ir Iche: Cbtit+.kil!4tist1 < 3 f~Clitil! Gin. 'ill :ltinpirv also took six t!r in lie ea!t wl rlkt-is,,cottp. , , And this ~ a did- r a d j gte h r turned rt homed r c 'cr YPus. c?,,(order l tNtl~te c l o s u r a d o f f the c I n { V ny }~' ~Athi;wd' A Salesian ia- f , ~ 4i ttt-0 i cl(=rrs, eel 1 r, ? t relr education In trafro. ?'icy niverssf.y' s i'lt' t}tis $tear because Ittduslrics >vlinit ter mid. Mfr I a~ f# !h 1 t~? (tl f +st ancl' Iv{a n ,. of the un?ohtrolladble !agitation by tong Abu. Isla asl Foreign, itnis- 1t1,';Y C1L4r,11Ji 11 rni~cl.tll ih; 'i+r~}ec trail Cn In ih l l f C cm'ofr the E vn the Fait' y''ftdlil' ~itirillt;` Tlise! g Ggl*tinunb3ts.) ?coup till n.Copn,tynist?? Patty. InI the Four front gc ter,1 They nil ?.,UCjon ttitm 1.ct fulld'nin [hut dayy'berdutae; pdr.Iearlier yye?srs, a great deal of - ~anL~aEEios ty. ( Ff ),as Ru11ta Cltmnlm!nist .witharrtl.dtl f}oodcd In'. Fedc a#io{s ou L,alaotl4 Tt?the ade I trray 'IIc' a roue sb at the e pohti Coedm three ree nr,t ?4s'h4I ss{{51Rcf~trite, , iprgcautton4. S Cojf,1sriI`I irilmuniSt tt, Fvvttt. literature 'p'ile party. the , .' tftc , Leants' Federatio s l -t Wfihesi;' Major allAtta and An 6, I i 1 flit ?tstih of m Uq } the Yduih? ? a , his two frtonci.s, Who,-as Commu- an Witt its headquarters in Khan- yp An n-1 ti IQ t>~is aircraft missiles at Port Sud n. This has not deterred Mosc w from protesting loudly agal st General Nimeiry's crackdown n the Communist party. the Sudan's Ills underlay though It was technically Illegal a' ' xne "1UinBLIUH v! PUVVLcy a Y B -.-f.! -t G.l. i..-. ..9!-e, d th an e l f s e., o bership Is generally estimated o t t C f tt In the hang it ~iMd` PAM Release 1999/09/0? CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 . Iln:I t , III' ' r:I, ? ? I.. ?.1?. : I Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-0.1194A000300070001-6 LINK, New Delhi 25 July 1973 SUDAN Communists Take over T E successful coup: staged by Major Hashim .31 Atta against the' Go rnment of Gen Abdcl Numejri will affect not only Sudan but also the Arab world and Africa. It is the -first attempt by a Communist' Party in he region Id take direct control of 3overnment with the help of a sect on of the army. In Sudan, in fact the party had its secret wing in the armed forces. In his broadcast to the nation, Atta promised radical social and economic reforms and a battle aga st the local and foreign capitalists wh were trying to disrupt the eco- no y. He accused Gen Numeiri of im- pos ng? an autocratic rule on the cots itry and deviating from the true .pall i of the May 1969 revolution which ov -threw the reactionary regime of M lammed Ahmed Mahjoub. he ween Atta and Numeiri came when N meiri decided to join the proposed co federation composed of Egypt, Lib- ya and Syria. This he did at the re suction of Nasser whom Numeiri, ad ired as a great liberator and friend of Sudan, Gen Numeiri was able, co rageous and nationalist officer but he lacked political awareness and fail-I ed to recognise the mood of his pco pl , particularly the leftist elements] wt weild enormous influence on the! misses. The leftists had built him up as a mass leader and persuaded him to adopt socialist and radical measures ant also to move closerto the socialist Co entries. The Soviet Union is held in gr at respect in Sudan because of its c ,stant support to the Arab's fight ag inst Zionist expansionism and its' pt icy to help the. developing coun Ir :s. Sudan's army has been rebuilt wi IS the assistance of the Soviet Union Major Atta was not in Khartoum wh n Numeiri took over power two years ago:, He was Sudan's Military. att. chc in West Germany but Numeiri ha no alternative but to include him an three of his leftist colleagues in the Government. He had in fact come to power with the actiVe help of the, C nmunist Party and his first Coun- cil of Ministers included nearly eight pr minent leftists. 'ONFEDERATION: But the breach which has also trained a large number of its officers in modern warfare. Nu mciri did maintain excellent relatib'ns with the socialist countries but 'he tried to emulate Nasser in his domestic policies which proved his undoiug?. He thought his friendship with Cairo and Moscow had proved his position as a socialist, and :thus he was free to curb the real leftist elements in his country. The difference between him arid Nasser was that while the Egyptian revolution was entirely Nas- ser's own, Numeiri owed a great deal to the local Communist Party . COMMUNIST PARTY:, Sudanese Communist Party is the largest and most well-organised leftist force "in whole Africa and the Arab world. It began functioning secretly in the early forties when no other organised politi- cal activity was allowed in the country by the British. It first won over some:. of the best intellectuals,, most of whom were teachers, doctors and lawyers. Then it spread among the students, youth, workers and peasants. Khartoum University, which was the only centre] of higher education Until recently, bey, came the centre obis_ activities where the only, other organised force it faced l was the Muslim Brotherhood. After independence the party, though illegal, claimed- a tightly knit organisations of peasants, workers, students and youth. For a number of years they have been a power to reckon with. DISCORD: Maj. Atta, Maj. Babikr Noor and Maj. Gen. Farooq Hamdalla who are now in power, were the main link between the party and the army. They had joined Numeiri's Govern- ment when be came to power in May 1969. Atta was, then in West Ger- many, flew to Khartoum a few days after the 1969 coup. Gen. Numeiri, who also included in his Council of ,Ministers seven well-known leftists, re fused to be guided by the political readership of the Communist Party. This went against Mahjoub's original thesis, in which despite the army's pre-- dominant position in the Government the leadership had to be retained by the PB and the Central CommitIee. The three officers who now rule Sudan remained true to Mahjoub's thesis. Numeiri's efforts to create a split in the party leadership by giving impor- tant positions to some opportunist left- ists also failed, and, he was alienatcd from the party. The final breach came when Numeiri insisted on joining, the proposed confederation. Mahjoub argued against Sudan's 'entry into a larger group of countries whose political and economic policies clashed with its own, and Where open leftist activity is not only banned but considered 'a crime. Mabjoub feared that his party may lose its identity and influence if Sudan became a unit of the confederation. The three officers, at his instance, opposed Numeiri in his move and. in turn >lrere forced by him to quit the Government. This brought the Communist and 'non-leftist factions of the army into an open clash. Nun- meiri banned all leftist activities and arrested a large number of Communists, including Abdel Khaliq Mahjoub. He declared that. he. would "crush and destroy" them if they blocked Sudan Joining the confederation. As Numeiri lost his balance, Khartoum buzzled with rumours about the- possibility cif a Communist, take-over. JAIL-BREAK: Two weeks before Atta's coup, Mahjoub escaped from the well-guarded Kobar jail on the bank of the Blue Nile facing Khartoum. The jailers and police officers detailed to watch him also escaped. That showed the party's influence on the police. Des- pite a countrywide hunt by Numciri's intelligence service, Mahjoub could not be traced. He was only in Omdurman, a few furlongs away from Numciri's presidential palace. And Atta and his colleague kept in touch with him. Mahjoub, who is commonly referred to as the Lenin of Sudan, has thus be. come the architect of the first Com- ` muni:cf Government in Sudan. Both Nool_pnd Atla, who form an effective- team, have promised radical transformation of the country's eco- nomy and a more militant foreign pol- icy. It is obvious that political equations is inter-Arab politic will updergo a change. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 15 CPYRGHTApproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 ? WASHINGTON STAR 2 August 1971 Sudan has never taken too kind- :y to conquerors and colonialists. The E;Iyptians moved in in 1822 and hung on f some 60 years until they and their B itish partners in conquest were ousted 3 Muhammed Ahmed, the tabled hdi. At the, turn of the century, B itish-Egyptian rule was restored for 53 ears when by mutual aeree- alter the coup. Both governments ave been prompt and effusive In their on- gratulations at his success in ousting the conspirators. There is renewed spec ila- tion that Sudan will join the rab Federation with Egypt, Syria and Libya-a federation that the Soviet n- Ion has, until now, given strong sup art. It appears likely that, in the end, the easy y nt Sudan was set free. have been what it got. Numairl, In an Soviets will swallow their anger nd the Soviets took over, , interview with a correspondent o! the ! maintain their ties with Sudan. he boring the 60s , , n ~' with troops but with aid and influ- e ce. Now the brief honeymoon is at an e d and Khartoum has recalled its bassador from Moscow. It's Mos- e w's turn to learn how readily Khar- t m will bite the foreign hand that t eds it. 'Two weeks ago, everything seemed to b 'going Moscow's way. A coup, headed b Sudanese Communists, ousted the p ime rI inister, Major General Jaafar mairi: Some 72 hours later Numairf the Sudanese Communists k b . ; ac s trials for treason were The scope of the Russian miscacula- ideal with the Sudanese, and a reailza on th il d r e , e e fa td and the executions began. The so- lion extends well beyond the borders of 'that Moscow's hold on the Arab co n- Ie , who had held their peace when Sudan. Egypt and Libya were prepared tries is not nearly secure to as-we or Xpra Andat nut down an earlier ra-~ intervene in Nnmairf'a behalf Kremlin leaders believed it to be. WASHINGTON POST 4 August 1971 CPYRGH The Kremlin Comes a Cropper The inner contradiction of Moscow's Mideast policy-its effort to support "anti-imperialist" local governments and, at the ? same' time, the local Communists challenging those governments-has ripened with a vengeance in Sudan. There the Soviet Union had made an important investment In General Nimeri, giving him not only arms and some economic aid but advice if not direct support in his campaign to suppress black rebels in the south. But then the Sudanese Communist Party, reported- ly in cahoots with Soviet operatives, in Khartoum, essayed a coup against General Nimerl, and he In suppressing the coup executed a number of party leaders, including a- Lenin Prize winner. To keep faith with the local. brothers, the Kremlin protested. Understandably, the general took um? brace. Official Soviet-Sudanese relations are Un- raveling and-the future of the Soviet investment is, at best,. clouded. To be sure, for a great power Sudan is not what you'd call a great prize. Its huge but poor and the British, In arbitrarily wrapping its borders around blacks as well as Arabs, built in an abscess which has steadily drained away what potential for development the country may have. Its "loss" by Moscow, if it comes to that, would be small along- side the Soviet "loss" of Indonesia in 1965. Still, the Soviet-Sudanese affair cannot fall to rever- berate throughout the Arab world. Already, to Moscow's deep embarrassment, it has brought Into bold relief the Communist aspect of Soviet policy which Moscow has sought to keep subdued, as opposed to the anti-American aspect on, which the Soviet thrust for Influence In the region has been Approved For Release 1999/09/e : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Moscow revolt against him, let out a bellow of diplomatic rage. ' The Sudanese leader, Moscow said, was' involved in a "bloody reign of ter- ror." Unless the anti-Communist activity stopped, the Soviets warned, aid would be cut off and diplomatic relations broken. __ Whatever result Moscow anticipated from Its angry warning, It could not LondontObserver, expressed his belief In alternative is to place in extreme jeo ar- Moscowr complicity in the abortive coup dy their influence throughout the id- and rev ,eled that he had given the Rus- die East. The fruits of two decade of sian ambassador an ultimatum. The energetic and successful diplomacy I too "false and .unfounded" attacks on his l high a price for them to pay to extra t a regime were to stop, he said, or he would suitable reprisal for the deaths o 14 take "necessary steps to restore the Sudanese Communists. dignity and prestige" of Sudan and its . Whatever the Soviets do, it Is unl ke- its people. And he meant it. Numairi ly that the West-and particularly the has announced that his ambassadors United States-will inherit any imm dl- to Russia and. Bulgaria are being, called' ate benefits. The most we can de ive home and that top diplomats 3rom ;from Moscow's problem Is a sense o re- ' , lief that it is they, not we, who hav to those two countries are to leave Sudan `based. One result is1 to give fresh currency to de-, nunclatlons of communism which have emanated; { , from.. Libya,. these days the ' most ` determinedly anti-Communist of Arab states. Another result Is sons from local disaster that less well endowe and less ambitious states are com(felled to dra Therefore 1 to expect Moscow to Conclude th radical' Arab regimes' are too' unstable and u I to complicate , Soviet, flat tiirl,'`'ils' prineibal Arab ;. grateful to be worth supporting further Is to ignor ?,lw 1u1, >#1111 v, iU i,?Ctt?, It. t, i:uiltt: 1:y tltlcl,,I L-1I1ic 14)1 111lilt 1rt.~ :U l,;tt,l. ji111t' a , g ,, 11 Iteltt itllii ni, .Cll., t ; ,:: lu lt:tt'11~t 1,, lli 1* IS:aICt lo, 1i, 1,t 1. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR CPYRGHT?, August: 1971 ,,,p d'etat in May, 1969. Lessons p and executions followed,-but, the party was Lessons of , history To understand some of the difficulties of not liquidated. By John K. Cooley t9day's Sudan, it is useful to dip into recent In 1963 the Iraqi Baathists accused the Arab histotty, which tends - to repeat itself, Bulgarian embassy of helping the om- in short cycles. munist plotteri:'"Egyptian journalists fr' and- Beirut, Lebanop Back in 1958, the late President Nasser l ly to General Nigteiryr made the s me Sudan's newes't' arlti-Cordmilhitt' Mtge `fa of Egypt reluctantly accepted a fec~eFal charge against the Bulgarian emboss in my the latestt pisodt in a 'kind of serialized'?n on with the anki?Communist 4rian Gov- Khartoum ii1 the Communist coup att mpt an oi` this month. Just as the events of 1959 and ernment. Rather than be involved' with' hriller story-.'that - has. tfascinated, shocked e nd sometimes,, bored ,the (Arab, world, for experimental he Ifeit was doorhedi to ' failutei 1963 strained, President Nasser's rela ions Syrian ' Co'rhmunist leader Khalid- Bagdash with~,the 'Soviets, so are those ? in Sudan to- early 15 years. ..1 o dislappeaYtd' frdil Damascus? He, turnedi up .day producing a, chorus of accusations 'om This is the struggle between t o Sovi t?rin Peking whr 'he denounced.,~gth.$resi-,Mgscow..and prorMoscQw Communists. asked, ortho&z mind?l kideaste{{''~ G~or i? dent Nasser, and the Soviet i t)n of the issue in S ,'ia, in 1958 or d in unist parties 'and''thcir erietiiie's, th16 Arab` Vp Rp y4 . 1i,,; ,Ano1her,4rab federation 1s atls6 i i8c'ay.'Iraq ~n 959 and 63 is identica' with ore in ationalista dan: the one-party state. I This time- it is,. the projected one'"bi` it y~it, today Su It is a tale lote iwith' surpris+ees And with 1 Libya, and Syt ia, General Nitn' iry11WIn`ttd'' 'ties a`l ' Niineii y no 'like' 1'r~ s' ent Ad enemies saetnnobimes+turnung up as friends. 'Sudan tojoin h, 'the Sudatibae Cbrninunists'Nasser an'd General Katsem' tlhlen. warts a Most of the Soviet-type Arab Comnittnistldid riot,' ;slat' tFieir Soviet fi'Iend's' cAr`efdlly,one-party systenh. The ICommunistr uld artics are ,sma1ll,,,weak,,,iille,gal,,s,nd,,sup,?la,oidedtaking ''any public ;stand;,,an;the.haaive to: cease their own political exist ncc ressed, ever y reg lines rec iviri a gengc?,lisSUe:' r,s a party.,. us portion of S vret aid, like thos in; ypt s Lommunisis 'agreed to do this. ' , Ln 1959, ,,shortly after the, }ft;ght ?{I MF. Egypt, Algei{ia etn Trtact.' For lie' moat aiy 1l3agdash from Syria, Iraqi; ~iftator Abdel Thhy' merged into Egypt's Arab So alist Moscow has eh1 ie4'fectly content to sit' by Karim Kassem,;,who had been imprisoning Union 'its imperfect but- We legal arty, and watch thli'ill?o!rgf;nred! Arabot>irades, Communists, suddenly chaiige'fl'tiactics'."He"though .some , reananed itt concentration originally led,by, Europeans, ?be prosecuted released Communist, leade`r's' 61h& 11lbiy- ;camps just the same. I or persecuted. Moscow's own state-to-state leashed" armed Communist militia against The Communists-of Iraq, Syria, and dan relations 'with the Arab governments im? his other enemies, the Baath (Arab social. never agreed to efface themselves Ii the proved as a result. . ist) party. In northern Iraq hundreds were -Egyptian ori6s. They have continued a woi'-' The Sudanese Communist Party, now ob- killed in what came to be called the "Mosul ried and often underground existence. .jest of a ruthless repression by Sudanese Massacre." Very probably, say the old Sud nese General Jaafar al Nimeiry's forces, is differ- Oddly enough, the same Iraqi Baathists, hands, 'Abdel Khalek Mahgoub and his men ent. It is strong and well organized. Its now in power in Baghdad, but isolated and, feared the imposition of a one party s stem leader, Abdel Khalek Mahgoub, who was badly in need of friends in the outside Arab in Sudan. This would spell the end f the executed July 28 for his alleged part in the world, have been supporting the, Sudanese Communist Party and all its many front July 19 pro-Communist coup against General Communists against General Nimeiry , organizations for workers, students, w men. Nimeiry, was known and respected in ortho? 'In the'' neat episode, in February 1963,; young people, and university graduate;. dox Communist circles around theworld. the Baathists seized power in Iraq and Ignoring the lessons of history, both Gen. What is more, Mr. Mahgoub's disciplined launched a drive to liquidate the strong eral Nimeiry and the Communists in don legions of workers, schoolteachers, bureau-` Ira Si Communist Party, were rigid and uncompromising. Sot ' this 'crate, and intellectuals did much to help 'Three hurAred Cam"Untsts broke a oo: has been the undoing of the Communis , but General Nimeiry overthrow Sudan's ailing 'detention at the Al Rashid military camp r the next episode may not be long In cing. parliamentary A0PFobe FE'S?fitie1flse r19" 1 0 -!ad'10e ' -SMT94A000300070001-6 1?; iallyi' `Egypt, which Clot' only daltlted Gonoral Nih 'a long" ret:ora, American as well as avviCt, tiha itterirs restoration I ,to power buE acttitk111~ ~ol ees , in, the opposite direction.' I ' J01104 goes., 'Libya' 'in' provldink' plan'ea'to starry Sudanese 's9Y "I i I To expect "other Arab' stales tq'conclude tha 1i 1lierk' front Stfei to' Xhirto`u'rn to help out with the' 1 ' goviet support is too risky' ideologically" and restoration. ? litica11y' to bd worth accepting ~s , equally, illusory,, 1 h a ,, ; Fort; heeds' and re son o their own, countries lik Taal 'great power involve in, what ; it,regard; 44 t It aiid?5yiti'a feel competent to Fide :thf),1Co. "a`Crucial tstir a for pgsi don across a. ~rhole?ref oQo,:t1 'Ihilt is 'fl .e 'The will hardly slter their view y r~osirtgle setback in a p ace,as peripheral ,ts.Sudau.,;1;, a olI,yie ,~1 ?e` Genq,al,,Nimeri-fe)l; off the, tiger' can oe ,dlsabling,~ ?is gSeeab~e' as it mailel, One; t , j t i i : t t anti three i days iin i its, belly! before-.h i te s a k c ; , ; , 1 t~ the hal,m r s of great powers' is a cap bi and '3~g'y-psians Syrians will rib a i+ceel, 1. ,1 I It 11, t, Aso Mg bands, and day,in.the gamd."I'he remou u 1 =,b* ausi of tbtati cre; them the tent u " of such states 'n the e o if not Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 DAILY TELEGRAPH, London 28 July 1971 CPYRGHT I RUSSIA'S SUDAN QUANDAIiI R USSO-ARAB harmony has received its nastiest jolt result of the short-lived coup in the Sudan, now bein tamped out in an anti-Communist blood-bath and witch hunt by the restored ruler, Col NUMEIitY. The allianc between Soviet imperialism and Arab nationalism ha lways been one of the most cynical expediency. On eason is the basic contradiction between Communism an Islam. Another is that the Arabs have been inveigled into opening their gates to the onl countr in the w ld th t y y or a . Ms strategic designs against their lands--the neighbourin Russian Super Power. Finally Russia, while prejudicing the Arabs' natural oil market in the West, offers no Comparable outlet in compensation. i Hitherto Russia has taken extreme care not to give offence by open interference in Arab affairs. Thus, although In most Arab countries Communism is outlawed and its supporters harshly repressed, the Russians have sedulously kefrained from remonstrances. Now, suddenly, Tass has some right out with a condemnatory statement speaking Of "bloody terror ... hysterical anti-Communist campaign ilitary tribunals making short work of patriots." Col NuMEIRY's Government is warned of "the danger of the path along which it pushes the country." There was also more tangible Russian intervention. ussian military advisers and technicians tried to stop oyalist troops using tanks and aircraft against the rebels nd some were locked up after encounters. All this will o down badly In the Arab world, especially In Egypt and ibya, where a rescue operation for Col NuMEtfY against he Communist was being mounted. President SADAT' of gyps, a strict Moslem, is even more suspicious of ommunism- -than. was : Col,- ?NASSes, while Col GAfDArL f Libya is fanatically say nothing of the rab kings., .But why is ,1ussia sticking her neck out : fi e Sudanese ' Coillhmnists?.' , S.utei,4 not, in view of hek wn record, because blood is being shed in the suppression f a rebellion:. Chagrin because- coup by Africa s biggest ommunist atij was prevented i i success, at this stage, ould have been an embarrassment. The artswer is rdbably at?'Russia,?,with Chiba Comp tlti for leddtt'shl riP"ttna anmtinist world, could 'xotl,a8'brtjto reth& 'sfleA' Approved For Release 1999/09/v : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Approved For, Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 CPYRGHT HINDUSTAN TITHES 29 July 1971 taidf&idii has worse in store From Madan M. Sauldie? t1fndustan Times Correspondent CPYRGHI- Addis Ab a: Coups in Africa The result was the communist- hers of the ruling Revolutionary. the recent dtsturbnnces hi thl have becom at tiny game. Inspired coup that ousted Gen. Council of Ministers-two of them; country. o seize the Nimgiry on July 10. being Lt-Col. Babaktt Al-Noor ? ,One ne s my too radio, the Irp rt and the Gov- Ne erthelcss, for Nimelry and Mal. Al Attah who, together Southern problem __ ___a ... find the Ioh tR there was no alternative to a 1 with ued ?st lai ey mae y 16 -#-h- -4 4- .4 41- _#' in a difficult situation In the 4on- sk _ - r d ...... .. e. q.yv..- . to ...... that ...e .a vecu. The htr?e m ss of the populn- worth taking. The Communist- the r ranks. text of its southern problem. It' tlon merely nods as It azed inspired radical policies had The Ministers were accused of Is commonly th. that tho spectator of th hectic toings-on. brow ht about ruination of the rebels In the South, mostly rise It Is oft n he mill ark that leaking State secrets and main bans and pauana who sec sc es? coon try's econorhq. Investments slop from the 1~rnb north, are undertakes uc operation s but were dwindling. and foreign l tabling "contacts abroad, possi- mnre often it ! the clvllinn poll espy was keeplnli Offs, .. t . , biy as the recent events showed: getting ? military assistance n is??I that c muse the military to Iu7 witti the Aeathist party In Iraq Israel, and presumably Ort act, oreover, theCr,tnmrnlsts had which detests Egyptian hegemon Uganda wherthousands of , tie equcncy of cmrps become a stumbling, block in the of the.Arab world tied wantedi Southern Sudnnere are livini In; Indeed way of the N'imefry Govern- and now co nl r-coups'-!n Africa ment's gradual move into the I The real blow to the Communo seems to u do score the comple- Arab fold. And, It was the ists was struck In February it is- indeed a fight be cee' mentary c ra ter of the equa- popular feeling thus aroused year when Gcn. Nimelry announct. Chribtians and Muslims Arabs on the' lion hctwr civilians and the aganst Sudan's entry into an ed that his Government would one hand, and Arabs and fri-. reds the. other to Arab Federation that kept Sudan "crush" and "destroy" the Coma cans on the other. ' away ~ from the rubscquent monists and p~urge yalI Commu- Wthln the Arab north too the, in point Is the rregotiatrrns for the Federation fists from public life, He had traditional elemcnts? allearhe dcd' ;r a iarl;est country which comes into being on Sept. argued that it was the duty of his by the Anaars, have been upg where Gov inn rots have changed 1. Government to y regard but not ellminnted. To' hands betty en the pollticions and Impelled by such res.~ures of protest the ctrl, hose elements Gcn. Nime ry military in to na s ce Its lode- the Cnmm hlste on public opi-. ed zenc by against the Communists. terrorism unleash,.! brnnd of soetallsm seems In m?, ~~rr pendence 1 1 Sb pion, the Nlmefry regime cm- pntlble wlih the relative e0 nut all n flit ry regimen with- :bnrked on a collision course. Nevertheless, the Communists, v ntikm of Islam. They still W8 we out except) n, nve tendre~ to en- with the Communists. In October. continued their underground aetl- allegiance to Muslim Prot er?- Nd.tropul g port and._partle!- IND. Gen. Nimelry dropped the ;vitics reicnttesr;l). Only last hood, a movement against w tch' nc as civiiinn Gov- 53-year-old Marxist Abubakr month the Communist Party . Nasser fought throughout, in hit; ration, as general secrets own country. rnments av rested on the Awrriallnh from the post of hts successfully csen]],cdMa from hat oyntty of t t le soldier. But reglni a first Prim Minister. irMnr with the help of a 'cornoral ion Gen. Nlmelry's dramatic c me+t rpither the tvi fans nor the army in Awadallph was accused of in an address to students in duty However, while the Corm . back on July 22, therefore, ncel n the coo ry could ever reps- East Berlin an that the Ctud tnis In monists within the country were: nt:nln brings him face to Ince Ith, rent any c e+ o element.'. th ?~..r~,.-@ ,.r Its till v tar from "coughed;' , Gen) the problems of his country. But' u i R me e a reg ?.L.., 'Communist countibd th .res aroa thanan ever. The regi a o. Gen. Al Nimelry, the ommunist party-Africa's! hie domestic Policies should no% vhich r , automaUcaily affect the friendly-, The army Is critically dlv tc. n o ower In Mny only one-refused to dissolve It- pp C li a ve elements will still, c 1In fnrth(r e broad directive, cceneraall n. sNecretiya' Tiehad d of Ills country with onservn the stand In the way of his "prolrrc ry "Articular' In mi d C 9 end, to n om?r dtwo th y Mr 1Chalck Mate oub, 'O vas arrester.' muntst China and the . SovIC give rev rf. e . R a. n on-Comm Ist It on on. o mm e . It first tt i gaam m and 13 senior army officers with ~ Union with whom, he sal The southern problem wiU1, it n- Communist leaningti were dig- :Sudan's relations have been re time to cause a heavy drppraerec inlt th m d ? the ca tN into rtunlatsho byveemrn?- arlswed, fruitful. the country's financial and b I ' Clo fa resrurcps, white the g meat end stn an to denrollsb Gen. ]~limeiry tvCttt i step Str-I Buts more thengg all this fE wa~~state of Sudanrse et onomy r file. ' missed th eee 8 lasConmunIst~tndm--k Arab IlMltltlc& the., brv'ontlight eat onti late'aril-mWi' m.. r. , .,...... a r a t Jul possa dh And thisition put Sud !n Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 19 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 LE 14W EE, Paris CPYRGHlJuly 1971 Mi(ts 1 DES tr r Les ie ti s a dtre:~-ivr sc i e Uno gravo crlse menace /as relations eritre Moscou of Khartoum aprds los s6v6res mestlres do 'repression. anti-communists adoptees par, !es dlrlgoents soudaneis. Notre envoyd `epectal eu Soudan, Eric Routoeu, lndlquo quo Pon s'oftorcerait ?'de : part' et ?d'dutre d'dvllo, uno rupture totafe. 0 A MOSCOU. oD to compagne do protestation- s'amplfllo, doux 'cents dtudlants orabes oat manifestd ce.loud! 29' lulllet devant ?Pam? bossedo du Soudan eux cris de ? ftadhefl, to es un !Ache ?, ? Nometry 0 AU PROCHE-ORIENT, M. ' Joseph Slsco,. socrdtelro d'Etet edlofnt emdr1ca1n, dteif ettendu leudt' A Jerusalem.-!! bereft portour dun nouveau plat) emdrldoln presenld cbmme uno solution provisolro reels qui pourralt Otte durable. ? slnon ddfinllly?. r9otr' eH oye'`5p6clal ERIC ROULEAU qubira to sort do Noury SaTd Khartoum. I- PAalgrb leg d6nd(Ia? 96n4ral Nometry. L'entretien Be scroll Ios fourri latos occidenteux, no ten, i do four asstntance m1114olre et Oc o- 11 na otflclelles, 11 y e lout Ilev do dbroutd dons un otlmat eregeux. Le ent plus de War quo Moscou rd- mique. Vest atnel qua Pon expll us c ol-o quo loo relations enlro to Sou- reorhneniant de Mosaou euralt 61evd prOOVO Is chassa IPvtdo at'x commu- let Is violence du ton adoptb Per On at M.R.S.S. trovorllenl line uno viva proleatilton contra is ma- ntsles sovdanats. 11 cambia Nouso ertse. Plows apprenone, en quo to faience Toss pour condemnor fee r rot, do bonne source, quo 9o' nr6rp dent sent tratds los conceit- ?disor6tlon observed tusqu'Ici ail' 6td persecutions anti-communtstos Cu el,os, d.I 1 d lobo emt ills ou mnnnceolreI u ant leg lore at bxports eovtdtlques at euralt - diclbo. ontre suites raisons, per un Soudan. El West trOs probable ant d I6- demandb des explications. No leg .sovel d'efflcaclt6. En oIfet, salon oe communlqu6 qul a suncltd Is ibs depvis qu umilli jour. par lo616 g aysnt p a a obl^.nues, 11 auralt uno personnalit6 ? OFfictelte, to Chet dc~rleration, mercrodt colt, du pen rat olqueg tortfes eudannlses d'arrster touts "06 flans detours to question do es ? do I'Etat sovdanats auraft re0u do Nemolry d6noncant le campaign do riHvlb of do raster, daps to ma? voir al is) gouvarnoment eoud anais M. Podgomy un message dons lequel prosso d6clench6o A I'6trengor c tro ' eovoConnall to Kromlln d'avolr !616- Is president dp pr6srdturn dt' Soviet to Soudan. Lo toxic, egn6 par to hot a re du poes1ble. che>? eux co^+mamd6 ou soutonu to coup d'Etat supreme to priait. dune manl&re Cartnins oat ddib cholsl do qullteP do I'Etat, ri comports P adres uno menac ., l d'6pargne- Is vie du prlino volldo edress6o A i'U.R, A. pays. Tows too experts ost-alts= precommuntdte dv 99 Julllet Le gd prossanle, ends Tot is ieo ex sdaur qu9 Nometry 1.. aural! MpondlreAcho? 1 eecrdtnlre g6n6ral de to C.G.T., ptilsqu'rf rappolle quo lea rap its vnrenr rte nnteetos do ministrre,d0 " i'"nquA? ^e 11111n, nn Chnfal El Cheikh. Le gdndral Nemolry Fntro tog Vale dolvent Ettre to des I lntFri9ur on1 M6 mIe Al pled. Oe? Un e -e(etO la demands, r6pondant btu- antvuoment our too intt rots cam ns. message de M. podgon1y i talamnnt quo Moscou pron&t alnsl exctunnt loute In bronce done log till.) tundl. leg correspondant9 des IFlo duronao d'un ? erlmine/ de droll ; affalros Int6rloures sys communl4les sent ~mpOchds ' Solon cart *Ines informations non commun ' ~ Les ? lnMctr6ls eomnluna a eux sum cxorce? four molter ; its no sent plus cOnfirmbes, 1'nmbassadcur sovlgtlqua - LA pr6sldont do to R.A.U.. M, 1lnovet'` crud! At 't, pays sent loin d'dtre n6 it o ios _ _ ._ ._ g g ennktrnncns do emssn nt . ..-__ t El f r? -??- -- -- pro it vcvnvmlquo Ot mal[a nO a on ext'rlcvr, fours !tines thitphontgves putschlstes, to commandant Nnchom former quo P dgorny tut exam ailfnneo avec I'U.S.9., cells dor? 1 do telex nynnt 616 covpflos. Oe El Att.. Plus grove encore euralt M6 demarM6 d'RStsrren t pour eauvnr to niOre pardralt dnorm6menl at log title mC,Credr 25 1Wllot, ?W!) ICs In Min Inuit nnr tar! Ir nrnorla .AL A. n1..tM el V , It w I w ..h ? A. 101,o"Idontet r?~'?.~rl^3 ?^ melt GO 5Q' .VUC3 mIftaires svvtnuquea dens to dt~ro.- 1'Etot egypflan. preeteent nos Infer' s nnyn do I'_51 aul sent 11611 pro, lament du coup d'Etat A en orolro tnateure soudenats dovalt so position coupe. ced'un ntrals en at occ pant )ntra l'o Atrtq o, h Memont dishes - sent ?"ewes do log rumours qul circutent A Khartoum. ' formutb , ragv8 to on sot, Copondan4 nom tli lio ne ne pon 6 arn Iourn vnilsos diniomatlquos A Ile euralent notommont prove lib propro. On n la lose d'ettleuts voPonttaro to cr . L me r r of disposilton dos wtoritds Gouda, q moondonde stabs. La prudence 6mo es, fl so rdservenl to droll e'en 1 Immoblllsellon ? de chars apparte- entendre lot quo to gouvemern6M do M.P.S.S. on Egypto et. po lent. qui n1r61n' Ie contend.Celto mod en Want A un r6glmont Ioyatiste. 8bynilon nnnrotrv+s au Prochc-Orlent depend done uno II ost possible quo cos rumours pdrovoqud ung vivo 6motlon dens no solent pas fondbos, mats 11 est fl^49-communlates prla?9 etD corfalne mosure de to solidi! do milieux diptomatlques, oust blon' slgnlucatit qu'ellea dmanont da ml? $owen? eon implantation damn t'htnto lend vx gb'orlenteux. .Ileux proehos do gowornement A " aunt gv'll?en colt. aprbs eat Opt- soudenats. Tenets qvo so enleux & @ huts t'embassade aovl6fique, qu1 red- bode Moscou euralt. lug6 Inutile de Cost oourquof taros sent gas 0 set- tee IQ proog du eecrOtaire g6nLra1 gamble de plus on plus A un camp Plalder Is brace pour to sect6telre velours A Khartoum qul crolent h la u PA A , soudenats, Abdel Khalek ralranch6, it nest as possible d'ob? 96n6ra) du part! communists Atxlel probebtlltb d'tvto rupture sett foe nhfovb. I'ambessadeur eovi6ttgve - tariff Is moindro Indication A co sulef. , Khatek PRahloub. Les Sovidttques daux pays. Lo detente du g6 Aral pprenons-nave, 4gatement de eovrae Male leg tenetlonnalres. qut, pas aere a m an416 bro aveoldequeN Ios tlyd- gtr'Petry do t no pas A {~er llo too riots Itn dlene de tot - e ex198 6'btro ragu,do so p irais ~0. d'urgence Per "Ap'p~0 Is (dpg ltAeR i 9J1" 6171P90"* de vre pas ten. CPYRGH-ikpproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 I94A000300070001-6 r publiques tag meaure9 vexa ' 1 tros prises ii 1'encontro do ses cos- rtlesanis confirment I'Impresslon uo log daux capttates espbrent en- ore 6vltar rirrbparabe, Copondnnl, las mllfevx' dtrlgennt oudanals re eont pas unenlmoo. 4 ouhattor to mnintien do rolattonei troltea avao Pu'A'S.0, La dreite du. dgtmo - plus forto eprbe Is Itqul. anon . physique des dirigoants do- extr6mo gauche of dos progres. Isis - a'& force de convatncre Ie bnbrai Nnmotry do Changer do cop in potltiquo 6trengbro. ntorrompte. to tache quit West IF109 'de Ilqutder tine foie ' pour touter l'oxtrt!m gaucho dens . on pays. ,Merctedt, Its arreelallons as pour- Ieulvetent tandlo qu'une contalne de ? suspects . ilalent remts en llbert& Dux personnatitds do premier plan du mood- ayndtoal ont 6t6 eppf6- hendoea : N.M. Hal ?Abdel Rahmen, aect6talre gbn3ral edjotnt de to C.G,T.. of Awadalleh Ibrahim. prgsl- dens Is Grand-Khartoum. Is second passatt pour btro Is colioborateur Is plus proche d'Abdel Khatek Mah- Joub. Leers portraits alnsl quo ceux do deux suites mombres du comitd central, MM. Jazoull Said of Soliman Named. sont diffusbe our los dcrans do to tltbvieton of darts In prasge. Ile soratent, dit-on, pendus tous to$ qualre e'lis devalent titre arrbtds. Tout membro de Is direction r6pendus, mOme dens los mllloux nor communistns, o0 I'on fail romarquoi quo les Soudnnals r6prouvent, psi nature. toule effusion do song, Mme Abdol Khalok MahJoub, to veuve du secrbtalro g6n&rai du P.C., It bt6 orrbtoo morcrodi malln. Rn ontendanl A to radio is nouvelle do I'ex6cutlon 'do son maH, else e'btatt prdclpitdo dens Is ruo Dour 'Be nouvoiies arl?'estations Pour i'Instant, toutafols, to principal' cute du gbnbrai Namelry set de p-d. ever on Image de marque do tee-. lot a progressisto . sons pour eutent Les deux hommos e'6talent rdfugl6s dons Is ctandestlnit6. Au total. onvl- ron une quarantalne do dirigeantta du psrtl communleto est, an allot. sangulnalre - of leg ? assassins consid6r6 comme petsonnollement,; Be bell" our, qui nous a recta ou responsable du coup d'Etat du 19 lull. j soul, de Is malson. a dbclarb aux let I A Omdurman. rune des trols a lo?' ucCiuonraux presents t on encore ectivement recherchbs, on m6ratlons du Grand-Khartoum. of ? Rites Poplnlon mondlale quo to particuller deux .membtes du peup/e eoudanata ON tier d'Abdat bureau potitlque du pant comma- guarder populatre consid6t6 commo Khatek. K ,at Mort ft We haute, an mate, MM. Tayeb El Tlganl et Moha- d uneot fief communlsie, lea fldatee d'Ab? -trftent pour ass t:onwctlons mod Ibrahim Nugud. Le Premier titan Khaiek MahJoub plourent to loader reeDeneabte de t'orgenisollon du part) dlaperu. L'Indignatton at r6ocoure- Orin(".' ROtsa tA1D. msnt serelentles IAntlmantsta. plum DAILY TELEGRAPH London 2 August 1971 CPYRGHT RUSSIA 'AND THE ARABS R SSIA'S SETBACK in the Middle East as a result of e abortive Communist coup in the Sudan is easily the rst.since the Six-Day War. Schaden.freude in the West ust be. tempered by the memory that on that occasion ssia. turned the defeat of her. Arab proteg6s into a b illiant strategic and political success for her expansionist editerranean and Middle East policy. She did this party b more than making good, in: an incredibly short time and r gardless of cost, the Arabs' enormous lo?es of military @ uipment. In addition she got away-without. American r action-with h direct intervention in* the war on an ceasing and by now highly significant ;scale. To some extent Russia's troubles, as before, are litany-although less dramatically so-and psychological. T e, there has been no fresh Arab defeat. Rtst there h s been no victory either, no regaining-of lost lands, nor a y early prospect. The best that President SADAT Can o er to keep up spirits is to proclaim 1971 as the year, o decision, 1972 as the year of preparation, inc so on. I this, the Arabs ask, all that the Russians can do for t m, -after inciting them to war in 1067 and letting them defeated? Under the strain Arab divisiveness has ps uced an imbroglio of feuds and internal and external ses unprecedented even in the' Middle East. In this rought atmosphere ! ussia's part in the Sudan affair. has set fire to some of the vast quantities of anti-Communist tinder in the Moslem Arab world. ? ` An open break between' Moscow and Khartoum would gravely damage Russia's position in Africa as well as the Middle East. It is curious that Russia should have risked her enormous investment in the Middle East by standing up for the Sudanese Communists. Never hefm'e liar. the tail of outside Communist opinion wagged the Russian dog to this extent. There are more urgent rtuestlnns. Will Russia try to correct the situation and maintain Arab oyalty by upping the ante, as she did in 19137? She can only, do this now by offering Egypt her full support in war. Or might Russia think that her involvement in the volatile Middle East has gone for enough? America should warn Russia against military adventures. The West as a whale should remind the Arabs of the mutual identity of interest in every field, with special reference to the expansion of oil production and sales. The signing yesterday of the Egyptian pipeline agreement was apposite. Mr Sisco, in Jerusaleln, has a difficult task, Mrs Mr in even more so. She can argue that Israel is winning the battle of nerves. But, at the right moment, she must be, willing to take calculated risks for peace. The parties must return to the Suez Canal discussions With tl renewed determination to And a way, Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 21 1 CPYRGAHpproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 THE GUARDIAN, Manchester 2 August 1971 The :drab way with an y Most developing nations have made the point o the Great Powers at one time or another that terference In their Internal affairs-real or? agined-will not be tolerated. This has been e burden of the message of the executions and. umerous arrests of Communists in the Sudan, (ter the unsuccessful: attempt to overthrow President Numeirl. The Sudanese leader's reaction Soviet and East European complaints about his activities has been to Indicate that Soviet advisers are about to leave and to warn the Soviet Union to end its attacks on his regime. In doing so, he is arguing, on his own terms, that a Soviet- Sudanese relationship should be a two-way affair,' and that It needs the efforts of both sides to keep' It going. This will be seen as relevant to Arabi; Soviet relations as a whole. .-. I The Soviet Union must be disappointed In., what has happened. In giving total support to the Arabs against Israel they should have, been on to a winner. It has been no difficult task for them to emerge In a better light for the Arabs beside the ; United States, seen as the evil supplier of hostile eryalpmont to an aggressive Israel. Tha mood of self-proclaimed revolutionary, nociallst Arab gev ernments should superficially have matched easily with that of the Soviet Union. The anti-imperialist line adopted by most Arab States should have given It a head start. And In strategic terns, Soviet naval deployment In the Mediterranean, and access to air and naval bases in Arab countries along the shore have been major gains since the. war of June 197. Sudan has shown, however, that the Soviet policies have their fratztie corners.. Sudan's decision to join the Federation of Arab Republics (of Egypt, Libya, and Syria) gives Its actions wider significance. Implicit Is the approval they must have. They also confirm a ,recurrent tendency in the Arab -world to deal severely with people suspected of communism ono matter how woolly the definition of this term. ,The persecution of Communists In Sudan also demonstrates that, wiper It. matters, outside powers can have only marginal influence on internal politics. In Egypt, the Soviet Union has extensive control over the armed forces and certain sectors of the economy; This nkturalty' brings with It some general influence on policies.. But when President Sadat had his clean-out .in May in the aftermath of Mr Ali Sabrt's challenge, the Soviet Union. was waiting on the sidelines with... the rest of the world to sec what was happening. could find its echoes. President Sadat's political. reorganisations in Egypt suggest a shift towards' the right, and towards emphasising Islam. President Gadafy holds forth in pan'-Arab.. tones, and. against Israel and Jordan with one hand firmly on the Koran. President Assad of Syria has tangled once before with the Soviet Union when he suspected them of putting pressure. on Syria Internally. Sudan has served notice that, however sympathetic the Arab may be towards the Soviet Union for its help in specific areas, they will react with hostility--even to their own economic cost-- towards any suspicion of interference. THE EVENING STAR, Washington The Sudanese Communists 7 August 1971 As. the Russians are discovering in den, it is sometimes caster to idcn- ti y your enemies than your ideological lends. And the Sudanese Communists CPYRGHT lire discovrrinr to their discomfiture.. 't 1[L~, ' as has happened so mrlny other 'q rtes ,in so tnany other parts of the *id, , the Russians always wily sacrifice local Communist party when It Is nec- sary to do so to preserve the I{rcmlin's , rnteglc objectives. I- fits counter-coup, General Nu ;;!,' has executed at least 14 Commu tsts and Communist sympathizers.. thers art being hunted divan and Ittt 'risoned, iettving the Sudanese Commt>t-" - lit party, the `largest In Africa or the @ y as Egypt will continue to sulipre. it3 ow Communists and to resist Comments elsewhere In the Arab world. And the Russians, as the abatement of their pro- tests about Numairi's action.'; shows have had to swallow this bitter pill much as they did In the late 10508 When President Nasser cracked down on th Egyptian Reds. r" While the Arab leaders still Intend ;milk the Soviet Union for as much milli ?? tart' and economic aid as possibld, th prospects for Arab ComrnunistS in th great are from the Pillars of Iierctiles the, Fertile Crescent' seldom have ap peered dimmer. That. is good news, an It says aatttething about both the mall, CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 WASHINGTON POST 12 August 1971 dan ~, ts Soviet Im NpeeIll to The Washington Post -CAIRO, Aug. 11---Sudan's Ministry of economy has an- nounced that imports from the Fhvlet Union have been sus? pended after Moscow Mlcg? bdly vininted n trade agree- nient. Minister of State for; }vnnnmy Mohamed Idris aiso+ Severely criticized S o v i e t ?rnde methods. -'fiurlan's criticism of the So-' i'Int Union and other socialist countries was coupled with .prniso fnr China and Yugosla- ?vva as countries that, respect their agreements. This is believed to be fur- [her evidence of Sudan's dete< iiorating relations with this' lilviet Union after the unsuc? ressful Communist-led coup ' igainst the government of tresident Jastar iNimert lost .1 Vwnthb ~ r, Arrording to the Sudanese newspaper al Ayam, Idris ac- cused the Soviet Union of levying a 30-per-cent Increase above International rates on commodities it sold to Sudan !under the bilateral trading agreement. . He also charged the Soviet Union with having sold Su. danese cotton at rebates of up BALTIMORE SUN 13 August 1971 CPYRGHT to 10 per cent in Sudan's.tradi. fated agreements to ensure{ tional markets: that discrepancies will not`, Ali,, ., etbnomy ministry, occur in future," Idris said. the Soviet Union bought ' al. most 60 per cent of Sudan's cotton and then sold it to Iiidia and. other countries. Moscow paid 25 per cent In fiord currency for the cotton and the rest in military equip. ment, he said I Idris spoke today of a "new f policy' for Sudan's trade, 'under . ? which the pegple's needs would be Imported from all over, the .world. "We will revise - all? the vto. Sudan Reds Elect New Chief Beirut, Lebanon tai--The hard. pressed Communist party in the Sudan has elected a new leader and vowed to wage "ceaseless underground struggle" to over- throw the regime of Maj. Gen. Gaafar al-Numairy, the official newspaper of Middle Eastern communism reported yesterday.' The newspaper, Al Nida, of) Beirut, said the party Centrai+ Committee unanimously chosen Mohammed Ibrahim Nogod as' secretary general. The paper did not say where the commit.; tee met. i Mr. Nogod replaces Abdul Khalek Mahnoub, who was hanged in Khartoum recently .on charges -of having planned the July 19 coup which General Ne alq vsW ned thw days Meanwhile the Sudanese depu- ty prime minister said today his country does not wish to esca- late late tensions with Moscow. In a brief statement over Om- durman Radio monitored in Cairo, Babakr Awadalla said, "We do not wish to escalate the tensions between Sudan and, the Soviet Union any' further. We desire the normalization of relations between the two coun- tries.'? Relations between Sudan and the Soviet Union were strained ;almost to the breaking point after the attempted coup and the subsequent execution of 14 Communist leaders and sym- pathizers. General Numalry recalled his ambassador from Moscow and asked the Soviet counselor In Khartota to leave. ' . * . j The bilateral agreements with socialist countries were a sen., salve Issue but oni: had to talks frankly, he added. ' The minister praised Chinal .and Yuaosiavla for respecting their agreements to the letter; and announced that Sudan would import $3 million worth of textiles from China. It was earlier announced that a Sudanese delegation led by Defense Minister MaJ. Gen: ' Khaled Abbas will visit i;4 king shortly, Approve For Release I999f09f0f : CIA_aDP79-OII94A000 00070001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 12 August 1971 CPYRGHT Page from mmunis 'maser an By Paul Wahl Soviet setbacks in Egypt and Sudan seem to have been inspired .by Moscow's action' plan for conquest of political power in Africa, Presidents Sadat of . Egypt and The task of the Communists is to use these forces in order to "transform the democratic-revolutionary peoples's patties into new parties of a vanguard (meaning Communist) type.".'This can be, the' book, warns, "an extremely slow and contradic- tory process." political chessboard. the countries where: democratic-revolution ary people's parties either are to power or head a national liberation movement. Such parties, says the book, can become "re- liable detachments of the Communist and workers' movement. But even when they are in power or when they are able to seize, power, other social forces are active on the zama, Congo-Brazzaville, Angola, Portu- clews in Egypt's ruling party sought to do. guess Guinea, and Mozambique. These are.- Only' President Sadat, who, may haw: had their alliance with the bourgeoisie or of siding firmly with the workers and 'peas. "The elaboration by the Communists of Entrance into the party in power should not be considered by the Communists as winding up of their-own party. "On the con. for Its political agents. The edition was kept trary, the Communists must try to over- unusually small in the expectation that the come the 'resistance' of nationalist, ele?' text would not fall into non-Communist.., inents on the right wing of the ruling 'hands. Parties and gain the support of the more The Soviet action plan pays special 'at? revolutionary elements of the left wing." tention to Guinea, Algeria, the U.A.R., Tan.-. . This is exactly what the Communist nu? decoy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., entitled The Political Parties of Africa." The book, which was printed in only 3,700 copies, was destined for Moscow's Africa specialists and r r t o u ons y prop'.. s pa tvs, c book published in October, 1970, under the munists turn these parties toward the revo? auspices of the Africa Institute of the Aca- lution." a Page from the Soviet leXtbgok and applied correct tactics for the democratic?rcvoIU? It against its 'authors. tionary Parties is of Special importance. By entering into the ranks of the democratic. The Soviet action plan is contained in ?a - ..entering 1 t m n? ' t th C 1 knowledge of the Soviet textbook, arrested and did away with the members of the. Communist nucleus inside his party just in - time. In Sudan, -where the Communists formed a coalition party, they thought the moment had come to seize full power. When Presi- dent Nimeiry struck back, he carried out what the Communist. textbook recom? -mended, namely "to proceed to regular purges of elements alien to the party." What the Sudanese President did was to purge the purgers who'had sought to purge him. Through their Pedantry and doctrinaire insistence on giving their agents detailed , "Through their nuclei hnside the demo-, printed. Instructions while underpinning cratic-revolutionary. people's parties the these insf etio'ns "theoretically," the Com- Coenmunists must seek to place these ?' anitni:ts. ha' , been hoisted .by. their owes parties before me alternati" of. continuing i petat Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 CPYRGHT I SOVIET AND OTHER CCCMUNIST MEDIA COMMENT ON SUDANESE DEVELOPMENTS CPYRGHT Ap TASS DEPLORES "REPRESSION" OF CCMIUNISTS AFTER COUNTERCOUP statement on e the "repression" of communists and other "patriots" and-the "hysterical anticommunist campaign" in Sudan following the 22 July countercoup returning Revolution Command Council Chair- man an-Numayri to power. Moscow had reported approvingly, and. in some detail, the 19 July "corrective action coup" over- throwing an-Numayri, TASS claiming that it. was cheered by "thousands of elated people" in Khartoum. And a NEW TIMES article reported by TASS on the 21st had called the coup an "important event in the political life of the Arab world," while a LIFE ABROAD. article, signed to the press the same day, approvingly enumerated the proclaimed policies of the "new Sudan leadership." The terse TASS reports. of developments in the wake of the countercoup conveyed Moscow's unhappiness with the turn of events and its dilemma in having to support an-Numayri, a friend of the Egyptian and Libyan leaders, while he was calling for "punishment" of.Sudanese communists. Initial arrests and executions of leading coup figures were noted only in brief dispatches, but with the 26 July arrest of Sudanese CP Secretary General 'Abd al-Khaliq Mahjub and the execution that day of Sudanese trade union leader ash-Shafi' Ahmad ash-Shaykh, Moscow seemingly felt constrained to make a public protest. Both East European media and West European CPs had already been criticizing the "anticommunist campaign" in Sudan. Moscow has taken virtually no note of Arab reaction to the Sudanese events--either pro- or anti-an-Numayri. TASS reported an-Numayr:i's closure of the Iraqi embassy in Khartoum and the Sudanese embassy in Baghdad "in view of the Iraqi Government's hostile action." But there was no elaboration_ and apparently only the LIFE ABROAD article, signed to press 21 July, acknow- ledged Iraq's prompt recognition and support of the 19 July coup. There was no mention of the Iraqi delegation sent to convey congratulations, whose plane crashed in Saudi Arabia on the day of the countercoup. Moscow has indicated UAR and Libyan stands only by briefly reporting Libya's removal of two 19 July coup figures from a BOAC plane which landed in Benghazi' .by order of the j,ibyan authorities, who subsequently "forwarded" .the passengers-to an-Numayri, and by noting that an-Numayri had had telephone contacts with as-Sadat and Qadhdhafi. STATEMENTS BY The TASS statement refrains from condemnation TASS, AUCCTU of Sudanese Chairman an-Numayri while deplor- ing the arrests and.harsh sentences against "absolutely innocent people," communists and other patriots, charged with complicity in the 19 July movement. The statement he CPYRGHT ~PyrRPHj ? 1 ?449Q03000700 1212 ve For 61A'ape Sudanese l'eadership' is aware of, the danger of the road onto which theS a're 'pu'shing' the dounts'y';" a Iditziatidn dahgerous "for the vety''destidies of the Sudanese national: Ide4nbctatic?'revolution." It als'o' hbpea''thab' the le'adershi'p "i*ril1~1find ,the 'strength" to return to ' the' '154th ' bf cbnsolidati'ng 'th'e unity' 'of all 'national pattrio't'io I fdtced and, baNguairditig' I sUdadss'.'in ~ the ett uggle , against, iffipeAalis~t' and for' Buddzi I's 'soeiai. I prsgress?a "m,,, 1,.1 , ,,,,I ;TASS routinely points to approval by imperialism and reaction of the "bloddj terror "arid 'fanning' of ' Aziticommunism" in Sudan. It ptaisea `tyre Suddzl6se CP's role it atrdngthening ; the country's nati'onal' "dependence Andl'so6ial'progress,'likewise hailing the arrested Mahjub,and executed ash.-Shaykh as "heroib~ sons. of the ?u'darleae iiedple." I?,1 I,, , ]''it .::,, :,I.I..: ,., 1 . Late do'the'26th- TABS' had -carrried ,a''statemezit,,by'theISoviet A11-Union Central' Council' of 'Trade Uniohs (AUCCTU). voicing its "wrathful"cbndei nation" bt the '''murder1!':bf'SiKdanese{ trade union l'eade'r and W?TVI vice' president abh-Shaykh j holder' of a.Lenin eace''priY.e: Hi:#' ekdcfitibn; thel'stittmefit' ~asherta i ,playsi into he''hands''ttf those who' alwsya''sebught"to'?'strike, at the Sudanese, trade"uftidz1is''ungermirie"the uz'nity,of":the' Siidenese' people,,.. and w` eakb'fi `'the'ir' st=ruggle' for, the', country' b' progreeaive. and. de~tocrati'c"@evelopmea4t ,1 1 ,: ??I,, I ,1,,1 iit7ing lied tibettii govetptrl Egjfptr ..,. allies? VVG have ?c^n them movie? a! or?t in th;; stre::ts of :ruira where they cr,l based, flyir ; the Ml-8' F ii?opters ar 1 fi%rng ct us the' -kits 2ri.t 3,,Am of thecc h:!icoptors. We have hear!] the-,, cc nvrtin i,,ating v.ih c::ch other in their tanks'and in their phinzs. We have heard the scretims of Lass iria lri.lot We hav; who p:: cciuli;;d with t5ii,i.r helicot:_,x::~, L:r nrxr t ,ul c'00:; not have tho oil o< ?.r.; .: , t!; chronic cf of our r: , I rc ice arc; s. All w of life is to L ai1iuwed to it. We do not ;c k fors :gin arms. ~: ",y ar pith. A!I ire bc, f:. om the r.;,, of Africa v0d EhN ; a.r!d is flu recognition that we are li.ririnf not animals, and the right, to live as huriau beirit;a. Is this ~.r unill', d_=ad? Your Excellency, who is a peaceful man, m::y question why we do not surrcnrerour arms and co-operate with the Sudanese government. We have rich!, :cd to do so many times. William D-11. 1" illustrious schoh.r and statesman .;hose ti;_, p Lh of c4 op.^ratio:i. Hi w,,is Cot d-:::1 by,: Sudanesa i riy -'m ly afta~ his, el_rrti in in'iooj i ntrr,l'. ni,,s.a is but one of scores of d e r lost talented so1ct1 rners whcac Choice of cc- operai:on resulted ian heir mu ,.J.. z or in:carreration. Among the ordinary people, many have triett. to Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RD 79-01194A000300070001-6 Ap CPYRGHT co=opp?ate. They have been repaid by being slaughtered in their honkies and in theirchurches ana mosques:; One exatnple among thousands, may be cited from a rgcent book"Sundan,.An African Tragedy," by a Norwegian journalist. Discussing a massacre of A -group of dommunicants in a church, the: guthor,dcscribed'vrhat he saw as, "the burueil chap,1, thewoundect, the burned banes and slculls of the 50 innocent Civilians; including Children, mur.ered in cgldblood." This int ident took place within the last six months. The Sudanese.ggvernment and its army frequently announce so called "amnesties" under which the 500,Q00 Southern Sudanese refugeesir treighbouring states are invited to return to the Sudan. Those who have responded to these amnesties have been massacred. The Sudanese government and its,Egyptianand Soviet masters have triedto conceal the true nature' of their genocidal war in the Southern Sudan by saying that the Southern problem is one of religion. This is nonsense. Muslimsr Christians of all denominations and pagans are working together against a single problem: the genocide ofthO Africans in the,.Sudan. Among the foremost; guerilla generals in the Southern Sudan are the Mgslem3, Abdel Rahman Suli and Paul Ali Gbatala. For what crime then are,we condemned to annihilatioiti? Whatever, the crime it must be heinous, beciuse we have paid the fullmeasure, off v e hundred thousand lives for this crime. Is it becaue,`we were born black? Because ae dp not wish to be slave? Because we date to assert 'we are men! Will Africa and the "world forever lookaway'in the hope that we will all die, out and relieve the conscience'of those who pretend we do4not'exist? Or even worse, those, who recognise our existence, 4 butpreteridwe"do not suffer an rie? Wilt no one socak out in oti beh'atfI. If.4gt one African leader or ptateinan raised his voice for us, surely others would follow. But no one will be first. Therefore we must Suffer in a backwash of human misery, relegated to limbo of .despair, until every African roan, woman and child. in th.; Southend Sudann,uo n?~ tter whit his tribe, or religion, "i s dead. Dead froin the .machines of war or the concomitant ho:rers as starvation anddisease. Is there no stareman tq tell the story to the world? Not 4A000300070001-6 just one rdan? Do not forsake us, excellency Bring our case before the OAU and the world. LET US BUT 'LIVE. In the naine of God humanism, treat us like me'n.'FOO +WIi ARE MEN Respectfully ?Colonet,[oseph L agu on behalf of the Anya IVya AEGIS CQMMITFEE -3ft Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Appro d ffjDnvReWAWAR9 A9 i .CAWRQP7R701194A000300070001-6 Uganda's Ties With Neighbors Worsen as East African Leaders Continue to Rebuff Amin CPYRGHT ipeolaX The New Yallo JINJA, Uganda, April 25- Relations between the. Govern- ment of Gen. Idi Amin and sev- eral neighboring countries have been deteriorating rapidly. Altlhough General Amin over- threw President Milton A Obote three months ago in a coup d'etat that was widely support- ed In Uganda, a number of East African left-wing leaders have refused to recognize the new Government. Today the general chanted that Somalia had"spear- headed" discussions among those. leaders of "joint armed action" against Uganda. The general, a towering, mus- cular man who was once the heavyweight boxing champion' of the army, said at a large rally in this southeastern town on Lake Victoria that such dis- cussions had been attended by representatives of Tanzania, Zambia, Rwanda and Burundi. Mr. Obote, who during his pres- idenc had announced policies aimed at moving Uganda "to the left," Is now in exile in Tanzania. President Amin announced that he had asked the Organi- zation of African Unity to con- sider action to end the pro- longer civil war in the Sudan between the Arab-dominated Government and a black mi- nority: in the south. This represented a significant diplomatic shift for Uganda, which is just south of the Su- dan. In the past, th e Ugandan Government has sought to avoid positions that would annoy the Sudanese Government, even though there is widespread sympathy here for the black rebels. General Amin, wearing khaki and a black beret, told the crowd in a stadium that "our brothers are being burned alive" in the southern Sudan. He said the Organization, of African Unity, which embraces all African states except those governed by White minorities, had "kept quiet" about military repression by the Sudanese Government. However, General Amin a so said that Uganda would !continue to refuse to allow $u- se refugees refugees to "engage in hostile activity" against the Su- dan from Uganda. Last week Uganda accused the Sudan of permitting Ugandan guerrjllas who support Mr. Abate to train to the Sudan and of helping1 launch guerrillas make a foray Into Uganda. He has also accused Tan- Wia of allowing gueirilla ac-, t#vity by Obote followers. Also lastweek, General Amin, attacked President Kenneth D. Kaunda of .. Zambia as' "the greatest two-faced double-deal- er -of . our Continent." Prime ,Minister John Vorster of South Africa had said that President Katinda had engaged .in secret diplomatic contacts' with South Africa while publicly attacking ,the South African Government for Its racial policies.. President Kaunda denied any, secret, con- tacts. Repeating the charges today, General Amin saidat -Presi- dent Kaunda had encouraged others to fight South Africa while seeking secret negotia- tions so that "when war comes Zambia is safe and others will be attacked." Such charges seem to reflect General Amin's anger over President Kaunda's sympathy for Mr.. Obote and attempts to deny Uganda's Government it seat in the Organization of Af- rican Unity. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Approved For Release 1999/O9/q f sari 4laR9-O1194AOOO3OOO7OOO1-6 whit,, a. C., Apra 4 19T1 The Stubb~rn Struggle for Black Power in Sudan CPYRGHT By DAVID ROBISON Siseciai to- The Star The night I arrived in Southern Sudan, 80 black guerrilla soldiers were grouped around their fires, singing one of their popular songs: "Three persons Anyanya, killed Ar- abs with bows and .arrows; the rest started running. In the beginning we told you; What ;did we tell you, oh Arabs? We said the birds would eat you, The birds will fly over you, Northern youth; Your country is eaten by vultures." After each song, the soldiers bel- lowed the "Freedom"- cry of Ken- ya's aged leader, Jomo Kenyatta, used when the Mau-Mau were fight- ing the British for independence: "Harambee, Harambee."- The group was led by Rolf Stei- ner, an ex-Legionnaire and former Biafra mercenary, who had entered the bush 10 months'before to try to upgrade the woefully inadequate combat skills of the Anyanya (pro- nounced An-YAHN-ya.) This time he was fighting without pay, since no country cared enough to pay him. The war had entered its ninth year, but the Anyanya-about 8,000 armed African soldiers fighting the .Arab-led Sudan army of 35,000 men-had never been skilled and disciplined enough to make their guerrilla war a replica of Vietnam. Now, with Israel supplying arms to the Southern guerrillas and Rus- sia providing its own army advis- ers, pilots, helicopters and bombers to the Sudan army,, the virtually unknown Sudan war was taking on a new character. I went with this unit when it attacked the Sudan1 army post at Kajo Kaji, close to' the Nile near the Sudan-Uganda border. Of the three platoons Steiner had trained for this, attack, one never even ar- rived at the starting point because its major went off to another head- quarters. His men remained in their base camp despite strict marching orders. The other two platoons marched to within three miles of their oppo- nents, and at midnight left to infil- trate in pitch blackness to within 65 yards of the Arab barracks. I went with the second platoon and Stei- ner, crossing and r; e c r o s s i n g streams and through elephant UUW at Is am. we .ere u ly lost. The guide, an elderly ser- geant, had led reconnaissance pa- trols perfectly in the past week. We learned later that he had relatives living among the civilians at the post. Three Die It was too late to po4ition the second platoon. Promptly at six, the first platoon launched its at- tack, succeeding with'bazookasin burning down all but one of the buildiwgs, but losing three killed and much of their prbcious ammu- nition. Steiner aimed to. U7 s w?*k later, but 19 of his 23 a muti- nied, refusing to fight again so soon and so close to the enemy. They said they were.used to ambushing; left unsaid was that the An anya's uncoordinated ambushes have nev- er hurt the Sudan army very badly. Steiner began again, training a younger group of officer cadets, telling them: "Our time is still coming." But Steiner's time is apparently up. His Anyanya had cooperated with the Ugandan army under Gen. Idi Amin, but when Steiner went back into Uganda for rest, he was seized by President-Mitton Obote's special police and cast inte.Kampa- la prison for three months, without charges. Just before Gen. Amin overthrew Obote in January, Stei- ner was handed over secretly to the Sudan, government, though no ex- tradition treaty existed between the two countries. Steiner, is expected to go on trial for his life shortly in Khartoum. The unsuccessful attack and Stei- ner's capture seemed typical for the Anyanya. The Africans in Southern Sudan seem never to have had much luck. From 1820 to 1898, they were victims of the slave trade. An estimated 2 million Afri- cans from Sudan were carried off in chains during those years and sold in the slave markets of Khar- toum and Cairo. Beginning in 1898, the Southern- ers were sheltered by British rule. The Arabs in the North were kept out for the next 50 years, and Angli- can and Italian Catholic mission Schools "9 it education, Engiis and Christianity to the South. B 1956, however, North and South Su (Ian were merged, by Britain int independent Sudan, despite a armed Southern revolt in 1951, against union with the North. Civilian Suffering During the last 15 years, report of unrest, fighting and vast civilia suffering in the South have failed arouse outside interest. Nineteen-seventy began as the Southerners' good year. Israel be gan airdropping arms to the Any anya in September 1969 and has continued with almost weekly drop of arms .and medicine since then. Southerners walked to training camps in eastern Equatoria prov- ince from all over the South, often hundreds of miles through undulat- ing savannah, bush and swamp- lands. Nearly, once a week, an un- marked DC-3 circled low over the camps in the night. Out parachuted Russian and British arms, includ- ing machine guns, World War II rifles and bazookas, which Israel captured from Egypt in the Six Day War. Besides fresh arms and rudimen- tary training by four Israelis in the bush, the Southerners were bol- stered by alliances with non-Arab blacks in the North. Sudan's 15 mil- lion population is actually divided into 6 million black Southerners, 3 million non-Arab Northern blacks, and 6 million Northern Arabs. To- gether, the blacks are a majority, though a majority without power because the Arabs dominate Su- dan's government, army, economy and social structure. 'The Northern blacks and the Southerners joined in a black-power alliance in 1970, demanding majori- ty control of Sudan's institutions, a demand which is anathema to the Arabs. The blacks plotted under- ground, having produced at least half of the nine unsuccessful coup attempts against the regime of Gen. Gaafar Nimerir in the past 20 months. The Southerners hope that their black-power strategy may work, even if it requires many years of continued guerrilla fight- mg. Approved or Release CPYRGHT months, according to U.S. intelli- gence sources in Washington, 100 to 200 Russian army advisers have been directly planning and partici- pating in the counterguerrilla war- fare operations of the Sudan army against the Southerners. A larger group of Russians, 300 or more, have piloted and serviced Russian helicopters and bombers supporting combat operations in the South, according to American intelligence specialists. Up to 1,000 Russian military men are estimat- ed to be supporting the Sudan army, counting Soviet army advis- ers, pilots, ground crew and missile technicians. In the North, at Port Sudan on the Red Sea, the Soviets are build- ing, A, naval base and installing SAM-2 antiaircraft missiles to de- fend the area. The missiles were presumably detected by U.S. elec- tronic surveillance, since Air Force sources state that the presence of the Russian missiles at Port Sudan is a certainty. The Soviet aim is believed by Washington to be two-fold: first, to establish a strongly-defended base for Soviet naval power to be proj- ected into the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, and second, to bottle up the Israelis in the Red Sea area. The Russians are thought to want to influence Africa, continue to domi- nate the Arab world and leapfrog beyond the Mediterranean and the NATO system. But first they must secure their base in Sudan, accord- ing to this analysis, by aiding the Sudan army to crush the Southern guerrillas. German correspondent Rudolph Chimelli flew in an MI-8 helicopter gunship from Juba to Meridi in South Sudan. He wrote in Sued- deutsch Zeitung, Jan. 22: "The helicopter crew consisted of a. Sudanese air force officer as nominal captain, a Soviet copilot in blue' overalls who directed the flight, a Soviet navigator, an Epyp- tian navigator and two soldiers armed with ` heavy automatic ri- fles." Chimelli reported that, "helicop- ters flown by Russians played a decisive role in a battle by a Su- danese brigade that lasted 25 days." In Juba, the commanding officer of this brigade described the Soviet helicopters as "the only means the army has for carrying out, such an operation." He ac- knowledged that the Sudan army has become dependent on helicop- ters because in all of the South's 350,000 square miles, there are only a few dirt roads. A c r d Fir F eleasea 999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-011S4A000300070001-6 l-Iow, for rs une ut v1 Oryf OSWfQ e t e most rate of any base near the Uganda border. Ac cording to eyewitnesses who reach'. ed Uganda in December, the Rus- sian helicopters were used repeat- edly to rocket the Anyanya and to bring soldiers and supplies to the Sudanese army units. The bomb- ings caused an estimated 1;000 cas- ualties, mostly in surrounding vil- lages. About 35,000 Southerners were re- portedly' made homeless by recent fighting and bombing around Bor in Upper Nile. A 45-bed government hospital in the bush at Magwi, in eastern Equatoria, was bombed and destroyed on Jan. 25 : after which a Sudan army patrolled the medicines and hospital equ p- ment. U.S. defense analysts believe that the Russians will not easily , with draw from this war, They assert that the Southern Sudan Is, too large to be controlled effectively by the Sudan army.. The Egyptians might intervene with their 5,000. troops now stationed around Khartoum to protect the Nimeiri regime, but without changing the balance. The war is increasingly seen as an extension of the Middle East conflict. Barring an Arab-Israe' settlement and an accommodation between Sudan's Arabs and Afri- cans, the Russians in Sudan are expected to .' continue . being drawn into fighting the Africans in the South, as they have already done. Though the scale of Russian ac- tivity in Sudan is relatively small compared to the preset"U.S. role in Indochina, it is being compared in -Washington to the beginnings of the American intervention in sup- port of South Vietnam in 1960-61. Khartoum is as unstable as Sai- gon used to be, with nine coup attempts reportedly made by Gen. Nimeiri's opponents since he as- sumed power. The Anyanya guer- rillas have shown themselves will- ing to fight for another decade if necessary. On the other hand, the Africans in the South have not become effec- tive guerrilla fighters and they are now facing modern helicopter oper- ations backed by the Russians. The price of the conflict is evi- dent throughout the bush. In all the villages I visited in Equatoria prov- ince, the level of disease and star- vation was clearly the highest in Black Africa today. Foreign doc- tors who deal with Southern refu- gees estimate that one Southern child in four reaches the age of 15, other African region. At night, the villages reverberat- ed with hacking, wheezing, barking coughs, evidence of the epidemics of bronchitis, pneumonia and often tuberculosis that afflict the South- erners. No medicine or health care has reached them for years. No, relief-group dares to ship medicines illegally across' Sudan's, borders. As I left the bush, a 60-year-old sergeant held up his tattered shirt. He asked for $10, enough to send his son to school in Uganda for a year. Except for clandestine schools run by the Anyanya, but lacking paper, pencils, books and desks, there was no education. He said: "We are the land of nobody. I remain nothing." Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Approved FBOV gad 'ON : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Sudan - en of ikansk tragedie BORLAGT AV K ASCHEHOOG & CO. (W. NYGAARD) OSLO 1970 CPYRGHT Den 3tte 3r gamic Beda fra Iandsbyen Banja vrir seg i smerte. I g$r ble han operert av den amerikanske legen pa misjons- stasjonen i Aba. En kule liar gAtt gjennom nederste del av ryg- gen og har tatt med seg mesteparten av Fret pA veien ut. En annen kule liar gAtt gjennom hodet. Den er fremdeles der inne. Den satt for dypt inne i hjernen til at legen kunne fjerne den. Beda er lam pi venstre side. Kanskje vil han overleve, kanskje er han alt ded. Ett av ofrene.ved massakrene i Banja. I den Lille sykestuen ligger hans mar. Hun liar fAtt ti kuler gjennom begge bein, ti arabiske kuler da hun fortvilet provde A flykte sammen med to barn. Den Lille datteren star hjelpelos midt i rommet. ?Piva,? klynker Beda. Noen Keller vann fra en kaffekjele inn i munnen bans. Hele rommet er fylt av hans klagende ynk - og av stanken fra betente sAr. Jeg stir ved enden av Bedas seng. Jeg prover 3 fange hans blikk. Bare det ene oyet er synlig. Det andre er skjult av bandasjene. Det feberfylte, slappe blikket Bier meg ingesting. Men med ett forstAr jeg det meningslose i denne konflikten. Jeg vil komme til Bedas landsby. Jeg vil fortelle verden om' denne skjenselsgjerningen. Bedas klagende stemme klinger ennA i orene mine da vi tidlig om morgenen drar ut i jungelen. Sammen med Anya- Nya-folk skal vi to oss fram til Banja og selv se om det er sant det de overlevende liar fortalt. De liar fortalt oss felgende: Det er morgen i den Lille landsbyen Banja. Det er torsdag 26. juli 1970. Sola er forlengst oppe. , I dag har,.det ik6'.reg- net. Alt er normalt, innbyggerne tar fgt. p3' dagens arbeid. Det er noen gronnsaker som skal innhlsstes, noe kasava og noen jordnotter. Det er ikke mye, men 'nok tA'at liv'et kan' g3 videre. Buskapen har Anya-Nya elier arabtrne tatt,, men follcet i Banja mA eksistere videre trays 1 at dot egentlige liv'runn- laget er tatt fra dem. De kryper tit av sine sm3, strAhyttet og -7- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 CPYRGHT Approved For Relegs? 199909/02 t h - y gar i gang. Noen vasker kla?r, barna leker to elig runt tene. Bare en liten gutt opplever en dag utenom det normale. I dag er ban syk. S'a syk at moren mener presten bor be for ham. Ja, hun inviterer alle i landsbyen til en bonnestund i kirken eller kapellet, Ysuona Lueto. Langsomt samles de, en handful! mennesker for A sende en bonn opp til Den Allmek- tige Gud. Misjonaerene har fortalt at Han kan gjore gutten frisk igjen. Kateketen leser fra Bibelen, og innbyggerne er sam- let i bonn. Kirken er ikke stor, den kan vel romme en 80 men- nesker under det lave strltaket. Britt stopper bonneropene i kirken. Det blir sI stille der inne. Utenfor borer de ukjente lyder. Araberne er der! Ara- berne er kommet til Banja. Alle vet hva det betyr. Patruljen bestir av i alt 41 mann med automatviIpen. De stormer inn i kirken, binder kateketen med hendene pi ryggen til en skrope- lig stol. En annen gruppe raser rundt fra hytte tit hytte. De bruker ikke geva:r, kniven gjor samme nytten nit mllet bare er I drepe for fote, dessuten sparer man da ammunisjon. Innbyggerne, de som fremdeles lever, blir fort inn i kapellet. Langsomt blir de bundet til stolen med et to-tre centimeters tykt tau. Noen skriker, noen grlter, andre ber. Det er for det meste kvinner og barn, men ogsl noen eldre menn som i kir- ken Ysuona Lueto venter pg en skrekkelig dod. En offiser gir ordrer. Det siste han sier for ban gir ut av den lave doren, er: NI skyter vi dere i deres gudshus, la nd deres Gud komme og redde dere! Han sier det med et hatsk, ironisk smil. Og sI: patruljen bar tatt oppstilling p3 den ene siden av kirken. Hundrevis av kuler spruter ut av automatvlpnene. De tommer et magasin eller to hver. Kvelende top i smerte lyder der inne fra. Ikke alle er dode. Sett fyr pi! lyder ordren. Etter fI sekunder stir kirken i lys lue. Man kan nesten ikke se flam- men, for sollyset overtoner alt. Bare en svak, grll royk stiger opp og blir fort bort i den svale brisen inn over det hoye gres- set i jungelen. Snart lyder ingen stemmer mer innenfra. De alle dude. Det vat femti i alt. : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 YRGHT tit 4, 4"In. De prover nI I flykte. Araberne sender salve etter s lye e ter dem til de forsvinner i gressct. Noen forblor der ut og it aldri funnet, noen - i alt 14 - greier A to seg ne til en Aba til sykehuset. De fortalte oss om Banja. Araberne er ferdige. De kan trekke seg tilbake til forleg in- n. Anya-Nya er pi vei til Banja: trommene bar spilt le- f nens rolle igjen. De kommer for sent. Etter endt did sla per 41 araberne av i forlegningen, trygt beskyttet av panserb ler. e drikker of og brennevin, de royker og er i godt hu r. I dag fikk vi da has pA en bunt slaver! En ung pike so er rlovet med en av soldatene, flykter. Hun holder det ikk ut. un bar fortalt om festen. I ja aptein Michael bar tatt pi seg oppdraget I fore os til anja. ?Dere skal selv fA se, sl kan ikke araberne karakter sere et som ondsinnet Anya-Nya-propaganda. Ta binder, vis k pel- t, vis de slrede, vis de oppbrente knoklene og hjerneska ene 1 uskyldige sivilister. Dette er folkemord. Det bar vi h det nge, men verden bar ikke trodd oss. Dere skal selv se, ere Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : Ct7 tDP79-01194A000300070001-6 CPYRGHT p'prWed For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Han er ung. Han matte slutte pa realskolen da han var 16. Siden gikk han inn i AnyaNya. Na krysser han grgnsen fra tid til annen. Han har fatt billharzia der inne i jungelen. Han har lyst a fortsette skolegangen og kanskje studere ved uni- versitetet. Jeg ser ingen muligheter for den unge, begavete mannen fra Wau i Bar el Ghazal. Nicholas deler skjebne med tusetivis av andre landsmenn. De bar fatt odelagt sitt liv, denne generasjonen kommer aldri til a fa oppleve et modern Sor-Sudan. Noen' faller i krigen, noen dor av suit, andre bukker under av alvorlige sykdommer. Likevel star Nicholas der med et spent, optimistisk srhil foran oss: ?Jeg hater arabeme, jeg ville aldri kunne sti ansikt til an- sikt med en araber.? Dette hatet hos Nicholas er representativt for negrene i s r. Det er vanskelig I si hva som ma til for at hatet skal f - svinne. ?Jeg cr villig til a kjcmpe til jeg dor, og jeg kommer til a gjore det,? Bier Nicholas. Jeg tror han er etterretningsoffis r i Anya-Nya, met] han roper ikke sin funksjon de 14 dage e vi er sammcn. De liar lam, enda sa unge de Cr. I filler gar e til fronten som er ovcralt. Dct cr (lager da de ikkc liar ma de kjcmper i dcspcrasjon og hat for en rettfcrdig sak. roper Nicholas. < Vi trenger hjelp o det fort. Hvorfor snakker dere alltid om Ser-Afrika? Tenk he ler pa oss! Araberne driver folkemord, det er ingen tvil lenge Men bare vent: vi skal nok fa hjelp fra visse utenlandske mak ter. Den dagen er araberne ferdige. Kanskje set du meg aid igjen, om noen dager ratner jeg kanskje opp der inne, > ha nikker i retning av bush-en. ?Jeg faller for en god sak, m aller heist ville jeg studere og bli noe nyttigere b > Clement er 16 at gammel. For et par ar siden gikk han p skolen i Torit. Etter middagspausen tar elevene plass i d primitive skolestua. Plutselig er araberne der. De skyter vilt in i klasserommet. Instinktivt kaster Clement seg mot glassruten Han redder livet, kameratene dor. Na roper han mot bush-en. En eldre mann kommanderer ham til a dra i retning Uganda. Det er flere dagers marsj. Clement vii gjerne tilbake til foreld- rene og 6 sosken, men mannen sier at det betyr den visse ded. Clements lange vandring tar til. (I dag gar jeg pa skole i Uganda. Men jeg lengter tilbake til Torit. Hvor er det blitt av foreldrene mine? Hvor er mine sostre og brodre? Jeg vet ikke, kanskje lever de, kanskje er de for alltid borte. Jeg har mistet ett oye, med det andre skal jeg en dag se igjen mitt land! Hvis konflikten er over om et par ar, vil jeg bli politiker, hvis ikke, tar jeg ogsl geweret i hind. Da skal jeg kjempe. Jeg hater araberne.)> -9- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 S1JaA T -- AN AF CAN TRAGEDY By Per oyv:i.nd He.radstveit (From: Sudan -- en Afri_kansk Traedie, Aschehout Publj shinT Co., Oslo, 1970, pp 13-1 , 92-93 CPYRGHT _saona Lueto Eight-year-old Beds from the village of Banja writhes in pain. Yesterday he was operated on by the American doctor at the mission station in Aba. A bullet went through the lowest part of his back and took most of his thigh off when it re-emerged. Another bullet went through his head. Tt is still in there. It was too deeply imbedded in the brain for the doctor to remove it. Beda fs paralyzed on hj_s left side. Perhaps he will survive, perhaps he is Just about dead. One of the victims of the massacres in Banja. His mother lies in the little ward. She .,rot ten bullets through both legs, ten Arabian bullets when she desperately tried to flee with two children. Her little daughter stands helplessly in the middle of the room. "Piva," cries Beda. Someone pours water from a coffeepot into his mouth. The whole room is filled with his cries -- and the smell of infected wounds. T stand at the end of Veda's bed, trying to catch his eye. Only one eye can see. The other is hidden by bandages. The feverish, apathetic glance tells me nothing. But suddenly T see how meaningless this conflict is. T will go to Beda s villare. T will tell the world of this infamous deed. Beda's plaintive voice is still ringing in mvr ears when we go out into the j, early in the morning. We will go to Banja with the Anya-Nya people and se for ourselves if what the survivors have told is is true. This is what they told us. It is morning in the little villaI'Union Nationale du Soudan Afrionin (L4 ) s'6tablit b d'6?ranger at depuis, ells a { pour so cause per des appels of des p6 s ns aux organisations, internationales. q~ ivite des politiciens soudanais 6 I' 6t er, ajoute Die Presse, a cause one rs- uerent brOl6s at ?pilles, et 4eurs habitants hommes, femmes et enfants - assassin6s. Ces horreurs eurent pour consequence la fondation d'un mouvement appel6 Anya'nya, en 1963. Ce nom est celui d'un poison mortel qu'on obtierrt on reduisant en poussibre la tgte s6ch6e d'un cobra. Anya'nya tronsforma da guerilla, qui existait depuis 1955, en one force de combat plus efficace. En 1964, le regime du general Abboud tombo, at le secrbtaire general de I'UNSA, William Deng, qui fut ossassine Van dernier a Khartoum, retourna dons a gouvernemen ovec d'autres politicians exiles. Ceci morquo de debut de profondes diver- gences dons les mangs de roppositaon africoine. En 1965, Joseph Oduho *init los groupes rivoux des ' poll-fieiens du Soudon du Sud sous 1 egde du Front de Liberation de I'Anya'nya. (FLA). Mais, en 1967, on soi-d-isant ?gouverne- ment provisoire? fut fond-6 dons le Soudan du Sud sorts d'aide du FLA, et, en 1968, ?il com- menra b s'oppeler a ?Gouvernement'Provisoire du Nil*. Oduha s'opposa violemment 6, ce mouvement. Avec 4'aide de Joseph Logu, chef du FLA dons do province equatoriale, its rrsu- nirent one force disciplin6e qu'"9!'s appele rent l'Organisation Nationale de 4'Anyo'nya (ONA). Depuis dons, les mouvements voulant cr6er on Etat africain dons lle Sud du Soudan se sont divises en deux groupes principaux: le Gouvernement Provisoire du Nil at d'ONA. Un troisieme groupe, le Front Uni de Lib6ra- tion du Soudan Africain fut cre6 en mars 1970 au Congo-Kinshasa. Son but est de realiser on Soudan gouverne par les Africains of no subissant plus 4'influence orabe. Le pr6sident du Gouvernement Provisoire du Nil est Gordon Mayen, ancien mi?nistre d.u Travail 6 Khartoum. Ce gouvennement a d6clar6 I'independance des trail provinces du Sud du Soudan et 'les a oppel6es la ((Republique du Nile. Son aparlement) siege dons one butte de terre, en pleine for6t. Jusqu'ici, iI n'a pas 6te decouvert par 'les Arabes: Le parlement le plus secret au monde, cela a I'vir d'une tragi- comedie, mais ?les acteurs sont terribtement s6rieux, dit I'artiele de Presse. Les Forces Arm6es Nationades de d'Anya-nya representent l'orgonisation m?ilitaire du Gouvernement du Nil. L'outre groupe principal, d'ONA, n'a pas d'organisation civile. II est purement militaire at se -montre tres critique envers les membres du Gouvernement du Nil. Le territoire du Soudan du Sud 6quivaut a deux fois celui de la Republique Federale Allemande. Cest on pays de for6ts humides, infests par la malaria, et dons lequel les serpents at Iles animaux sauvages abondent. Les petites villes du Sud, fortifi6es contra les attaques de I'Anya'nya ne sont habitees maintenant'que par des Arabes, les Africains cyant fui par crainte des persecutions. Dons lo brousse, to ?loi de I'Anya'nya prevaut. Cette region est trop peu maniable et trop grande pour que les troupes arabes puissent to contr8ler entierement. De leer c8t6, les Af- ricains sont trop foibles, trop .mel nourris et Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : Cl .RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 CPWbWed For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 trop ma equip es an ormes pour u er ovec succss b eux souls contre Khartoum. Leurs efforts ont eu relativement peu d'effets sur des forces gouvernementales en nombre superieure.. Mais, or leur tactique de guerilla, its reussissent a harasser une arm$e profession- nelle de plus de 10.000 hommes. Celo com- prend ;la destruction de ponts et de routes, 1' attaque de convois routiers at de bateaux sur le Nil, to coupure des voles de chemin de for reliant Khartoum b d'autres centres. Bien sOr, 4ts ovtoritbs de Khartoum ripostent. .IIs (les Arobes) orrivent gbn@ralement b la tombee de lo nuit, entourent un village of jettent des tisons sur les toits de choumes, dit Joseph Oduha. .Affoie s, hes habitants s en- fuient de cot enter br0kmt at tombent entre r r, niialns t Arobes qui ie; ortwent, )as violent at lee assassinent - da plupart du Sernps, cc sort des femmes, des enfa-rts, et des nlGicds Les hornrnes ?vivan ha .itue!iument clans to brousse, com?ba;tont ou s'entrcincnt au cc roat. lie Iclssent a t4u'r, fommes e, G lours vniant? 'to sots do ovlt!vrsr le you cte le~,res qui pe?ut ,encore 4'etre. Chaque foie que les Arabes trouvcnt des traces de cc.rnpement cfricoin, its rEduisent tout a nouvecu en cendres, dit I' orr'clo de Die Presse. C'est pourquoi un grand nombre de Sou:iana'is du Sud oat fui leur? pays. Plus encore sort morts de It n'y a IEgadement pas de discrimination rcciale au Soudan. Cependant, sedon le journal outrichien, des Arabes qui ant ate la classe dominants pendant des generations at qu.i ont, dons, [a-passe, considers les Afr ica'ins cornme c!es`;csclaves, jugent encore la population afri coine du Sud comma une race de seconde c1csse, ul?Is ont transfonme ? le Soudan ' an un Etat o?robcH, dit avec ,amertume Joseph Odigho. otth are r 9/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 through the complete disruption of norm prof onomic life in the swamps, forests, a grassy plains of the three southern - inces. Refugees helped In neighboring countries United Natio s organizations, the World ~ Council f Churches, the Swedish Red Cross, Rom Catholic Mission Relief, and the Briti Catholic Womens League among others ha been helping refugees. In 1968 the UN estimated 63,000 southe Suda,,i-se refugees in Uganda and 40,000 Congo (Kinshasa) alone. In 1955, the la year of British rule, the southern, Britis trained Equatoria Army mutinied unsucces fully against Arab officers and civil servant sent from Khartoum to "integrate" the no Muslim south, A series of politicians and parties, som legal and some underground, have sine campaigned for southern self-rule. Measures untaken General Nimeri after his take-over 1969 promised more measures to help th non-Muslim sough to self-government, bu refugee sources say these never got off th ground. Two main rival southern groups now exist One is the "Nile provisional government" o exiled southern politicians in Kampala Uganda, last known to be headed by Gordo Mayen. It advocates total independence fo a "republic of the Nile." More active is the Azania Liberatio Front. The Anyanya -is its military arm and it is attempting to organize schools an some basic administrative and economi activity in "liberated"; regions where Ara government has either: been driven out o never really existed. Government troops hold the main south ern towns, such as Juba in Equatoria, Wa in Bahr-el-Ghazal and Shambe in Upper Nile. But they are evidently unable to se cure roads and other communication line or hold villages in bush areas. In a preface to a recent book "The Su- dan, a Southern Viewpoint" by southern exile leader Oliver Albino, published by the Institute of Race Relations in London, British historian Arnold J. Toynbee writes: "British rule [from 1899 to 1956] differ- entiated the northern and the southern Su danese from each other without separating them from each other politically. "This made it virtually inevitable that, i and when the British abdicated, the north erners, being by far the stronger of the tw sections of the Sudanese people, shoul attempt as they have done to assimilat the southerners by force. This in turn, ha made it inevitable that there should be southern resistanep mnvement." THE PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy, Mass.) Monday, January 10, 1971 CPYRGHT rHE ROY WILKINS COLUMN: Su&ds Racism Traps Blacks WASHINGTON Hardly ># is' killed oft by government, then se ek goes by without revealing Io a valid charge, t at the pit propaganda phrases The petition, however, exposed e o many of the sloganeering black than the genocide fantasy of Ame ilitants are so much holuam. A black militants. All the for left Neu w ority of black thinkers believes the big name black leaders eIn Ile talon(( plea , are i 'in those it now has a chance to stampede eAlgerialsewhere or hi AfricAfrica,have been n prey log t eir own race into a suicidal emo- the vilest anti-Semitism, ti nalism under the sweeping black They have promised Egypt that bl ek I el. American volunteer soldiers would help he Sudanese Genocide Arabs against Israel. It is true that e Two black Sudanese have outlived the have been changes in the mood of b ck p secution of black people by the Arabs America, but no one has yet recorded in Northern Sudan and thus have forced rush of blacks to fight alongside( ha th pro-Arab black operators here toward Arabs. M ment of truth. Curious Silence ese have becu harping on the charge Speechmakers, interviewees d of genocide. They , want the world to analysts of .the black revolution it ep -w.~o, .a,w. Ll, CAlC1 WWg4Wa ;WO government, Tile U.N. petition filed by he N population Southern Sudan Liberation Front docla es ` obody among the dark wailers has that Egyptian and Libyan troops are be ng s Ja policy, the total 'Negro population Soviet-built aircraft. are bombarding he er than that o( whites, The life ex, Black militants beat the tom-tom for ancy of Negro men and women IT black, blank, black. They sound often like - ei et p hate . rums .. he Isindsi of ?;dlnsurance, policies now Every, Negro American who does t av liable to Negroes testify in un-' embrace 14 unquestioning fashion no son imental statistics to the Improvement goodness of blackness is denounced as a in ealth and in the diversification in "traitor, to big race." He merely may e occ ations. Granted that ghetto life is saying that two plus two equals four, at ding and hard, that malnutrition takes if the black spellbinders say the total, its toll, that" Negroes arrested for an "black experience" is We, them he is al ed infraction of the law are' more' condemned. like than whites to be convicted and that The disciples of blackism and th it nar otics have' made searing inroads, it white sycophants are now called upon o is s ill not accurate to call the Negro death become something they have never bee i: r "genocide." consistent. Are they for the liberation fro it petition, filed with. the United id black Sudan as they declare themselves Nat s by two black Sudanese puts to be for the liberation front in Vietnam? gen ide in its proper place. They charge Do they oppose the Arab-led gover - that 250,000 black Sudanese have been shot meet in Khartoum, or do they contin e to d th and 250,000 have.died of hunger. to urge Negro Americans to help the Ara la e half-million dead, they assert, were exterminate Israel? the exult of official policy which the Arab- It is long past. time for someone led Khartoum government is enforcing say something besides "black." L aga it four, million blacks. in southern "humanity," for instance. Sud n. If one-eighth of the black population (The Register and Tribune Syndicate) Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 -49- SUEDDEUTS&L9f o jgase 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 January 22, 1971 Sudsudan: Aufstand als Uberblkibsel des Kolonialismus as ?Cai~uC(~ G;'" a 119? (I Da CPYRGHT Die Regierung macht die Gewahrung der Autonomie von ,der Auflosung der Rebellenbewegung abhangig Von unserem Korrespond.ente:n Rudolph Chimelli Khartum, im Januar Der Rotor des Hubschraubers treibt rotliche Staubwolken in den dunstigen afrikanischen Sommerhimmel. Gerauschvoll hebt sich die ton- nenschwere sowjetische Mi 8 vom Flugplatz von Juba, der Hauptstadt der siidsudanesischen Pro- vinz Aquatoria. Das Ziel: 240 Kilometer welter westlich die Distriktstadt Meridi, die auf dem Landweg nur nosh zweimal monatlich im_ bewaffneten Konvoi erreichbar ist. Die Fracht: eine kleine Gruppe Informationsbeamte und Journalisten, ein paar Regierungsfunktio- nare,, ein Eisenkoffer mit 150 000 Pfund in bar von der Nationalbank. Die Besatzung: ein suda- nesischer Fliegeroffizier als Kommandant, im blauen Overall ein sowjetischer Kopilot, der je- doch tatsachlich den Flug dirigiert, ein sowjeti- scher Navigator, ein agyptischer Navigator, der auger beim Start und bei der Landung den drit- ten Sitz in der Kanzel ubernimmt, und zwei Sol- daten, die rechts und links mit schweren Ma- schinengewehren, Relikten einstiger deutscher Militarhilfe an den Sudan, aus geoffneten Bull- augen nach Rebellen spahen. Das wellige Land, das einige schroffe Felsbar- rieren von Nord nach Siid durchziehen, erscheint aus 2500 Meter Flughohe fast menschenleer. Me- terhohes Steppengras, einzelne Baume, die sich manchmal zum Gebiisch verdichten, die Win- dungen eines algenverwachsenen Flusses, drei oder vier Dorfer aus runden Grash{ tten, sonst wahrend einer Sturide und zehn Minuten nichts. Der ganze Sudsudan, bestehend aus den Provin- zen Aquatoria, Ober-Nil und 'Bahr-el-Ghasal (Gazellenflufi), mit semen 650 000 Quadratkilo- metern so grog wie die Bundesrepublik, Oster- reich, die Schweiz und Italien zusammen, hat hochstens vier Millionen Einwohner. Von Khar- tum nach Juba ist es so weft wie von Munchen nach Tunis, von der ostlichen Ecke der Siidpro- vinzen am Rudolfsee bis an die Grenze der Zen- tralafrikanischen Republik so weit wie von Paris nach Sofia. Im ganzen Suden gibt es keine AsphaltstraBe, sondern nur Erdwege, von denen die meisten wahrend der sechs Monate wahren- den Regenzeit nicht benutzbar sind, eine Eisen- bahn von Khartum nach Wau, der Hauptstadt von Bahr-el-Ghasal, und als einzigen zuverlassi= gen, aber langsamen Verkehrsweg den Weil3en Nil, der zwischen Juba und Malakal ein 400 Kilo- meter langes und 300 Kilometer breites Sumpf- gebiet bewassert. Seit Jahrzehnten abgeriegelt. DaB dieses riesige Land heute zum Sudan ge- hort, ist eine Folge britischer Kolonialpolitik im 19. Jahrhundert; daS es wahrend zweier Men- schenalter nicht an den arabischen Nordent assi- miliert wurde, ebenfalls. Rigoros sperrten die Briten den Suden gegen Siedler und islamische Missionare aus dem nordlichen Landesteil, ge- gen kulturelle und wirtschaftliche Durchdrin- gung aus dem hoher entwickelten arabischen Sudan ab. Der Suden blieb Schwarzes Afrika, der Suden blieb zuruck. Als der Sudan am 1. Ja- nuar 1956 in die Unabhangigkeit entlassen wur- de, gab es in den drei Siidprovinzen nur sechs Personen mit Universitatsbildung, nur eine ein- zige Mittelschule, kaum Ansatze zu einer kom- merziell betriebenen Landwirtschaft, so gut wie kein einheimisches Handwerk, praktiscl} keine Industrie. Vielleicht 20 000 bis 25 000 der schwar- zen Stammesleute waren zum Islam bekehrt, et- wa 200 000 waren von weil3en Missionaren fur den Katholizismus gewonnen, 25 000 bis 30 000 waren Protestanten. Die ubrigen, mehr als 90 Prozent, hangen bis heute Naturreligionen an, bauen wie eh und je Negerhirse zum eigenen Verbrauch, leben als Jager und Sammler oder ,nomadisieren mit ihren Rinderherden. Obgleich der Suden als selbstandiges Gemein- wesen kaum vorstellbar war, wehrte sich die kleine- afrikanische Elite, die hierin ihren Ruck- halt beim Volk hatte, von Anfang an dagegen, daB mit der Unabhangigkeit des Sudan die Macht von britischen in arabische Hande Uber- gehen sollte. Schon 1955, im letzten Jahr der Hcrrschaft Londons, meuterten die sudlichen Garnisonen. Da der Suden mit seinen Forderun- gen auf Autonomie und Federation niemals durchdrang, befindet er sich seither mit Unter- brechungen im Aufstand gegen Khartum. In Meridi, das der Gouverneur von Aquatoria am Tag zuvor als ,ruhigsten und sichersten Platz in der Provinz" geschildert hat, sind die Spuren der Rebellion fast uberall zu sehen. Am sudlichen Stadtrand, von wo es zu den blauen Hugeln des Kongo nur 25 Kilometer sind, kon- nen neue Anpflanzungen von Hirse und Kaffee nur besichtigt werden, wenn vorher ein Land- Rover mit aufmontiertem Maschinengewehr am Rand der Felder in Richtung auf den Busch in Stellung gegangen ist. Schwerbewaffnete Solda- ten umringen jeden Schritt der Journalisten. Auf dem von einem Schutzenpanzer und Ma- schinengewehrlochern gesicherten Damm, der Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 CPYRGHT fragt der Begleitoffizier freundlich besorg : ?Sie wollen doch nicht auf die andere Seite gehen?" . Wie um alle Stadte des Sudens hat sich um Meridi ein Ring von Grashtittendorfern gebildet, utter deren Bewohnern zu wenig Manner sind. Der stellvertretende Kommandeur des siidlichen Armeebereichs,Oberst Omar el Tayeb, gibt of- fen zu, daB die Zwangsdeportation einer der ?Eckpfeiler der Befriedungspolitik 1st. ?Wir wol- len die Leute urnsiedeln. Wir sammeln sie in den Waldern und im offenen Land ein und siedeln sie in. der Mahe;: der Stddte neu an." Der Zweck sel, den Rebellewdie,Mogliehkeit zu nehmen, in der Bevolkerung unterzu(auchen. und sich zu versorgen. ,Und wenn die Leute nicht mit Ihren Soldaten kommen und; ein Friedensdorf' bauen wwollen?" Mit dem selbstzufriedenen Lacheln eines Man- nes, der ein gutes Werk geleistet hat, schatzt der Oberst, dalI uber die Halfte der friiher im Busch lebenden Einwohner Aquatorias und der am meisten gefahrdeten Gebiete der beiden anderen Siidprovinzen eingesammelt worden ist. ?Wir mussen einfach etwas fur die Leute tun. Es 1st der Gang der Geschichte. Jetzt gefallt es ihnen nicht, aber spater werden sie uns verstehen." . Es gefallt ihnen tatsachlich nicht. Bei der Um- siedlung verschwinden haufig die Manner im Busclh, um zy den Rebellen oder uber die Grenze, vorw'iegend nach Athiopien, Uganda und in den Kongo zu gehen. In den Grashuttenslums um die Stadtre herrscht Armut. Juba ist von 1963 his rum verga;ngenen Jahr von 18 000 auf 65 000 Einwoh- ner gewachsen; Meridi von 4000.auf 15 000. Fur so vi(ele Menschen fehlt es an Arbeit, an sanita- ren IEinrichturgen, an allem. Demoralisierung, MuBi;ggang, Kriminalitat, Prostitution sind die Domi~nanten im Leben der meisten Umsiedler. Soweit die Bevolkerung des Sudens auf dem Land geblieben ist, gebietet die ' Regierun;, im Biirge;rkrieg den Stammesfehden weniger als fruheir Einhalt. Ohnehin stehen die Dorfer zwi- schen zwei Feuern: Arbeiten sie mit den Rebel- len zusammen, trifft sie eine Strafexpedition der Armee; bleiben sie loyal, was auch vorkommt, rachem sich an ihnen rilcksichtslos die Aufstan- dische!n. Es gibt Stamme, die von diesen N:iihl- steinem buchstablich zerrieben worden sind. Vom Volk der Lapit, das einst 30 000 zahlte, ve- getiereen heute nur nosh wenige Hundert am Rand won Juba. ,Auf einem Hugel fiber Meridis besser gesi- chertex Nordseite steht zwischen Palmen, Man- gobauimen und i1ppig wuchernden Bliitensi.rau- chern die protestantische Kirche: strohgedecktes englis(ches Backste~n-Tudor. Ein Frauenchor singt zur Begieitung von Rasseln und Hand- tromnneln eine melancholisch-rhthmische Hymnce. Meridis Kirchen waren nie zerstort. In Malak;al, der Hauptstadt von Obernil, ist Monsi- gnore ?Yukwan sogar dabei, mit der Finanzhilfe Roms eine nepe Kirche zu bauen. Er bereugt, daB er- keine Behinderung seiner Arbeit un 1 daB seine Gemeinde. keine Verfolgung kennt. Aus der elektrizitatslosen Nacht der Grashiit- ten driingen dem Fremden andere Stimmen ent- gegen. Sie sprechen mit dem festen Glauben und dem einfachen Vokabular der 1VLissionsschu e. ,,Wir haben noch immer Vertrauen zu i13t n. Gott hat uns these Priifung aufgegeben, da it wir Zeugnis ablegen, und ihr, unsere Braid r, mul3t es auch tun", sagt ein.schwarzer anglika i- scher Pfarrer, der keine Gemeinde mehr h t. Seine Kirche hat in den Wirren der Jahre 1965 6 im gesamten Suden 38 Gotteshauser and V - sammlungsgebaude verloren. Sie wurden v en den Regierungstruppen zerstort, nicht well ie christlich, sondern well sie die Zentren der - senden, schreibenden, organisiert handelnd n Minderheit waren, die den Widerstand gegen ie Eingliederung in den Norden leitete. Da es r britischen Zeit im Suden nur Missionsschul n gab, konnten die Fi hrer der Autonomiebe - gung nur Christen sein. Die heidnisch geblie - ne Manderheit, die ihre politischen Wiins e nicht verstandlich machen kann, empfindet - doch nicht anders als sie. ,,Wir machen keine Fortschritte mehr, wir f 1- len zuriick" klagt ein katholfscher Priester. i- ne Kirche hat weniger Gebaude eingebullt u d ist organisatorisch besser intakt geblieben, a seit der Ausweisung s:imtlicher 33 wr"iCen d sionare, welche die sudanesische Ec., :c, ; verfugte, ist die Last auf den SchcaiLer crr nigen einheimischen Pfarrer zu sci;w..r. S.: Priestern aus afrikanischcn und arabischen L` - dern, die im Sudsudan aushelfen konnten, g bt Khartum nur selten ein Visum. Am scharfs n urteilt ein presbyterianischer Kirchenma n: ,,Wenn ein weiles Regime mit uns t5te, as Khartum mit uns macht, wi rde sich die ga ze Welt darilber aufregen. Was im Sudsudan a-.. schieht, ist zehnmal schlimmer als das, was n- sere Braider in Stidafrika und Rhodesien aus halten haben." Wie praktisch alle jiingeren e- sprachspartner, wenn sie von Regierungsau an unbeobachtet sind, bekennt er sich zur ?An Nya", der Bewegung der Rebellen und zu de an Ziel, zur Sezession. Die Anya-Nya (zu deutsch: giftiges Gras) at. im Juni letzten Jahres die vier anderen Sepa a- tisten-Organisationen (Anzania Liberation L a- gue, Suer Republic, Anidi Government, Nile 1 e public) unter ihre Fittiche genommen, die m i sten der friiheren zivilen Foderationspoliti er mattgesetzt und ein einheitliches Militarko - mando errichtet. Ihr Fi1hrer ist der ehemal e Leutnant Joseph Lago, ein Katholik. An zw i- ter Stelle steht Samuel Abu John, Ex-Hau t- mann und Protestant, an dritter Stelae Freder k Brian William Maggot, gleichfalls Protest nt und ehemaliger Major. Joseph Lago werden v m sudanesischen Geheimdienst enge Verbind - gen nach Israel nachgesagt. Er sei selber d rt gewesen und babe andere Anya-Nya-Krieger Ausbildung hingeschickt. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA -DP79-01194A000300070001-6 CPYRGHT Lips) Obgleich die Kampfkraft der schwarzen Re- bellen von unabhangigen Beobachtern, die auf der anderen Seite waren, gering eingeschatzt wird, hat die Anya-Nya dieses Ziel sehr weitge- hend erreicht: Ein erheblicher Teil der sudanesi- schen Armee steht heute im Siiden. Ein grol3er Teil der StraBen ist durch Minen and Gefahr von Uberfallen aus dem Hinterhalt unpassierbar. Im Dezember attackierte eine Anya-Nya-Gruppe unter Fii.hrung von vier weifen Soldnern die Po- lizeistation von Bor am Nil, 300 Kilometer von der Grenze Athiopiens oder Ugandas entfernt, tdtete einen mit den BehSrden kollaborierenden Schilluk-Hauptling and fur Polizisten and ver- schwand. Die sechs Gefallenen, welche die Anya-Nya zuriicklied, waren gut ausgeriistet and gekleidet. ,Wenn wir ein Jahr vorher einen Rebellen fingen, hatte er nur ein oder zwei Pa- tronen. Jetzt haben sie Bazookas and 5-Zentime- ter-Motser", klagte ein Offizier. Zeitweise gelingt es den Rebellen, kleinere Gebiete unter ihre Kontrolle zu nehmen. Das wichtigste davon, genannt ,Moroto" (der groBe Versammlungsplatz), das in einem schwer zu- ganglichen, bergigen Areal im Grenzgebiet mit Uganda siidlich von Yei lag, konnte eine sudane- sische Brigade im Herbst nach 25t5gigen Kamp- fen ersturmen. Die von Russen geflogenen Hub- schrauber spielten dabei die entscheidende Rol- le. ?Das einzige Mittel fur die Armee, diese Ope- ration auszufilhren", nennt sie der Komman- dant. ,Ohne Helikopter batten die Soldaten nie-, mals an diese unwegsamen Platze gelangen kSn- nen." Gefangene wurden kaum gemacht. Dif. meisten Aufstandischen entkemen, so such der Mann, der den Anya-Nya als Chefausbilder ur,d Khartum als Beweis fur imperialistische Anstif- tung der Rebellion dient: der deutsche Ex- Fremdenlegionar Rolf Steiner, der spater in Uganda festgenommen and jetzt an den Sudan ausgeliefert wurde. Die Behauptung, israelische, amerikanische and westdeutsche Drahtzieher stiinden hinter der verstarkten Aktivitat der Anya-Nya ist zum Kleingeld national-arabi- scher Propaganda von Khartum bis Beirut, von Kairo bis Bagdad geworden. Details zur angebli- chen Verwicklung der Bundesrepublik kann in- dessen niemand liefern, nicht die Verwaltung im Suden, nicht die Armee, nicht die Polizei, nicht 300070001-6 das Informationsministerium in Khartum, nicht das Amt des Prasidenten. Das Ministerium fur Angelegenheiten des Sudens wartet mit einer Liste auf, in der in pauschaler Form Personen and Organisationen (,,die Caritas die Freunde Afrikas") genannt werden, die propagandistisch oder a Geldsammler fur die Siidsudanesen ta- tig sii1d. Ein Sender, ?Die Stimme Afrikas", soil von Kdln aus den Rebellen den Riicken steifen. Bestimmter wird erst der Minister, Joseph Ga- rang, selbst Sudlander and Kommunist: ?Es kann kein Zufall sein, das diese Organisationen immer dann aktiv werden, wenn im Sudan ein linkes Regime erscheint." Die Schaffung von Garangs Ministerium and seine Berufung in das Ressort fur den Silden sind einige der wenigen Taten, die auf Numeiris Proklamation des Prin- zips der Regionalautonomie am 9. Juni 1969 folg- ten. Als die 'Revolutionsregierung damals ver- kiindete, dag sie ?die historischen and kulturel- len Unterschiede zwischen Nord and Sii.d aner- kennt and fest daran glaubt, dag die Einheit un seres Landes auf diese objektiven Tatsachen ge- grundet werden mug", hatte sie zunachst Kredit im Suden. Der Aufstand schlief ein. Nahezu ein halbes Jahr lahg herrschte vollige Ruhe. Doch es geschah nichts, auger dag Projekte zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung der drei Pro- vinzen entworfen wurden. Arabisch blieb die al- leinige Sprache der Verwaltung and der Schu- len, uberwiegend arabisch blieben Regicrung, Armee and Beamtenschaft. Im Revolutionsrat gibt es keinen Sudlander, im Kabinett nur zwei; nur einer von noun Provinzgouverneuren stammt aus dem Suden, drei Obersteri sind die ranghochsten Offiziere, welche der Sddsudan hervorgebracht hat; an der Universitiit Khartum studieren nur 220 Studenten aus den Siidprovin- zen; eine gemeinsame Regionalverwaltung fur Aquatoria, Ober-Nil and Bahr-el-Ghasal, be- setzt and dirigiert von Si dlandern, gibt es nicht. Die Chance, den Wilnschen des Sudens im Frie- den entgegenzukommen, damit das Feuer des Aufstands dauernd geloscht werde, wurde ver- paBt, der Circulus vitiosus 1st wieder geschlos- sen: So lange die Rebellion andauert, kann'.ceine wirkliche Autonomic gewahrt werden; so tango keine Autonon'-ie gewahrt wird, daucrt die Re- bellion an. CPYRGHT Khartoum, January By Rudolph Chimelli The helicopter rotor drives reddish clouds of dust into the hazy African s er sky. Noisily, the Soviet Mi 8, weighing tons, rises from the landing fiel Juba, capital of the Sudanese province of Equatoria. Our destination is the strict city of Meridi, 21L0 Kilometers toward the west, now reachable by land ],y twice a month by armed convoy. The passengers are a small group of inform on officials and journalists and a couple of government functionaries. An iro est containing cash from the National Bank to the value of 150,000 pounds is rried as freight. The crew consists of a Sudanese air force officer as capt Soviet copilot in blue overalls who in fact directs the flight., a Soviet navi tor, an Egyptian navigator who, except during take-off aid landing, occupies ird seat in the cockpit and two soldiers armed with heavy automatic rifles, Approved For Release 1999/09/0 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001 CPYRGHT through open portholes. The rolling country, traversed from north to south by a few rough mountain ranges, seems from the altitude of 2500 meters almost empty of human beings. For an hour and ten minutes nothing is to be seen except yard-high steppe grass, scattered trees, sometimes condensing into bush, the windings of a river overgrown with algae, three or four villages of round grass huts. The whole of South Sudan., consisting of the provinces of Equatoria, Upper Nile, and Bahr-el-Ghazal (Gazelle River), with an area of 650,000 square kilometers, as large as the Federal Republic, Austria, Switzerland, and Italy put together, has a population of at most four mai.lli?on. The distance from Khartoum to Juba is as great as from Munich to Tunis, and from the eastern corner of the southern provinces on Lake Rudolph the border with the Central African Republic is as far as from Paris to Sofia. In the entire South there is no asphalted road, only dirt roads, most of vich are not passable during the six-month long rainy season. The only railroad nuns from Khartoum to Wau, capital of Bahr-el-Chazal, and the only reliable, but slow, traffic route is the White Nile, which waters a 400 kilometer long swamp region between Juba and Malakal. Cut Off for Decades That this huge country today belongs to Sudan is a result of British colonial policy during the 19th century, as is the fact that for two generations it has not been assimilated by the Arab North. Rigorously, the British cut off the South from settlers and Islamic missionaries from the northern sections of the country, as against cultural and economic penetration from the more highly developed Arabic Sudan. The South remained Black Africa, the South remained backward. When the Sud gained its independence in January, 1956, there were in the southern provinces only six persons with university educations, only one middle school, hardly the beginnin of commercial agriculture, practically no native handicrafts, and practically no industry. Perhaps 20,000 to 25,000 of the black tribesmen were converts to Islam, about 200,000 had been won over to Catholicism by white missionaries, 25,000 to 30,000 were protestants. The rest, over 90 percent,tiave up to the present time h on to their native religions, grow millet for their own consumption, and live as hunters and food gatherers or as nomads with their herds of cattle. Although !the South was hardly conceivable as an independent commonwealth, the small African elite, which in this had the support of the people, from the beginnin of independence resisted the turning over of British power to the Arabs. As early as in 1955 the last year of British domination, the southern garrisons mutinied. Since the SouthIs demands for autonomy and federation were never successful, it has since that time, with interruptions, been in a state of rebellion against Khartoum. In Meridi, which the governor of uquatoria had the day before described as "the quietest: and safest place in the province," the traces of the rebellion are seen almost everywhere. At the southern edge of the city, only 25 kilometers from the blue hills of the Congo, new plantings of millet and coffee can be inspected only when in advance a Landrover has been positioned at the edge of the field with its machine gun pointing toward the bush. Heavily armed soldiers surround every step taken by the journalists. On a dam, protected by armor plate and machine gun pits above the small reservoir formed by the Meridi RLver, the escorting officer asks with f riendly solicitude: "You ll not wish to go to the other side?" As around all of the cities of the South, a ring of grass hut villages has grown up around Meridi, among the people of which there are too few men. The depu commanding officer of the Southern Army Region, Colonel Omar el Tayeb, frankly admits that forced deportation is one of the cornerstones of the pacification Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA,DP79-01194A000300070001-6 pen oounWepcY~s'el~near theciesl $~1-0~1A?Of~~(3A1#fte ebels of the opportunity to disappear is to deprive the ppear among the people and to support themselves. And when the people refuse to come with the soldiers to build a 'peace village l?" With the self-satisfied smile of a man rh o has done a good job, the colonel stimates that over one half of the inhabitants of Equatoria who formerly lived n the bush and those who lived in the most endangered areas of the other two outhern provinces have been collected, "We must simply do something for the ople. It is the course of history. They are not happy with it now, but later hey will understand us*" It does not please them, as a matter of fact. In the course of the resettle- ent, the men often disappear into the bush, to join the rebels or to go over the 1 order, mostly to Ethiopia, Uganda, and the Congo. In the grass hut slums around he cities poverty predominates. From 1963 to 1970, the population of Juba in- eased from 18,000 to 65,000, and that of Merida from 1,000 to 15,000. For that any people there is shortage of work, sanitary facilities, everything. Demoraliza- an, idleness, crime, and prostitution prevail among most of those resettled. To e extent the people of the South have stayed on the land, the government during e civil war restrains tribal feuds less than before. Nevertheless, the villagers e between two fires: If they cooperate with the rebels, they meet with an army Live expedition, if they remain loyal, which also happens, the rebels ruthlessly t revenge on them. There are tribes that have literally been crushed between ese two millstones. Of the Lapit people, who once numbered 30,000, only a few h dreds now vegetate at the edge of Juba. . On a hill above Meridi's better secured north side, between palms, mango trees, d luxuriantly blooming shrubbery, stands the protestant church, a thatch-roofed gush brick Tudor structure. A female choir sings a hynm in melancholy rhythm t tie accompaniment of rattles and hand drums. Meridi,'s churches have not been erupted. In Malakal, capital of Upper Nile Province, Monsignor Yukwan is even b ilding a church with the financial aid of Rome. He declares that there has been n interference with his work and that his parish experiences no persecution. In the night, other voices meet the strangers from the grass huts that are ck,void of electric light. They speak with the firm faith and simple vocabulary the mission school. "We must still have confidence. God has given us this trial s that we may bear witness, and you, our brothers, must also do so, n says a black glican minister, who no longer has a congregation. In the chaos of the years 1 S-66 his church lost a total of 38 churches and meeting houses in the South. y were destroyed by government troops not because they were Christian, but be- cawe they were centers for the literate, organized minority which led the resis- t ice to assimilation by the North. Since during the British time there were only mi sion schools in the South, the leaders of the autononr movement can only be Ch 'stanns. However, the majority that has remained heathen experience nothing th Lbis different. "We no longer make progress, we fall behind.." complains a Catholic priest. Iii church has lost fewer buildings and has remained more intact organizationally, bu since the expulsion of the 33 white missionaries at the disposal of the Sudanese go rrunent in 1962 the load an the shoulders of the few native clergymen is too he vy. Khartoum only seldom grants visas to priests from African and Arab countries wh could help out in South Sudan. A Presbyterian church man expresses his opinion in the sharpest terms: "If what is being done to us by Khartoum were done by a rah to regime, the whole world would be stirred up. What is happening in South Sudan is ten times as bad as what our brothers in South Africa and Rhodesia have to bear." Lie practically all the young people with whom we talked when unobserved by govern- t eyes, he admits to belonging to the Anya-Nya, the rebel movement, and to approve of X F$t6d P&& T&Ase 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 In June of last year the Anya-Nya (Poison Grass) took the four other separatist organizations (Anzania Liberation League, Suer Republic,, Anidi Government, and Nile Republic) under its wing, checkmated most of the former Federation politicians, and established a unified military command. Its leader is former Lieutenant Joseph Lagu, a Catholic. Second in command is Samuel Abu John, ex-captain and Protestant, and third in command Frederick Brian William Maggot, former major and also a Protestant. Joseph Lague is said by the Sudanese secret service to have close con- tacts with Israel. He is said to have been there himself and to have sent other Anya Ilya fighters there for training. Victory by Means of Soviet Helicopters Although the fighting strength of the black rebels is estimated as slight by independent observers on the other side, the Anya-Nya has very largely attained one of its goals: A considerable part of the Sudanese army is today in the South. A large proportion of the roads is impassable because of mines and the danger of attacks from ambush. In December, an Anya-Nya group led by four white mercenaries attacked the police station at Bor on the Nile, 300 kilometers from the borders of Ethiopia and Uganda, killed-a Shilluk chief who was collaborating with the authori- ties and four policemen and disappeared. The six rebels killed, left behind by the Anya-Nya, were well equipped and clothed. "When a year ago we caught a rebel, he had only one or two cartridges. Today they have bazookas and five-centimeter mortars," complained an officer. From time to time, the rebels succeed in bringing smaller areas under their control. The most important of these, the Moroto (The Great Gathering Place), located in an inaccessible mountainous area on the border with Uganda south of Tei, was in the fall stormed a Sudanese brigade after a battle lasting for 25 days. Helicopters, flown by "ussians, played a decisive role. The commanding officer describes helicopters as "the only means the army has of carrying out such an operation. Without helicopters the soldiers would never have been able to reach this inaccessible place." Prisoners were rarely taken. Most of the rebels escaped, as did the man who serves the Anya-Nya as chief trainer ad Khartoum as proof of imperialist instigation of the rebellion, the German ex- oreign Legionnaire Rolf Steiner. Steiner was subsequently apprehended in Uganda and handed over to the Sudan. The contention that American and West Germans are pulling the strings behind the increased Anya-Nya activity has become small change in national Arab propaganda from Khartoum to Beirut, from Cairo to Baghdad. In the meantime, nobody can furnish details on the supposed materialization of the federated republic, not the administration in the South, not the army, not the police, not the informa- tion ministry in Khartoum, and the President's office. The P6 nistry for Southern Affairs serves up a list, in which are lumped together persons and organizations (Caritas of the; Friends of Africa) who are active as propagandists or collectors of funds for the South Sudanese. A broadcasting station in Cologne is said to be stiffening the backs of the rebels. Minister Joseph Garang, himself a Southlander and Communist, is more positive: "It cannot be a coincidence that these organizations become more active when a Left regime appears in the Sudan." The oration of Garang's ministry and his appointment to the administration for the South was one of the few actions that followed upon Numeiri's proclamation of the principles of regional autonomy of 9 June, 1969. When the revolutionary government at that time announced that it "recognized the historical and cultural differences between the North and the South and firmly believed that the unity of our country must be founded upon these ob- jective f acts," it was at first believed in the South. The rebellion died away. c''omplete calm prevailed for almost six months. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : GCS-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 CPYRGHT ,,~, ~o CPYRGHT P -Y6ff INXf th ;e-e- W E~ r2r~ef e`W V e o '1'angu01Pen3stra tion and in the schools; the government, the army, and the civil service remained preponderantly Arabic.. There is no southerner in the Revolutionary Council, only two in the cabinet; oly one of nine provincial governors is from the South, and only three officers of ranks as high as colonel; at Khartoum University there are only 220 students from the southern provinces; there is no joint regional adminis- tration for the provinces of Equatoria, Upper Nile, and Bahr-el-Ghazal, staffed and directed by southerners. The chance of meeting the desires of the South in peace, so that the fires of rebellion could be permanently extinguished, has been passed up. The vicious circle has once more been closed: As long as the rebellion lasts, no real autonomy can be assured, and as long as autonomy is not assured, the rebellion will last. MORCENBLADET, Oslo January 23, 1971 Lars Korvald an og FN : C aien" NoreborvOge a s(~ YRG Jeg gje a se o so internasjonale menneskerettigheter, ved at vi spilte en mer aktiv' rolle f, eks. i FN - og at vi ikke matte vike unna for to opp konkrete saker i internasjonale fora nar medmenneskers, liv, sikkehet og frihet er i fare. Det er formann i Kristelig Folkeparti, lagtingspresident Lars K o r v a I d som sier dette till Morgenbladet i en kommentar til den treghet som hersker nar det gjelder A` fa Av GUNNAR MOE borgerkrigen i Syd- Sudan I FN. Under utenriksdebatten i Stor- tinget i november ifjor, fremmet Korvald et forslag om at den nor- ske regjering matte to et initia- tiv I denne saken I FN, og kreve at en granskningskommisjon ble sendt til omrAdet der borgerkri- gen pAgAr, for sA senere a frem- legge konkrete forslag to en los- ning av den blodige konflikten. -Er det ekjedd noe med denne saken siden De tok den opp I Stortinget? - Nei, sier Lars E orvald, det vanlige er jo at slike forslag blir Rsamlet opp> av Regjeringen, som sA - vanligvis en gang pr. Ar - sender ut en melding eller et doku- ment om hva den bar foretatt seg I disse sakene. Hvis en storttngs- representant osker saken gjort til glenstand for en realitetsvotering i Stortinget, da mA ban be om slik votering med en gang. Ellers er vanlig praksis at forslagene.blir vedlagt protokollen og oversendt Regjeringen. Hva tror De er den egentlige Arsak til at ikke bare Norge, men de fleste land, vises sA liten vilje til A to den opp I FN saker som gjelder brudd ph menneskerettig- hetene? -- Det virker meat som om det er formaliteter og en slags inne? bygget treghetsmekanisme i uten- rikstjenesten, mener Korvald. - I smrdeleshet gjelder dette over- for FN. Man unnskylder seg med formelle vanskeligheter: ?det er ikke det rette tidspunkta, ?vi vil ikke fa stotte fra andre staters, osv. - Men yeg tror imidlertid at Norge en gang ibiant kunne koste ph seg A stA alene om en sak der vi vtrkelig mener at noe br r gjo- res, og hvor vi tror at FN kunne utrette noe positivt. Tar vi en slik fast holdning, vil vi som regel og- ,sA efterhvert f A folge av andre. Norge er, efter min mening, I en sick posisjon at ingen vii kunne . mistenke oss for A to skjeve, smr- politiske hensyn om vt sa klart ifra i :like raker. - Ligger det kanekje politiske hensyn bak vAr forsiktighet? Er vi redde for A komme Litt pA' kant med stormaktene? - Net,. det vil jeg nouig tro, sier lagtingspresidenten bestemt. - Men det er mitt inntrykk at det ofres altfor. lite oppmerksomhet ph krenkelser av tnenneskerettig- hetene, selv om det, er gledelig A registrere at bide folkeopinionen og politikerne i sin almindelighet, t stigende utstrekning gjores be- visste om at en mer aktiv linje er nodvendig for A beskytte disse rettigheter. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : O A. RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 MOR.GINBLADET Oslo @3 r:Releasb?$ / W:1dIA qM '#4 0Y 9b * CPYR@KRGHT e orway p ay a ea g ro-re Men tt MUMS fending international human rights, by being more active -- in the ited Nations, for example -- and by bringing up concrete issues in tie international forum when human life, security, and liberty are i danger." These words were spoken by Lars Korvald, president of the lower chamber of Parliament and chairman of the Christian People's Party, i an interview with this paper, commenting on the slow progress mad i getting the civil war in southern Sudan discussed by the United N tions. During the foreign policy debate in Parliament last November, K rvald proposed that the Norwegian government take the initiative i this matter at the UN, request that a committee of investigation b sent to the area affected by the civil war and later present cone to p oposals for ending the bloody conflict. We asked if anything had happened since he took the matter up i P liament. "No," said Lars Korvald. "Usually such proposals are 'picked up' b the government which then -- usually once a year -- issues a state m nt or a document on what it has done about them. If a parliamentary r presentative wants the matter brought up for a vote in Parliament, h must request such 'a vote at once. Otherwise, the customary p ocedure,is to include the proposal in the minutes which are submitted t the government." We asked what he thought was the reason why not just Nors y but m st countries seem so unwilling to discuss in the UN matters pertai i g to breaches of human rights. "Apparently formalities and a kind of built-in mechanism of sl g shness ih foreign affairs offices," Korvald said. "This is especi ly t e with regard to the UN. Formal difficulties are used as excuses This is not the right time,' or 'Other countries will not support o p sition,:'. and so forth. "But it seems to me that once in a while Norway could take it u n i self to stand alone on an issue on which we really think action sh d b taken,: when we feel that the UN could really do something positive. I we took such a firm stand, others would usually join us after a w ile. In my opinion Norway has such status that no one would suspect of twisted political motives if we spoke out on such matters." We asked if our caution might not be due to political motives. W ).s Norway afraid to step out of line with the great powers? "No,, that I would not believe," said the president of the lower h )use emphatically. "But it is my impression that too little attention i paid to encroachments on human rights, although I am happy to not that popular opinion and politicians In general are becoming more an m )re convinced that we must take a more active line in order to protect t ese rights." Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIDP79-01194A000300070001-6 NEW YORK (moved For Release 1999/09 January 23, 1971 CPYRGHT Africa's Hidden Wars For a year the guns have been Silent in Nigeria. ine civil war that gripped the world's attention is ended; the Ibos who powered the Biafran secession are resigned most of them-to working back their passage within united Nigeria. But the first anniversary of Biafra's sur- render serves as a reminder that three other blood civil wars have been grinding on almost unnoticed i Africa. These wars are humiliating for leaders of the ne Africa and for the 41-nation Organization of Africa Unity, especially at a time when they are imploring th world to help end white minority rule in South Africa Rhodesia and three Portuguese colonies. For all thre wars involve ethnic and religious clashes comparabl to those that helped provoke Nigeria's agony, comparabl even to those behind the black-white confrontatio farther south. In the Sudan a Government dominated by the Arab Moslem majority of the north has fought for fifteen year to suppress a struggle fo autonomy by the blac pagan and Christian mi nority in the south. Tw representatives of a blac Sudanese liberation mov ment, in, New York r cently to petition th United Nations for heir, charged the Khartoum Government with a policy "genocide against the four million blacks of the souther! i MORG NBLADET, Oslo CPYRGHT January 26, 1971 troops, President Tombalbaye's black and largely Chris- tian Government has been unable to crush an insurrec- tion of Arabic and largely Moslem northerners. Faced with France's decision to pull all its troops out of Chad during 1971, Mr. Tombalbaye has signed an agreement with several dissident leaders and is negotiating with others; but there is no indication to date of any peace moves involving the major rebel fighting force. East of the Sudan, the Moslem-led Eritrean Liberation Front, which has struggled for nine years for independ- ence from Ethiopia, recently charged Emperor Haile Selassie's Christian Government with attempting "mass annihilation of Eritreans." With their fixation on the white regimes farther south, African governments have made no serious effort to halt these wars. The Organization of African Unity has not even set up a consultative committee as it did in a fruit- less peace effort in Nigeria. African leaders can say with justice that much respon- sibility for these cleavages in Africa rests with the colonial powers that drew state boundaries to suit their own convenience rather than for ethnic, religious and regional viability. They are less persuasive when they blame the steady exacerbation of old African feuds on "neo-colonialists" or "imperialists"-or on unnamed "out- side nations and groups," as Emperor Haile Selassie did with regard to the Eritrean conflict this week. In forming the Organization of African Unity the African governments agreed to live with those colonial boundaries and to strive to surmount them in a collective effort to build peace, prosperity and solidarity. Their effectiveness in extending majority rule to the rest of Africa will depend heavily on their ability to put their racial house in order north of the Zambesi and their' success in halting the killing of African by African. Sudanesisk prest til tysk avis: ?Ti ganger verve cnn i Syd-Atrika cHvis et hvitt regime hadde behandlet oss slik Khartoum nu gjor, da Mille utvilsomt hele verden ,rast og skreket Opp. Men det som skjer i Syd-Sudan er ti ganger verre enn de tilstander som vane brpdre Det er en syd-sudanesisk, presbytarlansk prest som sier dette til Siiddeutsche Zeitungs utsendte medar- beider Rudolph C h I m e I- 1 i, i en rapport datert ja- nuar 1971 (SZ 22. ds.) i Syd-Afrika og Rhodesia Og som praktlsk tact alle de yngre personer denne Jo- CPYRGHT ev t h med, bekjente ogsh denne presten seg til opprprsbeve- gelsen Anya-nya og dens po- Iitiske mal: LOsrlvelse. - Vi gjer ikke lenger noe fremkritt, vi bare faller til- bake klaget en katolsk prest seg ti] Chimelli Det kirke- saintunnet nan tilhorer har klart a flilcke pa, endel kirker, og liar organisatorisk sett klart a hedre sine vilkdr en- Men efterat samtlige 33 a denne kirkens hvite misjonee rer ble utvist av den sudane siske regiering 1 1962, er by den pt` de f'a tnnfodte pre sters skuldre blitt for tun E. Selv prester Ira andre arab eke ag afrikanske land som kunne hjelpe syd-sud neserne - biir jjelden innvi get vlsum fra Khartoum-r gj eringen m vle undeApproved FdVnKWfas'&n1969/b1O : t -RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 T V ANGS- DEPORTASJON Chimelli beretter om en he- likoptertur han var med p.a fra Juba (hovedstaden i pro- vinsen Ekvatorta) til di- striktsbyen Merida, 240 krn lenger vest. Helikopteret, en russisk MI-8, be flrbyet av en sudanesisk pilot og med et mannskap som sellers bestod av bade russere og egyptere, hadde ogsa meth seg soldater som holdt kontinuerlig utkikk efter mulige gerilja-soldater pa bakken. I. Meridi ble de mgtt av stedfortredende kommandant for den sydlige armegruppe. oberst Omar el T a y e b, som kunne fortelle de ankomne pressefolk at etvangsdeporta- sjon var en av hjprnestenene i. regjeringens frigjdringspoll- tikk> . - Vi vil finite andre bo- plasser for folket. Derfor sam- ter vi dem inn I skogene og pa det apne lendet og far dem til a bosette seg I neer- heten av byene. MAlet er a hindre at oppr?rerne skal kunne blande seg med folket og bli forsprget av den lokale befolkning. -Og hvis folket ikke vii bli med Deres soldater for a bygge slike efredsbyerx - hva da? spurte journalistene obersten. - Vi ma ganske enkelt gjpre noe for dem. Det er hi- storlen gang. De innser ikke dette ennu, men senere vii de komme til a forst& det. Med et selvtilfreds smil kunne han fortelle at over halvparten av dem om var butt innfanget, av troppene hadde butt med til byene. Hva som skjedde med den andre halvparten sa han in- tot om, if?lge Chimelli. det stor armod. Som eksempel nevner han at Juba siden 1963 har hatt en befolknings- eksplosjon rra 18 000 til 63 000 innbyggere; Merida fra 4000 til 15 000 1 samme tidsrom. For sa mange. mennesker mangler man b&dP arbelde, saniteeranlegg og sA godt som alt annet. Resultatet er demokratise- ring, kriminalitet, lediggang, prostitus j on. H.EREN BINDES I SYD Selv om Anya-nyas militee- re styrke regnes for a va;re ganske beskjeden, har den 1 hvert fall klart a oppna at mesteparten av den sudanesi- ske beer ma sta I Syd-Sudan. Og en stor del av velene har Anya-nya klart a gj0re ne- sten ufremkommellge, ved 1. plassere miner og ph grunn av den stadige truselen om overfall og gerilja-angrep. -Nar vi for bare ett 6,r siden klarte a fange en opp- rerer, sa hadde an vanllgvis bare to eller tre patroner pa seg. Men i dag har de bade bazookas og 2-tommers botn- bekastere.. uttalte en bekym- ret offiser 1 regjerings-styrke- ne til Rudolph Chimelli. Pa regjeringshold fikk han ogsa h?re at uten de sovjet- iske helikopterne ville ikke regjerings-styrkene ha store muligheter for A gripe inn mot Anya-nyas avdelinger. De ferdes ofte I s>l ulendt og vanskelig terreng, at det ville vaere det rene selvmord a forf?lge dem. I disse omrade- ne har opprorerne ofte den reelle kontroll, skriver Siiddeutsche Zeitung. SLUM Det er imidlertid tydelig at negrene I Syd-Sudar slett Ikke forstar at' regjerings-sol- datene vii ?gjyre noe' for dem. Festeparten av menne- ne, som blir samlet inn som kveg pa markehe, rummer fra Kfredsbyenea. De slutter seg til Anya-nya ute I bushen, el- ter de flykter over grensen tit Etiopia, Congo eller Uganda. skriver Siiddeutsche Zeitungs medarbelder. dg i gresshytte- slummen rundt byene hersker ME.7,LOM BARKEN OG VEDEN Sk langt befolkningen I syd er butt tilbake ute pa lands- bygden, betyr borgerkrigen at stammefeldene er b11tt langt sjeldnere og svakere. Men al- likevel star landsbyene mel- lom barken og veden:" Hvis de samarbeider med oppr(rerne. rammes de av regjerings- styrkenes straffe-ekspedisjo- ner. Hvis de er lokale mot re- gimet i Khartoum - noe som ogsa forekommer - utsettes de for hensynslpse gjengjel- delsesaksjoner fra opprorernes side. Det finnes stammer som bokstavelig talt er butt revet t stykker i dette dilemma. Av Lapi-folket, som en gang tellet 30 000 mennesker, gjen- star der I dog kun noon fa hundre som vegeterer I ut- kanten av Juba, beretter Chi- melli som et eksempel pa hva denne hensynslose borgerkri- gen har fort til Anya-nya (som rett over- satt betyr cgiftig gress*) tok i junt for den 4amlede sepa- ratistbevegelse under ' sine vinger (Anzanta Liberation League, Suer Republic, Antdl Government, Nile Republic). Lederen for denne fronten er en katolikk og tidligere loytnant, Joseph L a g o. Hans nestkommanderende heter Samuel Abu J o h n og er protestant og tidligere kap- tein I haeren. Som nr. 2 kom- mer en tidligere major, prote- stanten Frederick Brian Wil- liam Maggot. Det sudaneiske hemmelige politi hevder at Lago star 1 naer kontakt med Israel, at han selv har veert i det lan- det og at ban sender andre Anya-nya-krigere dit for. ml- liteer utdannelse. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 1011'r Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 C PYRC TDITIONS IN SUDAN TEN TIMES WORSE THAN IN SOUTH "If a white government treated us the way Khartoum does, the hole world would have risen up in protest. But what is going on in he southern Sudan is ten times worse than the conditions being en- dured by our brothers in South Africa and Rhodesia." This statement was made by a southern Sudanese Presbyterian inister to Rudolph Chimelli, foreign correspondent for Suddeutsche eitung, in an interview dated January 1971 and appearing in that paper n 22 January. Like almost all the younger people with whom the journalist ame into contact, this minister believed in the rebel movement, the ya-Nya, and in its political goal -- emancipation. "We are no longer making any progress, we're just going back- ard," a Catholic priest complained to Chimelli. The religious society o which he belongs needs to repair some of its churches and must mprove its organizational conditions. But since 33 of the white missionaries of this church were rdered to leave the country in 1962 by the Sudanese government, the urden has fallen much too heavily on the shoulders of the few native riests. Even priests from other Arabian and African countries -- who ould be able to help the South Sudanese -- are seldom granted visas y the Khartoum government. Teport at i on Chimelli told of a helicopter trip he took from Juba (capital f Equatoria province) to the town of Meridi, 24+0 kilometers to the est. The helicopter, a Russian Mi-8, was flown by a Sudanese pilot d manned by a crew of Russians and Egyptians. It also carried sol- ders who kept a constant watch on the ground for guerillas. In Meridi, they were met by the deputy commandant of the south- rn army forces, Colonel Omar el Tayeb, who told the arriving press epresentatives that "forced deportation was one of the cornerstones f the government's liberation policy." "We will find other places for these people to live. That is y we are rounding them up in the jungle and from the open country d making them settle near the cities. Our goal is to prevent the 1 bels from mixing in with the people and from being supported by the cal population. The journalists asked the colonel what happened if the people d not want to join his soldiers in building these "peace villages." "We simply have to do something for them. It is the course of U story. They don't understand that yet, but they will understand it 1 ter on." Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : G4 RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 CPYRGHT wit.-h 9. self -satisfied smile, he said that over half of those ho had been caught by the troops had come along aid nothing about what had happened to the other half, according to himelli. However, it is very obvious that the Negroes of southern Sudan do not understand that the government soldiers want to "do something" for them. Most of the people who were rounded up like cattle from the fields run away from the "peace villages." They join the Anya-Nya out in the bush or cross the border to Ethiopia, the Congo, or Uganda, ac- cording to the correspondent for Suddeutsche Zeitung. And there is great poverty in the grass hut slums surrounding the cities. As an example, he mentioned that since 1963, Juba had suffered a population explosion from 18,000 to 63,000 inhabitants. Meridi's population had swelled from 4,000 to 15,000 in the same period. There is not enough employment, sanitary facilities, or anything else for that many people. The result has been demoralization, criminality, unemployment, and prostitution. Dilemma of Tribes As long as the population in the south remains out in the country, the civil war serves to reduce the frequency and intensity of tribal feuds. Even so, the villages are faced with a dilemma -- if they cooperate with the rebels, they become targets for the govern- ment forces' punitive expeditions. If they are loyal to the govern- ment in Khartoum -- which does happen -- they are exposed to severe retaliatory actions by the rebels. There are tribes that have literally been torn apart by this dilemma. Of the Lapi people, who used to number 30,000, there remain today only a few hundred who vegetate in the outskirts of Juba. Chimelli cites this as an example of what this ruthless civil war leads to. The Anya-Nya (the proper translation of which would be "poison grass") took the entire separatist movement under its wing last June (Anzania Liberation League, Suer Republic, Anidi Government, Nile Republic). The leader of this front is a Catholic and former lieutenant, Joseph Lagu. His second in command, Samuel Abu John, is a Protestant and former captain in the army. Next in line is a former major, a Protestant, Frederick Brian William Maggot. The Sudanese secret police claim that Lagu is in close touch with Israel, that he has been to that country himself, and that he sends other Anya-Nya warriors there for military training. Army Must Stay in South Even if the military forces of the Anya-Nya are estimated to be quite limited, they have been able to make sure that the greater part Approved For Release 1999/09/0k: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 CPYRGHT 1-6 of the Sudanese army has to remain in southern Sudan. And the Anya-Nya have been able to render a large number of roads impassable because of mines and because of the constant threat of ambush and guerilla attack. " Just a year ago, if we managed to capture a rebel, he usually had only two or three cartridges with him. But today they have bazookas and 2-inch grenade launchers," a worried officer in the government forces told Rudloph Chimelli. Government sources also said that without the Russian helico ters, government forces would have little opportunity to attack Anya-Nya squads. They often operate over such rugged and diffic terrain that it would be sheer suicide to try to pursue them. In such areas, the rebels are often actually in control, according to Suddeutsche Zeitung. AFRICA DTARI January 29 - February I3, 1971 CPYRGHT, Genocide' In South A dlenod Two representatives of a black Sudanese movement have claimed that the Arab-led Governmeilt of Sudan is using Egyptian and .Libyan troops and Russian aircraft irl the I6-year-old conflict between the Christian and pagan blacks of the south and the Muslims of the north. In whit they described as an overt appeal to world public opinion, the two men described the policies carried out by the national Government in Khartoum "as genocide against the 4,000,000 blacks of southern Sudan". "We call upon the nations of the free, world to express their indignation at what is happening and to bring pressure to bear on the nations that supply armaments to Khartoum", Mr. Laurence Wol Vol said in New York recently. He is a Sorbonne graduate who, as a member of the Southern Sudan Liberation Front, has presented a petition to the United Nations calling for the observer teams to investigate his charges of genocide. The other spokesman, Mr, Frederick Maggotti, who identified himself es a co;oncl of Anyanya, the guerrilla army of the south, said that 25 Russian built aircraft were being used to bombard (ho southern provinces and that Libyans and Egyptians were among the 25,000 troops fighting the rebels in the south, He said that in the past eight years some 250,000 black Sudanese tied been shot and 250,000 had died of hunger. For its part, the Khartoum Government has accused outside forces of stirring up rebellion and secession, "They stirred up civil wars in the Congo and Nigeria and they are trying to play the same evil game in Sudan," Mr. a1.Nimeiry, the Sudan Prime Minister, sold in a recent interview In Khartoum. (Tirne..r, London) Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :.GtA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 1 ppxQvildf oLdeJease 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 January 28, 1971 THE THRE. HE germ of seces- sion is growing ain in Africa. Just r cently, several areas i northern province Ethiopia were aced under state of ergeney. Reason? ecause of banditry d subversion. An Ethiopian Go- ernment statement blished in the offi- ial gazette, alleged t at "foreign spon- red bandits, trained d armed with mo- ern weapons, were ttempting to under Inc Ethiopia's sove- ignty and integrity." The emergency rder affected areas in ritrea enclosing a ix-mile belt along the ea coast and Sudanese order. In this area, group of Eritreans, perating under the mbrella of Eritrean iberation Front. have emanded indepen- ence for the territory. Su- And in Southern Su- an, a group of unpa- iotiC citizens known s "Anya Nya South udan Freedom Figh- ers", are reported to ave intensified their l fir the suc- ession of Southern uda;l from the rest of etcountry and have aken up arms against e Government. Serious concern The situation in Ethiopia and Sudan should cause alarm and ? serious concern to fall patriotic Afri- cans who abhor the concept of secession as a means of settling political differences. AFRICA The question here is not about the merits and demerits of Eritean libe- ration Front that is Pham- pioning the cause of in- dependence of the Eritean people. The question is whether Africans can ? again afford to kill one another on the instiga'ion of foreigners, no matter the reason. . In this wise, It becomes imperative for the Ethio- pian Government to en- by' JAMES. U MOH Ten years ago, It was Congo. We had thought that Africans would learn a lesson from that blood bath. Then it happened in Nigeria. Must we allow it to happen in Ethiopia, Sudan or any other Afri- can country? And if' we must not allow it to hap- pen, is it not proper that we kill this dangerous germ of secession before it grows too big to cause a menace? It is not yet known which of the foreign Go- vernments are actually behind the rebellion in Ethiopia. But the fact that the Ethiopian Go- vernment has officially alleged that foreign Go- vernments sponsored, trained and armed the re- bels with modern wea- pons, is enough to keep every patriotic African standing on the alert. lighten the people of Afri- ca with the real situation. At the moment, very little seems to be known. Those foreigners sponsoring the Ethiopian rebellion, should be named openly. All available . facts should be placed before the Organisation of Afri- can Unity to enable the OAU intervene with a view to seeking peaceful ways of settling the con- flict. A once and for n11 lasting but peaceful settle- ment should be effected as urgently as possible. This can be possible if the OAU is involved 'now that the dispute has n_ot got out of control. Reactionary farce the very reactionary fo ce which propped up d sustained the rebellion in Nigeria are solidly:. behi d the Sudanese rebels. Ironically, the is e forces, that backed Ni, e - to .~ ~ry are a o ri said to l~ * pporting e Sudanese Government. Sudan. which is e main link between Afr a and the Arab world -- as the two races inhabit t e Country - is religion ly , divided between the M s- lem north and the Ch s- tian south. It is this t at the rebels are exploiti g to sustain their igno le cause. Recently, the So th Sudanese Freedom Fig t- ers appealed to the P e for aid, charging the u- danese Governfent w th committing genoci e against the people of Southern Sudan. In their appeal, t ey described themselves as the "Southern Sudan e Catholics along w th other Christian breth n living under extreme e- pression in our homela d or as refugees in frien 'y African countries un er the foot of the Sudan se Arabs." The rebels further a e- ged that. "Russians soldi rs were directing the Su a- nese Arab soldiers in their war to stamp cut Christianity from cur In the case of Southern Sudan, it is clear that country and to exter i- nate our African civili a- tion...... killing and ma' ing our defenceless o- ple." We in Nigeria, are v ry familiar with this type of allegation. It was the e Ap roved For Release 1999/09/02 : CI -RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 CPYRGHT lu u powe KeieAsenq0 to obtain massive a from 1 on t e allegation the unit f the conflict f th . y o e country, o the world Roman Catho- that Sudan was "threate- an attempt was made on No matter how progres- li th h h ed i i h n cs roug t e notor ous n w t dege eration, his life when he visited CARITAS under the pre- instability and chaos." Southern Sudan. Several text of protecting the The Southern Sudan rebels were killed in Christian East from "on- problem began to 'plague clashes with Government slaught" of the Moslem the regime of Aboud in troops. Presently, 'a cam- North. It is not likely that 1963 leading from one paign to eliminate the the same can happen in crisis to another up to rebels is said to be going Sudan? And must we allow October 1964 when 17 an in Sudan. it to happen? people were killed as While it is recognised It is not necessary now they marched to the pa. that there is 'a southern to recall the full back- lace where Aboud lived to Sudan problem, it must ground of the crisis. It is protest against the earlier also be recognised that a known fact that for a killing of a student of the solution to this con- long time, there has al- Khartoum University in flict cannot be found in ways been the conflict previous revolt. secession. between the Arab north and African south of Su- dan. This often centred around the accusation by Solution to cenfiict MiIitt3ry campaign General Numeiry may be, its success depends on all Sudanese hands being on deck. It is a vital fact the Sudanese Government cannot afford to overlook. Besides, it will be to the eternal credit of General Numeiry, if he succeeds in forging a happy multi- racial society. the Africans that the It was the same South- The Sudanese Arabs Arabs were wielding po- ern Sudan problem which and Africans, with a pro- litical and economic po- forced Aboud to resign per understanding and wer to their disadvantage on November 15, 1964 co-operation can and and were trying to subju- after ruling for six years. should live together hap- gate christianity to Islam. The demand for seces- pily. While the 'military It was only in the last sion became more pro- campaign goes on per- decade that the conflict nounced with the eme.gen- haps unannounced to was intensified with gra- ce of left wing regime smash the rebels, the Su- dual demands for seces- of General Numeiry in danese Government should sion particularly during May last year. Shortly take urgent but positive the era of General Ibra- after he had taken over steps to seek a much him Aboud who seized TEEMPO, Montevideo January 29, 1971 CPYRGHT Santisimo Padre: 25 de mayo de IM Nosotros, ca'diicos del Suddn meridional en con- junto con otros hermanos cristianos y eompatriotas musuimanes que vivimos suletos a ex'rema represi6n en nuestra Patria o refugiados en paises africanos amigos, de nuevo suplicamos a Su Santidad que tome cuenta de nuestra triste condicibre y haga oir su voz bendvola en bien de nosotroe. El ado pasado inten'amos poner en conocfmiento de Su Santidad la situaeibn de nuestro pueblo bafo la bota de los drabes sudaneses. No se nos oeurria entonces que en espacto de un solo mes el Gobierno en Jartum sufriria in cambio que acarrearia aun mayores represiones, esta vez bajo el infiufo de una potencia extranfera -la Uni6n de Repdblicas Socia- listas Sovidticas. Precisamente mientras escribimos a Su.Santidad los tanques sovidticos retumban por las canes y ice reac'ores sovidticos MIG-21 sobrevuelan el desfile en conmemoracidn del Dia de la Revohici6n Afrieana. Ayer esos mismos tanques y aviones actuaban en el Suddn meridional, matando y mutilando a nuestra rmeblo indefennen. 11 Manaus voloerds a continuer an misibn de muerte if estrdgos. Desde el eambio de bie no en mayo nuestro pueblo se ha habi'uado at es pectdculo de scldados rusos at =and* de soldaft drabes sudaneses en su guerra por aplastar el Cristia nismo en nuestro pass y exterminar nuestra, civili zaci6n africana. Esta guerra de los drabes contra el Cris'ianism no as Cosa nueva en el Suddn, donde reins Cat6H cos Ortodexox comp Makuria V Aiwa fueron destrui dos par inmigrantes drabes de Arabia en el siglo XI de la Era Cristiana. Hacia la segunda mitad del siglo %I% el Sierv del Senor, monsenor Comboni, penetr6 en el Suddn Is cabeza de in pufiado de gallardos y devotos mt sioneros y de nuevo enarbol6 la Bandera de la Sal vaci6n. A la desesperaci6n reemplaz6 la esperanza Cuando germinaba la simiente del Ct4stianismo un segunda tragedia azot6 a la naciente Iglesia, la cua fue tronchada por la revuelta mahdista. La mefor descripci6n de la revuel'a mahdisti que cast destruyd la obra de la Igtesia hace 70 atio es is del R. P. Joseph Ohrwalder en su libro "Die silos de cautiverio". En el deeia: "El adetanto de 5 ados fue arruinado par la revuelta mahdista. El Su ddn volvio a caer en las tinfeblas de las cuales Approved -6 fi o~b~~LY deralfd '`-RDP ~ r t `Is r iLs"!/' =rfl e.tSu s nttidaadd como esclavos y la band-era de la tirania onde6 sobre deberd tambidu derivar valor de ells. las ruins humeantes de Darfur at Mar Rojo y de Esta nueva voluntad a resistirnos a la is1amiza- Repaf a la segunda catarata. Partidas de /andticos cion y arabizacidn de nuestro pueblo por la fuerza ha has barrido pot sobre la fat de la lierra, destruyendo traido una nueva ola de sufrimiento a nuestra tierra Lode swto ertstiano. M sudan Pace coterie en su ~ y d~uda? y nuestro pueblo. La espada isiamica shore se en- La Paz inc restablecida por los ingleses durance cubre tras Los tangoes sovibtlcos y Los fandticos mu- La del none den muerte sWematicamente a sus 50 ands de gobierno. A Los misioneros cristianos nttestro pueblo con cohetes y bombas incendiaries lee Inc de nuevo autorizado el proselttismo en el Su- fabricados en la URSS. Tengo que repetir los hechos ddn meridional Durante la tutela ingiesa los misio- de nuevo Para en/atizar nuestra situaci6n. Ya mds de nerds laboraron sin cesar predicando la Palabra de 500 mil hombres, mujeres y nigos han perecido ba- Dios al bum pueblo del Suddn meridional. Vartos ie s., QugMOW vivos en no. choza s o muertos de centenares de miles abrazaron at Cristianismo,,,y des- aid. Otros tdntos ltan tenido Qiee purls de 62 anon de dura labor el Cristianismn alcan- hambre escaper y de e/suerme Patric en busts de refugio en Los vee I a la carters generaei6n en algunas families. cinos estados de Uganda, Kenta, Etiopia y la Repti?- Los buenos misioneros tambidn fundaron escuelas y Mica Centroafricana. BE resto de la poblaci6n en el ezsenaron tEcnicas moderns. Los centros crs'ianos Sudan es una poblact6n de refugiados que se ocultan r del aqui saber se multiplicaron.. Nos enorgullece menc?ra en Las selves y los mon'es. Su gituacibn es en verdad egresado de que Ios todo centros sudanbs cris meridional instruido era penosa. Viven en constante temor y siempre en fuga Los os sa- desoiada. Heridos de muerte par las bolas sovleticas, cerdotes catOlicos naturales del l Su Su . ddn meridionidional Inc.- otros miles perecen de enfermedad y de hambre. Casi r andan ae at iNg Dtem. IQs buenos Padraa de secs de calla diet recidn nacidos mueren de malaria y Verona han estado pacienemente preparande elate de una multitud de endemias tropicales. Miles de ni- loeal - cures, religios y religiosos-. BE Progreso fm not mueren cads ago de desnutrici6n par falta de rdpido y el futuro del l Crlstianismo estuvo cast ale- - alimentact6n vitaminica. Miles mueren pot exposition gurado en e1 Sudan meridional. a la intemperie. PiIotos drabes. en aviones MIG ru- Suplicamos a Su Santidad sec Indulgente con nos- sos han destruido totalmente Las viviendas y el ga- otros mien ras repasamos esta pequega historic ya ndo vacuno, cabrio i lanar en muchas pares del que pone de relieve la calamidad que ha sobreventdo Pais. Hospitales y escueLas han sido destruidos, clau- ahera a la Iglesia v que amenaza La destrucclOn to- surados o convertidos en cuarteles militares. La go- tel de Los cristianos sudaneses. EI and pasado Ia ame- blacion estd moribunda V su situation inspire Idsti- naza provenia tie Los nuevos s de los inmigran- ma. Carece de refugio permanente v se guarece bajo tee drabes que dos veces destruyerruyeron el Cristlanismo drboles infestados de mosquitos y en cuevas. Si el en nuestra parted de Africa. Hoy esa cruel fuerza dra- mundo permanece indiferente a la agonia del Suddn be es azsiera a y enormemente reforzada por la URSS. meridional, no quedard vivo en 61 ning'un cristiano que quisiera roar, destruida la Iglesia en el Sudan me- en unos cuantos altos. ridionai, ya que el Cristianismo es anatema Para el Era de esperarse 4ue los otros estados africanos drito de Los nglatios erra cedi s edib cos La . independencia a Ios se irguieran,en nuestra defensa contra esta conjure Cuando Inglat drabe Para come'er el genocidio en toda una nation sudaneses, los del none : enian Vera alto. Disponlan a/ricana, Pero no to han hecho. No nos queda otra del poder canto politico como economleo. Esos drabes, esperanza en la humanidad ni en Los Consejos Mun- obsesados per ci anhelo de subyugar at Mediodia cris- diales de Paz, salvo en la Iglesia de la cual es jefe nano, elaboraron political dirigidas a la total isla- Su Santidad. De nuevo suplicamos a Su Santidad que mizaclbn is arabizacidn del pueblo sudanbs rn?eridional. otorgue at pueblo sudanbs meridional su bendici6n Nuestra volumed de rechazar is resuos a esta paternal y pontifical Para que podamos mantenernos /orzosa isiamizacibn y arabizacibn de nuestrestra culture firmes en nuestra resolution de defender nuestra Fe cristlana'p afrteana crab inevitablemente la actual Lu- y echar de nuestra Patria a las tropas extranjeras. cha armada antra Mediodia y Seplensta' . padre Santo, nosotros sus hijos e hijas en Je- Respaldados par el mundo comunista sdvibtlco r sucristo comprometemos nuestra lealtad a la Iglesia Pudien arabe, Los drabes sudaneses, no cio ddblega de Dios, asegurdndole que acep?aremos el genocidio el espIritu del pueblo sudanbs meridionadionaI, estdn die- antes que permitir que par tercera yes se destruva et hate. tierra erra futuro e es s mientr Cristianismo en nuestra tierra. puesto el mus a ndo e entero teroarnos de observe y la fez nada de la et mu d n ri . ei n'eL' hJoseph ? SU~a-pu , a l degdcii6n C d to V s realmente sombrio y Para tenebroso pare nosotros soda- La vases meridionales y Para el el Cristianismo. o u Sag Cuando el ago pasado vimos a Su Santidad du- Combatlentes de Libertad del 3uddn Meridional. rante in peregrination a Uganda nos nutrimos de TIEMPO,, Montevideo January 29, 1971 25 May 1970 We Southern Sudanese Catholics along with other Christian brethren and Muslim countrymen living under extreme repression in our homeland or as refugees in friendly African countries appeal once more to Your Holiness to take stock of our plight and raise your benevolent voice Approved F 'R ese 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 _(,5- CPYRGHT Approv?d LFor ~P '~j ' ???YOVJ& Cj 3F'p9bMi94AOOO&GOG OOO1-6 o then that in only one month's time the Government in Khartoum would undergo a change which would bring about even greater repressions, this time under the influence of a foreign power - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Even as we write to you, Soviet tanks are rumbling through the streets and Soviet MIG-21 jets are flying overhead in a parade to com- memorate African Revolution Day. Yesterday these same tanks and planes were in action in Southern Sudan, killing and maiming our defenceless people, and tomorrow they will return to continue their mission of death and havoc. Since the change of government in May of last year our people have grown accustomed to the sight of Russian soldiers directing the Suda- nese Arab soldiers in their war to stamp out Christianity from our country and to exterminate our African Civilisation, This war of the Arabs against Christianity is not new in the Sudan, where Orthodox Catholic Kingdoms such as Makuria and Alwa were destroyed by Arab immigrants from Arabia in the 12th Century Anno Domini. "Towards the second half of the 19th Century the Servant of the Lord, Mgr. Comboni, led a handful of gallant and dedicated Mission- aries into the Sudan and once more raised aloft the Flag of Salvation. Des- pair was replaced by hope. As the new seeds. of Christianity took root, the second tragedy struck the infant Church which was nipped in the bud by the Mahdist revolt. The Mahdiss revolt which almost destroyed the work of the Church 70 years ago is best described by the Rev. Fr. Joseph Ohrwalder in his book "Ten Years in Captivity". In it he said: "The progress of 50 years was ruined by the Mahdist revolt. The Sudan fell back into the darkness from which philanthropy had rescued it. Civilisation was swamped in the flood of fanaticism. The sign of.Salvation was blotted out, the bearers of it chained as slaves and the flag of tyranny waved over smoking ruins from Darfur to the Red Sea and from Regaf to the second cataract. Bands of fanatics have swept over the face of the land, destroying every Christian sign. The Sudan lies open in its desolation and nakedness." Peace was restored by the British during their 56 years of rule. Christian Missionaries were again permitted to proselytize in Southern Sudan. During British tutelage the Missionaries worked relentlessly preach- ing the word of God to the good people of Southern Sudan. Several hundred thousands embraced Christianity and, after 62 years of hard work some Christianity reached into the third generation in some families. The good Missionaries also opened schools and taught modern skills. Christian in- stitutions of learning became widespread. We are proud to mention here that every single educated Southern Sudanese graduated from Christian institutions. The first Southern Sudanese Catholic priests got ordained in 1944. Since then the good Verona Fathers had been patiently producing- local clergy - priests, sisters and brothers. Progress was rapid and the CPYRPH,T j)f-Chrj,s, 1aj itvwa We beg Your Holiness to bear with its in our reviewing this little history as it heightens the calamity which has now befallen the Church and which threatens the total destruction of the Sudanese Christians. A year ago the threat came from the new offspring of the Arab immigrants that twice destroyed Christianity in our part of Africa. Today this cruel Arab force is urged oil. and mightily reinforced by USSR which would like to sec the destruction of the Church in Southern Sudan, as Christianity is anathema to the success of Soviet designs. When Britain handed independence to the Sudanese, the north- erners had the upper hand. They wielded both political and economic power. These Arabs, obsessed by the desire to subjugate the Christian South, made policies aimed at the total Islamisation and Arabicisation of the Southern Sudanese people. Our will to reject and resist this forced (slamisation and Arabici- sation of our Christian and African culture inevitably created the present armed struggle between South and North. Supported by the entire Soviet Communist and Arab world, the Sudanese Arabs, unable to break the spirit of the Southern Sudanese people, are determined to eradicate 'is from the face of the earth while the whole world looks on and does nothing. The future is indeed bleak and gloomy for us in Southern Sudan and for Christianity. When we saw your Holiness last year during your pilgrimage to Uganda we drew great moral strength and courage from the experience and we found a renewed spiritual impetus for our struggle to defend our Homeland and our Faith. Your Holiness should also draw courage from that. This new will to resist the lslamisation and Arabicisation of our people by force has naturally brought a new wave of misery to our land and people. The Islamic sword now takes cover behind Soviet tanks and the Moslem fanatics of the North are systematically killing our people with rockets and fire bombs made in USSR. I must repeat the facts once more in order to emphasize our plight. Already more, than 300,000 men, women and children have perished either shot dead, burnt alive in their huts or died from famine and disease. A similar number have been forced to flee their Homeland as refugees in neighbouring states of Uganda, Congo, Kenya, Ethiopia and Central African Republic. The rest of the population inside the Sudan is a refugee population hiding inside jungles and mountains. Their plight is indeed pitiful. They live permanently in 001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09M2 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 knnrovedTFor Release 1999/09/02 - CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-R fear and are always on the run. Besides being killed by Soviet bullets daily, thousands die from disease and famine. Nearly six newly born babies out of ten die from malaria and a host of other tropical diseases. Thousands of children die each year from malnutrition as a result of shortages in vitamin giving foods. Thousands perish from exposure to bad weather. Arab pilots in Russian M1Gs have destroyed every single home, cattle, goats and sheep in many parts of the country. Hospitals and schools have been either destroyed, closed or turned into military barracks. The entire population is a dying one, their. conditions are pathetic. They have no permanent shelter, but hide under mosquito-infested trees and in caves. If the world remains indifferent to the agony of the Southern Sudan there will not be a Christian life left there in a few years to come. We would hope that other African states would rise to our de- defence against this Soviet Arab conspiracy to perform genocide on an entire African nation but they have not. We have no hope left in humanity nor in the World Councils of peace except in the Church of which you are head. Once more we beg Your Holiness to give the Southern Sudanese people your Paternal and Pontifical blessing so that we shall -remain firm in our determination to defend our Faith and to drive the foreign troops from our homeland. Your Holiness, we your sons and daughters in Christ do pledge to you once more our loyalty to the Church of God assuring you that we will accept genocide rather than allow Christianity to be destroyed in our country for the third time. with filial devotion Col. Joseph Lagu on behalf of The Anya Nya His Holiness Paul VI South Sudan Freedom Fighters -68- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 MARCH ? rQW or Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Jariua; ~ AC8 OX rnH LEVI BANK .ARABS. USE SOVIET ARMSTO MASSACRE NEGROES CPYRGHT While the whole world is in an uproar over Britain selling arms to South Africa which might be us- ed :against Africans, not a whimper of protest is heard about the Soviet arms that are not only be- ing used to kill the Sudanese, but have been used against them for several years past. South African apartheid is a OPEN GENOCIDE b1 t on civilisation which no de- As for the war in Sudan, which c it man will uphold, but it is for the past few years has been a alling that those who condeinn coming close to outright genocide, ite racism suddenly go blind, this is not hypothetical butchery de ' if and dumb when dealing with in some distant future, but some- ot er versions of the say-Pe thing that is taking place right di ease. now, with non-aligned nations If it is criminal for South Afri- conveniently looking the other ca Whites to turn guns on South way because it suits their ipter- Af lean Blacks, it is equally ab- gists. ho ent for the Arab minority in That the murder of Negroes in th Sudan to turn its guns on the the Sudan has been ignored does Af. can majority that inhabits the not make it any the less dreadful. so thern regions of that country. The details of this one-sided con- e arms that Britain plans to flirt have been recorded in' all pr vide South Africa -in return for their gory detail on several op- la 'ties at the. Simonstown base casions, but the same "liberals" ar being given for, purely strate- whose tearduc's are so sorely af- gi reasons that Britain considers fected by Vietnam don't seem to ess tial to its security. The Third give a damn. W rld, used to looking at One particulraly vivid pictorial ev thing with blinkers on, re- account of this one-sided conflict fus s to see the necessity for the was given over Norwegian televf- W tern nations to have a base sion. An equally harrowing We in he Indian Ocean at all but is told in "Sudan - An African do not mind in the least if Rus- Tragedy" by Per Yvind Heradst- sia vessels virtually take over veit. The authors of these ac- the area. counts bluntly called. what was .hlr Swaran Singh at Singapore, going on in the Sudan "murder when faced point blank with evi- of a nation," but the Norwegian, de a of Soviet naval base all foreign Ministry, with customary roe d the Indian Ocean perimeter, diplomatic' down-playing, put on fle in the face of facts by claim- its rose-tinted spectacles and ac- ing there were no bases at all. nounced that these. accounts were exaggerated and that the situation He went on i:e argue that there in South Sudan was " improving. wa a vast difference between. ,"facilities" given to the Soviets In order to clear up who was an the communication base that right and who was wrong, the re- Brit tin and America intend to puted journal Aftenposten decid- est lish in Diego Garcia. '60 to. check. Heradstveit's findings hen specifically confronted and to quiz him in an., interview. wit the naval base of Socotra, The following are extracts from rec try given to the. Soviets by the article by Afteinposten's Au~gn the Republic of Yemen, Swaran Tjomsland : Sin h retorted that no such base he controversy over television exis ed _ because the Soviets. had reporter Per Yvind Heradst- den d it and South Yemen had veit'~s claims about the war repl ed to his queries in the nega- in the Sudan will undoubtedly S aran Singh must be singe- about the Sudan is published in lay] naive to take such assertions the near future. at face value. Nei country is 'going H ere he repeats claims denied ...-.,,.,.,..,.. =au vouba FU to blazon such deals to the worj i. by the Norwegian Ministry 4 Norwegian TV team at the actual I am not willing to back k d n site. an inch." Foreign Affairs and, among other The world found out abo t it things, uses the phrase "murder because two reporters accide ally of a nation". Regardless of who arrived on the scene just ter- comes closest to the truth, wards. No one knows low arty Heradstveit has done a great deal similar events have taken ace, to bring this "forgotten war" into Heradstveit says. the light. Since Heradstveit and Sta run Heradstveit made a trip last (his TV colleague) entered p evi- summer that lasted for about a ously closed areas in South S an, month, travelling both in North in June 1970, new reports the and South Sudan. Arabs' oppression of the Net roid INESCAPABLE REALITY population in the South have eeu made. In his TV programmes Heradst- Among others, Bishop fno veit drew. a number of farereach- Tiboi; in a letter to the two efe- ing conclusions. Among other vision reporters from Aba in the things he used the expression Congo, 'has written that With "murder of a nation" to describe soldiers a attacked a village and ill- the Arab rulers' actions against ed at least five people, while the the Negro population in the rest of the inhabitants fled nto South., the forests. When this conclusion was re- In the London Times there is a lected by Foreign Minister Svenn report of another occasion en Stray, the TV reporter said i "I six people were killed. do not want this to be a conflict NORWEGIAN FEELING over words.' The essential factor is that we must open our eyes to What does the Norwegian ov- what is happenfng 'in the Sudan, ernment feel? whatever we choose to call it.$) .'Ve ' do not : deny that the Genocide is usually defined as situation is serious, we do not the killing of members of a group. doubt that there are acts of op- of people with the aim of com- pression by both sides, and we pletely .or partially annihilating do not, of course, doubt the TV national, ethnic, racial or relteam's pictures at all," says De- Otis groups . and this is the partment Head Tim Greve, of the word ("folkemord" in Norwegian) Foreign Ministry, to Aftenpo en. that Heradstveit used. But we have made our ,fnv sti- Heradstveit in his book has put gat ions during the course a year prior to Heradstveit s d aside his professional mask of neu- Stabrun's coming to the Su an trality and objectivity. And Fie , and we believe we -:are able to does not try to conceal this fact. prove our statements that the on- After having been led to the re- clusions ? are exaggerated." mains of a church in the country town of Banja, where 28 people However, he cannot re eal w e r e murdered, Heradstveit what sources the Foreign Mi is- wrote : - try bases its claims on. "T heard about Arab massacres On the opposite side, Hera st- in the Sudan. I had taken these veil claims : "I cannot say reports with a grain of salt. Nqw thing besides the fact that we T saw it for myself." have been in South Sudan, h ve It has later been confirmed by seen the charred remains of _ b es other sources that the massacre and smelled the corpses, and hive in Banja took place under , condi be} n ^with .people who have b en -69- Approved For Release 1999/09/02. CIA-RDP79-01 194A000300070001 -6 CPYRGHTApproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 He also adds that the informa- The law of amnesty would be captured our r tion he was given in Khartoum expanded. Southern Sudan would landing strips for . aircraft, which agreed completely with what his be developed socially and cultu- the rebels used to move in arms, critics said but which, according rally, with emphasis on economic medicine and food. Large quanti- to him, does not present the true progress. A Minister for Southern ties of military equipment, anti- picture at all. affairs would be appointed. Edu- aircraft guns, mines, mortar and Heradstveit quotes a captain cation of the Southern Sudanese automatic rifles were also seized, named "Michael" from the Anya- for various sectors within the ad- said Abbas. Nya (the South Sudan ` rebel ministration would be started. Reports bout this were carried movement) on the situation. "They Heradstveit says in his book in, among others, the French (the Arabs) do not want us Neg- that Nimeiri's Government has newspaper Le Monde. The British roes in the Sudan", Michael says. shown a willingness to improve Evening Standard also reported "They want to wipe us out They the situation. But he concludes by that "about 60 Soviet-equipped want the land, the fields, the saying that not much has been and to a great extent also Soviet- nastures. They want to control the done. The people are no longer manned MiG-21 jet aircraft now Nile. They do not want us in a satisfied with words. They want are stationed at the town of united Sudan. They will wipe us to see action, and there has been Juba", the capital of the south- out. no action., ern province, Equatoria. "At this moment hundreds of Norwegian television's findings The Sudanese Minister for South people are dying of undernourish- are fully corroborated by Oslo's Sudan, Joseph Garang, recently ment in the bush. They have never leading daily Morg+enbladet. On confirmed that a constant escala- seen a doctor, they have. never December 3, it carried an article tion of the war is taking place in had enough to eat. if this is not by Gunnar Moe, not only indicat- the three southern provinces and murder of a people, I cannot un- ing genocide against South Suda- recommended that greater military derstand what you can call it." : nese, but charging the Russians pressure must be exerted from the world keeps quiet and accepts the Arab ^ overnment in Khartoum XT-_ The active presence of the As a summary or inc ractw;, lowing is taken from Moe's report for themselves a solid military behind the conflict, Heradstveit in. Morgenbiadet olitical foothold in the coun- p "Racial conflicts there have al- ways been between the Arabs in the North and the Negroes . in the South. As an -overshadowing, do- minant fact is the Arabs' feeling that the people in the South are like helpless children at another phase of historical development, and that they are not `mature' enough to rule themselves or to have any influence on the central government. This should not be in the least surprising. In Stalin's day hole nations were removed from their ancestral land and sent to erish in exile. Small races like the Chi hen- Ingush were totally wiped out. Larger ethnic groups lik the Crimean Tatars were ban bed, but not allowed back even after they had been rehabilitated the charges against them being rov- ed to be totally false. There is something int nsely odious about nations with lood, on their hands trying to each peace to the world - and at is exactly what Russia is doi . r,VUALLZ nAt.x~i Russian bombers in great sweeps As is known, the matter was "In many. ways we recognise systematically bomb the jungle taken up in the last debate on the pattern from the thought-pro- where rebels are hiding. They use foreign affairs in the Norwegian cesses among the Whites in Rho- both napalm and ordinary 'bombs. Parliament, but Foreign Minister desia and South Africa. It is tra- After that, Arabs come with tanks, Stray answered that it "would not gic that the African people in infantry, parachute troops and be correct to deliberately portray many ways are not better than helicopters. The jungle is " tho_ the situation as bein worse tai n the worst of the White racists. roughly combed". Behind all this, it is according to the factual in- And the most tragic fact of all, the Russian military advisers then formation which is obtained from perhaps, is that the Arabs them- follow. a number of sources." selves are not conscious of this condition." Aircraft used are Russian MiG- We ask again : What are the According to Heradstveit this 21 and Antonov bombers, as well sources of. the Foreign Ministry? as MI-8 helicopters. The Daily Where have they been in order to Is, that hhassbeen discussed very title Telegraph reported on 17 Octo- obtain "factual information?" It and which has been described as ber, 1970 that an additional 27 is important to know this now - "the forgotten war." Russian bombers had arrived at since a long line of internationally Khartoum airport for delivery to recognised press organs, journal- The new regime which came the Sudanese Air Force.. For two ists and news bureaus claim the into power during the summer of and a half months, the offensive exact opposite of that which the 1969 has recognised the relation- went on, while the world is little Norwegian Foreign Ministry sour- ship with the population in the informed about the blood bath. ces maintain. South as Sudan's greatest problem Khartoum no longer attempts to From this article one can see and has formally giv the south- conceal that a battle is being that the Soviets while they keep ern provinces region n nal self-gov- waged in the south. On 9 Novem- prodding their client states to ernment. her, 1970, Defence Minister Gene- raise a howl against the supposed The new President, the GaafAr fol rat Khaled Hassan Abbas held a militarism of the West, and who lowing Nimeiri, has declared that thhe fol. keef South African racialism to lowing four measures will be put press conference in which he said the forefront, quietly - P try. iii to. asily u u.. ?-.~; - r I government in is entering a new and more ported the ocentra ~ serious phase. The, Khartoum Nigeria during the conflict with Government has begun an inten- Biafra, they now have no scruples sive offensive with bombers, beli- about helping Prime Minister copters, napalm and motorised in- Nimeiry in Sudan to crush the fantry to crush "once and for all" Negro rebels in the ,outh. the rebel organisation Anya-Nya`. The problem is only to get This great offensive, which is "the job done as discreetly as directed by Soviet "advisers", possible". The publicity which was begun in the middle of Sep- now begins to follow in the tracks tember last year according to of the civil war, does not particu- several sources. larly please Khartoum. M Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA- DP79-01194A000300070001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 February 1971 THE ~'v~AMEM 0 F W SEC0,10 0IAFRA CPYRGHT Race and religion split the Sudan From THE SUNDAY TIMES, London rising re- sistance from the black tribes of the South to rule by the Arab North. Even a coup by the leftist military junta of Gafaar al Nimeiry has failed to settle the vexing question of autonomy. The Times of London has a worried report from Anthony Nutting, after a trip to the Sudan saying that racial and religious overtones and the combination of hysteria on the rebels' side and confusion in Khartoum threaten a new Biafra. Joining the fray are an observer who takes the rebels' part in a letter to The Times and a mercenary whose last main engagement before the Sudan was in Biafra. He is interviewed in Hamburg's Die Welt. N THE HEART of Central Af- sit round a table and negotiate rica an almost forgotten war is with the rebels, they made it clear being waged which has all the equally that the only basis on makings of a second Biafra. For which the Anyanya would ne- most of the last 14 years, since gotiate was absolute independ- the Sudan gained its independ- ence for the South, which no one ence from British rule, the three in Khartoum could accept. southern provinces have been They refused even to consider conducting a running battle for the present government's propo- secession against successive gov- sals which would give the South ernments in Khartoum. regional autonomy within a Periodically a lull in the fight- united Sudan and insisted that, ing enables the local Sudanese as Africans, they wanted no administration to establish a few truck with an Arab regime which more "peace villages," where life wanted to Arabize and Islamize can return to normal under the them as all previous Khartoum protection of the army or the regimes had done. police. But, as happened just be- Today no less than in the past, fore my visit in October, the reb- North and South are divided by els-or Anyanya, as they call a "grass curtain" with the differ- themselves from the local word ence between the sides as stark for the viper venom which is as the contrast of the rich red their emblem-soon resume their soil and tropical abundance of harassing tactics. Roads are Equatoria with the and desert mined, army convoys are am- wastes of Nubia, Kardofan and bushed and the peace villages be- Darfur. come once again isolated clear- I am convinced from my talks ings in a hostile' jungle. with Nimeiry and his ministers I did not gain much cheer in Khartoum that they genuinely from talking to the Anyanya believe their policy of regional leaders in Uganda, whose atti- autonomy is the best way to bring tude showed a militancy which peace to the South and keep it would have done justice to Bi- within a united Sudan. Certainly afra's Colonel Ojukwu in his it is a considerable advance on most perverse moments. While anything offered by their prede- protesting that, if the Sudanese cessors. government genuinely wanted a But in an area without as yet settlement, they should offer to a common language among the major tribes, without modern roads or railways and where the tribesmen are at roughly the same stage of civilization as Brit- ain before the Roman conquest, it is hard to see how regional au- tonomy can be much more than a paper project for many years to come. And the danger is that, if the Anyanya keep up their harassments for another two to three years, the Nimeiry govern- ment will be forced to maintain martial law and will be unable to show any progress with its "southernization" programs. Dis- illusionment in the South could then spread like wildfire and an- other Biafra become inevitable. As I learned from the display of captured rebel arms at army headquarters in Juba and from information given by Anyanya deserters and prisoners, Israeli officers, helped by West German "mercenaries," veterans of Biafra, are training and supplying the rebels with equipment ranging from American medical kits to Russian and Chinese weapons captured from the Egyptians and Palestinians. But if, over the South, the Nimeiry government has been the Approved For Release 1999/09/02 74h4-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 victim of the mistakes and ma- chinations of others since it seized power in 1969, it is not making the problem any easier to solve by pursuing an economic policy which involves national- izing and confiscating foreign and Sudanese private enterprise with a socialist insouciance that takes too little account of the country's real economic needs.. No doubt previous governments had allowed some cobwebs of cor- ruption to spread through Su- danese business and commerce. But Nimeiry's new broom has not only swept away the cobwebs, it has also removed much of the essential furniture. The Sudanese pound's value on the free market has fallen to a half of the official exchange rate. With the cotton crop mort- gaged to Russia for the next three years, trade is being steadily di- verted towards the Soviet bloc, and the Sudan's balance of trade ATLAS February 1971 with Britain and the West plunges ever deeper into the red. Not that Nimeiry and his Revolutionary Command Coun- cil are unaware of the risks they are running. The disinclination they showed to discuss economic problems when I called on them seemed to suggest that they were more bewildered than com- placent. Nimeiry struck me as a sincere and dedicated patriot. His minister of planning told me that the government intended to introduce measures to promote security for foreign investment. But if Nimeiry decides to slow down the nationalization pro- gram, as the recent sacking of three hard-line Leftist ministers suggests he may, he will still have to reckon with a strong reaction from the Communists. No doubt it was in an effort to find a way out of this labyrin- thine confusion that the Sudan agreed so readily to join the re- cently established tripartite union with Egypt and Libya. D(- spite the differences which d - vide the Sudanese and Egyptian peoples, President Nasser' 3 death was probably felt mo acutely in Khartoum than in an other Arab capital outside Cair . Over the last year of Nasser life, the Sudan enjoyed som - thing of a special relationshi with Egypt. At such a crucial moment, marriage with the oil wealth Libya and the relatively superi technical and political know-ho of Egypt can hardly come ami and, so long as it lasts, may pr - vide a much needed blood tran - fusion for the Sudan. PYRGHT IS NIIIEIRY THE VILLAIN? Anthony Nutting's article on the Sudan contained several errors of fact. Firstly, the Southern Sudan rebels, known as the Anyanya, are not "separatists." They are fighting to create conditions whereby the civilian population can have a chance of democratic self-determina- tion. Many of the freedom fighters would welcome the chance to achieve real (not mythical) autonomy for the South. Secondly, the Anyanya have frequently offered to meet the Khar- toum government at a peace conference to be held outside the Sudan. Nimeiry has refused. It is, therefore, inaccurate to draw a close parallel with Biafra. Nutting's impression that the Khartoum government is making an all-out effort to achieve peace and progress is belied by the actions of their own army, the bombing of civilian villages, the burning of crops and the massacre of Christians at worship (all of which are amply documented). These acts of barbarity are rapidly alienating even further a large proportion of the Southern popula- tion and destroying hopes of eventual peace. Surely the solution (if Khartoum is genuine in its peaceful in- tentions) is to withdraw the army from the garrisons in the South, to cease to train or employ Egyptians and Libyans and to get down to the conference table with Southern leaders. Failing this, the. only recourse left open to Southerners is to strengthen their forces until i i i i 6 i . s qe1k l f - Letter from B.H.D. McDermot, chairman of the Southern Sudan Association in THE SUNDAY TIMES, London Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :1.-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT I By shin Burman, rvive the sixth coup att pt- si h i nce t e r seizure of p wer months no, have accuse 0- nited States. Israel and esti erinanxy of ? a plot to tur the The three countries, of cc rse7, e `Anya Nya' (the rebel n. n ter the scorpion's tfr~i znn r.: Pe donee, the Sudan. the far s4 an culturally the most var erdl, co ntry in Africa, was ruled by an Anglo-Egyption Condominit In, Br ain shared sovereignty o cr. Su an with Egypt. Now Sudan is I rul d by a (Revolutionary Cou cil est bibbed by a group of yoo g I ar y officers after the May 1 6 i sd the VAR, with whom It forusiaai ro of the secessionists while haa. ur an arras, are isecurely held by th government forces. Howe erg wi h A he gradual escalation of fig Ling the situation in ti :;e ar too is rapidly changing iss, fa ur of the rebels. lie war in the southern S cia- n c provinces till recently ied d n the bulk of the count -y'as 30 000 strong, partially So et- e ipped armed forces. The n.` da, developed tropical region; ' th a area of 300,000 square in e:s is largely populated by 'thre to" fo r million' Christian and pa an bi eks, who often fall pre to s% eping attacks of disease, fa, m e and northern raiding par lea. 7b ~ rural areas, allure more t an 5?i per cent of the native pop Ia. P rtuguese Angola. Within a pan o eight months more than 7 000 f .itives from the three vast s there provinces of Sudan ave b en resettled in Uganda, 5. 000 I Burundi, 24 000 in the' he C ego a rd 14,000 in ii'anzania, in a ? di? ti n, there are thought t be ht ndreds of thousands of unr 'hi- to ?ed !refugees. n w oeconte the largest a a ;le s rte of refugees after war, u,.n aI as"'.cadly,. Sudan cornprisrera "Yearly 000 tribal groups. The 14 rr,ii.?,ion people are all Islamic by faith a and tradition save those izt, 'the south. Khartown, the capital, or long derived its wealth from the Me. But today, with an an- nual Paz" capita income of X40 only,, Sudan survives virtually on a single crop, cotton, and has limited foreign exchange resources. It is, finding it hard to finance tlasa war in the south. The violence in the south Is due ! to the same racial conflict which caused the civil wars in Chad? Ethiopia and Biafra. In Sudan its has been aggravated also by the grave inconsistencies in Britain'a own policies prior to the country a. independence. To aradicate slave raiding a* well as the economic and cultural a xploi.tation of the black tribes by the northerners. the British. cordoned off the southern region, from the rest of the countr-y creating in effect a huge sane... tuary shielding its inhabitants. from development. Education wan: neglected and left completely in. the hands of Christian mission- aries. After. World War 1.1 Britain, confronted with increasing na-. tionalisrza and pressure from the north, abruptly lifted the protec- tive ban on south Sudan and ali., cci independence talks at which, the black minority was absent. The Arabs demanded a complete-. . iv centralised type of administra- tion and ultimately secured it. After Independence, Sudanisatlosu led to the appointment of Arab* rather than Africans, in the civil services even In the south. The south also faced a tremendous now of traders and soldier` from- the north. A mutiny finally broke out is;, :Eaiuatursra and Bul'ar-el^4:ai`aa.rsl Ply Atha southern army men.. in 1956. Thou;'' it was quelled, open re. sist.arce to the northerners, con- tinued and -gradually developed into an, organised guerilla'-tlhe `Anya I'vya.' Political leaders who demanded a federal constitution were either imprisoned ' or forced: to seek as rlum in foreign countries, Siinul- taneouxsly all missionaries were expelled. Large-scale civilian violence grey. ' It is now clear that without the co-operation of :the "Anya Nya", there can be no effective a.daitiia- istration in the rural areas of the south. General Tafeng, a old former officer of the Ecsua- toria Corps who leaf the . 1325` mutiny, is - the rebel .iesder.. 'The i uerilla force- was or? gniscd III 1963. Today. it equipped with modern automatic weapons, inid receives foreign military aid. Torit, Juba and' Nimule are places where heavy fighting has., been reported. Significantly. it is the Nasserite Sudanese leaders who seek a fe- deral-type set up under' which' the three Southern provinces would get an autonomous status. Approved For Release 1999/09/027 CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 NANA IX THE A&W- gql For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 February 33, 1971 Sudan South comes first CPYRGHT The Sudanese army has recently scored some successes in its apparently endless war against the southern separatist rebels, the Anyanya. These successes were due partly to a new supply of Russian weapons, in par- ticular troop-carrying helicopters, and partly to the changed attitude of the former Ugandan government. One of the more publicised incidents was the handing over by the Ugandan authori- ties of Rolf Steiner, a German mercenary who had fought in the Congo and Biafra before he came to Sudan. He escaped into Uganda after his camp near the frontier was over- .run two two months ago ; the Ugandans -Landed him back to the Sudanese. These military operations are one part of a two-pronged attempt by the radical army officers and left-wing intellectuals who now run Sudan to find a solution to the southern prob- lern. The other part is represented by the declaration of regional autonomy announced by President Numeiry after he seized power in May, 1969. This Was not just a fine-sounding phrase ; the government, particularly its marxist members, are looking for ways of implementing the liberal measures envisaged in the declaration. The regime's concern with internal affairs far- outstrips its interest in the still shadowy plans for inter-Arab unity. President Numeiry went to Cairo last month for the meeting of heads of state of the proposed Egyptian- Libyan-Sudanese-Syrian federation in order to show willing and to avoid giving the Libyans an excuse for saying the Sudanese were dragging their feet. But the Sudanese have made it per- fectly plain that they, like the Egyptians, will not be party to any hasty, ill-prepared union which would only humiliate the Arabs by its inevitable failure. The Libyans recently published in their army newspaper details of the discussions which led to the declaration of tripartite federation (Syria was a late, and not altogether welcome, fourth) ; this provoked e u into publishing their version of the talks. The Sudanese report claims that the Libyans were proposing the imme- diate unification of the three countries' foreign ministries and political organi- sations (though Egypt, at present, is the only one of the three to have a political organisation) and the estab- lishment of a fixed timetable for full constitutional unity. All this, the Sudanese argue, is impossible because of the wholly different circumstances of the three countries. The ardent, puritanical Islamic Arab nationalists in Libya are impatient with Sudan's concern with its southern conflict and censorious of the continuing presence of marxists in the Sudanese government. But Sudan's leaders need the support of both right and left. Although the revolution of May 25, 1969, was carried out on a wave of popular enthusiasm for the idea that Sudan should shed its old ways and decisively join the "Progres- sive" Arab camp, much of this enthusiasm has waned and the regime lacks a solid popular base. So it is trying to win allies where it can. The recent release of 125 of the 16o men accused of being involved in the fighting at Aba Island last March (when the Imam Hadi a1,Mahdi was killed) was aimed at disarming right- wing opposition. The Sudanese com- munist party is split but the weightier half, led by the attractive, if irrepres- sibly bourgeois, Abdul Khalik Mahjoub, is now opposed to the regime. Mr Mahjoub himself is in detention and two of his supporters were eased out of the government in November (the third minister dismissed at this time, Major Farouk Hamdallah, is not a com- ,munist). Marxists who remain in the government include the minister of labour, Muawiya Ibrahim, and the minister of industry and mining, Ahmed Sulaiman. Their presence does not satisfy Sudanese communists but they help to protect the regime from an all-out onslaught from the left. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDPZ9-01194A000300070001-6 APWr W br 4 4ase 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 'February 16, 1971 CPYRGHT Norsk initiativ for Syd-Sudan i FN? Appell til Menneskerettighetskommisjonen og regjering om bidrag til a lose konflikten C PYRGHT og menn har i en henvendelse tii Regjeringen anmodet om at det tas et norsk initiativ med sikte pi en losning av situa- s jonen i Syd-Sudan., I henvendelsen heter dot bl. a.: *Undertegnedo ber Regjeringen om A medvirke til at konflikten i Sudan blir tatt opp til behandling I den sesjon FN's Menneskerettig- hctskonmisjon skal ha i Geneve den 22/2-26/3 1971 slik syd-suda- nesiske politikere ber om. Vi har tillatt oss a sende en henvendelse om sakgn direkte tit Menneskeret- tighetsko.mmisjonen og logger ved en kopi. Vt mener at en behandling i kommisjonen sikkert vii kaste nytt lys over situasjonen og at det er et rimelig krav at represen'anter for Syd-Sudan far legge from sin sak for verdensopinionen.> I henvvendelsen t11 Monneskeret- tighetskommisjonen heter dot bl. a.: ?Til tross for motstridende in- meldinger pA at sivilbefolkningen i Syd-Sudan er rammet av suit og sykdom og utsatt for overgrep fra do stridende parters side. Det er derfor grunn til A frykte for at sto- re dolor av befolkningen ikke or sikret selv de most elementaere menneskerettigheter. Det er et sterkt behov for tiltak sow kan gjo- re en snarlig slutt ph de indre mot- setninger mellow Nord- og Syd-Su- dan. Vi or kjent med den rcformvilje den sudanske regjering har uttrykt, I pakt med denne mA dot vaere rik- tig at begge parter Mr anledning til A legge sin sak from for verdens- opinionen. PA denne bakgrunn vii undertegnede sterkt oppfordre Menneskerettighetskommisjonen til A to det sudanske problem opp til undersokelse og vurdering pA sin sesjon i Geneve den 22/2-26/3 1971.>) Bak henvendelsen star en rekke personer fra det politiske og hu- manitmre, kulturelle og kirkelige virkefelt, bl. a. syv stortingsrepre- sentanter, ni biskoper, Oslo-univer- AFTENPOTEN., Oslo February 16, 1971 CPYRGHT NORWEGIANS SUBMIT REQUEST FOR DISCUSSION SOUTH SUDAN PROBLEM IN UN Appeal to I-krnian Rights Commission and the goverment about contributing to the resolution of the conflict. In a communication to the government, forty prominent women and men requested that it take up a Norwegian initiative aimed at a solution of the situation in Sout4 Sudan. The communication says, among other things: "The undersigned ask the goverment to cooperate in having the conflict in Sudan taken up for discussion in the session which the Human Rights Commission of the UN will hold in Geneva from 22. February to 26 March 1971 as the South Sudanese politicians request. We have taken the liberty to send a communication about the matter to the Human Rights Commission and enclose a copy of it. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : IArRDP79-01194AO00300070001-6 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 "We believe that consideration in the commission certainly will throw new light on'the situation and that it is a reasonable demand that the representatives for South Sudan should submit their case for world opinion." The communication to the Human Rights Commission says, among other things: "In spite of conflicting information about the conditions, reports indicate that the civilian population in South Sudan is stricken with hunger and sickness and exposed to attack from the disputing parties. Thus there is reason to fear that most of the population is not assured even the most elementary human rights. There is a great need for an effort which can put a speedier end to the internal conflicts between North and South Sudan. "We are familiar with the desire for reform which the Sudanese government having reason to present their case for world opinion. On this background, the undersigned strongly wish to urge the Human Rights Commission to take up the Sudanese problem for study and evaluation in its session in Geneva from 22 February to 26 March 1971." A number of persons from the political and humanitarian, cultural and church fields, among others, seven members of parliament, nine bishops, and a rector from the University of Oslo, are behind the communication. MOR(fl1BLADET, Oslo February 17, 1971 CPYRGHT SUDAN - EN PROVE EN GRUPPE nordmenn? - med bl. A. 9 biskoper, 7 stortingsmenn, flere professo- rer og rektor ved Universitetet I Oslo, samt forretningsmenn, pressefolk og talsmenn for en rekke humaniteere organlsasjo- ner - har rettet en henven- delse til FN's Menneskerettig- hetskommisjon og anmodet om at konflikten i Syd-Sudan mA bli dreftet I dette forum. Grup- pen har ogsA henvendt seg til Den norske regjering og bedt regjeringen stette initlativet. Tiltaket indikerer i sin And noe mer enn. bare det syd- sudanesiske sporsmAl. Det in- nebeerer i realiteten ogsA en generell og ekende misneye med den behandling som de internasjonale menneskerettig- hater blir til del, nettopp i de organer som har pAtatt seg A vokte over enkeltindividets Integritet, sikkerhet og frihet. Det har I flere Ar vokset frem en stigende grad av for- bauselse og skuffelse over den eftergivende holdning som har preget regjerlngene I de demo kratiske land, nAr det gjelder aktivt A arbeide for slike sa- ker I FN og lignende interna- ejonale sammenslutninger. Man vil ikke lenger aksep- tere adet stille diplomatic, som vokter seg vel for ikke A stete stormaktene pA mansjettene i full offentlighet. DET NORSKE initiativ over- for Menneskerettighets- kommisjonen bmrerl bud om at opinionen nu forventer en mer aktiv og Open hoidning fra den domokratiske del av ver- den. Sudan er den aktuelle prove- sten - men med at langt vi- dare nersnektir. Approved For Release 1999/09/0: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Nom- ggl, F ji eIease 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 February 17, 1971 NORWEGIANS URGE UN DISCUSSION OF SUDAN PROBLEM CPYRGHT ament A group o orw several professors and a rector of the University of Oslo, as well as business men, pressmen and spokesmen for a number of humanitarian organizations, have sent a communication to the Human Rights Commission of the UN and requested that the conflict in South Sudan be discussed in this forum. The group also has turned to the Norwegian government and requested that the government support the initiative. The effort indicates something more in its spirit than only the South Sudanese question. In reality, it also signifies a general and increasing dissatisfaction w' the treatment of which the international human rights is a part, precisely in the organs which have undertaken to watch over the single individgal's integrity,.secur' and freedom. For several years, an increasing degree of amazement and disappointment has arisen over the acc.omodationg attitude which has characterized the governments in the democratic: countries when it is a question of actively working for such matters in the UN or similar international organizations. The "quiet diplomacy" which is careful not to hurt the feelings of the big powers in full public is no longer accepted. t1 Human Ri hts Commission carries the message ty The Norwegian initiative to ie g that [world] opinion now expects a more active and open attitude from the democrati part of the world. Sudan is the current acid test - but with a much wider perspective. AREEI DE RBL ADET, Oslo a f / 0 February 17, 1971 ; ,OR, I 7; 0 7 J CPYRGHT /.' 0 r l./ v -17 rr 0 Pet vii by ph praktiskc problerner t f'a hrakt opp situanjonen j ?r- udan i FiNs mennes ere a ornmisjon, oru se r er ncinli at Sudan sely gir sift samtykke til dette. Op I annen Vi'-sarnznen lieng er det vanglcelig A fA offisiell he- handling av saken. Ekspedisjonssje: Tian Greve i uten- riksdepartementet sier, pA bak grunn av brevet fra en rekke per- soner fra ulike virkefelt i Norge til Regjeringen om S to et initia- tiv, at de norske myndigheter er fullt oppmerksom pd lidelser folk i Sor-Sudan ni 1 gjennomgi, og? er opptatt av dette. - w;en sporsm:11et el- om man kan gj0re n,oc gjennom menneske- rettighetskommisjonen hvor Norge for ovri'g ikke er med. Komrni- sjonen har scly satt opp visse ,-1., tnr hphanrllineen av klager. eller opprette en ad hoc-komite for A gjcre dette, kan det bare giores med samtykke av den Stat- en saken gjelder. Forutsetningen er at unders?kelsen skal skje i nzert og varig samarbeid med den ne part og pa de vilkar ? denne fastsetter. Dette gji r at de formel- le inuligheter for A arbeide via kom.misjonen er sterkt begrcnset. Og ennA er vi ikke kommet s', langt at FNs mcnneskerettighets- konvensjon er bindende. Men nar dette er sagt, er det dart at en appell fra en bredt ral=k vi-r'kning. Den vil i h0y g-a henlede opi.nionc:ns oppmer?ksomh t pa prohlemet. - Kan ikke saken tas opp annen mate i FN? - Situasjonen er den at den saken er tatt opp underhfinde . Men orn Norge skulle 0nske A bringe den inn for FN, vil m. ikke fd stotte fra de afrikans e land. Dermed er sjansen for t den skal komme opp liten. Fra S?r-Sudan er det komm It on henvendelse om at FN a gripe inn, silk at organisasion n er kjent mcd situasionen. Approve For Release 1999/09/02: jfRDP79-01194A000300070001-6 ARBECDERBLADET, Oslo February l7,A oved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 CPYRGHT SUDAN SITUATION DIFFICULT TO PRESENT It would present practical problems to have the situation in South Sudan brought up in the UN's Human Rights Commission. The assumption is that Sudan itself will give its approval for it. Also in another UN connection, it is difficult to get official handling of the matter. Tim Greve, a department head in the Foreign Department, said, regarding the letter from a number of persons from different fields in Norway to the government about taking an initiative, that the Norwegian authorities are fully aware of the suffering that the people in South Sudan must experience and are preoccupied with it "But the question is whether one can do anything through the Human Rights Commission in which Norway is not a member. The commission itself has set up certain rules for handling complaints. If it should undertake investigations itself or establish an ad hoc committee to do it, it can only be done with the approval of the state concerned with the matter. The assumption being that the investigation occurs in close and lasting cooperation with this state and under the conditions which it stipulates. This has the effect that technical possibilities to work through the commission are very limited. And yet we have not gone so far that the human rights convention of the UN is binding. "But when this is said, it is clear that an appeal from a broadly made-up roup will have a moral effect. It will draw a great deal of the attention of [world] opinion to the problem." "Can the matter not be taken up in another way in the UN?" "The situation is that this matter was taken up privately. But if Norway hould desire to bring it before the UN, it will not get support from the African our*ries. So the chance that this shall occur is small. "A communication came from South Sudan that the UN must intervene, so that he organization is familiar with the situation." Approved For Release 1999/09$2 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 ' el&;' -' 99/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 CPYRGHT FS-F UTESJA7VGDE BE,-Fl?1E~LSEFRONT S .da s afrikaner tigs ihjal ^ Inga "olalnpliga" befrielserorelser tillats delta i den konferens oln Afrikas befrielserorelse, som pagiir i I)ipoli i Otniis. -Motets yard, Finlands Stu- rlentkarers. Forbund (FSF) liar vinkat used kalla handen at Dominic A. Mohamed, representant for sodra Sudans befriclsefront Anya Nya. Orsak: Den liar befrielsefronten ar "rote tillrackligt kand". o FSF har dock ;haft c. 15 ar pa sig, att Infdrskaffa informa- tion o utvecklingen I sodra Sudan, Mir hundratusentals in- vanare odats urdcr de senaste 15 are [:] Enli t uppgifter fran Foren- ta rata nernas flyktingkommis- sarie, u pgick antalet flyktingar till gr nlanderna Iran sodra Sudan or tva ar; sedan till 125000. I lag an siffran c. 300 000, sager minis Mohamed. o Han has varit kontakt med FSF, f? att fa delta i konfe- rensen tminstone ; som observa- tor. Hari var villig alt endast lyssna, me talc. Cf Me nej. FSF uppger pa Hbl:s "rfragan, att konferen- sen int kunde u(vidgas till att omfatt ocksa problem I Sudan. Det a trots att man vid forhan informationen fore konfer sen uttryckligen pape- kade al t "Afrikas hPfrielserorel- se" sk ll tolkas sum en enda heihet, alt det inte an fraga om de en ilda befiielsefronterna, utan a samordnad kamp mot koloni ism, imperialism, rasism och to tryck overhuvudtaget. o Pa tisdagen krop det dock tram a t befrielserorelserna skall vary g dkanda av den afrikans- ka enhctsorganisationen OAU, for att vary salongsfahiga pa Dipoli. o FSF:s dorrvakter ser till att obehoriga jute tar sig In 1 mo- teslokalen, berattar utrikessek- reterare Martti Laajava vid FSF for Hbl. 'plan viii jute hora Dominic Mohamed beratta om hur 1 mil- jon manniskor, afrikaner, i sodra Sudan her dodats av regerings- trupperna. araber. (Uppgitterna om antalet doda ar okiart, andra kallor havdar alt det ror sig om c. 100 000 nagra hundra tusen etc. Kiart ar I. alla fall att forlusterna i manniskoliv ar enorma.) FSF-konferensen vill jute hel ler hora talas om de hundra- tusentals flyktingar, som lever under obeskrivliga forhallanden i Sudans grannlander. - Vi hjalper ju dem ocksa, sager viceordf. Martti Mellais, FSF. Var organisation star ju bl.a. bakom Finlands Flykting- hjalp rf. Pa FSF-motet ges ingen infor- mation om uppgifterna, corn havdar att M000 soldater fran Libyen och Egypten hjalper. Su- dans militbrregering i stravande- na att "arabisera" sodra Sudan. Konferensdeltagarna skulle bland annat ha haft mojlighet att titta pa biller, som vicar hur napalmbomber, som enligt hr Mohamed tagits I bruk under de senaste fyra manadernna, har farit Pram med eivilbefolk- ningen. Yen eftersom man "saknade information" om befrielserbrel sen Anya Nya, sa hade bildern ingen plats I debatten om de afrikanska befrielserorelsen stort. Detta trots att ocksa de andra sidan hade haft utmdrkt mojligheter att ge sin syn p saken. FSF:s medarrangbr, In ternational Union of Student; (IUS med hbgkvarter i Prag ordforande ar namligen hemm hbrande i norra Sudan' Viceordf. Martti Mellais berg tar att FSF varit i kontakt me denne. och att man efter de diskussionen definitvt beslut ate Anya Nya inte far delta motet. FSF anscr som sagt alt ma jute har tillrickliga informati nor om organisationen. For ti manader sedan tillstalldes doe FSF en promemoria om rore sen? doss syften, aktivitete , problem. on:.koinal M.M. Anya Nya har ocksa beror 1 flera brett upplagda artikla I varldspressen, och ocksa i de. finlandska pressen. "Folkmord tysthet", "'Ett nytt Biafra", "De burtglomda tragedin i Sudan' har man kaliat afrikanerna kamp mot de harskande arabe na. FSF sager: -- Vi kan irate p nagot satt notera Anya Nya, d kunde Sara nagon annan. Hbl: Vem? FSF: - Nagon som anser a sodra Sudans befrielsefront int har nagonting att gora bland d andra befrielsefronterna pa dett mote. Det ar vart all notera att kon ferenstemat I och med delta at talande har andrats. Det ar alit Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :4 A-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 CPYRGHT av ~ ; t ,~ ' rf` IVase 1999/09MI exploaterats. G IAi4 9-011$A~4-A013AS1~7000 a 6 5 e l ii re s r Sydafrika, Rhodesia, Namibia, Mogambique, Angola och Guinea Bissau). Inte om "Afrikas befrielse". Dominic Mohamed ar en av de fa Fran sodra Sudan, soot beffolkningen lever kvar i stenaidern. I dag lever . afrikanerna i Sudan undangoinda i bushen, pa flykt undan regeringstruppernas soldater, lyckats skaffa sig utbildning. Regeringschefens, general- Han studerar for narvarande vid major Jaafar al-Nimeiri, erbju- hIinnesotauniversitetet i USA. danden om partiell autonomi Han berattar for Hbl att be- vagar man late lita pa. Inte fricisei'Orelsen kompar for reli- elter de massakrer sour for- gionsfrihet och for afrikanernas anstaitats mot afrikaner, och ekonon:iska och kulturella obe- inte sedan man under de senaste roende. wren sett sina skolor och sjukhus For invanarna i sodra Sudan framstar araberna corn kolonia- lister, sour med vald foroker omvanda afrikanerna till Islam (den forharskande religionen bland afrikanerna ar kriytendo- men. men manga naturreligioner har ocksa anhangare). bombas till ruinhogar. Och alldeles apeciellt irate sedan ryskbyggda illigplan och helikoptrar borjade kretsa over sad'-a Sudan. samtidigt som egyptirka och libyska trupper pa regeringens beg5ran kom till landet. i > Sudan's own civil war appears-to be warming up again. The Khartoum Government, dominated by the Moslem majority in Northern Sudan, has never been able to pacify the Southern area of the country. That part of Sudan is inhabited by some 4 million blacks, most of them Christians. The Anya Nya, a military force of black guerrillas who want independence for the Southern Sudan, has kept war going for eight years. In this war to date at least 500,000, probably many more, have died. Most of those killed were blacks with ties to the peoples of Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Congo. > > Israel, says the Sudanese Government, is getting into Sudan's war. Through Israeli military missions in Ethiopia, Uganda and the Congo, say officials in Khartoum, Israel is supplying arms to Southern rebels. Soviet_made antiaircraft guns lost by Egypt to Israel in the June War of 1967 now are used by rebels against Sudan's Soviet-supplied helicopters. Ask Israelis, and you get official denials that their arms go to Sudan's rebels. You also get an unofficial reminder: "Sudan is at Israel's back door." Approved For Release 1999/09/029 CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 TIME, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 March 1, 1971 Africa: Rumblings on a'Fault Line Across the midsection of Africa, at roughly the point where the savanna meets the tropical forest, a kind of human fault line separates the Arab world from Black Africa. This zone of instability, from Chad to the Horn, is a battleground where Arab guerrillas are pitted against black gov- ernments, and African rebels against Arab regimes. In a sense, two of the stub- bornest rebellions-the civil war in the southern Sudan and the Eritrean uprising in northern Ethiopia-are extensions of the Arab-Israeli conflict to the north. The situation in the Sudan has been further complicated by the So- viet Union's powerful thrust toward the Indian Ocean. 5UUAN he Soviet Viet Nam Like their neighbors in Egypt, the Len who run the Sudan have found for- ign Communists a good deal easier to et along with than the domestic va- ety. Two weeks ago, Major General afar Numeiry, 41, the Sudan's leftist I ader, vowed that he would "crush nd destroy" the country's 6,000-mem- er Communist Party. The local Com- unists, he said, were guilty of ev- ything from sabotage to poking fun the Sudanese armed forces. Nonetheless, Numeiry's revolutionary gime is becoming more and more de- endent on the military support of the viet Union, which has some 500 ad- 'sers in the Sudan. Farther down the orn of Africa in Somalia (see map), t ere are an estimated 325 Russian ad- sers. Last year the Russians began to nstruct a naval base at Port Sudan the Red Sea, an installation that ill be useful, once the Suez Canal is re- ened, in the further expansion of So- et naval activity in the Indian Ocean. ow the Russians are installing SA-2 an- t aircraft missiles to defend the base. t ven more startling is the fact that ut 100 of the Sudan's Soviet ad- rs are directly helping the Khartoum ernment to prosecute its civil war inst 6,000,000 black southerners. e north contains 6,000,000 Arabs 3,000,000 blacks.) The southerners and autonomy within a federation, guing that under the existing system t ey will never be given any real au- t ority by the Arabs of the north; at in- pendence in 1956, for example, the rtherners grabbed off 796 of the 800 ailable government posts. There is, oreover, a long history of hatred be- t teen the two regions: in the 19th cen- t ry, Arab slave traders from Khartoum d Cairo carried off 2,000,000 blacks i chains from southern Sudan. Drums Sounding. Since last Sep- amber the Russians have engaged in ound operations in all three southern ovinces. Last month they accompanied idanese army units in a raid on the ain guerrilla camp, Owing-ki-bul (an choli war cry that means "Hear the drums sounding"), attacking the south- erners by surprise while many were bath- ing in a river. The rebel Anyanya (who took their name from the poi- son of a cobra or scorpion) lost o dozen men and considerable equipment. A bombing raid against a rebel base' at Morta near the Uganda border caused nearly 1,000 civilian casualties. Russians have almost certainly flown helicopters into combat against southern rebels. They, as well as Egyptian pilots, may also have conducted bombing mis- sions with AN-12 transports and two squadrons of TU-16 medium bombers. The Russians, in addition, are known to have carried out MIG training mis- sions in the north, but whether they have flown MIGs into combat in the south is uncertain. In any case, the Soviets have al- ready set two unwelcome precedents for themselves: never before have they participated so actively in a Third World counterinsurgency effort, and never have they fought against Black Africans and helped bomb their villages. The situ- ation prompted an Oslo newspaper, Mor- genbladet, to headline a Sudan story a bit hyperbolically: THE SOVIETS HAVE THEIR VIET NAM. Soldier of Fortune. The southerners have received some modest foreign sup- port of their own. In September 1969 -about three months after Numeiry seized power in Khartoum and aligned the Sudan more closely with Egypt -the Israelis began parachuting arms and supplies from an unmarked DC-3 to Owing-ki-bul. The DC-3 apparently flies in from either southwestern Ethi- opia or northern Uganda; Israel pro- vides extensive aid to both countries. Because the Khartoum government has allowed Ethiopia's Eritrean rebels to cross the Sudan while returning to their own country from overseas, Emperor Haile Selassie has permitted the south- ern Sudanese to take refuge in Ethi- opia from time to time. Until recently, the southerners were also aided by one of Africa's more no- torious soldiers of fortune, German-born CPYRGHT Mercenary Rolf Steiner. A veteran of losing battles in Indochina, Algeria and Biafra, Steiner spent some 13 months trying to train the rebels to fight the rul- ing Arabs. "They fight very well against each other," he once said. "But against the Arabs they feel inferior." Late last year Steiner was captured by Uganda police while spending a few days of unofficial rest and recuperation outside the war zone. After three months in a Uganda jail, Steiner was secretly turned over to Sudanese authorities. He is now in prison in Khartoum, where his fate will be settled by still another group of foreign Communists. The case against him is being prepared by some of the 50 East Germans who advise the Sudanese Interior Ministry on se- curity techniques. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 -96- Approved I/ - T,7 D9 ?#PAgQ W 0001-6 CPYRGHT Cairo, Cairo Radio, March 1, 1971 Tiere is a to 'c which newspapers have paid prominence to, namely the statement issued y sterday evening by the general command o the u anese a forces Tn reply CO tie allegation made in TIME magazine. The following is the text of the statement b the General Comand of the Sudanese Armed Forces: Aldis Ababa Radio broadcast on Friday evening, February 19, 1971, a report attribut d t the American TIM magazine which stated that Soviet experts are helping the Sud t ,D the rebellion movement in the south by building a naval base and missile s tes on Sudan's Ibd Sea coast and that a number of Soviet experts took part with tie Sudanese Armed Forces in raiding Sudanese rebel camps last month. The Sudanese Armed Forces statement added that the armed forces general command denies this report c mpletely and :presents the following facts connected with this question: .-The alleged.base or missile sites do not exist and Britain, Indian, and other which arrive at Port Sudan from all parts of the world confirm this fact. -The armed forces have carried out internal security operations in southern Sudan f. or the past 16 years, and continue to do so, and are scoring successes day after c V. Our turning to the great Soviet Union did not take place until after the vic- torious May revolution two years ago. !_-We know that the purpose of this mad campaign is to cast doubt on the skill of the Sudanese fighter and belittle the splendid results he achieved recently, by elling world public opinion that foreign interference existed and was the main cause or those victories. P --The U.S. and Western press spare no of forts to harm the firm relations which h a e own between our republic and the great Soviet Union, and that we are proud of this riendship and: assistance, particularly in the field of scperience and equipment. --These mad campaigns are the beginning of a foreign intervention through false egations that the Soviet Union is building bases in the Sudan and is fighting I de side with the Sudanese soldiers in the internal security operations. CPYRGHT SUDAN FOREIGN MINISTRY DENIAL Cairo, Cairo Radio, March 20, 1971 'e Sii nogg F^, ,i s Mini try has denied a report by the U.S. Time magazine that the Soviet Union is building a naval base in Port Sudan harbor. It has also denied the rnacrarine's allegation that Soviet experts have participated with Sudanese forces in rime magazine's editor in chief refuting the lies contained in the riarcn issue. m e :Letter was published by the Sudanese Embassy in Cairo today. The Foreign Ministry has accused the U.S. magazine of giving a false picture of interests and on respect for Sudan's independence and sovereignty. The als affirmed that Sudan is proud of the ties of f riendship which bind it and the Soviet 'Union together, particularly in the field of technical cooperation. Replying to the magazine's allegations, the Ministry said that ships calling at Po Sudan from all: parts of the world can ascertain that the Soviet Union is not buildix a naval base in the harbor. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 -81A-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 CPYRGHT 40 7C Q 1a i7r29;Q00?7z9s he Sudan e s @~ ire , e orrespondent should have known and noticed that the Sudanese forces alone successfully arried out their operations in the South, which he reported to his magazine. He should ave known also that these forces can frustrate any plot aimed at jeopardizing Sudan's erritorial safety." he Ministry charged the magazine with trying t o cast doubt on the Sudanese forces' ombat ability. It said the magazine has overlooked the reason why the Northern udanese had assumed key government posts after independence; that is, the British eft Southern Sudan in a state of economic and educational backwardness which, aturally, left the Southern Sudanese unable to participate in governing the country. ommenting on the part of the magazine's arlti.cle on Israel's support for the insur- ts in Southern Sudan, the Ministry said srael's role in the South--which is also art of a large-scale imperialist conspiracy to overthrow Sudan's progressive regime- s aimed at checking Sudan's growing activity in connection with the Arab cause and eventing progress from reaching Southern Sudan. NEW T11?S, No. 12, USSR March 24, 1971 Letter to the Editors C ly to ill 6 If " 1 Magazine CPYRGHT T me magazine in its March 1, 1971, issu published an article under the tit! "Africa Rumbling on the Faultline." The author had chosen Sudan to be the sub ect of his imaginative article. Under the subtitle "Soviet Vietnam," the aut or, in addition to a number of ab- sur 'ties and misleading information ab if the Sudan, stated that "about 100 of udan's Soviet advisers are directly hel ing the Khartoum government to pro acute its civil war against 6,000,000 bla k southerners." T begin with, the figure given for the total number of Sudanese living in the southern part of the country is a pur invention. According to known rec rds, the total population of the thr a southern provinces is much less than 3 million, of which more than two mil on are from largo Nilotic tribes wh are committed against the Steiner followers and rebel activity and pol- ici as a whole. nofher invention is the alleged par icipation of Soviet military experts in ostilities in southern Sudan. Under i the arresting subtitle "Drums Sound- ing " the author states: "Since last Seppp- to r the R ue s't~rtgF !r~ g P dRgrati I s in all three southern rovincos.... The Soviets hove their Vietnam." The mysterious author expects is readers to believe that "100 Rus- ions" are engaged in ground opera- ions against a mythical 6,000,000 blacks tattered over an area larger than Spain and France put together. In the same article the author sup- plies Time readers with more sensa- tional news, such as Russian pilots lying combat missions against a "Hear the Drum Sounding" rebel camp it -the jungle. Another fabrication relates to Port Sudan. In spite of the fact that Port Sudan is an open commercial port where ships belonging to India, Britain and various other countries , put in daily, the author, to give Time readers another thrill, discloses to the ap- parently blind crews of those ships that the port is actually being turned into a Soviet naval base. No doubt the author of the article was prompted and inspired by the recently published news that a contin- without any essistonco from Ike air, an unaccompanied by any "Russian," captured those camps. By alleging that the Russians did it, the author sought to question the ability of the Sudaneso Army unit to do it alone. Such an at- titude is only natural, for the Zionists and racists of all kinds do not believe that Africans alone are capable of do- ing anything without a Steiner or a European of some sort to lead them. But whether the Zionists like it or not, the Sudanese Army did capture the mercenaries' bases and is able to deal effectively with any intruder in the southern part of the Sudan. However, it is no secret that the Soviet Union does offer assistance to the Democratic Republic of the Sudan. The $udanese people after more than 15 years of independence found the Soviet Union and the Soviet people to be their true friends. The Sudanese- Soviet friendship is also no secret to be hidden from any quarter. On the contrary, the Sudanese and the Soviet completely liquidated the rebel camps on the Sudan-Uganda boundary. These camps, as admitted by the author of the Time article, were used by Israel to rain European and this friendship is mentioned. Whether the author is a Zionist or a hired hack in Israel's pay is beside the point, but the publication of such an who infiltrated into Sudanese territory. Time magazine readers. The editors of he success of the Sudanese Army unit in crushing these boundary pockets of mercenaries is not expected to be good news for the employers of the Steiners and other interventionist enemies of the Sudanese and African people. Time, in their blind support of Israel and the Zionist strategy of aggression and intervention in African affairs, have indeed paid a high price in terms of the integrity of Time magazine by al- lowing such an article to be published. /Pk W2reA. i-E PP79-01194AOQ QQQ QE1 -98- THJk S ,F ? 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000 R -6 ., 197 Anya Ny I. bull rebels' ing in South Su CPYRGHT eorge we expected Africa to be the -fighting ground of the two Great World Powers the scene of continuous: warfare. We still have 13 years to go and at the moment there is fighting in five African territories. In Chad, Angola, Mozam- bique, and In the small-scale guerrilla activity of Rhodesia the conflict looks back to the fight to end colonialism. The warfare In the. South Sudan is the exception - each month edges the 14-year-old civil war towards greater involve- ment In the grand strategy of Russia in the Mediterranean and North-east Africa For many years the. struggle of the South Sudanese Anya Nya rebels to ,preserve some degree of inde- pendence, frdin successive Sudanese Governments was virtually a private fight, ignored by everyone except the refugee organisations. Demoted This has changed since the seizure of power by General Ndmt;iri's revolutionary Socialist Government in May, 1969. Now Sudan is linked with the Arabs of Egypt and Libya. Egyptian, Libyan, and Russian soldiers, airmen and advisers have been moved ditto the Sudan and brought into the fight against the 'Anya Nya,. The Russian front has quietly moved south. . No wonder Uganda's Head of State, General Amin, has, demoted the threat to Africa of Britain selling arms to South Africa to second place to the threat from Sudan. No wonder the Israelis are providing support for the Anya Nya. No wonder the *.Foreign Ministries of Britain and several other countries, and, an assortment of intellig- ence services have recently intensified their watch on the South Sudan. an be ignored. Any hopes that the situation would l be resolved by a military defeat of the rebels or by a defus- ing of the conflict by the Khartum Government's declared policy of recognis- ing the South's claims to a large degree of autonomy are fast disappearing. The relbels have shown they have the weapons and the will to keep the fight going : the Khartum Govern- ment, however genuine its declarations, has failed to make its political solution viable. The South Sudan has been called "Russia's Vietnam " and "a second Biafra." Both descriptions are at present highly exaggerated. Russian mi-litary involvement is still very limited and although about 250,000 refugees have fled from the region, they have been able to find refuge in surrounding countries instead of being surrounded and starved. But on a lower scale the South Sudan becomes a point of conflict between Arab and Black Africa, between the Arabs and Israel, and so. between Russia and the United States. Just in the wings to the south are the large British economic interests in Uganda and Kenya. The Khartum Govern rnent's military drive against the rebels has been inten- sified in recent months increasing the' flow of refugees into Uganda, Kenya, the Congo, Ethiopia, and the Central African Republic. Khartum's claim that large numbers of ' refugees have been voluntarily returning to Sudan are rejected by refugee organisations. Evidence Thirty MiG-17s and Rus- 3lan-built bombers and heli. copters are being used pilots are flying combat mis- sions. The Khartum govern- ment administration in the South has been reinforced by? Russian advisers. A few Rus-' sians have been killed in attacks on Anya Nya camps. Grisly confirmation that they were Russians was supplied by dental evidence. The Anya Nya, knowing that the identity would be challenged. cut off the dead men's heads and had the dentistry estab lished as Russian by dental experts. A collection of eye-witness accounts prove that bombing raids on rebel camps and villages thought to contain rebels are a regular event.' The scale of rebel resistance . is shown by a recent attack on Pacholi, The rebels attacked 300 troops and 150 armed police and claim to have killed over a hundred men and to have captured some 80 automatic weapons and 26,000 rounds Of ammuni- tion. Rebel equipment raw includes mortars, bazookas,' mines, and some light anti- aircraft guns. Some heli- copters used in attacks on a rebel airstrip were shot down. That strip is still held 'by Government troops but they rebels have another availabld' 'in Equatoria Province. With tfii'ir supvrior frees the Government holds the towns and roads and pre- vents any concentratio of Anya Nya forces. But arti- cularly in the thick jingle area of Equatorla Pro nee. roughly the size of F nee, they cannot break the r bels' hold on the countryside. The' Anya Nya are now setting up their own civil administration in all thr a of the subprovinces, Equa ria, Upper Nile and Bah el Ghazal, and have started tun- dreds of bush schools. 1 cu les terever they are ge ing their arms from - an I have no evidence-to sup ori the allegation that Is ell arms are being air drop ed the rebels remain an e ec- tive fighting force. It is iffi cult to see how they coul be 'so without the backing of he local people. And if the civilian pop Ia- tion supports the rebels he increased military acti ty, with the inevitability of r el 'soldiers melting away w He the civilians remain to be shot up, is likely to lessen he chances of the Khar m Administration be ng accepted. Complete military vict ry being ruled out, th re remains a negotiated set le. ment at some time in he future. The rebels do of believe Khartum's talk of autonomy 'for the So h. Khartum will not agree to he ,rebels' proposals for Peace, talks in a neutral Afri an' country. Meanwhile the Arab- s- slan build-up continues th its threat to the stability of both the Middle East d 'Africa. John Fairhalll Approved For Release 1999/09/02. iA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 TI*5, Lags bpproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 March 7, 1971 THIS question which every T "es person must ask them- selves now that war has become to devastating and terrible. The terrible nature of modern agar draws one's attention to a problem that always existed. Bss it ever been right and proper for men to kill each other under due process of law. There are two ways in which men can kill each other under due process of law. One is by war and the other Is by execu.tion. By execution I do not ran necessarily with an axe or the lopping off of your head. I mean that you are tried, found guilty of some crime, the punish- ment-for which is the taking of your . life, and legally drlle to death by some official person usually called an, executioner. This -is called capital_ punishtrcnt. It is worthy of note that capital punishment is increasingly un- popular among civilised nations. In most Scandinavian countries it has been abolished. In the USA It Is legal In some states, while in others it -hay been abolished. In the states where it is legal, it is usually Lorne time since the last execution took place. In Britain it is quite a while since the last execution took place and very shortly Britain will probably join those countries who have abolished capital punishment. 6o much for capital punishment but what about war? More people can die in a week of war than in seve- ral years of capital punishment. The question that arises Is this. Is the individual entitled to decide- off his own bat, that all killing, of man by man is unmoral or against the law of God if he be- lieves in such-a ditty and refuse to fight for his, country, when called upon to do so. The question remains an open one in most countries. In most coun? tries the conscientious objector is now tolerated and allowed to get AM among those who believe that man is still among the most fierce of animals and will continue to be a fighter,- even unto death, for several hundreds of years yet.-Clinton *way-, with his . refusal to fight ta.ndpr any circumstances whatso- ever, But no nation as a whole. has outlawed, war. Our own civil war was fought en- tirely by voluntary recruits. if in tinother war in which we felt our very survival was involved we saw fit to - Introduce conscription: would we let the conscientious ob- jector get away with It? To get the majority of amen of any one nation to agree that-they will not fight under any circumstances whatsoever see ns an almost lmpos- sihle task. But supposing you did succeed In convincing tbdt one nation, would It survive among a majority of na- tions who believe that some things are worth going to war and fight- ing for? And supposing it failed to survive, which seems to me most likely ins all the circumstances would the( moral effort have had any effect upon humanity as a whole. In other words would its going down in a sea of blood have been worth while. Personally, I more than doubt it. I do not feel that the disappearance of one nation as a result. of such a moral decision would have such an effect upon world history as to Jus- pl[y it. couple years It would be forgotten among the warring nations. am among those who believe that man is still among the most fierce .of animals and will continue to b+- , fighter even unto death, for seve- ra hundreds of years.yet. Civilisation has decided that the con- scientious objector must be allowed to do his stuff. I don't see that it lets anybody anywhere. It's just for consicence sake. If you feel like that, you're entitled to be taken seriously. But If you think you're going to convert the world you're in for a big disappointment. Men realise that it's rather wicked to destroy one another for ideological reasons and rather more wicked to destroy one another for non-Ideo- logical reasons. It used to be the fashion to fight be- cause you belonged to one religion and I to another and both our re- ligions said that the unbeliever should be destroyed. Now it's more fashionable to fight about racial or economic Issues. There are two racial wars going on at-the moment or rather one Is going on and the other is pending, with a view, to settlement, because the whole world is interested. Both sides feel that the big powers will ensure that actual fighting does not break out again I'm Speaking of course of the Israeli- The other war I have in miAu is the civil war In the Sudan, between the dominant. Arabs of the North and the black Afrinans' of the South. We are not allowed to interfere beef use of the OAU, to which the Arai' and African riations also belong. My sympathies are with the black Africans who are being exterminated. by Arab armies. Could the policy of the OAU be In error? I think we have at least to consider the possibility. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :_RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 OBa vbd or Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 March 7, 1971 CPYRGHT WAR ON THE NILE months with the rebels to compile this bloody war is Growing in intensity. On one side are the Arab rulers of the Sudan ; on the other the Negro rebels, who demand secession for the country's far south. The heavily-camouflaged rebel guerrillas were trained by ex-Foreign Legionnaire Rolf Steiner (above) until he was caright in neighbouring Uganwr and handed over to the Sudan Government. The war receives scant publicity - few outsiders can get in to see it - but the stakes are high. Its outcome- is crucial to the Sudan, Africa's biggest country, but ~Jlso Egypt and Israel realise its significance for the Middle last conflict. In the wings stand Russi, and America. DAVID ROBISON has spent several F iftecn hundred miles from the centre of the 3liddle East cmi-flict, a lone unmarked 1)C-3 circles over its drop- zone and picks up a guiding signal from it small radio beacon. The pilot is Israeli; so is the operator of the signal beacon. The drop-zone is in the forests of the southern Sudan. About twice a month through- out the past year, the 1)C-3 has appeared in the night sky and parachuted arms to waiting guerrillas. The supplies include heavy machineguns. bazookas, hand-grenades, .303 World War II rifles and old land mines of Russian and British origin. Almost all were captured by the Israelis, from the Egyptians during the Six 1)av War. The recipients are groups of ill- trained fighters who call them- selves Anya-1ya. The name derives from the fatal poison of the Gahon viper: the poison was at one time spread on spears to dispatch tribal enemies with a long and lingering death. The Anya-Nva say they are striiggling on behalf of nearly seven million Africans spread throughout 350.(44) square miles ref)Ort. of the Sudan's southern pr - vinces, an area five times that of the British Isles. The rebels swe r they will never accept the units v Sudan State created in 1956 1 v Britain. Since 1963 the war has com- bined with disease and tl e shrivelling of trade, social se.- vices and medical care in ti e south to kill between 51)0.0(4) ai d a million people. Civilian deatl s are now higher than in Vietnam The Arab-dominated Goverrnnei t far away in the north, in Kha - toum, admits that fighting It, steadily grown more fierce. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 -101- CPYRGHT The ernotApprtwed>IfdrsRelealseil9 9IO91 2s- CIARDP794i 94A O OQO1-6 emote but bloody trial of strength is the southerners' feeling of being a racially abject group. I'll c southerners allege land- obhery by Arab settlers, forced projects The figures are certainly re- vealing. Of SIN) Government posts Siulanised' at independence in 1956, only four went to souther- ners. Twenty-one southerners, as gainst 190 northerners, were dmitted to the Sudan police allege between 1950 and 1964. my 241 out of 559 army officers' commissioned between 1954 and 1965 were from the south. By 1965 the 3,900 students at Khartoum University included only about 100 southerners. While the number of Governnumt secondary schools it, the north iuereased from four at independ- ence to 22 in 1965, the south was left with the two schools - both of which are now closed anyway for security reasons. 1-et souther- ners make up about 10 per cent of the Sudan's 15 million popula- tion. Complementing the Arab-Negro conflict is religious hostility. The south is almost entirely Christian or pagan while the north is equally IIuslim, The northerner sometimes still uses the word rrbcl- or -slave', to refer to southerners - a reminder that for hl) years, until IS95. several million southerners slaves. were carried off as Southern soldiers first mutinied in 1955 against the prospect of union with the north. Britain helped to crush that revolt. The dissident soldiers then developed into guerrillas in 1963. using spears and bows and arrows. Later they acuuired nun,, from the Congo, where disorder iuade weapons easily available. The first planeload of arms from Israel reached the south in September 11)69. But Israel was the last of the four outside Powers involved in the Middle East to intervene in tit(, Sudan - after Egypt, Russia and the CS. The eight-year-old war has now a volatile mixture of participants. These include Eg*-ptinn troops army 'advisers' with tanks and armoured helicopters, East Ger- man security urea. Libyan soldiers, Israeli advisers. and American agents. Finally there was a merceuar% element. Outside intervcution followed from the Sudanese army (.41111) of 25 May 1963), when Colonel Jaafar )llrhilllimacl el-,\imeiry overthrew the civilian Govern- ment in Khartoum. I nuuediately after the coup all the old-line parties except the Conununists were suppressed. Since the" the army has continually been purged of any conservative elements and Nimeiry has even split the munists by frequent reshuffiliug of his Caliinet and arresting the Communist Party secretary- general. Except for segments of the army, Nimeiry's support comes from his powerful foreign backers. Egypt's late President Nasser acted quickly to sustain the Nimeiry regime; a UAR-Libya- Sudan defence alliance was soon born. The Sudan then announced it had become a `confrontation State' against Israel and an Egyptian army college moved to Jebel Aulia, south of Khartoum, to become the Sudan General Staff School. To protect the regime, 5,000 Egyptian troops were deployed into the Sudan and concentrated around Khar- toum. Up to 100 Egyptian combat aircraft, including a squadron of MiG 17s and MiG 21s, stand under a desert sun at Wadi Seidna air- base, just north of Khartoum and safely out of the range of Israeli Phantom jets. For five days at the end of March last year, they were used within the Sudan to bomb the headquarters of the Ansar Muslim, a sect of two million conservative Arabs. The bombing raids followed an unsuccessful attempt by Ansar civilians to assassinate Nimeiry with spears and clubs when he visited the town of Kosti, near the Ansar stronghold. The Egyptian MiG attacks left. 3,000 dead on the Ansar island of Aba on the White Nile. The Ansar religious leader, the Imam el- Mahdi, was killed as he fled Russians have followed the Egyptians into the Sudan, as they did in the Yemen, Aden and Libya. A Western teacher in Omdurman last summer has told me of his surprise at hearing Soviet army instructors giving orders to Sudan troops - in Russian. According to a British aircraft mechanic who worked in the Sudan, Soviet military pilots ferry military supplies in from Egypt in Antonov transports almost daily. At least five of the largest Antonovs, the AN-24s, have been converted into bombers, he said. These have joined with two squadrons, each of six giant TU-16s, that carried out raids on the south in the last three months of 1970. Diplomatic and intelligence sources in two neighbouring African countries - and in Wash- ington - say that the Russians have also given the Sudan MI-8 civilian helicopters converted with armour-plating and rocket- launchers, more than 100 T-55 heavy tanks, as well as howitzers, artillery and ground rockets. More important is the presence of Red Army advisers - now almost 1,000-strong - Soviet heli- copter and jet pilots, and ground crews. More than 100 Russian officers are reported serving with Sudanese combat units in the south and a Russian general is said to command troops at Juba, southernmost provincial capital. Egyptian pilots are believed to have carried out recent bombing raids on the south - raids that were beyond the present com- petence of Sudanese crews. The mystery is why the Russians have apparently com- mitted their own men to combat. A Washington specialist on the Sudan argued to me as follows: `I guess the Russians wanted to control the Sudan army, so they had to move into the field with the Sudanese to show how to use Soviet equipment. But now the Soviets cannot afford to let the southern Sudanese will, because Russian equipment, officers and prestige are involved. I suppose Approved For Release 1999/09/0212 IA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 CPYRGHT ;1999 lllV0J`6w ,q,' Ol s ft ibo le For the same reason, the Nor- wegian newspaper Morgenbladet carried this headline over a Sudan story last December: SOVIETS HAVE THEIR VIETNAM. If the Russians build missile sites for Sam-2s and Sanl-3s in the Sudan, they will duplicate almost exactly their commitment in Egypt, though; on a smaller scale. There are unconfirmed re- ports that missile sites are being prepared. There are also sonic East Ger- mans running the Sudan 'Ministry of the Interior. Their main activity is internal security and surveillance. Opposition to: Nimeiry is divided. The guerrillas of the Sudanese National Liberation Front do not trust Khartoum's conservative Arabs, and vice versa. The Arabs have received money from Saudi Arabia, whose conservative sheikhs fear Russo- Sudanese subversion from across the Red Sea. Neighbouring Ethiopia has be- come a sanctuary; for Sudanese exiles. The obsession of Ethiopian foreign policy - 'Arab encircle- ment' by the Muslim countries on its borders. Sudan and Libya are known to be sending lu?nls and money to the separatist Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in Ethiopia. But the Emperor is unwilling to aid the anti-Nimeiry groups openly in the Sudan because of his symbolic role as father of the Organisation of African Unity, where Arab- African conflicts are never mentioned. The southern Negroes still hope for aid from America on the basis of `cold war' competition in Africa. In 1965 they received parachuted arms near the Congo border. An American Negro, named only as Louis, mysteriously joined the Anya-Nya and guided in airdrops with his radio. But that was at a time when the Khartoum Government was pro-Russian. When Sadiq el- Mahdi became Prime Minister and the Government turned cool towards Moscow. Louis dis- appeared and the American aid dAflf~'Fjfl'r1Vtt`19fl~P~l4" ground, logs '06 1'f~~ . ~ `iiff t e Americans c?an w out Nimeiry by using his Arab opposition, they won't give us a dime.' The mysterious Louis would receive a warm welcome if he reappeared, however. In 1968, the Anya-Nya leader Joseph. Lagu went to Israel to appeal for aid. It took Israel a year to decide, after consulting Ethiopia, Uganda and the Congo. Today, 30 Anya-Nya second lieutenants, fresh from three- months' training in Israel, instruct the guerrillas in fielderaft and marksmanship. They are super- vised by three Israeli officers. One guerrilla described for me his personal quest for Israeli arms and training. 'We crossed the Nil- in rubber boats, at night, and walked 10 days to reach one of Lagu's camps. There were four Israelis there - a Colonel John and a captain, who were checking our military training, a radio operator and it doctor. All four spoke English and the radio- man and doctor spoke Arabic, too. We had 31) Anya-Nya training us. They went to Israel in groups and, after three months there. came back as second-lieutenants. 'I shot a ?303 rifle, a sten and a Bren machinegun. But for economy we fired only 2(1 bullets. We had plenty of fieldcraft: how to advance to the enemy. how to ambush, how to find cover and how to walk at night. Then, after one month, the Arabs attacked one of Lagu's posts near our camp. We had a store of arms there. `The Arabs came at five in the morning, without warning. Lagu sent a reinforcement which never reached there. The Anya-Nya in the post ran away, leaving about 40 arms in the store. We heard the firing in camp and my platoon went to reinforce and got lost. `The Arabs were mortaring in the bush. We fired at them. Then both sides waited while it rained. We forced the Arabs to go away; they buried seven men by the stream and we had two dead.' In one area of the south, I visited a clandestine bush school run by teachers loyal to the Anya-Nya. There were three long soldier as guard. Black youngsters danced in a circle, clad only in shorts or in green leaves. Older boys marched in military drill. while six- to eight-vear-oids practised abort-faces ;knd march- ing in single file. A teacher whistled and classes began again. The youngest sat on the ground, used wooden sticks or their fingers to draw tablets in the sand and practise writing words in Kakwa, the local dialect, with symbols remarkably like Hebrew. Ten-year-olds sat on the logs nearby, singing Christian mission- ary hymns. The school itself had no paper, pencils, desks or books. Inside one open-sided hut, about 60 boys of grade four, aged 13 to 24, practised writing sentences. They had pencils and paper paid for by farming and bought across the Uganda border. I questioned them: What would they do after grade four? About one-third of them finally said they would join the guerrillas. Why? One after another they told stories of seeing schoolmates rounded up at. school by Sudan army patrols. `When I talk about it, I have a burning feeling,' one said. The Anya-Nya fighters cone from several different tribes. After several months of training, many of the men will have run away with their arms, preferring to soldier in their own tribal areas under local self-appointed colonels. I went with one Anya-Nya unit while it made an attack on the Sudan Army post at Kajo Kaji, close to the Nile near the Sudan. Uganda border. The night I arrived, the Anya-Nya were grouped around their fires, singing one of their popular songs: `Three persons Anya-Nya/Killed Arabs with bows and arrows/The rest started running./In the beginning we told you;/What did we tell you, oh Arabs?/We said the birds would eat you,/The birds will fly over you, Northern youth/Your country is eaten by vultures.' The Anya-Nya group was led by Colonel Rolf Steiner, the Approved For Release 1999/09/Q2 j3ClA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 CPYRGHT assembled with their weapons - British Bren.guns, a Russian heavy inachinegun and Russian bazookas and British -303x. Re- German-born ex-French Foreign Legionnaire who commanded Biafra's 4th Brigade in the Nigerian civil war. Steiner asserted that, unlike the dozen other whites who fought in Biafra, he was not a mercenary. The Anya-Nya said that he lived in the Sudan as poorly as they do and had not received money from abroad, even to augment his obviously meagre food supply. `I am an extremist,' Steiner told me. 'The Africans need my help and I'm prepared to spend five years here.' Of the three platoons he had trained for the Kajo Kaji attack, one never even arrived at the starting-point: their major simply went off to another headquarters. His men remained in their base camp despite strict marching orders. This behaviour, it appears, is not unusual among the Anya- Nya. The other two platoons NIGERIAN OBSERVER March 12, 1971 CPYRGH connaissance patrols to northern Sudanese army showed that the `Arabs' Anya-Nya name for all the post (the nor- therners) were not expecting an attack. They were busy playing football on the parade-ground in the late afternoon. At midnight, one Anya-Nya platoon left for its assigned position in bushes only 65 yards from the Arab barracks. An hour later, the second platoon set out. Its guide was an elderly sergeant who lived in the area and had guided reconnaissance patrols perfectly. But by five a.m. the second platoon was utterly lost; at sunrise it was a mile from the post.. There was no time left to get in position undetected. Steiner could only hope that the first platoon would realise its isolation ~tracu~0 MANY right thm ng r cans, no ma er _Vvew leanings, must have viewed with utter dismay, Press report emanating from no less a personage thanl the bulky and controversial Ugandan army ruler, General Idi Amin Dada, that there is a "South Africa in South- ern Sudan where Catholic and Protestants are not allowed to go to church". Although the Kampala regime is as yet too effeminate to pursue its cherished objectives through the proper dip- lomatic channels, the present state of war in Soulthern Sudan cannot be allowed to go on In- definitely while all Afri- ca looks on. Indeed General Amin and withdraw in time. Promptly at six, the first platoon was discovered. It launched its attack with bazooka fire against four barracks and succeeded in burning down all but one of the buildings in the post. Three Anya-Nya were killed as the platoon retreated. The redeeming feature of the attack, for Steiner, was that the Anya-Nya had never fought so well before. However, although he planned a second attack, most of the Anya-Nya officers mutinied five days later. They said the orders were too strict. They preferred to go back to their usual style of fighting. This involves occasional ambushes - which are poorly- prepared and mainly use fire directed from a long distance. Despite the mutiny, Steiner did not show himself too discouraged. `Patience,' he told me. 'Our time is still coming.' In fact, he never had a chance to see it, sounds one use!-1 note when he mentions that the OAU cannot confine itself to double-talks and endless but ineffective resolutions over South Asks Abraham Omoyi Africa and Rhodesia when right at our own nose, the all-Arab Khar- toum government oppres- ses and persecutes the black Sudanese majority. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CRDP79-01194A000300070001-6 CPYRGHT App o ed-For iLI-ase 1999/09 02 : lA-FYF~719-01194 her of the OAU. country. base e , Much of the Arab- In the Sudanese cas black bitterness is older power in the hands of than those now organi' Britain not only left sing or fighting' the war the minority, Arab Su- Itself. ' danese but made sure that this was firmly en- In the nineteenth cen- trenched in the law tury, Arab slave raiders books before they bow- and ivory traders were ed out. said to have removed No safeguards were two million blacks from given for the more po- this region alone, in pulous but less advan- chains through the de- ced blacks should they sert, and at a huge cost in the future, come face of black African lives: to face with civilization. monopoly Moreover, when the British came late? last century, the ancient ca- pital of Khartoum re- mained their centre of adfninistration and to- gether with this was thg grooming of local Arabs for leadership just in case the Englishman had to go. It is therefore not sur- prising that in 1956 and ever since, Arath have monopolised virtually every office of govern- ment and have held just to the economic life of the state. When the British left in 1956, Arabs who con- stituted only six million of Sudan's fifteen mil- lion people grabbed 790 out of the 800 vacant posts in government de- partments. Fifteen years of in- dependence, however, helped a lot to heal the serious wounds inflicted on the Sudanese blacks by neglect, ignorance and illiteracy. As the years wore on, after. 1,956, blacks started making demands for equality with their nor- thern neighbours. It is, of course, a constant if not an inten- tional deformity in Bri- tish t'ramed constitutions that, somehow, a bone of contention must be left in thg political soup-pots of colonies as- piring to independence so that, a4 , soon as the Union Jack: is lowered, violence would errupt to engulf a once proud. The end result so far is that while no Arab is prepared to give any concession to the blacks, the Southern Sudanese are firmly demanding autonomy. resistance Throughout the 1960s spirited efforts have been made by black Su- danese nationalists to assert their rights through violence as it became increasingly evi- dent to them that Arabs of the North would ne- ver really part with their positions of autho- dity under the existing system. Although the Southern "rebels" have kept up their resistance ? at a purely guerrilla level, the Arab chiefs at Khar- toum have frowned bit- terly at this subtle at- tempt by the blacks to truncate their authority. They replied by thrus- ting the all-Arab Suda- nese army, into suspec- ted rebel hideouts flush- ing them out in their tens and hundreds. But in resillience, the black Sudanese are much a ? match for the Arab soldiers from the north, `and what had started years ago - as primitive bush fights has now developed, sadly enough, into a sideshow of the sophisticated Mid- dle East confrontation. To break the will o1 the southerners, the Khartoum regime hasp in recent months, approved air raids into densely populated southerp towns and villages. 1Clteilar b' ",h- )0~0100,91l6 Mml'ar, near, the Ugandan border, caused nearly 1,000 civi- lian casualties. International obser- vers who flew into the scene of incident to as- sess equipmet used by the Khartoum gover- ment forces said they were of Russian origin. Khartoum, df course, has never made secret of its "friendship" with the Soviets in recent months. Despite General Nu- meiry's vow to wipe out local communists who number only 6,000, the Sudanese leader still to- lerates about 100 Russian "advisers" among whom are the only pilots who help him in prosecuting his war of "smash and rule" In Southern S' dan. arms The Southern "rebels" themselves are not com- pletely starved of ex- ternal support. Since Numiery started moving Sudan closely to Egypt and Russia, Israel began parachut- ing arms and supplies from an unmarked D.C.3 to Owing-ki-bul, 'a major guerrilla camp. The Israel plane, ob- viously flies in from ei- ther Uganda or Ethiopia; Israel provides substan- tial mi?,tary aid to both countries. Khartoum and Addis- Ababa are particularly not on speaking terms since Sudan started of- fei1ing access routes to Ethiopia's Eritrean rebels returning to their coun- try from overseas. Meanwhile, South Sudanese refugees are received with. open arms in Ethiopia' from lime to time. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 _y_RDP79-O1194AOOO3OOO7OOO1-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 011610/001IL tell ANOTHER VIEW OF THE STUBBORN WAR IN SUDAN Moscow keeps busy in Africa CPYRGHT Translated from RHEINISCHER MERKUR, Cologne Two months ago, ATLAS published a British view of the 16-year-old war that is raging between the Arab rulers of northern Sudan and the black (Christian) Africans of the South. As our February report sug- gested, the hopes raised by the takeover of General Gafaar al-Nimeiry, a "democratic socialist", have largely come to naught as reports of further killing continue to come in to the U.N. This follow-up report by Siegmar Schelling, the foreign editor of Cologne's respected con- servative weekly Rheinischer Merkur, contradicts positive reports from ther sources. Schelling blames the Soviet Union for keeping - the udan in a state of turmoil to provide a staging ground for rebel orces in surrounding nations. ESTERN journalists trying to visit the Sudan today are Greened most carefully. If an ap- licant's record shows that he as studied the South Sudan and s problems, he may be sure of of getting a visa. And even if he oes succeed in going to Khar- um, he will definitely not reach e South Sudan. One million eaths are too much for the pub- I c to take. A million dead do not t into the -TV screen. Better leave them alone-else a new iafra might be evoked. In the Sudan, as in many lands o the underbelly of the Sahara, t e struggle between Arabs and b ack Africans is raging. Like its p edecessors, the Nimeiry gov- e nment is trying to gain control o the situation. But the fact re- sins that animosities between b cks and Arabs are nowhere re virulent or tenacious than i the Sudan. Tribal conflicts in the Sudan were held in check by British colonial rule until 1963-the year of independence. With the ouster of England came the end of tolerance: the Sudan 'split apart. All that still bound North and South together was the bit- ter heritage of slavery. For a cen- tury the Arab tribes had sent their caravans across the Nile swamps to get slaves; for a cen- tury, the southern tribes were the servants and bootblacks of the Arab North. The British were only too glad to leave the job of civiliz- ing the South to the missionaries: church-sponsored schools were no burden on Great Britain's bud- get. In the civil war that marked the English retreat, Moslem army and police forces began to get control of the country; mission- aries in the South were dpven over into the Congo or Chad.-Aid the resistance movement in the South developed a momentum which all the napalm, phosphorus bombs and torture used by Khir- toum could not stamp out. It was only natural that the Khartoum government, faced by this conflict and by growing eco- nomic troubles, turned to the first power that offered help-the Soviet Union. And that it sought to internationalize its problems by aiming for a quadruple alli- ance with Libya, Egypt and Syria. Today the Soviet position in the Sudan is an accomplished fact. Still, the Soviets, like the British before them, need a mid- dleman. That role is played by Egypt. Egyptian "advisers" were already in the Sudan before the Nimeiry coup of May 25, 1969; today there are about a thousand in the country. The military school in Khartoum, indirectly controlled by the Soviets, is one of the best in the country. Over 200 MIG-19's and MIG-21's are stationed In the Sudan. These air- craft are not only an element of support for the Arab cause: they are used to keep the Nimeiry regime in power. Nimeiry, who tried to set up a Nasser-type "Arab socialist" re- gime, has outlived ten putsch at- tempts. His survival would not have been possible without Soviet assistance. Yet it is typical of this country, in area the largest of the ~1i~e~~tertur Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 CPYRGHT African states, that Nimeiry speaks only for Khartoum and not for the rest of the territory; numerous guerrilla organizations have :set up shop here. One such group is FROLINA, the Islamic liberation organization operatin in the Chad. The Sudan also pro- vides, a rear grouping area for the Eritreans who at the moment are trying to overthrow the Haile Selassie regime in Ethiopia. The proposed federation of Sudan, Egypt, Libya and Syria should give ! new impetus to these sub- versive activities. Both the U.S.S.R. and Red China have tried to secure a foot- hold; in Africa. So it is a natural reaction for the Western powers, particularly the U.S. and Israel, to intensify their own activities in the area. It remains to be seen how; successful they will be. In the African game, the Sudan oc- cupies a key position. Thus far the Soviets have been able to play the'British cards in the old way. How long Nimeiry can hold on, however, depends on whether his government can work out an ar- rangement with the South. That looks unlil-21y. The hatred between the two halves of the Sudan runs deep. In Khartoum one notices little: of this, but as soon as one crosses the border into the Sudan from the Congo or Chad, one comes upon burned- out villages, abandoned settle- ments, "scorched earth" on the Vietnamese dren's drawings on walls of houses or schools-drawings that reveal all that the children know : violence, In the South Sudan, only one child out of four reaches adulthood ; there is no medicine, there is not enough to eat, there. are no schools left since the mis- sionaries were driven out. Meanwhile a million people have been killed in the Sudan. The world has taken no notice because journalists get no visas, journalists get only as far as Khartoum. There are no foreign "interests" to defend here, either economic or political. The only world power to have "discovered" the Sudan to date is, the Soviet Union. The Soviets are using it as a pawn in their strategic game to build their own influence in the grab world as well as to com- bat the inroads of Communist China into black Africa. With England, the Western world withdrew from Egypt and the Sudan. Through its protege Nimeiry, Moscow has established Itself in the breach. For the-mo- ment it appears to be out of the question to hope for recovery of influence in the area, not to men- tion establishment of a democrat- ic regime. For. the time being the surrounding states must resign themselves to the fact that, while the Sudan has its own rebellion, it also provides a staging area for insurgent movements in nearby countries-Uganda, Ethiopia and Chad. 40 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 IAVXnvyjI0,&p, F ie M1 flfft : N 79-01194A000300070001-6 December., 1970 SOU~AIRIE Reserves a I'egard de ('unite arabe CPYRGHT Associ6 a la Libye et it la Repu- blique Arabe Unie dans le , Front Revolutionnaire ? fonds en de- cembre 1969 par Gamal Abdel Nasser, le Soudan se felicite des avantages que comports pour lui cette formule : appui politique or- ganique du Caire, coordination croissante des echanges dans la moyenne et basse vallee du Nil, perspectives d'investissements Ii- byens dans une industrie encore embryonnaire et dans une agri- culture placee devant de lourdes tdches de modernisation. Et le general Gaafar al Nimeiri a sou- tenu ('action politique du Rais jusqu'au jour mime de la mort de celul-ci : durant la crise jor- dano-palestinienne de septembre, it a ete charge, en particulier, Waller faire le point a Amman en vue de preparer Ia mediation interarabe. Un colonel soudanais dirige d'ailleurs encore le groups d'officlers arabes qui contrOle, sur le terrain, ('application de ('accord intervenu entre le gou- vernement royal d'Amman et le Comit6 Central de la Resistance Palestinienne. Ce n'est donc pas une opposi- tion de principe que le Soudan a exprimee, debut novembre, aux projets egyptiens de renforcement du ? Front o. Mais le general Gaafar al Nimeiri, lors de ce petit ? sommet ,, a cependant formule des objections a I'encon- tre tant de la formule egyptienne de ? direction politique unique que des veeux libyens d'unifica- tion immediate des services diplo- matiques, de creation d'une Orga- nisation populaire unique et de fixation d'un delai maximum de trois ans pour la realisation d'une unite complete entre Ies trois Etats. Le contre-projet soudanais, envi- sageant un acheminement gra- duel et prudent vers le but uni- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 -108- ApRIr p ,~?fjgr Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 taire, preconisait que ('evolution se fit, !dans chaque Etat et pour ('ensemble en gestation, par eta- pes. II; suggerait que, dans un premier temps, fut realisee la totale o liberation - politique et aconorrique de ces pays, et qu'il y fOt institue des gouvernements stables, garantissant la liberte, la democratie, I'independance eco- nomique et la levee d'une solide armee. Puis devalent interve- nir, au cours d'une seconde phase, des essais d'echanges techniques et culturels soumis ensuite a un examen critique, et une cdordination des economies operee grace a I'action d'un Conseil de Planification commun. Conformement aux vues souda- naises, ce n'est donc pas une formula; de ? federation ?, c'est un ? plan d'action , unitaire que les trois chefs d'Etat ont adopts le 8 novembre. Et le general Gaafar at Nimefri a pu souligner. dans un message radio-diffuse le 16 novembre, que les mesures d'unification envisagees seraient lentes et progressives. II ne s'agit pas seulement, pour le gouverne- ment de Khartoum, de manager un sentiment ombrageux de I'in- dependance nationale, qui de- meurevif dans tous les milieux qu'a touches ('influence nistorique du mahdisme. Mals it convient aussi, et surtout, de progresser d'abord: dans Ia solution de cer- tains problemes particuliers au Soudan,: de maniere a pleinement assurer. I'homogenaite du pays avant d'engager a fond celul-ci dans un ensemble plus vaste. Le retablissement d'une situation normale dans les provinces meri- dionales du pays a constitue, on s'en souvient, le souci primordial du gouvernement revolutionnaire soudanais, des ('accession de celui-ci au pouvoir, au printemps 1969. L'autonomle Interne a Atd promise a cette region, un plan special de developpement a ate elabore a son profit, et le minis- tere des Affaires du Sud, confie a une personnalite politique lo- cale, M. Joseph Garang, s'est mis en devoir de rassurer la popula- tion par diverses mesures admi- nistratives ; une amnistie generale etait accordee, les refugies etaient invites a regagner leurs foyers, et les autorites de Khartoum se declaraient disposees a entrer en conversations avec ceux qui s'etaient rebelles contre les abus du passe. Certains resultats ont pu, de la sorte, etre obtenus dans les villes et les principales bourgades du Sud, qu'ont regagnees plusieurs milliers de fugitifs : les ecoles et un certain nombre d'eglises ont ate rouvertes, les ateliers d'arti- sans et les petites industries loca- les ont repris vie, le commerce local a retrouve une partie de son activite. Mais les Soudanais du Sud refugies a I'exterieur, soumis d'ailleurs a diverses propagandes independantistes parfois inspirees de I'etranger, hesitent encore a rentrer. Les dirigeants separatis- tes qui animent, dans le ? ma- quis ,, ('insurrection armee de I'Anya-Nya (? Front de Liberation de I'Anzanie') et les chefs de la plupart des a gouvernements en exit ,, dont I'articulation est d'ail- leurs confuse, se refusent a tran- siger et visent it la creation d'un Etat nigro-africain du Haut Nil ; -109- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00300070001-6 CPYRGHT soul l'un d'entre eux, M. Gordon Mayer, au nom du , gouvernement provisoire du Nil,,, c'est dit prdt A negocier, mals apparemment sans rien rabattre de ses exi- gences. Les forces soudanaises conti- nuent donc d'opsrer contre les groupes de rebelles armes qui tIennent, ou parcourent, une grande partie des provinces me- ridionales ; elles trouvent peu de concours aupres de la plupart des populations tribales qui furent naguere ('objet de la repression brutale de Ia dictature militaire, restent sensibles it ('influence des ? maquis ? et Ignorent les inten- tions du nouveau gouvernement ou les m6connaissent d'instinct. Comme it est malheureusement presque inevitable dans ce genre d'operations, de fr6quentes con- fusions sont commises, et it ar- rive que des rassemblements paisibles sont trait6s comme des formations rebelles : Ia presse internationale a signal6, cet 6te, plusieurs cas de ce genre, en particulier I'attaque d'un groupe de fid6les d'une secte christo- africalne r6unis dans une eglise A Bansa, localite des confins du Congo-Kinshasa abritant des r6- fugies sud-soudanais, et le meur- tre de six chefs et notables de la tribu Dinka, A la lisiere du Kordofan. La bonne foi des auto- rites centrales de Khartoum n'est pas mise en cause par ces regret- tables excss, dont la responsa- bilit6 incombe h des chefs de d6tachement inducts en erreur ou persistent dans les pratiques de la periode ant6rieure. presse (voir en particulier f El Moudlahid N, Alger, 10 novembre 1970), la rebellion bendficie d'ap- puls strangers, et en particulier israeliens, mobilisant A son profit des mercenaires europeens et vlsant A 00nhtituer trole -fronts de combat ? : A I'est A partir de la frontiere ethiopienne, au sud sur le Haut-Nil, au sud-ouest dans le Bahr al Ghazal. Le 17 octobre a Ate arrdt6 en Ouganda un an- cien sous-officier ouest-allemand, que les autorit6s locales soup- connent d'avoir fait partie des ? maquis m sud-soudanais avant d'dtre entr6 clandestinement dans lour pays (? El Moudjahid u, 25 octobre). Le 8 novembre, le gene- ral Hassan Abbas Khaled, ministre soudanais de la Defense, a de- clare, au cours d'une conference de presse, que les forces souda- naises avalent rsussi A d6truire, dans I'Equatoria, les quatre bases rebelles de Morto, Edo, Lorango et Bramba, et A arrster le ? chef des mercenaires Rudolf Steiner, ancien sous-officier ouest-alle- mand de la Legion Etrangere et naguere ? colonel , des troupes biafraises, alors qu'il tentait de s'enfuir vers I'Ouganda. A cette occasion, le ministre soudanais a formellement impute A Israel et aux Etats-Unis ('envoi aux rebel- les d'auxiliaires mercenaires et d'armement lourd, en vue de pa- ralyser le gouvernement souda- nais au sein de la coalition arabe et de I'empdcher de jouer un r6le dans le conflit de Palestine. Les provinces du Sud continuent, de la sorte, do constituer le prin- cipal souci du gouvernement sou- danais dans le domaine de la securit6. II est cependant oblige Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00300070001-6 Approve0,l6-qRg,I>gase 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 aussi de veiller, daps ('ensemble du pays, a ne se laisser deborder ni' sur sa droite par leg elements islamo-integristes ou mahdistes qu'il regards comme ayant des I'origine complote contre lui, ni sur sa gauche par leg sympathi- sants progressistes et commu- nistes qu'il avait, en revanche, associes a sa politique socialiste, mais dont it redoute, de plus en plus, qu'ils ne veuillent mener en dehors de Iui, voire contre lul, une action de surench6re pou- vant alter jusqu'a Ia subversion. En vue de faire face aux menses venant de Is a droite', leg insur- ges mahdistes de I'ile d'Eba sont severement poursuivis. Une Hau- te Cour militaire, constituee le 10 octobre, a entrepris une se- maine plus tard Is proces de 160 d'entre eux. D'autre part, le mi- nistLre de I'Interieur a annonce le 19 novembre I'arrestation de plu- sleurs membres des anciens partis reactionnaires ? et de ('association c I a n d e s tine des ? Freres Musulmans,,, qua seraient impliques dans des activites con- tre-revolutionnaires. Entre-temps, it a fallu aussi faire face aux intrigues decelees a gauche, et, le 16 novembre, le ge- neral Gaafar at Nimeirl a annon- ce a la radio que trois ministres, membres du Conseil de la Revo- lution, avaient ete revoques de leurs fonctions et dechus de leurs grades militaires, on raison des contacts qu'ils avalent pris avec des -elements subversifs * dont leg activites s'etendaient It I'inte- rieur mOme du Conseil des forces armees et des syndicats. II s'agit du colonel Babaker al Nour, vice premier Ministre, charge de I'Eco- nomie et de Is Planification ; du commandant Farouq Osman Ha- madallah, ministre de I'Interieur, et du commandant Hachem al Atta, vice-premier Ministre charge de I'Agriculture et des Ressour- ces animales. Quelques jours plus tard, Is nouveau ministre de I'Interieur, Is commandant Aboul- gacem Ibrahim, exposait aux re- presentants des ? etudiants pro- gressistes u de I'Universite de Khartoum que ces m e s u r e s n'avaient aucun rapport avec le plan d'action ? tripartite adopts au Caire et pour lequel Is chef du gouvernement soudanais avast re- cueilli ('approbation unanime des membres de celul-ci. Les trois ministres revoques, et en particulier le commandant Fa- rouq Osman Hamadallah, avaient joue un role important dans Is mouvement revolutionnaire du 25 mai 1969 ; depuis lors, Is com- mandant Hamadallah detenait Is portefeuille de I'Interieur ; leg deux autres officiers, en revan- che, no s'etalent vus confier de fonctions ministdrielles qu'a Is suite d'un remaniement partial, on juin dernier. Tous trois etaient connus pour lours opinions so- ciales avancees et pour leurs sympathies a regard de I'ancien Parts Communists soudanais ; ce- pendant, Its no preconisalent pas, du moans ouvertement, Is recons- titution de celui-ci. Le portefeuille de I'Economie et de Is Planification a ete confie, par Is Conseil de Is Revolution, au general Gaafar al Nimeiri. D'autre part, Is jour m6me de Is Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 CPYRGHT revocation des trois ministres, onze officiers superieurs et deux officiers subalternes ont ete mis e la retraite d'office, probable- ment pour d'analogues motifs ideologiques. Enfin, le lendemain 17 novembre, etait annoncee I'arrestation de M. Abdelkhaleq Mahgoub, secre- taire general de I'ancien Parti Communiste soudanais, auquel etait de longue date reproche de poursuivre la reconstitution de ce- Iui-ci et d'envisager son action sous la forme d'une force inde- pendante. Au printemps dernier, le gouvernement avait dejA ecarte dii pays, pour quelque temps, M. Abdelkhaleq Mahgoub, puis I'avait autorise A rentrer at sem- blait lul avoir de nouveau temoi- gne une certaine confiance. II semble probable que M. Mahgoub ait profite de I'ouverture A gau- che que manifestait le remanie- ment ministeriei du moss de juin pour accroTtre ses contacts dans les milieux gouvernementaux, et qu'il ait de la sorte profite de cer- taines Indiscretions. On pout donc presumer, en depit de I'absence de toute indication offi- clelle A cat egard, que I'arresta- tion de I'ancien secretaire gene- ral du Parti Communiste souda- nais n'est pas sans rapports avec la revocation des trois ministres auxquels ont ete reprochees des Imprudences macs que, jusqu'A present, on raison sans doute de leurs services au profit du mou- vement revolutionnaire, le Conseil semble se borner A vouloir ecar- ter des affaires publiques. Le gouvernement de Khartoum parait donc, A I'heure actuelle, devoir concentrer beaucoup de son attention sur des problemes d'edification interieure, et iI est aise de comprendre qu'il en- tende assurer d'abord la parfaite solidite du pays et de ses insti- tutions avant d'associer I'Etat A une construction unitaire arabe plus structuree. Cette attitude a d'ailleurs ete comprise par les dirigeants egyptiens et libyens, et le ? plan d'action n arrete en c o m m o n en tient largement compte. Dans ces conditions, on pout presumer que le Soudan s'associera sincerement A une oeuvre progressive d'unification, menee sans We excessive et evec suffisamment de prudence. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 ,#ppr gd For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300070001-6 IF March 15, 1971 CPYRGHT A F R I K A t es Parallelen zwi- schen Stidsudan and Stu os as en. So siedeln auch die Behorden im Su Su- dan die mit den Aufstandischen s m- pathisierende Bev6lkerune In b fe- stigten Dorfern an, um die Rebelle zu isolieren. Wie in Saigon scheint uch das Regime in Khartum alles an ere er- N In in knapp aft zwei JahrenHerrs lebte b nicht weniger als neun Umsturz er- suche. Anders aber als der hervorra end organisierte, dlszlpllnierte Viet ong sind die sudsudanesischen Aufst' di- schen durch Stammes- and Fti.h gs- rivalitaten zerstritten. Der in a em Khartumer Gefangnis auf seine er- urteilung wartende deutsche R bel- len-Helfer Rolf Steiner: ?Am b sten kampfen sie untereinander." Experten beurteilen denn auc die Erfolgsaussichten der Sudsuda esen - anders als die des Vietcong su- f3erst skeptisch. Ein Washingtone Mi- litarspezialist: ,Jetzt, nachdem So- wjet-Offiziere and Prestige verw kelt sind, kbnnen die Russen keine iege der Aufstandischen mehr zulasse 1 den Vereinigten Staaten" ausgeweitet A army tisch-;igvpi lsrhe pz ,i;,?nz im Sudan ist ~~ schwarzen Sudsudanesen interessiert, ten NuI,wl,. Mig die sich von der arabischen Fuhrungs- clan-Luftwaffe 1st colt -Uber- schicht in Khartum majorisiert and schalljagern, An-12-Transporters, Tu- 16-Bombers and Mi-8-Hubschraubern, unterdruckt fiihlen. den , fliegenden Lastkranen" der So- Seft abet der 1969 in Khartum an wjet.-Luftmucht, ausgerustet. die Macht gekommene Generalmajor i~el port Sudan baucn die Sowjets Numeiri seines 15-le Mallioantiwenwoh- cities Flatten- and Samie Socten-Staat Lager fij ins radi h d antiwestliche Stiltzpunkt. Auf dem Flugplatz Wadi Lager fiihrte, hat t zWis c Bhen iir degem rk ara- rieg rieg Seidna, 24 Kilometer nordlich von b einem nd dem zwi Khartum - aul3erhalb der Retchwei- zwis h and deco schwsr Afrika, to von Israels Jets -, stehen 100 agyp- cen Arabern unit Israel l and da- e Mips. rrdt zwischen der Sowjet-Union and tisch , '-render nher ais die sowje- SUDAN Hort die Trommeln l comer wenn u schen Busch eine DC-3 ohne Ho- heitszeichen auftaucht, stilrzen schwarze Rebellen freudig gestikulie- rend aus ihren Verstecic..n; denn das Flugzeug bringt begehrte Gi ter: Waf- fen and Munition, Let}ensmittel and Medikamente. Am Steuer der aus Athiopien oder Uganda kommenden Maschine sitzen Welf3e - Israelis. Sohald aber Mi-B-Orol3hubschrau- ber ',der An-12-Flugzeuge iiher die Wipfel knattern, gehen die Guerillas entsetzt in Deckung; denn die Ma- schiner. bringen Tod and Verderben: MG-Feuer, Bombes, Soldaten der Sudan-Armee. Auch am Steuer dieser im Sudan gestarteten 'Maschinen sit- zen Weif3e - Russen. Der Bus'hkrieg im Sudan, Afrikas flachengroiitcm Land, fist In cis neues Stadium getreten. Mehl' als zehn Jahre lang hatten sich nur humanitare Or- ganisationen fiir den scheinbar aus- Denn well der revolutfonare Sozia- lilst Numeiri mehr and mehr Russen and Agypter ins Land holt.e and damit das Gleichgewicht. dc+r Krafte im i st- lichen Afrika verinderte, wurden auf der anderen Seite westliche Mi chte aktiv - vor allem die Israelis. Verglichen mit dem ost.lichen Enga- gement fiir Numeiri nimmt sich die westliche Unterstutzung fur die nach einem Schlangengift benannten Anya- Nya-Aufstandischen allerdings be- scheiden aus: Die Israelis instruierten In Israel einige Anya-Nya-Fiihrer - so den Chef der ?Southern Sudan Li- beration Front", Joseph Lago -, sie leisten Materialhilfe'aus der Luft and schickten 26 Agenten zur Beratung der Rebellen in den Busch. Bescheidene Hill',e leisten auch Athiopien and Uganda. Haile Selassies Kaiserreich, sift der linken Macht- ubernahme in Somalia in die Zange geraten, gewahrt deh Rebellen Unter- schlupf. Der Negus? racht sich damit zugleich bet Numeiti fur dessen Un- terstutzung der Eritrea-Separatisten, die Athiopiens reiche Kustenprovinz aus dem Kaiserreich losen wollen. (so der britische ?Guardian"). zu beiden Seiten der Grenze leben, steht erst seit dem Sturz des Linken Milton Obote am 25. Januar Pest an der Seite der Sudsudanesen. Idi Amin, Ugandas neuer Fuhrer, verglich Nu- meiris Behandlung der schwarzen Su- danesen mit Sudafrikas Apartheid- Politik. Daraufhin drohte Numeiris Minister Abu Issa: ,Wir werden ange- sichts der Einmischung im revolutio- naren Sudan nicht die Hande im Schof3 gefaltet lassen." Seine militarische Starke verdankt der revolutioniire Sudan der Sowjet- Union, die such an dem Mitte Februar ausgesprochenen KP-Verbot keinen Anstofi nimmt. Das Gastebuch im Ho- tel der stidsudanesischen Provinz- hauptstadt Juba ist volt von russischen Namen. In die Spalte ?Firma" haben fast alle ?Air Force" geschrieben. 500 his 1000 russische Expcrten dril- die Verwicklung der sozialistischen Freunde in den Biirgerkrieg, denn sett sechs Monaten beteiligen sie sich aktiv an den Aktionen gegen (lie Rebellen in den drel Sildprovinzen: So brachten im Oktober von Rus- sen 'geflogene Hubschrauber eine su- danesische Lager Morta, unweit deraUganda- Grenze. Die Hubschrauber griffen in die Kampfe ein, angeblich fielen fast tausend Zivilisten. Und im Januar unterstiitzten Hubschrauber einen An- griff auf ?Owing-ki-bul" (HOrt die Trommeln), das Hauptlager der Auf- standischen. Von Sowjets gesteuerte Hubschrau- ber, Migs and Antonows flogen aul3erdem von den Basen Juba and Malakal aus Bombenangriffe gegen vier weitere Orte. ,,Niemals zuvor haben die Sowjets so aktiv an der Unterdruckung eines Aufstands in der Dritten Welt teilge- nommen, nie zuvor haben sic gegen schwarze Afrikaner gekampft and bet der Bombardierung ihrer DBrfer ge- holfen", entriistete sich das US-Maga- zin ?Time". Uberschrift: ?Das sowjeti- sche Vietnam." Approvea or a ease