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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 1 94A000300100001-2 ???6611010401=m Propaganda PERSPECTIVES MAY 1971 PATRICE LUMUMBA UNIVERSITY: TRAINING IN THE "SCIENCE OF REVOLUTION" INSIDE THE 24TH CPSU CONGRESS CZECHOSLOVAKIA: SHOWCASE OF SOVIET COLONIALISM THE SOVIET SECURITY CONFERENCE OFFENSIVE EAST PAKISTAN: SINO-SOVIET BATTLEGROUND POLLUTION IN THE SOVIET UNION DATES WORTH NOTING SHORT SUBJECTS SWEDEN SCORES RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT FROM USSR HOW THE KREMLIN TRAPS JOURNALISTS CUBAN POET UNDER ARREST BULGARIA: THE 16TH SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC KHRUSHCHEV MEMOIRS AUTHENTIC 25X1C3b1 Approved For Release 19=glifia:CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 25X1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY May 1971 THE PATRICE LUMUMBA PEOPLE'S FRIENDSHIP UNIVERSITY OF MOSCOW ? Lumumba University, which even some Soviet officials admit:was founded "to educate students from underdeveloped countries so they can return to their homelands to become the nucleus for pro-Soviet activities," is eleven years,old. It was when former Soviet Premier Khrushchev visited Indonesia in February 1960 that he made the first public announcement of the Soviet Government's intention to establish a "University for Friendship Among Peoples," as the institution was first called, in order to offer training to the national intelligentsia cadres for Afro- Asian and Latin American countries. Months, before, however, word had been spread among students already study- ing at Western universities about the impending announce- ment.: Arab and Asian students in West Germany, for example, not only knew that the university was coming into being, they Oven knew details of its organization plan. The Early Days For the first academic year, according to Soviet sources, some 43,500 applications for admission had been received by 31 July 1960, the final date set for submission. From these, 501 applicants from 63 countries were accepted including 193 from Africa, 142 from Southeast Asia, 120 from Latin America, and 46 from the Near East. Also enrolled for the first. year were some 50 Soviet students from the Central Asian. and Caucasian republics. Some governments objected to the way in which Moscow bypassed them in the selection of students. Burma, for example, decided that the enrollment list of Burmese students (of whom there were 35) sent direct to Moscow via the Soviet embassy in Rangoon, constituted a violation of Burmese regulations and refused to give the students exit visas. India insisted on taking a hand in the selection of students as did Indonesia and Nepal. As a result of these interventions, student departures were either canceled or delayed and the gates of the new Friendship University swung open on 1 October 1960 with only 300 students in attendance. During the late 1950's the majority of students entering the USSR from the developing countries were drawn from the Middle East and Southeast Asia, but in the early 1960's the emphasis switched to sub-Sahara Africa:, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 and the new entrants from Africa rdse sharply from about 400 in 1960 to about 2,000 in 1962. Africans have accounted for fifty-five to sixty-five per cent of the total number of new students from the developing countries every year since 1962. The largest number have come from Somalia, Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria which, together, have sent more than 3500 students to the USSR since 1959. In their eagerness to attract students from lower economic and social strata, the Soviet officials were initially overly lax as far as entrance requirements went and many students were accepted without any or with very little secondary school education. The Soviets soon discovered that the "poor students" for whom Patrice Lumumba had been established were also poorly qualified for academic studies. The dropout ratio was high and by 1967 some 850 students had been sent home because of academic failures. This inability to meet minimum academic standards contributed to widespread dissatisfaction among the students and was an important factor in the December 1963 demonstrations by African students. Subsequently the Soviets gradually raised the standards for admission and imposed stricter controls over the behavior of students in residence. In fact, there have been widespread reports of near-segregation of Asian and African students, who have resented and COM- plained about the constant surveillance and restrictions on their activities. Student Recruitment The Soviets use two approaches in recruiting students for training at Patrice Lumumba: official, through bilateral cultural agreements or under sponsorship of United Nations agencies (i.e., with the approval of the students' home governments) and unofficially, through Communist parties or front organizations such as friendship societies and trade union groups (i.e., illegally without the consent of the students' home governments). For example, in February 1961, when the university was officially renamed in honor of the deceased Patrice Lumumba, such groups as the Inter- national Union of Students, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the World Federation of Trade Unions, and the Inter- national Organization of Journalists all renamed their scholarship funds which became part of the "International Patrice Lumumba Scholarship Fund." Many governments have now imposed stricter controls on students leaving their countries and the illegal scholarships are a smaller proportion of the total than they were up to the mid-1960s. A factor in encouraging home governments to exercise greater caution may well have been the exposure in mid-1963 of Pavel Erzin, a prorector and recruiter for 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 go abroad for higher studies. To crown all, there is a statement that 'preference will be given to Indo-Soviet Cultural Society workers." In February of this year, according to a TASS dispatch, Prem Sagar Gupta, General Secretary of the India-USSR Society, said that approximately 4,000 applications to the university will came from India during this year. The Academic Level Only !about one third of the some 12,000 foreigners studying in the USSR go to Patrice Lumumba University. For the rest, those whose level of training will often have a bearing on the ultimate success or failure of a given Soviet economic or technical aid project, openings are available at some 170 of the various polytechnical, scientific,: agricultural or other specialized institutions of higher education scattered throughout the country. The role of Lumumba Friendship University, as Pravda noted on the occasion of the institution's tenth ama'FFEgiry last year, is to "strengthen the position of progressive forces" in the world struggle. On the same occasion, the university's rector, Sergei Rumyantsev, held a press conference at which he said that 2,335 students had graduated-from'his univerSity since it was founded. Rumyantsev also quite frankly alluded to the university's political character saying it had originally been founded because of appeals from "representatives of progressive circles in a number of countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America." These "representatives" talked of need for forming national cadres, but also allegedly said such an institution would "render great support to the liberation movement" During Rumyantsev's press conference, held 28 January last year, the rector fielded a number of questions posed by both Soviet and Western journalists. The rector seemed, to Western journalists at least, notably defensive in answering:questions which probed Lumumba University's academic standards, the qualifications of its applicants, and problems related to the Lumumba graduate's return to his home country. One correspondent asked how many students drop out and why. Rumyantsev said that an average 150 drop out annually, most are either first year students with insufficient preparation or students who develop serious illness or those who have "adjustment difficulties" (unspecified). One correspondent commented: "As the final trumpet blast fades away, one is struck with the notion that even after ten years Lumumba University is still striving to establish its reputation as a serious educational institution." Approved For Release 1999/09/0i : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Patrice Lumumba University, as holding the rank of General in the Soviet Union's secret police, the Committee for State Security (KGB). Erzin, who stayed on with the university until at least 1968, was identified as a KGB officer by a fellow KGB operator, Yury Rastvorov, who defected to the West in the early 1960's. A 17 April 1963 London Daily Tele- graph article had described Erzin as on his way to Indonesia from India where he reportedly recruited more than half of the 50 Indian students he planned to have admitted to the university during the next academic year. Currently, Soviet extra-legal student recruitment continues in countries that have no bilateral agreements for student exchanges with the USSR, such as Iran and many Latin American countries. The practice also prevails in countries where the Soviet Union wants to attract more students than are provided for under bilateral agreements or where it wants to maintain good relations with the local leftist organizations and to train their members, such as with the. most recent cases in Mexico and Ceylon. In these situations, scholarships are offered directly through trade union, student and other front groups, as previously men- tioned. Or, students may be recruited from among groups already abroad and studying in the West. Since the students' home governments are bypassed, many countries are unaware that they even have nationals studying in the USSR. For example, when the new ambassador from Cyprus arrived in Moscow in 1963, he was surprised to learn that at least 50 Cypriot students were studying at Patrice Lumumba. Any foreigner who has not been offered a scholarship but who wants to attend Patrice Lumumba University can apply directly to the university or can apply through the Soviet embassy or consulate in his home country. Many countries, aware of the threat of illegal recruitment, now forbid direct applications to the university. In 1962, for example, India established a selection board especially for students applying: to Patrice Lumumba. Yet as late as March 1969, the National Council of the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society ran an ad in the New Age weekly, inviting applications for scholarships of five to six years', duration to Lumumba University. Commenting on the ad, Current newspaper noted, in its 19 April issue of that year, "Other countries advertise through the Government of India, but this one dispenses with that formality. Application forms for scholarships of other countries are obtainable free of charge, but this ad says, 'Applications on prescribed forms only will be entertained. Forms available on payment of Rs 5.' This should enable Quite a large sum to be collected from thousands of frustrated students wanting to 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 _Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 CPYKuri NEW YORK TIMES 18 April 19/1 Soviet Union: What They Do At Old turilumba U. MOSCOW ? Lumumba which die Soviet. Union established to educate students from non-Communist develop- ing countries, celebrates its 11th anniversary this year. The school, on Moscow's south side,: has figured in the news recent; ly in conjunction with reported , revolutionary movements in Mexico and Ceylon. According to dispatches from, Texico City last month, some of the people arrested for revo- lutionary activities there were said to have attended Lumumba University some time ago and to have made:' North Korean contacts while in Moscow. Simi- larly, radical leftist insurgents in Ceylon are also said to have ? a Lumurnba background, and the Ceylonese were reported to have expelled North Koreans in connection with the present civil strife. The suggestion that students at the university are being _ trained for revoiutionarj/ activi- ties against existing govern= merits in their home lands can- ? , not be documented here. Nor, has there been any information about North Koreans at Lumumba, for students from Communist countries are nor- mally placed in other universi- , ties. criteria that guide the selection ` of Oue.ct .,tudc...ts far Latmeteba , University. However, observers have noted' that they appear tcY be somewhat ,older than ordi-' 'nary Soviet college entrants. , Although all formal political ' ; activities are prohibited on the: , campus, there is known to be frequent controversy -- and even strife -- among the for- eign students. Soviet authorities are said to be particularly con- , cerned over occasional evidence ; of Maoism and, adherents of the , militant guerrilla tactics of Che, Guevara. ; Basically, however, . foreign - students are expected to seek . a professional education at the Patrice Lumumba ? Peoples'* ; Friendship University, as the institution is officially called. It t was named 'for the Congolesd : leader, who in 1961 was ,killed under obscure circumstances in the Katanga region. ' The annual freshman class. consists of 225 Soviet citizens and 600 foreigners; the latter , are selected from applications sent through the education sys- ! terns of their home countries' I and ark an individual basis. i Competition is strong, with as many as 7,000 and 8,000 appli- cants for the 600 foreign. open- ings. On arriving, the foreigners are ; put through a preparatory, one- ; year course. The course is de- ? signed to give them intensive training in Russian so that they - 4 preparatory program is also in to fill any gaps in the ' academic backgrounds of the new arrivals, and may be ex- . tended to two years if the stti- ' dent is particularly poorly pre-, :pared. ,3 Like ordinary Soviet univer- sities, Lumumba does not offer a general liberal arts program, but assigns students immediate- ly to any of six professional schools., They are the Schools, ; " The Soviet press has been silent on any link between Lat- in - American or Asian revolu- tionaries and Lumumba. Pub- lished commentaries on the can understand the lectures, all 'rest in Ceylon have described of which are in Russian. The the insurgents as anarchists fi- nanced by, Western intelligence agencies. , However, there is little doubt that, in the five or six years of their studies foreign stu- dents are exposed not only to ' the Soviet way of life ? "one.; fourth of the 4,000-member stu- dent body and the entire teach- ing staff are Soviets?but also, to tha political ?cross-currents' that the Asian, African and Lat- in - American newcomers brine or Faculties, of Economics and Awith te=tElsorhiRlabkhasie,1999vratzximrop leased on, the procednre. and Enaineerina. CPYRGHT In an attempt to make the 'courses as relevant as possible to the particular needs of the .% developing countries, Soviet ed- ,, ucators have added subjects not normally taught at the Soviet college level. They include trop- ical forestry, crop cultivation,, , animal husbandry, econom- ics and- law in the neutralist parts of the workk and architec- ' ture in tropical climates. The largest single contingent ? last year ? 964 students ? was? from Latin America, with as many as 109 from Mexico alone. Next came the African , group of students, numbering 834, with the largest national, representation consisting of 81 , Kenyans. , As a general rule, Lumumba , does not admit students from . other Communist countries; they are placed in regular So- viet universities. Nor does it admit Japanese, on the ground that Japan is an advanced in- dustrial nation that does not fall within the concept for which the university was in- tended. Like regular Soviet college students, foreigners at Lumum- ba get free dormitory space, plus a 'monthly stipend of 80 .to 90 rubles ($88 to $99). This ,is substantially higher than the 7 30 rubles a month received by Soviet students. There have been about 2,500 graduates so far since the first graduating class of IR in 1965. A small percentage stays on lot Post-graduate work, and the un. i'Versity has conferred 20 doc. torates to date. .--THEODORE SHABAD 194A000300100001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 SOVIET UNION #3 1970 A few words about the Patrice, Lumumbn University from its Rector SERGEI RUMYANTSEV: hen we opened the doors of our country's first inter- national institution of higher learning we knew that we were embarking on e great experiment. There was no doubt that our staff would be able to provide' the necessary leaching for people who had chosen to become mathematicians, physlelets, engineers; agronomists, lawyms, Of dO61.911, ftlfW1 Iii(jhef AC11'01111 Ma already proved its worth. The uncertainty lay elsewhere: wculd it be possible to form a cohesive, friendly community of young people from different countries, with varying views and social backgrounds? Some foreign specialists and journalists gave us "friendly" warnings. The Russians, they said, have without knowing it, taken on the impossible. They don't realise that these Afri- cans, Indians and Latin Americans are simply not capable of .analytic thinking. In short, they were telling us that this was our own busi,ness, of course, but nothing would come of this noble effort. We did in fact encountered certain difficulties, but they were by no rkjrns insurmountable. , The entrance examinauxis disclosed some serious gaps In the applicants' knowledge of the natural sciences; many of those who held secondary school-leaving certificates actually had insufficient educational qualifications for entrance to a Soviet institution of higher learning. It was a question of In- adequate preparation for material reasons rather than lack of ability. And there is a big difference between the two. To bring the students up to the requisite educational level, we organised a special Preparatory Department, offer- ing, among other subjects, a one-year course in Russian which became the working language for all students. The University has already sent off five batches of grad- uates; 2,335 young men and women have already received diplomas, and another 579 will receive them this year. The University of Peoples' Friendship has fully justified its name. This is not just my opinion, but also the opinion of many observers abroad. Let me quote some foreign comment. "I am very happy to pay a visit to this great Institution where friendship in the international field Is nursed with such devotion. Students drawn from all over the world find a a rare opportunity of not only getting advanced training in higher sciences and technology, but in the process emerge as strong links for international waderstanding and friendship. Great force for peace and friendship." This statement was made by India's Minister for External Affairs Swaran Singh. And here are the words of the eminent British scientist John Bernal: It has been a great inspiration to me to visit the Lumum- ba Friendship University. After travelling over much of the world it is a pleasure to meet all together and working In har- mony the young men and women, who are going out to build a new world of peace." The members of a parliamentary delegation from Costa Rica had this to say: We were able to assess the feeling of unity and the scope of the work being done at the University for the ben- efit of all the people on our planet. Comparing Friendship University with other modern universities, we must say that this was a discovery for us. This new university of culture and friendship is developing successfully." After ten years of work, we can justifiably say that we have passed our major test. The University has become a large centre for the training of highly skilled specialists for the developing countries. Already working in various branches of science, industry and agriculture in their native countries are 593 of our graduates from Latin America, 451 from Africa, 317 from the Arab East, and 518 from Asia. There are 3,092 students from 84 different countries currently enrolled in the six main departments (engineering; physics, mathematics and natural sciences; medicine; agricul- ture; history and philology; economics and law). Since the developing countries need specialists with .a broad training, we have made it our aim to prepare our stu- dents to work in the most different branches of their chosen fields. The medical faculty, for example, not only provides train- ing in therapeutics and surgery, but also in the organisation of ?public health services and epide- miology. The graduates of our ag- ricultural faculty are not only high- ly qualified agronomists, but have a soundAbc of -vetenIK and farm mec ? A good deal of attention Is also given to developing teething skills In the students themselves; the skills they need In order to train national specialists In their own coun- tries. Many of our graduates have devoted themselves to teaching. For example, Kante Kabine heads the Mathematics Chalf et trio jdonakfi Folyt@ohnics1 Institute (Ouiriosh tiesiun Odunuga Is head of the Russian Language Department at lbadan University (Nigeria); Krishna Reddi is head of the Mathematics Chair at the Colmbatore Institute of Technology (India); and Sanchez Vargas is Dean of the Physics and Mathematics Department of the University of Los Andes (Colombia). The srecific problems involved In training specialists for Asia, Africa and Latin America required that we add to the teaching syllabus a number of special courses and provide special textbooks for these courses. Our University chairs have published textbooks on such subjects as tropical forestry, agriculture and livestock breeding; tropical infectious and other diseases; the problems of economics and law In developing countries; architecture for tropical countries; and others. So far, in these first ten years of the University's exist- ence, the academic staff of the University have published 1,427 different textbooks and other teaching materials. These are now part of our well-stocked library (over 420,000 volumes), which receives all newly published literature in the Universi- ty's fields of interest and subscribes to over 1,000 Soviet and foreign scientific periodicals. The University conducts intensive research into problems related to the development of Asian, African and Latin Amer- ican countries. Here are just a few examples: the mining and geology chairs study the geology, magmatic formations and problems involved in mining processes in Africa and the Hin- dostan Peninsula; the Humanities Department conducts re- search Into the socio-economic problems of the developing countries; and the law department concerns itself with problems of the formation of national state and legal systems. Research in these and other important fields is also done by our post-graduate students. The University has already produced 170 Candidates of Science in various fields. The work done by first-degree students on terminal and final exam- ination projects not only helps them to master the fundamen- tals of their subject but also to make an individual contribu- tion to it. Through the joint efforts of the staff and the students, a friendly and .hard-working community has grown up at the University. Our decision to institute student self-government turned out to be a good one. The students of each faculty elect a student council for their respective faculty, and the chairmen of these councils represent the students on our highest governing body?the University Council. There are also the student hostel councils, the women's council, the journalists' club, the debating society, etc. From the very beginning the University has had various types of student organisations. These include the student associations (zemiyachestvo) which are composed of students from the same country. There are now 80 of these associations In the University, each of which is run according to rules and regulations drawn up by the students themselves, and has Its own structure and elected administrative bodies. These associations take part in discussing and deciding basic questions relating to the University's activities. Occa- sionally they invite representatives of the administrative and academic staff to their meetings. The administration in its turn holds meetings of the associations' representatives to pass on Information and discuss iimportant questions concerning the development of the University. The student organisations are always represented at stu- dent scientific conferences, meetings and sports competitions. They recommend their members for taking part in the work of various social organisations, set up national amateur art groups and guide their activities. In this way students take a most active part In all aspects of University life. Over Its ten years of existence the University has won Itself a high reputation abroad. This can be seen botn from the 7,000-8,000 applications which arrive each year from young people of 'different countries and from the University's extensive contacts with foreign universities, government bodies and social or- ganisations. Marta Release 1999/09/0/ : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 anisation. CPYRGH1Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 CPYRGHT JAPAN TIMES 2 April 1971 Lumumba U. in oscow Said Producing evolutionaries By ROGER LEDDINGTON MOSCOW (AP) ? -The arrest of 20 lettwing terrorists in co recently revealed a clandes- tine aspect of Soviet "coopera- tion" with developing countries ? the production of young revo? lutionaries at Moscow's Patrice Lumumba Friendthip Univer- sity. With the announcement that, . the arrested terrorists had stud- ied at Lumumba, the sub- sequent recall of Mexico's am- bassador from Moscow and the expulsion of five Soviet Embas- sy offi cials from *Mexico City, there seemed to be little doubt the Mexican Government be- lieved that the Kremlin had plsi,ed a major role in the crea- tion of the terrorist group, the Revolutionary Action Movement (MIR)., Although North Korea alle- gedly served as the guerrilla warfare training ground for the Mexican recruits, it was at Lu- mumba, on the outskirts of Moscow that the Mexicans got their ideological education. Created in 1960 as the Pec' pies' Friendship University, the institution was founded by the Soviet, Gc ernment "in com- pliance with the Leninist prin- ciple of rendering disinterested assistance to the peoples of the liberated countries." I n 19 62 the name was changed to the Patrice Lu mumba Friendship University in, honor of the Congolese Premier "who sacrificed his life In the struggle for his country's freedom and independence." Last year, when the univer- sity celebrated its 10th anni- versary and revealed the latest student statistics, 3,092 foreign students were attending Lu- rnumba, representing 84 count- ries, 75 per cent of them were under 26 years of age. Latin America contributed the largest number of students; 964. Africa llowed with 5 Arabs accounted for 770 and Asians for 524. Mexico was fourth on the in- owlet al list with. 109 students, outnu nbered only by India with 210, Chile with 186, and Syria with 43. Notably th a country that con- stantl / espouses female equaf- ity, t le Soviets permitted only 447 women ? out of the 3,092 studets ? to attend Lumumba. In us first decade the univer- sity as graduated 2,335 men and women. Latin Americans Jed Vie list of ordinary gradu- ates with 593, but was at the bottom of the post-graduate list with mly. 15, indicating an ern- phasi by Latin American stu- dents on basic education and trainhig. Soviet students,' who make up a small minority of the student body, led the post- gradt ate list at 145. No information was available on the Latin Americans' par- tibulAr study fields. In many underdeveloped coun- tries the students are selected by the local Communist party or the ocal branch of the Soviet "frioidship society." Then the Soviet Union takes over ? local governments rarely provide scho arships. The students are brou ;ht to Moscow free of char e, housed and educated free, and returned home free. While here they receive mon hly stipends from the So- viets ranging from about 80 to 100 rubles ($72 to $90). On that they are expected to feed and to chthe themselves and to pro- vide whatever entertainment they can find in the capital city.. In a society where the aver- age monthly per capita income is 1: 1 rubles ($109) and where both parents th a household usually work, many students, privAtely complain that they find it difficult to adequately live on their stipends. TI,e university's hard-cover' an American or European college catalogue with a few difference. According to it, the university offers instruction in seven dif- ferent faculties or departments: natural sciences and mathemat- les, engineering, medicine, agri- culture, preparatory . Russian history-philology, and econom- ics-law. , All foreign students, unless they speak Russian fluently, spend their first year studying ' the language. All instruction and books are in Russian. In all but the that two facul- ties, the ?course titles indicate the students get basically the 'samd education as their West- the students are offered a course in ."the history of ?the countries of Asia, Africa and - Latin America." That course requires 414 stu- dy hours. The department's Russian language studies re- quires 434 hours. The history faculty's course catalogue is replete with studies such as "the breakup of the co- lonial system of imperialism, development of the intert national working-class ail Communist movement, mover ment for peace and friendship between the peoples for peace- ful co-existence and abolition of a new world war." Other than the compulsory law ? courses the university's prospectus. gives no hint of guerrilla warfare training. But as Mexican. officials and diplomats revealed earlier, practical application of the 20 Mexicans' Soviet education was made in North Korea. A pamphlet published by the university last year concluded with: "The celebration of the tenth anniversary, reaffirms the rec- ognition of the university as a center of training for first-class experts for the liberated count- ries of Asia, Africa and Latin America." em counterparts. The ,difference ? and the uni- versity's probable role in the: recent events in Mexico ? be-- , !gin to appear in the economics- law and history-philology; stud-1 les, In the first, in addition to the usual legal and economic in- struction, there is an emphasis on the "modern bourgeois polit- ical economy." From there the students pro- ceed to courses such as inter-; national law 19: "History of Po- litical Thought" which stresses the study of "revolutionary and' national liberation movements." Among the compulsory !I courses in the law department ls "problems of the general the-, ory of state and law" which'. covers "peaceful and nonpeace-, ful ways of transition to social- ism." Under another compulsory course,, law students , are edu- cated in the "ways and meth- ods of ? colonialism liquidation," the "legal character of armed struggle against colonialism,"; and "liquidation of imperialist' bases on the territory of devel- oping nations." In the history faculty, in addi-: lion to stress on the methods of ? teaching children and adults ("training of will, character and conscientious disciplines"), 4.....01????????bilmfmlirrlo 4 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 THE UNIVERSITY IN FIGURES ? There are 3,092 students from 84 foreign countries currently en- rolled in the University. These In- clude 447 women students. In ad- dition, 969 young Soviet men and women also allefid the UnlVerSity, ? The University has 82 chairs and 864 teachers representing 149 fields of knowledge. O The teaching staff includes 84 professors with doctoral de- grees and 388 assistant profes- sors with Candidate of Science de- grees. ? 150 teachers of Russian are taking special courses offered by the Advanced Training Depart- ment, and 25 engineers , from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Arab East are raising their qualifications in the UN Courses at the University. O The University has Ii2 special study rooms and 151 laboratories and workshops. ? The students receive practical training at 210 industrial and ag- ricultural enterprises, research In- stitutes, clinics and museums, lo-? cated in 35 Soviet cities. ? The academic staff of the Uni- versity has written and published 60 monographs and textbooks and over 2,300 articles which have appeared. in Soviet and foreign periodicals. The University has demeleted 160 reseireh lifejeits tor various enterprises and organ. isations. ? At present, 225 young scien- tists (145 Soviet and 80 foreign) are doing post-graduate work at the University. O The University has signed agreements on co-operation with many institutions of higher learn- ing in the developing countries, 'including the Technical University In Oruro and the Tomas Fries University in Potosi (Bolivia), the Gorakhpur University (India), the Central University of Las Villas In Santa Clara (Cuba), and the Uni- versity of Khartoum (Sudan). ? In 1965, the Patrice lumum- ba University was accepted as3 member of the International Af- sociation of Universities. ? Nearly 1,200 students, post- graduates and teachers are active members of the University's Sports Club, through which they engage in a total of 20 different kinds of sport. WASHINGTON POST 12 March 1970 Lumumba University Rounds Out a Decade By Donald Armour RNiIrrs MOSCOW ? Patrice NI- I a I. i CPYRGHT proominz Asian. African and Latin American students for a niece In the "third world." hng produced 2.335 et-nth:ales in its first decade, just ended. The univer,ily. which ac- quired ilg present name a year 4.tey R was founded, following the death of the first Congo- lew leader. Patrire Lumumba, k geared In specific require- ttlf.P19 or developing countries. be six (acuities ? Of engi- neering. sciences. medicine, urimilltere, history snd reannmics snd law ? re. fleet a. marked emphasis nn1 reienceicalhr thaiards. ! The *VM,Inlak AG's' Rel ivtith geology and mining ern- ptiastze xperiat prospecting problems In India and Africa, while the medical faculty con- ducts research Into tropical idsrases. The largest contingent of , ti university's roll of 3,092 fsrelen students comes from; at in A mcrica, numberinal PIK followed by Africa with; F-14, arab countries with 77(1 rand Asia with 524. Individual rountries with I te lei vest representation elude Chile (111M, India (awl ;nil Syria (1431. MOOT than 751 ler rent of the students are nrIer 26 years of age. Women I umber only 447. or five years hi the elISP nri medicine, and nil studies nrel preceded hy al least one year's: training In Russian ? tite teaching Intuoinge, 11.entrilkin Is then. reikelly not a compulsory sub- Pict as II Is it Waxer soviet universities. und In Out stu- dents From other coternunist Countries, tnetwitroa Cuba anal Chios. are not 4dirnItte4 toy OM Patrice Lumembe taniversit/.. Nor are Japanese. student s,1 since .1apan Is tainsidered Industrialired 5181C and not ii de:eloping country. The universtly has not been free from internal strife. someittnes involving pro- The university collaborates! Chinese elements among the with the United Naliona Edii-1 students. The government rational. Seientific and Cull newspaper lzvestla reported Tensions between Africans, and some Russian citizens led' In serious trouble six years! ago. On Dee. 18. 1901 hundreds: of African students fieleht their way to hlosrow's lied, Square over pollee barricades. demanding an inquiry into the death of a Ghanaian student. whom the Soviet authorities said had died from exposure tO cold while he was drunk. The Africans said Russians had beaten him to death for timing out With a white girl. ImpernougzigpciAA Lftftikrik990300100001-2 I anon ovno). after e an o er str hu e pamphlets received from the Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 ties decided to immortalize the name of our Prime Minister, we wern delightedr-all of us, not just the Congolese, but the people .of the other young nations that used to be oppressed. There is no doubt that the hope of the third-world countries was that this place would serve as a sanctuary for the development of lofty thought, and not as a den for weaving the most deceitfy. kind 'of plots. On the eve of the 24th Congress of the Soviet CP,. we should hope that the Soviet authorities will give some consideration to this question and cast some light on the real role assigned the Lumumba University. The fact is that it is becoming increasingly clear that an evil campaign is being run from the place named for our national hero, and that he is sometimes alleged to have held philosophical concepts he never endorsed in his life. Of course, it would not be inappropriate right now to reMind the world that the first Congolese prime minister never in all his political life opted for any of the ideologies that divide the world today. Citizen Christophe Ngbenye, a former rebellion leader, testified to Iumumba's nationalism, when he stated redently at Kampala that General Mobutu had made the Congo what Lumumba had wanteNi it to be. On its side, the great French daily Le Monde, in a Special issue devoted to General Mobutu's imminenT?Vigir-to France, points up the similarities between the political think- ing of our head of state and those of the Congo's national hero. These are two. important voices which we cannot ignore unless we want to give currency to the unhealthy factions that threaten to blacken the,,reputation of Patrice Emery Lumumba. From now on, the great institution set up in the name of Lumumba in the Soviet capital, if it is to be worthy of its high inspiration and Serve the countries of the third world, must teach our future cadres the concepts of nationalism as he under- stood them, instead of orienting them toward goals that might well bring shame upon the noble heritage of the hei.o Of our once-oppressed countries. The nationalism of young nations, al- though each of us has its own special kind, finds its common de- nominator in our quest for our intrinsic, primordial values. This is nothing more or-less than a return to our own authentic sources, and General Mobutu is the champion in that quest today. Approved For Release 1999/09/6 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 LE PRiDgES, Kinshasa 24 March 1971 LUMUMBA UNIVERSITY; HOTBED OF SUBVERSION? Last March 15th, the Attorney General of, Sanchez Vergae, announced that the Mexican police had uncoyered a commun-i.. .ist plot and arrested 19 terrorists who had holed up in their 'den, andithat the police were hunting the other suspects listed as fugitives. The Attorney General also announced that the ? group had come back . via East Germany and the USSR after a train. ing course in terrorist sabotage and guerrilla tactics in North. Korea. According to the Mexican Attorney General's office, some., of the terrorists apparently had been given scholarships at the,: Patrice Lumumba University under Soviet-Mexican cultural ex- 4 change programs. 'TheY` admitted that they had not Only received, training in politics, but that the purpose of this training' could have been to teach them to commit other crimes. It was against this' background that they stole timated at the equivalent of more than 40,000 zaire from a Mex- ican bank. They allegedly admitted that they intended to go on stealing from banks and financial institutions 'in Mexico City ? and elsewhere throughout the country. The government also claims :to have captured large quantities of weapons and other propaganda materials. On 17 March 1971, the Mexican government recalled its am- bassador from Moscow for consultations. Apparently the plot was organized with the collaboration of some Soviet pitizens. In this connection, the official French radio and TV announced in its news broadcasts last week-that five members of the Soviet embassy staff in Mexico?had been asked to leave Mexico. It was also pointed out that recently a great many Mexicans, Latin Amer- icana, and Africans have been going to the USSR. .Unwilling to head the list of countries that harbor terrorist movements, this great power allegedly uses North Korea as a cover for training revolutionaries to operate in non-communist countries. The Mexican daily El Sol has directly accused the USSR of 'involvement in the plot, charging that scholarship students at Iumumba University are indeed engaged in revolutionary activi- ties, and that it is an established fact that scholarships grant- ed under this cultural exchange program are used for Other pur- poses. This is no secret to anybody. As for reaction in Congo, the obvious point is that peo- ple here are very much offended at this ignoble use of the name of their national hero. Back in 1961, when the Soviet authori- ? Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 5 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 EL MERCURIC, chile 2 September 1970 KUNAKOV FILE (VI): LUMUMBA UNIVERSITY IN MOSCOW . A visWto the Soviet Union, and 'enrollment in Lumumba jrniversity in Moscow, which was especially oreated for the. youth, .of underdeveloped 'countries, constitute two of the greatest in- centives devised by the EmbaSsy and the Communist Party to at. .15.raot adherenti and future oollaborators in their intelligence services. According to the Kunakov File, there are, in the Soviet ,Embassy, detailed lists of all. Chileans who have received grants: to study in Moscow since 1960, including their names, addresses 7! and other items. According to the' File, the following grants .were .awarded for the years in question: six in 1960; 12 in 1961; '12'in 1962; eight in 1963; 42 in 1964; 47 in 1965; 49 in 1966; 31 in 1967; 32!in 1968; and 25 in 1969. About the middle of last year,,Kunakov drew up a list of 25 graduates of Lumumba; and, on the basis of this tabulation, of the total number invol- ved, three graduated in philology; five in engineering; four in 111edioine; four: in physics; three in chemistry; three in econom- ics; two in agronomy; one in international law; and one in his- tory. 'A good Many of them are working at the University of Chi- 1.e4, some with the INDAP /Thstituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario; ;Agriculture-Livestock Development Institute 7, two on the Cen- tral Committeei of the Communist Party 7 one at the Soviet-Chilean Institute, and another at. the State Technical University. On the iiiitiative'oethe Soviet-Chilean Institute, a 'Center for Former S.pudents, and one ofTarents and Guardians of students now in Moscow were formed. The parents are involved in collecting funds and favora_for the youths, and the gradu- ates are urged tO remain united in association with the InSti- tute. This does not always happen, and the File notes (in July 1969) that " a delegation of former graduates appeared at the Embassy a few days ago, expressing criticism for the Soviet- .chnean Institute's failure to do anything to help them 'Faliriata, their.lomotessionAl.degrees. Kazakov, who spoke to them, _quated 'them f - as. salting that in view of the Institute's: - attitude, they were holding their meetings at the East German-. . Chilean Cultural Institute. This provoked Kazakov's indigna- tion, and he requested that they return again to the Institute. Candidates for Lumumba are selected by the Institute and ut the Embassy, apparently on the basis of merit, but in reali- 'ty aocording to the status of their sponsors in the Communist -Party, or their influence at the Embassy. Acoording to an .evaluation made by Kazakov (File, 23 September 1968)0 "the ,chief danger at the Institute is the interference of 'alien' individuals in the selectiop of candidates for:Lumumba Univer-. - sity; if this should happen, the political intervention of the.. U.S.S.R. in Lapin America). Would be. seriously jeopardized.", . Approved For Release 1999/09/0;-:. C1A-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 LE PROGRES, Kinshasa 24 March 1971 Univers Lumurnhal -.foyer de suiliVeysica ? CPYRGHT Le 15 mars clernicr, k pro- enreur general de Mexique, Sanchez Verge% a annonee que in pollee tie Mexico avail ilejoite un cemplot communiste et arritte.19 terroristes qui s'e- talent retires dans leur repaire et qu'elle recherche les mitres suspects pories ? disparns. Le procureur general a d'autre part precise flue le groupt CtaiI revenu par in RDA et 11.111SS nitres un entrainement tie sabotage terroriste et de taetique de guerilla en Corea du Nord. Scion les informations re- eueillies =titres du procureur general 1nm:1e:tin, il seeable tine queiques-uns tic es ter- roristes auraient men des b.urses a Vijniversite Patrice Lumumba, d'apr'es le program- me d'echanges culture's sovie- to-mexicains. us ont, en fait, avant qu'ils n'ont pas mule- meat !Ten l'entrainement.tlans le cadre politique, mais que lc but de cet entrainment pou- vait leur permettre do perpe- trer d'autres melaits. C'est dans cc cadre qu'ils out vole uric cornme evaluee. plus de 40.000 mires d'une banque mexicaine. us auraient precise a cet effet que leur but etait de continuer a valer dans des hanques et societes finan- clams, tant a Mexico .que dans (Ventres villes du pays. D'au- f,re part, le gouvernement aU- rail beancoup d'armes et autres materiels do propa- gande. Le 17 mars courant, le Gou- vernement mexicain a rappole son ambassadenr k Moseou pour consultation. U Kimble que lo complot ekait organist avec la collaboration de cer- tains Sovietiques. A cc propos, dans ses emissions de la se- maine derniere, POICiee de la radio television francaisc an- noncait que cinq mcmbres de Pambassade sovietique a Me- xico ont ite invites a quitter le territoire mexicain. On fait renharquer par ailleurs que derniereinent beaucoup de Metticains, de Latitio-Ameri- caihs, voire des Africains se sorli rendus en DRSS. Par erninte de se rnontrer en tete d'azffiebo des pays qui entre- tiehnent des mouvements ter- rol'istes, eette grande puissan- ce se couvre de la presence de la Corie du Nord pour Pen- trainement des revointionnai? res destines a jotter lcur role dans des pays non communis- ten. Le journal rnexicain, El Sot a accuse PlURSS en affirmanf que les activites eevolutionnal? res sent menees par des hour. siers de l'Universite Lurnurnbro et qu'il est bien etabli que cep bourses donnees dans le cadre de programme d'echanges cul- ture's sont utilisees a d'autres fins. Ce West un secret pour personne. Pour cc qui est de Popinion congolaise, on no peut man- quer de souligner qu'elle est offusque'e par un empini si abusif du nom de son hems national. En effet, en 1961 (mend les autorites sovietiques deciderent d'eterniser le TIM de notre Premier ministre, ee- a faisait la joie, non mule- irtent du peuple eon golais. nsis milnia dos kitties Nations sitfrofoir opprhutes, 11 10 fail awns+ dottle que respoir dee pays flu (ler, monde hail qu., cc Neu serve de aunettutire flu developpement do haute pen. see et non d'un rephire oh t dol. !vent se trainer le desseins les iplus sournois. 1 A la veille du XXIVme con- gres du_PC sovietique, nous -souhaltertons que les enteritis sovietiques se penchent sue cette question afin de firer an clair le role imparti I l'univer- site Lumumba. En effet, II s'avere de plus en plus qu'une mauvalse campagne est menee l'endroit de notre biros na- tional I qui on attribue parfois des conceptions phiiosophiques no nourrissait pas de son 'vivant. Certes, 11 ne serait pas mal venu tie souligner aetuel. lenient aux yettx du monde que le premier Premier minis- tre congolais tie s'etalt Jamais prononee dans an vie politique pour les ideologies qui divisent aujourd'hui le monde. Le citoyen Christophe Ngbe- nye, ancien leader de la rebel- lion a temoigne du national's- me de Lumumba, en declarant dernierement I Kampala que le general Mobutu a fait du Congo ce que Lumumba von- lait qu'll soil. De son elite, le grand journal franca's, k if Monde a. dans le numero special consacre a la prochal- ne visite du general Mobutu. en France rappelle les simili- tudes de la pens& politique de noire chef de l'Etat avec celles du hems national cows golais. Ce sant la deux 0111011 gnages itnportants quo nous no pouvons negliger en faisant valoir par mitre des inten. titym malsaines qui risqUent tit noireir la reputation de Patridt ea Emery Lumumba. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 "The second request was from 'a candidate who indicated in his autobiography that he had 'twice failed in, his attempt ,to enroll in the University of Chile. "The third, from still another candidate; contained a 'certificate of secondary studies,containing two incompletes, entered in red, indicating that this individual had suceeeded in passing his ecaminations 'wthan average mark. ? "Whereupon Silva Cimma told Mrs. Millas that all those pre-selected were 'either,/ Communist Party militants, or spon- sored by 'benefactors.' When he asked me who .was in charge of bolding the meetings'of the board of 'directors,I,told "him: 'You, Mr. Chairman.' He ordered the secretary to call the 'board for a meeting on Monday, the 14th, at 1700 hours, and asked her if she would mind if he took the,documents. Me,later - -took off with"all the 'documents, Aeclaring,the,pre-selection invalid, and requested that the documentation on all the other -candidates be 'sent to 'his residence. . "i view of these events, Adriana Millas: called the Cen- tral Committee of the Communist Party, asking to speak with Os- car Diaz Iturrieta, the national head of the Institutes. He replied that he was on leave, and she then asked 'Mrs. Virginia, who is Diaz ?Iturrieta's secretary, to come to the Institute. 1Ithe latter vehemently refused to do so suggesting that Mrs. lianas solve the problem he_rtelfjThis involved locating Segovia (the Communist Partes charge at the Institute) by tel- ephone in Arica, and she subsequently succeeded in dontacting Fernando Garcia, the acting Secretary General; who was at the Astor Theater., Garcia authorized the transmittal of the docu- mntation to Silva Cimma, and the convocation of the meeting on Monday." ' The preceding account offers a very good example, of the decisive role played by the Communist Party in the granting of .scholarships, and in the administration of the Institute. Some ;other instances of political intervention, i among many, are the following: ' Carmen Marsellesa Pereira Pena refused the grantSbe had obtained to enroll_ly the School of Medicine at Lumumba Univer- sity. To replaseh_erj the Chilean Communist Party, in a letter'. dated 5 August 1969, sent through the Institute, suggested a Communist Youth organization-militant, Alicia Mujica Romero. The note was submitted to the Soviet Ambassador on the date in- dicated, - There is a notation in-'the Kunakov File as follows: "On Friday, the 7th (of March 1969), Baltra telephoned the In- stitute and asked me why 'his candidates', that is, the indiv- iduals he had recommended, were not even premsolected. ,He com- plained of the fact that even the applicant that he had 'submit- , 'bed, a relative of Soriaior Hugo Miranda, had not been pre-.eleotede/ told Baltra that the seleotion bad been made by a _?_?. _ Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 10 :I '4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 ?0,!. The Kunakov File recounts an interesting episode in the -i process of prp-selecting candidates for Lumumba: "At about 1730 hours on Friday (11 April 1969), Enrique :Silva Cimma called me to ask whether the meeting called by the Seoretar7 Gonoral for the proviouo 447 had boon hold; thin was la meeting at which he was going to approve the pre-selection of scholarship candidates. I told him .that this meeting had, ! in fact, taken place; to which he replied that he had been given0 La message on Wednesday afternoon which, on account of a previ- ous commitment, made it impossible for him to attend the meet- ing. I'informed him that, at that very moment, the Secretary - General was about to send off a letter;ainZzIKWnk. 1for the length of time this pre-selection had taken, and containing, as an enclosure, a list of those who had been pre-selected. TheI -meting had been held, on Thursday, the 10th, because the matic pouch had to go out on Monday or Tuesday, and the docu- -t mentation on the pre-selected individuals had to be sent. Other-1 wise, they would have to go in the May pouch, which would pu Chile's candidate's beyond the deadline for application (1 May. ' -1969). ,"Silva Cimma asked me about 'his participation in the matter of the grants,' saying that he was supposed to be fam- :iliar with the background of the candidates. I told him that even I.bad been surprised at the haste in which the meeting had been held, which had forced me to rush in preparing a on the activities; and that, in any event, the 'recut-qt. .of the pre-seletted individualm.yere at the Institute awaiting withdrawal, some.time or otherilthe Embassy. At this, he ,informed me that he would be-at the Institute in 30 minutes, 'to look at the documents. tl ? , "Shortly thereafter, V. Kazakov arrived in search of the ".folder containing the documentation on the pre-selected Indivi- duals. I told him what the situation was, and he Suggested that, . as soon as Silva Cimma arrived at the Institute, I tell him that '1 had been left out of the pre-Selection process, and that the one responsible for the documents right now was the wife of 'Deputy Orlando Millas,, who was a'secretary at the Institute. Silva Cimma arrived at 1930 hours, and I promptly followed Ka-. 'zakov's advice. At this, he summoned Mrs. Millas, and demanded . the documents of her. "The first autobiography that he read was a request sub- mitted by a militant from the Communist Youth Organization of 1., the North, who introduced his application as follows: have- ;. been informed by Tay comrades in the Tarty that you are reppon sible for the distribution' of. the scholarships to Lumumba Uni versity..1" . Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 9 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 EL MERCURIO, Chile 2 September 1970 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT ? rchivo Kunakov'(Vi) 'f r ? Investlgacien y Mato di 3 . Xaj Demi? K. . . f Un viaje a la Union Sovletic wy el Ingres? a Is Urriversida , Lumumba do Monti,. creada e I ',jlecialmento pars jemmies d ,los paises subdesarrollados iconstituyen dos do los.. may. lres incentives esgrimidos por I ;Embajada y el PC para atrae ? ta los mucbachos y captai adhe irentes y futures colaboradore ren sult,servielos do informacien Segun el Archive de Kunako n la Embajada sovittica exit Lien Ilstas detalladas de todo ilos ?ehilerros 'becados en Mose' tslesde ' 1960, incluyendo . nom throe, dilveciones y okras refe {rendes. De acuerdo al Archive 'en .los ones respectivos se con 1cedieron las siguientes becas: . ,en 1960; 12 en 1961; 12 en 1962 .0 en ,1063; 42 en '1964; 47 e 4965; 49 en '1966; 31 ere 1967; 3 en 1968 y 25 en 1969. A media. ;dos del alio pasado Kunakov Cenfecciono una lista de 25, jegresados de la Lumumba; se-. igun ella, de este total habia 3 egresados en filologia, 5 en in 4enierfa, 4 en niedicina, 4 e ,fisica, 3 en'quimica, 3 err econo- 1 'Inia, dos en agronomia; uno? ? en derecho internacional A uno '. en historia. Entre' elks, una buena parte trabajan ten la ..Universidad de Chile, va- rios en INDAP, dos en el Coml. te Central del PC; uno en dr 4,Instituto Chileno - Sovidtice y Aotro en la Universidad Tetrads Pdel Estado., Por idicriativa del Institute' sChileno ? Sovietieo se constitu.' 1 syo un Centro do Ex Alumnos 9 un Centro de Padres r Apode- rados de los estudiantes actual. snente en Mosctl.' Los padres so preoCupan de recolecter fondos !y obsequies para los inuchachos. lry los egresados son estimulados a marrtenerse unidos en terms atil Institute. Este no siempro /se ]ogre, y el Archive seilala [(en Julio de 1969/ quo "una de. riegaciOn de antiguos ,egresados' 'se present6 hace algnnos dies. :en is Embajada y formuld ed..- fleas contra el Instituto ChilenoA, ,Sovietico, quo no ha hecho na- ; Ida pare ayudarlos a validar sus "titulos 'profesionales. Kazakov, . qua habld con cites, manifesto 1..#que le habiair informed? quo eti 1 vista de le actitud del Institute testaban reuniendose en el local' del Institute Cultural - ChiIemi Au 'RDA (Alemanla Comunista). EV, ,to provoca indignacion ,en Ka4 Itakov, quien lea solleit6 que set ' .aeorearan nuevazuante, aj#,tt1 11. 1,tuto".:.' .. , :Y, ?T ,,,, .. ...:,T,.. Loa teildatoi, ii".I.Um ni 441" bkikaoualioialoaaltoiK4ce ? rsicla k3sc WEI?negarie i insirtuio ver los documentos Poco rato despuds 3iegO V./?. 1,Kazakey a buscar ?el paquetq Iests4 ,con los documentos de los pre-1 ; Lltuur y an Is zmtialada, eu ,soleccionados; le infertile de lei ?.aparienclas per merites, pero? situacion y me recomend6 quei . en realidad segiin la calidad do ?apenas Silva Cimma Ilegara all los padrinos que tengan en el PC o las influencias quo se mueven en la Embajada. Sc' logim tars apreciacien de Kaza3 ikov (Archive 23-IX-68) "el pail ? ler? principal en el Instituto ee lla intervencien do personas "ex-..! . Itrabas" en la seleccidn de pos., tuiantes a la Univorsidad Lu rriumba? si -este sucediera, sal ondria en sodas dificultades;; ? intromision politica de law ??,;:' documentos, URSS grz America latirra". ,??;, ? rimera autobiografia qua !Institute le ?dijera que se me Rabin excluide de Is realizacion 6 la preselecciOn y quo ia res.; ? ponsable do los documentoI ? /en este memento era la esposa del diputado Orlando MIlla l ? im secretaria del Instituto. Silva Chu liege a las 19.30 y de' 1,Kazakey; ante esto liam6 .a la ,inmediato sego( et consejo del - tsetiora Millas y ? le exigi6 loss ' t En ,e1 Archive Kunakov se rrelate un interesante episodio (id proceso; .de preseleccidn' ,de candidates a la Lumumba: ? t? "El viernes 11 taint 1969) ?alrededer de las 17,30 bores' l; me liam6 Enrique Silva Cimma 1#, ipara consulter si se habla rea- klizado la reunion convocada ipor el secreted? general para. el,dia anterior, en la coal so iba a aprobar la preseleccion de :los postulantes a becas. Le in. :forme que efectivamente se liable realizado esta reunion, in In que er replic6 que se le ? Prabia dojado un mensale erLs Ila tarde del mlercoles, in quo! iimpldiO, por rezones de corn- . si?omisos antedores, coneurrie? a este reunion. Le infornie que, el secretario gen,erai le estaba? (lespachando en ese mismo 1 1:momento una carte con excu-:, ass por is premura del tiempo . con que se habia realizado este. 1 ? militantes del partido comunis-./ preseleccidn y en la?cual se lei. ' ta o favorecidos por "coma-, adjuntaba una lista de los pre." ., i tdres", Me pregunte quo quient ?.: .? eyo fuc de una solicitud pre,. ? -.. 4sentada-p.or una militante de las: ../JCC del Norte, que encabeza-, :besu presentacion de is si-' tguidnte manera: "Me he infer- ;made per intermedio ' de Ins tcompafieros del Partido que us-' itedes tienen a su cargo la.dis- aribucien de las becas a la 7Universidad Lurnumba.. SI i.. La segunda solicitu 'era de un postulante que en so au- toblografia indicaba nue en dos oportunidades habia fracasado en sus intentos para ingresarl a la Universidad de Chile.? , 'La tereera, de otro postulan-s e, contenia un certificado de) .estudios secondaries ? con dosl 1 Slotas insuficientes seiialadasi ton rojo e indicando quo esa i :persona habia logrado aprobar sus examenes por promeclio r Ante este._ Silva Cimma le di-. Jo a la senora Mlles quo to- dos los preseleccionados eran 0 seieccionados,. La reunion se; habia realizado el jueves 10,' i debido a que el lunes o mar-. tes scale la vallja diplomatica.. 3' debIan enviers? los documen-., Ites de los preseleccionados, ca- se contrario irfan en la vallje siel met de roam 10 quo "sigotes ? ficaba quo las solicitudes del Chile quedaban fuera de plazo 1do entrega (l.o de mayo 1969). ? Silva Cimma me consuIt6 quell "coal era 'su participaciiin en el asunto de las becas". y 000 61 debie conocer lors.anteceden- tee de los postulantes. Le dije., lode incluse a mi .ree hehiarij Tsorprendido con la nremura deti 'hacer la reunion, ka que ? me,t1 'oblig6 a preparar .acelerada- Y ' mente un Informe sobre -las actividades; quo en' todo ea,: So las solicitudes de. 145 pre-' fieleceionados estaban en: cit Institute esperandow:que de un? Memento. antro- las, rettraran la.Embajada..Anto tato me 1. 1041,PitaittelaRami _ . . . disponfa la realizacion de re. ?uniones de directorio, le dlia :"usted, senor presidente". Le ordend a la secretaria eller at ;;.Directorio pare el tunes 14 ai :las 17 horas y le pregunto si) flenia Malin inconveniente pars.) 'que el se llevare los doeumeni ,les, Posteriormente se Ileve? tos f dos los documentos. declaranda . ;tando ,el envie a su domicili ,nula la preseleccidn Y solic.1:1 lade los documentos ' de,' irides, Hos otros postulantes. ? ' 1 i pc; Ante estos hechos, Adriana; ' /-*Millas llama al Comite Can.; ; s?t tral del PC, sollcitando hablae . *con Oscar. Diaz Iturrieta, encar. . . Ciacio nacional de 10S. institutors; rte contes.t6 ? quo' cstaba do 1A"wvacaciones; soliclt6 entoncer it ' ti "sellora Virginia", 'clue ,et :secretaria ' de ,', Diaz Iturrieta) 'quo ?viniera reinstitute. Eats' illtInie so ;negd -retundadient0. ..#reconiendfindole a la senora Mi.; 9, a IN .11 Approved For. Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 12 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 team consisting of Segovia, Ubeda and Gardia; and that their 'choices had later been protested by the President, Mr. Silva , :Cimma. 'Baltra gave me his private telephone number, so that ' Segovia could call him that very day and give him a full ex- planation. He also remarked that 'an overly legalistic cri- terion' had evidently been applied in the pre-seleotion. Later Segovia tried to have Fernando T explain to Baltra that the one who had been responsib a or the failure of his.candi. dates to be pre-selected was 'his friend and protector, Silva Cimma.'" The following entry on this topic appears subsequently in the File: "When Segovia inquired of Air France the number of passengers arriving from Moscow, he was told that there were 27, instead;Of 26. Later investigations proved that the 27th ticket belonged to Manuel Bachelet Pizarro, the brother-in-law .of Radical Senator Hugo Miranda. Baohelet, who resided at 2093 Los Araucanos, in Santiago, had not been pre-selected, and, when the pre-selections were announcedr withdrew his application.,; Senator Baltra requested information from the Institute, point- ing out the feasibility of a grant for Bachelet Pizarro, in view;c of his status as Senator Miranda's brother-in-law. The negotia- tions to Secure this grant were carried out by Senator Baltra - .with the Soviet Ambassador in Santiago." T:On 17 June 1969, Lumumba University-in Moscow sent the'' Ilist of those selected to Santiago. According to the File: "Of the 26 names sent by Lumumba, 24 were those of individuals who had been pre-selected by the Institute, and, two for grants.. offered by the Soviet Embassy. The latter scholarships went to Gilberto Cepeda Contreras and Luis Monardes Jogo; the former iapparently received his grant as a result of the intercession ,of former Senator Baltazar Cafftro." At Moscow, the academic achievement of the Chileails has been less than satisfactory. At a meeting with Kunakov? on 22 January 1969, at the Soviet Embassy, First Secretary Dimitriy Pastujov cited this matter in detail. The File reports: "A report was received by the Embassy on the unfortunate performance of the Chilean scholarship holders at Lumumba. Among other things, Santiago had been officially informed of the of Nelson ()lave, in February 1968, 'on account ofdrunkunness.! The individual in question had postponed hisLireturn to Chile several times, but, since this-situation had gone on too long, and ?lave's behavior was bad, it was 'decided to expel him. The Embassy was notified of this decision. Pastujov officially reported to the Institute that the number of scholarships to Lumumba University for 1969 had been out to 20, owing to the - poor performanoe of the Chilean students. He added that, at ,, the present time, over 200 Chileans were taking courses. there,:: and that, of this number, about 120 were academically unfit. - In the University's classification of academia Ithe Chileans,were in next-to-last. pl.aoe.11 - Approved -FOrRelease?t999/09/02 : CIA4RDP79-04494A0003001000012 66bierienfenti?1. 11 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 they traveled individually to East Ber- lin, where they exchanged their Mex- ican passports for false North Korean- passports. They regrouped in Moscow, where they visited for ten days before fly- ing to Pyongyang on a Soviet Aeroflot ' 'plane. Next came six months of train- ing in guerrilla tactics, radiotelegraphy, Judo and use of weapons. Retracing -their steps through Moscow and East Berlin, the youthful firebrands returned to Mexico and, during the next year, with another $16,000 supplied by North Korea, recruited 40 more like-minded revolutionaries to make similar trips to Pyongyang. The movement, which only really got off the ground last August, turned out to be short-lived. On Dec. 19, six MAR members allegedly assaulted a bank mes- senger and snatched a strongbox con- i taining $84,000 in U.S. currency, The ' raid put the police on their tracks. The break in the case finally came when a MAR member named Francisco Parades Ruiz was arrested on a vagrancy eharge 'March 1 and police found a phony pass- port on him. Under interrogation, Pa- rades Ruiz reportedly informed on the others in exchange for immunity. With his information, police soon arrested 19 more MAR members on a wide va- riety of charges. Soviet Involvement. The youths read- ily admitted that they had received guer- rilla training in North Korea. "No easy coup d' lint was planned," said Go- mez, "but a long struggle, guerrilla war- ? fare and armed confrontation." At first, the Mexican government cautiously avoided implicating the Soviet Union and put full blame on the North Ko- reans with whom Mexico has no dip- lomatic relations. But when it came to light that no less than 50 Mexicans had crisscrossed the Soviet Union on -North Korean passports, the Mexican government reacted angrily, expelling five top-ranking Russian diplomats and recalling its own ambassador from Mos- cow. Western intelligence said that the diplomats had been directly involved with MAR'S activities. As police stepped up the search for 28 other members of the ill-fated movement, the Soviet em- bassy issued a statement proclaiming its "strict observance of the principle of nonintervention in the acts of each country." But few Mexicans could ac- cept that profession of innocence. The episode may mean a considerable setback for Soviet foreign policy in Latin America. In the last two decades, Moscow has established diplomatic re- lations with every. South American country except Paraguay, and assidu- ously cultivated a Via Pacifica policy emphasizing cultural exchange programs and trade agreements as a means to 'peaceful expansion and influence. The first repercussions came from Costa Rica, which postponed negotiations for a Soviet embassy in San Jos?It would have been the first for the Russians in Central America. 14 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 CPYRGHT "Vte I It , NW OR tio,ar ai segovia tencareado (lel. PC en f,e1 Institut()) por talefono e Arica, y limp) se.consiguid ubt- sear a Fernando Garda, secre-, ;tario general Interino, quien Se Cencoritraba en el Teatro Astor,,l i,Garcia autorizo el env16 de la% elocumentacion a 'Silva Clmmat tY la realizacidn de la teunlOk el lanes". . f'! La relaelda precedent* ilua.'? muy Wen el paPel dechavell "que juega et PC en el otorga.f trelento de becas Y en ?Ia. c11.1 Yrecclen del Institute., Otros ca-1 sos de Intervencion, politica, ell etre. muchos, son los siguientes: !,1' ?Carmen Marsellesa Pere1-1 t%)'a Perla ranunc16 a la beca? iobtenida para ingresar a la? f Facultad de Medicina de la U. !ALuburnba. Eh su reemplazo 4P CCH. en comunicacion dr.4. ;5-VIII.69 prOpuso por interme> ti.dlo del I:litituto a la mi1itan4 te de le Juventud Comunistai Ai Alicia Mullett Romero, La no. pta fun entregada Ethbajadort asovietleo en la fecha indicada; q'? ?En el Archive Kunakov sil anota: "El viernce 7 (marz 0.069) Nitre llama por telefol al Institute y me consultd Otabre los motives de. que anti eandldatos, o sea, las persol nas recomendadas por el, ni si iuiera fueron preseleccionadas4 ,1rotest6 por el hecho de. quei Incluso ei candidato presental cdo por el, pariente del senador. ?Hugo Miranda, no fug prese.; Occcionado. Le Informe a Bat,: ,,,,tra quo la selecciOn la liable i?realliado un equipo integradd; 'por Segovia, Ubeda y Garcia% quo posterlprmente este' seleol chin fue ;ntojetada par e1 pre' dente senor Silva Chnmei tBilitra tni? din ati telefoon part ".ticular *con el objeto de qua iiSegovia In Ilamara ese mismo Ildfa? y le dlera ampliai explica4 kelones; expres6 edemas que el rparecer se liable adoptado tsoeritero demasiado legallste Zen la preseleceldn". Posterior) ?.)nente Segovia estaba tratanddi lbgrar quo Fernando Garcia t ? re milkers a Molten que el; It ? Cusavapaniable de la no preselee., elan do sus recornendados era! min amigo' y compadre. Slice j:Cimma". t.,11 Sobre este problema, en ell ,I1Archivo aparece post erio temente la siguiente note: "Sego) Vvia al ?solicitar a Mr France! ntimero de pasajes Togadoe Monti, se inform6 que 'dn vez de 26 /easajes, habfa 274 . rEn averlguaciones posterioree confirm6 due el pasaje nti-! 1. mete 27 correspondfa a. Eduar.: do Manuel .Bachelet Ptzarro, ?"cunadO del senador radical Hu..., 1?, titgo Miranda. Bachelet, con do:,/ nnicillo en Santiago, to Arau- P.;oanos 2093. no habfa aid? pre. eleccionado y luego de publl- earso la preselecclon retire, Bur kdOcumentos. EI senador Baltra Informaciones al ? Ins. ;.tituto' inanIfestando. la ? donve. nIenclitie una. beca para. Ba.1 ihehelat .Plzarra, por' flu entitled) pickC miliaria- delna* . se Miran,* f La igestldn .Para Obtene r "silts beta fun.. /*allude pore; oefuldot : Baltresote...01: Embv iador sovietIco en Santiago". I. ?El 17 de junto de 1969 Ia. (UniversIdad Lumumba de Mos- etilenvie? a Santiago la lista de as selecclonados, Segiln eL latrehivo "de los 26 nombres en4- jvlados pox. 1 Lumumba, .24 co: tresoonden a eireaelerrInnadna or 'el Instituto y dos do ellos hecas otorgadas por la Ent.' 'bajada sovietica. Etas bccate, reorrospondon a Gilberto Cepo.,', ,11a,, Contreras y Luis Monardes Wage; al parecer el primer() re-) beca por ? gestiones4 trealizadas par el ex ' senadoti Illaylazar Castro"t ? Mosta el renchmiento aca datieo'tie' lea ehilartos es! qtle discrota, En um; Wilton "con Kunakov, el 22 de [endro de '1969 en la Embajade. oyietica.? el ?Primer Secretarial pirnitri Pastujov se refirld de-1 talladamente a este ,problema.4,: .Ex'presa el Archivo:. "En' lak 'Embajade se recibl6 un infor-; Ina' sabre 'el triste papel clue; eaten hacienda los becadas ienoe en la Lumumba, Entre,. ?otras COUS se informd oficia1.1 intente a Santiago sabre la exii fpillslan ."por ebriedad" 'de Nei. on Olave, en febrero de 1968.% T1: afectado ? !labia, postergadoT fyiriaa veces su retorno a Chl-.1, -per? como esta situacidnj prolong6 demasiado, y Olavo ; -tenfa male conducta, se resol. .,. .v16 sti expulsion.. La decisiOnl juo comunicada 'a la Embajada.:! ?Pastujov informo oficialmento ;el' Institute elle el nilinere de; ..tbekas a la U. Lumumba pare' i1969.fue rebajada a 20 por iaJ rendimiento de los estu-1 idlantes chilenos. Agreg6 Altie7 t'eta la actualidad m?de 2004,, rilenos siguen eursos alit, del ok cuales alretiedor AO 120 son.: 'dadeMicos Ineapeces;'Los. atm Ilguran en' .0l. pentillbno- NdiV,en la elialtleacion',liv, lvtirsIdad...soloy.; tendizzitentol .;.r v TIME 19 April 1971 MEXICO Troubles on the Via Pacifica CPYRGHT Political one-upmanship in Mexico frequently comes in the guise of a com- ic. hook. All factions can and do com- pete to produce the cleverest and most convincing interpretation of national events. Last week a new comic hit the stands. On the cover was Miss Liberty in all her Grecian-gowned glory, about to be done in by sinister men armed with rifles and long Turkish knives. Were those the Russian and North Korean flags over their heads? They most cer- tainly were. This unabashedly patriotic comic, the handiwork of a wealthy, mid- dle-aged illustrator named Jos?. Cruz, spins out in cartoons, photographs and cryptic c!.:alogue what many Mexicans are talking about these da/s: the arrest 2.0 YeAprOrtriWaDdrailtRifitilifiS who traveled to North Korea for guer- rilla training and returned home to cause the severest strain in Mexican-Soviet re- lations since Leon Trotsky sought asy- lum in Mexico in 1937. 2 de Ocfubre. Even without the com- ic embellishments, which probably ex- aggerate the Soviet role in the affair, the story is a remarkable account of in- ternational intrigue. As pieced together by TIME correspondents from various sources, it all began in the dormitory of Patrice Lumumba People's Friendship University in Moscow. The time was Oc- tober 1968. Upset by the bloody uni- versity riots in Mexico City that month, which claimed at least 34 lives, six Mex- ici eget?113 yingattavil ?s Pal gether and decided to form a clan- destine organization. They named it Movimiento de Accion Revolucionaria (MAR) and called the guerrilla unit the 2 de Octubre, the date of the massacre. Fabricio Gomez Souza, one of the stu- dents, made contact with the North Ko- rean embassy in Moscow and arranged to visit Pyongyang. There he received the North Koreans' assurance that they would give the Mexican students polit- ical and military training. Back in Mos- cow, he was handed $10,000 by the North Korean embassy to finance the students' travels. Gomez then returned to Mexico, where he recruited several more as- avoid sus- sPrItitittft - t nte agencies, ? ? 17 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 CPYRGHT BALTIMORE SUN 28 March 1971 Suspicioas' Raised By Soviet-Bolivia Cultural Exchange By Boni= A. EttILANDSON Sun Staff Correspondent La Paz, Bolivia?A purportel long-range Soviet plot to intro. duce North Korean-tra ned Me) - lean guerrillas into Mexico ap. parently is being repeated her in Bolivia. Some sources are convince that Moscow had guerrilla trait - trig in mind when it signed recent cultural exchange agree ment to offer scholarsh ps ,eight Bolivian students yearly i undergraduate and postrgaduat Work at Moscow's Patrice Lt mumba University, in additio to other scholarships at othe ? Soviet irstitutions and an e. change of professorships. t According to reports here, th2 Russ ans selected 10 leftist Me) ion students to attend the urn. versity in 1963 on four-yea Scholarships. After graudatio teh reports said, they were sert by way of East Germany t North Korea, on North Korean passports, for an intensive sin- month course in guerrilla war, fare. Subsequently, the reports con- tinted, another 10 students f0- loWiid the SAMS route and Pined their colleagues in establ shing , t, 01Ang and recruiting centers in the Mexican hinter- lands. When the Mexican govern- ment discover xi the plot earlier this month, it expelled five Soviet d pIonts, includng the man who reportedly recruited the first students. The Russir ns have been carrying on a cultural and com- ? mercial offer sive throughout Latin Ameriza for several years, sendh4 delegations and top entertainn ent attractions to convince the various govern- ments of the sincerity of the r purposes in a ding underdevel- oped nations. Prelude Co Election Ths was pa licularly evident in Chile last year as a prelude to the Septembe election which saw a Marx i it,, Salvador Al- lende, emerge a president. ? ? Bolivia, 1 le other Latin American courtries catight up in thi current ware of nationalism, appears to be turning to Rossi' and East European countries in deliberate effort to Rd itself of any taint of United athttql dorni nat on. This has certainly been the case with Chile and Peru. There has been no official re- action here yet to the Mexican affair. But it must be assumed that all Latin American govern- ments, especially those which already have guerrilla prob- lems, will take second looks e any agreements they might have with Russia. It may well set back the Soy et efforts in Latin America for several ' years. Five Agreements The Bolivian program in eludes five agreements, three commercial accords, one for sci- entific co-operation and the lat- est, signed February 25 in Mos- cow and reaffirmed here two weeks ago, the cultural ex- change agreement. Under the cultural accord, university degrees w 11 be mu- tually recognized in the two countries and the Soviet Union will extend scholarships to Bo- livian. students for unlimited technical and scientific stud es in Russia in areas needed for Bolivian development. It also provides for full cultur al exchange on an academic ley-, el, with exchange visits between Bolivian and Russian profes, sors. The Bol vian academic community is markedly leftist, and the student organizations I are led by Havana-Peking ori- ented students. All the agreements with Boli- de contain provision for mutual recognition of sovereignty, inde- pendence and non- ntervention in domestic affairs. So, presupil ably, did the one with Mexico. THE CURRENT WEEKLY, India 10 April 1971 S VIET PLOT A ai st 2 Govts. A 'CURRENT' Special N March 15, it was announced that the r011ee had -0 smashed a plot against the Mexican Government and arrested 19 terrorists at "Guerilla , Academies" and various secret hideouts. On March 16 the. Government of Ceylon declared a state of emergency as tt precautionary measure against a coup by the People's Liberation Front. CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/021:6CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 - CPYRGIAT:sproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 31 March 1971 CPYRGHT Guerrilla slot in exico linL e to Soviet cultural institute By Conrad Manley. Special to The Christina &tome Mon Mexico City 0 The Soviet Embassy's control of the cul- tural center is exercised by its cultural attach?Boris N. Voskoboinikov, who was in Santiago, Chile,, as a student for six' months in 1965 and who has been active here among members of the Mexican Corn- munist. Youth. He is assisted by Konstantin N. Verzhbit- , sky, assistant. cultural and sports attache, who devotes Much time to youth and uni- versity groups here and in Veracruz, Guadalajara, Morelia, and other provincial cities of MexitO. With the arrest and arraignment of IL Mexican urban guerrillas reportedly trained :In the Soviet Union and North Korea, the 'spotlight here is on the Mexican-Russian 1' 'Institute for ? Cultural .Exchange which :anted them scholarships in Moscow. The Institute, which functions, with thel rfinancial assistance and under the direction of the Soviet Embassy, recruited 50 Mexi-4 can students between 1968 and 1970 to study at the Patrice Lumumba University iri'Mos- Equipment seized ? From Mosca:-, through arrangements with the North Korean Embasy, they alleg- ,..edly went in three groups to Pyongyang Am political indoctrination, training in the 'Ilse of ? weapons and explosives, and strate- gy and tactics of urban and rural guerrillas , in courses of six months to one year. The 19 guerrillas weretaptured with mill. tary weapons, uniforms, short-wave radios, quantities of Communist propaganda, and other materials and were charged with "planning to impose an Mexico a Marxist- Leninist regime." Others members of the guerrilla teams are still being sought by , Mexican authorities. Attorney General Julia Sanchez Vargas I reported that confessions by members of the band not only confirmed their travels and training abroad but also implicated .:hem in an'484,000 robbery of a bank mes- senger here last December and in the acci- dental killing of one of their fellow guer- rillas during target practice in the state of, Michoacan. Scholarships arranged The Mexican-Russian Institute, headed by Adelina Zendejas Gomez, had, as of last fall, arranged scholarships for 150 Mexican students who now are at the Patrice Lu- rnumba University. ? The institute also functions here as both a language training school and a cultural cen- ter in which Russian books and periodicals are available and events such as film show- liTerved it* tReikVVITM19/02 na. ts, and t e hke are nei regui . Membership is estimated at 2,300 members IIJi, dic of ly 80 ecntl Expulsions recalled The present minister counselor of the Rus- dan Embassy in Mexico, Dmitri A. Diako- iov, who previously served as its press attache, was expelled from Argentina in .958 and from Brazil in 1963 for allegedly _ntervening, as an agent of the Soviet secret "once, the KGB, in internal affairs of both :ountries. Although a cultural agreement between Vlexico and/the Soviet Union, signed in Oc- tober, 1968, calls for a mutual exchange of, Midents, the trafc has all been one way.: rhis situation was blamed by Mr. Vosko- Joiniltov in September on the Mexican Gov- !rnment, which, he said, "will not award my scholarships" for Russians to study in Nlexico. Tour of Europe A group affiliated with the institute, the Latin American Institute of Cultural Stu- dent and Teacher Interchange (ILICEM from its initials in Spanish), organized in 1970, has sponsored for Mexican partici- pants a 52-day tour of Europe, including the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Denmark, Swe- len, Finland, and ,Austria for the bargain price of $1,360. Mexicans and resident foreigners here are intensely interested as to whether, in its trials of the Marxist-Leninist urban ? guerrillas, the Mexican Government will implicate even More the Mexican-Russian Institute for Cultural Exchange. , If it is demonstrated that the binational : CIA-RDP MVP NOVO 41iiiafi, Aminging for dos- ing of the institute and expulsion of the Soviet diplomats might be the minimal re. 25X1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY May 1971 THE SOVIET SECURITY CONFERENCE OFFENSIVE Two international conferences scheduled for May and June will include as major discussion topics on their agendas, variants of the concept of European security and the matter of a conference on European security (CES). They are the World Peace Assembly, meeting 13-16 May in Budapest and the 25th Congress of the Socialist International, meeting 25-27 May in Helsinki. The Soviets can be expected to take every possible propaganda advantage they can from these two meetings. One they will run from behind-the-scenes and the other they will try to manipulate. Soviet Propaganda Offensive The Soviet campaign to bring about, as soon as possible, a conference on European security is going ahead at two levels.-- governmental and public. At both levels, the Soviet propaganda offensive is calculated to divide the U.S. and its European allies by nurturing European suspicions about U.S. commitments in Western Europe and convincing West Europeans that America is the only stumbling block to the: convening of a. CES. At the same time, the USSR seeks to induce the people of Western Europe to pressure their governments into acceding to the Soviet request for a CES. On the government level, Leonid Brezhnev told the recent 24th Party Congress that the majority of European countries had come out in favor of a CES and that preparations for it were moving along. However, this is far from true. While the majority of European countries express agreement in principle, several are also adamant in their insistence on a satisfactory Berlin solution and on an informal and flexible exploratory phase as preconditions to any preparations for a conference dealing with European security. Finland, too, is successfully resisting Warsaw Pact pressure to speed up preparations for a CES. Faced with these obstacles, the Soviets have now shifted their main focus of effort to the unofficial level while they continue to try to apply diplomatic pressure and to vocalize at the government level. At the unofficial level, the Soviets are operating on the theory that if the electorate is swayed, so will be the parliament. At this level, Soviet propaganda is designed to sway public opinion through the tactic of getting various professional, youth, labor, or peace organizations to go on record in favor of a CES thereby bringing pressure to bear Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 on West European governments to show some fdrward movement. Their aim, of course, is to ultimately make it appear that the initiative for a CES --- whatever form it takes --- comes as much from the people of Western Europe as from Moscow. World Peace Assembly At the end of last year, the International Institute for Peace held a conference in Vienna which was billed by Pravda as an attempt "to mobilize public opinion in the direction of a European security conference". The actual sponsor of the conference was the World Peace Council (WPC) and its chief organizer was Maurice Lambilliote, chairman of the Belgian Council of Peace (affiliate of the WPC) and the Belgian-Soviet Friendship Society. It was at this conference that plans were laid for a "Congress of the European Peoples on Security and Cooperation". Some 65 delegates attended the Vienna conference; the majority represented the WPC and other Communist-front organizations. A series of reports was delivered on the subject of European commercial, technical, and scientific exchanges and on the main political aspects of European security. These papers are now being incorporated by the secretariat of the WPC into a "Charter of European Security" which will be the basic working document for the plenary congress that the WPC hopes to convene sometime during. 1971 or 1972. This month, the WPC is holding a World Peace Assembly in Budapest to which all member organizations have been invited along with various groups of sympathizers and representatives from large numbers of Communist-front organizations. A special committee will be concerned with European security and the plenary congress project. In the Warsaw Pact countries and in some West European countries, national committees are already at work preparing for the congress. Additional committees will be set up during the assembly. The Belgian national committee, headed by Lambilliotte, is to play the key role in organizing a "committee of distinguished personalities in public life" to sponsor the congress, so as to give it the appearance of being held in response to the demands of West Europeans of varied political persuasions and from all sectors of society. Participants will be drawn from trade unions, women, youth, and professional organizations. 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09h02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Out of the plenary congress is to come a Charter of European Security and Cooperation. Congress participants will form standing committees throughout Europe dedicated to influencing public opinion to bring pressure on West European governments to accede to Moscow's call for an imminent conference on European security. The aim, of course, is to make it appear that the initiative for a CES comes from the West as well as from Moscow. Socialist Opinion on CES In January this year, Britain's "shadow Defense Minister", George Thomson, told a meeting of the Bureau of the Socialist International in London that if the Soviet Union was "acting in good faith in demanding a European security conference leading to progress and detente, then Berlin is a reasonable test of that good faith." Mr. Thomson felt that a major breakthrough or a major setback in East-West relations could be imminent and that Berlin was the crucial litmus test. (A reprint of the text of Mr. Thomson's address published in Socialist Affairs is attached.) Finland Resists Moscow's Pressuring The government of Finland has quite clearly committed itself to being the cautious broker in the eventual convening of a conference on European security. In all proposals made since May 1969 when Finland formally offered to sponsor an East-West security conference, up to the most recent offer to host a "multilateral gathering of ambassadors" preparatory to a CES, Finland has been careful to maintain its neutrality and not to Side with either East or West. The Finnish government is, however, being almost crudely pressured by the Warsaw Pact to hurry matters along to the extent Of calling immediately for an ambassadorial gathering with or without America and some of her West European allies. Finland has been firm in resisting this pressure. The only exception came after the issuance of the December 1970 NATO communique in which that body deferred on the Finnish proposal for a multilateral gathering pending additional progress at the bilateral level and on Berlin. To the embarrassment of his government, Foreign Minister Leskinen then told a meeting of the Social Democratic Parliamentary Group that NATO was "escalating the conditions stipulated by the West" and suggested that preparations for a CES should begin even if some countries were unable to accept the Finnish invitation. Prime Minister Karjalainen almost immediately slapped Leskinen's wrist by telling a television audience that Finland most 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 certainly would not host a "rump" conference on European security. Official Warsaw Pact pressuring began with a visit to Helsinki in late January by Hungarian Prime Minister Fock who told a press conference that Finland should issue invitations for ambassadorial level talks on CES even though the U.S. and some West Europeans might not attend. Three days later, Prime Minister Karjalainen again publicly rejected the idea of beginning such discussions before they were acceptable to all the states involved. By March, Foreign Minister Leskinen, too was publicly rejecting any speed-up in CES preparations. While on a three day visit to Austria, Leskinen told a press conference that to attempt to speed up preparations for a CES "would be like hitting one's head against the wall" and said that bilateral talks should be continued. A hint that Finland will be subjected to further Warsaw Pact pressures has just came from Poland. Jozef Ozga- Michalski, who is both vice president of the Polish Peasant Party and chairman of foreign relations in the Polish parliament, has publicly criticized the U.S. for its "braking role" in CES preparatory work. Speaking at a 17 March press conference in Warsaw, Ozga-Michalski said that the sponsors of CES wanted a universal gathering, but that if one country consistently vetoed conference preparations, then the possi- bility of proceeding with an empty chair at the meeting table should be considered. Just the week before, Warsaw government leaders had been visited by Soviet ambassador- at-large and specialist at "peacekeeping", Lev Isaakovich Mendelevich. It is therefore speculated that this newest "empty chair" concept was born in Moscow and that Mendelevich brought orders for its public appearance with him to Warsaw. 4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100TARGHT SOCIALIST AFFAIRS, London February 1971? SOCIALISTS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY Progress on Berlin is the Key GEORGE.' THOMSON Britain's Shadow Defence Minister sets out the attitude of the British Labour Party to the proposal for a conference on European security. He feels that a major breakthrough or a major setback in East-West relations could be imminent, and specifies the Berlin issue as the crucial litmus test.' P., British Labour Party regards the key to world peace as still lying in the heart 4f Europe. There are, of course, important north - south ' problems. There are also urgent international dangers in the Middle East. Never- theless, the danger of international conflict from either north-south prob- lems or Middle East tensions is the danger of conflict by accident.' The heart of the balance of power on which the peaCe of the world depends today is still in Europe and is the balance between the Atlantic Alliance on the one side and the Warsaw Pact Alliance on the other. It is against that background that we in the British Labour Party approach these problems. My view is that we are probably at the beginning of a very critical period in the relationship between Eastern and Western Europe. In one way I believe that we could be on the verge of a major breakthrough in East-West relations. On the other hand, if the breakthrough is not achieved; then I think we must face the fact that we will probably find ourselves conscious of a very sharp setback. The pros- pects of a European Security Confer- ence have been considerably increased over the last few months. By this I mean the prospects of a European security conference which has been properly prepared, which has the right sort of attendance and which has an agenda that will enable it to do serious business. This kind of European security conference, which is, I believe, now a possibility, is of course a long way from the original proposal of the Soviet Bloc, which was much more a propaganda manoeuvre than a pro- posal for making a real and construc- tive contribution to Eurppean d?nte. d For Rcicc Why has this change come about?., the leader of a coalition government Why are, there these possibilities either _ with an extremely narrow majority. of breakthrough or of setback? The ' major new event in the European field has been the Ostpolitik pursued by the German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, and by the Government led by the German Social Democratic Party. We in Britain have watched with both anxiety and admiration the progress 199?10?? 102 ? CIA' RDP79 011? 4A000300100 01 Because of this background, it is important to record that Willy Brandt now needs and deserves some positive sign of response from the Soviet Union and from the Eastern Bloc. It is in this sense that I believe that on the one hand there is the possibility of a major breakthrough. Yet on the that Willy' Brandt has made in his other hand, if the breakthrough does negotiations with the Soviet Union, not come, the very fact that Brandt with Poland and indeed with other has gone as far as he has and that Eastern European countries. He has hopes have been raised in the way signed treaties with the Soviet Union that they have, could lead to quite a and Poland, subject to ratification, and significant and sad setback. Certainly this has of course transformed the my own impression of the German possibilities in East-West relations in political scene is that Willy Brandt Europe. is under very substantial pressure at This is because the heart of the the moment in his own country. European problem remains the Ger- The position that Willy Brandt has man problem. No one needs to be taken, which the British Labour Party reminded of the very deep suspicion has very strongly supported, is that which has existed through the whole we have now come to a stage where post-war period in Poland and the progress in relation to the problem of Soviet Union of German motives and Berlin is a reasonable and necessary German policies. Often these suspi- pre-requisite to making progress in dons have been deliberately fanned the direction of a European security and exaggerated by the communists conference. for political purposes. Nevertheless it Perhaps I could explain why we remains a fact that underneath the attach such vital importance to pro- political provocation there was a very gress on Berlin at the present, time. real hard core of fear and suspicion. First of all, it is important in human It is the eroding of that fear and terms that the people of Berlin should suspicion which is the remarkable have much freer movement and that achievement of Willy Brandt and of there should be altogether much easier the present Federal German Govern- access. All the, parties of the Inter- ment, national should be conscious of the We must be conscious also, as general duty that the socialist move- socialists, not only of the constructive ment has to preserve human liberty nature of the work that Brandt and inside Berlin. Secondly, I believe it is his Government have undertaken in perfectly proper to say that if the the field of East-West relations, but Soviet Union is really acting in good also of the great political risk that he faith in demanding a European security has taken in so doing. He is, after all, conference leadind to irogress and Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-CPYRGHTz d?nte, then Berlin is a reasonable test of that good faith. Finally, from the point of view of Britain and the other West Berlin powers (to say nothing of the point of view of the Soviet Union), if there is to be progress towards East-West d?nte it is very important indeed that the four-power responsibilities in relation to Berlin are reasserted and safeguarded. In the first place, it is i. aportant to Britain, as a Western power guaranteeing liberty in Berlin, that the progress of the Ostpolitik is not of such a nature that Britain, France and the United States end up with continued responsibilities in West Berlin but with their rights to fulfil these responsibilities undermined by whatever agreement might be reached. Equally,, there is a good deal of evidence that the Soviet Union is not anxious for its share of the Four Power responsibility for Berlin to be undermined in favour of East Germany. I would now like to consider the question of a European security con- ference itself?what it ought to seek to achieve and what would be the problems facing it. First of all, I would emphasise the very noticeable improvement which has taken place in regard to the communist conditions for a European security conference. Eighteen months ago it was ,,by no means clear that the communists would not once again seek to use a European security conference to try to drive a wedge between the Euro- pean allies within NATO and the United States and Canada. Now it has been, I believe, established beyond doubt that Canada and the United States would be members of inch a conference without question from the beginning. Secondly, there was a very great reluctance on the part of the Eastern Bloc even to consider the question of mutual force reductions being a part of he agenda of a European security conference. Although the communist position is not as clear on this as it is on the membership of the confer- ence. I think there are some signs of movement on the Eastern side. And finally, there has been the idea of the conference leading to the estab- lishment of some kind of permanent machinery. To begin with, this idea was greeted with great scepticism by the communist side. Once again there have been signs of movement here. ? * As the British Labour Party sees it, the purposes of a European security conference would be three-fold. First of all, taking the easiest aspect, which the communist side has always empha- sized, it would no doubt be useful to discuss at a general European con- ference the means of improving the momentum of exchanges in the techni- cal, social and economic fields. These go on at the moment; they can always benefit from an extra impetus. But this part of the conference would be largely declaratory. Real progress in East-West exchanges in the technical and social fields is bound to be achieved on a bi-lateral basis rather than multi-laterally. Indeed, if one tried to set up multi-lateral machinery for this purpose I think you would retard the pace of progress rather than speed it up. Secondly, there is the question of the conference leading to some con- tinuing machinery. This is something in which we in the British Labour Party have been very interested for a considerable time. Indeed, it was Michael Stewart, as our Foreign Secretary, who can claim to have taken a leading part in trying to pro- mote this idea within the Atlantic Alliance. What we envisage is the emergence of permanent East-West machinery on the political plane that would match the European Economic Commission (which is an East-West forum in Geneva) on the economic plane. We would not think of this as any dramatic breakthrough. Neverthe- less, the establishment of continuing machinery would make a constructive contribution, and would help to enable those countries in Eastern Europe who have a different emphasis on various problems from that of the Soviet Union to be given the maximum opportunity to develop that difference of emphasis and to enable Europe generally to talk about its problems with a greater sense of continuity. Finally, there is the main question of promoting security; that is, the problem of producing some kind of reduction of armaments inside Europe. The NATO countries have been put- ting forward proposals for balanced force reductions for a considerable time now, with until very recently a totally negative response from the communist side. We ought not to conceal the very substantial difficulties involved in making a reality of mutual - force reductions. The Warsaw Pact countries have an overwhelming pre- ponderance of conventional forces as against those deployed by the NATO countries. And therefore the key formula in terms of mutual force reductions which we must always keep in mind is the concept of what I would call equality of security. By this I mean that it is not enough to take arithmetically the same number of forces from each side. You have to take forces from each side in a way which at any stage in the process leaves security in as good a state as it was before the process began. And , this may very well mean an asymetri- cal reduction in forces ? a different volume of force reduction on the 1Warsaw Pact side as compared with reductions on the NATO side. Simply to put it that way underlines the very considerable difficulties involved in making progress. The final question is whether, in fact, the Soviet Union and its allies are now really serious in wanting to make progress or whether they still simply see a European security con- ference as a method of making people forget as quickly as possible the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia and of help- ing to legitimise the status quo in Europe. I believe myself that there are cautious grounds for believing that the Soviet Bloc may mean some kind of business in this field. First of all, the Soviet Union itself obviously has an interest in arrangements on its Western flank that safeguard whatever might develop on its Eastern flank, where it has the longest and most disputed frontier in the world with China. Secondly, I would guess from what contacts I have these days with the communist side that probably there is an increasing awareness of the poli- tical risks that Brandt has taken in Germany and of the risk that the Ostpolitik might go under if it is not given some concessions which demon- strate its success to public opinion inside Germany. Thirdly, there are the differences within the Eastern Bloc to which I have referred. These pro- bably encourage progress rather than discourage it. Finally, there is the fact that the Soviet Union is engaged in the SALT talks with the United States. Although these talks have now gone on for some time?without visible pro- gress, what is significant is that they have continued despite a number of events in various parts of the world Approved For Release 1999/09/02 . I -RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 CPYRGHT which might easily have led either side in the talks to have broken them off. There have been crises between the Soviet Union and the US over the Middle East; the SALT talks have gone on. There has been the fact that the Soviet Union appeared to behave provocatively near the shores of Cuba; the SALT talk have gone on, One can draw from this the conclusion that both sides in the SALT talks are talking seriously. This fact has large implications both for the future of Western Europe and for the prospects of a European security conference. FRANKFURTER AILGEMEINE ZEITUNG Frankfurt 12, February 1971 * This article, exclusive to SOCIALIST _AFFAIRS, is based on an address which George Thomson gave to the January 19 meeting of he Bureau of the Socialist International in London. VARIED REACTION IN SCANDINAVIA TO IDEA OF EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE The attitude of the Scandinavian countries to the plan of A European security conference is varied, 'however it is basically Pervadingly positive. Finland has shown the strongest commitment. In May of 1969, building on the stimulus of the Budapest Meeting of the Warsaw Pact, Finland had declared in a memorandum to the states of Europe, including both parts of Germany, and to the United States and Canada, that Helsinki was prepared for the role of host to such a security conference. There followed thorough international soundings by Finnish special ambassador Encke11,. Last July President Kekkonen? who travels at least once a year to the Soviet Union, went together with his then new Prime Minister Karjalainen and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Leskinen to Moscow, and im- mediately thereafter to the United States. The topic of the discussions with the Soviet Leadership and then, on the basis of this experience, with President Nixon, was the security con- fe.vence. The Social-Democratic Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs Leskinen, who in recent years has had especially good relations with Moscow Party Chief Brezhnev, made extremely optimistic temporary prognoses on the basis of the Washington discussions as to the beginning of a preliminary conference. However, he had to revise these prognoses several times before they became outdated anyway by succeeding events. The second Finnish memorandum, addressed to the same international circle as before, followed at the end of November, and contained an invitation to consultations of diverse embassies in Helsinki with the Finnish Foreign Ministry. However, these consultations were not yet to mean a commitment of the participating countries to the security conference. The caution of the NATO states with respect to the hardening of the Soviet position in Berlin and the generally observed cooling-off of relations between the Big Powers caused Finland to become cautious in the last few weeks. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 During the whole time since the first Finnish initiative, Helsinki was careful not to be labeled a mere servant of Soviet interests, for that very thing would be most damaging to Finland's goal of giving Helsinki the neutral position of Geneva, and thereby giving the country universal security, through a great international conference or a series of successful meetings. In December Deeltinen hinted that a preparatory oonferenoe Gould also be called without full attendance of the participating countries. That Soviet wishes aimed in this direction have foundered on Helsinki in spite of Leskinen's indulgence, was recently made clear by Prime Minister Karjalainen when he stated that the conference could only succeed on the basis of the consent of all appropriate countries, and Finland would make no reductions in the circle of participants. The conference is too important for Finland's neutrality for Helsinki toibe a party to a one-sided propaganda event. Finland continues to hope for the occurrence of a comprehensive conference, but is already showing.: a certain amount of skepticism, at least as far as the date is concerned. Soviet Defense Minister Grechko's ears probably tingled from Karjalaineds speech; he was in Finland right on the heels of the Hungarian government head Pock; before that, in the beginning of December, Grechko was in Sweden. The Soviet Union is continually attempting to encourage the neutral countries into undertaking initiatives for the conference. But although Sweden is by all means in favor of the conference, and has frequently expressed its agreement -- Stockholm also declared itself "of course" immediately ready for the ambassador-level consultations in Helsinki -- it does not like to be pushed to the forefront by the Soviet Union. Stockholm's attitude is, as usual, cautiously pragmatic. The Swedes praised the plan last March during the visit of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Smirnov in Stockholm, in June during the trip of Prime Minister Palme to Moscow, and now again to Grechko; but at the same time they point to the decidedly affected countries, and among these especially to the Big Powers, on whom finally depends the realization of the security conference, they said. The NATO country Denmark is even more cautious. Copenhagen itself traditionally follows a policy of reduced tensions with Eastern Europe, as does neutral Stockholm. After the war, Denmark was for a long time the only NATO country which had intensive relations with Poland, especially during the governing period of the Social-Democrat Krag. At that time Copenhagen ren- dered good service to Bonn in Warsaw, which had lasting effects. Baunsgaard's government welcomes the plan of the conference, but does not thereby forsake the common ground of NATO agreements. Denmark, which sees itself as especially vulnerable to Eastern wooing, was on its guard against hurrying forward in its answer to the second Finnish memorandum: The result of the memorandum, they said, would "naturally depend on the reaction in. the many countries which are mutually responsible for the solution of the Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :4CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 fundamental European security problems." Copenhagen itself has a "funda- mentally positive" attitude, it was vaguely stated. For a long time all the Scandinavian countries have made the partici- pation of America and detailed Preparation conditions of the conference. Likewise, all Scandinavian countries are agreed that the German Ost?Politik with the treaties of Moscow and Warsaw has furthered a reduction in tensions and has improved the preconditions for the conference. It is the logical consequence of this evaluation, that the necessity of a countermove by the other side becomes clearer and clearer to the Scandi- navian politicians. Norway, like Denmark a NATO member, has recently out- -lined its stand unambiguously. The Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz was told in Oslo that thdre was a clear connection between Bonn's treaties with Moscow and Warsaw, the Berlin question, and the security conference. For the improvement of the East-West relationship a Berlin settlement is mandatory, they said. Progress in the Berlin negotiations is accordingly a precondition for the security conference. A visit to Norway and Sweden by the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Manescui in Winiewicz's footsteps, and which undoubtedly would have had the same purpose, was cancelled, possibly because of a Ramanian ambassadors' meeting taking place in Bucharest. Perhaps a discussion on this point was not agreeable at the moment to Manescu, who is Open to realistic differen- tiations. The strategic situation of Norway, the weak neighbor of a Big Power which at any time could turn one of its extensive maneuvers into something serious, forces Oslo to be keen-of-vision. The Norwegians test the changes of international conetellations for possible effects on their security. Norway is also dependent on NATO, leans on it, and would by no means like to see it perceptibly weakened or disappear without a functional defense. Oslo carries out a policy of reducing tensions by trying to realize and expand collaboration in practical realms, as in economics or with tech- nical Oooperation. But Oslo considers as illusionary the view that the security conference would automatically lead to the concrete practical col- laboration which Norway wishes to have with every country. Norway regards the conference Iplan with an open mind, but skeptically. Approved For Release 1999/09/0%: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 CPYRGHT FRANICEURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt 12 February 1971 Unterschiedliche Beurteilung in Skandinavien Finnland am stiirksten interessiert / Von Clans Gennrich, Stockholm Die lialtung der skanclinavlschen Liiiidee Wtt Men @hie? oi-iroppii@ri Nitherheitskonferenz ist unterschiedlich, jedoch im Grundzug durchgehend positiv. Am starksten hat sich Finnland daftir engagiert. Im Mai 1969, aufbauend auf die Anregung der Budapester Tagung des Warschauer Paktes, hatte Finnland in einem Memorandum an die Staten Europas einschlief3lich bolder Teile Deutschlands sowie an die Vereinigten Staaten und Kaneda erklart, Helsinki sei zur Rolle des Gastgebers einer Si- cherheitskonferenz bercit. - Es folgten eingehende internationale Sondierungen des finnischen Sander- botschafters Enckell. Im vergangenen Juli reiste President Kekkonen, der sich alljahrlich mindestens einmal in die So- wjetunion begibt, zusammen mit set- nem darnels neuen Ministerprasidenten Karjalainen und AuBenminister Les- kinen nach Moskau und unmittelbar an-'schliBend in die Vereinigten Staaten. Das Thema der Besprechungen mit der sowjetischen letihrung und auf die- ser Erfahrungsgrundlage dann mit Pre- sident Nixon war die Sicherheitskonfe- renz. Der sozialdemokratische finnische AuBenminister Leskinen, der in den letzten -Jahren besonders gute Bezie- hungen zum Moskauer Parteichef Bre- schnew unterhalt, machte an Hand der Washingtoner Besprechungen auBer- ordentlich optimististhe zeitlichee Pro- gnosen Ober den Beginn einer Vorkon- ferenz, die er allerdings mehrfach revi- dieren muBte, ehe sie durch die Wirk- lichkeit ohnehin ilberholt wurden. Ende November folgte das zweite finnische Memorandum an den gleichen internationalen Adressatenkreis mit der Aufforderung zu Konsultationen der diversen Botschaften in Helsinki mit dem finnischen AuBenministerium. Diese Konsultationen sollten allerdings r ec.h keine Festlegung der beteiligten Lander auf die Sicherheitskonferenz be- deuten. Die Vorsicht der Nato-Staaten im Zu- sammenhang mit der Verhartung der sowjetischen Position in Berlin und der allgemein zu beobachtenden Abktihlung des Verhaltnisses zwischen den Gra- machten veranlafite Finnland in den letzten Wochen zur Zuriickhaltung. Wahrend der ganzen Zeit seit der ersten finnischen Initiative athtet Helsinki sorgsam darauf, nicht als Handlanger sowjetischer Interessen abgestempelt zu werden, well gerade das Finnlands Ziel am meisten schaden milfite, oeurch the in diese Richtung mien( en blJV 1 I J tieelieh Welled-if) trot g LeAkiimi Nfieh- giebigkeit an Helsinki scheitern, machte Ministerprasident Karjalainen dieser Tage klar, als er sagte, die Konferenz Menne nur auf der Grundlage des Ein- vernehmens eller zustandigen Lander glecken, und Finnland mache vom Tell- nehmerkreis keine Abstriche. Ftir Finnlands Neutralitat ist die Kon- ferenz zu wichtig, als daB Helsinki sich zu einer einseitigen Propaganda- veranstaltung hergeben k6nnte. Finn- land hofft wetter auf das Zustande- ?' kommen einer umfassenden Konferenz, .eeigt aber bereits, zumindest was den Zeitpunkt betrifft, eine gewisse Skepsis. Dern sowjetischen Verteidigungsmini- ster Gretsthkow dtirften von Karjalai- nens Rede die Ohren geklungen haben; auf den Fersen des ungarischen Regie- rungschefs Fock war er gerade in Finn- land; davor, Anfang Dezember, war Gretsthkow in Schweden. Die Sowjet- union sucht die neutralen Lender standig zu Initiativen fur die Konferenz zu er- muntern. Doch obwohl Schweden dem Konfe- renzplan durchaus geneigt ist und seine Zustimmung hating geauBert hat ? auch zu den Botschafterkonsultationen in Helsinki hat Stockholm sich ?selbstver- standlich" sofort bereit erklart?,1? es. sich nicht gem von der Sowjetunion vor- schicken. Stockholms Haltung ist, wie meistens, vorsichtig pragmatisch. Die Schweden lobten im letzten Man beim Besuch des stelivertretenden sowjetischen Auflen- ministers Smirnow in Stockholm, im Juni wahrend der Reise des Minister- prasidenten Palme nach Moskau und jetzt wieder Gretschkow gegenilber das Vorhaben; doch sie verwiesen gleich- zeitig auf die entscheidend betroffenen d dbi besonders auf die Lander un da be GroBmachte, von denen das Zustande- genehm. kothmen der Sicherheitskonferenz Die strategische Lage Norwegens, de i schliefilich abhange. schwachen Nachbarn einer' GroBmacht, Noch vorsichtiger ist das Nato-Land die jederzeit aus einem ihrer umfassen ? Danemark. Kopenhagen fiihrt selbst, den Manover ernst machen Montt, ebenso wie das neutrale Stockholm, tra- zwingt Oslo zur Scharfsichtigkeit. Di ?, ditionell eine Politik der Entspannung Norvveger preifen Verenderungcn in ? gegentiber Osteuropa. Nach dem Krieg ternationaler. Konstellationen atif meg - war Danemark lenge das einzige Nato-, lithe Folgen hirer Sicherheit. Norwegen Land, das intensiven Umgang mit Polen ist eta die Nato angewiesen, stlitzt sleet hatte, besonders wahrend der Regie- auf sie und mochte sie keinesfalls spier- rungszeit des Sozialdemokraten Krag; bar getheveche oder ohne funktionsfae darnels leistete Kopenhagen Bonn gute. higen Einsatz schwinden sehen. Dienste in Warschau, die nachgewirkt Oslo betreibt Entspannungspolitik, in- haben. dem es Zusammenarbeit auf praktische e Die Regicrung Baunsgaard begrefit den Gebieten wie in der, Wirtschaft oder eizie groBe Internationale Konferenz Plan zur Konferenz, verlent aber dabel bei technischer Kooperation zu ver- oder durch eine Serie erfolgreicher Zu- nicht den gemeinsamen Boden der Nato- wirklichen und zu vertiefen sucht. Dore sammenictinfte Helsinki den neutralen rbereinktinfte. Danemark, das sich be- hell Oslo die Ansicht filr eine Illusion, Rang von Genf und damit dem Land sonderem ostlichen Liebeswerben aus- daB die Sicherheitskonferenz autoina- eine allseitige Sicherung zu geben. gesetzt sieht, hat sich bei der Antwort tisch zu konkreter praktischer Zusarr- Leskinen . lice im Dezember durch- auf das zweite finnische Memorandum menarbeit f?hren werde, die Norwegen blicken, ciaB eine Vorbereitungskonferenz vor dem Vorpreschen gehtitet: Das Er- mit idem Land wilnscht. Norwegen be- Landern abnangen, cue r e sung der finielementAlen europ5igichen heitsprobleme mitverantwortlich sind". .? Kopenhagen selbst verhalte sich, hien es - vage, ?grundsatzlich positiv". Alle skandinavischen. Lander stellen sett langem die Bedingungen der Teil- nahme Amerikas und einer detaillier- ten Vorbereitung. Ebenso sind sich alle slcandinavischen Lander darin einig, dal) die deutsche Ost-Politik mit den Ver- t en von Moskau und Warschau die Entspannung gefordert und die Voraus- setzungen fiir die Konferenz verbessert habe. Es liegt in der Folgerichtigkeit dieser Bewertung, clan den skandinavischen Politikern jetzt die Notwendigkeit , des Gegenzuges der anderen Seite imrner deutlicher wird. Das wie Danemark der Nato angehorende Norwegen hat seine Haltung dieser Tage unzweideutig pro- filiert. Der stellvertretende polnische Auelen- minister Winiewicz bekam in Oslo zu hOren, es bestehe em n klarer Zusammen- hang zwischen den Vertragen Bonns mit Moskau und Warschau, der Berlin-Fra- ge und der Sicherheitskonferenz. Ftir die Besserung des Ost-West-Verhaltnisses sei nun eine Berlin-Regelung unerlaB- lich. Fortschritte in den Berlin-Verhand- lungen seien demgemaB eine Voraus- setzung fiir die Sicherheitskonferenz. Ein an Winiewicz ankniipfender Be- such des rumenischen AuBenminister: Manescu in Norwegen und Schweden der ohne Zweifel dem gleichen Theme gegolten hette, fiel aus, moglicherweise wegen eines in Bukarest stattfindender .rumanischen Botschaftertreffens; viel- ,leicht war Manescu, der realistischen IDifferenzierungen gegentiber aufge? schlossen ist, eine Unterhaltung Ube- diesen Punkt im Augenblick nicht an ? lender einber f n werden ,konneen0 q31 Po au ch ohne vApprovedrFr as azokxviromuctimboomaufgeschio- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt 12 February 1971 YUGOSLAVIA HOPES TO BENEFIT FROM EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE From the beginning Yugoslavia agreed with the Soviet project of a European security conferences although it did not deceive itself about the underlying intentions. It certainly played a role here that Tito did not 1..ant to take a stand against the Eastern Bloc on such a plan, especially since several Western countries were not verbally in favor of the idea. However, it is more important that an all-European security conference fit into the conception of Yugoslavian foreign policy, of course only under certain preconditions. Belgrade is not interested in a security conference which leads a sleepy life in the fog of nonbinding chatter or which only serves as a podium ford Soviet propaganda. The diplomatic euphemism for this is that one should not remain on the declaratory field. Yugoslavia much rather intends concrete tasks for a security conference: It should further the military reduction of tensions in Europe. By this Belgrade has in mind above all that the Big Powers reduce their military presence on the continent as well as put an end to military demonstrations of power in and around Europe, and that meneuvers, especially those in border territories and in notoriously crisis-prone regions, become rarer. The increased military security gained by this benefits the inde- pendence of all European countries according to the view here. In Yugoslavia's opinion, the security conference must give each Euro- pean state new guarentees for the inviolability of its borders, and reject bloc doctrines of all sorts which attempt to pass over sovereignty. Even if not exclusively so, Belgrade here has primarily the Brezhnev doctrine in mind. This is connected with the fact that Yugoslavia does not want the security , conference to be a round of discussions by the Big Powers or by both blocs, whereby the small states would only be the trimmings. The result of the conference, or of a series of conferences, should not solidify the bloc structures, but should loosen them up. The bloc members should receive more political elbow room. It is sure that Belgrade is thinking of its bloc-weary neighbors Romania and Italy here, even if it does not openly say so. For the European countries which do not belong to any bloc, especially for itself, Yugoslavia hopes for greater influence in Europe from the conference. The Yugoslavian diplomats are not considering preconditions for the security conference. But they are clear about the fact that there is no chance for the conference before a Berlin settlement. In this sense Belgrade speaks of "context" or "parallelism," and avoids the word "condition." Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 7 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 CPYRGHT FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt 12 February 1971 Jugoslawien wiinscht Ergebnisse Von JOHANN GEORG REISSMOLLER, Belgrad Jugoslawien hat dem sowjetischen Projekt einer europaischen Sicherheits- konferenz voms Beginn an zugestirnmt, obwohl es sich iiber die dahinterste- henden Absichten nicht tauscht. Ilabei spielt gewil3 eine Rolle, daB sich Tito nicht gerade aber em n solches Vorhaben mit "deaf Ostblock anlegen wollte, zu- mai auch mehrere westliche Lander sich 'nicht verbal far die Idee erwarmten. Wichtiger aber 1st, daB eine gesamt- europaische Sicherheitskonferenz ins Konzept der jugoslawischen AuBen- politik pat, allerdings nur unter be- stimmten Voraussetzungen. Belgraddst nicht an einer Sicherheits- konferenz interessiert, die in Nebel- schwaden unverbindlichen Geredes da- hindammert, oder nur der sowjeti- schen Propaganda als Tribune client. ? Man darfe nicht auf dem deklaratori- ? schen Feld bleiben, heiBt die diploma- tische Umschreibung dafiir. Vielmehr denkt Jugoslawien einer Sicherheits- konferenz konkrete Aufgaben zu: Sie soil die militarische Entspannung in Europa voranbringen. Dazu gehort nach Ansicht Belgrads vor allem, daa die GroBmachte ihre militarische Prasenz auf dem Kontinent. vermindern sowie militarische Macht-' demonstrationen in und urn Europa unterlassen und daB Manover, beson- ders solche Th Grenzgebieten und in notorischen Krisenregionen, seltener werden. Die daraus gewonnene ver- mehrte militarische Sicherheit kommt nach hiesiger Auffassung der: Unablaan-, gigkeit aller europaischen Lander zu- g ute. Aus jugoslawischer Sicht muB die Sicherheitskonferenz jedem europa- ischen Staat neue Garantien far. die Unverletzbarkeit seiner Grenzen geben und Blockdoktrinen aller Art, welche die Souveranitat zu ilberspielen suchen, verwerfen. Dabei hat Belgrad vor al- lem, wenn auch nicht ausschlieBlich, die Breschnew-Doktrin im Auge. Damit hangt zusammen: Jugoslawien wiinscht sich eine Sicherheitskonterenz nicht ald GesPrachsrunde der Grof3machte oder der beiden Blocke, wobei dann die kleineren Staaten nur Verzierungen ab- Oben. Das Ergebnis der Konferenz oder einer Serie von Konferenzen soil die Blockstrukturen nicht verfestigen, son- dern aufweichen. Die Blockmitglieder sollen mehr politischen Spielraum be- kommen. Es 1st sicher, daB Belgrad da- bei besonders an seine blockmiiden Nachbarn Rumanien und Italien denkt, wenn es auch nicht often davon spricht. Far die keinem Block zugehorenden eu- ropaischen Lander, vor allem far sich' selbst, erhofft sich Jugoslawien von der Konferenz graBeren Einflui3 in Europa. ' Vorbedingungen far die Sicherheits- - konferenz laBt die jugoslaWische Diplo- matie nicht gelten. Sedoch ist sie sich dartiber im klaren, daB vor einer Berlin- Regelung das Konferenzprojekt keine Chancen hat. In diesern Sinn spricht Belgrad, das Wort ?Bedingung" ver- meidend, von ?Zusammenhang" oder ?Parallelismus"., FRANKFURT ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt 12 February 1971 ' ENGLAND SKEPTICAL AND CAUTIOUS REGARDING EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE As a topic of British foreign policy, the European security conference and the calling of the Geneva Conference on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, whose permanent chairmanship is shared by the British and Soviet Ministers of For- eign Affairs, have had already for years in common that they give the oppor- tunity for ritualistic affirmations. Since in both cases it is, or should be, a question of striving for peace, the reaction is always positive, at least in principle, and is only dependent to a minor extent on the party color of the British government in power at the time. Between the view of the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Alec Doug1as-Home9 and that of his socialist prede- cessor, Stewart, no difference on the issue of a European security confer- ence can be discovered, even with a magnifier. Approved For Release 1999/09/028: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 When one strips the official answer of its rhetorical flourishes and formulas and reduces it to its pragmatic essence, the precondition of British assent is the guarantee,-if not absolute then at least convincingly tested, that Moscow cannot use such a conference purely for propagandist purposes. The exclusion of the United States from a European security conference, originally hoped for by MoSw but ia the meantime dropped, was not only un- datable for London, but a certain sign for how much skepticism and caution the Soviet plan was to be treated.with. There was complete agreement in the London conversations between the West German Minister for Foreign Affairs Scheel and Sir Alec Douglas-Home that a European security conference can only become a topic for serious pre- liminary deliberations when Moscow has presented proof of the validity of its intentions on the Berlin question. CPYRGHT FRANKFURT ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt 12 February 1071 England skeptisch und vorsichtig Von HEINZ HOPFL, London Als Thema der britischen Autienpoli- tik hat die europtlische Sicherheitskon- ferenz mit der Einberufung der Genfer Konferenz ilber Vietnam, Laos und Kambodscha, in deren permanenten Vorsitz sich der britische und der so- wjetische AuBenminister teilen, nun schon seit Jahren gemeinsam, daB sie Gelegenheit zu rituellen Beteuerungen geben. Die Reaktion 1st, da es sich in beiden Fallen. urn Friedensbemilhungen han- delt oder handeln soil, immer positiv, zumindest im Prinzip, und nur in ge- ringftigigern,Mafie von der Parteifarbe der jeweiligen britischen Regierung ab- hangig. Zwikhen der Auffassung des jetzigen AuBenministers, Sir Alec Dou- glas-Home, und der seines sozialisti- schen Vorgangers, Stewart; laBt sich auch mit der Lupe kein tinterschied in der Frage einer europaischen Sicher- heitskonferenz entdecken. Wenn man die offizielle Antwort ih- rer rhctorischen ,Floskeln und Formeln entkleidet und auf ihren pragmati- schen Kern reduziert, 1st die Vorbedin- gung einer britischen Zusage die wenn nicht absolute, so doch aberzeugend ge- prafte Gewahr. daB Moskau eine solche Konferenz nicht zu blofien Propaganda- zwecken mil3brauchen kann. Der urspriinglich von Moskau erhoff- te, inzwischen fallengelassene Ausschlufl der Vereinigten Staaten von einer eu- ropfiischen Sicherheitskonferenz war fur London nicht nur undiskutabel, son- dern. em n sicheres Zeichen dafar, mit welcher Skepsis und Vorsicht der so- wjetische Plan zu behandeln war. In den Londoner Gesprachen hat es zwischen BundesauBenminister Scheel und Sir Alec Douglas-Home voile tber- elnstimmung dartiber gegeben, dafi eine europaische Sicherheitskonferenz erst dann aberhaupt Gegenstand von ernst- haften Vortiberlegungen werden kann, wenn Moskau in der Berlin-Frage den Beweis der Echtheif seiner Absichten geliefert hat. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 FRANKFURTER. ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Rankfurt 12 February 1971 ITALY FAVORS EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE AFTER BERLIN ShilLEMENT Italy adheres to the standpoint of the NATO declaration of 4 December 1970 on the question of the European security conference. Rome makes the solution of the Berlin question and a reduction of tensions in the Mediter- ranean a precondition or tha aonferena4. To bo sum the Mediterranean oc- curs in the NATO declaration only in subsidiary clauses. But Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Moro expressed himself clearly in front of the NATO Council. To be sure it is freely admitted also in Italian circles that the concept "reduction of tensions in the Mediterranean" allows for various inter- pretations. For example, is the removal of the Soviet Russian fleet from this sea involved here? No one will expect that. Basically therefore, also for Italy, everything depends on the Berlin question as a precondition of the conference. If there should be an,agreement on Berlin, the Italians would alsb agree to a security conference. As long as this does not occur, the Italians are not ready for multilateral discussions on preparations for the European security conference. They recently stated this to Finnish President Kekkonen, who advocated such conversations. As in so many other points, Italy seems to be very close to the German Federal Government on this issue also. But there is one difference. Rome is more anxious for a conference than Bonn is; the reason for this lies in Italian domestic politics. At times this conference-eager attitude threatened to bring Rome in con- flict with the three big Western allies, especially the United States and France. The Italian concept of the conference was first developed in 1969 by the then Italian Mimister of Foreign Affairs, Nenni, the leader of the social- ists. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt 12 February 1971 Ap , Italien denkt an das Mittelmeer Von JOSEF SCHMITZ VAN VORST, Rom CPYRGHT In der Frage der europaischen Sicher- heitskonferenz halt Italien an dem Standpunkt der Nato-Erklarung vom 4. Dezember 1970 fest. Rom macht die Lo- sung der Berlin-Frage und die Ent- spannung Mittelmeer zur Vorbedin- gung der Konferenz. Das Mittelmeer kommt zwar in der Nato-Erklarung nur verklausuliert vor. Der italienische AuBenminister Moro hat sich jedoch vor dem Nato-Rat deutlich geauf3ert. Auch in italienischen Kreisen wird freilich zugegeben, daB der Begriff ?Entspannung im Mittelmeer" verschie- dene Auslegungen zulasse. Gehort bei- spielsweise die Entfernung der sowjet- russischen Flotte aus diesem Meer dazu? Das wird niemand erwarten. Im Grunde laufe daher auch filr Italien alles auf die Berlin-Frage als Vorbedingung der Konferenz hinaus. Kommt es ilber Ber- i:Attaintarneivagth tiss . ? k ? ? r. C51.111.r stimmen. Solange sie ausbleibt, sind die Italiener nicht zu multilateralen Gesprachen zur Vorbereitung der euro- paischen Sicherheitskonferenz bereit. Dies haben sie noch vor kurzem dem finnischen Staatsprasidenten Kekkonen erklart, der solche Gesprache anregte. Wie in so vielen anderen scheint Italien damit auch in dieser Frage dem Standpunkt der deutschen Bundesregie- rung sehr nahe zu stehen. Es gibt aber ' einen Unterschied. Rom ist konferenz- freudiger als Bonn; der Grund dafiir liegt in der italienischen Innenpolitik. Zeitweise erohte diese konferenz- freundliche Haltung Rom in Gegensatz . zu den drei groBen westlichen Verbiln- deten, insbesondere zu den Vereinigten Staaten und Frankreich, zu bringen. Das italienische Konferenzkonzept ist 1969 zuerst vOn dem damaligen italic- OV nigithernister, cle_m_aozialisten- pa$IS4A00.03001 00001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 FRANKFURTER ALLGINBINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt 12 February 1971 FOR FRANCE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE A WAY TO STRENGTHEN ITS OWN POSITION France favors an all-European security conferences After long initial hesitatiOn, Paris regards it as a means to strengthen ita own role in Eastern politics. Since his trip to the Soviet Union, President Pompidou has re- peatedly declared that the "multilateral preparation of a European security conference" could now "move into an active phase." Pompidou rejects a legal package deal linking the conference to a prior Berlin settlement. Just as France does not want to give up its role as-occupation power in Berlin and thus wants to keep the last lever of a right to participate in discussions on all-German issues, thus the German question -remains the central issue in considerations regarding a security conference. Pompidou would like to continue de ?mullets Eastern policies. They involve the establishment of bilateral contacts with the 'Soviet Union and the East European states, with the goal of dissolving the-"bloce'in favor of a reduction of tensions in Europe. In domestic affairs Pampidou thus ' obligates the French Communist Party to. support his foreign policy. In the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is neither any haste nor any special enthusiasm for the idea of a conference, so urgently demand- ed above all by Moscow. A mammoth meeting for the sole purpose of presenting the Soviet Union with a contractual sealing of the status quo in Europe is considered senseless. The minimal demand would have to be the free traffic of people between both parts of Europe, the possibility "of cultural and intellectual penetra- tion." But Pompidou has also declared -- most recently in his press conference of 21 January -- that the conference would make little sense without progress in Berlin and withOut successes in Chancellor Brandt's*Ostpolitik."In the preparatory work the French have so far proceeded from the idea of a meeting of ambassadors from both sides in Helsinki. But recently one notices a def- inite reduction in Soviet pressure. In Paris one thinks it is possible to exclude the United States and Canada from participation. European security would be guaranteed by the atomic parity of both world powers, it is thought. In spite of their rejec- tion of bloc politics, French experts admit that a reduction of troops for the sole benefit of the Soviet Union would mean a threat to European security. It is however significant that Brandt's"Ostpolitik"overshadows all planning. Should the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties occur after a prior settlement of the Berlin question, it is said in Paris, then the all-European security conference would have no objective. Meanwhile, one is ...-Jilent about the connection ofthis whole complex to the fact that the suc- cm,of Bratuitli' is dependent on the will of the Big roved For eiease 199 /02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2- pew. ii Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Frankfurt 12 February 1971 Fiir Paris em n Mittel zur Starkung der eigenen Politik Von JAN REIFENBERG, Paris CPYRGHT Frankreich beftirwortet eine gesamt- europaische Sicherheitskonferenz. Nach langem anfanglichem Zogern betrachtet , Paris sie als Mittel zur Verstarkung der eigenen Rolle in der Ostpolitik. Staatsprasident Pompidou hat seit "sei- ner Reise in die Sowjetunion wieder- holt erklart, die ?multilaterale Vorbe-_ reitung einer europaischen Sicherheits- konferenz" kiinne jetzt ,,in eine aktive Phase tibergehen". Pompidou lehnt em n juristisches Junk- ' tim zwischen der Konferenz und einer vorherigen Berlin-Regelung ab. Wie , Frankreich in Beilin einmal sdihe Rolle als Besatzungimacht nicht aufgeben und damit den letzten Hebei des Mit- spracherechts in gesamtdeutschen Fra- gen behalten will, so bleibt such bei den Erwagungen beztiglich einer Sicher-, heitskonferenz die deutsche Frage der Mittelpunkt. Pompidou mochte die Ostpolitik de Gaulles fortsetzen. Sie beinhaltet die Herstellung bilateraler Kontakte zur Sowjetunion und den osteuropaischen " Staaten mit dem Ziel, die ?Blacke" zu- gunsten europaischer Entspannung auf- zuldsen. Innenpolitisch verpflichtet Pompidou auf diese Weise such die KPF ftir seine Atthenpolitik. Im franzosischen Auf3enministerium ? herrscht weder Elle noch sonderliche Begeisterung gegentiber dem zunachst von Moskau dringend geforderten Kon-' ferenzvorhaben. Eine Riesenzusammen- kunft zum alleinigen Zweck, der So- ' wjetunion die vertragliche Besiegelung des Status quo in Europa zu liefern, gilt als sinnlos. Mindestforderung mtiBte der freie Verkehr von Menschen zwischen beiden Teilen Europas, die Moglichkeit ?der kulturellen und ideellen Durchdrin- gung" bleiben. Aber auch Pompidou hat ? zuletzt in seiner Pressekonferenz vom 21. Januar erklart, ohne Fortschritte in Berlin und ohne Erfolge der Ostpolitik Bun- deskanzler Brandts habe die Konferenz wenig Sinn. In den Vorbereitungsar- beiten 1st von franzosischer Seite bisher von einem Botschaftertreff en beider Seiten in Helsinki ausgegangen worden. Aber in letzter Zeit stellt man merk- liches Nachlassen des sowjetischen Drangens fest. In Paris halt man es filr moglich, die Vereinigten Staaten und Kaneda von der Teilnahme auszuschliefien. Die Si- cherheit Europas werde durch das Atomgleichgewicht der beiden Welt- machte garantiert. Trotz der Ablehnung von Blockpolitik geben franzOsische Fachleute zu, daB eine Truppenvermin- derung zu einseitigen Gunsten der So- wjetunion Gefahrdung europaischer Sicherheit bedeutet. Entscheidend 1st jedoch, daB die Ost- politik Brandts alle Planungen tiber- schattet. Solite es zur Ratifizierung des Moskauer und Warschauer Vertrages nach vorheriger Regelung der Berlin- Frage kommen, heiBt es in Paris, so werde die gesamteuroPaische Sieber- heitskonferenz gegenstandslos. Man schweigt sich indessen tiber den Zu- sammenhang dieses Komplexes mit del Tatsache aus, daB der Erfolg von Brandts Ostpolitik tiber Berlin vom Willen der vier Mtiehte abhangt. Approved For Release 1999/09/022: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 CPYRGHtPProved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 CPYRGHT LE MONDE WEEKLY Paris 9 December 1970 110 dttenle, CPYRGHT a two-way street Cluunpagne and ehandeliers were laid on in ' Warsaw title week for the eignine by Wein Amman ' I Chancellor %lily Brandt and Polish Premier 1 Jozef Cyrankietvicz of a treaty intended to olpen, i the way for nennalizatIon of the two countries':' , relations. But ;Berlin remained the central issue . ' in the question of how far and how fast East- ' West d?nte in Europe can progress. The future of Berlin was also a major issue at the conference of the Warsaw Pact powers' which 'ended last Wednesday and of the meeting of the. ' Nato Council in Brussels on Thursday and Friday. ..... The Nato ministers made It clear that they regarded the "satisfactory conclusion" of the Big / Four talks and the favourable progress of "other The whole future course or detente in Europe may depend on the d cisions taken b the War ae Pact leaders. The ball is de- cidedly in their court. for West German Chancellor Willy Brandt has- for his part done everything -possible to create improved rela- tions with Eastern Europe. He signed the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty which In ef- fect condemns his country to the status of a second-class military power. He made the pilgrimage to Erfurt to meet the prime min- ister of a state whose existence until then Bonn had assiduously Ignored. And he went to Moscow. and has just gone to *Warsaw, to sign treaties that sanction bound- aries which previous West Ger- man governments had refused to recognize?except in exchange for the East's acceptance of German reunification. There are several reasons for thinking that Mr. Brandt may not have paid as high a price as ap- pears at first glance, He suc- ceeded in avoiding the de jure recognition sought by East Leer- many that would make the separa- tion of Germany definitive, and his recognition of the Oder-Neisse line was made in the name of the Federal Republic, not that of an eventually reunified Germany. In addition, East Germany continues to be kept out of the various bodies of the United Nations and these treaties have thrown wide the door to trade with Eastern Europe. Despite all this, it remains true Ain't so far it has been Bonn that has been making 1111 the conces- sions, and now it is up to Moscow - and its' allies' to decide' how far they twee/Ming to g0 in exchange. . I..t Package deal APpooved IFISM6Pagen? minister Walter otlaa 'ottgoing talks" as a necessary prolintitiary to : Western gammen* to a novapean seeurite MM.` ference. A communique issued after the Warsaw Pact meeting, in East Berlin itself, made it clear that .Soviet Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev had im- posed his policy on the recalcitrant East German leader, Walter Ulbricht. It failed to support Mr. -Ulbricht's long-standing demand for de jure recognition of his government by Bonn and re- iterated Mr. Brezhnev's recent reference to a Berlin settlement which would correspond to the "eequiremerits of the population of West Berlin." e, But it added that thereevas "no reason" to delay the i convening of a conference on European security.! By ANDRE FONTAINE -felling apart. The presence of American, Brit- .sh and French forces in West Berlin is based on the very gen- eral terms of the 1944-1045 agree- ' ments which have since been iisputed be the Soviets. What is needed, therefore, IS a binding set- tlement which would prevent the East Germans from closing road traffic and the Russians from dis- rupting air traffic on the pretext1 A military manoeuvres. To the extent that the declared aim of Soviet policy is to make the status quo definitive, Moscow :annot deny that West ,Berlin's ettachment to the Western system Is an integral part of that status, quo. Official Soviet recognition of this fact is little enough to ex- pect in exchange for agreementl on frontiers and the division of Germany. I Too often in the past twenty/ years the Russians have tried to rid themselves of this Western; outpost by resorting to blockade or even the threat of a world ware It would be a fatal mistake for the West not to insist on such a settlement. After all, the West succeeded in holding on to Berlin even under ' the worst stresses of the Cold War and there is no reason why it should run the risk of losing it in a time of detente. . General. de Gaulle understood this better than any one else. It' Is clear ,from his memoirs that, to , the end of his life, he was con- vinced that he was right to have ;toed firm against Nikita Khrush- I hey's blusterings. Prime Min- ester Jacques Chaban-Delmas and -Foreign Minister Maurice Schu- Mann ? have made it abundantly Meer that they are following the path that De Gaulle set out., e Thi East GerManis, however 0040400104400-11300**2? hat these various agreement he? Non - Proliferation Treaty, 'normalization" treaties w th Moscow and Warsaw and eventtall- bt Prague, the modus vivendi to be negotiated with East Germany, and the Big Four settlement?vill not be submitted separately, to .1Ihe Bundestag for ratification: On the contrary, they intend to present them as a package deal, evhich means that if any one claese Ii not accepted the whole of Mr. lirandt's Ostpolitik will be jet p- erdized, The Socialist-Liberal coalitien has yet to define the lim ts 'beyond which it would have to selmit that its policy had failed. Since this is a question of inter- pretation, the government may `te t enpted to accept a pro forma ar- rangement on Berlin rather thin a imit a failure which could teed I,* its downfall. This was certainly Moscow's h )pe. And it has undoubted y been the fear in Washington and o her Western capitals. But recent d !elarations by official West Ge '- nem spokesmen have unequivoca ly stated that a Berlin settlemer t Is the sine qua non for any implementation of their Ostpolitik. But why Berlin? As last week s slowdown on West Berlin access roods or recent disruptions of a* tr tine once again revealed, the s Soviets and their East German ' at les have used access to WeA Berlin as a Means of exertine pressure on the Western *alliet.. Atheugh these tactics may have been a good source of foreign cute ? reney, they have backfired' polite , kelle by making'Derliri a symb0. of the Cold War and by Testotlhe Viet...seem solidarity at the ver 96946ifia:CaniRal?' 13 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300'iC171(0721T ?cherished dream' of making a reunified Berlin their capital. This means that they will do their best to keep Soviet concessions to a niinimuni. History shows. however, that when It comes to the crunch the Soviets usually manage to resign themselves to the necessary compromise, es- pecially when It can be made at the expense of one of. their allies. Assurances in order - The Western allies, on the other hand, could well afford to give certain assurances in exchange, especially since the West Germans have ehown themselves to be rather high-handed with the statutes of West Berlin by holding Bundestag sessions or electing their president there. ? What matters is that they are uncompromising on the question of free access and Soviet respon- sibility for guaranteeing it. It would be too easy for the Rus- sians. once sovereignty over access routes had been given to 1 East Germany. to merely wash their hands of the whole affair, when- ever a new incident cropped up. Mr. Brezhnev, meanwhile, held out some hope for an improve- ment In the Berlin situation In , his speech delivered ten days ago ? ? in Armenia. According to him, that is needed is a show of 1 goodwill by all interested parties, , and that they work out solutions , which satisfy the needs of West % Berlin% inhabitants while at the same time respecting the rightful 1 :Interests anti sovereignty of $1ast 'Germany. It would take an inveterate ' ? optimiet to conclude from this ? that the Soviets are ready to pay the price of detente. If Mr. Brezhnev is serious about respect- ?' ing the hopes of the West Ber- liners, he has only to consult their ?'voting record over the past twenty ,years. The candidates of the East German Communist Party, who are authorized in West Ber- lin... have nevers obtained more ? Om a handful of votes., while the vest majority have always gone to the. parties firmly, attached ,to ?Western democracy. ? ? , .;. ? :,i.,t? ? R'wOuld bolo? nructt t,o hope,- 'two Years after the Ltivasion 'of . Otechoslovakia, that Mr. Elreshnet tear' clovin , the Infamous Berlin Wilt; But the , West can at least demand of, the man who has 'raised the qvision'of.the world to an absolute principle that he carry his reasoning to its logiewl conclusion, that is, that he accept certain facts unfavourable to Mmcow, Sonn, London, Parte And Wa.ohu ington must 'Imake it clear to him that, unless 'he does so, the dip- . flomatio triutilph of last summer's Bonn-Moscow treaty, which he ' prides himself on, may well prove to be illusory. ?Detente can never be a one-way ? 'street./ 'Otherwise. instead of "slowly brealdbg down the barriers Ithat'separato' the two Europety it, . ',Could: tempt the temporary victor' 'to 'exploit' his advantage and the, yaser :prepare hie revenge. qodi otbu Imo ti?i ANDRE FONTAINE a ik41.1./.1r4r1P, .11.ser sr oil LE MONDE WEEKLY Paris 9 Deceriber 1970 LA itiENTE ET LE VERE1 ORIN IS I. Le e a long: one. Individual Bulgar ans are stil so closely watcl-td that few dare enter the reading rooms of Western embassies. Instead, crowds of Belgarians stand outside the a merican library to stare at pictures of Trioia Nixon and he fiance and of United States: auto- mobile racing drivers --nd their cars. A Western corre: pondent ,trying to reach a private Bul- garian citizen, whose n une had been obtained from mutual friends, was annonym msly but firmly advised nut t ) pursue, his efforts. Visitor Is gushed , Even more striking was the experience of a Greek- kmerican who spent some time recently with relatives, who were for- cibly moved to Bulgaria 25: years ago during the Greek civil! war. Visiting them ir a small 'village, he found flat they refused to believe that Amer- icans had telephones and tele- vision, much less color tele- vision and a choice ol channels to watch. He was also hastily hushed by his brother when he began to criticize Bulgaria. The wife of another brother, he was told, was a police agent charged with spying on tin former Greeks. ?journalists with foreign-lan- guage ability, sports figures and specialists in foreign trade. rciceign commerce is becoming a popular field of study for young Bulgarians who want to travel outside their own coon-' try and know they can only go to the West if they have official business there. One young man who has made foreign trade a career agreed, speaking figuratively,, that Austria, for example "smells better" than his own country. But he added: "It is unfair to compare our situa- tion with that of the advanced nations. A better measure of our progress is to put us where we belong historically and geo- graphically, next to Greece, Turkey or Yugoslavia." . 2d Fastest Growth Rate , Using that rating, Bulgaria ?with the fastest rate of econ- mile growth in the world after Japan ? looks rather good. But party leaders, putting. a new stress on consumer wel- fare for the coming five-year. plan, forecast food imports to a nation that is traditionally, an agricultural exporter. . The progress achieved is partly the product of hard work ?arliarie-but is also ?the result of extensive Soviet aid, esti- mated at more than 12-billion' in the last quarter century. . Bulgaria, which says sho sold Russia 200 million bottles of wine last year, is planning to maintain that profitable rela- tionship. Some 82 per cent of her trade over the next five years is to stay inside the Com- munist him and 58 per cent tr 124 treittMase eit9ipm2vfM79-91,POVC166"13601 pr 22 2 r,1,0.41M, rrtivr? Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 AFTENPOSTEN, Oslo .6 March 1971 NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV'S MEMOIRS GENUINE ENOUGH Byer Egil Hegge In this article, Per Egil Hegge, the Ate n estencorrespondent recently sent home from Mbscow, examines the much-diss boo , rushchev's Memoirs, which will be available on the Norwegian market very soon. The doubts be had earlier disappeared when Pravda printed Khrushchev's own denial -- a confirmation in itself! It is not quiteclear how the memoirs came into the hands of the American Time-Life concern, but Hegge names here one of the men who could probably tell the whole story -- Time correspondent Jerold Schecter, who left Moscow last September. * * * The origin of the Khrushchev Memoirs was one of the topics I was working on when my work Was so rudely interrupted five weeks ago. Much of the information I obtained cannot be published for fear of placing some people in a difficult situation. Both this information and the circumstances I will relate in this article tend without exception to substantiate Time-Life's claim that the memoiis are authentic, that is to say they came, for the most .part, from the retired Mr. Khrushchev. How much is based on records from Khrushchev's_neriod df_glorY will .remain 4 secret, because the people directly involved in this affair are obliged by contract to keep quiet about it. A Soviet acquaintance told me in May 1970 that Khrushchev was writing his memoirs. I did not have much faith in this information. It was reasonable that rumours would circulate that a retired man with Khrushchev's level of activity and need to talk would 'tirritse something down. Nor did I have any reason to believe that my confidant had any special knowledge of what Khrushchev was doing behind his guarded fence -- it was only later that I understood clearly the level of ,his contact with the Khrushchev family. I thought too that this was material neither I nor any other western journalist would ever get to see and that, therefore, the information was uninteresting from a news angle. Even after the report that the memoirs would be published, I remained skeptical, reasoning like many other people that even if Khrushchev had his own ideas about the policies of the present leaders, particularly the Stalin question, he was still a loyal communist who would not send critical material out of the country. For that reason I assumed that the memoirs were a forgery. I changed my mind when Khrushchev's so-called disclaimer was published on 16 November. .This must be regarded as one of the most affirmative disclaimers the world has ever seen, since it said between the lines that material for reminiscenses did exist. What Khrushchev did deny was that he had personally delivered such material to anyone -- which no one had claimed he had. In his denial, Khrushchev described the memoirs with a word commonly translated as forgery. But the word has a more limited, precise meaning than that. If, for example, the memoirs were edited without the cooperation of the autlir ppiiivkr AV/60ga qWgioifb/PtalAlkbPPS-IYMitatTOSIEN1581 -2 23 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :__CIA-RDP79-01194AQ0030 - .010000 philologically be regarded as "falchivka" and still be genuine. Thus xnrusncn le1? is telling the truth -- and so are the publishers. The denial was dated 10 November, but was sent out by the Tass bureau on 16 November. Several days later I heard from a source I considered and still consider very credible and reliable the story of how Khrushchev had been summoned to Arvid Pelshe, member of the Politbureau and chairman of the supervisory commission of the party. There he was ordered to sign a denial that had already been drawn up. During his conversation with Pelshe, Khrushchev claimed that he had no idea how his memoirs had ended up outside the country, a statement that might be correct, although I and most of the Russians I knew doubted it. Khrushchev yielded to pressure and signed the disclaimer aftermaking certain changes -- which I do not know. The excitement was hard on the 76-year-old pensioner and he entered the hospital immediately afterward. An experienced colleague of mine in Moscow warned me against sending this story. They'll expel you for it, he told me. I did not follow his advice and it appeared in Aftenposten on 27 November. The story also appeared in other newspapers and led people in Washington to think that my source must be Khrushchev's son-in-law, former editor-in-chief of Izvestia, Alexei Adzhubei. Thus Stewart Alsop wrote in Newsweek at the beginning of January that Adzhubei granted an interview with western Journalists in Moscow at the end of November. He gives that as an established fact.- It .s1 pure fabrication. And it. is regrettable that it was taken seriouslyargi-Iceepsturning up -- for example in Professor John ' Sanness' otherwise excellent introductionto the Norwegian edition that will 'be out soon -- tut in a very diluted form. This is the background of the Memoirs. In the fall of 1969 or just after New Year's Day 1970, Khrushchev got a tape recorder and was very pleased with it. Every time he had someone to listen to him, the old popular speaker awoke in him, and it was mainly his many grandchildren who heard grandfather talk while the tape recorder operated': Without an audience, hothing would have come of it. I do not know who turned the tape recorder off and on or who removed the tapes. But I doubt that it could have happened without Khrushchev having some idea what was going on. Henry Shapiro, UPI correspondent in Moscow for many years, also investigated these matters and came-to the conclusion that it was Lev Petrov, Khrushchev's fatally ill son-in-law; who saw to it that the reminiscences got into the hands of a foreigner. For all I know, this could be true. Petrov suffered from incurable cancer and had only a few months left last spring. He died last fall before the news of the memoirs became known. Right after Christmas, Moscow journalist Victor Louis was a steady visitor in the home of the Khrushchev family. His name was immediately mentioned in connection with memoirs in the West. The only reason for it at that time was that people knew he had been engaged in similar affairs in the past. Louis is a Soviet citizen, a Moscow correspondent for the London Evening News, a KGB agent, and a frequent traveler abroad. The suspicion that he had something to do with the matter was strengthened when his stay in Copenhagen on 24 August became known. In Copenhagen he met one of the top men in the Time-Life concern, MUrray Garth, and Jerrold Schecter, at that time Moscow correspondent for Time. One theory is that the manuscript -- or the tapes -- was handed over then and there. That can't be true -- according to my information, all the material Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 24 Approved For Release 1999/09h02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 was out of the Soviet Union and almost completely translated by that time. Louis' name has been cited as proof that it was the KGB that was behind the export of the memoirs. Nothing I know excludes the possibility that the KGB had quite a bit to do with it. But Victor Louis engages in a multi-faceted activity, the object of which in the main is simply to earn money -- and only that. I would not offhand exclude the possibility that this was the idea this time too. The man who could tell the whole story is undoubtedly Jerrold Schecter. This very likeable, capable, and most active correspondent left. Moscow last September, despite the fact this left the Time office empty, as it has remained ever since -- a void that a news magazine like7 Time shuns like the plague and must have had very good reasons for considering-7:-to say nothing of accepting. It should surprise no one that Schecter is one of those obligated by contract to keep quiet, an obligation he has honored. (I for one would give a lot to hear his comments about the theory of the British expert on Soviet affaris, Victor Zorza, that the material was delivered to Time by CIA agents who claimed to be Russians!) Inimy opinion, the strongest confirmation of the authenticity of the memoirs lies in the treatment afforded them by the Soviet press. Aside from the "denial," printed 17 November, and some dark allusions to 'memoirs of all kinds" there has been total silence. It is also revealing that the Soviet press has not printed summaries of the articles in western newspapers seeking to prove that the memoirs were forged. But most revealing is the following detail I hear from a Soviet acquaintance in a position to know -- at the last minute three or four critical portions dealing with the memoirs were deleted from the manuscript of an article printed in the party organ, Pravda, last 17 December. This article was signed I. Alexandrov, a pseudonym used under particularly authoritative statements. "Alexandrov's" articles are written by a group of leading writers for Pravda on orders of the party s-cretariat. This article dealt with ideological warfare waged by the imperialists and a few remarks about the Khrushchev memoirs would have fitted in very well in this connection if, they were forged. my informant had only one comment -- "The memoirs are genuine and they know it. Otherwise Pravda would have used them then." It is every bit as' interesting to speculate on the purpose of the memoirs if they were smuggled out with knowledge of the authorities. That is another -- and very long -- story. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Khrushchev Memoirs Authentic Of the hundreds of news accounts dealing with the origins and authenticity of the Khrushchev memoirs, the attached article "Nikita Khrushchev's Memoirs Are Genuine Enough," appearing in the Norwegian daily Afternposten of 6 March 1971 and written by Norwegian journalist Per Egli Ilegge, formerly posted in Moscow, is by far the most convincing. flegge came into some exclusive and closely held information (the source of which journalistic ethics precludes his revealing) and otherwise reasons very cogently from indirect evidence to make a strong case for the authenticity of the memoirs, which was published by Little, Brown and Co. in book form last year under the title Khrushchev Remembers and is available in many languages. In the course of his article, he refutes many'Of the arguments -EdianCedby .those who wish to consider the memoirs - fraudulent. It deserves dissemination to a wider audience than Hegge's own, the Norwegian public. Approved For Release 1999/09/026 CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300100001-2 AFTENPOSTEN, Oslo CPYRGHT 6 March 1971 A ? . ? ikita rusyts3ovs t ? inner er e n Ay Per-Egil Hegge ? Per Egil Ilegge, Aftenpostens medarbeider som nylig ble ' utvist fra Moskva, tar i denne artikkelen for seg den meget ? orntalte boken eKrusjtsjov minnes? som kommer pa det norske 0. marked, om kort tid. Hegge tviler ikke pa at memoarene er ekte. ? Den tvil han hadde pa et tidlig tidspunkt forsvant da Pravda , bragte Krusjtsjovs eget dementi ? som i seg selv var en bekref- telse! IIvordan memoarene kom det amerikanske TimeLife- konsernet i hende er ikke belt klarlagt, men' Ilegge trekker. her f rem en av de menn som sannsylligvis kan fortelle hele histo- rien: Time-korrespondenten Jerold Schecter som forlot Moskva ? ? september ifjor. Historien om Krusitsjov-me- ? moarenes opprinnelse var ett av de emner jeg holdt p med da jeg flick et kjedelig avbrekk 1 arbeldet for fem uker siden. En del av de opplysninger leg kens frem til, kan jeg ikke offentlig- , eJere av hensyn til personer som da vine hilvne I en vanskelig , situasjon. Bade disse opplysnin- ger, og forhold jeg skal nevne denne artikkel, bidrar uten unn- tagelse til underbygge, Time- Life's pastand om at merarene er autentiske; dvs, at de I hoved- sak stammer Ifr& pensjonis- t e n Krusjtsjov. Hvor stor del av dem som bygger pa arkivinateri; ale Ira -Knajtsjovs glansdager, vii forbli en hemmelighet, siden de personer som har wed direkte kontekt med offteren, er kontraktforpliktet UI holde munn. En sovjetisk bekjent fortalte meg 1 mai 1970 at Krusjtsjov var gang med sine memoarer. Jeg ? festet ikke noen sterns lit til donne opplysning. Det var rime- lig nok at det skulle oppsta rykter MI at en pensjonist ....4 heller ingen grunn til Itro at min hjennitelsmann skulle ha sverlig grele p& bye Krusjtajov , foretok Beg bat sitt bevoktede gjerde bans ? kontaktflate ? med Krusisjov4amillen flick jeg? ? fOrst senere klart for meg. ? Jeg regnet og. med at dette var &toff' som hverken jeg eller noen annen' vestlit Journalist noen gang vine fa se, og at opplysningen derfor var uinteressant som nyhet betraktet. Selv etter meldlngen om at memoarene vile bli utgitt var jeg skeptisk og resonnerte som sa mange andre: Selv om Krusjtsjov nok kan ha sine tanker om de riuvserende lederes politikk, sezr- lig 1 Stalin-sponanalet, er ban ' like fullt en lejal lt ommunist som .ikke vine sende kritisk stoff .utenlands. Jeg gikk derfor uten 'Mere ut fra at memoarene var et falskrieri. ? Jeg skiftet melting da Krusjt- , sjovs skate dement!. ble offent- liggjo'rt dew 16. november. Dette. dementi ma were et t RV de mest bekreitende. dementler verden noen- gang her sett, siden de' ein s ,han persenlig skulle he, over- !evert slikt materiale til noen og det var det Jo heller ingen nom haade Ostia. Krusjtsjov omtaler dementiet ?memoarene som f Isj iv k a, et ord som vanligvis oversettes med falskneri. Men det bar en mer ? begrenset, eitsakt betydning enn som si: hvis memoarene f. eks. er redigert uten forfatterens .medvirkning, silk oversetteren, Strobe Talbott, sier de Cr. 'kan de rent fllologisk sett betegnes som falsjiv k a, og ends were ekte. Krusjtsjov hat dermed sine., ord behold ? utgiverne likes& Dementiet var datert 10. no- vember, men ble sendt ut Toss' tjeneste 16. november. Noen, dager senere fikk jeg fra en kilde jeg ansa og anser som meget troverdig og palitelig, here ' historien om hvordan Krusjisjov var Witt innkalt tit Arvid Pelsje, medlem av politbyriket og mann 1 partiets kontrollkomml-, sjon. Her fikk han ordre om undertegne et dement! som She- redo la ferdig. ICruissisjov hevdet under samtitlen med Pelsje at Krusjtsjovs hictivitetsnivi or ta- mllo linjetie to at det eksi- han ikke ante at hens erindrin- , tfnVgtteYigtNtt44,gca:g99/09ga? et-A1VVW?insterlide. Det ger yar havnet I utlandet, en pp jiAiviRdWM.0 41g 1a4A006030011960104a2viere mug.. _ Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00030010C_P_YRG H T0001-2 selv om jeg or de fleste russere . jeg kjente. tviler pk det. Krusit-, sjov bOyde seg for preset Og ?undertegnet dementiet efter a ha . Toretatt enkelte enciringer hvilke vet jeg ikke. Opphisselsen ' tok sterkt p den 76 kr 'gentle pensionisten, og han ble timid- de1bar efterpk irmlagt p syke- . hus. ? Denne historien ble jeg av en ? erfaren kollega I Moskva advert . mot a sende. De komrner tEl k - utvise deg for den, sa ban. Jeg fulgte ikke hens rad, og 'den to Aftenposten 27. november ifjor.. Historien gikk ogse. 1 andre aviser, og forte I Washington til at man trodde det var Krusjt- sjoys svigersonn, Izvestijas tid- ligere sjefredaktor Aleksej Adsju- bej, som var kilden for den. Stewart Alsop skrev sAledes Newsweek I begynnelsen ay ? Januar at Adsjubej go. et Inter- . vjU til vestlige journallster Moskva i slutten av november. ? Dette slir han fast som et fak- . turn. Det er blankt oppspinn. Og det er beklagellg at det ble tett alvorlig og stadig spoker Isom: f.eks. 1 professor John Sanness' ellers utmerkede forord til. den norske utgaven som konimer pk, markedet om kort tid ? men der 1 sterkt fortynnet form. Memoarene ble til pA fOlgende mkte: Krusjtsjov fikk hosten 1969 eller like efter nyttar 1970 fatt I en lydbandopptager og ble meget begeistret for den. Hver gang han hadde tilhOrere, vaknet den gamle folketaler i ham, og det var fortrinnsvis hens mange barnebarn som fikk hoe beste- far fortelle mens bandopptageren, gikk. Uten publikum flick han aldri noe til. Jeg vet ikke hvem? som skrudde. bandopptageren av og p og hvem som fjernet bandene. Men jeg tviler pit at det kan ha foregAtt uten at Krusjtsjov hadde en anelse om det. UPI's korrespondent I Moskva gjcnnom mange Ar, Henry Shapiro, forsket ogsa, en :lel 1 denne materie og kom tit den konldusjon at det var Krusjtsjovs dOdssyke svigersOnn, Lev Petrov, som stirget for at erindringene kom en utlencling.1 hende. Det kan were riktig for alt jeg vet. PetrovAPpliOnfilkdeEdatr og hadde bare mkneder igjen leve IfjOr ? VA.r. Han, dOde .ifjor hest, fOr nyheten Om menlOarene' We, kjint. . ? , . ? ? Ut over efterjulsvinteren var. ? Moskva-journalisten Viktor Louis' fen fast gjest I 1CrtisitsjoV-fam11W. ens hjem. Louis navn ble iresten meeerf gang lett I for. mon Dirm9attinth Grunn-;?.' laget var det tidspunkt ikke' annet enn at man visste at han' ? tidligere hadde syslet med ? lign-. ' ende, ting. Louis er tovjetisk ..borger, korrespondeht 1 MoskSti,' for London-avisen Evening News,'. KCIBfligent og en .hyppig gjest; I utiandet. Mistanken om at ham'. hadde ' med Bitten a gjore, styrket da. ? hens ?oppheld Kobenhavn 24. august ble kjent:' I Kobenhavn traff han en sv :Time-Life-konsernets Overate sjeil; fer, Murray Garth; og Tirne dawerenCle kortespondent? ?Mosktra,. Jerrold Schecter. - En. teori gAr ut' pet at manu-!'., skriptet, ? eller lydbandene ble overlevert der og da. Det kan. ikke were riktig ? alt miteriale ? var ifOlge mine opplysninger We' av Sovjet og praktisk talt fertile, oversatt ?pet det tidspunkt. Louis' newt er blitt nevni son4 : bevis for at det var KGB sent 4' forget for eksporteri av memoate-.? ne. Jeg vet ;Ikke om floe sow 'utelukker. a ICOB kan ha hatt. en ? viktig ' finger Med 1 spinet.; Men Viktor Leads driver en Itnangesicllg virksomhet hvor for- ?millet 1 swert mange tilfelle ganske enkeit er k ? tjene penger og bare det. Jeg vil ikke uten Atter? utelukke at det kan ha wert hensikten ogsk dcnne gang.. Den mann som kan rotten? hele historien, er utvllsomt Jer- , rold Schecter. Denne ytterst sym- :patiske, dyktige og meget aktive korrespondent reiste fra Moskva , 1 september ifjor, til tross for at Times kontor da, blo stfiende ubesatt og har stAtt ubesatt siden ???? en tornhet som et. nyhetsinagasin ay Times typo skyr verre enn pesten og ink, ha hatt meget gode grunner for Ai overvele enn 51 akseptere. Det btu. ikke . overraske noen . at . Schecter er blunt dem aom et' kontraktforpliktet tit A, holde munn, en forpliktelso han har ease 4,999/09/02!Velf/PRIDP79-01194A000300100001 -2 mye for a hOre hens kommentar til den britlske Sovjet-eksperten Victor Zorzats teori om at mate- rialet ble overlevert Time av CIA-agenter son utga seg for russere!) Den sterkeste bekreftelse pi at ftiernoarene er autentiske, ligger efter min mening 1 den behand. ling sovietnk Pre,SSO har Cita dem, Bortsett fra edementlets, som ble trykt den 17. november, og bortsett fra enkelte dunkle hentydninger ? tit ememoarer av Mt mulig slags har det vsert born stille. Det er ogsk avslorende at sovjetisk presse ikke har trykt utdrag av de artikler I vestlige, aViser hvor man har sOkt bevise at menioarene skulle vtere et falsknerl. Men mest avslOrende er fOlgez.- de detalj, som' jeg har fra en . sovjetisk bekjent som sitter' slik til at han nik vite det: Tie-fire fordommende avsnitt om memo- arene ble I siste liten tatt ut eV manuskriptet til en artikkel soni. sto I partiorganet Pravda den 17: desember ifjor. Denne artikkel var undertegnet L Aleksanclrov, et psevdonym som biukes under spesielt autoritative erkheringer.' *Aleksandrovss artikler skrives av et kollegiuw ledende medarbeide-? re i Pravda pk partiselcretariatete ordre. Mime artikkel omhandlet ideo- logisk krigforing fra imperialist- enes side, og det Wile ha passet bra med noen betraktninger om Krusjtsjov-memoarene 1 denne sammenheng hvis de hadde vcert. et falbknerl. Min hjenunelsmann hadde bare en kommentar: eMemoarene er ekte, og de vet net. Elers hadde Pravda tatt seg ? av dem den dagen.) ? Minstl like..interessant. er det spekUlere ,1:ok hensikten med memoarene, dersom de ble let nt med'MyndIghetenes viten? de.. Det er en annett lig en' mega lane .4.-k hinkried ' . ' 7g