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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 72
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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,tions of labor discipline" and affixed penalties for such acts. Adn.in-
istration of the law was entrusted to Work Councils established in
every place of work whose'elccLion was based on a "good socialist
attitude toward work."
lit Cuba today, froo unions have disappeared and workers are called
upon to perform "volulltaly" extra-hours labor without compenstl,-
tory pay City workers are oftou transported to Clio countryside for
"voluntary" weokond labor on Cuban farms without remuneration.
CAHTI(0'H POLITICAL AMDITIONS
Sineo i obrull.ry 1050 whom Fidel Castro assumed the role of Premier
of Cho Cuban 1'OVOlUtiollary government, lie llas remained the absolute
governing polvor ill Cub(n:.Ill an address to the nation on March 14,
I1)(11I, (f'ant.ro anlcod: "And what in the good of it I11>,riy where every Citing
revolve around one nlau?" The mall who askod that question Is
Prime Minintor of his government, First SocreLary of the Party,
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, President of the Central
Planning Board and Director of the National Agrarian Reform
Iustituto.2
(:ASTno AND COMMUNISM
In December 1001, Castro announced:
Do I boliovo in Marxism? .1 believe absohiLoly in Marxislnl
Did 1 believe ill it on 1 January (10501? 1 believed on the
1 January. Did I. believe ill it on 20 July [1053-attack on lino
Moneada Barracks]? I boliovod in it on 20 July * * * We
boliovo in Marxism, * * * we believe Chat it is the most,
eorreCL, most, nrientific, the only, true Llloory, the only true
rcvohltiollary t.heoly. Yen, I slate it hero, with C(111ploto
naIinfactioll Rind with full ct)Ilfldellco. T atn 1L' IVlarxist-Leninist ,
and .I Hhall be a Marxist-Loninist until Clio last day;of my
life,"
rr Jomopb (lurk, "Tbna n mks 1k 1 e u lru " 111nn'n ,Jun; Fni,, lu7U, p, 47,
u F1,10 Uunlro, npwww'b o(1)wou,bor4 IBM ti+'oud a I lrmu *nu 1 nt iri Uon $nrviku Dully 1(npur(,'%nun
A,uor{un," 1)u,umnbrr4, 11161, pp. 111111114, ii 1IIll1 16
1
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~ryVI"D^-T TTTT''T flmn =Ly October 1970
' D ATE S W 0 R T H N 0 T I N G
October 2 India Conclusion of Gandhi Centennary
marking Gandhi's birth Oct. 2,
1869. While Gandhi was leading
India's independence movement, he
was the object of Soviet villifica-
tion -- most notably, he is called
a "traitor to the Indian people"
by the Soviet Encyclopedia, 2nd
edition. The new edition of the
Encyclopedia, which is now in
publication, may correct this
outrage. However, the first volume
to appear has already raised a
storm of controversy in India by
showing parts of Indian territory
in China.
October 3 Paris
25th anniversary of World Federation
of Trade Unions founded at end of
WWII to promote international
cooperation, but subverted within
f years by its Communist members
and turned into a Soviet front.
The Soviet aggression in Czechoslovakia
in 1968 caused serious dissensions
within WFTU, about which the present
WFTU leadership is silent.
October 9 Latin in 1967 in Bolivia The Guevara met
America his death in guerrilla warfare which
he was attempting to spread through
Latin America according to Castro's
doctrine of armed revolution.
October 9 - 14 Lima International Seminar on the
Problems and Struggles of Latin
American Peoples sponsored by
the (Communist) World Peace Council.
October 19 Japan Anniversary of the signing in 1956
by USSR and Japan of a protocol
ending their technical state of war,
in lieu of a peace treaty. The
lack of a peace treaty has left
unresolved the disposition of the
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Kurile Islands, which the USSR seized
from Japan in the last days of WW II,,
October 23 Hungary Anniversary of the Hungarian
Revolution in 1956.
October 2L New York United Nations Day and 25th
anniversary of the UN. The
UN celebrations will run 11E - 24
October, with many heads-of-state
expected to speak to the General
Assembly.
October 2L Berlin 20th anniversary of the dedication
in West Berlin City Hall of the
Freedom Bell, given to the people
of West Berlin by Radio Free Europe.
The Bell was accompanied by Freedom
Scrolls signed by more than 16
million Americans. Over 400,000
Berliners, about 100,000 from East
Berlin, were in City Hall Square
to hear General Clay give the
dedication.
October 21+ Santiago The Chilean National Congress meets
to elect the next president of Chile,
choosing between the two candidates
who won the highest pluralities in
the national elections on 1+ September,
Salvadore Allende and Jorge
Alessandri.
October 26 -
November 1+ Budapest 8th General Assembly of the World
Federation of Democratic Youth.
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BACKGROUND USE ONLY
THE COMMUNIST SCENE
October 1970
Albanian Expose Ten Years After the Fact
Ever since Stalin's death, the Soviet leaders from Khrushchev
on have tried to divest themselves of the Stalinist image of arbitrary,
ruthless dictators not only in domestic affairs, but in the leader-
ship of the international Communist movement. Thus, they have
tried to create the impression of a willingness to permit free discussion
of all points of view at international Communist conferences, and a
mutual respect for the independence of all parties. The growing number
of Communist parties and leaders who express points of view diverging
from those of the CPSU has seemed at times to bear witness to a more
relaxed attitude on the part of the Soviets toward dissent. But the
fact is that this dissent is growing precisely because the Soviet
leadership is "stalinistically" incapable of acknowledging the
validity of any point of view except its own and because it has never
ceased trying to force its will on other parties,in the international
movement's private councils.
A revealing reminder of the continuing Soviet practice of dictating
to the international movement was given recently by the Albanian
Workers' Party. About June 1970, the third volume of a history of
the Albanian Workers' Party [Communist] was issued. It contained
the hitherto unpublished speech which Enver Hoxha, then as now First
Secretary of the Albanian Workers' Party, delivered to the all-
important meeting of 81 Communist parties in Moscow in November
1960. (Attached are excerpts from this speech as broadcast in
English by Tirana radio in June and July of this year. It was
also published in the August issue of the Albanian Party journal,
Rruga e Partise.)
The speech represents the Albanian party's official reaction
to the Soviet initiative undertaken at the Rumanian Communist Party
Congress the previous June to bludgeon the world's CP's into condemning
the Chinese Communist Party for the latter's refusal to adopt the
Soviet international line. Hoxha's speech minces no words in describing
the arbitrariness of the Soviet leadership in pushing through its
own line without the slightest regard to the views of their so-
called "equal, fraternal" parties.
In view of the bluntness of' Hoxha's attack, it may be that this
was a watershed in Soviet-Albanian relations. It is hard to imagine
the Soviets' being able to overlook Hoxha's insult, though the open,
no-holds-barred, name-calling polemics did not break out until some
two years later.
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Outside observers of international Communist conferences are
usually obliged to engage in speculation and guess-work on relations
among CP's, and particularly the Soviet attitude, in such conferences.
This they do by careful reading and analysis of the 8#'ficial noncommital
handouts from such conferences,more rarely on the basis of what some
dissenting Communist participating in the conference wishes to reveal
for his own purposes. Here is the rare opportunity of seeing directly
what actually happens, to watch the efforts of the Soviets to
dominate world Communism. It is instructive not only concerning Soviet
attitudes and behavior to the present day, but perhaps equally so
concerning the curious conspiracy by which so many of the free world
CP's kept silent about the bombshell Enver Hoxha dropped ten years ago.
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Excerpts from a Speech by Enver Hoxha, First Sec-cetary of the Albanian
Workers' Party to the Meeting of 81 Communist and Workers Parties in
Moscow, 16 November 1960. Published in The Albanian Workers' Party,
Principal Documents, Volume III, Tirana, Albania, gnnounced V,;ne, 1970.
On the. Condemnation of the Chinese Communist Party
11... on the occasion of the Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party on
24 June 1960, the Bucharest Conference was suddenly organized on the
initiative of the comrades of the leadership of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union without any previous warning, at least as far as our party
was concerned. Instead of exchanging opinions and setting the date for this
conference we are holding today [i.e. 16 November 1960j, which was agreed
upon by the representatives, they took up another topic, namely the
ideological and political accusations directed against the Chinese Communist
Party on the basis of the Soviet information material. On the basis of this
material, entirely unknown up to a few hour' before the meeting of the
conference, the delegations of the fraternal communist and workers' parties
were supposed to pronounce themselves in firor of-the views of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at al time when they
had come to Bucharest for another purpose...
"The fact is that the overriding concern of the Soviet leadership was
to have its accusations against the Chinese Communist Party passed over
quickly and to have the Chinese Communist Party condemned at all costs.
"Our party would have been in full agreement with anlinternational
conference of the communist and workers parties...-arovided that those
conferences were in order, had the approval of :..~ the parties, had a clear
agenda set in advance.... They should be conducted in complete equality
among parties in accordance with communist and internatiomialist spirit and
with lofty norms.
"We think that the Bucharest Confererc :; c.:ici a great disservice to the
cause of the international communist rc,ovenient.... The blame for this falls
on the shou1c1 rs. of the leaders of the Communist Party ofthe Soviet Union....
The -Soviet aim] is to have the Chinese Communist Party ''condemned by the
international communist movement for faults which do not exist and are base-
less .... The whole Albanian Worker~y Party holds the unanimous view that the
Soviet comrades made a grave in Bucharest by unjustly condemning.
the Chinese Communist Party for n,L.ng allegedly deviatedfrom Marxism-
Leninism, for having allegedly violated and abandoned the l97 Moscow
Declaration. They have accused the Chinese Communist Party of being dogmatic,
sectarian, of being an opposer of law, of being opposed to peaceful
coexistence, of wanting a privileged position in the camp and in the inter-
national communist movement, etc....they tried to impose heir incorrect
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views towards the Chinese Communist Party on the other communist and workers'
parties.
"...when the Soviet comrades began their feverish and impermissible
work of inveigling the comr.i.des of our delegation in Bucharest, it became
clear to the Albanian Workers' Party that the Soviet comrades wanted, by
means of groundless arguments and pressures, to lure the Albanian Workers'
Party into the trap they had prepared, to bring it into line with the
distorted views of the Soviet comrades. What was of impgrtance to Khrushchev
-- and Andropov said as much to Comrade Hysni Kapo -- was whether we would
line up with the Soviet side or not.... What was important for the comrades
of the Soviet leadership was not the viwt of a Marxist-Leninist party such
as qu.rs, but only that we would maintain the same' attitude in Bucharest as
the'entral Committee of the Soviet Union.
...now we hear that, excepting the Albanian Workers' Party, the Chinese
Communist Party, the Korean Workers' Party, the Vietnam Workers' Party, the
other parties of the camp had been acquainted with the fact that a conference
wou5,4 be organized in Bucharest to accuse China. If this is so, then it is
very clear that the question becomes very much more serious and assumes the
fort Hof a faction of an international character. Nevertheless, our party
hag-.,not been taken unawares and it did not lack vigilance....
"Some leaders of fraternal parties called us neutralists, some others
reproached us with deviation from the-correct Marxist-Leninist line and these
leaders went so far as to try to discredit us before their own.parties.
Has a party the right to express its opinion freely on matters as it
view1 them?.... We did not accept to pass judgment on the mistakes of the
Chinese Communist Party and even less to condemn the Chinese Communist Party
on the problems raised in such a distorted, hasty and anti-Marxist way against
it. We counseled caution, calm and a comradely spirit in treating this
matter so vital and exceptionally serious for international communism. This
was the whole crime for which stones were thrown at us.... Why did....
Soviet comrades make such great haste to accuse the Chinese Communist party
groundlessly and without facts?.... The Albanian Workers' Party is.of the
opinion that the Bucharest meeting was not only a gross mistake but also a
mistake which was deliberately aggravated.
"...fideological differences between the Communist'Party of the Soviet
Uni in and the Chinese Communist Party J could have been settled in due time
and':.-in a Marxist-Leninist way between: the two parties concerned. According
to the Chinese Document, the Chinese Communist Party says that these differences
of ]i~rinciple cropped up immediately following the 20th Congress of the
Communist Party of'the Soviet Union and were raised by the Chinese comrades....
The Albanian Workers' Party thinks that if these differences could not be
settled between the two parties concerned, a meeting should have been sought
of the communist and workers',. parties at which these matters could be brought
up and discussed, and a stand taken towards them. It isnot right that these
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matters should have been left unsettled, and the blame for this must fall
on the Soviet comrades, who had knowledge of these differences and disregarded
them because they were certain of their line and its inviolability.
"In order to condemn the Chinese Communist Party for imagined insults
and sins, Nikita Khrushchev and the other Soviet leaders were very concerned
to present the case as if the divergences existed between China and the whole
international communist movement. But when it came to problems like those
I've mentioned, judgment on them had been passed by Khrushchev and his
companions alone, thinking that there was no need for them to be discussed
collectively at a meeting of the representatives of all the parties,
altiough these were major international problems in character. The Hungarian
counterrevolution occurred, but matters were hushed up. Why this tactic of
hushing things up when they are not to the advantage of the Soviet comrades
while now, when it is to their advantage the Soviet comrades not only call
meetings like that at.Bucharest but do their utmost to force on others the
view that China is in opposition to the lime of all the communist and workers'
parties of the world? The Soviet comrades made a similar attempt towards us
alo. In August 1960 the Soviet leadership addressed a letter to our party
in=which it proposed that with a view to preventing the spark of divergences
from flaring up, the representatives of our two parties should meet so that
our party would align itself with the Soviet Union against the Chinese
Communist Party and that our two parties present a united front at this
present meeting. Of course, the central committee of. our party refused such
a thing and its official reply described this as an entirely non-Marxist
deed, a factional act directed against a fraternal third party, against the
Communist Party of China. Of course this correct principled stand of our
party was not to the liking of the leadership of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union.
"At the (Bucharest] meeting, the Chinese Communist Party was accused
of many sins. This should have figured in the communique. Why was it not
done? If the accusations were well grounded, why all this hesitation and
why issue a communique which does not respond to the purpose for which the
conference was called? Why was there no reference in it to the great danger
of dogmatism allegedly threatening international communism? C The Bucharest
Conference] was not based on principle, it was a biased one to achieve
certain objectives of which the main one was that of accusing the Chinese
Communist Party of dogmatism, to cover up some grave mistakes of line which
the Soviet leading comrades have allowed themselves to make.
"The Soviet comrades stood in need of the support of the other parties
on this matter. This is why they tried openly to catch them unawares....
The unanimous condemnation of China in Bucharest was reported in an effort
to,create opinion in the parties and among the people in;this direction.
"Immediately following the Bucharest meeting, an unexpected, unprincipled
attack was launched. Brutal intervention and all-round pressure was under-
taken against the Albanian party and its central committee. The attack was
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begun by Khrushchev in Bucharest and was continued by Kozlov in Moscow.
Comrade Kozlov has even,put to us Albanians these alternatives: either
coexistence as he conceives it or an atomic bomb from the imperialists which
will turn Albania into a heap of ashes and leave no Albanian alive. Until
now, no representative of United States imperialism has made such arl atomic
threat against the Albanian people. But here it is and from a member of
t4e Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union....
"But attempts to arouse suspicion about the correct.stand of our party
in Bucharest were not confined to Moscow alone, they were made with even
mor` fervor in Tirana by the employees of the Soviet embassy with the Soviet
ambassador to Tirana himself in the lead.... They began feverishly and
intensively to attack the Marxist-Leninist line of the Albanian Workers'
Parer to split the party, to create panic and confusion in its ranks, to
ali .ate the leadership from the party, and the Soviet ambassador to Tirana
wen so far as to attempt to incite the generals of our army to raise the
peoples' army against the leadership of the Albanian Workers' Party and the
Albanian state....
"It is clear that these contemptible acts of these Soviet comrades were
aimed at splitting the leadership of the Albanian Workers" Party, at alienating
it from the masses and from the party, and this as a punishment for the
alleged crimes we had committed in Bucharest, for having the courage to
express our views freely as we saw fit.
"Our only crime is that in Bucharest we did not agree that a fraternal
communist party like the Chinese Communist Party should be unjustly con-
demred. Our only crime is that we had the courage to oppose openly, at an
inte,'national communist meeting and not in the market place, the unjust
act ion of Nikita Khrushchev. Our only alleged crime is that we are a small
party of a small and poor country, which...should merely applaud and approve
but express no opinion of its own.
"This year Z-1960
_7 our country has suffered many natural calamities
rircluding earthquake, flood and drought, followed by crop failures. J The
people were threatened with starvation.... Our government urgently sought
to buy grain from the Soviet Union, explaining the very critical situation
that we were faced with. This happened after the Bucharest meeting....
Dicing these critical days we got ;rise to many things. Did the Soviet Union,
which sells grain to the whole world, not have 50,000 tons to give the Albanian
people who are loyal brothers of the Soviet people, loyal to Marxism-Leninism
and to the socialist camp, at a time when, through no fault of their own,
they were threatened with starvation? Comrade Khrushchev had once said to
us: 'Do not worry about grain, for all that you consume'in a whole year is
eated by mice in our country." The mice in the Soviet Union might eat, but
the Albanian people could be left to die of starvation until the leaders of
the Albanian Workers' Party submit to the will of the Soviet leaders....
This is terrible, comrades, but it is true.... Nor is it a friendly act not
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to accept our [credit) for buying grain in the Soviet Union but oblige us
to draw on the limited gold reserves from our national bank in order to buy
maize from the Soviet Union for the people's bread.
"They Cthe Soviet leaders) have become swollen-headed over the colossal
successes attained by the'i,.Soviet people and the CommunistParty of the Soviet
Union,...considering themselves infallible, consider every decision, every
act, every word they say and every gesture they make infallible and irrevocable.
Others may err, others may,b,e condemned, while they are above such reproach.
'Our;,decisions are sacred.: They are inviolable. We can make no concession
o, Rio compromise with the Chinese Communist Party,' the leaders of the
Comm ist Party of the Soviet Union said to our people.
'Then why did they call us together in Bucharest? Of course, to vote
with,ur eye blindfolded for the views of the Soviet leaders. Is this the
Marxist way? Is it a normal procedure? Is it permissible for one party to
eng*ge in subversive acts, to cause a split, to overthrow the leadership of
ang er party or of another state? Never!
On the.-Yugoslav Revisionists
J
"The Albanian Workers' Party considers the decisions' taken against Tito's
:renegade group by the Information Bureau Cominform decision in 19+8 to expel
the_T~pague of Yugoolav Communist Partiesjnot as decisions taken by Comrade
Stg,4n personally, but as decisions taken by all the parties that made up the
-Information Bureau, and not only by these parties alone, put also by the
communist and workers' parties which did not take part in! the Information
Bx.re u. Since this was a matter that concerned all the communist and workers'
par .es it also concerned the Albanian Workers' Party which, having received
and studied a copy of the letter Comrades Stalin and Molotov had written to
the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party, endorsed in full both
the letter and the decision of the Information Bureau. 11
"Why then was the change of attitude towards the Yugoslav revisionists
adopted by Comrade Khrushchev and the Central Committee of the Soviet Union
in 1955 not made an issue for consultation in the normal:way with the other
communist and workers parties, that was conceived and carried out so hastily
and in a unilateral way? This was a matter that concerned us all. The
Yugoslav revisionists had either opposed Marxism-Leninism. and the communist
workers parties of the world or they had not. Either they were wrong or we,
not only Stalin, had erred against them. It was not up to Comrade Irushchev
to settle this affair at this own discretion. That is what he did.! And
this Change of attitude in the relations with the Yugoslav revisionists is
coi ected with his visit to Belgrade. This was a bombshell to the Albanian
Wormers' Party which immediately opposed it categorically.
"CWe stressed, that the Yugoslav issue could not 1e settled in a
unilateral way, but that a meeting of the Information Bureau should be called
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This matter should have been settled after a correct and lengthy discussion....
Ana time has confirmed that the Yugoslav issue should not be settled in
this precipitate way. The slogan of overriding interests was lodged. The
second resolution of the Information Bureau was speedily; revoked. The
epoch of reconciliation with the Yugoslav comrades began. The conspirators,
wherever they were, were re-examined and rehabilited, and the Yugoslav
comrades came out unscathed, strutted like peacocks, trumpeted abroad that
their just cause had triumphed, and that criminal Stalin had trumped up all
these things and a situation was created under which whoever refused to take
this course was dubbed as a Stalinist who should be done:away with.
On .ondemnation of Stalin
"Just as it pleased him flairushchevj to say that the decisions of the
20thand 21st Congresses were adopted by all the communist and workers
parties in the same way, he should also be magnanimous and consistent in
passing judgment on Stalin's work so that the communist and workers parties
of the world could adopt it with a clear conscience.
"There cannot be two yardsticks nor two measures of :weight for this
matter. Then why was Comrade Stalin condemned at the 20th Congress without
prior consultation with the other communist and workers parties of the world
and why did many sister parties learn of it only when the imperialist press
pub.ished Comrade Khrushchev's secret report far and'wide? The condemnation
of Comrade Stalin was imposed on the communist and progressive world by
Khrushchev.
"Much has been said about our unity. This is essential and we should
fight to strengthen and temper it but the fact is that on many important
"
issues of principle we have no unity.
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Ili -1-i W-18064GONNIPW October 1970
Mounting Disaffection in the French Communist Party
Ever since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, there have been
rumblings of dissent in the large and conservative French Communist
Party (PCF). Initially condemning the Soviet action in 1968, the
PCF has since been notably unenthusiastic about continuing its
criticism and even less intent on examining the various reasons that
have been suggested for the Soviet overrunning of Czechoslovakia.
Meanwhile, number's of individual French Communists have made inquiries
about the invasion and the subsequent Soviet-directed "normalization"
of Czechoslovakia. Foremost among French Communists who persisted in
seeking the causes of the Soviet crime is Roger Garaudy, long-time
theoretician of PCF, successively deprived of his posts as member of
the Politburo of the Party, of its Central Committee, and finally of
his cell. Since the invasion he has used articles, books, and
personal appearances to point out the degeneracy of the Soviet system
of Communism, passionately arguing that other parties should not be
obliged to follow the Soviet "road to socialism." iis~ plea to
reject the Soviet model in favor of a model appropriate to specific
national conditions with no necessary relation to the Soviet experience,
ultimately led the PCF to purge him from the party. Outside the party,
Garaudy has pursued his crusade. In the attachment, we reproduce
some of his latest appeals to French Communists to seek their own
independent road. Other attachments include views of dedicated, old
time French Communists who now have given voice to long suppressed
doubts over the course their party has been taking.l
The importance of these selections lies in their universal
applicability to Communist movements throughout the world, almost all
of which suffer from the same dilemma: recognition of the alien
nature of Russian Communism, versus the habit of giving uncritical
praise to the "first socialist state in the world" combined with the
necessity of flattering the Soviet Union in order to assure continued
Soviet financial subsidy,
The attached citations are, respectively, from:
a) Roger Garaudy's preface to his publication of the "Varga
Testament," a "samizdat" typescript smuggled out of the
USSR, written by the brilliant but unorthodox (deceased)
Soviet economist Eugen Varga;
b) Charles Tillon's criticism of the PCF leadership in the non-
1. Full translations, as well as the original French text, can
be provided, if desired, along with some of the official PCF reactions.
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Communist magazine Le Nouvel Observateur. Tillon, formerly
a prominent PCF leader who was earlier (in 1952) castigated
and relegated to the sidelines by the party for his violations
of the party line;
c) Laurent Naves' open letter in Le Nouvel Observateur to his
cell leader, recounting his disappointment with Soviet
appointee, Georges Marchais, to the leadership of the
PCF and with the purging of Garaudy and Tillon.
All are eloquent testimonials to disaffection of thinking Communists
in France and elsewhere.
(Attached also is a French analysis of the current status of the
PCF, suggesting that the current dissent, unlike the various "deviations"
erupting in recent years past, is widespread and likely to have far-
reaching consequences.)
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Excerpts from "Why I Do Not Accept Marchais" by Laurent Naves in Le Nouvel
Observateur, 24-30 August 1970.
(Prefatory remarks by the editors of Le Nouvel Observateur 7:
The testimony which we have agreed to publish here is not anonymous.
It was signed by Laurent Naves, a 71-year old retired school teacher, 9 rue
de la Rachoune, in Albi. Furthermore, it would be difficult to assert that
Mr. Naves is anti-Communist. He has been a member of the French. Communist
Party since 1945. The number of his membership card is 92413. In Tarn,
.everyone knows the family of th .s militant. His father, a Socialist shoe-
,maker, was a close friend of Jaures. His son, Robert, left the Lyceum in
>`Albi in order to join the "Fabian Army," and was killed by the Germans.
`Laurent Naves asked us to publish an open'letter, which he addresses to his
long-time comrade, the Secretary of the Communist Federation of Tarn. We
!'will not pass judgment -- it is not up to us to do so -- on the charges
:.expressed at the beginning of this letter against the posture of Mr. Marchais.
But we do respect the sensitivity of this militant.
Once more Communists will speak of "intrigue." Once more we say to.them
that, if they would like to reply, they may do so here, in the same place,
in the same manner. French Communists are doing something that is significant,
and some of them feel they should let us know. If l'Humanite had agreed to
publish the testimony of these militants, we wo ld not have to do so.
"Dear Henry, I believe that I am doing the right thing by expressing
to you the feelings of several comrades at the base, who recently paid me a
visit and who share my strong feeling with respect to the Marchais affair.
That doubtless was not an isolated source of dissatisfaction, but an indica-
tion of deep trouble which is disturbing the whole Party....
"George Marchais agreed to go to Germany during the war as an STO.
Service du Travail Obligatoire - Compulsory Labor ServiceJ. For my part,
.I cannot bear, without anguish as well as rebellion, the idea that a high-
level leader of my Party worked in Hitler's factories, while my son, a
:schoolboy, a member of the Communist Youth, fell in combat, as many others
did, for the liberation of our country....
"While Marchais was not yet a member of the Party, he nevertheless was
French, and, as such, his duty dictated that he go into hiding, as many others
did, from all classes of society -- one out every two, according to estimates.
They did not hesitate, for the most part, to join the maquis, as a matter of
simple patriotic reflex, rather than contribute to the war effort of the enemy.
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"And when I think of the very careful and the very strict procedures
used by the Party when it chooses its cadres, the attention it gives to the
biographies which the militants at the base must scrupulously fill out, in
most minute detail, to attain the most modest posts of responsibility, I
cannot understand how Marchais was able to climb, without any checking, one
by one, the various Party rungs, until he reached the highest-level functions,
unless he concealed this episode in his life -- which would be even more
serious....
"He said that he later escaped. But then the question is: What did he
do in the Resistance upon his return to Paris? His strange silence in this
regard, when he talks, makes one think that he was not a part of the ardent,
patriotic movement which at that time stirred the young people and which led
them, in greater and greater numbers, into'the fight for freedom....
"Charles Tillon, one of the most illustrious personalities of the Party,.
recently referred, during an interview granted a journalist of France-Inter,
to these verses of Aragon, written at the very time when the menace of their
enrollment in the STO weighed heavily on the young French. people:
'Do not go to the enemy;
Do not go, it is felony.
Do not go; take a gun!'
"Well, Marchais went and, after his escape, he did not take a gun. And
yet he was in the prime of life and this at a period when others were falling,
without political considerations -- and some were no more than children....
"I do not intend at this point to overcriticize those who allowed them-
selves to be marched off to the STO at that time, nor those who did not
respond to the call to fight for freedom. Some later joined the Party and
I do not find fault with that. But while certain misjudgments and weaknesses
may be excusable in the case of an obscure militant at the base, they are
not tolerable in the case of a high-level leader, whose past must be an
example of uprightness....
"Georges Marchais, in my opinion, does not meet this requirement....
"If the young people of today, who did not experience these events, can
look on them with a certain detachment, I am certainly convinced, on the
other hand, that our old militants, who have suffered so much, and all those
who have been battered by the sacrifices of the Resistance, cannot accept
them with the same lightness....
"The memory of my son, who fell so young in a maquis group, and also the
thought of all the other martyrs of Hitler's barbarity, who were shot down'
or who died in deportation, no longer make it possible for me to accept without
protest the presence at the head of the Party of a man whose posture, in my
eyes, distorts the pure image that I had of it, of a man whose past does not
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embody heroism or the blood of the Communist Party in the Resistance....
"I had hoped that, after a reasonable lapse of time, Marchais would have
the dignity to resign from his functions, or that he would be invited to do
so by the political bureau. That was not the case at all....
"My initial impulse was to leave the Party. But I flinch before such
an extreme, which would be a veritable wrench for me. And I still hope
that this can be avoided by forthcoming changes in the leadership of the
Party....
"It was not before a long inner debate had taken place that I came to.
decision. In my confused dismay, I sorrowfully sought the step I should
'ake. For several days, I was torn between my attachment to the Party and
the cruel reverberations that this affair aroused deep down within me. First,
expected a categorical denial. L'Humanite, alas, presented me with only
,vague explanations, through which an embarrassed, furtive acknowledgment was
hinted. Facts, as one says, are not to be denied, and it does no good to try
to drown them in useless polemics....
"In the spare time that I have as an inactive person, I thought that I
would be doing a good thing, Henry, to write two letters to you in your
capacity as a federation secretary, one the same day, that this affair broke
out, the other the following day, to tell you of'my anguish. You did not
feel it necessary to answer me -- not even with a short note. Thus I collided
futilely against the leader of my federation and I realize that additional
protests, in any form, would be useless. The relentlessness of the organiza-
tion, at the various echelons of its hierarchy, quickly neutralized any
personal attempt at appraisal....
"And since, on the other hand, I am not so naive as to believe that a
Party organ would be likely to publish this text, I must therefore regretfully
present it through some other means, if I wish to freely make known to my
comrades these few reflections on some serious matters concerning which they
cannot be indifferent....
"A few more words. In my opinion, the best Communists are not those
who docilely accept, in all circumstances, the directives of a higher level
when, according to their conscience, they seem to call for reservations.
Such submission is the result of a system of authoritarian dominance which
completely dries up the source of a spirit of criticism and of initiative.
n fact, the excesses of centralism, depending on the character of a federation
"secretary, for example, permit him to assume a power which he too often has
*6 tendency to abuse. He can cleverly, during conferences when the maintenance
or renewal of.cadres are decided, cause the removal from a leadership post of
a comrade who has ceased to please him and to surround himself with persons
who are at his disposal....
"And one can thus impose, from top to bottom, a subtle and rigorous
mechanism of authority which reduces the militants at the base to the simple
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role of carrying out orders. That also explains the choice of delegates who
assure a surprising uaanimity in our congresses....
"In looking back on the federation headquarters that I frequented every
day for so long, I see that certain comrades fear being 'battered', or being
treated with other ill-sounding epithets, as a result of having expressed
mild criticism. Who knows how many excellent comrades have become suspect
and have been harshly rebuked for taking the liberty, one day, of presenting
a personal point of view which did not agree with such and such an article
in 1'Humanite or with the peremptory statements of a federation ldeader! Faced
-with this state of affairs, some began, little by little, to remain silent,
w hile others, and often some of the best ones, discreetly left on tiptoe --
.never to return....
"The only thing that I reproach myself with now is that, in the long run,
I too easily acquiesced in the harshness of the Party, as well as the rigidity
of its internal operation....
"Instead of currently unleashing against an always latent anti-Communism
explosion in the bourgeoisie, the Party would have done better not to have
furnished a pretext for it. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and
the subsequent normalization had already done us the greatest harm. And
then, through a confused combination of ideas, the stir that was created among
us by the Garaudy affair -- a Garaudy, whose pathetic face on television,
at the time of the last congress, remains impressed on everyone's memory --
and then his exclusion, soon followed by that of Charles Tillon, have left
French opinion with the unfortunate impression of a revival of Stalinist methods
-- that one had thought had been eradicated. I certainly want to believe that
CArturJ London-type trials would not be tolerated by us. And yet, people
are beginning to get this idea. When one goes outside the Party circle,
one perceives, as one mingles with others, their feelings and their reactions
to the brutal exclusion of two men who were among the best known and the most.
respected in the Party. Also, it is useless to conceal to what degree these
events have awakened distrust, and sometimes even a violent disapproval,
among the majority of the democrats in our country, who again are turning
away from the Party, and this at a time when a regrouping of all the forces
of the left is imperative. And then the Marchais affair took place, and
caused concern among the ranks this time, and provided food here and there
for most severe commentaries....
"The Party also is not infallible or irreproachable. It is indeed too
easy to throw onto others the consequences of its own errors or blunders.
First of all, are not those who feed anti-Communism in the leadership itself
of the Party -- a Party which will not again refind its esteem and a greater
audience in French opinion until it finally adapts itself to the democratic,
traditions of our country, in short, when it appears in a new light....
"It is my dearest wish, because the future of Socialism in our country
depends on it. And I hope that the development even of the history that
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we are in the process of living will soon lead the party to this necessary
adaptation....
"I am a Communist -- and I will continue to be one, no matter what
happens -- in heart and thought -- still always firmly attached to all that
molded, even before I reached the age of manhood, the bases of my conscience.
Fraternally,
Laurent Naves "
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Excerpts from the Preface by Roger Garaudy to le Testament de Varga
(The Varga Testament), Paris, Editions Bernard Grasset, 1970.
"Following the excommunication of Yugoslavia in 1948, the Chinese
schism 10-years later, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the
problem of the plurality of socialist forms became the central problem
for the communist and workers' movement. On the international level,
crisis and the dislocation of the movement'would result from the solution
to the problem if the fiction of the single form were maintained, as
well as the decline of the communist party in each'nation, or on the
other hand, if the problem were correctly resolved, this would lead to,
possibility of uniting and rallying all of the'forces of the future
the
around the joint project of a socialist form answering the needs of our
era and the specific conditions in each country. The description of
the Russian model for socialism by the great Soviet economist Varga is
a key document for consideration of this problem, its timeliness and its
development in the near future....
"...[me Varga Testament) is neither a book nor an article, but
a "konspekt," that is to say, a draft for a book, a summary, or theses,
published for the first time in the clandestine mimeographed review
Phoenix, under the authority of Galanskov, who'played a notable role
during the Ginsburg trial in January.1968. The authenticity of this text,
which is widely known in the Soviet Union as the Testament of Varga,
and which was found among the effects of General Grigorenko, has never
been challenged by the Soviet' leaders....
"...The successive incidents which occurred in the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union give us a rather dark picture of it's leaders. If
one is to believe Stalin, almost all of the leading companions of Lenin,
whether it be Trotsky, Bukharin, Kamenev, Zinoviev,~ Piatakov, or the
others, were traitors. If one is to belieye Khruslichev, Stalin himself
and his team, from Beria to Kaganovich and Molotov, were criminals. If
one is to believe his successors, Khrushchev himself was but a puppet.
And adding it all up, what part of the leadership of the Bolshevik Party
in the past 50 years remains valid?
"The problem thus must be reapproached at the'lb ase, at the very point
where` Lenin left it, before the degeneration of the system which,
beginning7with Stalin, led up to Brezhnev.
"One of the most evil aspects of this degeneration' was the confusion,.
which Lenin always expressly avoided, between that'which in the October
Revolution derived from the principles of Marxism (and which has universal
value), and that which is specific in the Russian path to socialism.
"The excommunication and the economic boycott!of Yugoslavia in 1948,?
the Chinese schism which occurred between 1959 and'"1960, and the invasion
of Czechoslovakia, in 1968 marked the stages in the Irejection of Leninism
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and the advance toward a concept of the single form of socialism which
divides the communist and workers' movement and condemns it to isola-
tion and sterility.
"The bases of this perversion were analyzed by those of the communist
parties which were able to break away. from the official dogmas fabricated
in the Soviet Union, that is to say, in the party in which the theoretical
degeneration of the leadership has been the most profound. At the end
of a major public debate in the theoretical review of the Italian Communist
Party, Rinascita, the root of the error was revealed: it involves a
change in the very concept of socialism by Stalin and his successors.
For Marx and Lenin, socialism was not an autonomous economic and social
structure such as slavery, serfdom, capitalism or communism. It was
a transition between capitalism and communism. And if it is a. form of
transition, this implies that one finds therein both the seeds or the
premises of a future system -- communism, and elements from the past --
from a developed or backward capitalist system, or a feudal one. The
differences between the various forms of socialism can thus be very
great, as a function of the economic and social structure of each country.
On the other hand, if socialism were an autonomous economic and social
structure, as Stalin taught, and as Walter Ulbricht said again recently,
there would be no different "models" of socialism but simply variations
on a single system, diversified solely as a function of!political and
cultural traditions, and the situation within which revolution comes
about. There would be only differences in forms or paths based on a
single model.
"The rejection of the plurality of forms of socialism derives thus
from a theoretical distortion of the very definition of;socialism, which
had its origins with Stalin, and which was maintained by his successors
c4ULL 11111 V t. 1. V L b . . .
" ..The recognition of ...diversity alone can, in each country,
liberate the movement from a heavy burden: to pose the; problem of a
single form of socialism, for example, for France, means first of all
making it clear that what is required is not a choice between capitalism
and socialism based on the Soviet model, for some, and 6n the Chinese
model, for others. To do this it is not enough to stress that socialism
in France can be established along other "paths" and may take other
"forms," because it is a matter of a basically different model. This
requires that we study the Soviet model in an objective and not apologetic
fashion, that we analyze, as in the example Varga has set for us, the
earlier social structure which led-to the development of such a form.
This requires that we not keep silent concerning the efforts to export
this model and to impose it upon countries whose social structure is
drastically different and in which the application of this foreign model
leads to catastrophe and to crime, as was the case in Czechoslovakia....
"...Without going back into the problem of the overall concept and
realization of a "French form of socialism" here (see Roger Garaudy,
for a French model of Socialism, Gallimard, 19G8), we eon accept, from
the analysis made by Varga of the bureaucrat,zation and the repressive
form assumed by the Russian model, that in France and in our time none
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of the objective historic conditions which led the USSR to these
distortions and these bureaucratic and repressive perversions exist.
"The debate on the prospects for socialism in France, and also
the joint drafting of a French version and the common struggle to
implement it, can also be liberated from the heavy burden and the con-
fusions engendered by deadly silence concerning the threat to and crime
against socialism represented by the export of an unsuitable model, most
recently to Czechoslovakia, with the fears which this may arouse con-
cerning the future.
"If we are able, unhesitatingly and publicly, to make this objective
an4lysis of the conditions for the formation and deformation of a given
model, and a lucid and merciless criticism of any effort to export it,
thit will only be dishonest people who can extrapolate and direct
cr`icism in advance against French socialism . on the basis of facts
~Qr^owed from a foreign version.
"This drafting of a French model for socialism and of the strategy
neoded to establish it can only be the work of all of those in France
rh truly want socialism: the communists first of all, but not them
a bne, for this party plays so great and. so decisive a role in the French
left, that its problem has become those of the whole country...."
.~ r
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Claude Angeli,. "Charles Tillon Accuses...", Le Nouvel Observateur,
Paris, 20-26 July 1970. (excerpts)
"After 51 years of party membership, Charles Tillon, whose life
story is interwoven with that of the French Communist Party, has been
ousted from that party. Nevertheless, he has not turned anti-communist.
Neither have we. But he is trying to understand, and asking for ex-
planations: he is not the only one who will be interested in hearing
them....
"On 3 July, his 73rd birthday, Charles Tillon learned that his Aix
en Provence cell had voted to oust him. 'By 8 votes for, 4+ votes against,
and one abstention' -- Charles and Raymond Tillon being absent -- the
Provencale rank and file made the decision Paris headquarters had de-
manded it make....
"...Last April, the cell to which Charles Tillon and his wife,
Raymonde, herself a heroic member of the Resistance and a Ravensbruck
deportee, met. They read a letter from 'Comrade Colomb,' secretary of
the Aix section and'registrar of deeds at the local courthouse. In
essence, this is what the letter ordered the members of his cell to do:
'Start proceedings for exclusion, and we shall back you to the hilt.'
One of the charges against Tillon was that'he, along with other communists
and ex-communists, had signed a petition asking that the party condemn
the 'normalization' of Czechoslov%kia. He was accused of joining with
non-communists and ousted communists to found 'Secours Rouge.' Even
more serious, he is charged with raving taken the floor at a Paris
protest meeting against the repression, along with 'leftist' leaders....
"In Saint Malo, where he was vacationing, Charles Tillon remembered:
'They were very careful not to gi?re Raymonde and me our party cards for
1970. I told them:
"'I did not go to prison in 1919 because I had fought against those
who were attacking the infant So,iet Union, only to stand by silently
today while the USSR occupies Cz:choslovakia. And I decided to stand
up against the repression in Fra.;ce because I know, from 7 terms in
prison under the 'villainous law,' of those days, what might be waiting
for us in the future. Maybe I I just ahead of my time? I was ahead
of my time back in June 1940, irBordeaux, when I spoke out against the
,fascism that was taking over in trance with Hitler and Petain, while
the party leadership up in Pari,was asking the Germans for permission
to start publishing Humanite aga.n.' And I insisted again: 'Take
careful note of what I am saying and inform those who. have decided to
open new procedings against me: shall answer no more questions until
the party publicly agrees to reo-.n my 1952 trial.'
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"On 3 June, Tillon joined with Roger :araudy, Maurice Kriegel-
Valrimont, ari4 Jean Pronteau, both of then former party leaders like
himself, in signing a statement entitled We Shall Be Silent No longer.'
Then, in reply to a letter from Daniele B:.altrach, a communist reader
living in Aix,,Tillon wrote us: 'Since y:ur correspondent is also
concerned with what I do as an 'old man' in retirement, I am ready,
after 51 years as a member of the communist party, to render an account
of my public and private life as a militant, hiding notheing of all
that my conscier}ce burdens me with because I was a Stalinist until 1950..
"On 26 Junes Tillon was summoned to another meeting of his cell.
'You hit upon a f.ne day to call me before you,' he said. 'It was
just 51 years age, at this same hour, that I was driven with whips into
a cell after the Guichen mutiny.' And some idiot answered, 'That was
before the Flood!' Then Tillon scornfully raised his voice: 'You
are acting under orders from those who were behind my 1952 trial. You
know nothing about the history of the party, or about the history of
the Resistance!' And Raymonde Tillon added, 'Nor about the history
of the deportations.'....
"The Tillons left the meeting before it ended, and their expulsion
was not voted upon until several days later....
"Tillon knew that this could+not last. He did not speak out with-
out certain knowledge of the reaction of the Political Bureau and of
Georges Marchais, who is 'number one' in the French CP since Waldeck
Rochet's illness. Because Tillon can hardly stand Marchais....
"'He went to work in Germany during the occupation as a laborer
requisitioned by the STO Service du Travail Obligatoire = Compulsory
Labor ServiceJ. A lot of other people did the same; they were neither
refractory nor resisters. When Liberation came, some of them joined
the CP, and there was nothing shocking about that. But what is shocking
is that Marchais hid his past from the party, that he swore he had
been in France throughout the entire occupation period, and that in
spite of this he has become the top leader in the party whose entire
history is stamped with the mark of the Resistance and those who were
shot for their part in it."'
^
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Josette Alia, "The 'Party Secrets,"' Le Nouvel Observateur, 27 July - 2 August
1970, Paris.
The Tillon affair has only just begun and, this time, no taboos will be
respected.
"What with those who have been expelled, who are dissidents, who have
resigned, who have been asked to resign, or who are simply weary, today
there are 800,000 persons in France who used to belong to the Communist
Party and who have left it -- either in the burst of excommunications or on
tiptoe. Nevertheless, this great group of 'former members' had never, up
to now, excited the Communist Party machine or caused the old fortress to
totter....
"It sufficed to christen each internal crisis an 'affair', to focus the
unrest on one or two culprits, to brandish threats of expulsion, to denounce
the 'vile slander' of the enemies of the working lcass... Then, cleansed,
purged, the Party continued along its path, merely leaving some names and
dates along the wayside: he 'Marty-Tillon affair," in 1952, the,'Lecoeur
affair,' in 1954, the 'Casanova-Servin affair,' in 1961, the 'Garaudy affair,'
in 1969, the 'Tillon affair,' in July.1970....
Irritation and Bitternesq
"But this time the multitude is disturbed and there is a strange splitting.
First, one sees Jacques Duclos on television; he is reading a revengeful
official communication: This whole affair is 'a concoction' of anti-Communists
on the outside 'who are quietly plotting against our Party.' This is after
the Garaudy affair. 'Garaudy miscarried; bring out Tillon...' And who
supposedly made this attack? As usual, at one and the same time, those who
have money, the bourgeois 'neo-centrists', and the 'leftists,' who have a
mutual supreme fear: a union of the left. Having denounced 'the maneuver,'
Duclos.utters the anathema, the condemnation of Marty and of Tillon: Tillon,
this renegade, this 'vicious, quarrelsome fellow', will remain,'as in the
case of the others, an isolated opponent. The virulence of Duclos'.remarks
is explained by the preponderant part that he took, in 1952, in the absence
of Maurice Thorez, in the condemnation of Marty and of Tillon. The Party,
Duclos angrily concludes, scoffs at these vile attacks!...
"But, at the same time, the leaders of the Communist Party are greatly
disturbed and react with a vehemence which can be explained only by a real
concern. On television, in the Party press, on radio microphones, Duclos and
Marchais give this 'little affair' very great publicity. Counter-fires are
kindled at all Party echelons, and-emissaries of the Central Committee are
immediately sent to the departments that are susceptible of being 'contaminated.'
An irreverent wind is blowing about even among the staff of 1'Humanite' 'How
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should one counter the campaigns of the bourgeoisie against Comrade Marchais?'
innocently, it seems, asks Laurent Salini. 'We must explain that Comrade
Marchais was a work deportee,' flings back Fajon in an arrogant. tone....
"In the brief silence which follows, no one, of course, points out that
the Communists for years combatted the very idea of 'work deportees.' Every-
one knows that, when things are bad, one must close ranks. Well, things are
serious now. The proof: When he finally appears on television, to give the
official and studied Party reply, Georges Marchais makes some sacrifices in
order to attain his ends. And not concerning trifles, but concerning an
essential point: 'We have said that we disapproved of the Soviet intervention
in Czechoslovakia...I reaffirm this again today.'
"And the normalization that is,taking place there?" asks an ORTF
journalist.
"Steps have been taken which do not please us, steps which we would not
take," replies Georges Marchais.
"To speak out against the Czechoslovak 'normalization,' desired by thie
USSR, when one is Georges Marchais, Deputy Secretary General of the French
Communist Party, is significant; it is serious. Is not this the very thing
that Garaudy desired -- and which he was persistently denied? Well, then,
why yield now? What keeps Marchais in check, Marchais who is visibly irritated
by the personal attacks that have been flung against him, and who nevertheless
restrains himself, moderates his voice, does not gesticulate, instead of
following the line of using the abusive language of the very fiery Duclos?
Does the Tillon affair, coming after so many other apparently more serious
crises, conceal a more real danger?...
"The Communist Party does not yet believe this. Tillon accuses? Well,
so what? They know that once more the good old reflex of Communist defense
will work, that the impact of this opposition is relatively weak 'at the base,'
even if only because the men who now are revolting have been on the sidelines
for a long time. Who are they, these 'Thirty' who have just signed an 'appeal
to the Communists' and who support Tillon? They belong to the 1936-19+7
generation: a good decade, a period of great Communist growth, which
originated in Spain, matured in the Resistance, was frozen by the cold war
and definitively ruined in' the Stalinist debacle. A 'duped generation,'
'writes Annie Kriegel, the product of a great misunderstanding, for a long
time put 'on ice,' but in spite of everything, completely loyal; in short --
a group of former valiant fighters who for years were confined to a discreet
opposition of his Majesty Stalin?J The Communist Party does not believe
that they will provide the decisive attack.... .
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Three elements
"Nevertheless, they are uneasy. Because the Tillon affair brings
together, for the first time perhaps, three elements of a serious crisis:
poor timing, an unfavorable outlook, a man who is perhaps dangerous....
The Timing
"The affair broke too soon., Subsequent to Charles Tillon's reply,
published in Le Nouvel Observateur, 29 June,~to a letter in which he had been
called to account -- a violent reply in which Tillon for the first time
attacked the posture of Georges Marchais during the occupation -- his cell
precipitated his expulsion. The Tillon affair materialized three weeks too
soon: instead of occurring during the slack vacation period, it will now
create a stir. Tillon, an obstinate Breton, overstepped discipline when he
did not wait, as one should, for his expulsion to be approved by the Central
Committee before talking about it on, the outside....
The Unfavorable outlook
"It must be said that, since 1968, internal crises in the Party are no
longer easily digested. For two obvious reasons: first, the May crisis --
which converted a diffuse opposition into a real?opp'osition; then, the
Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and especially Waldeck Rochet's con-
demnation of it, which marked the first official, acknowledged break in
relations between the French Communist Party and Moscow. From this original
sin on, one can no longer say, as before, that there is always, on the one
`hand the correct Moscow line, and, on the other hand, a 'handful of dis-
appointed, ambitious men' who 'play a reactionary game.' Because these men,
from now on, are no longer willing to allow themselves to be condemned without
reacting. The period of 'confessions' is over. They no longer feel guilty.
Suddenly, and for the first time, they are becoming organized....
"Garaudy is very quickly supported by two currents. One,-on the
outside: Well known personalities, like Pronteau, Kriegel-Valrimont, Tillon,
are the first to take the initiative, by publishing a manifesto: 'We no
longer wish to remain silent.' The other current, a clandestine one, is
that of the mysterious group, 'Unir,' (Unite), about which almost no one
knows anything, except that it was formed in 1952 by about ten important
Communists, that it has since remained completely clandestine, within the
Party, and that its objectives are -- roughly -- those of the 'Prague
Spring:' to reform the Party, but from within; to introduce free discussion;
to get rid of the restrictive stays of democratic centralism, 'which may have
been useful, but is now outmoded,' an anonymous militant told me in a discreet
printing establishment where everything seems to have remained frozen since
1942....
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"The underground currents, more than Tillon or Pronteau perhaps, are
causing the Party leaders to be greatly concerned. Because the latter fear
the imminent consequences of an operation which they sense from the begin-
ning and which they want to stop at all costs. They know that, next to the
Tillon affair -- the first wave -- they owe the recent stand of the thirty
well-known militants to 'Unir.' They know above all that a third, far-
reaching wave of protests (it reportedly would group some 400 signers,
including some present members of the Central Committee) is expected next
autumn against the present leadership of the Party, which senses it, is
preparing for it, and fears it....
"Tillon, Garaudy, Pronteau (he too, is in the course of being expelled)
are no longer -- as in 1956, as in 1961 --, intellectual men of good will
lost for a moment within the Communist ranks, who emerge only to :issue some
confidential, innocuous critical studies. Tillon is an old fighter. He is
dove all an 'apparatchik', one of the old hands, who knows the machine well
and knows where to put sand in the gears. In short, one is now dealing with
professionals and no longer with amateurs, and the 'pros' know the blows
that hurt. One became aware of this this week, from the first parries:
through a 'non-resistant' Marchais.-- when the whole subject of relations
between the USSR and the French Resistance-was thus -- for the first time --
publicly, politically set forth. Was this only -a?tiff among school boys or
choir boys...shades of the good old days? Actually, everything connected
with the Resistance now keenly interests young people. And Tillon is directing
his remarks to these young people when he later says 'that, if there is an
extreme left, it is because the Party is no longer fulfilling its role.' So,
we have come full circle from the FTPfFranc Tireur Partisans - World War
II Communist resistance organization to the Maoists, from 1941 to 1970....
"But anyone who knows the Party realizes that there are much more serious
prospects. Garaudy, and especially Tillon, one time the repositories of
formidable secrets: the famous 'Party secrets' dealing with internal purges,
the utilization of Soviet 'referendums' at the time of 'trials,' or, again,
mysterious financial operations which Garaudy attributes to a 'certain Mr.
Jerome.' Are they ready to reveal them? They have not yet, it seems, come
to any decision on that. Because, in fact, it is a serious decision. The
secret --- it is the ability of Communists to close ranks. They want to be
Communists; they are Communists. But secrecy was also what abetted Stalinism
most. And now they want to 'de-Stalinize' the Communist Party. Will they be
able to prove that only truth is revolutionary."
-4-
 Bs
LES "SECRETS DE PARTI"
L'affaire Tilton ne fait que commencer
et, cette fois, aucun tabou ne sera respects
Exclus, dissidents, demis-
sionnaires, demissionnes ou
simplement fatigues, its sont
on France qui ont appartcnu au
parti communists et qui, ensuite, l'ont
quittc -- que cc soit dans l'eclat des
excommunications ou sur la pointe
des pieds. Pourtant, ce grand parti
des c ex > - Ic plus grand parti de
France; do loin - n'avait jamais,
jusqu'a present, emu I'apparcil du
P.C. ni :ebrante la vicillc forteresse.'
II suffisait de baptiser chaque
crise interieure c affairs ,, do cris-
talliser is malaise sur un ou deux
coupables, de brandir les foudres de
1'exclu~ion, .dc dcnoncer les -, basses
calomnies ), des ennemis de la classe
ouvriC:'g... Puis, nettoye, purge, le
Parti poursuivait son chemin en lais-
sant simplement quelques noms et
quclqucs dates sur les rives . du
flcuve : c affairs Marty-Tillon A on
1952, c affaire Lecoeur s on 1954,
c affairs: Casanova-Servin A en 1961,
c affair; Garaudy a on 1969, c af-
faire Tillon c on juillet 1970...
Mais, setts fois, le flot se trouble
et les images, curicusemcnt, se dc-
douhlcnt. D'ahord on voit ii la tele-
vision Jacques Duclos lire '.un
communique vengeur : touts cette
affairs est z manigancec a de l'exte-
ricur par des < anticommunistes qut
complotent en douse contre notre
I'arti - C'cst la suite de l'affaire Ga-
raudy. < Garaudy a eeholle, on res-
sort Tiljon... " Et setts attaque, par
qui est=ells mencc ? Comma d'habi-
tudc, a la fois par les puissances
d'argent, par les . neo-centristes
bourgeois et par les c gauchistes
qui ont on common une craintc su-
prcmci: ]'union do la gauche. Une
fois dcnoncec a la manoeuvre r,
Duclos' jette 1'anathcme : Tillon, cc
renegat cc < mcchant, hargncux,
condamnation do Marty ct do Tillon.
restera eomme les autres un oppo-
sant isoje. La virulence des propos
do Duclos s'explique par la part pre-
pondcrante qu'il a prise, on 1952, en
('absence de Maurice Thorez, It la
condamnation de Marty et do Tillon.
Le Parti, termine fagcusemcnt Du-
clos, se rit do ces basses attaques I
Mais, dans le mCme temps, les
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dirigeants du P.C. s'agitent beaucoup
et reagissent avec une vehemence qui
ne pout s'expliquer que par une
reelle inquietude. A la television,
dans la presse du Parti, aux micros
des radios, Duclos et Marchais don-
nent a cette c petite affairs 3, une
tres grande publicite. A tous les
echelons du Parti, on allume des
contrefeux et des emissaires du Co-
mite central sont envoyes d'urgence
dans les departements susceptibles
d'eetre c contamines 3,. A la redaction
de c l'Humanite P. elle-meme, souffle
un vent d'irreverence. or Que faut-il
faire pour repondre aux campagnes
de la bourgeoisie contre le camarade
Marchais ? > demande, innocemment
semble-t-il, Laurent Salini. w 11 faut
expliquer que le camarade Marchais
a ete un deports du travail n, lance
Fajon d'une voix rogue.
Dans le bref silence qui suit, per-
sonne no relive, bien sur, que, .1es'
communises se sont, pendant des
annees. battus contre la notion meme.
de < deportes du travail n. Tout le
monde Bait qu'aux moments graves
ii faut serrer les rangs... Or le mo-
ment est grave. La preuve : quand
it apparait enfin It la television, pour
donner la reponse officielle et
concertee du Parti, Georges Marchais
jette du lest. Et pas sur des broutil-
les, sur un point essentiel : sc Nous
avons dit quo nous etions en desac-
cord avec ('intervention sovictique
en Tchecoslovaquic-... Je lc rcaffirme
encore aujourd'hui. n
< Et la normalisation qui se de-
route [A-bas? interroge be journa-
liste de I'O.R.T.F.
- Il y a des nlesures qui sont pri-
ses et qui ne nous plain; nt pas, des
mesures que nous no prendrions pas,
nous >, repond Georges Marchais.
Sc prononcer contre la s normali-
sation ' tchequc voulue par
I'U.R.S.S. quand on est Georges
Marchais, secretaire general adjoint
du Parti communiste frangais, c'est
important, c'est grave. N'est-ce pas,
trc's exactcment, ce que demandait
Garaudy et ce qu'on lui a obstine-
ment refuse ? Alors, pourquoi ceder
aujourd'hui ? Qu'est-ce qui retient
Marchais, visiblement irrite par les
attaques personnelles lancees contre
lui,? et qui pourtant se modc're, baisse
le ton, mesure ses gestes au lieu de
suivre sur la voie des injures le tres
CPYRGHT
bouillant Duclos ? L'affaire Tilton,
vcnant apres tant d'autres crises ap-
paremment plus graves, recZlcrait-
elle un danger plus reel 7
Au P.C., on ne le croit pas encore.
Tillon accuse ? Bon, et alors 7 On
sait qu'une fois do plus le bon vieux
reflexe de defense comntuniste
joucra, que l'impact de cette oppo-
sition est relativement faible It la
base s, ne serait-ce quo parce que
les hommes qui aujourd'hui se rcvol-
tent sont depuis longtemps sur ]a
touche. Qui sont-ils, ces c trente s
qui viennent de signer un c appel aA
communistes N. et qui soutiennent
Tillon 7 Its appartiennent It la gene-
ration 1936-1947 : une bonne de-
cennie, un grand cru communists, ne
en Espagne, muri dans la Resistance,
gels par la guerre froide et definitive-
ment gache par le glacis stalinien.
a Generation dupcc ,, ccrit Annie
Kriegel, produit d'un grand malen-
tendu, depuis longtemps on veillcusc,
malgre tout fidele, bref : une amicale
d'anciens et valcureux combattants
cantonnes depuis des annees Bans
une discrete opposition de Sa Ma-
jeste. Ce West pas d'eux, pense-t-on
au P.C., que viendra I'attaquc deci-
sive.
t r~~iv i2It ZI ills
Pourtant, on s'inquiete. Car I'af-
faire Tillon reunit, pour Ia premiere
fois peut-ctre, trois elements de crise
grave : un moment mal choisi, tine
conjoncture defavorable, un homme
pcut-gtre dangereux.
.g b. Le moment. -- L'affaire a de-
marre trop tot. A la suite de la
reponse, publics dans c lc Nouvel
Observatcur ~ du 29 juin, de Charles
Tillon a une Iettre qui l'avait mis on
cause - reponse violente dans la-
quelle Tillon s'en prenait pour la
premiere fois It I'attitude de Georges
Marchais sous l'occupation -, sa
ccllulc prccipite son exclusion. L'af-
faire Tillon est nee trois scmaines
trop tot : au lieu do tomber dans le
creux des vacances, elle fera des
remous 1 Tillon, breton et cabochard,
a manque do discipline on n'attcn-
dant pas, comme it se doit, que son
exclusion soit approuvec par be
Comite central avant d'en parley It
1'extericur...
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 CPYRGHT
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La conjoncture. --- II faut bien
dire que, depuis 1968, dans le
Parti, les crises interieures ne se di-
gercnt
plus aussi aisement. Pour
deux
raisons evidentes
:
d'abord la
crise
de Mai - qui
a
transformz
]'opposition diffuse en unc opposition
reelle. Ensuite ]'intervention sovieti-
que en Tchecoslovaquie et surtout
sa condamnation par Waldeck Ro-
chet, qui a marque la premiere faille
officielle et reconnue dans les rela-
tions entre le P.C.F. et, Moscou. A
partir de ce pbche originel, on no
pout plus dire comme auparavant
qu'il y a toujours d'un cote la ligne
juste de Moscou, de I'autre cote une
< poignce d'hommcs dequs et ambi-
tieux qui < font lc jeu do In reac-
tion n. Car ces hommes, desormais,
ne sont plus disposes a sc laisser
condemner sans reagir. La periode
des . aveux Y, est passee. Its ne se
sentent plus coupahles. Du coup, et
pour la premiere fois, ils s'organisent.
Tres vitc, Garaudy est soutenu par
dcux courants. L'un, extericur : ce
sont les personnalites connues,
comme Pronteau, Kriegel-Valrimont,
Tillon, qui prenncnt une premiere
initiative en publiant un manifesto a
quatre : . Nous ne voulons plus,
nous faire *. L'autre courant, clan-
dcstin, c'est celui du mysterieux
grouper Unir ., dont presque per-
sonne no salt ricn, sinon qu'il a etc
cr66 en 1952 par une dizaine de
communistes importants, qu'il est
reste depuis complCtemcnt clandestin,
intcrieur au Parti, et que'ses objectifs
sont - en gros - ceux du r Prin-
temps de Prague : reformer le
Parti, mais du dedans, y reintroduire
la libre discussion, faire sauter I'ctroit
corset du centralisme democratique
a qui a pu titre utile, mais est main-
tenant dcpasse ?, me dit un anony-
me militant dans une imprimerie
discrete ou tout semble titre reste
figs depuis' 1942...
Ces courants 'soutcrrains, plus qu?~
'Tillon ou Pronteau peut-titre, inquie-
tent fort les dirigeants du Parti. Car
ceux-ci redoutent los suites prochaines
dune operation qu'ils devinent a ses
debuts et qu'ils vculent a tout prix
enrayer. Its savent qu'apres I'affaire
Tillon, premiere vague, . c'est a
a Unir? r qu'ils doivcnt ]a recente
prise de position de trente militants
connus. Its savent surtout qu'une
troisicme vague de protestation, de
grande envergure colic-la (elle devrait
grouper environ 400 signataires dont
quclques membres actucis du Comite
central), est prevue pour l'automne
[,-)chain contre la direction actuelle
u Parti qui la devine, s'y prepare et
a craint.
1 (Les hommes. - Tillon, Ga-
raudy, Pronteau (lui ?aussi en
ours d'exclusion) ne sont plus -
omme en 1956, comme en 1961 ?-
es intellectuels de bonne volonte un
moment egares dans les rangs? du
ommunisme et qui n'en sortent que
pour publier de confidentielles et
noffensives etudes critiques. Tillon,
'est un vicux lutteur.. C'est surtout
in homme de 1'appareil, un t perma-
ent 3,, qui connait bien Ia machine
t salt ou mcttre le sable pour que
rincent les engrenages. Bref, 'on a
ffaire a des professionncls et non
1us a des amateurs, et ces c pro 31
onnaissent les coups qui font mal.
n ]'a senti, cette semaine, des les
remieres passes : a travers Marchais
on resistant, c'est toute la question
es relations entre ?I'U.R.S.S. et la
csistance francaise qui est ainsi our la premiere fois - publique-
ent, politiquement poses. Quere'lle
'ecole, de chapelle, vieilles lunes ?
oire... Tout ce qui touche a la
csistance retrouve en ce moment,
upres des jeunes, un interet aigu. Et
e sont les jeunes que Tillon < vise
orsqu'il declare, dans un dcuxieme
emps, < quo, s'il y a une extreme-
auche, t'cst que lc Parti no joue
lus son role *. Ainsi la boucle est
ouclce, des F.T.P. aux maoistes, de
941 a 1970.
Mais it y a, pour qui connait le
arti, de bien plus graves perspecti-
es. Garaudy, Tillon surtout, ont etc '
in moment d6positaires de redouta-
les secrets : les fameux a secrets
e Parti > - qu'il s'agisse des epu-
ations interieures, do I'uti?lisation de
K referends x sovictiqucs au moment
cs : proces a ou encore des myste-
icuses operations financieres que
araudy attribue a un < certain
M. Jcronte w. Sont-ils prcts a les d16-
oiler ? Its n'ont pas encore, sem-
le-t-il, pris de decision 1a-dessus.
Car, en effet, la decision est grave.
Le~ secret, c'est la solidarite commu-
istc. Or, ils se vculent, ils sont
ommunistos. Mais le secret est aussi
e qui a lc plus aide la stalinisation.
Or ils veulent a destaliniser x lc P.C.
Pourront-its prouver quc seule la ve-
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- 'BACKGROUND USE ONLY October 1970
CAPITALISTS RESCUE SOVIET SOCIALISM
During the past 10 years the Soviets have purchased substantial
amounts of machinery and equipment from Western countries. In the
last three years, for just the automotive and chemical industries alone,
they have spent approximately three quarters of a billion dollars. The
net result, as observed by an Italian Communist who was given a special
tour of advanced Soviet plants during April of this year, is that
Western-made equipment has played a prominent, even indispensable, role
in the industries the Soviets have chosen to modernize. In recent
years the new Soviet automobile plant at Tolyatti has attracted world-
wide attention; currently the Soviets are conducting negotiations in
Western countries for a new truck plant. These projects are discussed
below. Also discussed briefly are some financial aspects which indicate
that the Soviets are using their exports of run-of-the-mill equipment
and machinery to underdeveloped countries as an indirect means of
paying for the technologically advanced products which their own
industry is unable to provide.
In their latest move towards industrial modernization, the Soviets
are now seeking help from West Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands
in the construction of a billion-dollar truck plant. The plant, which
will be located on the Kama River, is to have a yearly production of
150,000 diesel-powered trucks capable of carrying 10 to 20 tons each.
The major foreign firm is Daimler-Benz, from West Germany. The Soviets
have only reached preliminary agreements on "technical cooperation" thus
far; there is no clear indication as to when final contracts will be
signed. The attached newspaper articles provide further details on
the nature of the truck plant project, as well as some analysis of the
political aspects.
The reasons behind the Soviets' decision are not hard to discern.
They need modern trucks, but are short of the kind of technology
required for the design of a modern truck, as well as for the design,
construction, and equipping of an efficient plant. The Soviets undoubtedly
realize that they could by themselves build a plant with a yearly
capacity of 150,000 large trucks; but Soviet experience shows that such
a plant would probably be far more costly, would take considerably
longer to build, and would produce trucks of markedly inferior quality.
The Soviet truck plant at Ulyanovsk, for example, took about 10 years
to build in the postwar period, and its products are still considered
unsatisfactory.
The present status of the Soviet truck industry presents clear
evidence of the kinds of deficiencies the Soviets hope to amend.
In 1968 the Soviets believed they could boost production from their
existing plants to 750,000 trucks in 1970; however, even if the current
1970 plan of 527,300 trucks is fulfilled, production will fall 30 per-
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cent short of the earlier goal. Weil over half" of Soviet truck output
comes from two plants, in Gorky and Moscow, both of which were built
in the 1930's, the one at Gorky with massive assistance from the Ford
Motor Company. These plants are still producing gasoline-powered trucks;
in the other relatively small plants only a small share of production is
of diesel trucks. Whereas the Soviets have relentlessly pursued research
and development on advanced technology in the aircraft and other defense
industries, they have virtually neglected the truck industry. Moreover,
in spite of being the world's largest producer of general-purpose
machine tools, the Soviets are weak in the capability to produce the
reliable, durable automated and specialized machine tools (lathes, grinders
bevel gear machines, etc.) needed in the mass production of precise
parts for automotive equipment. Thus, the Soviets' technological
lag shows up in the truck industry, and demonstrates why the Soviets
must swallow their pride and for economic reasons call on help from
outside their system.
Automobile Plant at Tolyatti
Heretofore the largest single Western-assisted project in the
USSR has been the automobile plant at Tolyatti.1 This plant when
completed, will cost about $1.5 billion, over a third of which will
go for the purchase of Western equipment. It will have an eventual
yearly capacity of 600,000 cars almost identical to the Fiat 124.
Construction was started in 1966 and although it has fallen behind
schedule, under the management and direction of the Italians it has
progressed at a rate significantly more rapid than the usual Soviet
project. The production goal for 1970 has been trimmed to 20,000
cars -- far fewer than initial expectations and down from the year's
plan of 30,000 cars, yet much higher than the Soviets could normally
have hoped for if they had undertaken the project themselves. Through
1970, assembly line production at the Tolyatti Plant, which began in
early September, will be helped by the import of assembled motors
and several thousand complete sets of parts from Italy.
The Tolyatti Plant has undoubtedly been a very advantageous
proposition for the Soviets. In automobile production, to an even
greater extent than in truck production, they were hopelessly
unprepared to enter the modern industrial world. Acknowledging their
gap in technological competence, the Soviets contracted with the
Italians in 1966 for a 'turnkey project under terms similar to those
the Soviets offer to underdeveloped countries.
I. The new name for the city of, Stavropol; named after the deceased
chief of the Italian CP, Paliniro Togliatti.
00030001-9
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Financing of Western Technological Assistance
The Soviets' need for Western equipment was discussed by Luca
Pavolini, editor of the Italian CP's theoretical journal Rinascita,
after his visit to the USSR in April 1970. He remarks on "the very
large numbers of installations and equipment of Western manufacture
I saw in the newest Soviet establishments," and goes on to say that
"there'is no 'scandal' about going,to the West to buy machinery, or
even whole factories. The problem is not 'ideological', but practical:
it is a matter of finance."
Besides selling abroad all they can, including vodka and caviar
to such an extent that there are domestic shortages, the Soviets are
making every effort to minimize the drain of their carefully husbanded
hard currency as they attempt to expand their purchases of Western
technology. They exploit the eagerness of Western firms to compete
for the Soviet market and they take advantage of the willingness of
Western governments to extend dredit at low interest rates and on
favorable terms. Moreover, the Soviets plan to pay for part of their
new truck plant with deliveries of raw materials such as oil, gas
and lumber.
The Soviets appear to have an additional means of financing their
purchases from the West. In their foreign aid program with underdeveloped
countries the Soviets have been shipping mainly machinery and equipment,
little of which has been of sufficient quality to compete in world
markets. (In 1968 the Soviets sold a half billion dollars worth of
machinery and equipment to the underdeveloped countries, or more than
half of the value of the machinery and equipment they imported from
the developed countries.) In return, the Soviets receive either goods
which fill some needs in the USSR, or, eventually, monetary payments
to cover trade deficits. Obviously, whatever the Soviets receive
for their own low-standard products can be used as a means of paying
for the West's high-standard products.
The Soviets appear to have benefited from being treated in a
way like an underdeveloped country. And they have also benefited
indirectly by exploiting their foreign aid program. Yet in time
it may be that Soviet technological development will be retarded as
a result of the infusions of ready-made Western technology into Soviet
industry and the Soviets' continuing illusion that they can sell
mediocre goods to developing countries.
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October 1970
YOU CAN'T TELL THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA CHIEFS WITHOUT A SCORECARD
Six top Soviet propaganda information officials were replaced
between April and September 1970. The Soviet press and radio buried
announcement of these shifts and, predictably, failed to analyze
them in any depth. Foreign commentators have attempted to fill this
vacuum.
One theory is that Soviet information policy (read: propaganda
strategy and tactics) has misfired badly during the past several
years and that Soviet citizens are continuing to doubt the accuracy
and fullness of news reporting. Moreover, dissidents such as Andrey
Sakharov and Petr Grigorenko have focused attention on the suppression
of information and free discussion as a block to progress and justice
in the USSR. The timing of most of these personnel changes, around
April 1970, can be interpreted to mean that the Soviets realized that
the propaganda campaign for Lenin's Centenary had been a colossal
failure: in fact, the saturation of the media with child-level and
thinly varnished. propaganda on Lenin was ridiculed and resented by the
people, and opened many eyes to the fact that mind-manipulation is
the purpose of Soviet media. So, the propaganda chiefs were sacrificed
in order to help their top Soviet leadership save face.
Another possibility for consideration is that the personnel
changes reflect Kremlin infighting. Analysis of the backgrounds
of the new and replaced chiefs shows clearly that supporters of
Trade Union boss Alexander Shelepin lost ground in the continuing
battle for influence among top-drawer Soviet leaders. The probable
gainer is CPSU chief Leonid Brezhnev, who is believed to feel threatened
by the 52-year-old Sholopin;. It's possibre that?.otheruEembers of the
ruling 11-man Politburo, whose average age is about 65, may have joined
Brezhnev in beating back the challenges of the "younger" elements of
the Soviet elite. At the same time, there is a missing piece in this
puzzle: the replacements do not appear to be "Brezhnev men." Thus,
Brezhnev may have been unable to muster the kind of clout necessary
to demonstrate that he is the top man in the Soviet Union.
Several other avenues of speculation were opened up by the recent
naming of Ivan Udaltsov as head of Novosti, the "unofficial" news
agency whose major role is to provide material to foreign media.
Because of Udaltsov's background, it is possible that this appointment
signals a turn towards a hard propaganda line. Another is that the
conspiratorial approach may be returning to fashion.
Ivan Udaltsov was a key figure in Prague before and during'
the invasion of Czechoslovakia. He was regarded as one of the Soviet
Embassy's leading experts on Czechoslovakia having been in that country
on and off during the past 20 years and continuously during the five years
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or so before the invasion. His job was to inform the Soviet ambassador
about the political climate in Czechoslovakia. His Czech associates
were almost exclusively extreme hardliners such as Vilem Novy, Ludvik
Askenazy:, and Milos Jakes, who had little influence in the Dubeek
regime and were opposed to its reforms. The result was that Udaltsov's
information to the Soviet ambassador was hopelessly distorted and
contributed to Moscow's erroneous conclusions that the Czech masses
would welcome the Soviet invasion forces with open arms and that the
Soviets would have no problems in setting up a puppet government.
Udaltsov remained in Czechoslovakia long enough to advise
Soviet occupation authorities on setting up Zpravy,.a Red Army
sponsored newspaper. Zpravy was blatant propaganda favoring the
occupation forces and endorsing the views of the extreme hardline
Czechs.
How Udaltsov's experience will contribute to Novosti is an open
question. Also in question is the whole series of earlier changes in
propaganda positions
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* l ***~~ TT ( TTT,Y
CHANGES IN SOVIET PROPAGANDA APPARATUS
1. Vladimir Stepakov was removed as chief of the Propaganda
Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, according to a
leak of Moscow correspondents on 1 April 1970. His replacement has
not been revealed.
2. Sergey Lapin replaced Nikolay Mesyatsev as Chairman of the
Government's Committee for Radio and TV, according to an official
announcement of 21 April 1970. Mesyatsev's ouster had been mentioned
in the leak of I April.
3. Boris Stukalin, according to a TASS dispatch of 24 July 1970,
replaced Nikolay Mikhaylov as Chairman of the Government's Committee
for Press and Publication. Mikhaylov's ouster had also been mentioned
in the leak of 1 April.
4+. Leonid Zamyatin on 21 April 1970 replaced Sergey Lapin as
Director General of TASS.
5. fury Chernyakov replaced Leonid Zamyatin as press spokesman
for the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
6. Ivan Udaltsov on 10 September replaced Boris Burkov as head
of Novosti, the "unofficial" Soviet news agency.
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r.T,,, TTgi ONLY October 1970
THE TREATY OF MOSCOW
SOVIET ANTI-GERMAN PROPAGANDA: OFF AND ON AGAIN?
The Soviet-West German non-aggression treaty signed in Moscow on
12 August is one of those diplomatic papers whose actual provisions are
less important than the atmosphere they create. In negotiating the
treaty, the Soviets gave West Germany nothing much but a few token
gestures such as reducing the flow of anti-German propaganda with which
Soviet media has been increasingly preoccupied during the past years.
Reportedly Mr. Brezhnev even assured Chancellor Brandt that efforts
would be made to encourage the newspapers to help change people's
attitudes toward West Germans within the Soviet Union. All of this
was designed to foster an atmosphere of detente.
It must have come as quite a jolt to the Russian people, for
years accustomed to hearing the shrill charges of "revanchism" and
"militarism" hurled at, their enemy, to suddenly find on their television
screens heartwarming scenes of those two new pen pals, Chancellor
Willy Brandt and Premier Aleksey Kosygin. While the vast majority of
the Russian people probably took scant notice of Chancellor Brandt's
visit to Moscow, the short treaty-signing ceremony itself was shown
over Soviet television. This viewing has been followed by several
weeks of pro-treaty articles appearing in both the Soviet government
and party press= At this writing, Soviet media are still speaking of
"detente with West Germany,"
Theoretically, the treaty should go far toward eradicating the
bogey of West Germany as the "imperialist threat" out to undo the
Soviet Union and the Communist., order in East Europe. Nevertheless,
there still remains a vituperative hard core of propagandists who
won't risk letting the Russian people stop thinking that "once a
revanchist, always a reven.chist." Despite the favorable treatment
given the Moscow-Bonn accords by the Soviet press, West Germans remain
suspect in the eyes of most ordinary citizens and probably in the eyes
of many official Soviets as well,
A Western correspondent who, in late August, went to a public
lecture at the Soviet Army Park in Moscow reports that the lecturer's
whole point in speaking was to emphasize the continuing menace that
West Germany supposedly represents to Soviet security. In a half-
hour lecture devoted to the "Military Forces of NATO," the speaker
first put his audience in the proper mood by citing facts and
figures about NATO's "aggressive" military forces. He then launched
into an anti-German tirade to establish his point that the "West
German revanchists have always been and will continue to be governed
by anti-Soviet motives." After the lecture, the speaker was surrounded
by members of the audience, obviously agitated over the treaty, and
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one heard the question repeated by several: "Why did we sign?"
Meanwhile, by late August and during early September, packed
movie houses across the country were enjoying the first installments
of two new film series on the KGB in action: "Spy's Mistake" (0shibka
Rezidenta) and "Spy's Fate" (Sud'ba Rezidenta). In one film the KGB
uncovers a spy network being run by the West German Cultural. Attache
in Moscow. Both of the films go out of their way to depict the
Germans as the main imperialist villians unmasked by KGB action. And,
perhaps significantly, the action takes place within the Soviet Union
in the late 1960's.
Neither lecturer nor film producer is going out of his way to
prime the Russian public for an open-arms welcome to be given any
West Germans arriving in the Motherland.
 CPYRGHT NEW YORK TIM
'
Text of Soviet-West German Treaty
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ll
and2 An~exej
Charter of the United.NatUo is agai st anyone, nor will the
corresponds to the most r- have such in the future. Y
dent desires Of the 'natio is
Th y regard the frontiers
and the general interests f of a -the states in Europe
international peace, Coda and in future as- in-
In appreciation of the fat viola le, as they stand on the'
that previously realized day f the signing of this'
agreed measures, particular y. treat , including the Oder
Europe and the 'world, ritor i Integrity 'of all states,
In. the conviction ? t at In rope in their present
peaceful cooperation.betwe n iron ers. ,
states on the fattndation , 'fl ' Thy declare that they]
-the aims and principles-of t e have no territorial demands
n
ties have gagreed, g p r whe no one infringes the;
In the endeavor to c =J pies nt frontiers.
ern. allies:: publ cs are agreed in the rec
Text .6f Treity ogni ion that peace in Eu-
rope can only be maintained
'the hi h contracti
- improved relations and of ,n, afor mentioned aims and
accompanying West Gerrit n'i principles, the Federal Re-
letter to Moscow and of a l pub! of Germany and. the'
..rwte from Bonn to 'the We t-, Uni of Soviet Socialist Re
viet-West German t eOty. n in ' accordance with the
,as printed in two;west,G r- natt nal security.
man .newspapers; of the' o ARTICLE THREE
? . Nations, from the threat of
SDe'Jal to TM :vcw 7fbrt Ttmu force or the use of force in-
BONN, Aug. 1l--FOllowi lions which affect. se-
is a translation of the to s, curly in Europe and Inter-
;relations, have created favo
able conditions for new in
'portant steps for the furth
-development and strengths -+
Ing of their mutual relation ;?
In the ? desire to give e "
pression in contractual fort f
to their determination towar
improvement and expansio
of cooperation between the M
including economic relation '?
?as well as scientific, tee
nir-, 1 rid cultural ties, In th
interest , of . both 'states, .. a
foljows:.
,of Sept. 13, 1955, concern,
the assumption of' diplomat
and
ntier between the Fed-
ARTICLE FOUR
'I'hi treaty between the.'
Feder I Republic of Germany`
and tie Union of Soviet So--
cialis Republics does not af-'
feet lateral and multilateral,
treaties and agreements pre.
vious concluded by them.
Thi
catior
the d
merit,
in..
treaty requires ratifi
and takes effect on'
y of ratification docu=
Done at ... on ... 1970 in'
two originals, one each ? We
the German and Russian lance
guages, whereby the text oil,
each is equally binding. '
ARTICLE ONE.
The Federal Repu6tic' of
Germany and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics re-
gard it as an Important goal,
of their policy to maintain
!.International peace and to'
attain relaxation of tension:"
"...They declare, their endeavor Letter to Gromyi;ti
.to-foster the normalization of, In connection with today's'
the situation in Europe. and Signing of the treaty between
the_ development of? peaceful] the Federal Republic of Ger
`relations between all Euro-f many and the Union of Soviet"
pean states, and proceed; Socialist Republics, the Gov.'
thereby from the existing real. ernment of the Federal Re=
situation in this region. public of Germany is honored
ARTICLE TWO to ascertain that this treaty.
does not stand iii contradic='
The Federal Republic of Lion to the political aim of
'Germany and the Union of the Federal Republic of Ger.
Soviet Socialist Republics will many to work toward a con
be guided in their mutual dition of peace in Europe in
relations,as wbll as to ques- which the German nation at,'
tions of the guaranteeing of twins its unity again in, free'
European and international self-determination.
peace by the aims and prin-
ciples which are laid down Note to Western Powers
in the Charter of the United ; , The Government of the
Nations.
Accordingly, they will solve federal Republic of Germany
their disputes exclusively is honored, in connection
with peaceful means and as- with the impending signature.
sume .the obligation 'to re- of 'a treaty between the red-'
frain, pursuant to Article 2 eral Republic of Germa:iv r
of the Charter of the United
the Union of Soviet Socialist , of the four powers does not
Republics,, to Impart the fol-- have any connection with the
lowing: treaty which the Federal Re-
The Federal Minister of public of Germany and the
Foreign Affairs has elabo- Union of Soviet Socialist Be-
rated in connection with the., publics Intend to conclude
negotiations the standpoint of and will hot be affected by it.
.the Federal Government with The Foreign Minister of the
regard to the rights and re- :Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
sponsibilities of the four. publics has declared in this
powers concerning . Germany. connection;.
as. a whole and Berlin. ? The question 'of the rights
Since a peace treaty re-, of the four powers was not a
mains outstanding, both sides subject of the negotiations
.have concluded therefrom with the Federal Republic of'
.that the intended treaty does Germany. The Soviet Govern.
!not affect the rights and re- ment concluded therefrom
sponsibilities of the. French that this question should not
Republic, , the ? United King-, be discussed.
~dom of Great Britain and The question of the rights
;Northet'n'Ireland, the Union' of the four powers will not
. of Soviet Socialist- :Republics be affected, ? either;. by, the
and the . United States ...of I tredty which the U.SS.It:'.and-
America. the Federal Repul)lic of Ger.;
The..* Federal .. Minister '.:of. many intend to ..'conclude_,
Thl
s is ,.tFle ;position of the
Foreign Affairs has declared
'in this connection: ? .. .' Soviet .Government on this
72ii q tints pf tha rijht$ nuestlnn_
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 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
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NEW YORK TIMES
12 September 1970
FRENCH GET ROLE
ON SUVIET TRUCKS
!Agreement Assigns Renault
a Major Participation in
Big Automotive Complex
By CLYDE H. FARNSWORTH
Salr.al to The New Yank T.m,,
PARIS, Sept. 1 - ran e
and the Soviet Union tod
signed an agreement for Fren h{
participation in construction f'
a truck plant to rank amp g
the world's largest, on the K L-
ma River, a tributary of t e
Volga, in central Russia.
Although a formal contra ft
has yet to be signed, toda s
agreement envisages a maj r
role in development of the
cility for the Renault Company,
the state-owned French a o
and truck manufacturer.
Renault would also help t e
Soviet Union modernize a d
expand existing automob e
production facilities. The val e,
of the two contracts is plac di
at $121G-million - one half o!
two-thirds of this sum got gi
into the truck plant.
Discussions With Germans
The Russians have been c r-
rying on parallel discussio s
with the West German Gcv-
ornment, which is promoti g
the Mercedes Benz Compan 's
efforts to participate in the i-
ant truck complex.
What was expected to be a
rivalry between the French Ad;
German companies is n w
more likely to be a partn r-
ship. The two compan s
announced tonight they will
amine ways of working to e-
ther on the contract.
The Kama River plant, n r
the town of Kazan on the R s-'
sian plains, would turn t
150.000 trucks a year. e
,cost of building the plant His
been estimated at up to , 1
billion. The lob is conside d
too big for one European m
ufacturer to handle alone. -1
Ford Rejected Offer
The Russians hart origina ly'
approached the Ford Mo r
Company with an offer to bu Id.
,the plant. Ford turned t c
nroposition down, reporte. ly
,because of pressure fr m
Washington.
One of the French worries
is that Renault would. he rele-!
gated to the role of a subcon
tractor in a consortium led by
Mercedes Benz. With its high-
ly reputed engineering know-
how, Renault is demanding a
!role as equal partner with the
Germans.
Questioned on this point at
a press conference today. Vlad-
imir Kirillin, Soviet -Deouty
Premier, said diplomatically it
will be the Soviet Union that
is the prime contractor and that
among the companies that par-
ticipate in the project, "Re-
nault will be in the first rank."
Besides the precise French-
German industrial relationship,!
-still to be worked out are the
credit terms in the Renault
contract.
The Russians demand credits
for most of their purchases in
the West because of their short-
age of hard currency.
Normally, the French give
the Russians eight years to pay.
The interest rate in recent
ideals has ranged between 5
and 6 per cent. Exactly what'
Irate within this band is the
subject of present negotiations.
Today's agreement, signed
by Mr. Kirillin and French
Finance Minister Valery Gis-
card d'Estaing, was seen' by
both men as further evidence
of deepening Soviet-French1
economic cooperation.
It comes just a few weeks
before a visit to the Soviets
Union by French President'
Georges Pompidou.
. Lesser Trading Partner
Actually, however, France is
well down the list as a trading
partner with the Soviet Union;
in fifth place after West Ger-
many, Japan, Britain and Italy.'
Last year, France and the
Soviet Union signed an agree-
ment to double their commer-
cial exchanges by 1974.
French sales to the Soviet
,Union quadrupled from 1965
to 1969 but at $264-million last
year they represented less than
?2 per cent of France's total ex-'
ports.
French imports from the.
Soviet Union have grown much
more slowly, giving France a,
$60-million surplus in Soviet,
.trade last year.
Asked at today's news con-'
iference whether last month's;
Soviet-West German treaty on;
renunciation of the use of force
!might have an unfavorable im-
pact on French-Soviet ex-1
changes, Mr. Kirillin said: t,
Policies which tend towards
,bettering and extending our
;relations . with France are
policies thet are permanent
,and will never change."
He added, pointedly, that co
operation with France, how-
iever, did not prevent the Soviet,
Union from "consolidating" its'
relations with other countries:
A French official said later:
The Russians talk to us as if
the Germans don't exist, and
I'm sure they talk to the Ger
mans as if we don't exist."
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CPYRGHT
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
27 August 1970
1 S 0
Soviet
truce comppiex
CPYRGHT
est Germans to Delp with plant
By Harry B. Ellis
Staff correspondent of
Project called huge
The likelihood 1s that the government w'
taken by Daimler-Benz and other West Ger
man supplier firms.
A billion-dollar truck plant centering on
Dain}1er-Benz may be the economic first
fruits of the recently signed Soviet-West
German treaty of cooperation.
The German automotive firm, maker of
Mercedes cars and trucks, for months has
been discussing with Soviet officials con
struction of a giant factory complex in the
Soviet Union.
The projected plant, according to press
reports, would turn out 150,000 heavy trucks
yearly, each with a payload capacity of 10
to 20 tons. The plant would be built on the
Kama River, a major tributary of the Volg&
Ford turned dowxa
Daimler-Benz, according to present think-
ing, would be the focal point of a European
consortium, including Fiat of Italy, Renault
of France, and Daf of Holland.
This is the same project Henry Ford
turned down, following a study trip to the So-
viet Union. Mr. Ford told stockholders the
project was beyond Ford's financial ca-
pacity.
The U.S. Defense Department is known to
.have opposed American participation, on
grounds that the huge truck plant would in-
crease the Soviet Union's military potential.
"It certainly will," declared a knowledg-
able source. "But wasn't it realized in Wash-
ington that the Soviets would get their plant
anyway? The difference is, European firms
now will have the business, not American
companies."
West German Government officials have
confirmed the lively interest of Chancellor
Willy. Brandt's government in the massive
truck project.
in, not only the major European truc_ ~
pliers of parts suppliers.
Economics Minister Karl Schiller
'with certainty discuss this project with hwil
is
Soviet hosts" during the Minister's forth
oming visit to Moscow, a governmen
West German Foreign Minister Waite
cheel and Soviet Foreign Minister Andre
. Gromyko had broached the subject dur
ng their recent political talks in Moscow
eading up to the Soviet-West German treat
igned Aug. 12.
aw materials to be supplied
The Soviet Government, informed source
ay, hopes to pay for this and similar und
er
4
kings partly through the delivery of ram
thers - to Western Europe.
Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin is said
have stressed to Chancellor Brandt the
ilitf th Si U
y oeovetnion to supply a varied
st of raw materials.
A good deal of negotiation lies ahead
Before the Soviet and Western governments,
lean banks have the project ready for
fining.
Even at this stage, however. the things
1. The West Germans continue to move
,rongly to reinforce their trade and tecbni?
2. The Soviet Union is demonstrably
ger for western help - focusing on West
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 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
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Oflf- M OSCOw aims
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
Behind friendship treaty looms risky rivalry
o for gaining---.or holding sway.in East Europe
By Harry D. Ellis
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
"The future shape of Eastern Europe,"
declared a knowledgeable source, "is the
prize for which Moscow and Bonn are con-
tending."
And, ironically, they are doing it through
a friendship treaty. But West Germany and
the Soviet Union each hopes to gain very
different things from that treaty.
Communist economies generally are fal-
tering, with the result that consumer un-
rest ultimately might threaten the Soviet
system of control in Eastern Europe.
An infusion of West German technical aid,
Soviet leaders are thought to: reason, might
help to stabilize the status quo in Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Burgaria. -r
This assessment comes from an official
in close touch with the thinking of Chan.
cellor Willy Brandt's government and aware
of what the Germans have gleaned from
their months of negotiation in Moscow which
led up to the signing of the treaty Aug. 12.
Interpretations differ
f
"In a sense," the source continued, "the
Soviets have elected to control EasternI
Europe through West German elp, and at
the same time to improve -the r own Soviet
economy."
"The Brandt government," the official
said, "looks at it differently. Without giv-
ing technical and economic help to Eastern
Europe, West Germany could have no in-
fluence there at all.
"By working patiently through the Soviets,"
therefore, then with the satellites, the Ger.
mans hope eventually the systems ove'r
there might be loosened up."
The treaty with the Soviets had been
fundamental in this regard, for without it
Moscow would not have given other Com.
munigt governments a go-ahead to work out'
their own relationships with Bonn.
The Brandt leadership, the source went
on, fully understood the danger that West ;
Germany-might end up helping to maintain
the Soviet system of control in Eastern
Europe.
Risk for e s also seen
But the Soviets, too, run a ris'k," the ?i
official, declared. "It was, -after all, West:
erman influence in Czechoslovakia whichI
the Soviets wanted to stamp out through
their 1968 invasion."
Moscow now was courting the same kind
of German influence, extended through
technological help, which the Alexander
Dubcek regime in Prague openly had sought.
The difference over the past two years,
the official' continued, was the urgency of
Communist-bloc economic problems and the
frankness with which the leadership ad-
witted them.
Ordinarily the Soviet 'military hierarchy
might be thought to fear the liberalizing
tendencies inherent in the Bonn-Moscow
treaty.
But in this case, Brandt officials assert,
Soviet military leaders argued in favor of
the treaty "because they wanted peace in
- the West to concentrate on the Chinese-
[Communist] threat."
Berlin and ratification
Already the West Germans and Poles are
discussing trade, aid, and politics, with' the
Hungarians and Czechs expected to follow.
But the Soviet-West German treaty itself
formally comes into force only after its
ratification by both parliaments. Mr. Brandt
demands improvements in the Berlin situa-
tion before asking the Bundestag to ratify
the pact.
Bonn officials express confidence the
Soviets will grant something in Berlin, be-
cause of their eagerness to have the Bonn-
Moscow treaty ratified before next year's
congress of the Soviet Communist Party.
 CPYRGHT
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30 August 1970 CPYRGHT
~nnPcietcj'Sj et C
By Edward Crankshaty
London Observer
ONDON=-The Soviet-German non.
JU aggression pact is not a nine-day
wonder In a vacuum; it is part of a
large movement on the Soviet side. It
is a movement designed, above all, to,
achieve detente with the West without
giving up any of the Soviet gains'
which were won at the cost of the ten
sion the Kremlin now seeks to relieve.
It had become a matter of urgency
In Soviet eyes because of the potential
threat from China and the continuing
weakness of the Soviet-economy. The
movement was under. way when it was
set back by the panic invasion of
Czechoslovakia two years ago.
The Russians were reluctant to in-
vadebecause they dimly perceived the
necessity for some reform In that un-
fortunate country's system if its rich
resources and skills were to be devel-
oped and exploited to Soviet advan
tage. But the reforms went too far too
quickly. For fear of infection, they had
to be stopped.
Today, there is a lot of talk in the
West to the general effect that we al
lowed ourselves to be frightened un-
necessarily by the use of violence In
Czechoslovakia. Two years later, it is.
being said, how silly those fears look.:
Instead of moving.from one aggression
to another, the Russians are cooperat..
ing with America over the Middle East
cease-fire and the SALT conversations,
signing a treaty with Bonn, tolerating,
Romania's gestures of limited independ
ence, allowing Hungary to embark on;
a reform program of her own and re-
fraining from trying and executing :
Czech reform leader Alexander Dub-
cek.
Russia's Chestnuts
j WAS NOT aware that anyone in his
j senses outside the Soviet bloc had
been frightened by the crime in Czecho-
slovakia. We did not feel fear; we felt
disgust. It is not we who should thank
the Kremlin; the Kremlin should thank
us for recognizing a'fait accompli and,
after a very short interval, allowing it to
carry op as though nothing had. hap.
pened. .
From the Soviet point of view. the
pact with Germany is a great achieve-
ment. By securing recognition of the
;.existing- frontiers of Europe - above
all, of course, the Oder-Neisse Line -
and opening up a broad vista of future
,cooperation with German industry, the
Soviet leaders can present themselves
as the liquidators of a German prob-
lem which they deliberately built up
.,until it came to weigh too heavily on
their own actions and on the minds of
their people.
At the same time, nothing is better
calculated to keep the Poles, the
Czechs and the East.Germans on their
best behavior than the uneasy knowl-
' edge that Moscow is talking over their
heads with Bonn on terms of amity.
All this does not preclude a resur-
.rection of the German "revanchist"
scare should, it at any time appear ex-
pedient: It would be easy enough to
`find a pretext for accusing the West
Germans of violating the spirit of the
treaty, if not its letter. And, for good
measure, a Russo-German understand-
ing might, in certain circumstances, be
employed as an instrument for loosen-
ing the cohesion of the Common Mar-
ket and/or putting a heavy strain on
German-American relations.
The foregoing is not an argument
for refusing to come to terms with the
Soviet Union, but we should under-
stand the limitations of those terms.
Our aim must be to neutralize the dan-
ger of atomic war - coexistence, in a
word - while hoping that over the
years a closer association with the Rus-
sians, and the coming of age of a new
generation, will bring the Soviet lead-
ership to. a radical re-examination of
the aims, fears, suspicions and doe-'
trines which are institutionalized in its
oppressive machinery of government.
Soviet aims (the aims of the pres-
ent leadership, that is) are, quite sim-
ply, coexistence while sitting firmly on
pmt gains, and a certain measure of
'desperately necessary economic re
form, ruthlessly controlled. For too
long the Soviet leadership has been
`deadlocked to the point of sterility.
Now, six years after the fall of Khru-
shchev, his successors are beginning to
pick up at the point he had reached in
the autumn of 1964.
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CPYRGHT -
PACT, From Page C1
There were signs that they were be-
ginning to do this three years ago. In-
deed, they never reversed Khru-
shchev's general foreign policy line-
his highly personal overtures to West
Germany excepted. They simply
marked time.
After they had tried to ease, rela-
tions with China and been snubbed,
and after Washington had conceived
the brilliant notion of starting to bomb
North Vietnam while Premier Alexei
Kosygin was actually in Hanoi, they
seem to have found the idea of devel-.
oping a coherent foreign policy too`
,painful to be endured and to have.,,
given up all pretense of having one -
apart from exploiting the opening in
the Middle East, which even a child
could have seen.
It was not until this activity culmi-
nated, much to their surprise and
alarm, in the fiasco of the Six-Day War
that they pulled themselves together
and started to think. The first tenta-
tive moves resulting from this thinking
were roughly interrupted by the
Czechoslovak invasion. And the after-
math of the invasion evidently pro-
duced a renewed conflict of opinion
between those who wanted to turn
their backs on the West and those who
believed it imperative to bring Russia
out into the world.
Because of this conflict, the Commu-
nist Party congress in Moscow sched-
uled for this autumn had to be post-
poned. Before it could take' place,
there had to be high-level agreement
and abroad. The eventsof the last few
weeks indicate that the deadlock has
been resolved, and if things go reason-
ably well, the Soviet leadership will be
able to face the congress next year
with the first, coherent declaration of',
achievement and intent since Khru-
shchev's fall.
As long' as we remember that all
the Soviet leaders started their ca-
reers under Stalin in the Stalinist Man-:,
ner and have owed their advancement
to one or another of Stalin's closest
aides, there should be nothing to wori&
about - apart from the nasty little
fact that the Soviet army, which ad-
vanced into Czechoslovakia "to protect
it from the Germans," shows no signs
of moving out now that the Germans
have promised to honor the frontier.
As far as the Middle East is con-
cerned, the chief Soviet objective is
not Israel but the Persian Gulf and the
freedom of the Indian Ocean. Even if
the Russians do choose to behave in a
19th century way in the nuclear age,
'there is no need for us to follow their
example. Israel has to be protected
and reassured, but this is all that mat-
ters.
As far as Europe is concerned, she
needs Russia just as Russia needs her.
But Europe, the Common Market not-
withstanding, cannot be said to exist
as long as a great part of it is ruled
from Moscow. This is a point to be
made again and again, however pain.
fully, until the day when those Rue
sians (Who are they?) who can see it
,for themselves begin to make their
on the general lines of policy at home T voices heard.
 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
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9
nn
5 nrice
CPYRGHT
Berlin concessions
tied to Soviet 'treaty
By Harry B. Ellis
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Chancellor Willy Brandt appears to have
defined the price he wants the Soviets to
pay in Berlin to gain ratification of their
newly signed treaty with West Germany.
Mr. Brandt insists he will not ask -the
West German Parliament to' ratify the
Moscow-Bonn pact until the Soviets have
Improve the living conditions of isolated
West Berliners.
Klaus Schutz, Lord Mayor of West Berlin,
now has disclosed what improvements Mr.
Brandt appears to have in mind--and what
counterconcessions he would make to the
Soviets.
A satisfactory Berlin settlement Mr.
Schiltz declared, should contain the following
elements:
1. West Berliners must have the same
right as West German citizens to travel to
East Berlin and the (East) German Demo-
cratic Republic. As things now stand, West
Berliners can cross the Berlin wall only in
hardship cases involving ,relatives in East
Germany.
2. Land and water routes from West Ger
many to West Berlin, running across East
German territory, must be free of interfer-
ence.
3. The Soviets and East Germans must
concede that West Berlin belongs to the
monetary, economic, and legal systems of
the Federal Republic and is represented In
foreign relations by Bonn. The official Corn..
munist view is that West Berlin, lying 110
miles inside East Germany, forms an inde-!
pendent political entity, with no links to the,
Federal Republic,
`Federal presence'
In return for such concessions, Mr.'
Schutz argues, Bonn might show willing-
ness to dismantle what he called "demon.;
strative forms of the federal presence" In
West Berlin.
Such demonstrative forms the Mayor
defined as Bundestag ' (parliamentary),
sessions in West Berlin and meetings of
the federal Cabinet there. He also ques.
tioned whether the federal President should-
continue to transact business in West,
Berlin.
The bulk of federal civil servants now'
in West Berlin would remain there, Mr.-!
Schutz stressed, because they administered;
Berlin and Bonn.
The Lord Mayor was speaking for him-'
self, in an interview with the nationallyi
circulated Welt am Sonntag. But a spokes.
man for Mr. Brandt confirmed that the
government had had prior knowledge ofi
Mr. Schutz's'program and that it'coincided}
with that of Bonn.
The above conditions, then, are what Mr.
Brandt apparently expects the Western
ambassadors to exact from the Soviets,
when their ambassadorial meetings resume;
in September.
Powerless to negotiate
Sovereignity in Berlin rests with the Big
Four victor powers-the United States, Brit-A
ain, France, and the Soviet Union. Mr.'
Brandt is powerless to negotiate directly'
with the Soviets on the future of the divided'
city.
So far, in the series of ambassadorial talks
which unfolded during the spring and sum.;
mer, the Soviets showed little readiness to
accede to what Bonn wants. This, however,i
was before the, conclusion of the Soviet. eat'
German political treaty, climaxed by Mr.
Brandt's presence in Moscow, cast relations'
l between Bonn and Moscow in a new light:"
: An utz had outlined confirmed "nothat t out what'
IMr. Sch
step" with improvements the American,'
British, and French Governments would like
P to see transpire in West Berlin.
$ ? The next move Is up to the Soviets, who
seem to set great store by the treaty which
Mr. Brandt and Soviet Premier Alexei N
i4tosygia signed in Moscow Aug.
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CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
W, Yet
29 AUEU t
West Berlin Mayor Is Hopeful ? on Curbs".
.3;)eej.1 to The New York rune. Travel May Be Eased According to the Teegraf,
BERLIN, Aug. .28 - Mayor
said Today that the new,Soviet-
West;,.Gernian . pact '.had. for, the
first "time. in years, created
conditions under, which - im-
provements for West Berlin
"havk moved into the range of
possibility."
He, spoke at a news confer-
ence .called to deal with reports
and 'speculations about possi-
ble East German moves to ease
restrictions on West Berlin.
The Mayor said he had had
rib officfal word from the East
Germans and did not want to
"speculate about rumors." But
his other remarks, indicated the
mportance the city administrar
don and Bonn' attach to the
Reports from East Germany East Germany is piannnn to
l id the-East Germans intended make. an overture next .ues-
mov on the last of Mr. day, Sept. 1, Peace Day in=the
hultz' points ? to ease the' East Bloc.
racit travel restrictions. Un- Diq Welt said .west Berlinere W t Germans or foreign would be given permission tional , West Berliners are
1cross into the eastern hall
it non ally allowed into East Ithe city on day passes.
riin o~
The ayor made it clear that jh'e paper also saw Eno ras[
t vet r striction were not the Germans Intended to restore
o ily pr blem. telephone communications :be-.
"Only when the basis of out tween the two halves of the
e istenc is no longer drawn city, cut off since 1952. Only
i to do bt, when the Soviet a handful of special lines, one
ioq a d her allies no longer of them between Russian head-
d ny,th it West Berlin is part quarters in East Berlin and
f the, a onomic, financial and British Headquarters in the
I al ' s item of the Federal west, are now in operation.
R pubii only then. 'v ill we The next round of fodr?powet
h ve 4a ruly new situation - 'talks on Berlin is scheduled for
n 1 11 tion," he -said. ? 1, ? when the United
Redo of East German Sept. .
pp not s read in Berlin. and tates,: Britain, France and the.
Moscow pact. B nn`by eastern newsmen and Soviet Union elpect to resume
The Mayor listed as major " ntac were r3ubllshed this their, discussion of the future
points free access to West Tier- rning by two West German; of the former German capital
.id, 110 miles within Enst',Ger n wsoap-to, Die Welt of Ham and their own roles in this city.?
;nand, "without unilateral eons b rg,~ a publication of the The talks, which opened in
trots and a lifting of the ban A el . S ringer concern, and March, were :recessed in July
barring West Berliners from stBe tin s Telegraf, closely after six meetings, without W,
entering the eastern half of the a ociat ' with Bonn's Social jangibleiuccess.
city. .., .. .~,..~. r- ,.~.,, ;,.... D macro . The Sppringer . pub..
li htg sd has. been.sharp,y,
ti ! of'; Bonn's Eastern
 WNDUN TIMES
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EUROPE'S HEART
The top government and party limited sovereignty was aimed at
leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries consolidating the Warsaw Pact states.
met in Moscow yesterday for the Consolidation wag again emphasized
first time since December. Ostensibly by the World Communist Conference
the purpose of their visit was to take in Moscow in June last year and by
a fresh look at Europe in the light the series of bilateral treaties which
of the recent treaty between Russia Russia has since signed with noun-
' and west Germany, but the timing tries in cast Europe. Czechoslovakia's
Of the meeting cannot have been turn for such a treaty of friendship
fortuitous. This, they imply, is. the came in May. This document' bn-
:light way in which to spend August shrined the now doctrine. The t ieaty
20-in constructive consideration of laid down officially that it waa`the
Europe's peace and security, rather " joint 'international duty of the
,than in laments over what bapponed? socialist countries" to defend
two years ago. socialist achievements ". As far as
The Russians and their orthodox its relations with the outside world
allies have continually insisted that goes,, including western Europe,
,the invasion of Czechoslovakia must 'Czechoslovakia has been reduced to
be taken as an accomplished fact. It the status of an automaton. This does
should not, they say, be used as a not make any easier the negotiation
matter for discussion by their friends of new and less suspicious relations
or reproach by their enemies. They, between" the states which belong '.to
have much resented suggestions by*,, the Warsaw Pact and those which
the West.that the continued presence belong to Nato.
of Russian troops in Czechoslovakia. In fact the Russian leaders them_
complicates questions of general'-.'. selves are well aware that the occu-
European security and ought, there- ,pation, of Czechoslovakia cannot; be
fore, to come up at any future East- forgotten. They failed to prevent thb
West conference on the subject. No subject's being , raised at the World
doubt a great deal will be made of the ? Communist Conference, and a nuhn-
argument that, if west Germany feels ber of communist parties continue to
Czechoslovakia no obstacle to better deplore it. Each action which M01-
relations with Warsaw Pact countries, cow regards as a further step towards
no other Nato governments have any " normalization " within the country
excuse for tender scruples. is seen outside as an example, of
The argument works both ways. If abnormality. The progressive degra-
Russia has now signed a treaty with dation of Mr. Dubcek is watched
west Germany whereby both sides everywhere with dismay. Arrests of
eschew the use of force and recognize Intellectuals and trade unionists are
the existing borders in Europe as in- deplored.' The possibility that some
,violable, what arc the Russian troops of those involved in the spring of
up to in Czechoslovakia 7 It was 1968 will be tried is still,`with good
always said in the East that they bad reason feared.
to be sent in to forestall. an attack Czechoslovakia is today a pro-
from west Germany. Nobody any- foundly unhappy country. There is
where can pretend there is any risk of an enormous gulf bctwoc govcrn-
i that today. Can it really be, after all, menu and people, and an absolute
that the Russian garrison of Czecho- conflict of ~interests between the
slovakia is purely punitive, to prevent ,people and the Russians. Yet Czech's
the Czechs and Slovaks from expres- `slovakia remains. a test case for E'-
sing themselves politically, intellec- ope. If, as must be hoped, the treaty
tually, economically, or in any other . between Russia 'and west Germai%y
way? is followed up by similar measures
Of course it is. But the continued affecting other ? countries in cast'
Russian pretence that it is not com-, Europe, including Czechoslovakia. a'
plicates the affairs of Europe as a formal detente will ensue. This could
whole. The invasion of Czedto- . have its values. But a true detente, as
alovakia hold up such measures of de- understood by most governments and
tente as the S.A.L.T. talks and the.... peoples in east and west Europe, is
German treaty. It continues to hold. something more than the fossilization'
up the security conference which of frontiers. It involves travel as well
the Russians themselves so ardently as trade; the. exchange of ideas as
desire. It is because of the bad faith - well as a truce to threats. This sort of
over ? Czechoslovakia . that the West'- detente cannot be attaintd so long as,
feels obliged to scrutinize Russia's Czechoslovakia is kept in a mould
words so closely. which her peoples almost unani.
Tha'' "Brezhnev. doctrine" .of mously' reject,
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CPYRGHT
MW YORK TIMES CPYRGHT
30 August 1970
Ulbricht Mixes ` Bullying
BONN-Ever since the reign
of Frederick the rea years
ago,, the rulers of the sandy
Brandenburg' Plain that used to
be called Prussia have preferred
to bully concessions out of neigh-
bors rather. than to negotiate
them. Walter Ulbrlcht, the chief
Main of Prussia's successor state,
Communist East Germany, is no
exception to this rule. Over the
last 25 years he has proved to
be a master of abtrotzen--liter=
ally to spite something out of
an opponent, in the sense of
bullying.
In terms of geopolitics the
.men who ruled from Berlin may
well have felt compelled to
'adopt bullying as a means of
survival, sitting as they did
astride the north-south and east-
west communication lines of
Europe and having virtually no
natural defenses on their fron-
tiers. But Mr. Ulbricht has an-
other strength lacking in most
.bullies. At critical moments he
can be infinitely flexible.
His ability to be both obsti-
nate and flexible undoubtedly
contributes to an explanation
why his German Democratic
Republic has become as secure
and strong as it is today.
There Is no question that Mr.
Ulbricht Is bitterly upset by the
turn. of events in Europe sig-
naled by the treaty of "cooper.
ation" signed Aug. 12 between
{his biggest ally, the Soviet Un-
Ion? and his biggest foe, West
Germany.
His dissatisfactions with the
Moscow treaty are manifold. lie
regards it, as a compact with'
tyhe capitalist enemy at the ex-,.
pense of the Communist, cause.{
'He"sees that it opens the gate
for West German penetration
of East Europe-the gate which
lie personally succeeded in keep-
ing closed all these years-and
creates competition for most of
his foreign trade. Finally, "nor-
malization of relations" be-
tween Bonn and East Bertin+
would subject East Germany to
far more "subversive.", West;
German influence' than at any;
time'since Ile, built thi ]Alta
Wall nine years ago.. ; YL
:With -Flexibility
Mr. Ulbricht showed this dis-'
atisfaction by remaining silent
fore, during and after the
oscow negotiations, by playing
own the event to the allow-'
ble minimum in his party press
nd later by Instructing his
inisterial council to issue a'.
eclaration. Interpreting the trea-
as a call for diplomatic rec-
gnition of his own Government-
y West Germany and the other,'
extern powers. Tass, the offi-'
iai Soviet press agency, rapped
r. Ulbricht's knuckles imme- !
lately by deleting those very i
assages of the ministerial dec-
aration ? which ran counter to
he Bonn-Moscow accord. Shorts'
y thereafter, the Soviet party
paper, Pravda, editorially criti-
cized Mr. Ulbrioht's view , of
Bonn.
The Russians followed up this
almost unprecedented rebuff, to'
their strongest ally by summon.
ing Mr. Ulbricht to Moscow
along with the other European
Communist rulers allied in the
Warsaw Pact to issue a seal of
approval for the Bonn-Moscow
pact In the form of a joint com--
muniqud. Mr. Ulbricht came to
Moscow, characteristically, with.
the largest delegation..
And, Mr. Ulbricht promptly
demonstrated his continued dis-.
satisfaction with' theMosco%4'
treaty and the Warsaw pact;
cornmuniqud on the day of his ?
tetutn, Aug. 22, through an edi-
torial attacking West Germany
I gwas published in the youth
organization paper, Junge Welt
(Young World).
Yet for the moment Mr. Ul
bricht appears to be almost:`
alone in bucking the trend of,
Central European affairs to-'
ward compromise and coopera-
tion. His consistent policies of
keeping West Germany at arm's'
length, of demanding nothing
less than fuliscale diplomatic'
recognition from Bonn, of dem-:
onstrating the strength of his
rand by harassing isolated West'
lin--alt an in peril.
CPYRGHT
Moreover, he seems for the.
.moment to have lost the posi-
tion of primacy in East Europe
and of even setting the tone of,
Soviet policy in Germany which-
'he enjoyed during .and after'
the 1968 Invasion of Czechoslo
vakla.
If the optimists In Bonn and
,Moscow are right, Mr. Ulbricht
i will have to give ground on
' some or all of his policies in the
"coming months. But past prac-
tice shows that 77-year-old
Walter Ulbrlcht will have a last,
word, or perhaps' even -two or,
three last words on t.0 settle-
:'ments now pending for the ac-?
cess. routes and frontiers that:
curl in and around the Plain of
Srao4sn ug and Bonin
`1'.-!-iMV1D SJNDF.R
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CPYRGHT
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
22 August 1970
Long-term agreement expected
onn, Moscow wear trade pact?
By Harry B. Ellis
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Sctence Monitor
did not include West Berlin within the scope
of the pact.
Meanwhile, Moscow negotiated five-year
trade agreements, each to run from 1970
Bon through 1974, with France and Italy. The
west ermany soon may join its major
Common Market partners in having a long
term trade agreement with the Soviet
Union.
Soviet - West German trade has grown
steadily in recent years, though shorn o
the benefits of a formal trade pact, which
the Kremlin refused to' renew after expira=
Lion of the last agreement in 1963.
A primary reason was the sticky problem
of West Berlin, which Moscow insists is a7i
independent political entity. Bonn says the
isolated city is linked economically to the
Successive West German governments
have declined to sign trade agreements, that
)lave one-year. trade pacts with the Soviets,
t be willing to accept a "Berlin clause" to. (Most major non-Communist powers main.,:
t it, tam two embassies in Brussels-one ac?s
i
an Government and tne:
sty not named .+e)g
other to the EEC.
This clause would not name the-city, butt As matters how stand, West Germany!
i
mply needs the approval of the Council of
uld specify that the trade agreement was, s
Ministers of the EEC to negotiate a bilateral
v lid 'within the territory of the D?mark trade treaty with the Soviets, within guide-;
est_'nr Writ German curre
li
-'_-- _
ncy
nes laid
' mania, and other Communist powers, Growing EEC stressed
when they negotiated formal trade agree. West German Foreign Minister Walter
ments with the federal republic. Scheel, during his recent political negotia
The 1961 Soviet-West German trade pact, tions in Moscowstressed to Kremlin lead- )
which ended in 1963, simply said that the ers the need for'- Moscow to recognize the i
pact covered the same territory as an "'reality" of an, integrated and growing",
earlier 1958 agreement. The Soviets claim EEC.
there was no specific inclusion of West Ber- Soviet-West German trade, meanwhile,
lin in the 1958 pact. I jumped 57 percent between 1967 and 1969,
Now the climate has so improved that: due partly to a major pipeline-natural gas i
Vest German Economics Minister Karl, deal.
chiller and Minister for Science and Edu- The Soviets will deliver Siberian natural
ation Hans Leussink will fly to Moscow in gas to West Germany through a pipeline toptember for trade and technical talks. be furnished by German steelmakers..'
Chancellor Willy Brandt's government Lengths, of giant pipe already are being
ould like to get a Soviet -West German ..shipped east under aegis of this deal.
rade agreement tucked away before the In 1969,. West Germany sold to the Soviets
nd of 1972, when Common Market mem goods worth 1.5 billion marks ($410 million),
era , lose the . right to negotiate bilateral: and bought Soviet products worth 1.3 billion r:
rade treaties with third-. eountrles that do' marks (nearly $360 million) in return.
at eta (EEC)the he European Econo{nlc,Com In 1958, when the Common'Market came.
.+ : > ... ,.--~-r i-';:.+ : - ~'.' '? Into being,- the Soviet Union bought only 5
percent of its total imports from' EEC?
`members. Today .that. share has risen to al
most 10-percent M ?.
CPYRGHT
Negotiations scheduled
Beginning in 1973, the Commission of the
European Communities is scheduled to:
negotiate trade treaties with such third!
parties, on behalf of member states of the'
six-nation Common Market.
Once that deadline is past, Moscow would
have to extend formal recognition to the,
EEC in order to negotiate a trade agree-,
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CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
27 August 1970
Soviet truck .
complex with
West Germans to help i Plant
By Harry B. Ellis
A billion-dollar truck plant centering on
Daimler-Benz may be the economic first
fruits of the recently signed Soviet-West,
German treaty of cooperation.
The German automotive firm, maker of
-Mercedes cars and trucks, for months has
been discussing with Soviet' officials con-
struction of a giant factory complex in the
Soviet Union.
The projected plant, according to press
reports, would turn out 150,000 heavy trucks
yearly, each with a payload capacity of 10
to 20 tons. The plant would be built on the
'Kama River, a major tributary of the Volg'$.
Ford turned down
Daimler-Benz, according to present think-
ing, would be the focal point of a European
consortium, including Fiat of Italy, Renault
of France, and Daf of Holland.
This is the same project Henry Ford
turned down, following a study trip to the So.
-viet Union. Mr. Ford told stockholders the
project was beyond Ford's financial ca-
pacity.
The U.S. Defense Department is known to
have opposed American participation, on
grounds that the huge truck plant would in-
crease the Soviet Union's military potential.
"it certainly will," declared a knowledg-
able source. "But wasn't it realized in Wash-
ington that the Soviets would get their plan
'anyway? The difference is, European firm
now will have the business, not America
companies."
West German. Government officials ha
llo
confirmed the lively interest of Chance
...Willy. Brandt's government. In tht massiv
struck project.
Project called huge
The likelihood is that the government will
taken by Daimler-Benz and other West Ger.
.man supplier firms.
e project is so huge that It will draw
anufacturers,but dozens of smaller sup-
iers of parts suppliers.
Economics Minister Karl Schiller will
viet hosts" during the Minister's forth-
West German Foreign Minister Walter.
1 ading up to the Soviet-West German treaty:
w materials to be supplied
The Soviet Government, Informed sources!
kings partly through the delivery of raw
aterials - oil, timber, natural gas, and'
o1ers - to Western Europe.
viet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin is said
a ility of the Soviet Union to supply a varied
lit of raw materials.
good deal of negotiation lies ahead
b1fore the Soviet and Western governments;
an banks have the project ready for,
sifnmg. ,
yen at this stage, however, two thingi
clear:
The West Germans continue to move'.
cad position east of the Iron Curtain.
. The Soviet Union is demonstrably
e rmany -- to modernize Its backward '
ve or a ease P79-01194A000400030001-9
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 CPY49Tved FOc L g st3~?8`J9~1
Refuse to Concede
Defeat in Election
By JOSEPH NOVITSKI
epeetsl to Te New Yobk TrM
SANTIAGd, Chile, Sept. 6-
e conserve v
Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez, the
runner,up in Friday's' presiden-
tial election in Chile, made It
clear today that they did not
accept the Marxist candidate's
top place as final.
A statement made on behalf
of the political parties and in-
dependent organizations that
supported Mr. Alessandri, a
former President running as an
independent, noted that the
process of electing the next
President of Chile had not been
completed.
Dr. Salvador Allende, the
Marxist candidate of a leftist
coalition, won a plurality of
39,338 Votes in the three-candi-
date election, but for direct
election under Chile's Constitu-
tion, a candidate must receive
a majority of the votes. Thus
the Chilean Congress, in a joint
session 'on Oct. 24, will decide
between Dr. Allende and Mr.
Alessandri, the top two can-
didates.
Mr. Allende has at least 80
votes in the 200-member Con-
gress, possibly outnumbering
Mr. Alessandri's votes by al-
most 2 to 1. RadImiro Tomlc
Romero, the candidate of the
ruling Christian Democratic
party, finished a poor third in
the electin and has publicly
congratulated Dr. Allende on
his victory.
The statement today was the,
first by Mr. Alessandri's sup-
porters.since the election. The
statement -- read by Enrique'
Ortuza Escobar, a former Cabi-
net minister under Mr. Ales-
sandri did not comthit the
cnservative parties to any
definite course of action. How-
ever, it indicated that they
would fight In Congress to pre-
vent the election of Dr. Ai-
lende to the six-year presiden-
tial-term beginning Nov. 4.
signed by Mr. Alessandri and
Pad 1' f00 4
ad his approval. It d:
"We' appeal to democratic
forces, to their representatives
!women of Chile, who make up
the iimmnense majority, to unite
to defend the constitutional
right to designate the Presi?
dent of the country. "'
Mr. Ortuza refused, to an-
swer any questions after read-~
ing the statement.
Meanwhile, the residents of
this capital appeared to be ac=
cepting the election results as
normal. In other countries of
Latin America, the outcome
has been Interpreted as the
first time that a Latin elector
rate has voted to exchange a,
capitalist society for a socialist
one,'
At a country club outside
Santiago, well-to-do Chileans
enjoyed their slightly English
version of the good life. On.
downtown streets, smiling,
strolling crowds watched yo
supporters of the losing cands ,
dates pay off election bets.
Country Club Is Calm
Young men and women leapt
Into the shallow, cold waters
of a reflecting pool in the down-
town Plaza Bulnes. A young
man wearing a sign saying "I
supported Alessandri" walked
around several downtown
blocks trailing a long tail made
of a torn sheet with a tin can'
rattling at the end.
By 10 this morning golfers
n a tournament at the Prince
f Wales Country Club in subs
roan Las Condes were start-
ng. their rounds among bloom-
ng fruit trees: Five tennis
urts were full, and families
pith small children were wan-
ering slowly around the
ounds that have the snow-
pped Andes as a backdrop.
One of Mr. - Allende's cam-
gn promises was to expropri-
te the ?'? }~ and turn it Into a
op.tar park. But few of the
hilean members were willing
o comment today on the elec-
ioni results. "We'll wait and
ee," said one.
Young rugby players greeted
ach other jokingly as Com-
ade before a game got under
ay on the club grounds.
'Perhaps they're hoping the,
ongress will elect someone
Ise,' said the referee, after
e'game. 'If the club's going
to be expropriated, they. might'.
as welt- enjoy it while
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THE EVENING STAR -
Was6ington, D. C., Thursday, September 10, 1970
Aiessandri Offers
New Chile, Election
Special to The Star
SANTIAGO -- A new righti t
hands of the Christian Demo.
crats," whose 75-vote bloc in the
200-seat Congress holds the bal-'
Idenc , of Chile to Marxist oat., anc of power.
dor Allende produced cries f
foul play from the left today.
And Allende forces called
mass rally for this weekend
"reaffirm victory and repudia
the maneuvers of the right."
The stop-Allende campaig ,
fighting an uphill battle, entire
a significant phase late yeste -
day when former Presider t
Jorge Alessandri, the runneru
in Friday's election,. announce
that if congress named hi
president over the popular-vo
winner, Allende, he would resi
to set the stage for new ele
tions.
Congress Is scheduled
choose Oct. 24 between the to
two candidates, since no one r
ceived an absolute majority i
the three-way race. On thre
previous occasions when Cot -
gress had to elect the preside
it always picked the man wh
had gotten the highest popula
vote.
Party Holds Balance
A source close to Alessan
said the candidate's statem
"puts the entire ball game In
Allende's Popular Unity coali-
tion has about 80 seats. Alessan-
dri' backers have 45.
e incentive for the Christian
De ocrats, as Alessandri back-
ers see it, is the chance to wir, a
new election, as well as to pre-
vent a Marxist government from
taki g power for the first time
any here in South America.
R domiro Tomic,, the Chris
tian Democrats'candidate,
plac third in the balloting.
Pre 'dent Eduardo Frei could
not arry the Christian Demo-
crat standard because the con-
stit on forbids anyone froml
bein elected twice in succes-
sion :.:S
Frei Might Run
In a new election, however, it;
is p sumed that Frei could run,
sine : `Alessandri would have
served an intervening term,
even if it lasted but a day. Frei
tro ced Allendd' in the 1964
clec on and still is regarded as
the ost popular political figure.
in C ' e.
reformist views of the
Ian Democrats are closer
to nde's than to Alessandri'e,
and . the party's congressmen
have been expected t6 put' Al.
lende in office. -
But Alessandri now has moved
to guarantee that a vote for him
would not put him In power but
would mean new elections. -
Communists Angry If congress elects him he said,
ould pave the way for a new
He would, not be a candidate
mself in such an election "for
The reaction from the left to-
was quick and sharp. Com-
unist party Senator. Volodial
oral suicide" which will end
gically."
The Communist party newspa-
. El Siglo headlined, "Crimi.
I Mummies Seek Civil War."
0 Chile, an Allende organ,:
lied it a "dirty maneuver." ,
e Allende camp began or
nizing a huge weekend rally
a show of popular support.
e political maneuvering Is un-j
ining is expected.
Christian Democrats, who
named a five-man commit-
to . Study the situation and
tt, to ",party's national.
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NEW YORK TILES
16 September 1970
FREI PARTY SEEKS
CHARTER CHANGE
Wants to Assure Democrac
If Allende Takes Office
plurality-but not the majority
required by the Constitution-
in a three-way race in which
the Christian Democratic Can-
didate finished last.
The election is to be decided
by Congress, which has sched-
uled a font session for Oct 24
to choose between Dr. Allende
and the tanner-up, former Pres-
ident Jorge Alessandri Rod-
riguez.
In such run-offs the candi-
. date with the popular pluralit
'
ship took some important steps
in reparation for negotiations
he needs to become President.
Last night the party leader-
give Dr. Salvador Allende, the
Marxist candidate, the support
decide quickly whether It wil
election Sept. 4 after six year
e r s an Democratic par
By JOSEPH NOVITSKI
6peotal to Tim New Took Ttmw
SANTIAGO, Chile Sept. 2
within Chile's democratic
framework or whether his Gov-
%ernment might become a dic-
tatorship of the Wt.
"Our party knows that the
,danger is real," said one mem
ber, who Insisted on remaining
anonymous. The Christian Dem-
Qcratia leadership has given or
,
y
q
has traditionally been chosen) down to his Dry as having de.
by Congress, although the on. livered Chili to the Commun.
stitution does not require this tsts," said a Christian Dem-
ocrat. "If w vote for Alesssan.
To Assure Democracy dri, we'll b blamed for super
The Christian Democrats, ac. porting the right against the
cording to party members, are people, who had freely trying to satisfy themselves on more raps process of social
the question whether Dr. Al- hange."
ders that no member involved
in the party decision can make
his views known publicly.
In an attempt to obtain iron.
clad guarantees that the next
Presidential election, in 1976,
would be a free one, the par-
~,ty leadership was understood
to have approved last night a
at amendments embodying such
guarantees, which might be
adopted before Oct. 24.
Talks Start This Week
ins with -Dr. Al.
lende \ are expected to start
this week nd the results asp
to be sub tted to a Christian;
Democratic party congress;
about the e id of September.
The Chris ian Democrats have
identified the press, the policel
and armed orces, and the edu-i
cational sy tem as three areas)
of national ife that would have'
to remain untouched under
Dr. Allende s coalition govern.
By mean 'o7 a Communist
party depu and sympathetic
journalists nions, the Allende
coalition 'ha already begun tb
put pressur on independent or
opposing r dio stations and
newspapers to recognize the
62-year-old hysician as Presi- .
dent-elect b fore Oct 24. Some
have yielded. Others have re-
fused. ,
"If we vo a for Allende and
his govern nt turns to doo-
trinaire Ma ism
we could
o
Dr. Allend 's coalition, based,
in the Soci ist.and Commun-!
st parties, ntrols 80 of.-the
00 votes in the two houses of
ongress. H needs at least
ome of the votes of the 75
Kristian' De ocratic Senators .
nd Deputi at the joint ses4
Ion of Oct.
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Thursday. Sept. 17,19410 C PYRG HT C PYRG HT
Chile's Powerful Publishing
amily Fighting Marxist
By Lewis H. Dluguid
Washington Post Foreign Service
SANTIAGO-Onp of tho
Chilean institutions most di-
rectly affected by the elec-`
toral victory of Socialist Sal,
?vador Allende is the news`
paper that tried so hard to
defeat him, El Mercurio.
Allende has vowed to see
The daily wrested from the
Edwards f a in i i y that has
wielded it for 143 years, dur-
ing which time the paper has
earned an International rep
utation.
A day after Allende was
placed first in the popular
vote for the presidency, the,l
at morning Mercurio fell to
half the weight that it car-'
tied lightly through years of
battle against the political
left.
It hesitated a couple of
objective editions, then Pub-
lisher Agustin Si Edwards
.III made his decision: "We';
will stay and fight," said a?
spokesman. "We will s t a y,j
until freedom ceases to
Gist."
The program of the Popu- !
lar Unity Front backing'
Marxist Allende says: "Com-
munications media are fun
damental aids in the forma-"
tion of a new culture and a
new man. They must be im-
printed with an educational t
orientation, liberating them
from their commercial char-
beter ... eliminating the sad
presence of monopolies.".
No Chilean could doubt
that the monopoly referred
to is the Edwards chain of
papers, of which Santiago's.;
114ercurio Is the most formi-.
dible.
All major Chilean cities,
have their own Mercurlos;
which take most of their
news and all of their opin-
ion from the capital edition. 1?
'Edwards also owns a major
afternoon paper here..
While the capital endures
about ten dailies, most are
owned or dominated by a
political party or the gov
ernment.
Among this melange o!1
low-circulation sheets, Mer-
curio looks quite disinter-
ested despite its unabashed
plumping of 'a free-enter-r
prise system that somehow,
never caught on. in Chile.
Mercurio, which domt-
',nates the advertising mar-
ket, Is also unique In that it;;
attempts to offer a fairly'
balanced report of news'
from abroad.
Pub ifs her Edwards--
namesake of the British'.
sailor who jumped ship to
take the hand of a fair Chi-
'lean- in Valparaiso in the4
19th century-is immediatei
past president of the Inter='
American Press Association.}
He is a founder of LATIN, a; '
joint effort by major Latin
American newspapers to cre-,
ate an alternative to North
American and European wire
services.
Other Edwards family in
terests are less controversial,'
and often more profitable,
than the newspapers: the
Edwards Bank and the Chi-
lean Consolidated Insurance
Co., specializing in fire and
accident insurance.
The family provides the
management and holds
large percentages of shares
in a brewing monopoly, a
ifoodstuffs complex, several
high-output farms (accord-
ing to the spokesman, one
was lost to the state under
President Eduardo Frei's
agrarian reform-which
'Mercurio bitterly fought).
The Edwardses hold half
the shares in a joint venture
with Lever Bros., that domi-
nates detergent sales.
Various planks of Al.
.lende's platform are aimed;
at state takeover of these in-
terests also. "All of our in-'
;vestments are in Chile," said
the company spokesman.
"We are going to try to
-make them break the law to
take ' us. If we leave with
dignity, we will be able to
come. back"
Sources outside the Ed-
wards organization say he
reinvested his profits so dili-
gently in Chile that a large
portion of his assets are tied
up-reducing his maneuver.
ability and raising the ques-
tion of how long he can.
even meet payrolls in an
economy now drum-tight be-
Cause of the election results.
Chile's political future is
so confused that it is not'
certain even that Allende
will be president, much less
that he will have parliamen-
tary support sufficient;, to
pass legislation taking over
the Edwards holdings.
But assuming Allende
does take power, he proba-
bly will be able to divide his
opposition on this issue. De-
feated Christian Democratic
candidate Radomiro Tomic
hinted that. he, too, would
move against Edwards,
though now the party is
championing press freedom.
And, every businessman ever
betred by Edwards-prob-
ably a majority of the small
entrepreneurial class here
-could find some retribu.
tion in the takeover.
Perhaps the secret of the
Edwards success was his
capital and willingness to in-
vest it. This found expres-
sion in a high quality of em-
ployees.
The Communist newspa.
per El Siglo tried to show
the completeness of Al
lende's victory the night of
Sept. 4 by running a story
about how Mercurio em-
ployees danced on the edi-
torial room fluor.
If somone danced, he was
unaccompanied. Mercurio
wages are low by interna-
F tional standards but atop
the prevailing Santiago
.scale. Top management peo-
ple are well, paid by any
standard. Employees are,
loyal.
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If Mercurio carries ouf
the decision to stay and'
wage a legal fight against
expropriation, it will have as
a model the classic case of
the Buenos Aires La Prensa
in neighboring Argentina.
La Prensa stood off dicta
tor
forced out the owners
When Peron was thrown outj
15 years ago, the paper was!
returned to its owners. '
Sources within Allende's,
front foresee no problem 1nI
Minding a pretext to move,
such as a craft union strike,
."requiring" national inter.
,vention. Then Allende might'
put into effect the plan he
ihas alluded to In speeches, a
.',workers' cooperative to dish`
,place management along the
lines of a takeover recently
jn Peru.
There is already a Chilean'
precedent in a Valparaiso
paper, in receivership, that
iwas reopened by- its work-
'ers.
Should the Mercurio pap-]
ers be taken over by work-,
, ers loyal to Allende, he
rcould move into a near mon
opoly of the press even as'
he would almost surely con
trol all television-one chan?,
nel belongs to the state, an.
s" and the third, the Catholic
;.University station, Is in thej
{
hands of the Christian Dem-
ocratic dissidents who'$
Pumped over, to Allende's'
!;front.
The o n 1 y unaffiliated"
daily of importance outside']
the Mercurio chain is
Clarin, a sensationalist tab-i
f loid with an editor whose,
k professed ideology -Is I
aligned with Fidel Castro's.
J
Clarin shifts loyalties occa-
sionally, but came on so
Agustin Edwards is out
of the country. The com- i
pany says he is abroad to
hold up delivery of the last 4
of the heavy equipment for'
the new plant, and to avoid
efforts to link him with any
possible coup efforts In com
ing days.
` It is to some extent a j
measure of the power of El's
Mercurio that its candidate, 1
Jorge Alessandri, 72 and)
Without effective political;
sacking, came within less
than 2 percentage points old
peating Allende. While Mer? e
;purlo has carried out cam-
Paigns before in its news]
eolumns, there is no prece-~
pent for this perhaps final
ffort.
"We gambled and we
ost," said the spokesman.
The Edwardses were mod
ernizing' 'capitalists in the{
orth American mold, but,
!Chile is a long way from the'
'United States and quite
afferent economy.
If Mercurio disappears
the country will have lost an,
Imperfect voice that mays
prove difficult to replace.,4
Communist-led students will
have lost a favorite, target o5
their frustrations. The cliff
,max of most rallies was e
march on the U.S. consulate,
by the park, or on El Mercu-E
rio downtown--a wait at the
;Corner for the green light
and then shouting and up.,
l'oar, Into the dignified mar-1
bled foyer of the newspaper
any hated, and most ever.
ne read.
immediate future Is proba4
-ly assured.,,_."
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030`t FIGHT
NEW YORK TIMES
7 September 1970
Chile's Leading Marxist!
SANTIAGO. Chile, Sept. 6 r
--As a medical student 40
years ago, Salvador 'Allende
discovered in Marxist-Lenin-
' St criticism of capitalist so-!
'clety a revolutionary
ponse to the social and eco-1
,omic ills of Chile.
Dr.~ Allende, who won a i
:tplurallty in Chile's presiden-
tial: election Fri-
Man day, at the age
in the of 62 still calls
himself a' Marx-
New'i ist, but :he is
quite a different
type, of revolutionary from
Fidel Castro or He Chi Minh.
He is an ambitim~anbut he'
times angry does not believe in violence.
.His long political career,
from student activist to the
-threshold of Chile's presi-'
dency. hay , been ' within'
Chiles democratic parliamen-,
At-
'There are many Latin'
Americans who do not be-
lieve that the electoral.proc-
,:ess of bourgeois democracy,
,can produce good govern'rent," he said before last i
week's election. "They would.
.favor power achieved only by.
,a revolution of the'masses, by
the armed struggle. A victory
by the electoral route will be
difficult for us, but it is the
.best way by far for Chile."
Dr. Allende has a reputa-
tion of being tolerant of the
political views of others.
You can disagree with Al-
lende,and still be his friend,".
said a Christian Democrat re-
cently.
However, Or. Allende heads
a leftist coalition that has as`;
its core the strong Chilean
Communist party. He has
proposed an "anti-imperial-
gramhat would dissolve the
present Congress, nationalize,
it at major foreign companies,.
and develop, close ties be-
tween Chile and Communist
Vietnram, ,phiniticlud andgCub -
Salvador Allende
By JUAN de ONIS
Attacks Power of Wealth.
By nationalizing the rbank-
ing system and carryi g out
a drastic agrarian reform,
also called for In his pro-
gram, Dr. Allende would des-
troy the 0itical and eco-
nomic power of Chile's few
wealthy families, vd11c1 has
been a constant In his
long pol'
In this, Dr. lAllende reflects
a deep political
of the middle :class . leftists
against the Ifew rich families
that form the only private
economic ppparer roU1' I t thiis
C'MOR Fire Waefa is a'
ready controls most basic en-
terprise, including oil, rail-
roads, steel and power.
This next government will
open the door to the estab-'
lishment nr socialism In, Chile," said Dr. Allende last
week. According to the codli
tion program, Chile's funda-,
mental problems of poverty,,'
housing, and hunger, are the
result of the privileges of "al
bourgeoise structurally de-1
pendent on forei n capital.",
The new' government wily
end this "domination'" and,
begin "the construction of.
socialism,"-he said.
"We recognize that social- C
Ism cannot be achieved over-,
.night," he said. "You cannot;
bring about socialism by de-`
cree. It is a lengthy social,
process, and -each country'
.must find its own way. r
He .said that a, socialist
'Chile would not be modeled.
after Cuba or any other na-,
tion. ""Chile is different," he
said. "For one thing, we are'i
much better off industrially,
than Cuba was at the start,
of her revolution. We don't
.have to import shoes or all
the other things that: Cuba,,
lacked so completely."
Rejects One-Party System ;
One of the key steps in Dr.
'Allende's program Js the re-
placement of the present
constitutional systerN which
places legislative power in
A9lyo houses--a Senate. and.
._.,'.;mbcr of Deputies---biy an
"assembly, of the pcnple,' an
elected body that would se-
lect new judges for the su-
preme court.
When asked at a news
conference yesterday if the
left-wing coalition he headed
planned to establish a one-
party system, Dr. Allende re-
plied: "never!" Dr. Allende, a,
Socialist Senator, has the
support of the Communist
and Radical parties.
In his campaign he sought
,to assure voters that his gov-'
ernment would' be hard on
foreign imperialists byt gentlb
and cautious In bringing
about changes.in the texture
of Chilean life, always with-
,the agreement of the people
and their elected representa-
tives.
But some critic doubt that
his Government would be
gentle.
"Allende is not himself a
.Communist; but the strongest
single group behind his candi
dacy is the Communist
:party," one said. "lie will
seem to be gentle, but it will
be the iron fist in the velvet
glove. If he is elected it will
ust be a matter of time be-
ore most of Latin America
becomes Marxist."
Headed Health Ministry
i4a entered politics as
medical student at the Uni-
versity of Chile during th
dictatorship of Gen. Carlo
Ibanez, who ruled from 192 .
td lgal, kENN(int activities landed Mr. Allend
In jail, but he also w
elected vice president of th
student federation the yea
he received his medical d
peg in 1932.
A year later, Dr. Allend
and a group of other forme
student leaders and Marxis
intellectuals founded th
Chilean Socialist party. H
was elected a national de
uty In 1937, 'after havin
practiced medicine for a fe
years in provincial cities.
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1939, he became Minister of
Health in the "popular front"Government of President-
Pedro Aguirre Cerda.
A major equake that
Year tested Dr.AAlle de's ad.
ministratlve abilities. His di-.
rection of relief efforts In the
disaster, in which 20,000 per..,
Sons (fied, earned him a'
national reputation.
Shortly. afterward, he pub-
Ilshe,d "Socio-Medical. Prdb?,
lems of Chile," a book that+~
attacked Chile's capitalist so-".
:tial structure as a cause of:
nutritional and other gl. ,
,nesseg ~meng the poor.
In 1939, tied ortensa Mr.
a stet s