Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
November 11, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 5, 1998
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 1, 1970
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9.pdf4.59 MB
25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 ,tions of labor discipline" and affixed penalties for such acts. istration of the law was entrusted to Work Councils established in every place of work whose'elccLion was based on a "good socialist attitude toward work." lit Cuba today, froo unions have disappeared and workers are called upon to perform "volulltaly" extra-hours labor without compenstl,- tory pay City workers are oftou transported to Clio countryside for "voluntary" weokond labor on Cuban farms without remuneration. CAHTI(0'H POLITICAL AMDITIONS Sineo i obrull.ry 1050 whom Fidel Castro assumed the role of Premier of Cho Cuban 1'OVOlUtiollary government, lie llas remained the absolute governing polvor ill Cub(n:.Ill an address to the nation on March 14, I1)(11I, (f' anlcod: "And what in the good of it I11>,riy where every Citing revolve around one nlau?" The mall who askod that question Is Prime Minintor of his government, First SocreLary of the Party, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, President of the Central Planning Board and Director of the National Agrarian Reform Iustituto.2 (:ASTno AND COMMUNISM In December 1001, Castro announced: Do I boliovo in Marxism? .1 believe absohiLoly in Marxislnl Did 1 believe ill it on 1 January (10501? 1 believed on the 1 January. Did I. believe ill it on 20 July [1053-attack on lino Moneada Barracks]? I boliovod in it on 20 July * * * We boliovo in Marxism, * * * we believe Chat it is the most, eorreCL, most, nrientific, the only, true Llloory, the only true rcvohltiollary t.heoly. Yen, I slate it hero, with C(111ploto naIinfactioll Rind with full ct)Ilfldellco. T atn 1L' IVlarxist-Leninist , and .I Hhall be a Marxist-Loninist until Clio last day;of my life," rr Jomopb (lurk, "Tbna n mks 1k 1 e u lru " 111nn'n ,Jun; Fni,, lu7U, p, 47, u F1,10 Uunlro, npwww'b o(1)wou,bor4 IBM ti+'oud a I lrmu *nu 1 nt iri Uon $nrviku Dully 1(npur(,'%nun A,uor{un," 1)u,umnbrr4, 11161, pp. 111111114, ii 1IIll1 16 1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 ~ryVI"D^-T TTTT''T flmn =Ly October 1970 ' D ATE S W 0 R T H N 0 T I N G October 2 India Conclusion of Gandhi Centennary marking Gandhi's birth Oct. 2, 1869. While Gandhi was leading India's independence movement, he was the object of Soviet villifica- tion -- most notably, he is called a "traitor to the Indian people" by the Soviet Encyclopedia, 2nd edition. The new edition of the Encyclopedia, which is now in publication, may correct this outrage. However, the first volume to appear has already raised a storm of controversy in India by showing parts of Indian territory in China. October 3 Paris 25th anniversary of World Federation of Trade Unions founded at end of WWII to promote international cooperation, but subverted within f years by its Communist members and turned into a Soviet front. The Soviet aggression in Czechoslovakia in 1968 caused serious dissensions within WFTU, about which the present WFTU leadership is silent. October 9 Latin in 1967 in Bolivia The Guevara met America his death in guerrilla warfare which he was attempting to spread through Latin America according to Castro's doctrine of armed revolution. October 9 - 14 Lima International Seminar on the Problems and Struggles of Latin American Peoples sponsored by the (Communist) World Peace Council. October 19 Japan Anniversary of the signing in 1956 by USSR and Japan of a protocol ending their technical state of war, in lieu of a peace treaty. The lack of a peace treaty has left unresolved the disposition of the Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Kurile Islands, which the USSR seized from Japan in the last days of WW II,, October 23 Hungary Anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956. October 2L New York United Nations Day and 25th anniversary of the UN. The UN celebrations will run 11E - 24 October, with many heads-of-state expected to speak to the General Assembly. October 2L Berlin 20th anniversary of the dedication in West Berlin City Hall of the Freedom Bell, given to the people of West Berlin by Radio Free Europe. The Bell was accompanied by Freedom Scrolls signed by more than 16 million Americans. Over 400,000 Berliners, about 100,000 from East Berlin, were in City Hall Square to hear General Clay give the dedication. October 21+ Santiago The Chilean National Congress meets to elect the next president of Chile, choosing between the two candidates who won the highest pluralities in the national elections on 1+ September, Salvadore Allende and Jorge Alessandri. October 26 - November 1+ Budapest 8th General Assembly of the World Federation of Democratic Youth. pprovea i-or Keiease 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 BACKGROUND USE ONLY THE COMMUNIST SCENE October 1970 Albanian Expose Ten Years After the Fact Ever since Stalin's death, the Soviet leaders from Khrushchev on have tried to divest themselves of the Stalinist image of arbitrary, ruthless dictators not only in domestic affairs, but in the leader- ship of the international Communist movement. Thus, they have tried to create the impression of a willingness to permit free discussion of all points of view at international Communist conferences, and a mutual respect for the independence of all parties. The growing number of Communist parties and leaders who express points of view diverging from those of the CPSU has seemed at times to bear witness to a more relaxed attitude on the part of the Soviets toward dissent. But the fact is that this dissent is growing precisely because the Soviet leadership is "stalinistically" incapable of acknowledging the validity of any point of view except its own and because it has never ceased trying to force its will on other parties,in the international movement's private councils. A revealing reminder of the continuing Soviet practice of dictating to the international movement was given recently by the Albanian Workers' Party. About June 1970, the third volume of a history of the Albanian Workers' Party [Communist] was issued. It contained the hitherto unpublished speech which Enver Hoxha, then as now First Secretary of the Albanian Workers' Party, delivered to the all- important meeting of 81 Communist parties in Moscow in November 1960. (Attached are excerpts from this speech as broadcast in English by Tirana radio in June and July of this year. It was also published in the August issue of the Albanian Party journal, Rruga e Partise.) The speech represents the Albanian party's official reaction to the Soviet initiative undertaken at the Rumanian Communist Party Congress the previous June to bludgeon the world's CP's into condemning the Chinese Communist Party for the latter's refusal to adopt the Soviet international line. Hoxha's speech minces no words in describing the arbitrariness of the Soviet leadership in pushing through its own line without the slightest regard to the views of their so- called "equal, fraternal" parties. In view of the bluntness of' Hoxha's attack, it may be that this was a watershed in Soviet-Albanian relations. It is hard to imagine the Soviets' being able to overlook Hoxha's insult, though the open, no-holds-barred, name-calling polemics did not break out until some two years later. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Outside observers of international Communist conferences are usually obliged to engage in speculation and guess-work on relations among CP's, and particularly the Soviet attitude, in such conferences. This they do by careful reading and analysis of the 8#'ficial noncommital handouts from such conferences,more rarely on the basis of what some dissenting Communist participating in the conference wishes to reveal for his own purposes. Here is the rare opportunity of seeing directly what actually happens, to watch the efforts of the Soviets to dominate world Communism. It is instructive not only concerning Soviet attitudes and behavior to the present day, but perhaps equally so concerning the curious conspiracy by which so many of the free world CP's kept silent about the bombshell Enver Hoxha dropped ten years ago. Approved For Release Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Excerpts from a Speech by Enver Hoxha, First Sec-cetary of the Albanian Workers' Party to the Meeting of 81 Communist and Workers Parties in Moscow, 16 November 1960. Published in The Albanian Workers' Party, Principal Documents, Volume III, Tirana, Albania, gnnounced V,;ne, 1970. On the. Condemnation of the Chinese Communist Party 11... on the occasion of the Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party on 24 June 1960, the Bucharest Conference was suddenly organized on the initiative of the comrades of the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union without any previous warning, at least as far as our party was concerned. Instead of exchanging opinions and setting the date for this conference we are holding today [i.e. 16 November 1960j, which was agreed upon by the representatives, they took up another topic, namely the ideological and political accusations directed against the Chinese Communist Party on the basis of the Soviet information material. On the basis of this material, entirely unknown up to a few hour' before the meeting of the conference, the delegations of the fraternal communist and workers' parties were supposed to pronounce themselves in firor of-the views of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at al time when they had come to Bucharest for another purpose... "The fact is that the overriding concern of the Soviet leadership was to have its accusations against the Chinese Communist Party passed over quickly and to have the Chinese Communist Party condemned at all costs. "Our party would have been in full agreement with anlinternational conference of the communist and workers parties...-arovided that those conferences were in order, had the approval of :..~ the parties, had a clear agenda set in advance.... They should be conducted in complete equality among parties in accordance with communist and internatiomialist spirit and with lofty norms. "We think that the Bucharest Confererc :; c.:ici a great disservice to the cause of the international communist rc,ovenient.... The blame for this falls on the shou1c1 rs. of the leaders of the Communist Party ofthe Soviet Union.... The -Soviet aim] is to have the Chinese Communist Party ''condemned by the international communist movement for faults which do not exist and are base- less .... The whole Albanian Worker~y Party holds the unanimous view that the Soviet comrades made a grave in Bucharest by unjustly condemning. the Chinese Communist Party for n, allegedly deviatedfrom Marxism- Leninism, for having allegedly violated and abandoned the l97 Moscow Declaration. They have accused the Chinese Communist Party of being dogmatic, sectarian, of being an opposer of law, of being opposed to peaceful coexistence, of wanting a privileged position in the camp and in the inter- national communist movement, etc....they tried to impose heir incorrect Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 views towards the Chinese Communist Party on the other communist and workers' parties. "...when the Soviet comrades began their feverish and impermissible work of inveigling the comr.i.des of our delegation in Bucharest, it became clear to the Albanian Workers' Party that the Soviet comrades wanted, by means of groundless arguments and pressures, to lure the Albanian Workers' Party into the trap they had prepared, to bring it into line with the distorted views of the Soviet comrades. What was of impgrtance to Khrushchev -- and Andropov said as much to Comrade Hysni Kapo -- was whether we would line up with the Soviet side or not.... What was important for the comrades of the Soviet leadership was not the viwt of a Marxist-Leninist party such as, but only that we would maintain the same' attitude in Bucharest as the'entral Committee of the Soviet Union. we hear that, excepting the Albanian Workers' Party, the Chinese Communist Party, the Korean Workers' Party, the Vietnam Workers' Party, the other parties of the camp had been acquainted with the fact that a conference wou5,4 be organized in Bucharest to accuse China. If this is so, then it is very clear that the question becomes very much more serious and assumes the fort Hof a faction of an international character. Nevertheless, our party hag-.,not been taken unawares and it did not lack vigilance.... "Some leaders of fraternal parties called us neutralists, some others reproached us with deviation from the-correct Marxist-Leninist line and these leaders went so far as to try to discredit us before their own.parties. Has a party the right to express its opinion freely on matters as it view1 them?.... We did not accept to pass judgment on the mistakes of the Chinese Communist Party and even less to condemn the Chinese Communist Party on the problems raised in such a distorted, hasty and anti-Marxist way against it. We counseled caution, calm and a comradely spirit in treating this matter so vital and exceptionally serious for international communism. This was the whole crime for which stones were thrown at us.... Why did.... Soviet comrades make such great haste to accuse the Chinese Communist party groundlessly and without facts?.... The Albanian Workers' Party is.of the opinion that the Bucharest meeting was not only a gross mistake but also a mistake which was deliberately aggravated. "...fideological differences between the Communist'Party of the Soviet Uni in and the Chinese Communist Party J could have been settled in due time and':.-in a Marxist-Leninist way between: the two parties concerned. According to the Chinese Document, the Chinese Communist Party says that these differences of ]i~rinciple cropped up immediately following the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of'the Soviet Union and were raised by the Chinese comrades.... The Albanian Workers' Party thinks that if these differences could not be settled between the two parties concerned, a meeting should have been sought of the communist and workers',. parties at which these matters could be brought up and discussed, and a stand taken towards them. It isnot right that these Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 matters should have been left unsettled, and the blame for this must fall on the Soviet comrades, who had knowledge of these differences and disregarded them because they were certain of their line and its inviolability. "In order to condemn the Chinese Communist Party for imagined insults and sins, Nikita Khrushchev and the other Soviet leaders were very concerned to present the case as if the divergences existed between China and the whole international communist movement. But when it came to problems like those I've mentioned, judgment on them had been passed by Khrushchev and his companions alone, thinking that there was no need for them to be discussed collectively at a meeting of the representatives of all the parties, altiough these were major international problems in character. The Hungarian counterrevolution occurred, but matters were hushed up. Why this tactic of hushing things up when they are not to the advantage of the Soviet comrades while now, when it is to their advantage the Soviet comrades not only call meetings like that at.Bucharest but do their utmost to force on others the view that China is in opposition to the lime of all the communist and workers' parties of the world? The Soviet comrades made a similar attempt towards us alo. In August 1960 the Soviet leadership addressed a letter to our party in=which it proposed that with a view to preventing the spark of divergences from flaring up, the representatives of our two parties should meet so that our party would align itself with the Soviet Union against the Chinese Communist Party and that our two parties present a united front at this present meeting. Of course, the central committee of. our party refused such a thing and its official reply described this as an entirely non-Marxist deed, a factional act directed against a fraternal third party, against the Communist Party of China. Of course this correct principled stand of our party was not to the liking of the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. "At the (Bucharest] meeting, the Chinese Communist Party was accused of many sins. This should have figured in the communique. Why was it not done? If the accusations were well grounded, why all this hesitation and why issue a communique which does not respond to the purpose for which the conference was called? Why was there no reference in it to the great danger of dogmatism allegedly threatening international communism? C The Bucharest Conference] was not based on principle, it was a biased one to achieve certain objectives of which the main one was that of accusing the Chinese Communist Party of dogmatism, to cover up some grave mistakes of line which the Soviet leading comrades have allowed themselves to make. "The Soviet comrades stood in need of the support of the other parties on this matter. This is why they tried openly to catch them unawares.... The unanimous condemnation of China in Bucharest was reported in an effort to,create opinion in the parties and among the people in;this direction. "Immediately following the Bucharest meeting, an unexpected, unprincipled attack was launched. Brutal intervention and all-round pressure was under- taken against the Albanian party and its central committee. The attack was pprovea i-or Keiease Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00400030001-9 begun by Khrushchev in Bucharest and was continued by Kozlov in Moscow. Comrade Kozlov has even,put to us Albanians these alternatives: either coexistence as he conceives it or an atomic bomb from the imperialists which will turn Albania into a heap of ashes and leave no Albanian alive. Until now, no representative of United States imperialism has made such arl atomic threat against the Albanian people. But here it is and from a member of t4e Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.... "But attempts to arouse suspicion about the correct.stand of our party in Bucharest were not confined to Moscow alone, they were made with even mor` fervor in Tirana by the employees of the Soviet embassy with the Soviet ambassador to Tirana himself in the lead.... They began feverishly and intensively to attack the Marxist-Leninist line of the Albanian Workers' Parer to split the party, to create panic and confusion in its ranks, to ali .ate the leadership from the party, and the Soviet ambassador to Tirana wen so far as to attempt to incite the generals of our army to raise the peoples' army against the leadership of the Albanian Workers' Party and the Albanian state.... "It is clear that these contemptible acts of these Soviet comrades were aimed at splitting the leadership of the Albanian Workers" Party, at alienating it from the masses and from the party, and this as a punishment for the alleged crimes we had committed in Bucharest, for having the courage to express our views freely as we saw fit. "Our only crime is that in Bucharest we did not agree that a fraternal communist party like the Chinese Communist Party should be unjustly con- demred. Our only crime is that we had the courage to oppose openly, at an inte,'national communist meeting and not in the market place, the unjust act ion of Nikita Khrushchev. Our only alleged crime is that we are a small party of a small and poor country, which...should merely applaud and approve but express no opinion of its own. "This year Z-1960 _7 our country has suffered many natural calamities rircluding earthquake, flood and drought, followed by crop failures. J The people were threatened with starvation.... Our government urgently sought to buy grain from the Soviet Union, explaining the very critical situation that we were faced with. This happened after the Bucharest meeting.... Dicing these critical days we got ;rise to many things. Did the Soviet Union, which sells grain to the whole world, not have 50,000 tons to give the Albanian people who are loyal brothers of the Soviet people, loyal to Marxism-Leninism and to the socialist camp, at a time when, through no fault of their own, they were threatened with starvation? Comrade Khrushchev had once said to us: 'Do not worry about grain, for all that you consume'in a whole year is eated by mice in our country." The mice in the Soviet Union might eat, but the Albanian people could be left to die of starvation until the leaders of the Albanian Workers' Party submit to the will of the Soviet leaders.... This is terrible, comrades, but it is true.... Nor is it a friendly act not Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-011;94A000400030001-9 to accept our [credit) for buying grain in the Soviet Union but oblige us to draw on the limited gold reserves from our national bank in order to buy maize from the Soviet Union for the people's bread. "They Cthe Soviet leaders) have become swollen-headed over the colossal successes attained by the'i,.Soviet people and the CommunistParty of the Soviet Union,...considering themselves infallible, consider every decision, every act, every word they say and every gesture they make infallible and irrevocable. Others may err, others may,b,e condemned, while they are above such reproach. 'Our;,decisions are sacred.: They are inviolable. We can make no concession o, Rio compromise with the Chinese Communist Party,' the leaders of the Comm ist Party of the Soviet Union said to our people. 'Then why did they call us together in Bucharest? Of course, to vote with,ur eye blindfolded for the views of the Soviet leaders. Is this the Marxist way? Is it a normal procedure? Is it permissible for one party to eng*ge in subversive acts, to cause a split, to overthrow the leadership of ang er party or of another state? Never! On the.-Yugoslav Revisionists J "The Albanian Workers' Party considers the decisions' taken against Tito's :renegade group by the Information Bureau Cominform decision in 19+8 to expel the_T~pague of Yugoolav Communist Partiesjnot as decisions taken by Comrade Stg,4n personally, but as decisions taken by all the parties that made up the -Information Bureau, and not only by these parties alone, put also by the communist and workers' parties which did not take part in! the Information u. Since this was a matter that concerned all the communist and workers' par .es it also concerned the Albanian Workers' Party which, having received and studied a copy of the letter Comrades Stalin and Molotov had written to the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party, endorsed in full both the letter and the decision of the Information Bureau. 11 "Why then was the change of attitude towards the Yugoslav revisionists adopted by Comrade Khrushchev and the Central Committee of the Soviet Union in 1955 not made an issue for consultation in the normal:way with the other communist and workers parties, that was conceived and carried out so hastily and in a unilateral way? This was a matter that concerned us all. The Yugoslav revisionists had either opposed Marxism-Leninism. and the communist workers parties of the world or they had not. Either they were wrong or we, not only Stalin, had erred against them. It was not up to Comrade Irushchev to settle this affair at this own discretion. That is what he did.! And this Change of attitude in the relations with the Yugoslav revisionists is coi ected with his visit to Belgrade. This was a bombshell to the Albanian Wormers' Party which immediately opposed it categorically. "CWe stressed, that the Yugoslav issue could not 1e settled in a unilateral way, but that a meeting of the Information Bureau should be called Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 This matter should have been settled after a correct and lengthy discussion.... Ana time has confirmed that the Yugoslav issue should not be settled in this precipitate way. The slogan of overriding interests was lodged. The second resolution of the Information Bureau was speedily; revoked. The epoch of reconciliation with the Yugoslav comrades began. The conspirators, wherever they were, were re-examined and rehabilited, and the Yugoslav comrades came out unscathed, strutted like peacocks, trumpeted abroad that their just cause had triumphed, and that criminal Stalin had trumped up all these things and a situation was created under which whoever refused to take this course was dubbed as a Stalinist who should be done:away with. On .ondemnation of Stalin "Just as it pleased him flairushchevj to say that the decisions of the 20thand 21st Congresses were adopted by all the communist and workers parties in the same way, he should also be magnanimous and consistent in passing judgment on Stalin's work so that the communist and workers parties of the world could adopt it with a clear conscience. "There cannot be two yardsticks nor two measures of :weight for this matter. Then why was Comrade Stalin condemned at the 20th Congress without prior consultation with the other communist and workers parties of the world and why did many sister parties learn of it only when the imperialist press pub.ished Comrade Khrushchev's secret report far and'wide? The condemnation of Comrade Stalin was imposed on the communist and progressive world by Khrushchev. "Much has been said about our unity. This is essential and we should fight to strengthen and temper it but the fact is that on many important " issues of principle we have no unity. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Ili -1-i W-18064GONNIPW October 1970 Mounting Disaffection in the French Communist Party Ever since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, there have been rumblings of dissent in the large and conservative French Communist Party (PCF). Initially condemning the Soviet action in 1968, the PCF has since been notably unenthusiastic about continuing its criticism and even less intent on examining the various reasons that have been suggested for the Soviet overrunning of Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, number's of individual French Communists have made inquiries about the invasion and the subsequent Soviet-directed "normalization" of Czechoslovakia. Foremost among French Communists who persisted in seeking the causes of the Soviet crime is Roger Garaudy, long-time theoretician of PCF, successively deprived of his posts as member of the Politburo of the Party, of its Central Committee, and finally of his cell. Since the invasion he has used articles, books, and personal appearances to point out the degeneracy of the Soviet system of Communism, passionately arguing that other parties should not be obliged to follow the Soviet "road to socialism." iis~ plea to reject the Soviet model in favor of a model appropriate to specific national conditions with no necessary relation to the Soviet experience, ultimately led the PCF to purge him from the party. Outside the party, Garaudy has pursued his crusade. In the attachment, we reproduce some of his latest appeals to French Communists to seek their own independent road. Other attachments include views of dedicated, old time French Communists who now have given voice to long suppressed doubts over the course their party has been taking.l The importance of these selections lies in their universal applicability to Communist movements throughout the world, almost all of which suffer from the same dilemma: recognition of the alien nature of Russian Communism, versus the habit of giving uncritical praise to the "first socialist state in the world" combined with the necessity of flattering the Soviet Union in order to assure continued Soviet financial subsidy, The attached citations are, respectively, from: a) Roger Garaudy's preface to his publication of the "Varga Testament," a "samizdat" typescript smuggled out of the USSR, written by the brilliant but unorthodox (deceased) Soviet economist Eugen Varga; b) Charles Tillon's criticism of the PCF leadership in the non- 1. Full translations, as well as the original French text, can be provided, if desired, along with some of the official PCF reactions. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Communist magazine Le Nouvel Observateur. Tillon, formerly a prominent PCF leader who was earlier (in 1952) castigated and relegated to the sidelines by the party for his violations of the party line; c) Laurent Naves' open letter in Le Nouvel Observateur to his cell leader, recounting his disappointment with Soviet appointee, Georges Marchais, to the leadership of the PCF and with the purging of Garaudy and Tillon. All are eloquent testimonials to disaffection of thinking Communists in France and elsewhere. (Attached also is a French analysis of the current status of the PCF, suggesting that the current dissent, unlike the various "deviations" erupting in recent years past, is widespread and likely to have far- reaching consequences.) Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Excerpts from "Why I Do Not Accept Marchais" by Laurent Naves in Le Nouvel Observateur, 24-30 August 1970. (Prefatory remarks by the editors of Le Nouvel Observateur 7: The testimony which we have agreed to publish here is not anonymous. It was signed by Laurent Naves, a 71-year old retired school teacher, 9 rue de la Rachoune, in Albi. Furthermore, it would be difficult to assert that Mr. Naves is anti-Communist. He has been a member of the French. Communist Party since 1945. The number of his membership card is 92413. In Tarn, .everyone knows the family of th .s militant. His father, a Socialist shoe- ,maker, was a close friend of Jaures. His son, Robert, left the Lyceum in >`Albi in order to join the "Fabian Army," and was killed by the Germans. `Laurent Naves asked us to publish an open'letter, which he addresses to his long-time comrade, the Secretary of the Communist Federation of Tarn. We !'will not pass judgment -- it is not up to us to do so -- on the charges :.expressed at the beginning of this letter against the posture of Mr. Marchais. But we do respect the sensitivity of this militant. Once more Communists will speak of "intrigue." Once more we say to.them that, if they would like to reply, they may do so here, in the same place, in the same manner. French Communists are doing something that is significant, and some of them feel they should let us know. If l'Humanite had agreed to publish the testimony of these militants, we wo ld not have to do so. "Dear Henry, I believe that I am doing the right thing by expressing to you the feelings of several comrades at the base, who recently paid me a visit and who share my strong feeling with respect to the Marchais affair. That doubtless was not an isolated source of dissatisfaction, but an indica- tion of deep trouble which is disturbing the whole Party.... "George Marchais agreed to go to Germany during the war as an STO. Service du Travail Obligatoire - Compulsory Labor ServiceJ. For my part, .I cannot bear, without anguish as well as rebellion, the idea that a high- level leader of my Party worked in Hitler's factories, while my son, a :schoolboy, a member of the Communist Youth, fell in combat, as many others did, for the liberation of our country.... "While Marchais was not yet a member of the Party, he nevertheless was French, and, as such, his duty dictated that he go into hiding, as many others did, from all classes of society -- one out every two, according to estimates. They did not hesitate, for the most part, to join the maquis, as a matter of simple patriotic reflex, rather than contribute to the war effort of the enemy. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 "And when I think of the very careful and the very strict procedures used by the Party when it chooses its cadres, the attention it gives to the biographies which the militants at the base must scrupulously fill out, in most minute detail, to attain the most modest posts of responsibility, I cannot understand how Marchais was able to climb, without any checking, one by one, the various Party rungs, until he reached the highest-level functions, unless he concealed this episode in his life -- which would be even more serious.... "He said that he later escaped. But then the question is: What did he do in the Resistance upon his return to Paris? His strange silence in this regard, when he talks, makes one think that he was not a part of the ardent, patriotic movement which at that time stirred the young people and which led them, in greater and greater numbers, into'the fight for freedom.... "Charles Tillon, one of the most illustrious personalities of the Party,. recently referred, during an interview granted a journalist of France-Inter, to these verses of Aragon, written at the very time when the menace of their enrollment in the STO weighed heavily on the young French. people: 'Do not go to the enemy; Do not go, it is felony. Do not go; take a gun!' "Well, Marchais went and, after his escape, he did not take a gun. And yet he was in the prime of life and this at a period when others were falling, without political considerations -- and some were no more than children.... "I do not intend at this point to overcriticize those who allowed them- selves to be marched off to the STO at that time, nor those who did not respond to the call to fight for freedom. Some later joined the Party and I do not find fault with that. But while certain misjudgments and weaknesses may be excusable in the case of an obscure militant at the base, they are not tolerable in the case of a high-level leader, whose past must be an example of uprightness.... "Georges Marchais, in my opinion, does not meet this requirement.... "If the young people of today, who did not experience these events, can look on them with a certain detachment, I am certainly convinced, on the other hand, that our old militants, who have suffered so much, and all those who have been battered by the sacrifices of the Resistance, cannot accept them with the same lightness.... "The memory of my son, who fell so young in a maquis group, and also the thought of all the other martyrs of Hitler's barbarity, who were shot down' or who died in deportation, no longer make it possible for me to accept without protest the presence at the head of the Party of a man whose posture, in my eyes, distorts the pure image that I had of it, of a man whose past does not pprovea i-or Keiease Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 embody heroism or the blood of the Communist Party in the Resistance.... "I had hoped that, after a reasonable lapse of time, Marchais would have the dignity to resign from his functions, or that he would be invited to do so by the political bureau. That was not the case at all.... "My initial impulse was to leave the Party. But I flinch before such an extreme, which would be a veritable wrench for me. And I still hope that this can be avoided by forthcoming changes in the leadership of the Party.... "It was not before a long inner debate had taken place that I came to. decision. In my confused dismay, I sorrowfully sought the step I should 'ake. For several days, I was torn between my attachment to the Party and the cruel reverberations that this affair aroused deep down within me. First, expected a categorical denial. L'Humanite, alas, presented me with only ,vague explanations, through which an embarrassed, furtive acknowledgment was hinted. Facts, as one says, are not to be denied, and it does no good to try to drown them in useless polemics.... "In the spare time that I have as an inactive person, I thought that I would be doing a good thing, Henry, to write two letters to you in your capacity as a federation secretary, one the same day, that this affair broke out, the other the following day, to tell you of'my anguish. You did not feel it necessary to answer me -- not even with a short note. Thus I collided futilely against the leader of my federation and I realize that additional protests, in any form, would be useless. The relentlessness of the organiza- tion, at the various echelons of its hierarchy, quickly neutralized any personal attempt at appraisal.... "And since, on the other hand, I am not so naive as to believe that a Party organ would be likely to publish this text, I must therefore regretfully present it through some other means, if I wish to freely make known to my comrades these few reflections on some serious matters concerning which they cannot be indifferent.... "A few more words. In my opinion, the best Communists are not those who docilely accept, in all circumstances, the directives of a higher level when, according to their conscience, they seem to call for reservations. Such submission is the result of a system of authoritarian dominance which completely dries up the source of a spirit of criticism and of initiative. n fact, the excesses of centralism, depending on the character of a federation "secretary, for example, permit him to assume a power which he too often has *6 tendency to abuse. He can cleverly, during conferences when the maintenance or renewal of.cadres are decided, cause the removal from a leadership post of a comrade who has ceased to please him and to surround himself with persons who are at his disposal.... "And one can thus impose, from top to bottom, a subtle and rigorous mechanism of authority which reduces the militants at the base to the simple Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 role of carrying out orders. That also explains the choice of delegates who assure a surprising uaanimity in our congresses.... "In looking back on the federation headquarters that I frequented every day for so long, I see that certain comrades fear being 'battered', or being treated with other ill-sounding epithets, as a result of having expressed mild criticism. Who knows how many excellent comrades have become suspect and have been harshly rebuked for taking the liberty, one day, of presenting a personal point of view which did not agree with such and such an article in 1'Humanite or with the peremptory statements of a federation ldeader! Faced -with this state of affairs, some began, little by little, to remain silent, w hile others, and often some of the best ones, discreetly left on tiptoe -- .never to return.... "The only thing that I reproach myself with now is that, in the long run, I too easily acquiesced in the harshness of the Party, as well as the rigidity of its internal operation.... "Instead of currently unleashing against an always latent anti-Communism explosion in the bourgeoisie, the Party would have done better not to have furnished a pretext for it. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and the subsequent normalization had already done us the greatest harm. And then, through a confused combination of ideas, the stir that was created among us by the Garaudy affair -- a Garaudy, whose pathetic face on television, at the time of the last congress, remains impressed on everyone's memory -- and then his exclusion, soon followed by that of Charles Tillon, have left French opinion with the unfortunate impression of a revival of Stalinist methods -- that one had thought had been eradicated. I certainly want to believe that CArturJ London-type trials would not be tolerated by us. And yet, people are beginning to get this idea. When one goes outside the Party circle, one perceives, as one mingles with others, their feelings and their reactions to the brutal exclusion of two men who were among the best known and the most. respected in the Party. Also, it is useless to conceal to what degree these events have awakened distrust, and sometimes even a violent disapproval, among the majority of the democrats in our country, who again are turning away from the Party, and this at a time when a regrouping of all the forces of the left is imperative. And then the Marchais affair took place, and caused concern among the ranks this time, and provided food here and there for most severe commentaries.... "The Party also is not infallible or irreproachable. It is indeed too easy to throw onto others the consequences of its own errors or blunders. First of all, are not those who feed anti-Communism in the leadership itself of the Party -- a Party which will not again refind its esteem and a greater audience in French opinion until it finally adapts itself to the democratic, traditions of our country, in short, when it appears in a new light.... "It is my dearest wish, because the future of Socialism in our country depends on it. And I hope that the development even of the history that Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 we are in the process of living will soon lead the party to this necessary adaptation.... "I am a Communist -- and I will continue to be one, no matter what happens -- in heart and thought -- still always firmly attached to all that molded, even before I reached the age of manhood, the bases of my conscience. Fraternally, Laurent Naves " Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Excerpts from the Preface by Roger Garaudy to le Testament de Varga (The Varga Testament), Paris, Editions Bernard Grasset, 1970. "Following the excommunication of Yugoslavia in 1948, the Chinese schism 10-years later, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the problem of the plurality of socialist forms became the central problem for the communist and workers' movement. On the international level, crisis and the dislocation of the movement'would result from the solution to the problem if the fiction of the single form were maintained, as well as the decline of the communist party in each'nation, or on the other hand, if the problem were correctly resolved, this would lead to, possibility of uniting and rallying all of the'forces of the future the around the joint project of a socialist form answering the needs of our era and the specific conditions in each country. The description of the Russian model for socialism by the great Soviet economist Varga is a key document for consideration of this problem, its timeliness and its development in the near future.... "...[me Varga Testament) is neither a book nor an article, but a "konspekt," that is to say, a draft for a book, a summary, or theses, published for the first time in the clandestine mimeographed review Phoenix, under the authority of Galanskov, who'played a notable role during the Ginsburg trial in January.1968. The authenticity of this text, which is widely known in the Soviet Union as the Testament of Varga, and which was found among the effects of General Grigorenko, has never been challenged by the Soviet' leaders.... "...The successive incidents which occurred in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union give us a rather dark picture of it's leaders. If one is to believe Stalin, almost all of the leading companions of Lenin, whether it be Trotsky, Bukharin, Kamenev, Zinoviev,~ Piatakov, or the others, were traitors. If one is to belieye Khruslichev, Stalin himself and his team, from Beria to Kaganovich and Molotov, were criminals. If one is to believe his successors, Khrushchev himself was but a puppet. And adding it all up, what part of the leadership of the Bolshevik Party in the past 50 years remains valid? "The problem thus must be reapproached at the'lb ase, at the very point where` Lenin left it, before the degeneration of the system which, beginning7with Stalin, led up to Brezhnev. "One of the most evil aspects of this degeneration' was the confusion,. which Lenin always expressly avoided, between that'which in the October Revolution derived from the principles of Marxism (and which has universal value), and that which is specific in the Russian path to socialism. "The excommunication and the economic boycott!of Yugoslavia in 1948,? the Chinese schism which occurred between 1959 and'"1960, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, in 1968 marked the stages in the Irejection of Leninism Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 and the advance toward a concept of the single form of socialism which divides the communist and workers' movement and condemns it to isola- tion and sterility. "The bases of this perversion were analyzed by those of the communist parties which were able to break away. from the official dogmas fabricated in the Soviet Union, that is to say, in the party in which the theoretical degeneration of the leadership has been the most profound. At the end of a major public debate in the theoretical review of the Italian Communist Party, Rinascita, the root of the error was revealed: it involves a change in the very concept of socialism by Stalin and his successors. For Marx and Lenin, socialism was not an autonomous economic and social structure such as slavery, serfdom, capitalism or communism. It was a transition between capitalism and communism. And if it is a. form of transition, this implies that one finds therein both the seeds or the premises of a future system -- communism, and elements from the past -- from a developed or backward capitalist system, or a feudal one. The differences between the various forms of socialism can thus be very great, as a function of the economic and social structure of each country. On the other hand, if socialism were an autonomous economic and social structure, as Stalin taught, and as Walter Ulbricht said again recently, there would be no different "models" of socialism but simply variations on a single system, diversified solely as a function of!political and cultural traditions, and the situation within which revolution comes about. There would be only differences in forms or paths based on a single model. "The rejection of the plurality of forms of socialism derives thus from a theoretical distortion of the very definition of;socialism, which had its origins with Stalin, and which was maintained by his successors c4ULL 11111 V t. 1. V L b . . . " ..The recognition of ...diversity alone can, in each country, liberate the movement from a heavy burden: to pose the; problem of a single form of socialism, for example, for France, means first of all making it clear that what is required is not a choice between capitalism and socialism based on the Soviet model, for some, and 6n the Chinese model, for others. To do this it is not enough to stress that socialism in France can be established along other "paths" and may take other "forms," because it is a matter of a basically different model. This requires that we study the Soviet model in an objective and not apologetic fashion, that we analyze, as in the example Varga has set for us, the earlier social structure which led-to the development of such a form. This requires that we not keep silent concerning the efforts to export this model and to impose it upon countries whose social structure is drastically different and in which the application of this foreign model leads to catastrophe and to crime, as was the case in Czechoslovakia.... "...Without going back into the problem of the overall concept and realization of a "French form of socialism" here (see Roger Garaudy, for a French model of Socialism, Gallimard, 19G8), we eon accept, from the analysis made by Varga of the bureaucrat,zation and the repressive form assumed by the Russian model, that in France and in our time none pprovea i-or Keiea Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 of the objective historic conditions which led the USSR to these distortions and these bureaucratic and repressive perversions exist. "The debate on the prospects for socialism in France, and also the joint drafting of a French version and the common struggle to implement it, can also be liberated from the heavy burden and the con- fusions engendered by deadly silence concerning the threat to and crime against socialism represented by the export of an unsuitable model, most recently to Czechoslovakia, with the fears which this may arouse con- cerning the future. "If we are able, unhesitatingly and publicly, to make this objective an4lysis of the conditions for the formation and deformation of a given model, and a lucid and merciless criticism of any effort to export it, thit will only be dishonest people who can extrapolate and direct cr`icism in advance against French socialism . on the basis of facts ~Qr^owed from a foreign version. "This drafting of a French model for socialism and of the strategy neoded to establish it can only be the work of all of those in France rh truly want socialism: the communists first of all, but not them a bne, for this party plays so great and. so decisive a role in the French left, that its problem has become those of the whole country...." .~ r Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Claude Angeli,. "Charles Tillon Accuses...", Le Nouvel Observateur, Paris, 20-26 July 1970. (excerpts) "After 51 years of party membership, Charles Tillon, whose life story is interwoven with that of the French Communist Party, has been ousted from that party. Nevertheless, he has not turned anti-communist. Neither have we. But he is trying to understand, and asking for ex- planations: he is not the only one who will be interested in hearing them.... "On 3 July, his 73rd birthday, Charles Tillon learned that his Aix en Provence cell had voted to oust him. 'By 8 votes for, 4+ votes against, and one abstention' -- Charles and Raymond Tillon being absent -- the Provencale rank and file made the decision Paris headquarters had de- manded it make.... "...Last April, the cell to which Charles Tillon and his wife, Raymonde, herself a heroic member of the Resistance and a Ravensbruck deportee, met. They read a letter from 'Comrade Colomb,' secretary of the Aix section and'registrar of deeds at the local courthouse. In essence, this is what the letter ordered the members of his cell to do: 'Start proceedings for exclusion, and we shall back you to the hilt.' One of the charges against Tillon was that'he, along with other communists and ex-communists, had signed a petition asking that the party condemn the 'normalization' of Czechoslov%kia. He was accused of joining with non-communists and ousted communists to found 'Secours Rouge.' Even more serious, he is charged with raving taken the floor at a Paris protest meeting against the repression, along with 'leftist' leaders.... "In Saint Malo, where he was vacationing, Charles Tillon remembered: 'They were very careful not to gi?re Raymonde and me our party cards for 1970. I told them: "'I did not go to prison in 1919 because I had fought against those who were attacking the infant So,iet Union, only to stand by silently today while the USSR occupies Cz:choslovakia. And I decided to stand up against the repression in Fra.;ce because I know, from 7 terms in prison under the 'villainous law,' of those days, what might be waiting for us in the future. Maybe I I just ahead of my time? I was ahead of my time back in June 1940, irBordeaux, when I spoke out against the ,fascism that was taking over in trance with Hitler and Petain, while the party leadership up in Pari,was asking the Germans for permission to start publishing Humanite aga.n.' And I insisted again: 'Take careful note of what I am saying and inform those who. have decided to open new procedings against me: shall answer no more questions until the party publicly agrees to reo-.n my 1952 trial.' Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 "On 3 June, Tillon joined with Roger :araudy, Maurice Kriegel- Valrimont, ari4 Jean Pronteau, both of then former party leaders like himself, in signing a statement entitled We Shall Be Silent No longer.' Then, in reply to a letter from Daniele B:.altrach, a communist reader living in Aix,,Tillon wrote us: 'Since y:ur correspondent is also concerned with what I do as an 'old man' in retirement, I am ready, after 51 years as a member of the communist party, to render an account of my public and private life as a militant, hiding notheing of all that my conscier}ce burdens me with because I was a Stalinist until 1950.. "On 26 Junes Tillon was summoned to another meeting of his cell. 'You hit upon a day to call me before you,' he said. 'It was just 51 years age, at this same hour, that I was driven with whips into a cell after the Guichen mutiny.' And some idiot answered, 'That was before the Flood!' Then Tillon scornfully raised his voice: 'You are acting under orders from those who were behind my 1952 trial. You know nothing about the history of the party, or about the history of the Resistance!' And Raymonde Tillon added, 'Nor about the history of the deportations.'.... "The Tillons left the meeting before it ended, and their expulsion was not voted upon until several days later.... "Tillon knew that this could+not last. He did not speak out with- out certain knowledge of the reaction of the Political Bureau and of Georges Marchais, who is 'number one' in the French CP since Waldeck Rochet's illness. Because Tillon can hardly stand Marchais.... "'He went to work in Germany during the occupation as a laborer requisitioned by the STO Service du Travail Obligatoire = Compulsory Labor ServiceJ. A lot of other people did the same; they were neither refractory nor resisters. When Liberation came, some of them joined the CP, and there was nothing shocking about that. But what is shocking is that Marchais hid his past from the party, that he swore he had been in France throughout the entire occupation period, and that in spite of this he has become the top leader in the party whose entire history is stamped with the mark of the Resistance and those who were shot for their part in it."' ^ 400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Josette Alia, "The 'Party Secrets,"' Le Nouvel Observateur, 27 July - 2 August 1970, Paris. The Tillon affair has only just begun and, this time, no taboos will be respected. "What with those who have been expelled, who are dissidents, who have resigned, who have been asked to resign, or who are simply weary, today there are 800,000 persons in France who used to belong to the Communist Party and who have left it -- either in the burst of excommunications or on tiptoe. Nevertheless, this great group of 'former members' had never, up to now, excited the Communist Party machine or caused the old fortress to totter.... "It sufficed to christen each internal crisis an 'affair', to focus the unrest on one or two culprits, to brandish threats of expulsion, to denounce the 'vile slander' of the enemies of the working lcass... Then, cleansed, purged, the Party continued along its path, merely leaving some names and dates along the wayside: he 'Marty-Tillon affair," in 1952, the,'Lecoeur affair,' in 1954, the 'Casanova-Servin affair,' in 1961, the 'Garaudy affair,' in 1969, the 'Tillon affair,' in July.1970.... Irritation and Bitternesq "But this time the multitude is disturbed and there is a strange splitting. First, one sees Jacques Duclos on television; he is reading a revengeful official communication: This whole affair is 'a concoction' of anti-Communists on the outside 'who are quietly plotting against our Party.' This is after the Garaudy affair. 'Garaudy miscarried; bring out Tillon...' And who supposedly made this attack? As usual, at one and the same time, those who have money, the bourgeois 'neo-centrists', and the 'leftists,' who have a mutual supreme fear: a union of the left. Having denounced 'the maneuver,' Duclos.utters the anathema, the condemnation of Marty and of Tillon: Tillon, this renegade, this 'vicious, quarrelsome fellow', will remain,'as in the case of the others, an isolated opponent. The virulence of Duclos'.remarks is explained by the preponderant part that he took, in 1952, in the absence of Maurice Thorez, in the condemnation of Marty and of Tillon. The Party, Duclos angrily concludes, scoffs at these vile attacks!... "But, at the same time, the leaders of the Communist Party are greatly disturbed and react with a vehemence which can be explained only by a real concern. On television, in the Party press, on radio microphones, Duclos and Marchais give this 'little affair' very great publicity. Counter-fires are kindled at all Party echelons, and-emissaries of the Central Committee are immediately sent to the departments that are susceptible of being 'contaminated.' An irreverent wind is blowing about even among the staff of 1'Humanite' 'How Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 should one counter the campaigns of the bourgeoisie against Comrade Marchais?' innocently, it seems, asks Laurent Salini. 'We must explain that Comrade Marchais was a work deportee,' flings back Fajon in an arrogant. tone.... "In the brief silence which follows, no one, of course, points out that the Communists for years combatted the very idea of 'work deportees.' Every- one knows that, when things are bad, one must close ranks. Well, things are serious now. The proof: When he finally appears on television, to give the official and studied Party reply, Georges Marchais makes some sacrifices in order to attain his ends. And not concerning trifles, but concerning an essential point: 'We have said that we disapproved of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia...I reaffirm this again today.' "And the normalization that is,taking place there?" asks an ORTF journalist. "Steps have been taken which do not please us, steps which we would not take," replies Georges Marchais. "To speak out against the Czechoslovak 'normalization,' desired by thie USSR, when one is Georges Marchais, Deputy Secretary General of the French Communist Party, is significant; it is serious. Is not this the very thing that Garaudy desired -- and which he was persistently denied? Well, then, why yield now? What keeps Marchais in check, Marchais who is visibly irritated by the personal attacks that have been flung against him, and who nevertheless restrains himself, moderates his voice, does not gesticulate, instead of following the line of using the abusive language of the very fiery Duclos? Does the Tillon affair, coming after so many other apparently more serious crises, conceal a more real danger?... "The Communist Party does not yet believe this. Tillon accuses? Well, so what? They know that once more the good old reflex of Communist defense will work, that the impact of this opposition is relatively weak 'at the base,' even if only because the men who now are revolting have been on the sidelines for a long time. Who are they, these 'Thirty' who have just signed an 'appeal to the Communists' and who support Tillon? They belong to the 1936-19+7 generation: a good decade, a period of great Communist growth, which originated in Spain, matured in the Resistance, was frozen by the cold war and definitively ruined in' the Stalinist debacle. A 'duped generation,' 'writes Annie Kriegel, the product of a great misunderstanding, for a long time put 'on ice,' but in spite of everything, completely loyal; in short -- a group of former valiant fighters who for years were confined to a discreet opposition of his Majesty Stalin?J The Communist Party does not believe that they will provide the decisive attack.... . Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Three elements "Nevertheless, they are uneasy. Because the Tillon affair brings together, for the first time perhaps, three elements of a serious crisis: poor timing, an unfavorable outlook, a man who is perhaps dangerous.... The Timing "The affair broke too soon., Subsequent to Charles Tillon's reply, published in Le Nouvel Observateur, 29 June,~to a letter in which he had been called to account -- a violent reply in which Tillon for the first time attacked the posture of Georges Marchais during the occupation -- his cell precipitated his expulsion. The Tillon affair materialized three weeks too soon: instead of occurring during the slack vacation period, it will now create a stir. Tillon, an obstinate Breton, overstepped discipline when he did not wait, as one should, for his expulsion to be approved by the Central Committee before talking about it on, the outside.... The Unfavorable outlook "It must be said that, since 1968, internal crises in the Party are no longer easily digested. For two obvious reasons: first, the May crisis -- which converted a diffuse opposition into a real?opp'osition; then, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and especially Waldeck Rochet's con- demnation of it, which marked the first official, acknowledged break in relations between the French Communist Party and Moscow. From this original sin on, one can no longer say, as before, that there is always, on the one `hand the correct Moscow line, and, on the other hand, a 'handful of dis- appointed, ambitious men' who 'play a reactionary game.' Because these men, from now on, are no longer willing to allow themselves to be condemned without reacting. The period of 'confessions' is over. They no longer feel guilty. Suddenly, and for the first time, they are becoming organized.... "Garaudy is very quickly supported by two currents. One,-on the outside: Well known personalities, like Pronteau, Kriegel-Valrimont, Tillon, are the first to take the initiative, by publishing a manifesto: 'We no longer wish to remain silent.' The other current, a clandestine one, is that of the mysterious group, 'Unir,' (Unite), about which almost no one knows anything, except that it was formed in 1952 by about ten important Communists, that it has since remained completely clandestine, within the Party, and that its objectives are -- roughly -- those of the 'Prague Spring:' to reform the Party, but from within; to introduce free discussion; to get rid of the restrictive stays of democratic centralism, 'which may have been useful, but is now outmoded,' an anonymous militant told me in a discreet printing establishment where everything seems to have remained frozen since 1942.... Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 "The underground currents, more than Tillon or Pronteau perhaps, are causing the Party leaders to be greatly concerned. Because the latter fear the imminent consequences of an operation which they sense from the begin- ning and which they want to stop at all costs. They know that, next to the Tillon affair -- the first wave -- they owe the recent stand of the thirty well-known militants to 'Unir.' They know above all that a third, far- reaching wave of protests (it reportedly would group some 400 signers, including some present members of the Central Committee) is expected next autumn against the present leadership of the Party, which senses it, is preparing for it, and fears it.... "Tillon, Garaudy, Pronteau (he too, is in the course of being expelled) are no longer -- as in 1956, as in 1961 --, intellectual men of good will lost for a moment within the Communist ranks, who emerge only to :issue some confidential, innocuous critical studies. Tillon is an old fighter. He is dove all an 'apparatchik', one of the old hands, who knows the machine well and knows where to put sand in the gears. In short, one is now dealing with professionals and no longer with amateurs, and the 'pros' know the blows that hurt. One became aware of this this week, from the first parries: through a 'non-resistant' Marchais.-- when the whole subject of relations between the USSR and the French Resistance-was thus -- for the first time -- publicly, politically set forth. Was this only -a?tiff among school boys or choir boys...shades of the good old days? Actually, everything connected with the Resistance now keenly interests young people. And Tillon is directing his remarks to these young people when he later says 'that, if there is an extreme left, it is because the Party is no longer fulfilling its role.' So, we have come full circle from the FTPfFranc Tireur Partisans - World War II Communist resistance organization to the Maoists, from 1941 to 1970.... "But anyone who knows the Party realizes that there are much more serious prospects. Garaudy, and especially Tillon, one time the repositories of formidable secrets: the famous 'Party secrets' dealing with internal purges, the utilization of Soviet 'referendums' at the time of 'trials,' or, again, mysterious financial operations which Garaudy attributes to a 'certain Mr. Jerome.' Are they ready to reveal them? They have not yet, it seems, come to any decision on that. Because, in fact, it is a serious decision. The secret --- it is the ability of Communists to close ranks. They want to be Communists; they are Communists. But secrecy was also what abetted Stalinism most. And now they want to 'de-Stalinize' the Communist Party. Will they be able to prove that only truth is revolutionary." -4- Bs LES "SECRETS DE PARTI" L'affaire Tilton ne fait que commencer et, cette fois, aucun tabou ne sera respects Exclus, dissidents, demis- sionnaires, demissionnes ou simplement fatigues, its sont on France qui ont appartcnu au parti communists et qui, ensuite, l'ont quittc -- que cc soit dans l'eclat des excommunications ou sur la pointe des pieds. Pourtant, ce grand parti des c ex > - Ic plus grand parti de France; do loin - n'avait jamais, jusqu'a present, emu I'apparcil du P.C. ni :ebrante la vicillc forteresse.' II suffisait de baptiser chaque crise interieure c affairs ,, do cris- talliser is malaise sur un ou deux coupables, de brandir les foudres de 1'exclu~ion, .dc dcnoncer les -, basses calomnies ), des ennemis de la classe ouvriC:'g... Puis, nettoye, purge, le Parti poursuivait son chemin en lais- sant simplement quelques noms et quclqucs dates sur les rives . du flcuve : c affairs Marty-Tillon A on 1952, c affaire Lecoeur s on 1954, c affairs: Casanova-Servin A en 1961, c affair; Garaudy a on 1969, c af- faire Tillon c on juillet 1970... Mais, setts fois, le flot se trouble et les images, curicusemcnt, se dc- douhlcnt. D'ahord on voit ii la tele- vision Jacques Duclos lire '.un communique vengeur : touts cette affairs est z manigancec a de l'exte- ricur par des < anticommunistes qut complotent en douse contre notre I'arti - C'cst la suite de l'affaire Ga- raudy. < Garaudy a eeholle, on res- sort Tiljon... " Et setts attaque, par qui est=ells mencc ? Comma d'habi- tudc, a la fois par les puissances d'argent, par les . neo-centristes bourgeois et par les c gauchistes qui ont on common une craintc su- prcmci: ]'union do la gauche. Une fois dcnoncec a la manoeuvre r, Duclos' jette 1'anathcme : Tillon, cc renegat cc < mcchant, hargncux, condamnation do Marty ct do Tillon. restera eomme les autres un oppo- sant isoje. La virulence des propos do Duclos s'explique par la part pre- pondcrante qu'il a prise, on 1952, en ('absence de Maurice Thorez, It la condamnation de Marty et do Tillon. Le Parti, termine fagcusemcnt Du- clos, se rit do ces basses attaques I Mais, dans le mCme temps, les W Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00400030001-9 dirigeants du P.C. s'agitent beaucoup et reagissent avec une vehemence qui ne pout s'expliquer que par une reelle inquietude. A la television, dans la presse du Parti, aux micros des radios, Duclos et Marchais don- nent a cette c petite affairs 3, une tres grande publicite. A tous les echelons du Parti, on allume des contrefeux et des emissaires du Co- mite central sont envoyes d'urgence dans les departements susceptibles d'eetre c contamines 3,. A la redaction de c l'Humanite P. elle-meme, souffle un vent d'irreverence. or Que faut-il faire pour repondre aux campagnes de la bourgeoisie contre le camarade Marchais ? > demande, innocemment semble-t-il, Laurent Salini. w 11 faut expliquer que le camarade Marchais a ete un deports du travail n, lance Fajon d'une voix rogue. Dans le bref silence qui suit, per- sonne no relive, bien sur, que, .1es' communises se sont, pendant des annees. battus contre la notion meme. de < deportes du travail n. Tout le monde Bait qu'aux moments graves ii faut serrer les rangs... Or le mo- ment est grave. La preuve : quand it apparait enfin It la television, pour donner la reponse officielle et concertee du Parti, Georges Marchais jette du lest. Et pas sur des broutil- les, sur un point essentiel : sc Nous avons dit quo nous etions en desac- cord avec ('intervention sovictique en Tchecoslovaquic-... Je lc rcaffirme encore aujourd'hui. n < Et la normalisation qui se de- route [A-bas? interroge be journa- liste de I'O.R.T.F. - Il y a des nlesures qui sont pri- ses et qui ne nous plain; nt pas, des mesures que nous no prendrions pas, nous >, repond Georges Marchais. Sc prononcer contre la s normali- sation ' tchequc voulue par I'U.R.S.S. quand on est Georges Marchais, secretaire general adjoint du Parti communiste frangais, c'est important, c'est grave. N'est-ce pas, trc's exactcment, ce que demandait Garaudy et ce qu'on lui a obstine- ment refuse ? Alors, pourquoi ceder aujourd'hui ? Qu'est-ce qui retient Marchais, visiblement irrite par les attaques personnelles lancees contre lui,? et qui pourtant se modc're, baisse le ton, mesure ses gestes au lieu de suivre sur la voie des injures le tres CPYRGHT bouillant Duclos ? L'affaire Tilton, vcnant apres tant d'autres crises ap- paremment plus graves, recZlcrait- elle un danger plus reel 7 Au P.C., on ne le croit pas encore. Tillon accuse ? Bon, et alors 7 On sait qu'une fois do plus le bon vieux reflexe de defense comntuniste joucra, que l'impact de cette oppo- sition est relativement faible It la base s, ne serait-ce quo parce que les hommes qui aujourd'hui se rcvol- tent sont depuis longtemps sur ]a touche. Qui sont-ils, ces c trente s qui viennent de signer un c appel aA communistes N. et qui soutiennent Tillon 7 Its appartiennent It la gene- ration 1936-1947 : une bonne de- cennie, un grand cru communists, ne en Espagne, muri dans la Resistance, gels par la guerre froide et definitive- ment gache par le glacis stalinien. a Generation dupcc ,, ccrit Annie Kriegel, produit d'un grand malen- tendu, depuis longtemps on veillcusc, malgre tout fidele, bref : une amicale d'anciens et valcureux combattants cantonnes depuis des annees Bans une discrete opposition de Sa Ma- jeste. Ce West pas d'eux, pense-t-on au P.C., que viendra I'attaquc deci- sive. t r~~iv i2It ZI ills Pourtant, on s'inquiete. Car I'af- faire Tillon reunit, pour Ia premiere fois peut-ctre, trois elements de crise grave : un moment mal choisi, tine conjoncture defavorable, un homme pcut-gtre dangereux. .g b. Le moment. -- L'affaire a de- marre trop tot. A la suite de la reponse, publics dans c lc Nouvel Observatcur ~ du 29 juin, de Charles Tillon a une Iettre qui l'avait mis on cause - reponse violente dans la- quelle Tillon s'en prenait pour la premiere fois It I'attitude de Georges Marchais sous l'occupation -, sa ccllulc prccipite son exclusion. L'af- faire Tillon est nee trois scmaines trop tot : au lieu do tomber dans le creux des vacances, elle fera des remous 1 Tillon, breton et cabochard, a manque do discipline on n'attcn- dant pas, comme it se doit, que son exclusion soit approuvec par be Comite central avant d'en parley It 1'extericur... Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00400030001-9 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A0004000300 ~RGHT La conjoncture. --- II faut bien dire que, depuis 1968, dans le Parti, les crises interieures ne se di- gercnt plus aussi aisement. Pour deux raisons evidentes : d'abord la crise de Mai - qui a transformz ]'opposition diffuse en unc opposition reelle. Ensuite ]'intervention sovieti- que en Tchecoslovaquie et surtout sa condamnation par Waldeck Ro- chet, qui a marque la premiere faille officielle et reconnue dans les rela- tions entre le P.C.F. et, Moscou. A partir de ce pbche originel, on no pout plus dire comme auparavant qu'il y a toujours d'un cote la ligne juste de Moscou, de I'autre cote une < poignce d'hommcs dequs et ambi- tieux qui < font lc jeu do In reac- tion n. Car ces hommes, desormais, ne sont plus disposes a sc laisser condemner sans reagir. La periode des . aveux Y, est passee. Its ne se sentent plus coupahles. Du coup, et pour la premiere fois, ils s'organisent. Tres vitc, Garaudy est soutenu par dcux courants. L'un, extericur : ce sont les personnalites connues, comme Pronteau, Kriegel-Valrimont, Tillon, qui prenncnt une premiere initiative en publiant un manifesto a quatre : . Nous ne voulons plus, nous faire *. L'autre courant, clan- dcstin, c'est celui du mysterieux grouper Unir ., dont presque per- sonne no salt ricn, sinon qu'il a etc cr66 en 1952 par une dizaine de communistes importants, qu'il est reste depuis complCtemcnt clandestin, intcrieur au Parti, et que'ses objectifs sont - en gros - ceux du r Prin- temps de Prague : reformer le Parti, mais du dedans, y reintroduire la libre discussion, faire sauter I'ctroit corset du centralisme democratique a qui a pu titre utile, mais est main- tenant dcpasse ?, me dit un anony- me militant dans une imprimerie discrete ou tout semble titre reste figs depuis' 1942... Ces courants 'soutcrrains, plus qu?~ 'Tillon ou Pronteau peut-titre, inquie- tent fort les dirigeants du Parti. Car ceux-ci redoutent los suites prochaines dune operation qu'ils devinent a ses debuts et qu'ils vculent a tout prix enrayer. Its savent qu'apres I'affaire Tillon, premiere vague, . c'est a a Unir? r qu'ils doivcnt ]a recente prise de position de trente militants connus. Its savent surtout qu'une troisicme vague de protestation, de grande envergure colic-la (elle devrait grouper environ 400 signataires dont quclques membres actucis du Comite central), est prevue pour l'automne [,-)chain contre la direction actuelle u Parti qui la devine, s'y prepare et a craint. 1 (Les hommes. - Tillon, Ga- raudy, Pronteau (lui ?aussi en ours d'exclusion) ne sont plus - omme en 1956, comme en 1961 ?- es intellectuels de bonne volonte un moment egares dans les rangs? du ommunisme et qui n'en sortent que pour publier de confidentielles et noffensives etudes critiques. Tillon, 'est un vicux lutteur.. C'est surtout in homme de 1'appareil, un t perma- ent 3,, qui connait bien Ia machine t salt ou mcttre le sable pour que rincent les engrenages. Bref, 'on a ffaire a des professionncls et non 1us a des amateurs, et ces c pro 31 onnaissent les coups qui font mal. n ]'a senti, cette semaine, des les remieres passes : a travers Marchais on resistant, c'est toute la question es relations entre ?I'U.R.S.S. et la csistance francaise qui est ainsi our la premiere fois - publique- ent, politiquement poses. Quere'lle 'ecole, de chapelle, vieilles lunes ? oire... Tout ce qui touche a la csistance retrouve en ce moment, upres des jeunes, un interet aigu. Et e sont les jeunes que Tillon < vise orsqu'il declare, dans un dcuxieme emps, < quo, s'il y a une extreme- auche, t'cst que lc Parti no joue lus son role *. Ainsi la boucle est ouclce, des F.T.P. aux maoistes, de 941 a 1970. Mais it y a, pour qui connait le arti, de bien plus graves perspecti- es. Garaudy, Tillon surtout, ont etc ' in moment d6positaires de redouta- les secrets : les fameux a secrets e Parti > - qu'il s'agisse des epu- ations interieures, do I'uti?lisation de K referends x sovictiqucs au moment cs : proces a ou encore des myste- icuses operations financieres que araudy attribue a un < certain M. Jcronte w. Sont-ils prcts a les d16- oiler ? Its n'ont pas encore, sem- le-t-il, pris de decision 1a-dessus. Car, en effet, la decision est grave. Le~ secret, c'est la solidarite commu- istc. Or, ils se vculent, ils sont ommunistos. Mais le secret est aussi e qui a lc plus aide la stalinisation. Or ils veulent a destaliniser x lc P.C. Pourront-its prouver quc seule la ve- 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 - 'BACKGROUND USE ONLY October 1970 CAPITALISTS RESCUE SOVIET SOCIALISM During the past 10 years the Soviets have purchased substantial amounts of machinery and equipment from Western countries. In the last three years, for just the automotive and chemical industries alone, they have spent approximately three quarters of a billion dollars. The net result, as observed by an Italian Communist who was given a special tour of advanced Soviet plants during April of this year, is that Western-made equipment has played a prominent, even indispensable, role in the industries the Soviets have chosen to modernize. In recent years the new Soviet automobile plant at Tolyatti has attracted world- wide attention; currently the Soviets are conducting negotiations in Western countries for a new truck plant. These projects are discussed below. Also discussed briefly are some financial aspects which indicate that the Soviets are using their exports of run-of-the-mill equipment and machinery to underdeveloped countries as an indirect means of paying for the technologically advanced products which their own industry is unable to provide. In their latest move towards industrial modernization, the Soviets are now seeking help from West Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands in the construction of a billion-dollar truck plant. The plant, which will be located on the Kama River, is to have a yearly production of 150,000 diesel-powered trucks capable of carrying 10 to 20 tons each. The major foreign firm is Daimler-Benz, from West Germany. The Soviets have only reached preliminary agreements on "technical cooperation" thus far; there is no clear indication as to when final contracts will be signed. The attached newspaper articles provide further details on the nature of the truck plant project, as well as some analysis of the political aspects. The reasons behind the Soviets' decision are not hard to discern. They need modern trucks, but are short of the kind of technology required for the design of a modern truck, as well as for the design, construction, and equipping of an efficient plant. The Soviets undoubtedly realize that they could by themselves build a plant with a yearly capacity of 150,000 large trucks; but Soviet experience shows that such a plant would probably be far more costly, would take considerably longer to build, and would produce trucks of markedly inferior quality. The Soviet truck plant at Ulyanovsk, for example, took about 10 years to build in the postwar period, and its products are still considered unsatisfactory. The present status of the Soviet truck industry presents clear evidence of the kinds of deficiencies the Soviets hope to amend. In 1968 the Soviets believed they could boost production from their existing plants to 750,000 trucks in 1970; however, even if the current 1970 plan of 527,300 trucks is fulfilled, production will fall 30 per- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 cent short of the earlier goal. Weil over half" of Soviet truck output comes from two plants, in Gorky and Moscow, both of which were built in the 1930's, the one at Gorky with massive assistance from the Ford Motor Company. These plants are still producing gasoline-powered trucks; in the other relatively small plants only a small share of production is of diesel trucks. Whereas the Soviets have relentlessly pursued research and development on advanced technology in the aircraft and other defense industries, they have virtually neglected the truck industry. Moreover, in spite of being the world's largest producer of general-purpose machine tools, the Soviets are weak in the capability to produce the reliable, durable automated and specialized machine tools (lathes, grinders bevel gear machines, etc.) needed in the mass production of precise parts for automotive equipment. Thus, the Soviets' technological lag shows up in the truck industry, and demonstrates why the Soviets must swallow their pride and for economic reasons call on help from outside their system. Automobile Plant at Tolyatti Heretofore the largest single Western-assisted project in the USSR has been the automobile plant at Tolyatti.1 This plant when completed, will cost about $1.5 billion, over a third of which will go for the purchase of Western equipment. It will have an eventual yearly capacity of 600,000 cars almost identical to the Fiat 124. Construction was started in 1966 and although it has fallen behind schedule, under the management and direction of the Italians it has progressed at a rate significantly more rapid than the usual Soviet project. The production goal for 1970 has been trimmed to 20,000 cars -- far fewer than initial expectations and down from the year's plan of 30,000 cars, yet much higher than the Soviets could normally have hoped for if they had undertaken the project themselves. Through 1970, assembly line production at the Tolyatti Plant, which began in early September, will be helped by the import of assembled motors and several thousand complete sets of parts from Italy. The Tolyatti Plant has undoubtedly been a very advantageous proposition for the Soviets. In automobile production, to an even greater extent than in truck production, they were hopelessly unprepared to enter the modern industrial world. Acknowledging their gap in technological competence, the Soviets contracted with the Italians in 1966 for a 'turnkey project under terms similar to those the Soviets offer to underdeveloped countries. I. The new name for the city of, Stavropol; named after the deceased chief of the Italian CP, Paliniro Togliatti. 00030001-9 .Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Financing of Western Technological Assistance The Soviets' need for Western equipment was discussed by Luca Pavolini, editor of the Italian CP's theoretical journal Rinascita, after his visit to the USSR in April 1970. He remarks on "the very large numbers of installations and equipment of Western manufacture I saw in the newest Soviet establishments," and goes on to say that "there'is no 'scandal' about going,to the West to buy machinery, or even whole factories. The problem is not 'ideological', but practical: it is a matter of finance." Besides selling abroad all they can, including vodka and caviar to such an extent that there are domestic shortages, the Soviets are making every effort to minimize the drain of their carefully husbanded hard currency as they attempt to expand their purchases of Western technology. They exploit the eagerness of Western firms to compete for the Soviet market and they take advantage of the willingness of Western governments to extend dredit at low interest rates and on favorable terms. Moreover, the Soviets plan to pay for part of their new truck plant with deliveries of raw materials such as oil, gas and lumber. The Soviets appear to have an additional means of financing their purchases from the West. In their foreign aid program with underdeveloped countries the Soviets have been shipping mainly machinery and equipment, little of which has been of sufficient quality to compete in world markets. (In 1968 the Soviets sold a half billion dollars worth of machinery and equipment to the underdeveloped countries, or more than half of the value of the machinery and equipment they imported from the developed countries.) In return, the Soviets receive either goods which fill some needs in the USSR, or, eventually, monetary payments to cover trade deficits. Obviously, whatever the Soviets receive for their own low-standard products can be used as a means of paying for the West's high-standard products. The Soviets appear to have benefited from being treated in a way like an underdeveloped country. And they have also benefited indirectly by exploiting their foreign aid program. Yet in time it may be that Soviet technological development will be retarded as a result of the infusions of ready-made Western technology into Soviet industry and the Soviets' continuing illusion that they can sell mediocre goods to developing countries. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 25X1C10b Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 October 1970 YOU CAN'T TELL THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA CHIEFS WITHOUT A SCORECARD Six top Soviet propaganda information officials were replaced between April and September 1970. The Soviet press and radio buried announcement of these shifts and, predictably, failed to analyze them in any depth. Foreign commentators have attempted to fill this vacuum. One theory is that Soviet information policy (read: propaganda strategy and tactics) has misfired badly during the past several years and that Soviet citizens are continuing to doubt the accuracy and fullness of news reporting. Moreover, dissidents such as Andrey Sakharov and Petr Grigorenko have focused attention on the suppression of information and free discussion as a block to progress and justice in the USSR. The timing of most of these personnel changes, around April 1970, can be interpreted to mean that the Soviets realized that the propaganda campaign for Lenin's Centenary had been a colossal failure: in fact, the saturation of the media with child-level and thinly varnished. propaganda on Lenin was ridiculed and resented by the people, and opened many eyes to the fact that mind-manipulation is the purpose of Soviet media. So, the propaganda chiefs were sacrificed in order to help their top Soviet leadership save face. Another possibility for consideration is that the personnel changes reflect Kremlin infighting. Analysis of the backgrounds of the new and replaced chiefs shows clearly that supporters of Trade Union boss Alexander Shelepin lost ground in the continuing battle for influence among top-drawer Soviet leaders. The probable gainer is CPSU chief Leonid Brezhnev, who is believed to feel threatened by the 52-year-old Sholopin;. It's possibre that?.otheruEembers of the ruling 11-man Politburo, whose average age is about 65, may have joined Brezhnev in beating back the challenges of the "younger" elements of the Soviet elite. At the same time, there is a missing piece in this puzzle: the replacements do not appear to be "Brezhnev men." Thus, Brezhnev may have been unable to muster the kind of clout necessary to demonstrate that he is the top man in the Soviet Union. Several other avenues of speculation were opened up by the recent naming of Ivan Udaltsov as head of Novosti, the "unofficial" news agency whose major role is to provide material to foreign media. Because of Udaltsov's background, it is possible that this appointment signals a turn towards a hard propaganda line. Another is that the conspiratorial approach may be returning to fashion. Ivan Udaltsov was a key figure in Prague before and during' the invasion of Czechoslovakia. He was regarded as one of the Soviet Embassy's leading experts on Czechoslovakia having been in that country on and off during the past 20 years and continuously during the five years Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 or so before the invasion. His job was to inform the Soviet ambassador about the political climate in Czechoslovakia. His Czech associates were almost exclusively extreme hardliners such as Vilem Novy, Ludvik Askenazy:, and Milos Jakes, who had little influence in the Dubeek regime and were opposed to its reforms. The result was that Udaltsov's information to the Soviet ambassador was hopelessly distorted and contributed to Moscow's erroneous conclusions that the Czech masses would welcome the Soviet invasion forces with open arms and that the Soviets would have no problems in setting up a puppet government. Udaltsov remained in Czechoslovakia long enough to advise Soviet occupation authorities on setting up Zpravy,.a Red Army sponsored newspaper. Zpravy was blatant propaganda favoring the occupation forces and endorsing the views of the extreme hardline Czechs. How Udaltsov's experience will contribute to Novosti is an open question. Also in question is the whole series of earlier changes in propaganda positions Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 * l ***~~ TT ( TTT,Y CHANGES IN SOVIET PROPAGANDA APPARATUS 1. Vladimir Stepakov was removed as chief of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, according to a leak of Moscow correspondents on 1 April 1970. His replacement has not been revealed. 2. Sergey Lapin replaced Nikolay Mesyatsev as Chairman of the Government's Committee for Radio and TV, according to an official announcement of 21 April 1970. Mesyatsev's ouster had been mentioned in the leak of I April. 3. Boris Stukalin, according to a TASS dispatch of 24 July 1970, replaced Nikolay Mikhaylov as Chairman of the Government's Committee for Press and Publication. Mikhaylov's ouster had also been mentioned in the leak of 1 April. 4+. Leonid Zamyatin on 21 April 1970 replaced Sergey Lapin as Director General of TASS. 5. fury Chernyakov replaced Leonid Zamyatin as press spokesman for the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 6. Ivan Udaltsov on 10 September replaced Boris Burkov as head of Novosti, the "unofficial" Soviet news agency. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 r.T,,, TTgi ONLY October 1970 THE TREATY OF MOSCOW SOVIET ANTI-GERMAN PROPAGANDA: OFF AND ON AGAIN? The Soviet-West German non-aggression treaty signed in Moscow on 12 August is one of those diplomatic papers whose actual provisions are less important than the atmosphere they create. In negotiating the treaty, the Soviets gave West Germany nothing much but a few token gestures such as reducing the flow of anti-German propaganda with which Soviet media has been increasingly preoccupied during the past years. Reportedly Mr. Brezhnev even assured Chancellor Brandt that efforts would be made to encourage the newspapers to help change people's attitudes toward West Germans within the Soviet Union. All of this was designed to foster an atmosphere of detente. It must have come as quite a jolt to the Russian people, for years accustomed to hearing the shrill charges of "revanchism" and "militarism" hurled at, their enemy, to suddenly find on their television screens heartwarming scenes of those two new pen pals, Chancellor Willy Brandt and Premier Aleksey Kosygin. While the vast majority of the Russian people probably took scant notice of Chancellor Brandt's visit to Moscow, the short treaty-signing ceremony itself was shown over Soviet television. This viewing has been followed by several weeks of pro-treaty articles appearing in both the Soviet government and party press= At this writing, Soviet media are still speaking of "detente with West Germany," Theoretically, the treaty should go far toward eradicating the bogey of West Germany as the "imperialist threat" out to undo the Soviet Union and the Communist., order in East Europe. Nevertheless, there still remains a vituperative hard core of propagandists who won't risk letting the Russian people stop thinking that "once a revanchist, always a reven.chist." Despite the favorable treatment given the Moscow-Bonn accords by the Soviet press, West Germans remain suspect in the eyes of most ordinary citizens and probably in the eyes of many official Soviets as well, A Western correspondent who, in late August, went to a public lecture at the Soviet Army Park in Moscow reports that the lecturer's whole point in speaking was to emphasize the continuing menace that West Germany supposedly represents to Soviet security. In a half- hour lecture devoted to the "Military Forces of NATO," the speaker first put his audience in the proper mood by citing facts and figures about NATO's "aggressive" military forces. He then launched into an anti-German tirade to establish his point that the "West German revanchists have always been and will continue to be governed by anti-Soviet motives." After the lecture, the speaker was surrounded by members of the audience, obviously agitated over the treaty, and Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 one heard the question repeated by several: "Why did we sign?" Meanwhile, by late August and during early September, packed movie houses across the country were enjoying the first installments of two new film series on the KGB in action: "Spy's Mistake" (0shibka Rezidenta) and "Spy's Fate" (Sud'ba Rezidenta). In one film the KGB uncovers a spy network being run by the West German Cultural. Attache in Moscow. Both of the films go out of their way to depict the Germans as the main imperialist villians unmasked by KGB action. And, perhaps significantly, the action takes place within the Soviet Union in the late 1960's. Neither lecturer nor film producer is going out of his way to prime the Russian public for an open-arms welcome to be given any West Germans arriving in the Motherland. CPYRGHT NEW YORK TIM ' Text of Soviet-West German Treaty 4 ih dl6r Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A00040003000iP9YRGHT ll and2 An~exej Charter of the United.NatUo is agai st anyone, nor will the corresponds to the most r- have such in the future. Y dent desires Of the 'natio is Th y regard the frontiers and the general interests f of a -the states in Europe international peace, Coda and in future as- in- In appreciation of the fat viola le, as they stand on the' that previously realized day f the signing of this' agreed measures, particular y. treat , including the Oder Europe and the 'world, ritor i Integrity 'of all states, In. the conviction ? t at In rope in their present peaceful cooperation.betwe n iron ers. , states on the fattndation , 'fl ' Thy declare that they] -the aims and principles-of t e have no territorial demands n ties have gagreed, g p r whe no one infringes the; In the endeavor to c =J pies nt frontiers. ern. allies:: publ cs are agreed in the rec Text .6f Treity ogni ion that peace in Eu- rope can only be maintained 'the hi h contracti - improved relations and of ,n, afor mentioned aims and accompanying West Gerrit n'i principles, the Federal Re- letter to Moscow and of a l pub! of Germany and. the' ..rwte from Bonn to 'the We t-, Uni of Soviet Socialist Re viet-West German t eOty. n in ' accordance with the ,as printed in two;west,G r- natt nal security. man .newspapers; of the' o ARTICLE THREE ? . Nations, from the threat of SDe'Jal to TM :vcw 7fbrt Ttmu force or the use of force in- BONN, Aug. 1l--FOllowi lions which affect. se- is a translation of the to s, curly in Europe and Inter- ;relations, have created favo able conditions for new in 'portant steps for the furth -development and strengths -+ Ing of their mutual relation ;? In the ? desire to give e " pression in contractual fort f to their determination towar improvement and expansio of cooperation between the M including economic relation '? ?as well as scientific, tee nir-, 1 rid cultural ties, In th interest , of . both 'states, .. a foljows:. ,of Sept. 13, 1955, concern, the assumption of' diplomat and ntier between the Fed- ARTICLE FOUR 'I'hi treaty between the.' Feder I Republic of Germany` and tie Union of Soviet So-- cialis Republics does not af-' feet lateral and multilateral, treaties and agreements pre. vious concluded by them. Thi catior the d merit, in.. treaty requires ratifi and takes effect on' y of ratification docu= Done at ... on ... 1970 in' two originals, one each ? We the German and Russian lance guages, whereby the text oil, each is equally binding. ' ARTICLE ONE. The Federal Repu6tic' of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics re- gard it as an Important goal, of their policy to maintain !.International peace and to' attain relaxation of tension:" "...They declare, their endeavor Letter to Gromyi;ti .to-foster the normalization of, In connection with today's' the situation in Europe. and Signing of the treaty between the_ development of? peaceful] the Federal Republic of Ger `relations between all Euro-f many and the Union of Soviet" pean states, and proceed; Socialist Republics, the Gov.' thereby from the existing real. ernment of the Federal Re= situation in this region. public of Germany is honored ARTICLE TWO to ascertain that this treaty. does not stand iii contradic=' The Federal Republic of Lion to the political aim of 'Germany and the Union of the Federal Republic of Ger. Soviet Socialist Republics will many to work toward a con be guided in their mutual dition of peace in Europe in relations,as wbll as to ques- which the German nation at,' tions of the guaranteeing of twins its unity again in, free' European and international self-determination. peace by the aims and prin- ciples which are laid down Note to Western Powers in the Charter of the United ; , The Government of the Nations. Accordingly, they will solve federal Republic of Germany their disputes exclusively is honored, in connection with peaceful means and as- with the impending signature. sume .the obligation 'to re- of 'a treaty between the red-' frain, pursuant to Article 2 eral Republic of Germa:iv r of the Charter of the United the Union of Soviet Socialist , of the four powers does not Republics,, to Impart the fol-- have any connection with the lowing: treaty which the Federal Re- The Federal Minister of public of Germany and the Foreign Affairs has elabo- Union of Soviet Socialist Be- rated in connection with the., publics Intend to conclude negotiations the standpoint of and will hot be affected by it. .the Federal Government with The Foreign Minister of the regard to the rights and re- :Union of Soviet Socialist Re- sponsibilities of the four. publics has declared in this powers concerning . Germany. connection;. as. a whole and Berlin. ? The question 'of the rights Since a peace treaty re-, of the four powers was not a mains outstanding, both sides subject of the negotiations .have concluded therefrom with the Federal Republic of' .that the intended treaty does Germany. The Soviet Govern. !not affect the rights and re- ment concluded therefrom sponsibilities of the. French that this question should not Republic, , the ? United King-, be discussed. ~dom of Great Britain and The question of the rights ;Northet'n'Ireland, the Union' of the four powers will not . of Soviet Socialist- :Republics be affected, ? either;. by, the and the . United States ...of I tredty which the U.SS.It:'.and- America. the Federal Repul)lic of Ger.; The..* Federal .. Minister '.:of. many intend to ..'conclude_, Thl s is ,.tFle ;position of the Foreign Affairs has declared 'in this connection: ? .. .' Soviet .Government on this 72ii q tints pf tha rijht$ nuestlnn_ Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/6YcIDP79-01194A000400030001-9 NEW YORK TIMES 12 September 1970 FRENCH GET ROLE ON SUVIET TRUCKS !Agreement Assigns Renault a Major Participation in Big Automotive Complex By CLYDE H. FARNSWORTH to The New Yank T.m,, PARIS, Sept. 1 - ran e and the Soviet Union tod signed an agreement for Fren h{ participation in construction f' a truck plant to rank amp g the world's largest, on the K L- ma River, a tributary of t e Volga, in central Russia. Although a formal contra ft has yet to be signed, toda s agreement envisages a maj r role in development of the cility for the Renault Company, the state-owned French a o and truck manufacturer. Renault would also help t e Soviet Union modernize a d expand existing automob e production facilities. The val e, of the two contracts is plac di at $121G-million - one half o! two-thirds of this sum got gi into the truck plant. Discussions With Germans The Russians have been c r- rying on parallel discussio s with the West German Gcv- ornment, which is promoti g the Mercedes Benz Compan 's efforts to participate in the i- ant truck complex. What was expected to be a rivalry between the French Ad; German companies is n w more likely to be a partn r- ship. The two compan s announced tonight they will amine ways of working to e- ther on the contract. The Kama River plant, n r the town of Kazan on the R s-' sian plains, would turn t 150.000 trucks a year. e ,cost of building the plant His been estimated at up to , 1 billion. The lob is conside d too big for one European m ufacturer to handle alone. -1 Ford Rejected Offer The Russians hart origina ly' approached the Ford Mo r Company with an offer to bu Id. ,the plant. Ford turned t c nroposition down, reporte. ly ,because of pressure fr m Washington. One of the French worries is that Renault would. he rele-! gated to the role of a subcon tractor in a consortium led by Mercedes Benz. With its high- ly reputed engineering know- how, Renault is demanding a !role as equal partner with the Germans. Questioned on this point at a press conference today. Vlad- imir Kirillin, Soviet -Deouty Premier, said diplomatically it will be the Soviet Union that is the prime contractor and that among the companies that par- ticipate in the project, "Re- nault will be in the first rank." Besides the precise French- German industrial relationship,! -still to be worked out are the credit terms in the Renault contract. The Russians demand credits for most of their purchases in the West because of their short- age of hard currency. Normally, the French give the Russians eight years to pay. The interest rate in recent ideals has ranged between 5 and 6 per cent. Exactly what' Irate within this band is the subject of present negotiations. Today's agreement, signed by Mr. Kirillin and French Finance Minister Valery Gis- card d'Estaing, was seen' by both men as further evidence of deepening Soviet-French1 economic cooperation. It comes just a few weeks before a visit to the Soviets Union by French President' Georges Pompidou. . Lesser Trading Partner Actually, however, France is well down the list as a trading partner with the Soviet Union; in fifth place after West Ger- many, Japan, Britain and Italy.' Last year, France and the Soviet Union signed an agree- ment to double their commer- cial exchanges by 1974. French sales to the Soviet ,Union quadrupled from 1965 to 1969 but at $264-million last year they represented less than ?2 per cent of France's total ex-' ports. French imports from the. Soviet Union have grown much more slowly, giving France a, $60-million surplus in Soviet, .trade last year. Asked at today's news con-' iference whether last month's; Soviet-West German treaty on; renunciation of the use of force !might have an unfavorable im- pact on French-Soviet ex-1 changes, Mr. Kirillin said: t, Policies which tend towards ,bettering and extending our ;relations . with France are policies thet are permanent ,and will never change." He added, pointedly, that co operation with France, how- iever, did not prevent the Soviet, Union from "consolidating" its' relations with other countries: A French official said later: The Russians talk to us as if the Germans don't exist, and I'm sure they talk to the Ger mans as if we don't exist." Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 CPYRGHT CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 27 August 1970 1 S 0 Soviet truce comppiex CPYRGHT est Germans to Delp with plant By Harry B. Ellis Staff correspondent of Project called huge The likelihood 1s that the government w' taken by Daimler-Benz and other West Ger man supplier firms. A billion-dollar truck plant centering on Dain}1er-Benz may be the economic first fruits of the recently signed Soviet-West German treaty of cooperation. The German automotive firm, maker of Mercedes cars and trucks, for months has been discussing with Soviet officials con struction of a giant factory complex in the Soviet Union. The projected plant, according to press reports, would turn out 150,000 heavy trucks yearly, each with a payload capacity of 10 to 20 tons. The plant would be built on the Kama River, a major tributary of the Volg& Ford turned dowxa Daimler-Benz, according to present think- ing, would be the focal point of a European consortium, including Fiat of Italy, Renault of France, and Daf of Holland. This is the same project Henry Ford turned down, following a study trip to the So- viet Union. Mr. Ford told stockholders the project was beyond Ford's financial ca- pacity. The U.S. Defense Department is known to .have opposed American participation, on grounds that the huge truck plant would in- crease the Soviet Union's military potential. "It certainly will," declared a knowledg- able source. "But wasn't it realized in Wash- ington that the Soviets would get their plant anyway? The difference is, European firms now will have the business, not American companies." West German Government officials have confirmed the lively interest of Chancellor Willy. Brandt's government in the massive truck project. in, not only the major European truc_ ~ pliers of parts suppliers. Economics Minister Karl Schiller 'with certainty discuss this project with hwil is Soviet hosts" during the Minister's forth oming visit to Moscow, a governmen West German Foreign Minister Waite cheel and Soviet Foreign Minister Andre . Gromyko had broached the subject dur ng their recent political talks in Moscow eading up to the Soviet-West German treat igned Aug. 12. aw materials to be supplied The Soviet Government, informed source ay, hopes to pay for this and similar und er 4 kings partly through the delivery of ram thers - to Western Europe. Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin is said have stressed to Chancellor Brandt the ilitf th Si U y oeovetnion to supply a varied st of raw materials. A good deal of negotiation lies ahead Before the Soviet and Western governments, lean banks have the project ready for fining. Even at this stage, however. the things 1. The West Germans continue to move ,rongly to reinforce their trade and tecbni? 2. The Soviet Union is demonstrably ger for western help - focusing on West Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 2 .SePVft$%4&or Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Oflf- M OSCOw aims CPYRGHT CPYRGHT Behind friendship treaty looms risky rivalry o for gaining---.or holding East Europe By Harry D. Ellis Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor "The future shape of Eastern Europe," declared a knowledgeable source, "is the prize for which Moscow and Bonn are con- tending." And, ironically, they are doing it through a friendship treaty. But West Germany and the Soviet Union each hopes to gain very different things from that treaty. Communist economies generally are fal- tering, with the result that consumer un- rest ultimately might threaten the Soviet system of control in Eastern Europe. An infusion of West German technical aid, Soviet leaders are thought to: reason, might help to stabilize the status quo in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Burgaria. -r This assessment comes from an official in close touch with the thinking of Chan. cellor Willy Brandt's government and aware of what the Germans have gleaned from their months of negotiation in Moscow which led up to the signing of the treaty Aug. 12. Interpretations differ f "In a sense," the source continued, "the Soviets have elected to control EasternI Europe through West German elp, and at the same time to improve -the r own Soviet economy." "The Brandt government," the official said, "looks at it differently. Without giv- ing technical and economic help to Eastern Europe, West Germany could have no in- fluence there at all. "By working patiently through the Soviets," therefore, then with the satellites, the Ger. mans hope eventually the systems ove'r there might be loosened up." The treaty with the Soviets had been fundamental in this regard, for without it Moscow would not have given other Com. munigt governments a go-ahead to work out' their own relationships with Bonn. The Brandt leadership, the source went on, fully understood the danger that West ; Germany-might end up helping to maintain the Soviet system of control in Eastern Europe. Risk for e s also seen But the Soviets, too, run a ris'k," the ?i official, declared. "It was, -after all, West: erman influence in Czechoslovakia whichI the Soviets wanted to stamp out through their 1968 invasion." Moscow now was courting the same kind of German influence, extended through technological help, which the Alexander Dubcek regime in Prague openly had sought. The difference over the past two years, the official' continued, was the urgency of Communist-bloc economic problems and the frankness with which the leadership ad- witted them. Ordinarily the Soviet 'military hierarchy might be thought to fear the liberalizing tendencies inherent in the Bonn-Moscow treaty. But in this case, Brandt officials assert, Soviet military leaders argued in favor of the treaty "because they wanted peace in - the West to concentrate on the Chinese- [Communist] threat." Berlin and ratification Already the West Germans and Poles are discussing trade, aid, and politics, with' the Hungarians and Czechs expected to follow. But the Soviet-West German treaty itself formally comes into force only after its ratification by both parliaments. Mr. Brandt demands improvements in the Berlin situa- tion before asking the Bundestag to ratify the pact. Bonn officials express confidence the Soviets will grant something in Berlin, be- cause of their eagerness to have the Bonn- Moscow treaty ratified before next year's congress of the Soviet Communist Party. CPYRGHT WAi3H b Tor Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 30 August 1970 CPYRGHT ~nnPcietcj'Sj et C By Edward Crankshaty London Observer ONDON=-The Soviet-German non. JU aggression pact is not a nine-day wonder In a vacuum; it is part of a large movement on the Soviet side. It is a movement designed, above all, to, achieve detente with the West without giving up any of the Soviet gains' which were won at the cost of the ten sion the Kremlin now seeks to relieve. It had become a matter of urgency In Soviet eyes because of the potential threat from China and the continuing weakness of the Soviet-economy. The movement was under. way when it was set back by the panic invasion of Czechoslovakia two years ago. The Russians were reluctant to in- vadebecause they dimly perceived the necessity for some reform In that un- fortunate country's system if its rich resources and skills were to be devel- oped and exploited to Soviet advan tage. But the reforms went too far too quickly. For fear of infection, they had to be stopped. Today, there is a lot of talk in the West to the general effect that we al lowed ourselves to be frightened un- necessarily by the use of violence In Czechoslovakia. Two years later, it is. being said, how silly those fears look.: Instead of moving.from one aggression to another, the Russians are cooperat.. ing with America over the Middle East cease-fire and the SALT conversations, signing a treaty with Bonn, tolerating, Romania's gestures of limited independ ence, allowing Hungary to embark on; a reform program of her own and re- fraining from trying and executing : Czech reform leader Alexander Dub- cek. Russia's Chestnuts j WAS NOT aware that anyone in his j senses outside the Soviet bloc had been frightened by the crime in Czecho- slovakia. We did not feel fear; we felt disgust. It is not we who should thank the Kremlin; the Kremlin should thank us for recognizing a'fait accompli and, after a very short interval, allowing it to carry op as though nothing had. hap. pened. . From the Soviet point of view. the pact with Germany is a great achieve- ment. By securing recognition of the ;.existing- frontiers of Europe - above all, of course, the Oder-Neisse Line - and opening up a broad vista of future ,cooperation with German industry, the Soviet leaders can present themselves as the liquidators of a German prob- lem which they deliberately built up .,until it came to weigh too heavily on their own actions and on the minds of their people. At the same time, nothing is better calculated to keep the Poles, the Czechs and the East.Germans on their best behavior than the uneasy knowl- ' edge that Moscow is talking over their heads with Bonn on terms of amity. All this does not preclude a resur- .rection of the German "revanchist" scare should, it at any time appear ex- pedient: It would be easy enough to `find a pretext for accusing the West Germans of violating the spirit of the treaty, if not its letter. And, for good measure, a Russo-German understand- ing might, in certain circumstances, be employed as an instrument for loosen- ing the cohesion of the Common Mar- ket and/or putting a heavy strain on German-American relations. The foregoing is not an argument for refusing to come to terms with the Soviet Union, but we should under- stand the limitations of those terms. Our aim must be to neutralize the dan- ger of atomic war - coexistence, in a word - while hoping that over the years a closer association with the Rus- sians, and the coming of age of a new generation, will bring the Soviet lead- ership to. a radical re-examination of the aims, fears, suspicions and doe-' trines which are institutionalized in its oppressive machinery of government. Soviet aims (the aims of the pres- ent leadership, that is) are, quite sim- ply, coexistence while sitting firmly on pmt gains, and a certain measure of 'desperately necessary economic re form, ruthlessly controlled. For too long the Soviet leadership has been `deadlocked to the point of sterility. Now, six years after the fall of Khru- shchev, his successors are beginning to pick up at the point he had reached in the autumn of 1964. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001`_9? . CPYRGHT - PACT, From Page C1 There were signs that they were be- ginning to do this three years ago. In- deed, they never reversed Khru- shchev's general foreign policy line- his highly personal overtures to West Germany excepted. They simply marked time. After they had tried to ease, rela- tions with China and been snubbed, and after Washington had conceived the brilliant notion of starting to bomb North Vietnam while Premier Alexei Kosygin was actually in Hanoi, they seem to have found the idea of devel-. oping a coherent foreign policy too` ,painful to be endured and to have.,, given up all pretense of having one - apart from exploiting the opening in the Middle East, which even a child could have seen. It was not until this activity culmi- nated, much to their surprise and alarm, in the fiasco of the Six-Day War that they pulled themselves together and started to think. The first tenta- tive moves resulting from this thinking were roughly interrupted by the Czechoslovak invasion. And the after- math of the invasion evidently pro- duced a renewed conflict of opinion between those who wanted to turn their backs on the West and those who believed it imperative to bring Russia out into the world. Because of this conflict, the Commu- nist Party congress in Moscow sched- uled for this autumn had to be post- poned. Before it could take' place, there had to be high-level agreement and abroad. The eventsof the last few weeks indicate that the deadlock has been resolved, and if things go reason- ably well, the Soviet leadership will be able to face the congress next year with the first, coherent declaration of', achievement and intent since Khru- shchev's fall. As long' as we remember that all the Soviet leaders started their ca- reers under Stalin in the Stalinist Man-:, ner and have owed their advancement to one or another of Stalin's closest aides, there should be nothing to wori& about - apart from the nasty little fact that the Soviet army, which ad- vanced into Czechoslovakia "to protect it from the Germans," shows no signs of moving out now that the Germans have promised to honor the frontier. As far as the Middle East is con- cerned, the chief Soviet objective is not Israel but the Persian Gulf and the freedom of the Indian Ocean. Even if the Russians do choose to behave in a 19th century way in the nuclear age, 'there is no need for us to follow their example. Israel has to be protected and reassured, but this is all that mat- ters. As far as Europe is concerned, she needs Russia just as Russia needs her. But Europe, the Common Market not- withstanding, cannot be said to exist as long as a great part of it is ruled from Moscow. This is a point to be made again and again, however pain. fully, until the day when those Rue sians (Who are they?) who can see it ,for themselves begin to make their on the general lines of policy at home T voices heard. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 20 A to For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 9 nn 5 nrice CPYRGHT Berlin concessions tied to Soviet 'treaty By Harry B. Ellis Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Chancellor Willy Brandt appears to have defined the price he wants the Soviets to pay in Berlin to gain ratification of their newly signed treaty with West Germany. Mr. Brandt insists he will not ask -the West German Parliament to' ratify the Moscow-Bonn pact until the Soviets have Improve the living conditions of isolated West Berliners. Klaus Schutz, Lord Mayor of West Berlin, now has disclosed what improvements Mr. Brandt appears to have in mind--and what counterconcessions he would make to the Soviets. A satisfactory Berlin settlement Mr. Schiltz declared, should contain the following elements: 1. West Berliners must have the same right as West German citizens to travel to East Berlin and the (East) German Demo- cratic Republic. As things now stand, West Berliners can cross the Berlin wall only in hardship cases involving ,relatives in East Germany. 2. Land and water routes from West Ger many to West Berlin, running across East German territory, must be free of interfer- ence. 3. The Soviets and East Germans must concede that West Berlin belongs to the monetary, economic, and legal systems of the Federal Republic and is represented In foreign relations by Bonn. The official Corn.. munist view is that West Berlin, lying 110 miles inside East Germany, forms an inde-! pendent political entity, with no links to the, Federal Republic, `Federal presence' In return for such concessions, Mr.' Schutz argues, Bonn might show willing- ness to dismantle what he called "demon.; strative forms of the federal presence" In West Berlin. Such demonstrative forms the Mayor defined as Bundestag ' (parliamentary), sessions in West Berlin and meetings of the federal Cabinet there. He also ques. tioned whether the federal President should- continue to transact business in West, Berlin. The bulk of federal civil servants now' in West Berlin would remain there, Mr.-! Schutz stressed, because they administered; Berlin and Bonn. The Lord Mayor was speaking for him-' self, in an interview with the nationallyi circulated Welt am Sonntag. But a spokes. man for Mr. Brandt confirmed that the government had had prior knowledge ofi Mr. Schutz's'program and that it'coincided} with that of Bonn. The above conditions, then, are what Mr. Brandt apparently expects the Western ambassadors to exact from the Soviets, when their ambassadorial meetings resume; in September. Powerless to negotiate Sovereignity in Berlin rests with the Big Four victor powers-the United States, Brit-A ain, France, and the Soviet Union. Mr.' Brandt is powerless to negotiate directly' with the Soviets on the future of the divided' city. So far, in the series of ambassadorial talks which unfolded during the spring and sum.; mer, the Soviets showed little readiness to accede to what Bonn wants. This, however,i was before the, conclusion of the Soviet. eat' German political treaty, climaxed by Mr. Brandt's presence in Moscow, cast relations' l between Bonn and Moscow in a new light:" : An utz had outlined confirmed "nothat t out what' IMr. Sch step" with improvements the American,' British, and French Governments would like P to see transpire in West Berlin. $ ? The next move Is up to the Soviets, who seem to set great store by the treaty which Mr. Brandt and Soviet Premier Alexei N i4tosygia signed in Moscow Aug. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT W, Yet 29 AUEU t West Berlin Mayor Is Hopeful ? on Curbs". .3;)eej.1 to The New York rune. Travel May Be Eased According to the Teegraf, BERLIN, Aug. .28 - Mayor said Today that the new,Soviet- West;,.Gernian . pact '.had. for, the first "time. in years, created conditions under, which - im- provements for West Berlin "havk moved into the range of possibility." He, spoke at a news confer- ence .called to deal with reports and 'speculations about possi- ble East German moves to ease restrictions on West Berlin. The Mayor said he had had rib officfal word from the East Germans and did not want to "speculate about rumors." But his other remarks, indicated the mportance the city administrar don and Bonn' attach to the Reports from East Germany East Germany is piannnn to l id the-East Germans intended make. an overture next .ues- mov on the last of Mr. day, Sept. 1, Peace Day in=the hultz' points ? to ease the' East Bloc. racit travel restrictions. Un- Diq Welt said .west Berlinere W t Germans or foreign would be given permission tional , West Berliners are 1cross into the eastern hall it non ally allowed into East Ithe city on day passes. riin o~ The ayor made it clear that jh'e paper also saw Eno ras[ t vet r striction were not the Germans Intended to restore o ily pr blem. telephone communications :be-. "Only when the basis of out tween the two halves of the e istenc is no longer drawn city, cut off since 1952. Only i to do bt, when the Soviet a handful of special lines, one ioq a d her allies no longer of them between Russian head- d ny,th it West Berlin is part quarters in East Berlin and f the, a onomic, financial and British Headquarters in the I al ' s item of the Federal west, are now in operation. R pubii only then. 'v ill we The next round of fodr?powet h ve 4a ruly new situation - 'talks on Berlin is scheduled for n 1 11 tion," he -said. ? 1, ? when the United Redo of East German Sept. . pp not s read in Berlin. and tates,: Britain, France and the. Moscow pact. B nn`by eastern newsmen and Soviet Union elpect to resume The Mayor listed as major " ntac were r3ubllshed this their, discussion of the future points free access to West Tier- rning by two West German; of the former German capital .id, 110 miles within Enst',Ger n wsoap-to, Die Welt of Ham and their own roles in this city.? ;nand, "without unilateral eons b rg,~ a publication of the The talks, which opened in trots and a lifting of the ban A el . S ringer concern, and March, were :recessed in July barring West Berliners from stBe tin s Telegraf, closely after six meetings, without W, entering the eastern half of the a ociat ' with Bonn's Social jangibleiuccess. city. .., .. .~,..~. r- ,.~.,, ;,.... D macro . The Sppringer . pub.. li htg sd has.,y, ti ! of'; Bonn's Eastern WNDUN TIMES Approved For Release 1999/09/0iL 1 W-01194A0 040003W HT EUROPE'S HEART The top government and party limited sovereignty was aimed at leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries consolidating the Warsaw Pact states. met in Moscow yesterday for the Consolidation wag again emphasized first time since December. Ostensibly by the World Communist Conference the purpose of their visit was to take in Moscow in June last year and by a fresh look at Europe in the light the series of bilateral treaties which of the recent treaty between Russia Russia has since signed with noun- ' and west Germany, but the timing tries in cast Europe. Czechoslovakia's Of the meeting cannot have been turn for such a treaty of friendship fortuitous. This, they imply, is. the came in May. This document' bn- :light way in which to spend August shrined the now doctrine. The t ieaty 20-in constructive consideration of laid down officially that it waa`the Europe's peace and security, rather " joint 'international duty of the ,than in laments over what bapponed? socialist countries" to defend two years ago. socialist achievements ". As far as The Russians and their orthodox its relations with the outside world allies have continually insisted that goes,, including western Europe, ,the invasion of Czechoslovakia must 'Czechoslovakia has been reduced to be taken as an accomplished fact. It the status of an automaton. This does should not, they say, be used as a not make any easier the negotiation matter for discussion by their friends of new and less suspicious relations or reproach by their enemies. They, between" the states which belong '.to have much resented suggestions by*,, the Warsaw Pact and those which the West.that the continued presence belong to Nato. of Russian troops in Czechoslovakia. In fact the Russian leaders them_ complicates questions of general'-.'. selves are well aware that the occu- European security and ought, there- ,pation, of Czechoslovakia cannot; be fore, to come up at any future East- forgotten. They failed to prevent thb West conference on the subject. No subject's being , raised at the World doubt a great deal will be made of the ? Communist Conference, and a nuhn- argument that, if west Germany feels ber of communist parties continue to Czechoslovakia no obstacle to better deplore it. Each action which M01- relations with Warsaw Pact countries, cow regards as a further step towards no other Nato governments have any " normalization " within the country excuse for tender scruples. is seen outside as an example, of The argument works both ways. If abnormality. The progressive degra- Russia has now signed a treaty with dation of Mr. Dubcek is watched west Germany whereby both sides everywhere with dismay. Arrests of eschew the use of force and recognize Intellectuals and trade unionists are the existing borders in Europe as in- deplored.' The possibility that some ,violable, what arc the Russian troops of those involved in the spring of up to in Czechoslovakia 7 It was 1968 will be tried is still,`with good always said in the East that they bad reason feared. to be sent in to forestall. an attack Czechoslovakia is today a pro- from west Germany. Nobody any- foundly unhappy country. There is where can pretend there is any risk of an enormous gulf bctwoc govcrn- i that today. Can it really be, after all, menu and people, and an absolute that the Russian garrison of Czecho- conflict of ~interests between the slovakia is purely punitive, to prevent ,people and the Russians. Yet Czech's the Czechs and Slovaks from expres- `slovakia remains. a test case for E'- sing themselves politically, intellec- ope. If, as must be hoped, the treaty tually, economically, or in any other . between Russia 'and west Germai%y way? is followed up by similar measures Of course it is. But the continued affecting other ? countries in cast' Russian pretence that it is not com-, Europe, including Czechoslovakia. a' plicates the affairs of Europe as a formal detente will ensue. This could whole. The invasion of Czedto- . have its values. But a true detente, as alovakia hold up such measures of de- understood by most governments and tente as the S.A.L.T. talks and the.... peoples in east and west Europe, is German treaty. It continues to hold. something more than the fossilization' up the security conference which of frontiers. It involves travel as well the Russians themselves so ardently as trade; the. exchange of ideas as desire. It is because of the bad faith - well as a truce to threats. This sort of over ? Czechoslovakia . that the West'- detente cannot be attaintd so long as, feels obliged to scrutinize Russia's Czechoslovakia is kept in a mould words so closely. which her peoples almost unani. Tha'' "Brezhnev. doctrine" .of mously' reject, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 . Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 CPYRGHT MW YORK TIMES CPYRGHT 30 August 1970 Ulbricht Mixes ` Bullying BONN-Ever since the reign of Frederick the rea years ago,, the rulers of the sandy Brandenburg' Plain that used to be called Prussia have preferred to bully concessions out of neigh- bors rather. than to negotiate them. Walter Ulbrlcht, the chief Main of Prussia's successor state, Communist East Germany, is no exception to this rule. Over the last 25 years he has proved to be a master of abtrotzen--liter= ally to spite something out of an opponent, in the sense of bullying. In terms of geopolitics the .men who ruled from Berlin may well have felt compelled to 'adopt bullying as a means of survival, sitting as they did astride the north-south and east- west communication lines of Europe and having virtually no natural defenses on their fron- tiers. But Mr. Ulbricht has an- other strength lacking in most .bullies. At critical moments he can be infinitely flexible. His ability to be both obsti- nate and flexible undoubtedly contributes to an explanation why his German Democratic Republic has become as secure and strong as it is today. There Is no question that Mr. Ulbricht Is bitterly upset by the turn. of events in Europe sig- naled by the treaty of "cooper. ation" signed Aug. 12 between {his biggest ally, the Soviet Un- Ion? and his biggest foe, West Germany. His dissatisfactions with the Moscow treaty are manifold. lie regards it, as a compact with' tyhe capitalist enemy at the ex-,. pense of the Communist, cause.{ 'He"sees that it opens the gate for West German penetration of East Europe-the gate which lie personally succeeded in keep- ing closed all these years-and creates competition for most of his foreign trade. Finally, "nor- malization of relations" be- tween Bonn and East Bertin+ would subject East Germany to far more "subversive.", West; German influence' than at any; time'since Ile, built thi ]Alta Wall nine years ago.. ; YL :With -Flexibility Mr. Ulbricht showed this dis-' atisfaction by remaining silent fore, during and after the oscow negotiations, by playing own the event to the allow-' ble minimum in his party press nd later by Instructing his inisterial council to issue a'. eclaration. Interpreting the trea- as a call for diplomatic rec- gnition of his own Government- y West Germany and the other,' extern powers. Tass, the offi-' iai Soviet press agency, rapped r. Ulbricht's knuckles imme- ! lately by deleting those very i assages of the ministerial dec- aration ? which ran counter to he Bonn-Moscow accord. Shorts' y thereafter, the Soviet party paper, Pravda, editorially criti- cized Mr. Ulbrioht's view , of Bonn. The Russians followed up this almost unprecedented rebuff, to' their strongest ally by summon. ing Mr. Ulbricht to Moscow along with the other European Communist rulers allied in the Warsaw Pact to issue a seal of approval for the Bonn-Moscow pact In the form of a joint com-- muniqud. Mr. Ulbricht came to Moscow, characteristically, with. the largest delegation.. And, Mr. Ulbricht promptly demonstrated his continued dis-. satisfaction with' theMosco%4' treaty and the Warsaw pact; cornmuniqud on the day of his ? tetutn, Aug. 22, through an edi- torial attacking West Germany I gwas published in the youth organization paper, Junge Welt (Young World). Yet for the moment Mr. Ul bricht appears to be almost:` alone in bucking the trend of, Central European affairs to-' ward compromise and coopera- tion. His consistent policies of keeping West Germany at arm's' length, of demanding nothing less than fuliscale diplomatic' recognition from Bonn, of dem-: onstrating the strength of his rand by harassing isolated West' lin--alt an in peril. CPYRGHT Moreover, he seems for the. .moment to have lost the posi- tion of primacy in East Europe and of even setting the tone of, Soviet policy in Germany which- 'he enjoyed during .and after' the 1968 Invasion of Czechoslo vakla. If the optimists In Bonn and ,Moscow are right, Mr. Ulbricht i will have to give ground on ' some or all of his policies in the "coming months. But past prac- tice shows that 77-year-old Walter Ulbrlcht will have a last, word, or perhaps' even -two or, three last words on t.0 settle- :'ments now pending for the ac-? cess. routes and frontiers that: curl in and around the Plain of Srao4sn ug and Bonin `1'.-!-iMV1D SJNDF.R Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 CPYRGHT THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 22 August 1970 Long-term agreement expected onn, Moscow wear trade pact? By Harry B. Ellis Staff correspondent of The Christian Sctence Monitor did not include West Berlin within the scope of the pact. Meanwhile, Moscow negotiated five-year trade agreements, each to run from 1970 Bon through 1974, with France and Italy. The west ermany soon may join its major Common Market partners in having a long term trade agreement with the Soviet Union. Soviet - West German trade has grown steadily in recent years, though shorn o the benefits of a formal trade pact, which the Kremlin refused to' renew after expira= Lion of the last agreement in 1963. A primary reason was the sticky problem of West Berlin, which Moscow insists is a7i independent political entity. Bonn says the isolated city is linked economically to the Successive West German governments have declined to sign trade agreements, that )lave one-year. trade pacts with the Soviets, t be willing to accept a "Berlin clause" to. (Most major non-Communist powers main.,: t it, tam two embassies in Brussels-one ac?s i an Government and tne: sty not named .+e)g other to the EEC. This clause would not name the-city, butt As matters how stand, West Germany! i mply needs the approval of the Council of uld specify that the trade agreement was, s Ministers of the EEC to negotiate a bilateral v lid 'within the territory of the D?mark trade treaty with the Soviets, within guide-; est_'nr Writ German curre li -'_-- _ ncy nes laid ' mania, and other Communist powers, Growing EEC stressed when they negotiated formal trade agree. West German Foreign Minister Walter ments with the federal republic. Scheel, during his recent political negotia The 1961 Soviet-West German trade pact, tions in Moscowstressed to Kremlin lead- ) which ended in 1963, simply said that the ers the need for'- Moscow to recognize the i pact covered the same territory as an "'reality" of an, integrated and growing", earlier 1958 agreement. The Soviets claim EEC. there was no specific inclusion of West Ber- Soviet-West German trade, meanwhile, lin in the 1958 pact. I jumped 57 percent between 1967 and 1969, Now the climate has so improved that: due partly to a major pipeline-natural gas i Vest German Economics Minister Karl, deal. chiller and Minister for Science and Edu- The Soviets will deliver Siberian natural ation Hans Leussink will fly to Moscow in gas to West Germany through a pipeline toptember for trade and technical talks. be furnished by German steelmakers..' Chancellor Willy Brandt's government Lengths, of giant pipe already are being ould like to get a Soviet -West German ..shipped east under aegis of this deal. rade agreement tucked away before the In 1969,. West Germany sold to the Soviets nd of 1972, when Common Market mem goods worth 1.5 billion marks ($410 million), era , lose the . right to negotiate bilateral: and bought Soviet products worth 1.3 billion r: rade treaties with third-. eountrles that do' marks (nearly $360 million) in return. at eta (EEC)the he European Econo{nlc,Com In 1958, when the Common'Market came. .+ : > ... ,.--~-r i-';:.+ : - ~'.' '? Into being,- the Soviet Union bought only 5 percent of its total imports from' EEC? `members. Today .that. share has risen to al most 10-percent M ?. CPYRGHT Negotiations scheduled Beginning in 1973, the Commission of the European Communities is scheduled to: negotiate trade treaties with such third! parties, on behalf of member states of the' six-nation Common Market. Once that deadline is past, Moscow would have to extend formal recognition to the, EEC in order to negotiate a trade agree-, Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 27 August 1970 Soviet truck . complex with West Germans to help i Plant By Harry B. Ellis A billion-dollar truck plant centering on Daimler-Benz may be the economic first fruits of the recently signed Soviet-West, German treaty of cooperation. The German automotive firm, maker of -Mercedes cars and trucks, for months has been discussing with Soviet' officials con- struction of a giant factory complex in the Soviet Union. The projected plant, according to press reports, would turn out 150,000 heavy trucks yearly, each with a payload capacity of 10 to 20 tons. The plant would be built on the 'Kama River, a major tributary of the Volg'$. Ford turned down Daimler-Benz, according to present think- ing, would be the focal point of a European consortium, including Fiat of Italy, Renault of France, and Daf of Holland. This is the same project Henry Ford turned down, following a study trip to the So. -viet Union. Mr. Ford told stockholders the project was beyond Ford's financial ca- pacity. The U.S. Defense Department is known to have opposed American participation, on grounds that the huge truck plant would in- crease the Soviet Union's military potential. "it certainly will," declared a knowledg- able source. "But wasn't it realized in Wash- ington that the Soviets would get their plan 'anyway? The difference is, European firm now will have the business, not America companies." West German. Government officials ha llo confirmed the lively interest of Chance ...Willy. Brandt's government. In tht massiv struck project. Project called huge The likelihood is that the government will taken by Daimler-Benz and other West Ger. .man supplier firms. e project is so huge that It will draw anufacturers,but dozens of smaller sup- iers of parts suppliers. Economics Minister Karl Schiller will viet hosts" during the Minister's forth- West German Foreign Minister Walter. 1 ading up to the Soviet-West German treaty: w materials to be supplied The Soviet Government, Informed sources! kings partly through the delivery of raw aterials - oil, timber, natural gas, and' o1ers - to Western Europe. viet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin is said a ility of the Soviet Union to supply a varied lit of raw materials. good deal of negotiation lies ahead b1fore the Soviet and Western governments; an banks have the project ready for, sifnmg. , yen at this stage, however, two thingi clear: The West Germans continue to move'. cad position east of the Iron Curtain. . The Soviet Union is demonstrably e rmany -- to modernize Its backward ' ve or a ease P79-01194A000400030001-9 25X1C10b L Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 CPY49Tved FOc L g st3~?8`J9~1 Refuse to Concede Defeat in Election By JOSEPH NOVITSKI epeetsl to Te New Yobk TrM SANTIAGd, Chile, Sept. 6- e conserve v Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez, the runner,up in Friday's' presiden- tial election in Chile, made It clear today that they did not accept the Marxist candidate's top place as final. A statement made on behalf of the political parties and in- dependent organizations that supported Mr. Alessandri, a former President running as an independent, noted that the process of electing the next President of Chile had not been completed. Dr. Salvador Allende, the Marxist candidate of a leftist coalition, won a plurality of 39,338 Votes in the three-candi- date election, but for direct election under Chile's Constitu- tion, a candidate must receive a majority of the votes. Thus the Chilean Congress, in a joint session 'on Oct. 24, will decide between Dr. Allende and Mr. Alessandri, the top two can- didates. Mr. Allende has at least 80 votes in the 200-member Con- gress, possibly outnumbering Mr. Alessandri's votes by al- most 2 to 1. RadImiro Tomlc Romero, the candidate of the ruling Christian Democratic party, finished a poor third in the electin and has publicly congratulated Dr. Allende on his victory. The statement today was the, first by Mr. Alessandri's sup- porters.since the election. The statement -- read by Enrique' Ortuza Escobar, a former Cabi- net minister under Mr. Ales- sandri did not comthit the cnservative parties to any definite course of action. How- ever, it indicated that they would fight In Congress to pre- vent the election of Dr. Ai- lende to the six-year presiden- tial-term beginning Nov. 4. signed by Mr. Alessandri and Pad 1' f00 4 ad his approval. It d: "We' appeal to democratic forces, to their representatives !women of Chile, who make up the iimmnense majority, to unite to defend the constitutional right to designate the Presi? dent of the country. "' Mr. Ortuza refused, to an- swer any questions after read-~ ing the statement. Meanwhile, the residents of this capital appeared to be ac= cepting the election results as normal. In other countries of Latin America, the outcome has been Interpreted as the first time that a Latin elector rate has voted to exchange a, capitalist society for a socialist one,' At a country club outside Santiago, well-to-do Chileans enjoyed their slightly English version of the good life. On. downtown streets, smiling, strolling crowds watched yo supporters of the losing cands , dates pay off election bets. Country Club Is Calm Young men and women leapt Into the shallow, cold waters of a reflecting pool in the down- town Plaza Bulnes. A young man wearing a sign saying "I supported Alessandri" walked around several downtown blocks trailing a long tail made of a torn sheet with a tin can' rattling at the end. By 10 this morning golfers n a tournament at the Prince f Wales Country Club in subs roan Las Condes were start- ng. their rounds among bloom- ng fruit trees: Five tennis urts were full, and families pith small children were wan- ering slowly around the ounds that have the snow- pped Andes as a backdrop. One of Mr. - Allende's cam- gn promises was to expropri- te the ?'? }~ and turn it Into a op.tar park. But few of the hilean members were willing o comment today on the elec- ioni results. "We'll wait and ee," said one. Young rugby players greeted ach other jokingly as Com- ade before a game got under ay on the club grounds. 'Perhaps they're hoping the, ongress will elect someone Ise,' said the referee, after e'game. 'If the club's going to be expropriated, they. might'. as welt- enjoy it while CPYRGHT 0030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT CPYRGHT THE EVENING STAR - Was6ington, D. C., Thursday, September 10, 1970 Aiessandri Offers New Chile, Election Special to The Star SANTIAGO -- A new righti t hands of the Christian Demo. crats," whose 75-vote bloc in the 200-seat Congress holds the bal-' Idenc , of Chile to Marxist oat., anc of power. dor Allende produced cries f foul play from the left today. And Allende forces called mass rally for this weekend "reaffirm victory and repudia the maneuvers of the right." The stop-Allende campaig , fighting an uphill battle, entire a significant phase late yeste - day when former Presider t Jorge Alessandri, the runneru in Friday's election,. announce that if congress named hi president over the popular-vo winner, Allende, he would resi to set the stage for new ele tions. Congress Is scheduled choose Oct. 24 between the to two candidates, since no one r ceived an absolute majority i the three-way race. On thre previous occasions when Cot - gress had to elect the preside it always picked the man wh had gotten the highest popula vote. Party Holds Balance A source close to Alessan said the candidate's statem "puts the entire ball game In Allende's Popular Unity coali- tion has about 80 seats. Alessan- dri' backers have 45. e incentive for the Christian De ocrats, as Alessandri back- ers see it, is the chance to wir, a new election, as well as to pre- vent a Marxist government from taki g power for the first time any here in South America. R domiro Tomic,, the Chris tian Democrats'candidate, plac third in the balloting. Pre 'dent Eduardo Frei could not arry the Christian Demo- crat standard because the con- stit on forbids anyone froml bein elected twice in succes- sion :.:S Frei Might Run In a new election, however, it; is p sumed that Frei could run, sine : `Alessandri would have served an intervening term, even if it lasted but a day. Frei tro ced Allendd' in the 1964 clec on and still is regarded as the ost popular political figure. in C ' e. reformist views of the Ian Democrats are closer to nde's than to Alessandri'e, and . the party's congressmen have been expected t6 put' Al. lende in office. - But Alessandri now has moved to guarantee that a vote for him would not put him In power but would mean new elections. - Communists Angry If congress elects him he said, ould pave the way for a new He would, not be a candidate mself in such an election "for The reaction from the left to- was quick and sharp. Com- unist party Senator. Volodial oral suicide" which will end gically." The Communist party newspa- . El Siglo headlined, "Crimi. I Mummies Seek Civil War." 0 Chile, an Allende organ,: lied it a "dirty maneuver." , e Allende camp began or nizing a huge weekend rally a show of popular support. e political maneuvering Is un-j ining is expected. Christian Democrats, who named a five-man commit- to . Study the situation and tt, to ",party's national. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT NEW YORK TILES 16 September 1970 FREI PARTY SEEKS CHARTER CHANGE Wants to Assure Democrac If Allende Takes Office plurality-but not the majority required by the Constitution- in a three-way race in which the Christian Democratic Can- didate finished last. The election is to be decided by Congress, which has sched- uled a font session for Oct 24 to choose between Dr. Allende and the tanner-up, former Pres- ident Jorge Alessandri Rod- riguez. In such run-offs the candi- . date with the popular pluralit ' ship took some important steps in reparation for negotiations he needs to become President. Last night the party leader- give Dr. Salvador Allende, the Marxist candidate, the support decide quickly whether It wil election Sept. 4 after six year e r s an Democratic par By JOSEPH NOVITSKI 6peotal to Tim New Took Ttmw SANTIAGO, Chile Sept. 2 within Chile's democratic framework or whether his Gov- %ernment might become a dic- tatorship of the Wt. "Our party knows that the ,danger is real," said one mem ber, who Insisted on remaining anonymous. The Christian Dem- Qcratia leadership has given or , y q has traditionally been chosen) down to his Dry as having de. by Congress, although the on. livered Chili to the Commun. stitution does not require this tsts," said a Christian Dem- ocrat. "If w vote for Alesssan. To Assure Democracy dri, we'll b blamed for super The Christian Democrats, ac. porting the right against the cording to party members, are people, who had freely trying to satisfy themselves on more raps process of social the question whether Dr. Al- hange." ders that no member involved in the party decision can make his views known publicly. In an attempt to obtain iron. clad guarantees that the next Presidential election, in 1976, would be a free one, the par- ~,ty leadership was understood to have approved last night a at amendments embodying such guarantees, which might be adopted before Oct. 24. Talks Start This Week ins with -Dr. Al. lende \ are expected to start this week nd the results asp to be sub tted to a Christian; Democratic party congress; about the e id of September. The Chris ian Democrats have identified the press, the policel and armed orces, and the edu-i cational sy tem as three areas) of national ife that would have' to remain untouched under Dr. Allende s coalition govern. By mean 'o7 a Communist party depu and sympathetic journalists nions, the Allende coalition 'ha already begun tb put pressur on independent or opposing r dio stations and newspapers to recognize the 62-year-old hysician as Presi- . dent-elect b fore Oct 24. Some have yielded. Others have re- fused. , "If we vo a for Allende and his govern nt turns to doo- trinaire Ma ism we could o Dr. Allend 's coalition, based, in the Soci ist.and Commun-! st parties, ntrols 80 of.-the 00 votes in the two houses of ongress. H needs at least ome of the votes of the 75 Kristian' De ocratic Senators . nd Deputi at the joint ses4 Ion of Oct. m; on r404 4. %, A CPYRGHT m1 p atW !vFWMse 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Thursday. Sept. 17,19410 C PYRG HT C PYRG HT Chile's Powerful Publishing amily Fighting Marxist By Lewis H. Dluguid Washington Post Foreign Service SANTIAGO-Onp of tho Chilean institutions most di- rectly affected by the elec-` toral victory of Socialist Sal, ?vador Allende is the news` paper that tried so hard to defeat him, El Mercurio. Allende has vowed to see The daily wrested from the Edwards f a in i i y that has wielded it for 143 years, dur- ing which time the paper has earned an International rep utation. A day after Allende was placed first in the popular vote for the presidency, the,l at morning Mercurio fell to half the weight that it car-' tied lightly through years of battle against the political left. It hesitated a couple of objective editions, then Pub- lisher Agustin Si Edwards .III made his decision: "We'; will stay and fight," said a? spokesman. "We will s t a y,j until freedom ceases to Gist." The program of the Popu- ! lar Unity Front backing' Marxist Allende says: "Com- munications media are fun damental aids in the forma-" tion of a new culture and a new man. They must be im- printed with an educational t orientation, liberating them from their commercial char- beter ... eliminating the sad presence of monopolies.". No Chilean could doubt that the monopoly referred to is the Edwards chain of papers, of which Santiago's.; 114ercurio Is the most formi-. dible. All major Chilean cities, have their own Mercurlos; which take most of their news and all of their opin- ion from the capital edition. 1? 'Edwards also owns a major afternoon paper here.. While the capital endures about ten dailies, most are owned or dominated by a political party or the gov ernment. Among this melange o!1 low-circulation sheets, Mer- curio looks quite disinter- ested despite its unabashed plumping of 'a free-enter-r prise system that somehow, never caught on. in Chile. Mercurio, which domt- ',nates the advertising mar- ket, Is also unique In that it;; attempts to offer a fairly' balanced report of news' from abroad. Pub ifs her Edwards-- namesake of the British'. sailor who jumped ship to take the hand of a fair Chi- 'lean- in Valparaiso in the4 19th century-is immediatei past president of the Inter=' American Press Association.} He is a founder of LATIN, a; ' joint effort by major Latin American newspapers to cre-, ate an alternative to North American and European wire services. Other Edwards family in terests are less controversial,' and often more profitable, than the newspapers: the Edwards Bank and the Chi- lean Consolidated Insurance Co., specializing in fire and accident insurance. The family provides the management and holds large percentages of shares in a brewing monopoly, a ifoodstuffs complex, several high-output farms (accord- ing to the spokesman, one was lost to the state under President Eduardo Frei's agrarian reform-which 'Mercurio bitterly fought). The Edwardses hold half the shares in a joint venture with Lever Bros., that domi- nates detergent sales. Various planks of Al. .lende's platform are aimed; at state takeover of these in- terests also. "All of our in-' ;vestments are in Chile," said the company spokesman. "We are going to try to -make them break the law to take ' us. If we leave with dignity, we will be able to come. back" Sources outside the Ed- wards organization say he reinvested his profits so dili- gently in Chile that a large portion of his assets are tied up-reducing his maneuver. ability and raising the ques- tion of how long he can. even meet payrolls in an economy now drum-tight be- Cause of the election results. Chile's political future is so confused that it is not' certain even that Allende will be president, much less that he will have parliamen- tary support sufficient;, to pass legislation taking over the Edwards holdings. But assuming Allende does take power, he proba- bly will be able to divide his opposition on this issue. De- feated Christian Democratic candidate Radomiro Tomic hinted that. he, too, would move against Edwards, though now the party is championing press freedom. And, every businessman ever betred by Edwards-prob- ably a majority of the small entrepreneurial class here -could find some retribu. tion in the takeover. Perhaps the secret of the Edwards success was his capital and willingness to in- vest it. This found expres- sion in a high quality of em- ployees. The Communist newspa. per El Siglo tried to show the completeness of Al lende's victory the night of Sept. 4 by running a story about how Mercurio em- ployees danced on the edi- torial room fluor. If somone danced, he was unaccompanied. Mercurio wages are low by interna- F tional standards but atop the prevailing Santiago .scale. Top management peo- ple are well, paid by any standard. Employees are, loyal. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9' CPYRGHT CPYRGHT If Mercurio carries ouf the decision to stay and' wage a legal fight against expropriation, it will have as a model the classic case of the Buenos Aires La Prensa in neighboring Argentina. La Prensa stood off dicta tor forced out the owners When Peron was thrown outj 15 years ago, the paper was! returned to its owners. ' Sources within Allende's, front foresee no problem 1nI Minding a pretext to move, such as a craft union strike, ."requiring" national inter. ,vention. Then Allende might' put into effect the plan he ihas alluded to In speeches, a .',workers' cooperative to dish` ,place management along the lines of a takeover recently jn Peru. There is already a Chilean' precedent in a Valparaiso paper, in receivership, that iwas reopened by- its work- 'ers. Should the Mercurio pap-] ers be taken over by work-, , ers loyal to Allende, he rcould move into a near mon opoly of the press even as' he would almost surely con trol all television-one chan?, nel belongs to the state, an. s" and the third, the Catholic ;.University station, Is in thej { hands of the Christian Dem- ocratic dissidents who'$ Pumped over, to Allende's' !;front. The o n 1 y unaffiliated" daily of importance outside'] the Mercurio chain is Clarin, a sensationalist tab-i f loid with an editor whose, k professed ideology -Is I aligned with Fidel Castro's. J Clarin shifts loyalties occa- sionally, but came on so Agustin Edwards is out of the country. The com- i pany says he is abroad to hold up delivery of the last 4 of the heavy equipment for' the new plant, and to avoid efforts to link him with any possible coup efforts In com ing days. ` It is to some extent a j measure of the power of El's Mercurio that its candidate, 1 Jorge Alessandri, 72 and) Without effective political; sacking, came within less than 2 percentage points old peating Allende. While Mer? e ;purlo has carried out cam- Paigns before in its news] eolumns, there is no prece-~ pent for this perhaps final ffort. "We gambled and we ost," said the spokesman. The Edwardses were mod ernizing' 'capitalists in the{ orth American mold, but, !Chile is a long way from the' 'United States and quite afferent economy. If Mercurio disappears the country will have lost an, Imperfect voice that mays prove difficult to replace.,4 Communist-led students will have lost a favorite, target o5 their frustrations. The cliff ,max of most rallies was e march on the U.S. consulate, by the park, or on El Mercu-E rio downtown--a wait at the ;Corner for the green light and then shouting and up., l'oar, Into the dignified mar-1 bled foyer of the newspaper any hated, and most ever. ne read. immediate future Is proba4 -ly assured.,,_." Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030`t FIGHT NEW YORK TIMES 7 September 1970 Chile's Leading Marxist! SANTIAGO. Chile, Sept. 6 r --As a medical student 40 years ago, Salvador 'Allende discovered in Marxist-Lenin- ' St criticism of capitalist so-! 'clety a revolutionary ponse to the social and eco-1 ,omic ills of Chile. Dr.~ Allende, who won a i :tplurallty in Chile's presiden- tial: election Fri- Man day, at the age in the of 62 still calls himself a' Marx- New'i ist, but :he is quite a different type, of revolutionary from Fidel Castro or He Chi Minh. He is an ambitim~anbut he' times angry does not believe in violence. .His long political career, from student activist to the -threshold of Chile's presi-' dency. hay , been ' within' Chiles democratic parliamen-, At- 'There are many Latin' Americans who do not be- lieve that the electoral.proc- ,:ess of bourgeois democracy, ,can produce good govern'rent," he said before last i week's election. "They would. .favor power achieved only by. ,a revolution of the'masses, by the armed struggle. A victory by the electoral route will be difficult for us, but it is the .best way by far for Chile." Dr. Allende has a reputa- tion of being tolerant of the political views of others. You can disagree with Al- lende,and still be his friend,". said a Christian Democrat re- cently. However, Or. Allende heads a leftist coalition that has as`; its core the strong Chilean Communist party. He has proposed an "anti-imperial- gramhat would dissolve the present Congress, nationalize, it at major foreign companies,. and develop, close ties be- tween Chile and Communist Vietnram, ,phiniticlud andgCub - Salvador Allende By JUAN de ONIS Attacks Power of Wealth. By nationalizing the rbank- ing system and carryi g out a drastic agrarian reform, also called for In his pro- gram, Dr. Allende would des- troy the 0itical and eco- nomic power of Chile's few wealthy families, vd11c1 has been a constant In his long pol' In this, Dr. lAllende reflects a deep political of the middle :class . leftists against the Ifew rich families that form the only private economic ppparer roU1' I t thiis C'MOR Fire Waefa is a' ready controls most basic en- terprise, including oil, rail- roads, steel and power. This next government will open the door to the estab-' lishment nr socialism In, Chile," said Dr. Allende last week. According to the codli tion program, Chile's funda-, mental problems of poverty,,' housing, and hunger, are the result of the privileges of "al bourgeoise structurally de-1 pendent on forei n capital.", The new' government wily end this "domination'" and, begin "the construction of. socialism,"-he said. "We recognize that social- C Ism cannot be achieved over-, .night," he said. "You cannot; bring about socialism by de-` cree. It is a lengthy social, process, and -each country' .must find its own way. r He .said that a, socialist 'Chile would not be modeled. after Cuba or any other na-, tion. ""Chile is different," he said. "For one thing, we are'i much better off industrially, than Cuba was at the start, of her revolution. We don't .have to import shoes or all the other things that: Cuba,, lacked so completely." Rejects One-Party System ; One of the key steps in Dr. 'Allende's program Js the re- placement of the present constitutional systerN which places legislative power in A9lyo houses--a Senate. and. ._.,'.;mbcr of Deputies---biy an "assembly, of the pcnple,' an elected body that would se- lect new judges for the su- preme court. When asked at a news conference yesterday if the left-wing coalition he headed planned to establish a one- party system, Dr. Allende re- plied: "never!" Dr. Allende, a, Socialist Senator, has the support of the Communist and Radical parties. In his campaign he sought ,to assure voters that his gov-' ernment would' be hard on foreign imperialists byt gentlb and cautious In bringing about the texture of Chilean life, always with- ,the agreement of the people and their elected representa- tives. But some critic doubt that his Government would be gentle. "Allende is not himself a .Communist; but the strongest single group behind his candi dacy is the Communist :party," one said. "lie will seem to be gentle, but it will be the iron fist in the velvet glove. If he is elected it will ust be a matter of time be- ore most of Latin America becomes Marxist." Headed Health Ministry i4a entered politics as medical student at the Uni- versity of Chile during th dictatorship of Gen. Carlo Ibanez, who ruled from 192 . td lgal, kENN(int activities landed Mr. Allend In jail, but he also w elected vice president of th student federation the yea he received his medical d peg in 1932. A year later, Dr. Allend and a group of other forme student leaders and Marxis intellectuals founded th Chilean Socialist party. H was elected a national de uty In 1937, 'after havin practiced medicine for a fe years in provincial cities. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400030001-9 CPYRGHT 1939, he became Minister of Health in the "popular front"Government of President- Pedro Aguirre Cerda. A major equake that Year tested Dr.AAlle de's ad. ministratlve abilities. His di-. rection of relief efforts In the disaster, in which 20,000 per.., Sons (fied, earned him a' national reputation. Shortly. afterward, he pub- Ilshe,d "Socio-Medical. Prdb?, lems of Chile," a book that+~ attacked Chile's capitalist so-". :tial structure as a cause of: nutritional and other gl. , ,nesseg ~meng the poor. In 1939, tied ortensa Mr. a stet s