CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 103
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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November 1969
THE SOVIET POLITICAL SCORECARD WITH ARAB AND BLACK AFRICANS
During the fifteen months since the Soviet-led invasion of Czecho-
slovakia sparked an:.almost unanimous and certainly unprecedented wave of
blunt condemnation of the Soviet Union from most of Africa's independent
leaders, the Soviet visage throughout Africa has markedly altered. Even
though the Soviet position may be primarily governed by events which are
beyond Moscow's control, wherever the Soviet position is particularly pre-
carious, it has been mostly Moscow's own doing. The period has also been
marked by growing African antipathy to "imported ideologies," to Sino-
Soviet rivalries and polemics, and to Soviet disregard of "nationalism"
and "sovereignty."
Especially in black Africa, together with the growth of a more prag-
matic attitude toward relations with the Soviet Union, there has evolved
a better comprehension of the risks incurred from a large Soviet presence
and from Communist (particularly Soviet) involvement and meddling in in-
ternal matters. The Soviets have lost political prestige in much of black
Africa as a result of some ruptured diplomatic relations, ousters of Sovi-
et personnel, antagonisms brought on by continued Soviet support for Arab
causes, or the tautening of some already strained relations because of
Soviet intrusions into territorial waters. Particular concern has been
voiced, in the wake of student disorders, about overly large Soviet mis-
sions.
The greatest Soviet gains have been scored by re-enforced ties with
Arab states and by an increased presence in Nigeria. Soviet reactions to
the most recent military coups (Libya, the Sudan, and Somalia) indicate that
the USSR assesses them in the same light: as golden opportunities for pur-
suing her objectives in North Africa, the southern Mediterranean, and the
Horn of Africa. But there are limitations even on those factors favorable
to the Soviets: frictions exist between Moscow and the Arab leadership,
the government in Lagos can hardly be called pro-Soviet, and none of the
new revolutionary council leaders has rushed into the Soviet orbit.
The following paragraphs score the political ups-and-downs of the
Soviet Union in her African dealings over the past few months. Clearly
each case is oversimplified, since little or no reference is made to in-
ternal political ramifications which in many instances had a direct bear-
ing on the outcome. However, the aim is not to analyze the individual
cases in detail, but rather to search out overall patterns which will in-
dicate how Soviet-African relations are evolving. The only cases cited
are those where in the past few months some notable or occasionally dra-
matic change has occurred to alter either the African view of the Soviet
presence or the Soviet evaluation of a given African state in terms of
Soviet geopolitical goals.
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Algeria: the Soviet presence and influence have increased -- a real plus.
The December 1968 trade agreement committed the Soviet Union to import
over the next seven years, three-fourths of Algeria's wine product and ten
percent of her crude oil production. Since it was signed, Soviet "advisors"
have increasingly worked their way into all sectors of Algerian social, in-
dustrial, and military life; they are outstandingly numerous in Algerian
strategic industries, oil and mineral resources. They predominate in
scientific-technical instruction.
A cultural exchange agreement and a protocol on the joint recognition of
educational diplomas were signed in May 1969. The Algiers daily newspaper
El Moudjahid reported 24 May that as a result of the agreements, the 100 So-
viet teachers already in Algeria would be augmented by additional higher edu-
cation teachers, particularly in the sciences, bring the total to 250, and that
Russian language instruction would be extended in both universities and secon-
dary schools.
The number of Soviet advisors in Algeria is most commonly estimated at
3,500. The "Arabization" of Algerian education appears to have been partly
deflected-by the need to communicate with these Soviet technicians and ad-
visors; it has obliged the Algerians to complicate their educational system
by introducing Russian language teaching down to the secondary level.
Frictions also crop up, however. While President Podgorny was visiting
in Algiers in spring 1969, President Boumedienne publicly called, in Podgorny's
presence, for the removal of "all forms of foreign presence from our Mediter-
ranean Zone." When the outlawed Algerian Communist Party turned up in Moscow
at the June 1969 International Communist Conference, Algeria's official paper,
Revolution Africaine, accused Moscow of "an unfriendly gesture and of inter-
fering in Algerian internal affairs."
Burundi: the Soviet presence cut -- a minus.
A 21 August 1969 newscast announced that President Micombero had of-
ficially requested the Soviet Union to reduce its "effective personnel" in
Bujumbura from sixteen to eight. The surplus Soviet personnel were asked to
be out of the country by 30 August.
Congo (Kinshasa): Communist curtailment -- a minus.
In the Congo, where officials have long been distrustful because of close
contacts established by members of over-staffed Communist, and particularly
Soviet, missions with students, trade unions, and Communist sympathizers, the
June 1969 student disorders sparked strong government action. General Mobutu
suspended Congo (K) diplomatic relations with Bulgaria on 20 August 1969 in
what has been interpreted as a warning to all Communist diplomats to stay out
of internal Congolese affairs. Recall that in June 1968 the Soviets were
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again permitted to reopen their own embassy in Congo (K), but under strin-
gent limitations. The Soviet ambassador's arrival in June 1968 marked the
third time that the Congo and the USSR had established diplomatic relations.
Twice previously the Soviets were expelled for having meddled in "internal
Congolese affairs."
Ethiopia: Soviets expelled -- a minus.
Because of suspected Communist involvement in Ethiopian student dis-
orders in March 1969, three Soviets and three Czechoslovak officials were
declared personae non gratae on orders from the Emperor. Specific charges
against the Soviets cited anti-government broadcasts by Radio Moscow, dis-
semination of Soviet propaganda publications in Addis Ababa, and extensive
contacts with students in violation of a government edict.
Ghana: very strained relations -- a minus.
In October 1968 the Ghanaian navy seized two Soviet trawlers and their
50-man crews were placed under arrest on charges of violating territorial
waters and suspicion of being engaged in subversive activities. The ships
and crews were not released until March 1969, and then only after the USSR
threatened Ghana militarily with gunboat diplomacy. The Soviets also ap-
plied economic pressures by threatening to default on the Soviet-Ghanaian
trade agreement and canceling crude oil shipments.
Guinea: Soviet subversion revealed -- a minus.
Even in Guinea, long considered as the last holdout of the West African
states who enjoyed "friendly and fraternal" relations with Moscow, the USSR's
image got a black eye: It was learned that a Soviet embassy protocol officer
had been secretly consorting with a Guinean accomplice of the 24 June, would-
be assassin of President Sekou Tour6. The Soviet protocol officer, arrested
after a drunken brawl, on 23 July 1969, reportedly openly confessed his in-
trigues to ,the Gunean.police and implied that the Soviet ambassador was
also involved.
In Guinea, the matter was hushed up; the story didn't make the interna-
tional press for two months. President Tours took no other action than to
dispatch a high-level diplomatic mission -to Moscow in order to impress the
USSR with the seriousness with which Guinea viewed the "incredible activi-
ties" of the Soviet embassy in Conakry. Reporting the event in the 21 Sep-
tember Nairobi Sunday Post, a columnist noted that such affairs were "a
luxury that no foreign mission can afford if it wants to keep its influence."
Ivory Coast: relations ruptured -- a definite minus.
President Felix Houphouet-Boigny cited his suspicions of Soviet in-
volvement in the Abidjani student disturbances of 19-20 May as his reason
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for formally breaking off diplomatic relations with the USSR later in the
same month.
Kenya: Soviets expelled -- a minus.
The present regime has always taken a hard line with suspected meddlers
and has expelled thirteen Soviets in the past three years. In April 1969 a
Soviet embassy first secretary and the Pravda correspondent were sent pack-
ing because of their suspected involvement in subversive activities -- in-
cluding the fomenting of troubles with students. In a later warning issued
publicly to "certain foreign missions" Kenyan Vice President Daniel Arap
Moi was quoted in the 6 August East Africa Standard as "deploring the use
of Kenya as a battleground for propaganda," referring specifically to Sino-
Soviet polemical exchanges.
Libya: the new look -- a plus.
Moscow recognized the Revolutionary Command Council almost immediately
after the monarchy of King Idris was toppled on 1 September 1969. By 2 Sep-
tember, Radio Moscow was treating Libya with Soviet views on Libyan foreign
policy, which also spelled out her own goals in Libya -- increasing her own
influence while restricting or eliminating that of her adversaries. The
broadcast, beamed to Libya in Arabic, stressed that "imperialism is the chief
enemy of the Libyan people" and noted approvingly that "it is not by chance
that the Council of the Libyan Revolution has stated that the activity of
the Republic will be directed. against imperialism and neo-colonialism....
Libyan public opinion considers the liquidation of foreign military bases
as an important step toward ... independence and security.... Putting an
end to plundering by Western ... oil monopolies fully conforms to the radi-
cal interests of the Libyan people."
The next few months will see the Soviets concentrating on nurturing
Libya's "radical interests" and on assiduously developing a cordial work-
ing relationship with the Libyan government in command. Should Libya be
induced to emulate Algeria and the UAR in her policies vis-a-vis the USSR,
this trio which dominates the southern shore of the Mediterranean might well
fulfill the Soviet aspiration to permanent anchorage rights for Soviet
naval and merchant fleets in that sea.
On 19 September the press in Tripoli reported the arrival in Libya of
Colonel Ivanov, special envoy of USSR Minister of Defense Zakharov, who
came "to express congratulations on the revolution and to offer technical
aid." At this writing, no acceptance of any Soviet "offer" has been an-
nounced.
Mali: fighting the socialist option -- a tenuous minus.
The coup of November 1968 ousted one of Moscow's favored clients when
the army "seized power to put an end to the radicalization of Modibo Keita's
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Marxist regime." That a pro-Soviet Lenin Prize Winner -- the only African
head of state who publicly praised the invasion of Czechoslovakia -- was
evicted and replaced by a military junta did not seem to bother the USSR,
at least not outwardly. Not only did Soviet media refrain from comment about
the ouster, but less than a month after the coup Moscow was warmly welcoming
Mali's foreign minister who was there on a goodwill mission.
The military junta presently governing Mali is divorcing itself from
its legacy of "socialist option." But the move is being made only slowly:
many bureaucrats who were Keita-regime holdovers and who continued to advo-
cate the policies of the former regime were left in privileged positions.
Mali's foreign trade deficit continues to soar and well over one-half of her
imports from non-African countries still come from Communist sources. Con-
trasted with the past when, in 1966, Mali had an 82 percent deficit in the
balance of her trade with the USSR, there has been some improvement.
Once Soviet (or Communist) inroads have been. made,the residues of Soviet
influence are extremely difficult to remove. It has not proved easy to try
to cope with the economic sabotage practiced in the name of "socialism" by
large numbers of officials in the state-run corporations that still operate
in Mali.
Mali probably best typifies those states where, together with a deepen-
ing antipathy toward foreign ideology, there is also developing a more prag-
matic view of how to get along with major foreign powers: Mali's finance
minister admitted in a recent public statement that "if we are going to sur-
vive we need the Communist countries -- I must be pro-Communist when that
seems the best thing to do." This sentiment is balanced by the governing
junta's belief that they must also be pro-West when that seems best: in
August 1969 Mali applied to participate in a Peace Corps program.
Mauritius: Communist inroads -- a plus.
Because of its strategic location in the Western Indian Ocean, Mauritius
has received quite a bit of Soviet attention. Even before Mauritius, one of
the world's smallest states, became independent in March 1968, Soviet mer-
chant vessels and space-associated naval auxiliaries had been frequent callers
at Port Louis and Soviet warships paid their first visit there in April 1969.
A Mauritian-Soviet agreement signed in August 1969 by which the Soviets will
provide Mauritius with modern fishing vessels, train Mauritians in deep-sea
fishing techniques, and conduct local oceanographic surveys drew reservations
from the Mauritian press on Soviet motives behind the agreement. The Mauri-
tius Times on 29 August asked if the Soviet "aid" were not a "subtle way of
gaining a foothold in our port?" The question may have been partly answered
by a 27 October headline story in the Port Louis daily L'Express to the ef-
fect that Mauritius may shortly accord the USSR facilities for satellite
tracking and communications.
Morocco: new inroads -- a tenuous plus (offset by a big minus).
In the past few months, while Morocco signed a partial association agree-
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ment with the European Communities and continued to be on the receiving end
of sizeable Western aid projects, political inroads were made by the Soviet
Union. After a two-year struggle, AEROFLOT got transit rights from Rabat
for its Moscow-Algiers-Havana run; King Hassan finally agreed to a Soviet
naval visit to Casablanca and to the opening of a Soviet consulate there.
A five-year trade agreement was signed with the USSR in July 1968 and dur-
ing President Podgorny's March 1969 state visit the formalization of a joint
Soviet-Moroccan friendship society was announced. While he was in Rabat,
President Podgorny's March 1969 public statements stressed the people-to-
people aspects of Soviet - Moroccan relations -- thus implying an effort to
reach the Moroccan people over the head of the monarchy.
In September, the commercial gains made during the past few months were
offset by a serious political loss. During 1968, -King Hassan had permitted
the legalization of a new Party of Liberation and Socialism (PLS) headed by
Ali Yata, long a Moscow favorite. In June the PLS was represented at the
Moscow International Communist Conference where All Yata's public speeches
gave clear proof that his PLS was merely an emanation of the Moroccan Com-
munist Party, dissolved in 1960. Arrested and charged with reconstituting
a legally dissolved party, All Yata was publicly tried and sentenced in late
September to 10 years' imprisonment and his PLS officially disbanded.
Nigeria: the Soviet presence increased--- a plus.
Since 1967, when Moscow stepped in to help Lagos in its war against
Biafra, the Soviets have achieved a sizeable presence in Nigeria. Official
diplomatic representation, for example, doubled between July 1967 and April
1969. The November 1968 credit deal under which the Soviet Union agreed to
build a n iron and steel complex in Nigeria .'would be the largest aid
commitment the Soviets had made to any African state south of the Sahara.
Mineral resource surveys of the type the USSR will conduct in Nigeria in-
volve upwards of 200 technicians over a several-month period. The Soviets
might well hope to take over the full task of supplying arms, equipment,
and trainees to Lagos, believing that their investment will garner enough
gratitude and respect for Soviet help so that when the war is over, the in-
creasingly strong Soviet position could pay off handsomely in terms of com-
merical and other benefits.
Meanwhile, Moscow's actions on other fronts appear far from designed to
gain the "respect" of the powers-that-be in Lagos. On 5 March 1969 a Soviet
naval flotilla, which included two guided missile destroyers and a submarine,
turned up for a "surprise visit" in Lagos. The objective of the visit, ac-
cording to an AFP release, was to establish in Lagos a staging post for
Soviet naval and merchant fleets. The following month Pravda deplored the
"far from brilliant condition of Nigeria's industry." The article, pub-
lished 14 April, was a clear statement of Soviet support for those officials
who were recommending that Nigeria adopt an economy based on "scientific
socialism." The article, appearing just when Nigerians were beginning to
discuss postwar economic and political development, was an obvious attempt
to ensure that developments should evolve along lines acceptable to the
Soviet Union.
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Somalia: "socialist republic" -- a true plus.
The 21 October bloodless coup that ousted Prime Minister Egal's govern-
ment was a joint army-police takeover that replaced parliament with a revolu-
tionary council. The coup came within hours of the funeral of Somali's Presi-
dent Scermarche which had marked the end of a brief moratorium on politics,
declared when Scermarche had been assassinated five days earlier. Reportedly,
while Egal was maneuvering to elect a successor to Scermarche, the army, long
outwardly discontent with Egal's foreign policy of detente with Ethiopia and
Kenya, moved quickly, with police aid, to take control. The Scermarche (-Egal
team) image had become tarnished by increasing charges of corruption and nepo-
tism and the coup is viewed as being of purely nationalist inspiration. The
council immediately proclaimed their takeover as designed to put an end to
"widespread corruption" but in the same voice declared their intention "to
support freedom fighters."
It is the latter declaration that must most elate the USSR. Somalia's
Indian Ocean coastline partially accounts for the considerable Soviet invest-
ment in that country over the years. The Somali army is fully equipped by,
trained by, and dependent on the USSR. Until the coup, the USSR had sustained
a delicate balance by refusing to officially support Somalia's claims on Somali-
inhabited lands in Kenya and Ethiopia and had appeared to favor Prime Minister
Egal's detente efforts with both. Before the coup, all concerned chose to ig-
nore the reality that it was the Soviet Union alone which supplied the weaponry
that Somalia was accused of having distributed to rebellious dissidents in
Ethiopia. Since the coup, no one has given the Soviets due credit for having
supplied the arms and know-how that made the coup possible.
Sudan: "modern socialist" state -- a true plus.
The May 1969 military coup that overthrew Sudan's elected government gave
that country a Revolutionary Council and cabinet composed predominantly either
of members of the Sudan Communist Party (SCP) or of self-proclaimed socialists
-- while those who are neither, are at the least pro-Egyptian. The SCP, now
represented at the top control echelons in Sudan, is known as the best organized
political group in the country and is Africa's leading Communist Party. As long
as the political coloration of the Revolutionary Council and cabinet remains un-
changed, Moscow stands a good chance that the Communists can assume real con-
trol. And Moscow's main interest lies not in having another Communist nose to
count at party round-up time, but in having guaranteed and permanent access to
Sudan's Red Sea coastline.
To underline Sudan's shift away from dependence on the "imperialist" West,
the government has promised to expand its military and economic aid and trade
ties with Eastern Europe. Actually, aid and trade agreements with the USSR
will simply continue a policy to which the overthrown government was already
committed. What is new is that the Sudanese military, now primarily western
equipped and trained, will be reorganized along Soviet lines. Sudan's pre-
carious economic position, with insurmountable domestic and foreign debts and
foreign exchange reserves at the lowest ever, leaves her dangerously vulner-
able to the type of arms deal that several years ago put Egypt's cotton in-
dustry in pawn to the USSR.
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Tanzania and Zambia: "pot-boiling" opportunities -- a potential plus.
To develop influence in Tanzania and Zambia is almost a must for any out-
side country that would want to try and influence the liberation groups to
the south. The Soviets openly and officially declared their support for these
liberation groups at the January 1969 Khartoum conference for solidarity with
the freedom fighters of Portuguese and southern Africa. Freedom fighter
groups operate out of both Tanzania and Zambia; leaders of both countries
are dedicated to the liberation movement. Tanzania's President Nyerere es-
pecially has consistently declared that if the liberation of southern Africa
cannot be achieved through peaceful change, it must come with a "minimum of
violence." Although the Tanzanian military is almost wholly Communist-
Chinese equippped, President Nyerere's tour last month of East Europe and
the USSR may indicate a change in the wind, if for no other reason au *
counteract Nyerere's probable fear of overdominance by the Chinese, As a
result of recent border incidents that have further aggravated,Zambian-
Portuguese relations, Zambia wants an expanded military program and, for the
moment at least, is looking to the USSR.
In Tanzania and Zambia, the feeling that western capitalist countries
are prejudiced by both countries' national socialist goals has been fanned
by Communist propaganda. The latest example also shows how favorably the
Soviets view recent developments;inboth countries. In the 23 October 1969
Izvestiya, political commentator Viadimir Kudryavtsev hails the "social and
economic changes in Tanzania and Zambia" as of importance for all Africa.
Noting the strategic loca,fions of both, Kudryavtsev concludes that "the
success of the struggle of African peoples for liberation of the continent
from racialists largely depends on the consolidation of national independ-
ence of these countries (Tanzania and Zambia)."
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ASSOCIATED PRESS, Saigon
13 October 1969
VIETNAM ROUNDUP
by Robert D. Ohman
A record 35,000 enemy soldiers, political cadre and sympathizers have
defected to the government side this year, a South Vietnamese spokesman said
Monday. He said the defectors, listed as "ralliers" under the government's.
Chieu Hoi -- Open Arms -- Program, turned in more than 2,200 weapons. The
only year approaching the 1969 figure was in 1967, when the government said
27,178 persons switched to its side during heavy fighting throughout South
Vietnam.
The spokesman said that since February 18, 1963 when the government be-
gan its organized efforts to woo the enemy, 125,437 persons had rallied to
the government. He said that the massive propaganda campaign has also had
its. effect on the thousands of North Vietnamese soldiers who have moved in-
to the South. .897 defectors are listed as North Vietnamese.
The spokesman said that of the 125,437 persons who have rallied to date,
139 held the rank of lieutenant colonel or above or were military doctors,
engineers or district commissioners. He added that the Chieu Hoi appeal has
been most successful in winning over enemy troops. A total of 78,057 ral-
liers was reported from guerrilla or line units compared to 34,323 political
cadre and 13,057 who had been allied with the Viet Cong in varying degrees.
The spokesman gave these annual figures for ralliers:
12,248 - 1963
5,417 - 1964
11,124 - 1965
20,242 - 1966
27,178 - 1967
18,171 - 1968
32,057 mid September 1969 since which time
and additional 3,000 have rallied.
The GVN operates Chieu Hoi compounds throughout the country where ralliers
are generally given two months of indoctrination and occasionally some voca-
tional training. A limited number are now serving in provincial armed propa-
ganda teams, 6,366 now serve with South Vietnamese or allied military units
and 7,969 work for various government agencies.
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MOSCOW RADIO,(in Arabic)
1 October 1969
"A New Falsification by Imperialist Propaganda"
Despite the failure of the many attempts by imperialist propaganda to
cast a -s-hardow on Soviet-UAR relations and sow the deeds of doubt about the Soviet
Union in the hearts of Arabs, we still encounter such absurd attempts every now
and then. Western propaganda's base lie about the so-called purge of pro-Soviet
elements in the UAR and nonexistent complications in Soviet-UAR relations has not?
completely collapsed. But it seems that even this has failed to teach a lesson
to the persons paid to circulate false news and rumors.
Imperialist propaganda has embarked on weaving various imaginary fancies and
extremely ridiculous rumors.in connection with a so-called plot to snatch a
Lebanese plane. Two Soviet citizens, one of whom is a diplomat, are supposed to'
have taken part. No doubt this well-contrived propaganda falsification is of an
anti-Arab and anti-Soviet design. Reason cannot accept things which have been
cooked up in the Western propaganda kitchen, and are but a continuation of the
recent false campaign about the situation in the UAR, a campaign to which Arab
public opinion provided the proper reply.
But the attempts of Western propaganda to propagate lies about the Soviet Union,
.Soviet citizens and, particularly, Soviet diplomats, have failed many times, and
we must bear in mind that the motive behind those attempts has in many cases been
the desire of Imperialist circles to divert the attention of Arab public opinion
from the realities of the interference by Western stater in the internal affairs
of Arab countries. Recently, the Lebanese press expressed indignation at the illegal
activity of the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon.
In one of its editorials the Beirut SAWT AL-URUBAH exposed the ccl,.ipse relations
between the U.S. charge d1affaires, Mak, and reactionary elements in the country
who are trying to isolate Lebanon from the other Arab countries, which are
struggling to consolidate their freedom and indppendenee.
The same paper said: The Lebanese people fully realize the serious aims of Mak's
activity, which is directed at splitting the ranks of Lebanese society and isolating
Lebanon from its sister Arab countries in their common struggle against.Israeli
aggression.
The attempts by imperialist propaganda to drive a wedge in the constantly developing
relations of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and Arab countries
are doomed, for Arabs are well aware of the treacherous aims. of these attempts, and
are also aware of the importance of friendly Soviet-Arab relations to our world.
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MOSCOW RADIO (in Arabic)
2 October 1969
Imperialist and Zionist propaganda always uses any simple or trivial excuse--
even if completely. unfounded--to channel a torrent of base fabrications, utter lies, and
imaginary fancies to the Arabs in order to complicate relations among the Arabs and
weaken the Arab fron which is defending the.'aause of freedom, national independence,
and;.progress. This anti-Arab propaganda exerts gigantic efforts, egpeeiali3- in ei+dulate
ing anti-Soviet fabrications and impudent provocative rumors.
This is quite understandable, since the continuous consolidation of friendship and
cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Arab countries, based on mutual trust,
leaves the Arab countries unaffected by various imperialist intrigues and provides the
necessary ciroumstaned for the independent national development of the Arab countries,
a.matter which does not please the imperialist. That is why the-impudent imperialist
attacks on fi4endly Soviet-Ahab relations became boring a long time ago, and tlo not
surprise anyone.
What is surprising is the extremely repulsive and impudent way these imperialist, pro-
paganda bodies, which have been entrusted with concocting fabrications against the
Soviet Union, function. It seems that those in charge of this underestimate the mentality
of the people to whom they are channelling these dirty propaganda lies.. Imperialist
propaganda operates according to the principle that some of this utterly fabricated
propaganda may stick in then;itirids,,of some.
An example of this hateful and hideous propaganda is the provocative fuss being created
by Western propaganda about Soviet diplomats in Lebanon. Everyone knows very well than
this incident was totally concocted. Of interest, for instance, is the absurd and
serious attempt to accuse the Soviets of trying to steal a Mirage aircraft from the
Lebanese airport. Is it not absurd to speak about suc1tthLugs, when it,is known that the.,
Soviet Union, which has powerful supersonic aircraft and is exporting hundreds of splen-
did military and civilian aircraft to the Arab countries, is not in the least interested
in foreign aircraft, particularly of old design. Is there anyone who does.not under
stand that the Soviet Union has no practical or imaginary reason to disturb relations
with Lebanon 'or with any other Arab country? How then, can anyone believe the false
Western propaganda?
It is obvious, dear listeners, that the imperialist are engirisering a propaganda move
and that imperialist intelligence is preparing a provocation to disrupt Arab-Soviet
relations. It is clear why only a few Arab papers have fallen into the trap; imperial-
ist efforts ~o undermine friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the
Arab countries are futile and doomed.
Abd al-HadioAlt?Nasif, member of the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union ands
member of the UAR National Assembly, who is visiting the Soviet Union, has told Moscow
Radio correspondents There is no need to explain that all imperialist efforts to weaken
the friendly ties between-the Soviet Union and the Arab countries, between the Soviet.
Un_1,on and the UAR in particular, are doomed, because cooperation. and understanding
between the Soviet Union and the UAR and between the Soviet Union and all Arab countries
are stronger than ever, and facts show this every day. The attack by the imperiallsta
and their agents on Soviet-Arab relations only gives rise to indignation and disgust
among Arabs.
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WASHINGTON POST
24 October 1969
CPYRGHT
Bolivia: All. Dressed Up and No Place ,To Go
if it were hot so inherently pathetic, Bolivia's
seizure of the Gulf Oil Company holdings at Santa
Cruz would be laughable, an opera bouffe to the
cha cha cha. The regime, apparently forgetting for
the moment that Bolivia is landlocked, is now con-
fronted with an elementary truth, that it is no
use having a bundle of oil if there is no way of get-
ting rid of it. Specifically, the regime in La Paz
reckoned on a takeover of Gulf's oil fields without
comprehending that oil production was dependent
on Gulf's marketing .apparatus and tanker fleet.
From Santa Cruz, the oil flows by pipeline to-the
Chilean port of Arica on the Pacific. There it is
pumped into Gulf tankers headed for the United
States, where about 75 per cent. of it is sold. The.
refinery at Arica is now full, awaiting a Gulf tanker
to arrive this week. Understandably mindful of
its $140 million investment, and angry at the pros-
pect that the Bolivian action may set an unhealthy
precedent, Gulf -hasp diverted the tanker. Unless
the Bolivians find some way to empty the bins at
Arica, oil production will have to cease at Santa
Cruz. So the Bolivians are at the moment all
dressed up with no place to go.
The circumstances of the seizure tend to Inspire
sympathy for Gulf, a rare condition on a continent
so outrageously exploited by American corporatism.
By most accounts, Gulf has been a good citizen-
ready and willing to negotiate terms with the Bo-
livians (it reportedly was prepared to up its royalty
payment from 33 per cent to 50 per cent), and sen-
sitive to the problems of: Latin America's. poorest,
most chronically desperate nation. There Is every
evidence that General Ovando, . in office by coup
less than a month, has lost control of events and
proceeded with expropriation not for any reason
of economics or even national honor but as a quick,
cheap, easy method. of building popular support
for his military government. It says. something of
Latin American attitudes now that 'the. cheapest,
quickest and easiest was, to seize. an American oil
company. The government is apparently prepared
to pay some compensation, but all statements along,
those lines have been vague.
As might be expected, the population is all forl
it. This week the government staged an elaborate
fiesta called "The Day Of National Dignity," re-"
plete with parades, demonstrations, and speeches
denouncing Gulf as an "imperialistic octopus."'
Ovando, evidently a formidable phrasemaker, told
the crowds that "we are at war and must join to-
gether in common cause against 'imperialism." At
the same time, according to The Washington Post's
John Goshko, emissaries of his regime were making
quiet overtures to Gulf to turn on the faucets at
Arica and continue, at least temporarily, the ship-;
ments. Negotiations are presumably proceeding..,
and meanwhile the people of Boliva can rest secure
in the knowledge of a dragon slain in their midst.
These chickens will of course come home to`
roost, if not now then a year or five years from,
now when despite all the speeches and the dem-;
onstrations the country is as poor as it ever was.,
The Gulf seizure throws into serious question the
ambitious venture (which was to be partly financed
by Gulf) to build a natural gas pipeline from Bo
livia to Argentina, a project of great value to the]
Bolivian economy. La Paz must calculate short--
term- popularity with long-term progress, and it}
may be that the one follows the other, that na-1
tional pride will reflect itself in a higher GNP,a
that Ovando and his fellow army officers can operate
the oilfields better, with more benefit to Bolivia, .a
than Gulf. American investment in Latin America
is a very mixed bag, and in too many places United
States corporations have a stranglehold on the local-'
economy. "Imperialism" is an entirely appropriate;
description of what we have wrought 'in Peru, for.;
example. But conditions in Bolivia do not give;
much confidence that expropriation is the answerf
to the excruciatingly difficult economic problems'
she, faces. The government ought to understand:
that the country, is landlocked in more ways than
one.
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November 1969
November 14-16 Venice 6th Congress of (Communist) Inter-
national Federation of Resistance
Movements. The FIR conducts anti-
West German propaganda in the name
of anti-Nazism and extols WW II role
of the Red Army and Communist under-
grounds. This year's meeting co-
incides with 30th anniversary of
first year of WW II, which was also
period of Nazi-Soviet Pact.
November 17 Czechoslovakia 30th anniversary of closing down of
all Czech institutions of higher learn-
ing by WW II Nazi occupation forces,
following mass student demonstrations
in Prague occasioned by death of a
medical student Jan Opletal, killed
during student protest against Nazi
occupation. Nov. 17 is commemorated
annually as International Student Day
by the (Communist) International Union
of Students which has its headquarters
in Prague. Now, however, this Student
Day ironically more likely recalls
Jan Palach's self-immolation in Prague
on January 16, 1969, protesting Soviet
occupation of Czechoslovakia.
November 29 Albania 25th anniversary of seizure of power
by Communist-led National Liberation
Front, in wake of German withdrawal,
1944.
November 29- Vienna Conference on European Security and
December 1 Cooperation sponsored by (Communist)
World Council of Peace.
December 1 USSR 35th anniversary of assassination of
Sergey Kirov, a key Soviet leader,
1934, which Stalin used as pretext
for launching the Great Purge.
20th anniversary of founding of Inter-
national Confederation of Free Trade
Unions, in London, 1949, by unions
leaving the World Federation of Trade
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Unions because WFTU had fallen into
Communist hands.
December 11-13 Quito Latin American Conference on Land
Reform and Trade Union Rights
sponsored by (Communist) World
Federation of Trade Unions.
December 15 Cairo Bureau meeting of (Communist) Inter-
national Association of Democratic
Lawyers.
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November 1969
HOW MUCH WILL EAST GERMANY'S ALLIES TAKE?
How East Germany reacts over the next few months to fresh initiatives
which will emanate from West Germany's new team of Chancellor Willy Brandt
and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel can either justify or invalidate East
Germany's claim for international acceptance. Solely on the basis of past
performance, invalidation would seem the most likely outcome. Among the
decisive questions are: Just how much will East Germany risk in order to
prolong the tension in Europe? and, For just how long will her East Euro-
pean allies condone the often headlong clash of their interests with those
of East Germany's? There are, too, indications that Moscow's patience with
the dictatorial Walter Ulbricht is again growing thin.
East-West German Relations
Up to autumn 1969, East Germany's posture toward Bonn had been pretty
consistent. Diatribes against West German "revanchism and militarism" were
as strident as they had been 20 years before and West German policies were
particularly maligned whenever some mobility in East-West relations appeared
in the offing. East Germany this year began to demand full recognition from
West Germany "under international law" and Ulbricht's address opening the for-
malities of East Germany's 20th anniversary celebrations, while devoid of
frothy polemics, included the full catalogue of his now-familiar demands.
Meanwhile, circumstances surrounding the mid-September 1969 talks between
East and West Germany on transportation and postal matters, which marked the
first official contact between the two sides in several years, indicated that
East Germany had come to the conference table only after considerable arm
twisting by Moscow.
When word first got around about the Allied proposal to Moscow that its
influence be used in getting East Germany to discuss inter-German transport,
postal a n d communication issues, it evoked a heated response from East Germany
to the effect that Pankow was not about to abandon its claims on Bonn. In a
contrived mid-August interview, Foreign Minister Otto Winzer declared that
Pankow was aware of Bonn's attempts to penetrate East Germany via "technical
and organizational questions" and, addressing himself to Moscow, noted that
Pankow was also "aware through whom" the penetration attempt was being made.
However, by late August, Winzer was on his way to Moscow for a hastily ar-
ranged meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko. Then, almost simultaneously
with the Soviets' response to the Allied demarche, came Pankow's agreement to
hold the talks. Even though not too much was accomplished by the talks, the
door was left open for future discussion (in late October) that could possibly
resolve some issues of political as well as economic significance.
East Germany and the Communist Fraternity
Of late, East Germany has done little to ease relations with its fraternal
East European partners. East Germany's special position within CEMA, Ulbricht's
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insistence on playing broker between East Europe and Bonn while East Germany
herself enjoys special benefits, and Ulbricht's penchant for lecturing his
allies -- all are things that rankle. Moscow has occasionally been annoyed
not only by East Germany's pursuit of purposes that do not always coincide
with her own, but also by the emergence of special German national interests
and a special German role within the Eastern European bloc.
Ulbricht openly opposes economic links with the West in favor of self-
sufficiency among CEMA members: "In the bitter struggle between socialism
and imperialism ... the community of socialist countries must solve all sci-
entific. and technological, defense, economic and other problems with their
own forces and means." (Wirtschaft, East Berlin, 27 February 1969.) One
West German expert, Peter Lutz, believes that East Germany under Ulbricht
actually aims, not without some chance of success, at becoming the dominating
force within CEMA: "For many years the East German planners have been con-
structing the economic system of their republic with an eye to the USSR and
the CEMA market. They are not striving towards an independent national econo-
my; on the contrary, closely integrated with the economy of the Soviet Union
and the other countries of the East bloc, they see the chance of becoming the
dominating political force." (Osteuropaische Rundschau, Munich, March 1969,
No. 8.)
In spite of a burgeoning "interzonal" trade with West Germany, which East
Germany considers to be her special privilege, Ulbricht's posture toward east-
west economic rapprochement has also been consistently rigid: "Those who as-
pire to travel between two worlds will end up sooner or later dependent on
the world monopolies or on their banks." (Wirtschaft, op.cit.) In the past
few months, official public speeches and articles appearing in German media
have been ever more fervent in their condemnation of "perfidious bridgebuilding."
Typical was the speech by Kurt Tiedke, head of East Germany's delegation to
Rumania's Tenth Party Congress in August 1969 in which he tried to set up
East Germany as the model of true Marxism-Leninism, pled for closer coopera-
tion with the Soviet Union and other socialist states, and warned against ap-
proaches toward 'American. and West German imperialism."
Little Support for East German Demands
In January 1967, when West Germany and Rumania exchanged ambassadors and
East Germany simultaneously unleashed her anti-Rumanian propaganda war; offi-
cial newspapers in both Prague and Budapest began to omit their previous edi-
torial demands that Bonn should recognize the "sovereignty" of East Germany.
The practice has caught on. During the most recent discussions of Polish-West
German rapprochement, Poland has been equivocal about Bonn's recognition of
the "existence" of East Germany as a prerequisite to actual negotiation.
In early September 1969, Polish Foreign Minister Jedrychowski did call for
such recognition before a gathering of newsmen from both East and West Europe.
At the same press conference, however, the head of the Foreign Ministry's In-
stitute of Foreign Affairs, Ferelek, enumerated the three conditions which
could lead to "normalization" of West Germany's relations with the Bloc, in-
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cluding the establishment of diplomatic relations:
--"all European countries" recognize frontiers as agreed to by the
Potsdam conference;
--West Germany sign the nonproliferation treaty; and
--West Germany cease claiming to be the sole representative of all
Germany.
None of the conditions calls for diplomatic recognition of the East Ger-
man regime. Ferelek described the three conditions as being the "joint demands"
of the socialist countries. If Ferelek was indeed speaking for the Bloc, his
words could well indicate that Moscow is joining Warsaw in politically skirting
Ulbricht's uncompromising demands.
Facing the Social Democrats
On 6 October when Soviet party chief Brezhnev joined party chief Ulbricht
in East Berlin to honor East Germany on her 20th birthday, the salient points
of their two speeches served to pinpoint the strains caused by their differ-
ences over West Germany. Brezhnev's speech did little to calm Ulbricht's
nervousness over being left out in the cold as Moscow-Bonn relations begin to
thaw. Brezhnev called the West German election results "a success for the demo-
cratic and anti-fascist forces in the Federal Republic" (while of course cau-
tioning that reactionary forces would not vanish overnight) and said the USSR
was ready to "respond accordingly" if West Germany developed a more "realistic"
foreign policy. No doubt reflecting official dissatisfaction with Brezhnev's
remarks, East German media failed to carry his early morning speech until late
in the day after reporting most of the speeches made by other delegations.
Ulbricht, on the other hand, as previously mentioned ran through his now-
familiar catalogue of demands from West Germany. However, compared with his
speeches made earlier in the year, particularly at the April Central Committee
Plenum, Ulbricht sounded just a bit less vitriolic. Instead of repeating his
April demand that Bonn "recognize East Germany under international law," Ul-
bricht said on this occasion that there should be "treaties and arrangements
(Perhaps a concession to make at least some
valid under international law."
of his demands more acceptable to Bonn?) Frequent references to East Germany's
desire for "peaceful coexistence" were also atypical.
Certainly life would have been a lot less complicated for the hard-line
factions in East Germany if the Christian Democrats had won a solid majority
and if the "neo-Nazi" NPD had got at least a few seats in the Bundestag. Willy
Brant's credentials as an anti-Nazi have taken some wind out of East German
(and Soviet) insistence that it is the "revanchist" elements who run West Ger-
many. How the East German regime reacts to the loss of this outworn theme,
and as a chain reaction, how the rest of Eastern Europe reacts to East Germany,
will show whether the tail wags the dog or vice versa.
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
21 September 1969
CPYRGHT
a
CPYRGHT'
ermaris ]Ail'. f ell 0'w-
By Harry B. Ellis
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Apart from Czechoslovakia and East Germs
many, communism has taken root only in
relatively underdeveloped countries, with a
peasant base. Czechs and Slovaks-as indus-
trious and skilled as the Germans -?-- have',
refused to make communism viable in their,
land.
The East German Communist, In rattling
off his nation's successes, did not mention"
that substantial trade with West Germany,';
on privileged terms, had done much for'
East Germany.
Had the diplomatic recognition of East:
Germany by Cambodia and five Arab states.,
been expensive? "At least two countries,'."..
the German replied, "Cambodia and the.,
Sudan, asked nothing. Some of the others,
were promised more aid."
He shrugged. "Unfortunately we cannot,
compete with the West Germans in giving"
economic aid."
He did not know when the next "wave" of
recognition would come-whether next year!
or in five years. But he was certain it would:
come.
India now was the 'prime target of East!
Germany. Indian Prime Minister Indira,
Gandhi had sent the congratulations of her
government .to East German chief of state
Walter Ulbricht on the occasion of the 20t4
anniversary of East Germany.
This constituted "political recognition,'k
the East German Communist asserted. I.,,-
principle, he asserted, Mrs. Gandhi would
like to open diplotriatic relations, but could.
not afford to lose massive West German
'technical and economic assistance.
Black Africa was a second area 'where;
E st Germany was working assiduously to,
cultivate relations. The Communist predicted,
that, when African recognition carne, sev.,
:eral African states would send ambassadors,
to East Berlin ma "wave," as the Arab
had done ..:.~.;.. .... ,..ti; .sa~?~;W
East German Communists are
howirii; a cocky. pride on the
0th anniversary of'their state.
, vhieh reportedly irritates and
isturbs many Soviet and other,
lavic Marxists.
East Germany, a well-placed']
crman Communist . declared,
'has accomplished more under.
ommunism than any, - other;
country."
Including the Soviet Union?;',
"Including the Soviet Union,".`
replied.
he
"'The German Democratic Re-
public," lie went on, "is living;
proof that communism can work.
in a highly industrialized coun?!
try and particularly in Ger;nrany,
where Marx and Engels came:
from."
He stressed the fact that East;
Germany was on a' different
plane, or level, of achievement'
than the Slavic nations of East
ern Europe.
"The fact that communism:
can work in ,'Germany is, more
important to world communism
than the fact that it, works in 'a`
Slavic state."
Here, dressed up in ,Marxist.,
trappings,; was the age-old ex-
pression of German superiority;
,over the peoples of Eastern.Eu'
rope. '
w East Germany indeed has;be?~
ome the most industrially ad'
anced nation under Communist
;ule. But, according to informed'
of Pike to be reminded of this:'
1 ? ny people in Czeehoslo-1
an s overrun by the Nazis stilr
ar or distrust of Germans;:
e East German Marxist to
h m I, spoke agreed readily;
ha few, if any, Eastern" Euro?.,
eel Germany reunited, even;
nc r communism.
Thirefore Germany will stay
rd East German leaders.
fea that the Soviet Union, pre-
Ch ia, might make a deal with
Wet Germany to the detriment
o, he replied. He expressed'"
yu' t confidence that, for two
re sons, the German Demo.
The existence of ? a Coin
m ist East Germany gave the
Sot
ets and Poles a secure buf?'
The success of ,the German
ri t fir predicting that com-
=
rn nism would work in an in
you trialize4 "society..
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR CPYRGHT
26 September 19b9
7?ast,. llest er?
mtergeovern.men
By Paid Wohl ;
Written for The Christian Science Monitor ,.
For the first time.in 20 years, East and
West Germany have settled down to talks
on an intergovernmental level.
Talks between the economy ministers of -1
the two states planned for August, 1968,
.were called off because of the Czechoslovak
,crisis. Now the topic is transportation be
tween the two Germanys. I
According to the East Germans, all as-
pects of transportation are to be covered:
railroads, inland shipping,. and road build-
ing. After the talks got under way on Sept.
16 in East Berlin, the West Germans dis-a
closed that inland shipping and the comple-
tion .of the autobahn (motor road) between",
Bad Hersfeld, West Germany, and Eisenach
in East Germany were the. first points on
the agenda.
This first step toward easing tension is
the outcome of East Germany's more con. r? sent all of Germany and'to the possession of
lowed Foreign Minister' Andrei A. Gro-
myko's
speech before the Supreme Soviet.
of July 10. y
According to Mr. Gromyko's new for-
mula, West Berlin was "a special political.'
.unit." It no longer was called "separate
and independent," a third- Germany so to
say.
New
departure
This new definition may sound 'like hair-z'
splitting to Americans. But for Communists{
sticklers for terminology, this was a new"
departure and it was understood as such in
Bonn-and in East European capitals.
By referring to West Berlin as a "special.
political unit" Mr. Gromyko 'enunciated a'
view long held by West German jurists.
According to Bonn, West Berlin is linked
to' West Germany in many ways-econom
ically, culturally, and in some respects ad
ministratively. But it is not formally part
,of the Federal Republic. West Berliners do
not have to serve in the West German Army
and do not elect deputies to the Bundestag.
Mr. Gromyko's formula originally seems,
to have shocked the East Germans. On the
one hand, they want improved relations with,
Bonn-their biggest trading partner in the
West. On the other hand, they fear any rap-
prochement would induce other Warsaw
Pact countries to follow the Romanian .ex
ample and improve their relations with the
Federal Republic-possibly,at the expense
~'nf tirsiAa with W et f:nr?.,nny
Conditions for und?'rstandill
g
But under some pressure from the Soviets,
Poland, and other bloc countries, East Ger.
A- many now has opted for somewhat im-
proved relations with West Germany.
The new departure came at a memorial
meeting Aug. 16 in the former Nazi concen-
tration camp of Buchenwald when Deputy
Premier and Politburo member Alfred Neu-
mann also referred to West Berlin as a spe-
cial political unit.
In every other respect Mr. Neumann re.
iterated East Germany's previous condi-
tions for a lasting understanding with Bonn
-recognition of all borders, including that
s` between the two German states; renuncia
tion'by West Germany of its claim to repre.
k1. East Germany as a separate state; etc.-; ?
Only Mr. Neumann's definition of the
V status of West Berlin was new, and an indi
cation of a somewhat softer stand.
1 ast response
Neucs Deutschland, East Germany's lead;
ing party daily, went so far as to write? "We
must find a way which would guarantee
peaceful coexistence between the Federal
Republic and East Germany."
The letter which East Germany's Trans-
port Minister addressed Sept. 11 to his
., counterpart in the Federal Republic, pro.
j posing negotiations between the two Ger-
4;? man states, was an attempt to find such a
way in an important, but politically neutral
domain. The fast response of the West Ger-
mans and their acceptance of negotiations
in the capital of the EAst Germany is a
heartening development.
Apart from the political significance of the
talks, there also. is an economic angle. In-
land shipping between East and West Europe
developed considerably in recent years.
In addition to East and West Germane
motor barges, each year about 300 Polisl .
.,'.vessels ply the canals and rivers of Central
L,~ Europe between the Vistula and the Rhine.'
They call at such ports as Amsterdam,"
Rotterdam,, and Basel with'average loads of
several hundred tons and represent a signifi.
cant traffic remunerative for both Ger?
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9 October 1969
AN EXER CISIE- FOR TWO
East Germany has been celebrat-,
ing its twentieth anniversary with an,
outward show of great~confidcnce.
EconomicaIly the confidence is justi=j
fief, Since 1961,*When the,Berlin.
Wall taut off the main escape route,
the people have largely settled down;
to rnakc the best of thci.r situation,
and industry and .agriculture have
devclopcd fast. Politically the' rcgimc.
i' not yet ?fubty accepted either at.'
home or abroad,'and,it shows every'
symptom of being aware of this fail-`
ure. The limits on s,pcech, .writing':
and travel remain as tight as ever,
and the demands for, international
recognition as strident.
The prospect;of a new government
in west Germany now puts the regime
in a ditem.nta, 'and the .way it reacts
will be in7.poi-tant for the immediate
future of, cast-west relations in
E.urope. As in the"pthcr communist
capitals, there are groups in c i t'Ber-~,
lin, which would probably have been`
happier if t.ho.~ Ohristian Democrats)
had Won a' solid majority, and the,
right' 'wing National Democrats -a
substantial representation in ,..ihe
Bundestag.
This would have confirmed the
main line of communist propaganda,
which hammers away at the alleged:
rov'ival of nazism in-west Germany.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
14 October 1969
CPYRGHT
Ii Jif .cil Ten:?:rar a limo piazo los ahorros f3
inv;,rsion(?,s necesar'Los para la expansion conomice. El creci-
mi.?nto de Is poblacion produce tambian un oumonto an el nu'rle-ro
de d~semplF,..dos y subempli,ados,dado quo no hay suficicnte
mpleo productivo como para absorber a la enorrme cantid.ad do
individuos quo inrrosan a1 mc-,:cado de tr'abajo calla abo.
El problema sn agtldiza mn las zonas url.)snas dondo el
crcc:i.m'-into de la noblacion e:xcede con fretcuetncia ?1 cinco
per ci ent o anual, d.abido no solo a unn tasaa de na talidad
ti,astantc alta s' no tamhian al niovimiento migr torso del camp(--)
a la ciuded. En 1960 hab`a nu: vn zones m-tropolitanas quo
c. ntaban al menos con un miller de 4abitantr~s; en 1970 habra
dieciocho y an 1980, veintiscis. Pcr otl-a parts so vu< lvo
cadn vez mas ,sc vora in nscasez dc bu-nos traba, jos, viviendas,
*scu 1..as y otpi-as comodjdad?s vit-l3s.
En la mayor{a de lcs pass : s lat' noam, r:r.c.r.nos no sr, ha )ro-
du_,' d.o Codav s nin ,una prF~sj.on ^:xcesiv_a de la noblacion sobrm
L tiorra arable dabido s la e ci Lcncia dry grand?:s extension
do tir-,rre sin cultivar. L ,to si nific~i oue los latinoarn~3rj.canos
t~~odavia no s; ban c lido cuenta de: n nu uuaalta 1 tf^ ,3s Ja Wage l.j.daryd
19* troga los bi-ni3%s CCa~.,' talas qu cri . i.a lry ti l: rorla de esos C!C{ l
oxist,n scDlo en forma limitads. Js mas, quo cs nocian bin ex-
t,:-3ndida on Latitaoa?i rica penosr que solo c-.xisten rproblritas en
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is regions s donde Is poblacion es muy donsa, como por o jemplo
an la India; lucS o entonces pionsan quo se nocasita un aumento,
no una disminuci,--n, de Is poblacion on los passes latinoameri-
canos. Sin embargo,esta crecimiento continuo y rapido de Is
poblacion crea la suficiente presion an los rsoursos economicos
como pare hacc:r imposible Is debida utilizacion do las tierras
sin cultivar y de las subutilizades. A su vez esto produce
un continuo movimianto migratorio do las zonas rurales a las
urbanes, eonstituyigdose entonces un poteneial de presionss
sociales viol+entas por parts de las grandms'masas urbane quo
no tienen ni Is oportunidad ni los medios de mejorar sus condi-
cione s de vida. Es seguro quo los cornunistas y otroa slsnentos
extremistas de Latinoa m:mrica haran todos los esfuarzos oosibies
pnra aprovecharss de esa situacion y tratar do agravar log
problL mas causados por la superpoblecion, con al ob jeto de crear
la inestablAidad social y f.conomica quo mejor sirve a sus into-
rases politicos.
Segue el Banco Int rar ericano de Desarrrollo, "El creci-
,a* onto anual O.o la fuerza do trabajo an Amorica Latina excede
of numero do oc-~pacionr>s quo se Crean cads ano fuera del sec-
tor agricola, y s? h.ocs dada vez mss grove e1 hacinamiento
producido on las ;rands-,s ciudedes por Is migracion de ale lentos
rurales. Sin embargo en Is mayoria de los passes Is major tie-
rs de zonaa agrlcolas ya establecidas sigue estando bastante
subuti' izeda; osa t ierra podria sesr f lent a do smpleo y de ingre-
sos pare numerosos carne*sinos.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00500030001-8
from AID DATA BOOK
(recent i ue )
LATIN AMMICA
Population Growth in 19 Republics
Estimated Year by which
Percent of Increase Rate of Growth Population would
1960 - 1968 1968 Double at
10 20 30 1968 Rate
Dominican Republic
Costa Rica
Venezuela
Nicaragua
/Mexico
Honduras
El Salvador
Ecuacor
Guatemala
Panama
Colombia
Paraguay
Peru
Brazil
Ci^ilc
Haiti
Argentina
Bolivia
Uruguay
W Republics
3.6 1988
3.5 1989
3.5 1989
3.5 1989
3.5 1989
3.4 1989
3.6 1988
3.4 1989
3.2 1991
3.3 1990
3.2 1991
3.1 1991
3.1 1991
3.0 1992
2.3 1999
2.0 2003
1.6- 2012
1.4 2018
1.4 2018
3.0 1992
.Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00500030001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
5 April 1969 CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Pal dgu.%.y and
population growth rates or ie difletent the ominican ,
countries." showing rates varying between 4 and 5 per-
The report makes no further analysis of cent,
Yet this "The significance of the preceding. fig-
e erall population question
.
Although noting substantial improverne t year' annual IADB survey, which has be. ures," the IADB report comments, "can bet-
i Latin America's growth rate during 196 , come something of a major yearbook of ter be appreciated when compared with
ae annual economic survey of the Into - econo is statistics for the hemisphere, does those for the industrial countries, whose
merican Development Bank suggests that devote considerable attention to population potential for continued growth is .fed by
growl in its reporting of individual coun- much larger capital and technological re-
tits improvement must be measure tries hich make up the bulk of the book, sources than can be mustered by. the de'-=
gainst a' host of negative factors prese Pop lation growth rates of 3 percent or veloping nations."
hroughout the hemisphere. more are recorded-for 14 of the 20 IADB The industrialized nations, it says, regis-
In fact, the IADB report which is. r(- mem r nations surveyed in the report.tered an annual growth rate of 5.1 per-
eased today emphasizes a number of pe Only rgentina with an annual population in. cent in the same period.
istent problems facing most Latin Amer - ereas of 1.6 percent, Bolivia at 1.4 percent, Problems pinpointed
an nations. Among these are the populatio Chile at 2.5 percent, Haiti at 2 percent, despite effort to show progressive
progressive
piral, a lag in agriculture, some' slo - Trinid d and Tobago. at 2.8 percent, and ! Yet te the America, the IADB survey
towns in industrial expansion, and an i , Urug y at 1.3 percent, are under; the 3 trends dai
ibility of the Latin nations to band together perce t rate. ' .. ' pinpoints a number of critical problems-in
n regional economic cooperation. But. t Tak n against the population increas0, the ,addition to the factor of population.
tank report does begin on a note of pro g. overa economic growth would be consider- Among these:
,ess. ably 1 ss' than .the 5 to 5.5 percent increase ? "A persistent lag in the ' rate of expan-
The IADB survey, entitled "Socio-Ec - noted n' the report. sion of the agricultural sector." For the
comic Progress in. Latin America," says period between 1960 and 1967, the yearly ex-
hat "according to currently available pr -1Upw ?o trends - seeii< pansion of farm output for the region
iminary data," the region's gross dome "barely exceeded 4 percent." Yet industrial
is product registered an increase of 5 At t e'same time, IADB officials do;ward expansion ran at the rate of 6 percent
5 p percent during the past year. This to wh t tlicy regard as significant upward per year and. in 1968 reached 8 percent.
i
tease, it adds, "indicates further region ltrends in Latin America's economic pie- .., p The overall` growth rate in industry
ture. he, report, for example, cites "im- "has
ro :gradually weakened during the past
gress toward achievement of the targets
,~ porta economic conditions in Argentina,, few years." The reason: -.relatively fewer
et by the Alliance for Progress. .,Brazil and Colombia" as"one of the princi- prospects foz`' import 'substitution in most
opulation growth noted pal fa ors accounting for the improved over- countries. The answer lies in an expansion
Furthermore, the bank comments, th t all pic ure. The majority of the' other coun- of markets including the development of
taken against the 4.5 percent annual growl tries lso showed relatively high develop- Latin America's economic integration.
,ate for the 1961-67 period and the corr - ment rates. a But that integration has not advanced
spending 4.3 percent figure for 1966 and 196 , In a dition, the IADB 'reports notes that much. "Despite?the statements and aftirma-
;he 1968 tally, "is all the more significant. 'during the 1960's, 12 countries in Latin Amer- tions contained in the Declaration of ,Punta
But the bank's survey quickly notes th t tea (t a Central American nations, Bolivia, del Este in April 1967, the region as a whole
"although generally satisfactory from 'a Ecuad r,- Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad, has been, slow to adopt the measures re.
Overall standpoint, economic developme t and T bago, and Venezuela) maintained an- quired to ensure effective establishment of
trends in the -region may be viewed as le nual economic' growth rates of 5 percent a Latin American Commgn Market, except
or mop, with four others (Chile, Colombia, for efforts to 'form the Andean Group."
favorable when expressed in the light of 'th
New York Tim
CPYRGHTI 6 MAR )Jugs-
Aid ,Agency Reports
Birth Ride Offsets
Latin Alliance Gains
By F'EII BELAIR Jr.
Special to The New York Tlmei
WASHINGTON, March 15---1
The Agency for nternationa
Development reported to Con-'
gress today that the goals of,
the Alliance for Progress with
;Latin-American countries were
neither realistic r
vntii the people Nee N11
took steps to control popula-.
tion growth.
In a report to a House "watch-'
dog" committee, the Agency
said that although there had'
been substantial progress to.'
ward economic, political and,
social objectives of the Alliance:
since its inception in 1961, such'
ains had been "largely can-
cel d out" in per-capita terms
be ause of "staggeringly high"i
bi h rates.
lie United States provided
$9. -billion in the Alliance
F~K u ca. -r092
o r economic ac rough
CPYRGHT
last June 30, with $4.1-billion
of it coming from the aid
agency. Other assistance was
provided through the Peace
Corps, the Food and Peace pro-
grams, the Export-Import Bank
and the Inter-American Devel-
opmentBank.
Total . United States eco-
nomic aid since 1949 to the.
Latin-American countries. has!
been about $13.2-billion. Proj-
ect loans and technical assist-
ance grants from 1949 through
1960 totaled $3.9-billion.
named for the meeting in 1961
at which the Alliance wac cre-
~ated, was an annual increase
of 2.5 per cent in the combined
gross national product of the
18 member nations. All citizens
and social groups were to share
in this economic advance
through high income and living
Istandards.
In the first seven years of
the Alliance, the combined
gross national product of mem-
ber countries actually showed
an average annual increase of
4.5 per- cent. But on a per-
f+~iAto~fa~a9++~ 1t$~OOQ~6~{~0~3.O~~i-ihos?'coun-
'aration of Punta. 'del 'Este. tries were among the world's
 CPYRGHT
highest. the Apmeved(For 1 v~ 9 0 $ d' CIA OOH Qie~ic$easan is that the
..It is evidcn that Latin- beyond 9 1:' s u e a e a breaking up of large rge land hold
with none la- The House subcommittee: priority concern by 41.1 major land
Am erican nations
,
astest rates in the world, must.
`fain total growth rates of 5.5
jper cent and more--higher
than the United States average
bf 5.1 per cent for the same
seven-year period-to attain
the Alliance goals of 2.5 per'
cent per capital," the agency's
report said.
The agency noted that popu-
lation control, "because of Its
political volatility"," was not
mentioned among the goals of;
the Alliance. It said that
"while there are growing signs
of growing recognition of the
population issue throughout the
hemisphere, there are few
countries in which the issue is
yet being squarely met." The
report added:
"Until these problems are.
better recognized and addressed
in most of the hemisphere
Icountries,, the question of at-
taining a satisfactory level of
development remains . un-
certain."
The report came in response
to a demand from the House
Government Operations Sub-
committee on Foreign Opera-
tions and Government Informa-
tion ". that the agency reasses
Alliance goals. in the light of
the last, seven, . years' expert-I
once. '
The report said at the outset
that realization of :,Alliance.
goals was not possible in they
10 years . orginially contem-
plated. It said "the framers of
the charter erected ' a' goal
structure which anticipated too
much too, soon and in recogni-
tion of this, the time frame of
WASF21GTOIi POST
23 March 1969
CPYRGHT
that United States administra-I
tors of. the Alliance had ex-1
tended the time period to 1S'
years, or three six-year periods.
The first was described as an
organization and mobilization
phase, the second as one of so-
cial and political development,
and the third asckne of integra-i
tion of the market economies,
of member countries.
The. subcommittee chairman,'
Representative John E. Moss,
Democrat of California, said he
welcomed the agency's report
as "an, honest evaluation of
performance toward Alliance
objectives and of the need to
restate its goals."
"Unquestionably real progress
has been made toward these
goals," said Mr. Moss, "but I.
feel that Congress and the peo-
p1e are weary of financing pro-
grams that fall short of stated
goals. I want to be able to say
for once ? that our objectives
have been achieved, but this
requires their restatement in
more realtistic terms.
The agency's report said that
"despite the initial unrealistic
10-year time frame, the goal.
structure still affords an attain-
able set of priority guideposts
for development of?the.hemis-'
phere." It added that "the de
velopment progress and mo
mentum generated 'under the.
alliance justify promise for thei
future and merit continued.
'United States support."
On the . other hared, the re=
port made' it clear that if the
Alliance's goals were to be. at-
tained even in the extended 18-
Svchool Attendance Cited
Illustrative of the impact of
birth rates on other Alliance
goals, the report said:,
?' "The ,number of school-age
children not in school tends to
grow at the very moment when
now schools are being built of
a record rate, 3ubstandally ins
creased food production and rep
markabiy expanded educational
facitilies barely keep pace with
population increase."
The report made the follow-
ing points regarding progress
toward other Alliance goals:
gTaxation: Although tax col=
lections have increased by 30
per cent since 1961 for all Latin
America, there is need for more
effective enforcement. '
gpublic Health: There has
been "dramatic progress" in
this area but much remains to
be done. The target of provid-
ing potable water to 70 per cent
of the urban populations will be
achieved by 1971. New or Im-
proved water supplies already
have been provided for 43 mil-
lion city dwellers, or 69 per
cent of the total, but only 19.
million out of a rural popula-
tion of 128 million have been so
benefited.
Deaths from communicable
diseases have been reduced
markedly since 1961, but still
are 10 times the rate for North
America.
q Agrarian reform: The mem-
;ber nations with some excep-
?tions, such as Mexico, Vene=
zuela' and Chile, -have not yet
,effectively "tackled this major.
frontation with an element of
the power structure well repre-.
spnted in national government.",
c.Monetary and Fiscal Stabil-
ity: Most"countries have man-
aged to keep a reasonable de-
gree of price stability despite
increased public expenditures.
Nine countries. had inflation of
less than 3, per :cent antlually.
In threo others, price Increases
amounted to about 6 per cent a
year. But stabilization Is still
'precariousc' -in- Brazil, Chile;
and .Columbia. -
hlncome Distribution: The
'only indicators available show
little change from 1960. A study
showed remarkedly similar In-
come structures, with the top
10,per cent of the population
receiving 40 per cent of the in-
come in''Argentina, Brazil and
Mexico. The bottom 40 per cent
of the population received 10
to 14 per cent of total income
in those countries.
q Education: Enrollment of
school-age; children in primary
schools increased by about 50
per cent 'between 1960 and,
'1967, or from 24 million to 36
(million. But there were 27 mil-
lion children not enrolled in,
primary schools in 1967-4740,.1
000 more than in 1960.
With an expansion by 1979
of primary 'education facilities
sufficient to give all school-age'
children six years of schooling:
before their 15th birthday, the,
adult illiterarcy rate would be
reduced to about 3 7per cent,`
or some three-fifths of the 1964'
rate, which was 62.1 per cents
Economic Calamity for Latin America. CPYRGHT
Can e Averted, Prebisch Says
By Richard 11allorart
Wanhinatniu Post Mail writer..
best-known economist, leaned back in,
his chair. and said emphatically: "No,.
no, no, not at all."
He waved his hand to. reject the pre-
diction of prominent British author
and philosopher C. P. Snow that the
advanced nations would be in a "state,
of seige" by the frustrated, famine-
stricken underdeveloped nations within:
20 years.
Prehisch, who Is identified through-.
out the world !~~ttNN tt~rrs ,}cl `s~rlcesr inleas
shTA
for the under I
"I don't see it from a catastrophic or
.at
qu
i
the
a is is point a view, . s c is (levelopment program to aver World.
to avoidable provided we recognize'
wide calamity. lie recommended that
complexity, the seriousness, and they allocate up to 20 per cent of their
urgency of the problem." gr
iss national products to economic
' Snow has magnified the problem aid for
the next 10 to 15 years,
Prehisch Gives Target
all out of proportion," Prehisch con- tin cd. "People. like that have intro.
"That's ridiculous,Prehisch said.
du ed an element of confusion and
"The target I'd like to see is one per
tin demsary pessimism. They have ex.
cent of GNP every year." Few nations
ag crated the degree of resources
come close to that level today. Pre-
ne did to stimulate development."
bisch further advocated "convergent
now gave his gloomy forecast last
measures from Internal and external
fat at Westminster College. in Fulton,
underdeveloped coun-
Al d, in the same forum that the late sources to thrust
WI ston Churchill made his famous tries into self-sustalned economic.
~~yy c~cit~2q~~,pp~ r
~ AQ:aO~~ -
ioc Ht5t1aT(s 1 19-4 Washington,
~ -`g~~ lc itdl~S?
ark i->rmecliatcty on a coordinated where he expects to spend half his
 CPYRGHT
time, to 'be a + st+ c roues to a r
pmen tqFfZeleadLcFg9'J1MM2 CIA-RDP79-0119wi 40-~`-6i0?$(~?OIL8ioltnet; wi-i
Inter?Anicrican tie oilmen n p . b h is intense and persuasive break out someday."
isc
and other inter-American and. interna?, is
in conversation but is an emotionally-
_,-?,,,, 11-A T.ofin Amariein Nn is arlic? cites 1llexico'S Growth
tional institutions concerned with'
Latin American development. Specifi-
rally, he Nvtll. guicl,~ s study %-kQ ffir.an'
It
al rlseurecs a>.'ail'Ahle i i i L t.
c't
Xmtriicx.
Ile plans. to K,scn.1 life c?thcr half of
his time mainly- is head of the Latin
American Institute for Economic and
Social Planning in Chile and occasional.
ly as special adviser to U.N. Secretary
General U Thant on global strategy for
economic development.
Prebisch, an Argentine, served as
head of his nation's central bank until
he fell out with President Juan Peron.
He moved on to become Executive
Secretary of the U.N.'s Economic Com-
mission for Latin America (ECLA)
from 1943 to 1963, then was head of
the U.N. Conference on Trade and De-
velopment (UNCTAD) until a few
weeks ago.
The careen of Prebisch has not been
without controversy.
His critics contend that he puts too
much emphasis on economic planning
and not enough on practical application,
that he is too much a blue-sky thinker,
and is an indifferent administrator,
that his ideas are socialistic and anti.
American.
His defenders, however, verge on the
passionate in their praise. They argue'
that he is an carthshaker In his Ideas,
that he is an innovator in a classical
sense, that his broad prescriptions for
economic development on a continen-
tal or hemispheric, or global scale
provide an essential framework for
Implementation.
ulate In English, which he speaks with
a slight Spanish accent, but Is more
expressive with his hands. He punc-
tuates his discussion by jabbing the
air with a forefinger, rapping the desk
with his knuckles, or sweeping his
hands in wide circular motions.
Prebisch sat in his simply-appointed
office at the IDB the other day ex-
plaining why Latin America, a poten-
tially rich region, has not made more
economic progress and what needs to
be done.
He said that the planning In the Al
liance for Progress, President Kenne?
dy's grand strategy for Latin American
economic development, and all the
other plans had provided an incentive,
but had not been translated Into prac-
tical measures.
"Planning can't just be superimposed
and machinery set up," Prebisch niain?
tained. "Economic progress takes a
change in attitude and discipline to
give continuity and support to develop.
ment."
"The responsibility is fundamentally
that of the Latin American countries
themselves," he said. "But the problem
of attitudes t.-ere is that governments
tend to salve problems day-to-day and
ignore programs that take years to
emerge."
"It is indispensable to have a deep
transformation' in the economic and
social structure," he said. The ques.
tion Is: Can the transformation come in
an orderly and non-violent way or will
it be by violence?_- If Latin America
.-. c...,,:.. p.,.., - .. .., .....-._... ._____ 11
M-S2 4i- 4:i i a??ceryr szit.i3:actor} rate
of growth--6 or 7 percent a year. some-
times a little more. Why? Because
Mexico had a deep social revolution,.,
a breaking up of the old economic and
social structure and a period of vio-
lent upheaval.
"4%11, of the dynamic elements of
youth cannot be absorbed by the prl'ir?
ent economic and social system," he
said. "These are the frustrated people
and the next 20 years will be difficult
from their point of view."
Prehisch contended, however, that
violence is not necessary for change.
- Prebiscl continues to advocate over-
all planning. "You can't take one fac-
tor and isolate it adn say this Is the
'solution." lie said that problems of
agricultural production, land reform,
the formation of an entreprenurlal
class, industrial development, capital
investment into infrastructure, and
population control all must be pursued
at the same time.
i But, Prcblsch argued, "the best in-
ternal policies are bound to fail if
there Is not a simultaneous policy of
international cooperation. The increase
in the rate of investment has to be sup.
ported by a transfer of international
resources."
The lag in Latin American economic
development, l'rebiseh maintained. Is
due to a combination of internal and
external factors. It will take a com-
bination of internal' and external
forces, he said, to overcome It.
WASIIINGTON POST CPYRGHT
3 April 1969 toLat?
Growth of Czties Seen. Peril r~ A inerica
By A. D. Horne
Washington Post staff Writer
Economic growth in Latin' this would bring per capita
America speeded Vp last year, GNP (gross national product),
but the region's cities are gain close to the Alliance for'
Progress target of 2.5 per cent.
growing too fast for its food, But the Bank's report
production and for "its capac- warned that "the rapid rate of
ity to provide efficient em- urbanization ... may lead to
rployment" the Inter-Americana serious problems." Cities of
Development Bank reported pe c ntrofnthe region's popu-
yesterday. lation In 1950 to nearly 33 per'
In the elthth annual report' cent in 1960, and are expected
of its Social Progress Trust to contain more than 60 per
Fund, established In 1961 to fi- cent of the population by 1980,,
nance social development the Bank reported.
projects in 20 Latin American, Gao U.S. official, in Con?
countries, the Bank estimated, gressional testimony last
a regional growth rate of 5 to, month, estimated that while
5.5 per cent in 1968. Assuming Latin America's population Is
i ' o ulalion rowth doubling Itself every 20 years,,
n
h
p
doubling every 10 years.
Much of this growth, the
Bank said, is in migration,
from rural areas no depressed;
that despite "the risk of not;
finding adequate employment'
In the city, ... little is lost by
abandoning the farm"
1
The Bank warned that "vir-
tual stagnation of yields ?perj
person" has held down farm!
productivity "far below the;
level ... required to support a
vigorous and sustained devel-
opment of the urban sector."
Progress In land reform has
been "disappointing," the
Bank declared, and "some of
the best;land" remains "very
much under-utilized" while
"the labor force grows at a
new jobs In non-agricultural',
activities."
"Despite the Impressive de-I
velopment trends in Latin,
American industry over the;
decade, the over-all growth
rate of the (manufacturing)
sector has gradually weakened
during the past few years,"
the Bank warned.
And, while urban growth In
the advanced countries has
been accompanied by rapid ex-
pansion . of manufacturing
jobs, the B.,nk found It dis-
turbing that in Latin America
a larger share of new jobs has
gone into less productive
"service activities." i
e re,; o
t
GSmk611 For I eRBi@a4?Wi'(!8t?02s:1C!
continues
A RD 79.044 4PtQ0G500030001-8
 CPYRGHT
,A roved F
17f.1f mara Appeals For Population Curb,
In Noire Dame Talk
By Jc9HN D. MORRIS
Speri.i yo The New York Times
SOUTH BEND, Ind., May 1'
--aer S. McNamara, IF-
dressing a predominantly Ro-.
man Catholic audience, ap-
pealed today for' a "humane
but massive" reduction in the
world rate of population
growth.
The ? former Secretary of
Defense, now president of
the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, received an honorary
doctor of laws degree from
the University of Notre Dame
at a solemn academic convo-
cation' In the university's ath-
letic and convocation center.
A Presbyterian, he acknowl
edged that "it may seem
strange that I should speak at
a center of Catholic thought on.
this awkward issue."
"I have chosen to discuss they
problem," he explained, ' 'be-,
cause my responsibilities as
president of the World Bank
compel me to be candid about
the blunt facts affecting the
prospects for global develop-
,jplease 1999/09/02
Mr. McNamara said that
current birth rates throughouti
the emerging world were "sere
ously crippling economic devel-:
opment efforts."
Diversion of Savings
"The reason," he said, "isI
that these governments , must
divert an Inordinately high pro
portion of their limited nation-.
way from produc-'
tive Inve5trr ent simply in order
to maintai the current lowl
level of exis ence."
He said t at new capital that
cannot be invested in "other
desperately neeEled sectors" of
the econo must be diverted
to food, clo king, housing, med-
ical care aid at least minimal
educational services for
"mounting aves" of children
in underde% eloped countries.
"A treadmill economy tends
'to emerge i which the total na-
tional effort will exhaust itself
in running faster and faster
merely to s and still," he..con-
tended.
He called this a "cruel and
self-perpetu ting dilemma" of
government of underdeveloped
countries a "their plans for
progress ev orate into massive
efforts mer y to maintain the
status quo"
Mr. McN ara also deplored
"the tragic th" of high abor-
tion rates, rticularly In Latin
America.
"The con. lusion Is clear, I
think," he aid, without men-
CPYRGHT
TI".lW YORK TIMES
il- Ilay, 1969...
. U.N. Unit eed 6% Growth Rate
As Goal F ' Developing Land
UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., May,
-3-An economic
6 per cent a year for developing
countries has been proposed by
a major United Nations eco-
nomic committee as the goal of
international development ef-
forts during the nineteen-sev-
enties. The developing countries
now average 4 per cent annual
growth.
The 55-country preparatory
committee for the second United
Nations Development Decade.
completed its first working ses-
sion this week. It agreed tenta-
tively to raise the growth tar-:
jet for developing countries
from the 5 per cent annual goal
used during the first' Develop-
ment Decade,. which began in
Of the 86 United Nations
tubers that are considered
d veloping countries, only 27
h ve been able to maintain the
a nual economic growth rate
o 5 per cent. Only 9 have
r ched the proposed rate of 6
.p r cent.
Committee discussions made'
It clear that most countries' de-
,v lopment will be almost stag-
,n nt because, of population in-
c eases that cancel Increases in
p oduction of goods and serv-
More Aid Needed .,- I
The '' inability of countries
th pcr capita income of $100
14 $250 a year to use domestic
s vings for,, rapid development
CPYRGHT
Cl r P ldl A-0005 Otkd8 to cope wit
resistance to birth contro pro- the population explosion, an
grams of the Latin-American reduce it to manageable pro
and Philippine governments.
"Where the public authorities portions."
Will not assist parents to avoid Without referring directly t
unwanted births," he said, "the the Catholic Church's opposi
parents will often take matters tion to artificial contraception
into their own hands -- at. Mr. McNamara mentioned "cer
whatever cost to conscience tain precise and painful mora
and health." dilemmas,"
A Right of Parents i He predicted that the pooula
b
ld
Mr. McNamara emphasized
his belief that It was right for
parents themselves to decide
the size of their own families,
it would be an "intolerable in-
vasion" of a family's rights. for
a government to use coercive
measures, he said.
"But," he maintained, "the
notion that family planning pro-
grams are sinister, coercive
plots to force poor people into
something they do not want Is
?bsurd. The pervasive preva-
nee of voluntary illegal abor-
tion should be enough to dispel
that fiction."
Mr. McNamara disavowed
any desire to reduce the popu-
lation of any country. Instead,
he advocated the reduction of
population growth rates to a
level that would allow a signi-
ficant increase in per capita.
income.
-He said there was barely
sufficient time to avert "whole.
sale famine," but he expressed
confidence that "application of
the new technology will dramt-,
IcaIly expand the rate, of
agricultural growth and will
buy two decades of time--ad-
a so ve
ton pro
em wou
"oria way, or the other."
"Are we to solve it b
famine?" he asked. "Are we t
solve It by riot, by insurrection,
by the violence that desperately
starving men can be driven to?
Are we to solve It by wars of
expansion and aggression? Or
are we to solve it rationally
and humanely In accord with
man's dignity?
"Providence, I think, has
placed you and me-all of us-
at that fulcrum point In history
where a rational, responsible,
moral solution to the popula-
tion problem must.-be found,
You and I, all of us, share the
responsibility--a responsibility
to find and apply that solu-
.tion."
The Rev. Theodore M. Hes-!
burgh, president of Notre'
Dame, thanked the speaker for.
"thoughtful. serious, moderate"
advice. ; '
'You have advanced a real
problem assuming that we take
it seriously, and we do,' he
said.
Mr. McNamara spoke at they
dedication of the Hayes-Healy
Center for studies In graduate
business education.
CPYRGHT
means that the new grow.Ln -
gte will necessitate increased
aid. During the first Develop-
ment Decade, the goals called
for the wealthier countries to
provide aid equal to 1 per cent
of their gross national product.
The committee also unanim-
j s for international coopra
areas to promote development.
Among the areas listed were
these:
glnternational trade, includ-
ing a "scheme for preferences",
to be granted to exports of de
veloping countries.
gTransfers of both foreign
and private jr -estment and
agreement to p.'itect develop-
countries frc,ii, luctuations
in commoany .
(lHuman development, in-
cluding education, housing,
health, nutrition and poplation
policy.
qDiversification of produc-
tion, including land reform to
promote agriculture and the ex-
panion of export-oriented in-
dustries.
The committee will continue'
Its work In Geneva in July and,
report to the General Assembly.
here this fall: An International
development strategy will be,
announced early next year.
The reluctance of the
wealthier countries to guaran-
tee aid and trade advantages
from' the developing countries
during this decade. , .. , ..
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 CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 19 ~ITRDP79-01194A000500030001-8
Seabed Proposals"
the' Disae?nament Confer
ence that listening devices
fixed to the ocean floor
must not b' outlawed in any
treaty limiting uses of the
seabed, Informed sources
said.
Commenting - on a draft
treaty submitted by Russia,
British Delegate Ivor Porter
said any.trouty which barred
submarines from resting on
the sea bottom also; would
be unacceptable.
CPYRGHT
NEW YORK TIMES
6 May 1969
Malthu Revisited
Were he alive now, Parson Malthus would have
found much that was familiar in Robert S. McNamara's
eloquent plea at Notre Dame for a sharp cutback in
birth rates in the underdeveloped countries. Many: of
those nations are "treadmill. economies" forced to
divert already in adequate capital resources to the care
of "mounting waves" of children whose immediate
needs leave little left over for raising abysmally low
standards of consumption and health. The choice, as
Mr. McNamara correctly stated it, is between reducing
birth rates" humanely or letting the cruel forces of
famine and war or other violence solve the population
problem in their usual grim fashion.
The bleak statistics of the population crisis ahead
are simple enough. If recent trends continue, human-
ity's numbers' will double in the next thirty years-
from about 3.5 billion now to 7 billion at the turn of
the century-and reach 14 billion by 2035. Of the
prospective increase between now and-the year 2000,
85 per cent or more could be accounted for by larger
numbers in the underdeveloped nations. If this arith-
metic is the pattern of the future, then chaos and
suffering on an almost unimaginable scale are certain.
Mr. McNamara may be. too. optimistic, if anything.
He sees the current rapid, advance of agricultural
productivity as sufficient to buy two decades during
which the world _ will have time to take measures_
needed to prevent' catastrophe. But the increasing
hundreds of millions in the underdeveloped areas
want more than merely enough food to fill their
bellies. Understandably they want a standard of living
that will approach; more. closely the standard taken
for granted in. the, developed countries. But this re-
.CPYRGHT
quires ' precisely the capital that is being eaten up.
by the ceaseless flood of new-born life.
Strong as the case is :for a systematic effort, to
reduce birth rates, the difficulties are . formidable.
There are great shortages of the'funds.and.manpower
needed to mount the required ,educational campaigns
and to provide mechanical, pharmaceutical -and' other
means of birth controls ' Even` more fundamental'.'ig
the resistance in many areas `to the idea of reducing
births. That resistance arises partly from religious
taboos, partly from deeply grained cultural patterns
grounded. in the' now obsolete ,wisdom of a past, age,'
and partly from fears , spread, by `demagogues` that
Western talk of.birth control is really inspired by
the desire to commit: genocide and "demographic
imperialism."
Mr. McNamara's campaign for population control
should apply to all nations, , the developed as well
as the underdeveloped. Food is not the limiting factor
in the former; but already important questions are
being raised about how much this small planet's air,
water and land can absorb in the way of automobile
fumes, ,insecticides and other. poisons, radioactive
wastes and. the other effluvia given' off massively
in modern industrial societies. The more people and
the higher the standard of living they enjoy, the
greater the volume of damage to the world environ-
ment as a whole. More, and more effective, measures,
of birth control are as essential in the have as in
the have-not nations, and 'only'their broad' acceptance
throughout the world during the next generation will.
prevent a" convulsion that will make all questions' of
population.control academic,because then there Won't
be enough 'population left to control..
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8
LOS ANGELES TINES
3 July 1969
Popi1atioii Grovth? Will -tray.
Latin America's Development
BY IRVING S. 'BENGELSDORF, Ph.D.
Tunes Science Writer
If the Rio Grande is considered-
to be tho dividing line between
North America and Latin America,
then there now are more people liv-,
in south of the river than to the
north.
North America, with 225 million
people-203 million in the United
States and 22 million in Canada--,
has 44.9'0 'of the 501 million people'
who live in the two Americas,. And'
55.1;'0 of the inhabitants of the twon
Americas live in Latin America
with its 276 million people-in
M ex i c o, t h e Caribbean, Central
America, and South America.
But human populations are not
static; they are dynamic and grow-
ing. And the population of Latin
America is growing almost three
times as fast as is the population of
North America. Thus, it is projected
that by 11780 the population of the
two Anicricas will be 640 million
people--with 264 million (41%) iri,
North America and 376 million
(50%) in Latin America.
If this population growth differ-
ence continues, then by the year
2000, it is estimated there will be
twice as many people south of the
Rio Grande as north of the river.
Of the 276 million people that now
live in Latin America, slightly more
than half live ia two countries--
Brazil and Mexico. Brazil, with 90.6
million people, now has an annual
population growth rate of 2,8% (for
every 1,000 Brazilians there are 38
babies born. and 10 people die). At
this rate, Brazil's population will
doubly: in about 25 years. Brazil Is
expected to have 124 million people-
by 1980.
Mexico, with 49 'million people,
now has an annual population
growth rate of 3.4 %'o (for every 1,000
Mexicans there are 43 babies born
and 9 people die). At this rate,
Mexico's. population will double in
about 21 years.-Mexico is expected
to have 71.4 million people by 1980.
More people need more food,
water, shelter, clothing, jobs, educe'
tion, -electricity, transportation, etc.;
And it is precisely those nations
with the highest population growth
rates that now are having difficulty
providing minimum goods and ser-
vices to the population they already
have, let alone be able to take care of
the needs of exploding populations
that will double in about 20-25 years.
And so, at East Setauket, Long
Island, N.Y., on Saturday and Sun-
day, June 28 and 29, the Population
Reference Bureau of Washington
and the Tinker Foundation cospon-
sored the Third Dialog on Popula-
tion Problems in Latin .America. In
attendance were . publishers and
editors of North American and.
Latin American 'newspapers. The
Tinker Foundation was created in
1959 by the late Dr. Edward L.'
Tinker "to promote better under-
standing among the peoples of ,the
world with a particular concern for
the peoples of the Americas."
R
One of the four'featured speakers
at the meeting was -Dr. Victor L.
Urquidi, president of the College of
Mexico, an outstanding graduate
CPYRGHT
and post-graduate school In Mexico
City devoted to in-depth studies is
the social sciences and humanities.
Dr. Urquidi emphasized that pop-
ulation problems in Latin America
were due to the continued mainten-
ance of a traditional high birth! rate
in the face of a non-traditional
falling death rate. Thus, in the,30-
year' period 1930-1960, the death rate
'in Mexico of children one year and,
younger was reduced by 50%; the
,death rate of l?lexican children in.
,the age grog 1-14 years was
reduced by 7570; and the death rate
of young Mexican adults in the age,
group 15-30 years was reduced by
60.70.
Thus, both Mexico and Brazil now.
have about ,45% of their populations
under the age of 15. This is precisely,
that part of the..population that
must be supported by the rest of the
population. And it also is that part
of the. population that' will be oi
highest fertility in,:the near future.;
Not only are Latin American
populations increasing rapidly,' but
the added numbers of people are.
moving into already overcrowded
cities in search of employment. Dr.
Urquidi estimates that unemploy-
ment runs about 10-12%, and per-
haps 25%, of the labor force as Latin
American cities are incapable of
absorbing the ever-growing number
of people looking for work.
Under such continuing population
pressures, Dr. Urquidi felt that
future economic development of
Latin America, indeed, dick not look
very promising.
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 Approved For Release ~Q~p~2{F01194A00050(1ok$T
7 October 1969
Recent statements from Brazil show in which birth control was once anathema;
the need for patience and persuasion in ,swing' over to government-sponsored ef-
the world's fight against overpopulation. 'forts to control growth.
Word from Brasilia is that (a) the gov- The real question is whether govern-
einment does not intend to lend any en- ments and peoples can succeed in time in
couragement to birth control : efforts de- bringing population expansjon under con
spite that-country's astronomical birthrate trol,.In India, for example, the govern-
and widespread poverty, and (b) United ment is' now committed to ' such control,
States efforts to promote such control are yet there has been no appreciable slowing
designed to keep Brazil weak. down in population growth, reckoned at
Patience is required because at so many + . about 12,000,000 yearly. The same is true
points population control runs, into out- in, say, Egypt and certain Latin-Ameri-
moded but still active social, cultural, and can, countries.
religious taboos. Persuasion is required Mere governmental determination to
for Brazil's own present and future good, limit births is not enough. Yet this is the
to say nothing about the world's good as indispensable first step in most of the
a whole. countries with overhigh rates. Thus the
Frankly,.we do not believe that Brazil, official Brazilian attitude, were it irre-
or any other land under the sun, will long versible, could eventually turn out 'to be
hold out against the need and desirability tragic. But too many other Latin-Ameri-
of keeping population growth under con- can countries have come to see the need
trol. In the first place, there is too much for 'putting some rein on indiscriminate
evidence of the harm' done by reckless re- population growth for anyone to - doubt
production for any government to pretend that Brazil will eventually come to 'do the
ignorance of the facts. In the second, the same out of sheer. good sense and neces-
last few years have seen land after. land, ' sity.
WASHINGTON POST
22 October 1969
GSA Moment in [Iluinan '111PP -;>1XT"
Ing but sometimes treacherous seas of in. early breakthrough to
dependence; and at a time when the winds technology and sel
once
of a cold war were blowing enjoyed by the
o called d
L_ -- - - g?
-
s
tales
onor
-?? -- -w ':" uu'll'; gave them an extraor
stances, old links and friendships, as well as,a;?,,,,, ?,,,
The accompanying is a partial text of
a speech by Lester B. Pearson, former
Canadian Prime Minister, at a develop.
ment conference in Racine, Wis., last
week. Mr. Pearson headed an interna-
tional commission which recently urged
the virtual doubling of foreign aid,
to keep out new and potentially hostile
political influences, played a large, though
by now a declining, part in the adoption of
development strategies and the distribu-
tion of development
aid by the older
and richer countries.
There were also two
other more permanent,
factors underlying the
world's wealth-creat
sion, with 80 per cent
policies of the Approved For Releak'9pg 1.iL UV -_
i ,. %iRpeace in the
ticipating states. i e e inn f space as u- u ure , . .
CPYRGHT
inanity's chief insight of the '60s. Gradually
entering the world's consciousness like a
silent and rising tide within the, human
imagination are those. pictures taken from
interstellar space, where our bright planet,;
Earth, full of life and light, hangs small,
single and alone in the cold void .
LOPSIDED and unified,' divided in re
sources and opportunities, but united by
knowledge and communications, the world
of the '60s takes into the next decade'
these old divisions and disproportions, but
also new challenges and opportunities.
' The drama of this moment In time lies
in the fact that on the one hand we now
have the knowledge and Incentive to work
towards a world community which recog?
nizes the inescapability of Interdependence;
while, on the other, we do little enough to
reflect that awareness in the social and
economic policies of our separate sovereign
states. So we must strengthen and improve
International cooperation in many fields;
Including efforts to remove the shocking
disparities of welfare and living standards
between the two worlds of the rich and the
,nnnr With th
'- ---
ese
 99/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001 PYRGHT
Approved For Release I
In an era of swift and often,
violent change. Doubts and fears and vast
dissatisfactions surge up all round the de
v"eloping world as the masses move from
field to city and men struggle to achieve
sense and mastery in their new way of life.
Cities grow. at twice, at even four times,
the rate of population increase. The rural.
exodus has become a new "wandering of
the peoples," surpassing 19th century
movements in size and differing In. that
barriers and restrictions prevent the rural
migrants from crossing seas and frontiers.
and finding new empty continents. They
people now have to move, very largely,
within the limits of their own countries.
Our development decades of the 19th
century, for instance, saw vast transatlantic
migrations, new lands opening up,. fantastic
breakthroughs in productivity and in com-
munications.. But in some ways the sequence
of events is now much less favorable to
continued development than it was a century
ago. The dilemmas of today are rooted in
much more stubborn obstructions and re-
quire far more aggressive, sustained and
determined action to break through and
launch the poorer countries into effective
modernization and growth.
Population growth outpaces anything
known in the 19th century and far exceeds
the ability of developing communities to'
feed and employ the new multitudes,:
The population of the poorer countries--
now nearly 2% billions --will' double An
the not 30 years. In the 1950s and through
most of the 1960s, food supplies in the
developing world have lagged behind this
fantastic thrust of
population growth.
Developing nations
again and again have
had to use precious
foreign exchange for
the import of food,
while the increase in
exports necessary to
pay for this food
from ' their own re-
sources has been held
back, in part by local
policy it is true, but
also by the fact that
it is made hard for
newcomers to com-
pete internationally
in the field of trade
against the establish-
ed giants of Europe,
Japan and the United
States ..
The seventies offer
us crisis, ' no doubt,'
but also vast cppor
,tunics for creative
action. The first is the possibilty of a com-
plete reversal of fortune on the agriculturai
front. We are already seeing the conse-
quences of this tremendous breakthrough
to new productivity in the shape of rising
grain productivity in large parts of Asia,'
and I suggest that if this technological
change is rightly_ handled it can begin to
revs m Vtb fat li"t1@0 of uk3Ftt=ildtlbn Ond
stagnation through every aspect of develop-,
mental change.
c~.m
INSOFAR as the new opportunities are
seized by small farmers, backed by exten-
sion services and cooperatives, we shall
create a more stable farm population. Un-
der conditions of intensive agriculture, the
land can for a time absorb more labor. We
shall therefore slow down the exodus to
urban life. A lively farming class will be a,
market for expanding industries and will
feed the cities, releasing foreign exchange,
for technical and, capital imports and for:
intermediate goods. At the same time,;
rising expectations, based on prosperous'
farming and expanding employment, will.
help to create the environment in which
parents will seek responsibly to stabilize
family size. Thus the spirals. may begin to'
go into reverse and push society towards"
greater wealth and hope. '
. ctio
WE ARE at a moment in human destiny
when the door can swing open to new op=
portunities and new hopes for the sub-
merged 2 billion. The gates of the future:
are not closed. They are. ajar. They will
respond to a determined :push .. .
Will we do it? Here I confess I hesitate
betwee n light and shadow. Light comes`
from our opportunities, our capacity for
such a fantastic coordinated effort as a
moon landing, from the moral urgency of
the young, from their underlying demand,
for human unity. The dark comes from our
record of fear and hate, our nationalist pre-
occupations, our huge armaments which we
feel must be maintained, our poisons and
pollutions, the casual destructiveness of
'much of our tedhnology; also from the rec.'
ord of declining public commitment to
worldwide development and a trend of
governments to look increasingly inwards,
not outwards, and neglect the planetary
environment they all help to create .., .
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 BAA, erg e or Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500030001-8
17 November 1969. CPYRGHT
6` QDJ j(L&ffLr&1L1iLff3'
centurnt
by C. P. SNOW
Lord Snow Is a British scientist, novelist
and former high-ranking government of.
ficial who has written extensively on the
interrelationships between his various In-
teresls. This article' is excerpted from
two lectures he delivered last week at
W1"cstmiuster College, Fulton, hlo,
than we have known before, and one that will happen, nor whether it will go one
we may not be able to control. I indefinitely or be controlled, can be re-
In the rich countries, food has ceased cisely, . calculated. There are too many
ture has had its spectacular successes in knowns, gives a glimmer of partial hope,
wanted. we could crow more food. All contribution I can make is to give 'myl
~~., r over the northern hemisphere, population own luagment, for wnat it is worut, it,,s
th
T N
p
ces
purpose JVty n1ronr many amenities, but not fast enough to cises w110 can read we evlaence. 1 BUN
m an nlrnncns- thheree a are e alrralv fun tun -------- I_
hu
h,,,.~. ... .. ..... ...... .. .. ... __ ._. .__ nl ess Upin1U11 dtllung Imuse WfU KIIVV( IaUSL
Within two or three genera tions-unless its many pc.-plc in the poor countries as -
- ,, in the rich Further there .rill-nothing and some areas of disagreement.
s
. . f .... .......... ... ._ lea. w v1 uw hUVI .rvl lu, .,ul 0%A UVuo v&
time of the first English settlements in three-quarters will be added to the poor..
Asia, Africa, Latin. America; the collision
between the rich and poor
The
a
p
g
America, there were something like a
between rising population and available
half billion human beings alive. When countries is growing. Take the avcrabe,;
daily inrrima.' in a large slice of the poor food is very near. The demographers say.
United States is about $8 a day-2Ct1; gludt b
three billion. By 2000 A.D. It It will be over li V. 1 . little might just conceivably be done in
l
I
it
e
y to
n .0 years
is
six billion, and may be nearer seven. times gn ter.
be 300 times 1*reaLec. 20 or 30 years. They call on the agronom
. Doubling the world population. In su lea, those statements ale give the demographers enough time.
years. That is something now in history. right. Some of them are dreadful cliclh ._.:
1rtaiizcu, eau rapla incl'vei 1^ iJVilUld- u.cnm.u. v,
ments h oon??y -? "----t the human increase soon'enough to give,,
t.. avve been caving it.for VAar4
rn,__ mini
,r.__e_.Y d_
bl
d
jud
ted
u
e
i
g
utauig ease. u.v I.vu.. .J. .+c ,I.. w ?uu~ui than all the which fret, '
hettrr nt kerninc+ nnonle alive. Medicine 1111POrtatlt, things The only rational ground for' putting
been reduced everywhere (remember,' invisible connection between. our local-, meet between responsible men. Here, as;
our 2rcit?nrandparcnts, even the privi- problems and the catastrophic world one.; 'it happens, there is the glimmer, the ray
took the death of children as an inevita- rely' to an extent upon judgment,`which' the bleak prospects lhele is ' one genuing
f
h
t
ble fact of existence) but the length of is really informed guessing. Most o
o' Pi;;.,,;,; I h ,;t site I,,;;- term it must
being rejoices in it. But It is presenting But I want to stress that neither the- ?.. "' `' ctrl .I?tl-
rc~t : t `v g ~7 (0n 0 nletCie All
Q 011eA.J T.I 00002 CIA RDP7 A11~~C1S A 717i11i1'
s,F8F .
 CPYRGHT
I.1 1' U. ,:1 + , . ! i,. .'. w? . ,,. . ?. 11L1 C 11C1 A4
ti;c , 1, ~, , t ww'a 1~,G~ 1,i~9 luctrie tolls. Aic%ipik strain.
11C S.111:C~inCr2me and tilt
:arvest has a en Something of tI.C same 11 1u1'C again
l:irl-of rcenrd
sa c
,,
,
grown ;n 1'a :,ta,n. For the :dement, the
`car of l:tr ;cr has heen beaten back
freal the subcontinent.
'rhis is a success story, carefully
planned, and the result of many years
work. .1 groat deal of the-credit, and it is
ileasnnt to say it here in the middle of
.lie United States, goes to two great prig
ate foundations, the 11,oclcefeller and the
Ford.
Progress n'itl; rice
Dwarf wheat strains have hen devel?
raped wiijch have a high degree of resis-
lance to; tropical conditions, That took
getting on for twenty years. In 1962 the
Indians decided their best chance was. to
import those Wheat strains. Their own,
re:carch workers have introduced other
genetic characteristics into literal. Tlte
Pakistanis did precisely the same, two
LOS ANGELES TINT S
23 April 19679
I ) . sc 7O al' \' e5 .111'1& '1';'0, it
took thrnas;nl(k of vent; to roast] a wvorldl
population of 2?'io nnillioil by .Af) 1. }:iy' 1650
world 11Oltulrltiorl doubled to 500 million,
Another cloublin'e took place by I q50, when;
world population reached one billion. Theft,!
supported by the two foundations,, Is,
happenin to rice, The; r. is an lntcrna
tional Rice Research Institute in the
Pllilippincs~ which started in 1062 and
has been producing a high yielding and
disease-resisting strain of rice. The most!
promising one, called Mal has already;
been exported to Asia and South ,Ameri?
ca. With any ludk,? more .hunger will be
pushed back for a wwhila; ' '
Well, this is Food news. In ;making'
ones jud~mcat of the future, it is .a
factor. We mustn't lose. our beads, ono
tray e; the other. The .limits t.o toed'
production, even when as deeply planned.
as this. seem to be quite: sharp. The,
population increase has no such limits,,:
The collision is still on j ?
The guess I should now rnal:c-as I
saki, this is no more useful than that otcl
arlyone else 1who,rends the CVidellce?-is
that laiFc?scale famine will not happen;
;as .Carly as 1975 or 19110. There wilt
'.rC~ P_ 1~ COMMENT': NUM~AE I . ONE PROBLEM
David, liapfnrn L assisialrt nrofr sor of eco-
Iil' DAVID KAPL,A~Nnondcs at So nla Monica City College.
80 w'cars later in 11).30, population dcui)]ed
again toIwo 16llion people. By 11)75, 45 dears
later , if prescnt trc;7ds continue, poliulaGott:
will have doubled to four hiIlion ?peoipple.
it our present ute of growth, we Call Look,
forw;tr'd to 11 billion people in 20:15 and 28'
billion 1>v 2070. Why has there been such all,
acceleration of growth in world, population?
The answers are easy.
Medical advances Have eradicated thn.
dreaded placn.lcs of the past centuries amen
death control..
CPYRGHT
No longer, and happily so, is world
'population going to be decreased by any of
the ancient pandemics. White we should
applaud these medical advances which have
saved so malls lives all over file world, we
also must observe that historically it was high
death rates that accounted for the slower
rates of population increase:
Economies Are Hit Hard
The eradication of high death rates while
;high birth rates continue has led to art
increase in the rate of world population
growth which 'in many cases his had
pernicious economic effects, particularly on'
the underdeveloped l.7ations.
conquered othei.? serious diseases l:ry devising Jr one were to (describe
water steno, I n aclclit.ion, .modern sanitation: capital shorty es, lowv anricu1tural prnduct.ivi-
ha. shary>t cb idllFo eiea e4+ '99/09/02: CIA-RDP719tO11I94AOOfl 50003OOQ1,-81nd
such as ma a la. unequal dlistl?1buti6n of income, Olpe would
probably (it is a bitter thing to fay) be
serious local famines, m" Jo." instance,
Latin America old parts of Africa. The
major catastrophe will happen before Ilia
end of the century. We shall, in thn rich
countries, be surrounded by a sca of,
famine, involving hundreds of millions of
human beings, unless three tremendous
social' WAS arc by then in operatian. Notl
just one alone, but all three. They are:
1, A'concerted effort by the rich cc un:
tries to produce food, money And tecimi.
cal ssi,tance for the poor.
n efiolt by. the poor cauiltrIes
thcnlsclwlcs, on ii;e ul India: ,1;;,l
hakiatn)1, iri rcl'olntlonirc their 1. od pro
ductinn. .
An effort by ?140, pour count rc
wvilh all ;he assistance 111,11 cal he, tiro.
,
1'.idcd under the first potrlt-to educe ir
~slup their population' incrr'ttse; 'whit a
;corresponding reductfbb in the populrtliull
increase in the rich culnltt'ie, lisp.
Those are the three Conditiolts, 811
necessary, if we are, to avoid social
despair.
 also 4pprovecI F1QnrReIteaseii 999iO'9/02 : CSI, r ~ 7, . ,;F; Opo a 0.s oaa -~
located In Asia, Africa and Latin America.
Perversely, these areas have the highest
rates of population growth, which act as a
serious drag on economic growth. Tore:
people mean more mouths to feed. This cues
clown the amount of product that can he
saved. With low savings rates, little capital is
available to modernize agriculture and indus
try-a modernization these ecorioniics despel'-
ately need if they are going to increase their
prtii9i.ietian of food and other products.
What, little produclinn Is obtained, say In
agriculture
, must, he inlnle_diatcly consuuned.
These economies thus have very low savings
rates, and these translate into low rates of
capital formation. flue of the basic prcreclui-
sit.es for economic. growth for these economies
-increasing levels of capital accumulation---
Is being seriously impeded by rapidly,
increasing populations.
Latin Anwril?a in Trouble
Latin America clearly reflects how popula-
tion increases have all but eradicated econom
is growth. Latin America has had a 4.7%
increase in gross national product annually.
1lotwevc.r, when you include population
growth of 3;r, yearly, the per capita growth.
rate actually collies down to 1,7;%% annually,
In 1900 Latin America had a population of
63 million, It now has a population of 268
million. This population, if the present rates
of increase continue, will double in 23 years.
By the end of the century, Latin America will
have 650 million people. It will be growing
then at a rate of 100 million people every 5
yeal:s. Obviously, with geometric population
increases of this magnitude, Latin America
will be very fortunate if it is able to record
any per capita growth in the final 30 years of
this century.
All of these areas wvhich have rapidly
increasing populations have extremely low
annual per capita. incomes: unrler $400 for
Latin America and under $130 for Africa and
\sia. (Those. incomes look especially low
when conlparecl to North America's annual
per capita income of well" over $3,500.) Yet,
Africa and Asia have rates of population
increase Which will result in a doubling of
both their populations by the year 2000.
Latin Anicrica, Africa, and Asia have
approximately 2.6 billion people now. If
present rates of population increase continue,
these areas will have approximately 5.3 billion
by the end of the century.
. , _ ._
'[lee ominous consequence; population growth are clear.
First, there will. be a continued exacerbation
of the gross inequalities in the shares o[ wworld
income going to the underdeveloped countries
;end to' the developed nation JL~" L`b y~{j }fin r{ L ~tp~pcl a r qA t t, pp toga ocrra
rmi u Pi ~bEt'`~4se U1 , toJe'19~`9~a 02,01 194 ''ttY' a og tako sna
za izgradnju socijaliznm, 6alc ! lcada intcgris`u u jedan sistem koji bi im !nog pokreta usmerenog protiv re
nih komuriistirkih partija, jer to u- vrednostima i smislu livota. U tome
nosi elemenie konkurencije i mo- je vcliki problem. Da so sa6ice jza-
Ida 6e nateratj izvestan broj parts'- ziva6a nereda javljaju na povrsini
ja da prevazidu sadasnju stagnaci- pokreta - to je to no. Ali ako se
ju marksisti6ke misli, koja mole sa-
mo da os]abi komunistj6ke partije
prod rastu6lm revolucionarnim po-
jcrctom.
ostane samo na tome, nece se nika-
da razresiti stvarni problemt Kada
se danas, u izvesnim socijalisti6kim
zcmljama, govorl samo o jdeoloA-
koj subverziji, pitam se na kakvhm
U svetlu ncdavnih dogadaja ko- teorijskim osnovama more poiivatt
ji su potresli socijalisticki svet jedan takav pojam. To pronto zna
mole li so konstatovati, po Va- 6i nalaziti so u dcfanzivi. Prlsc& mi
Icm miiijenju, da se ulalu vc6i se onog divnog intervjua to ga jo
napori a borbu protiv cfckata Lenjin dao jednom ameri6kom no
imperijalisticke divcrzijc, nego
to so trait rescnja postoje6ih
problcma unutar socijalistikog
svcta I samog sisteina, Ito bi sa
svojc strane u6inilo socijalizam
jos privia6nijim za mast?
TO JE USTVARI jedan znacajan
vinaru 1919, godine. aAko vi leite,
molemo sklopiti ugovor. Dozvolice
mo da so u Sovjetski Savez unosi
sva propaganda kapitalisti6kih ze-
malja, pod uslovom da Imamo re
ciprocitet?, rekao je tada Lenjin. U
vremo kada stvari nisu bile jedno-
aspekt stvari. U saopstcnjima koja stavne, Lenjin je bio u punoi ofan
su objavljena kako u Sovjctskom . zlvi, a kapitalisti6ki svet jc bio pre
Savezu take Ivi Cchoslova6koj ovih platen od jedne takve razmene. Sa-
dana povor?am godisnjico interven- 'da mi je te9ko da shvatim da se,
cijc, nvlrt:ta 1968, bio sam frapiran
6injcnlcom to so sve tc5ko6e pri-j
plsuju imperijalistickoj zavcri. Ra-
zumc so, daleko sam od pomisli da
negiram postojanjo kontrarevolucio-
narnih clemenata u Cehoslova6koj,
postojanje spoljnih faktora koji po-
kuAavaju da stvorc t6ko6e, no da
pomognu socijalizmu,.ve6 da ga sru-
Ie. To rnj se 6ini jzvesnim. Ali kada
so sve to so odigralo u Cehoslova-
6koj pokusava podvesti pod akciju
Ia61cc kontrarevolucionarnih clemo-
nata, Inspirisanc inostranim impc-
rijalizmom, 61)i anl so da so prikri-
vaju sus`tinski problemi. Ovili pos-
lednjih dana, na primer, osnovna
stvar nijc u tome to jo nokoliko
desei.ina Ili nekoliko stotina mladih
ijudi Ili mozda inostranih elemena-
to stvaralo teskoC?e u centru Praga.
Ako so pokusava sve objasniti take
kao da je re6 o nekoliko izgredndca
koji hoe da naruavaju red, Duda
se pona"a slicno Nilcsonu koji, s"a-
ijucl Itokfelcra U I:atinsku Ameri-
ku, pripisuje demonstracijo do ko-
ji, jc dosio prilikom prolaska njc-
l;ovng izaylani{ca "a6ici studenata
koji su se navodno prebacivali' iz
prestonice a prestonicu da hi prote
stvovali protiv Rekfclcra. Nije is-
k1ju6cno' da sit so grupicc studc-
natata prebacivale iz prestonice u
prestonicu, all "su~tina problema je
u 'ogroinnom protestu Litavog juzno-
amerilkog kontincnta protiv jenki-
jcvskog imperijalizma. Moglo bi, se
skoro, isto red za dogadaje inaja
meseca prosle godine u Fran-
cuskoj. Noma suninje da su ncki
clcmentl dotili sa "stranc: grupic'e
studenata su dosle iz Milana; no-
koliko studenata ?1z Berlina, kno to
je Kon-Bendit, moglo jc doer i po-
ku,ati da da posebno obeloije de-
monstracijama. To no negiram ni
na koji na6in. All ako se. drij samo
pedeset godma posle Oktobarslce re-
volucije, mole do to mere bits za-
plasen I kontrolisati kofere da no
bi bila proneta kakva kineska bro
Aura III no znam kakav elemenat
ideolo?ke diverzije. Ako se problemi
postavljaju na tai na6in onda smo
nesposobni da th 'resimo.
To me podse6a na sedan period u
natoj zemlji kada su kapitalisti i
gradanska Itampa, prilikom svakog
9trajka u Francusloj trazili stajnog
Aefa orkestran. Govorili su da jo Mo-
skva izazvivala sve to - ne?de. To
zna6i da nisu videli jedan vcliki I
autenti6an radnitki pokret koil Jo
ustaJao nastrajkove Is sopstvcnih
razloga, a oni su tragali za sideo-
loslcom subverzijom?. Mogu sasvini
da shvatim kada to bin! bur?zoazija,
all priznajem da veoma lose razu-
mom kada to line marksisti koji bi
trebalo da pokusaju da shvate vc-
like i sustlnske unutrasnje kontra-
dikcije koje so javljaju u svakoj
zemlji, urnesto da ih pripisuju sub
verzlvnom delovanju Aa6ica me-.
dunarodnih iagrednika.
Snaga i Ineino6 frallctlske
O)O.IC1JC
Sta mozctc rocs o sadasnjoj po-
liti%lcoj situaciju u Francuskoj?
NE MOCU DATI dublju analizu,
nemam ovde ni vrcmena ni prosto-
ra. Tpak, jzglcda mi zna6ajnini, to
Ato je opoziciija ' u ?,Francuskoj jsto;
vreme'no I u vc6lni I nemo6na, Na-
vedimo nekoliko primera. Maja mc-
soca prole godine doAlo je u Fran
cuskoj do najvc6ihstrajkova I naj-
trc6cg studcntskog pokreta 'u 61ta-
voj njenoj istorlit. NaJ91ri narodni
slojcvi u6cstvovali su u torn pokre-
tu: 'radnici, inlenjeri, tehnI ari, fun
lima, partija an vlasti, partija gene
rata De Gola, postigla je veliku iz-
bornu pobcdu. Godinu dana kasiiije,
dos`lo je do sli6nog fenomena. U toku
jednog nozaboravnog referenduina,
izdvaja so ve6ina protiv generala De Gala I on je prinuden da so povu-
%c. Mesoc dana kasnije zakazani su
predscdni6kj lzbori I kandidat'dego-
lista izabran je zna6ajnom ve6inom.
Po morn misljenju, iz takve situa
cije trebalo b! izvu6j neke pouke:
svaki put opozicija je u ve6lni a
istovremeno mole samo da negira,
nemo6na je da grad!.
Sli6an fenomen nalazimo I unutar
same opozicija. U vreme majskih do-
gadaja, komunisti6ka partija odig:ra
la je zna6ajnu ulogu u Itrajkovima,
Generalna konfederacija rada (CGT)
bila je nesumnjivo odlu6uju6i cle-
menat; za vreme !zbora, komunisti
6ka partija, za razliku od svih dru
gih levih partija, postigla je uspeh,
all se nalla izolovana unutar to o-
pozicije. Na istj naCin, u vreme prod
sednjckih izbora, kada su se sve o-
pozicone partije prakticno raspale,
komunisti6ka partija I njen kand!-
dat, Zak Diklo, koji je uostalorn vo-
dio odli6nu izbornu kampanju, po
stile uspeh. Ali sutradan posle tog
uspeha nasla se sama u toj, do kra-
ja podeljenoj opoziciji. To je para-
doks. Snage opozicija koje six u ve-
6lni, nemo6ne su u zemlji, a unutar
to opozicija najvc6a snega, KPF, ne
uspeva da okupi njene snago. Izglc-
da mi da je dos'ao trenutak za dubo
ku analizu ov!h novih uslova Fran-
cuskog politiCkog livota, analizu no-
vih klasnih odnosa koji su nastalt
u Francuskoj, i koji zahtevaju, pa
mom shvatanju, razradu nove poll-
ti6ke stratei;ijc, nove revolucionar
rte strategije koja 6e omoguciti Ko-
munisti6koj partiji Francuske da po
stove postane ferment okupljanja o
pozicije. No seism ovde da ulazim
u razradu razliCitih aspekata . ova
inicijative. Ono to mi izgleda bit
nim,jeste neophodnost ponovnog su
Itinskog razmatranja I analize kako
klasnih odnosa u Francuskoj, tako
i stra.tegije jedinstva opozicije 1, re-
kao bih takode, same koncepcije re
volucionarne, partije u jednoj visa
ko razvijenoj zemlji. Sa tog stano-
.vista gledano, pokusaj nas"ili Echo;
slovaCkih . drugova, od januara do
avgusta 1969, njihov napor da krei
raju politiku I stratcgiju prilagodonu
visokorazvijenoj zemlji, moo vain
.prosle nedeije: vMi.sxno solidarni sa
Polike od lativerzalaog
ZIIaC aja
Isto tako, primer jugoslovcnskog
Approvecl or Release : , -
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na od strane jedne partije, da to sokorazvijenoj zemlji kao ?to je dnog central i zovanog,
jem s
dolazi
doz-
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partija no zarncni klasu, da aParrt
no zanrcni partiju, da rulcovodcca
gruna no zamcni aparat, to po mom
mi?Ijenju, predstavlja pouku uni-
verzairiog "znaLtaja, .76"f