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25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 CPYRGHT AedrRelease 20 23.May 1969 S V I ET DISSIDEIITS III PROTEST TO UhN.. .Text Given to Newsmen Says Rights Are 'Repressed' CPYRQHT __---- MOSCOW, May 22 - More than 50 Soviet dissidents, alarmed at the growing nutn- ber of arrests of their fellows, have drawn up a petition to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, calling for an investigation of "the repres- sion of basic civil rights in the Soviet Union." The petition was drafted two days ago and it was not known whether the text had actually been sent out of the Soviet Union. The dissidents made it available to Western corre- spondents apparently in the hope of reaching the United Nations through Western news- papers. The petition said the recent! arrests have compelled us to think that Soviet punitive organs have decided finally tol bar the activity of people pro-; testing against arbitrariness in Tour country." Coincident with the petition, it was also learned today that Ilya Burmistrovich, a 31-year- old mathematician, was sen- tenced yesterday by a Moscow court to three years in prison for circulating typescripts of works of the imprisoned au- thors Andrei D. Sinyavsky and Yuli M. Daniel to some friends. He was arrested on April 16, 1968, and spent more than a) year in jail before his one-day trial. He was convicted under Ar ( titles 190 and 191 of the Rus- sian Federation criminal code against the spreading of anti- ;Soviet slander. Earlier this week, Ilya Gabai, n teacher of the Russian lan guage, was arrested, and docti~ 1. tents putting forth the case of Crimean Tatars were seized. with him. I 'On Satlin's orders the Crime- an Tatars were expelled from their' homeland during World 'War II on charges of collabora- tion with the Germans. Even though the minority has been of ,ficially rehabilitated, its mem- bers have not been able to re- turn to the Crimean area - ,around the Black Sea from their ,places of exile. mostly in So- -Viet Central Asia. Their plight has attracted the ,'.interest of many dissidents,. who Kaye tried to publiciz' :,heir case through western media. ;< The dissident group Is vir- tually unknown to the Soviet ,public and has little influence. .But their presence and the pub- 1icity they have received in the West has been a constant irri tant to the authorities. k:Prominent Members Arrested In recent months some of the .,more prominent members of ,the, group have been arrested, 'and some of them have been :sentenced. The acknwoledged leader and most active in the group, Pyotr G. Grigorenko, a former Soviet ;Army general, was arrested dearly this month In Tashkent, twhere he had gone at the invi- ;tation of 2,000 Crimean Tatars to help represent in court 10 other Tatars who are also due to go on trial on charges of spreading anti-Soviet slander. Many of the names on the `.petition to the United Nations commission have appeared on other documents that have .made their way to the West.. These documents have protest- red the trials of writers, report- `e.d evidence of growing Stalin 'fists trends in Soviet Society. ,and denounced the invasion, of 'Czechoslovakia. The most prominent name on the petition is that of Pyotr ?Yakir, a historian, now work- ing as a librarian, who is the ,son of Iona E. Yakir, one of the most famous Soviet army com- manders, who was arrested on lvlay 30, 1937, and executed that year on June 11 during a purge of the military conduct- ed by Stalin. Pyotr Yakfr, who himself was arrested in September, 1937, when he was only 14 years old, spent the next 14 years in con- finement in various camps be- `.fore finally gaining his freedom. F-, : In 1966, he ran afoul of the authorities when he began. to speak out against the campaign to rehabilitate Stalin's- reputa -tion in the Soviet Union. Appeal Not Received ~'?' r Fpeclat to The New York TImea 2. 'UNITED NATIONS,' N. Y., May 22-The dissidents' ap at reported from Moscow has of reached the United Nations, ac-I ,cording to officials who ha die 'human rights complaints. Thousands of petitions or et- ?ters alleging violations of ri hts are received each year--14, 00 in 1968-and accusations ve been leveled against virtu illy every government. this is known to have included ap- peals from Soviet citizens, ut sources here were unable to say whether they had came from inside the Soviet U ion or had reached here by o er routes. The practice has been to ac- knowledge and file the ti- tions. This effectively b ies; ;them unless the authors ub-1 licize them or. a delega ion- (chooses to raise them in an `open meeting of the Hu an (Rights Commission. A new procedure, backed by the United States but opp sed by the Soviet Union, w uld create machinery that w uld permit an investigation to be made when complaints reve led a consistent pattern of ab es. Such an Inquiry would eed the consent of the accused o9 ernment. Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP39-01194A000500100001-0 BALTIMQAP Ived For Release 2000/08/29 CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 23 May 1969 55 Russians Ask U.N. For Probe Of `Suppression's CPYRGHT peal circulating privately here ~ghtaA $ii nsaa Pcald,t ' ,o contends that recent arrests of appeal to the United Nations be. dissidents threaten a return to cause we have received no in. Stalinist terror and asks the swer to our protests and cc m. United Nations to investigate plaints which have been nt "violation of basic civil rights" over a number of years to he` by Soviet authorities. highest state and judicial a gm- So far, the appeal has been ties of the Soviet Union." signed by 55 Soviet citizens. Some Signers Listed Its circulation coincided with a The 55 signers included he report from friends of Ilya Bur. 'most active members of a s all mistrovich, a scientist, that he protest movement which as was sentenced yesterday to grown smaller as a result of three years in a labor camp on a continuing arrests and tri s. charge of spreading lies about Among the signers were: the Soviet system by lending 1. Pyotr Yakir, 46, historian a friends copies ? of critical writ- veteran of 14 years in la r ings of Andrei Sinyavsky and camps and son of a famed 1 d Yuli Daniel. Those two satirists Army commander who was s of have been serving terms in la- in Stalin's purges and later re a- bor camps for more than a year. bilitated. ITheir trial in 1966 stirred up: 2. Alexander Yesenin-Vole `protests both here and abroad.' 45, a poet and mathematiclai, The appeal in circulation pro son of the well-known poet, S r. tests the arrest two weeks ago of fgel Yesenin, and a veteran f the best known Soviet dissenter, prisons and mental institutio which are used to imprl n former Maj. Gen. Pyotr Grigo- protesEem. ryenko, and the arrest this week of a fellow dissident, Ilya Gabal, a poet and teacher. "These recent arrests force us to think that' Soviet punitive ,agencies have decided to sup- press once and for all the activi- ty of people who protest against arbitrariness in our country," the appeal said. "We feel that freedom to have and distribute independent convictions has fi- nally been placed in jeopardy." The signers said they were "deeply indignant over unceas- ing political persecutions in the Soviet Union, perceiving in them a return to Stalin's time when all our country was in the grip of terror." The appeal listed recent trials Involving intellectuals demand ing free speech and "people seeking national equality and preservation of their national culture ... Jews demanding the right to leave for Israel ... and believers seeking religious liber- Addressing their petition to the U.N. Commission on Human Approved For Release 2000/08/292: CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00500100001-0 . THE COMMUNIST SCENE (19 April - 23 May 1969) June 1969 I. Husak's First Month in Czechoslovakia II. On the Eve of the World Communist Conference III. Strange Bedmates in the Balkans IV. Briefly Noted: A. Chinese Policy after the Ninth Congress B. Soviets Meddle in Finnish Communist Affairs C. Lenin Centennial I. One Month of the New Husak Regime in Czechoslovakia On 17 April, with the second Soviet intervention, Gustav Husak became Secretary General of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CSCP) and thus top ruler in Czechoslovakia, taking orders from no one except the Soviets. His reign of something more than a month has been marked by definite steps toward Soviet-style "normalization" of the country's situation, which for the past year has been characterized by the Soviets as a "crisis" situation because it did not conform to the pattern of rule practiced in the Soviet Union and its other Satellites. Husak has proceeded in several directions simultaneously in his effort to satisfy the Soviets. Prospects are that he may restore Czechoslovakia to passive Communist orthodoxy using little noticeable violent suppression or old- fashioned Stalinist methods, in fact much less than there was reason to fear at first. Among Husak's moves are the suspension of some of the more out- spokenly liberal newspapers and magazines, including the Studentske Listy, Politika,(a major organ of the Central Committee of his own Communist Party), Listy, Reporter and others. Other publications that do not actively support the party line or are critical of the Soviet Union can expect to suffer a similar fate. On some newspapers, such as the CSCP daily, Rude Pravo, he has installed a new staff of editors he is sure will propagate his line. Some observers have noted that Husak is also substituting "reliable" Communists in place of liberals throughout the party and government hierarchy as an important measure to insure that his orders will be closely followed. There have been sporadic unrest and occasional demonstrations by various elements of the population, as on May Day, on the eve of 6 May (anniversary of the entry of U.S. troops into Western Czechoslovakia during World War II), and again on official Liberation Day, 9 May. In each case, Husak has ordered swift measures to cope with the possibility of mass anti-Soviet, anti-regime demonstra- tions by having the police round up and arrest as many thousands of demonstra- tors as necessary. Thus far, even though an estimated 5,000 students and workers demonstrated at Plzen (Pilsen) on 5 May, none of the popular resentment has gotten out of control, as far as is known. Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194AO00500100001-0 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 Thus Husak has moved decisively to demonstrate to his Soviet masters that he intends to fulfill their explicit or unspoken requirements. He has supported all Soviet foreign policy initiatives, especially doing what he can to assure that Czechoslovakia will not become a bone of contention during the World Communist Conference. His most servile move was to make a speech in Moscow on May Day in which he all but accepted the Soviet version of the pre-invasion situation in Czechoslovakia, (i.ea, that a counterrevolution was imminent), and therefore, in effect, seemed to agree that the Soviet-Warsaw Pact invasion was justified. This, all previous CSCP leaders had refused to do. The Husak speech was promptly featured in Pravda, but this sensitive portion was omitted in the version published for the Czechoslovak public. Seemingly as a reward for Husak's good behavior, the Soviets quietly suspended publication and distribution of their illegal Czech-language newspaper Zpr.avy, hated by the Czechs as a brazen symbol of Soviet rule. Husak may hope that the Soviets will further reward him by removing some Soviet troops from Czech soil or possibly by granting a hard. currency loan, which the Czech economy sorely needs in order to buy modern western equipment and help make the Czechs competitive in world trade. Some observers believe that the enigmatic Husak personality hides a strong will, a sense of independence, and a fierce sense of nationalism which make him not altogether to the Soviets' liking, But thus far, for all practical purposes, he has shown less independence than his predecessor Alexander Dubcek, despite extreme pressures kept to his commitment to preserve the important freedoms of speech, assembly and press. II. At Issue On the Eye of the World Communist Conference Czechoslovakia has been the main cause of the considerable disarray in the world Communist movement, and at the forefront of criticism of the Soviet Union has been the Italian Communist Party (PCI). The PCI has been critical both of the military intervention and of the Soviet-inspired effort to snuff out the Dubcek-led experiment in a humanistic and progressive Communism. Buts now that a native Czechoslovak is taking the lead in accomplishing Soviet objectives in Czechoslovakia, the PCI has less reason to point an accusing finger at the real culprit: the CPSU. Nevertheless, the invasion of Czechoslovakia and its justification in the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty gave added strength to pre- existing centrifugal forces that now threaten to throw more fragments of parties, if now whole CP's, out of the Soviet gravitational field. The period between the 23 May Preparatory Commission meeting and the end of the full- scale World Communist Conference, which starts 5 June, will witness a struggle between the centrifugal and centripetal forces in the movement. The Soviets will use every device their ingenuity can invent: pressure, persuasion, black- mail, bribery, to restore their centralized authority and control. If they do not succeed during this period in establishing some kind of international organization (as a latter-day variation of the Comintern or Cominform), they Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 are certain to continue this effort after the conference. Centrifugal forces, foremost among them the PCI, but including also such parties as the Rumanian and the British, will oppose this Soviet aim and will try to gain acceptance of their principle of true autonomy for each party. What sort of equilibrium between these two forces will emerge from the Conference may become evident from the wording of the document that is finally adopted by the 60-odd parties expected to attend. The critical portion will concern the relations between parties, i.e., between the CPSU on the one hand and individual parties on the other. Reportedly this section is causing serious difficulty for the drafters. If the Soviets succeed in their effort, the document should show strong emphasis on the unity of the movement and the "duty" and "responsibility" of fraternal parties to "proletarian inter- nationalism" with a secondary role accorded the principles of autonomy and independence of parties. It might even include a statement suggesting or implying the desirability of some kind of formal international organization. If the independent-minded parties are able to persist in their views (their ultimate weapon being a refusal to sign the final document), it should be reflected in a corresponding dilution of the importance of unity, duties, and responsibilities, and a strengthening of the theme of party autonomy. III. Albania, Yugoslavia, Rumania, China --- Strange Bedmates Ever since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Rumanians, Yugoslavs, and Albanians have feared that the Soviets would apply the Brezhnev Doctrine to their countries and move against them militarily. For those far removed geographically or psychologically from the danger of Soviet invasion, it is easy to dismiss such fears as far-fetched or even as being self-serving propaganda, but it should be remembered that it was just such "detached" observers who, before the Czech invasion, believed that the deviations repre- sented by Czechoslovakia were not sufficient cause for the Soviets' taking such drastic action. Recently, Soviet attitudes toward Albania raised these Balkan countries' apprehensions to a new level. The authoritative CPSU journal Kommunist (No. 5, 26 March 1969) claimed that the Chinese had established military bases in Albania with the intention of installing missiles there. The Albanians re- jected these accusations (as did their long-time enemies, the Yugoslavs) but saw in them Soviet establishment of a pretext for military action against Albania. They were especially apprehensive inasmuch as they had formally withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact in September 1968 without subsequent Soviet recognition or acknowledgment of this fact. (Hungarian withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact was one main reason for the Soviet invasion of Communist Hungary in 1956.) The depth of Albanian concern is illustrated by the curious phenomenon of the Albanians' offering to make common cause with their archenemies, the Yugoslavs, in defense against a possible Soviet invasion. This position was made clear in an editorial 11 April in the main Albanian CP paper, Zeri i Popullit. The Yugoslavs, in turn, while suggesting that some Albanian views Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 might be exaggerated, acknowledged that there was reason for concern since the Soviet accusation was false and therefore could quite logically be regarded as a trumped-up justification for military action. A military move against Albania would inevitably involve Yugoslavia, which has for months actively prepared its citizenry to resist Soviet invasion. The Albanians at the same time asserted, less surprisingly, that their fate is also linked to that of Rumania. Rumania has long been aware that, because of their relative independence of, and often outright opposition to, the Soviets, they could be the next victim of the Brezhnev Doctrine. In addition to this common fear, the two countries are bound by their mutual sympathy for Communist China, though for different reasons and in different degree. The Rumanians have discreetly supported the Chinese ever since the latter challenged Soviet claims to dictate the international Communist line, because the Rumanians themselves aspired to just such independence. The Albanians in their dispute with the Soviets found a willing ally in the Chinese and have been as vituperatively anti-Soviet as the Chinese themselves. The Chinese took until 7 May to register their view of the Albanian offer to make common cause with Yugoslavia and Rumania. China was able to acknowledge the logic of Albania's appeal to Rumania but unable to say a kind word about Yugoslavia, that archetype of revisionism. So the Chinese simply ignored the Yugpslav role. This spectacle of tangled Communist international relations clearly has its ludicrous aspects, but two serious lessons of import emerge. There can be no doubt that the three deviating Communist countries -- Albania, Rumania, and Yugoslavia -- despite important dissimilarities, feel threatened by the Soviet Union as a result of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. And despite the incredulity with which many may view these fears, they simply cannot be ignored, any more than the prospect of Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia should have been underestimated before 21 August 1968. Secondly, the mutually independent stance of all three countries vis-A-vis the Soviet Union is clear evidence of the potency of nationalism, even in the Communist world. This nationalism is one more proof of the falsity of the Communist myth, invented by Marx and enshrined by Lenin, that Communists as the vanguard of the working class regard "proletarian. internationalism" as a greater principle than looking after the national interest (traditionally contemptuously referred to by the Communists as "bourgeois nationalism"). IV. Briefly Noted A. Chinese CP Congress and National Policy As the dust settles after the long Chinese Communist Party Congress (1 - 28 April), it is evident that it was inconclusive. The length of the congress, particularly the time it took to put together a new Central Committee, is one of many tenuous indications suggesting a hard fight took place, with Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 tough bargaining and pulling and tugging between two factions in the party. On the one hand there are the moderates, pragmatists, who want to come to practical grips with economic and diplomatic realities and whose leader is generally thought to be Chou En-lai. On the other hand, there are the fanatic, purist revolutionaries, to whom the Cultural Revolution and Mao Tse-tung's ideology, bound in a little red book, are the ultimate reality and an end in themselves. The congress and its aftermath suggest that both factions continue to have influence on Mao and his heir, Lin Piao, who are the final arbiters over policy proposals put forth by each faction. It would appear that Mao sometimes decides in favor of one group and policy and then reverses himself under the persuasions of the opposing group, so that policies can veer wildly and change tack even from day to day. This factional struggle may explain why the Chinese proposal last November to resume the Warsaw talks with the U.S. (initiated by the moderates) was abruptly cancelled the following February (by the fanatics). Factionalism, presided over by an aging and capricious Mao, could also explain the simultaneous pursuit of contradictory courses, for example the current Chinese agreement to talk with the Soviets about navigation problems along common border rivers while renewed armed clashes go on. B. Continued Soviet Intervention in Finnish CP Affairs In early April Soviet Politburo member Arvid Pelshe tried to mediate the dispute between the dominant moderate faction of the Finnish Communist Party and the Stalinist faction, which walked out of the 15th Party Congress (3-6 April) with the intention of forming its own Communist party. On 21 April Alexey Belyakov, chief of the Scandinavian Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, quietly slipped into Helsinki to continue the Soviet pressure to prevent either side from perpetrating an organizational split in the Party. Thus far, Belyakov has been successful in that he has persuaded the two factions to sit down together and try to find common ground. As of mid-May, the two factions have not reached agreement and are continuing talks, not very optimistically. Helsinki newspapers suggest that the Stalinists themselves may split into one group that favors rejoining the regular party as an opposition faction and another group which will go ahead and form a separate party. C. Lenin Centennial The 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth falls on 22 April 1970. One of the major items to be discussed at the World Communist Conference 5 June will be the celebration of this centennial, which promises to take on vast proportions. Lenin's 99th anniversary this year was marked by a dull, un- inspired address by CPSU Secretary Ivan Kapitonov. More interestingly, Pablo Neruda, well-known Latin American Communist, launched his own celebra- tion in Santiago, Chile, with a flurry of newspaper features on various aspects of Lenin's life and work. He has promised to celebrate this god of the Communist world for the whole year. Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 CP( 0or Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 The month that has passed since Gustav Husak' replaced Alexander Dubcek in the driver's 'seat in.. .Prague has been a somber one'for Czechoslovakia. The press has been purged, put under. new leadership and tight censorship, and reduced almost to the level .of the worst Novotny years. Mr. Husak and his asso- ciates have gone to great lengths to assert their .loyalty to the Soviet Union, and to denounce the "right-wing" forces that were allegedly behind the trouble during the past year and a half. As a fitting- climax to a grim month, last week's extensive series of price increases has administered a. 'stiff dose of THE ECONOMIST 26 April 1969 nation w ose standard o living as hardly enviable to begin with,. Apart from the substantial success Mr. Husak as enjoyed in imposing normalization (Soviet style) u n his country, Czechoslovakia's will to resist has ma k edly deteriorated. For the moment, evidently, the.. great mass of ;Czechoslovaks have bowed to the threat of Mosco 's' superior force. But the ideas and aspirations of e Prague spring in 1968 have not been forgotten, a d, their political power, is in hibernation-not dead. e' world knows now what'the people of CzecJtoslov iar really want--democracy and genuine sovereignt and the future will 'surely bring a new opportuTx, atospuxsue_ the goals now temporarilyfzustrated..3 cheer for hard-liners. FROM OUR EAST EUROPE CORRESPONDENT Dr Gustav Ilusak, the new Czechoslovak party first secretary, is not interested in buying popularity. He has already embarked on a declared policy of appcasini. and flattering the Russians as the esscn tial prerequisite for the solution of all other outstanding problems. If any- body was in any doubt about this after his first policy statement to the central committee last week, these doubts must have been rapidly dispelled by the erup- tion of harsh promises to Moscow from Lubomir Strougal, the conservative Czech leader, and in the pages of Rude Pravo, all of which ? would have been music in the cars of Stalin. By way of further confirmation, Russian delegations of every conceivable shape and for every conceivable purpose have been arriving in Prague with the clockwork precision of the military airlift last August. Politicians and the press have fallen back into the use of execrable jargon which, stripped down to essentials, carries the depressing message that many of the old orthodox hard-line communists, who have had a thin time of it since Novotny fell, are back in command and have not forgotten the indignities, real or, imaginary, they suffered at the hands of the "revisionists." The point is best summed up by Rude Pravo : " the honest party members found it hard to tolerate that in the difficult days of post-,January development they remained without aid from higher. party bodies and left to the Inercy of speculation and exposed to insults." The paper then speaks of the sobering-up process " now under way. The loss of Mr Dubcek and %vIr e s ould have put up Mr Strou al Smrkovsky as effective symbols has been --who was one of 1 ' g h a beau blow n he tlatio}~ y,Q~,` the remluh s four App" a Fk) 'r a i~Glx~u/ `, CIA-RDP79-C 1' i 4Aa?b5a9O14 OO to deliver i y statement early this Dubcek and Smrkovsky: tomorrow week. Or. C:crnik, Svoboda and the rest." All ove the country, wall slogans are bein assiduously painted over in preparation fo a new era. One hears whispered remarks "I lave you seen ? The Dubcek sign is still on the radio building" ; and stifled sniggers at newspaper cartoons of obscure and esoteric symbolism. A daring span boasts that he sat on his hands during the frenetic applause for Mr Strougzl's " back to hhlarxism-lemnlsin " speech 'on Monday,.. in which lie clearly endorsed the Brezhnev policy of limited sovereignty in the conuuunist world. I-Ieavy;handed action against the press, radio and television is, of course, an essential preliminary to cwcicnt house- cleaning. A few knights with shining type-` writers will continue to fight a rearguard action, but an efficient, effectively inhple- mented censorship is hard to by-pass. The other alternative, adopted by some of the formerly more strident voices, is to lie low and keep their powder dry until the wind drops. Matters might, it is argued, have been worse, and one current occupation of intellectuals is to count up the positive aspects of life without Mr Dubcek. Dr Husak, many insist, may prove better able to negotiate with the Russians for an eventual withdrawal of troops. He has more drive, energy, greater physical stamina and powers of persuasion than his predecessor. There is also a tenuous hope that Dr Husak will keep a firm control of the ultra-conservatives who could put the clock right back to the 19.50s. If this were the case, it is curious h t at h h CPYRGHT Alpp drFtt 'irRi% a 2000/ /29 :CIA-RDP79-01 194A000500100001-0 Police staged defiant demonstra- rem Pilsen indicated that the Arrcricatt .Digs were detain lions in Pilsen last night, 24 F-rticipants were mostly st 1 and had their flags confiscate dents and workers venting their Elsewhere in 'tile city, abo t: years 'after, United States forces displeasure at the government's 1,500 liberated Gr? city from Nazi Ger_ persons staged a rencwetf pro=Soviet policies and' stration at a' bus crossindemoR - many' its attempts to minimize the role y ports said they placed America ` llepot?ta from the city in w' ?stk of the Western Allies jr, World flags and portraits of the la k ern Bohemia said nearly 40O pow` Jar I1. Tomas Afasaryk. first preside t lice and two water cannons were, The' turbulent' evening began of Czechoslovakia, and the for.' needed to quell three separate. with an official ceremony mark- mer Foreign Minister, Jan M demonstrations. Forty-five; Ing the 19.15 uprising against the saryk, at the remains of a t demonstrators were arrested, Germans in the fhial days of the Army memorial. The mem5ri and ' three policemen were in, 'European war.. Flags of the was dismantled during the St ' Jured, Czechoslovak informants, Soviet Union, Britain and the linist era. said. United States were raised at the` Participants stoned police, an In Prague, the, Communist memorial to the national resist- residents hurled flower pots a party newspaper *Rude Pravo ance' , movement in peace ' 4heni from apartment house tvi blamed the disturbance on Square, and wreaths were laid? dows amid whistles and Jeer* "'criminal elements" fomenting Five persons who reportedly 'reports said. After some scut" 11, anti?state act.iohs." Accounts tried to participate in the' core- ;fling, officers cordoned off Lh i ,many . carrying British and ;area.. , .,., a CP 7 `'Ij~N'FON POST 11 72.25 Arrests ' Reported B,%,- cze, Its PRAGUE, May 3 (UPI)--Po-' lice arrested 1225 persons in' Moravia and Bohemia cavlier this week in what was seen as a drive to round up possible: troublemakers. The Czechoslovak news' agency CTK said today that' police booked 524 persons ands detained 141 of them on crin~i~ nal charges, "mostly violen to. and theft." "Quantities of sto'en goods were reco-; cred, Including 2' motor vehicles. 10 firearm] building materials and cith r goods," the report said. Last Wednesday, lnterl r Minister Josef Grocsser sal4 officials in southern Moravl!a had uncovered "an illegal core spiratory organization" ctea Ing weapons allegedly for usb against Soviet occupatto troops. The plotters had "a politic 'l program and relations It i ,military circles," Groe se said, adding that "in the en future it will be possible t start prosecution. Grocsser - said . weapon thefts had 'increased In tb 1t1it'four.or,five months.- Approved NEW YORK TIMES 10 . ro M0's(Ccvj Czechs Absolved of Treachery' By ALVIN SHUSTER 6pedal to The New York T1mes PRAGUE, April 16-The Executive Committee of the ruling Communist party's Presidium today sought to reha- bilitate in the. eyes of the people a group of conservatives. 'Inc group included men said to have been selected by Mos- sow to form a new govern ment in Czechoslovakia at the time of the Soviet-led inva. sion by Warsaw Pact. forces last August. On the eve of a crucial ses- sion of the party's Central Committee, the eight-man Ex- ecutive Committee said the "ac- cusations of treachery and col- laboration" leveled at the 10 conservatives were unfounded. It declared that the men had been slandered on the basis of unfounded information and fabrications. Among those described as "honorable ' comrades" were Vasil Bilak, now a member of the Presidium; Drahomir Koldcr, a member of the Central Com-I mittee, and Alois Indra, a sec- retary of the Central Committee. Interpretations Vary It was this group that many ,Czechoslovaks believe was. picked by the Soviet Union to assume the leadership at the time of the invasion. Since then, their names have been anath- ema. to Czechoslovaks. The decision by the Central Committee was interpreted va- riously by observers as either a prelude to the assumption of new powers by members of this pro-Moscow faction, or as part of an arrangement with the Soviet Union to save liberals facing possible demotion at the( session opening tomorrow. It also cleared the way for a similar statement from the full 187-member Central Committee. It has been expected that the Central Committee will reassert tight ideological controls and perhaps determine the political fate of leading liberals. But the decision, c-idently taken under Soviet pressure, came as a sur- prise to Czechoslovaks. In its statement, the Execu- tive Committee said it had de-1 tided to clear the men of tht' charges against them in the in- terests of party unity nd in an effort "to consolidate condi- tions" in Czechoslovakia. For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 px del r ReleaseO Jflolc P79-O'b~b9 AfltO5449 1s O ees Gof ' mm~ttce. r c ll. b ration, it said, b2' t ates) "were spread aniong the popu- "Among part of the publir could be confirmed.' "It was not correct that the " the Ecxccu- lation in various ways without and in the party, anyone setking proof or a fac- tual and founded justification." Besides Messrs. Bilak, Kolder and Indra, the Executive Com- mittce named the followin?- Frantisek Barbirek, ht . Slo- vak Minister of Trade; Jan Pil- ]er, a member of the Presi- dium; Emil Rigo; Oldrich Svcs tka, editor of the Communist party journal Tribuna; Milos Jakes, chairman of the party's Central Control and Auditing Commission; Jozef Ltnart, a former Premier; and Antonin Kapek. Both Mr. Lenart and Mr Kapek ac alternate members of the party's Presidium. 6 May 1969 ;f 7-d tj party and civic honor of a num- ber of honest comrades, de- voted to the party, was allowed to he tarnished in such a fashion. It is important that in the future no accusation should be overlooked, that proof !should be demanded from any - 'one who, comes forward with an accusation and those who commit untruthful ? slanders should be dealt with according to the law. "The basic criteria for judg- ing the qualities of publicly ac- tive persons are socialist awareness, fidelity to socialist internationalism and the ability to apply the ideas of socialism, responsibly in practice. "rii;htwing opportunists" and The Ministry statement said' , of Commu= new majority th , e anti-Communist elements, was, reported obliquely in the f nists (the newly restored con'; press yesterday in ah ' an?I servatives) had condemned the' nouucement that the Commu "expression of antl?Soviet na te- tionalism and chauvinism" I ' n ns of the nist Party orga nor Ministry had elected "new that had been heard among se members of the Ministry and " i n a ty bodies leading Par heretofore un were still to be heard, al- t a t ballot a cre?.? disclosed meeting, on May 12 ;though their voices were and 13. "dying out." d by the = A tough-line member of the e = a Committee said, "there still. exists a lack of confidence in- the comrades accused of col-IL laboration and treachery." It noted that there has been an "organized and spontaneous', condemnation" of the men and; in the "lower party -bodies', many functionaries of the party and state were unjustly brand ed and in some cases were ex-`; posed to terror." "The Executive Committee' has discussed the state of of-' fairs," it went on, "and re- gards it as its duty to state publicly that it has no factual, proof on the basis of which ac- cusations of alleged treachery of some sort of collaboration A statement ssu Lubomlr T inistry said that the Commu Party Presidium, dJ, li nists there had sternly criti-' Strougal, who, was Interior cized the former Minister, Minister during the former for Stalinist dictatorship and is ive Tosef Pavel, a Progress - , Lax An convinced Chairman Mao that he could try, a loss of three years of education for. "remold the majority into new men." He' 'the country's youth and the planting of, believed that subjective will could be, 'savage rivalries deep in China's fabric. It turned into objective force. With some-.? .cost Chairman Mao whatever faith, the., thing like 500,000,000 backward, supersti- intellectuals had in.him: tious peasants living barely above sub-', Still the more difficult task was the' sistence in a tired land, China profited by ; rebuilding' of the party, for nothing clsa a Mao preaching the impossible. 'has been able to run China's 700,000,000? Chairman Mao's techniques worked un-; people. The rebuilding has to. be done- til the "great leap forward" when his from the top. The congress was the be enthusiasm for instant communism ginning of that process, but it is being' plunged China Into economic despair. done in Chairman Mao's way. This will Near famine was averted by the bureau- not be easy, for the congress showed it. crats who turned to pragmatic, rational ; could agree on honoring its old leader but policies to pull China slowly back togeth- nothing else. er. Chairman Mao never admitted his It said nothing about education, 'agri error but fought back to wipe out exactly culture, health or industry. For its Polite what he feared would ruin his purist. buro, it could not even agree on a peck. dreams. Ing order below Chairman Mao and Mr.. Peasants were thriving with their ari-:; Lin. Prescribing more and more Mao- vate plots, private pigs and private mar-, study, it seemed as if , the 75-year-old -ets. Workers were getting incentive pay' leader had decided to start all over again ather than laboring for the ideological' to convince the country of the righteoug, glory. The party was full of experts and ness of his ways: onagers, drifting from. Chairman Mao's Time, it seems,, has caught up with a' idealized contact withthe masses. Chair- figure as heroic as Chairman Mao hasp an Mao never saw nor wanted to see. ben for his China. His ideas are essen- at China was tially rooted in the past. He talks of progressing, just. as he,, modernization, but he opposes just' what ever cared to see Russian progress. All. China needs: the experts to run a moderrf e could see was his egalitarian vision- .economy. Chairman Mao's ideal of politi Bing destroyed by his old comrades in .tally loyal workers who think and intel- rms. lectuals who work just is not goo arty defeated ". enough. Undoubtedly, Chairman Mao was told this behind the closed doors of the By 1962, he was-striking back. Whatth? ninth congress. From what was said;' utside world saw as a conflict between- publicly, he is not convinced. ?4 deologues and pragmatists was the be. Communist China therefore faces an ?.g of Chairman Mao's Second revo- uncertain unstable future. Chairmani' ution. By 1966, Chairman Mao alone Mao's heirs today are a group of un?; ' inexperienced, unsophisticated arefully ripped otf the head of the party known, thih M A d Mao .A. n ti fs too la,e to have a e had built and slashed at its innards, third sing Red Guard students and his mass' Ufa?Lt revolution. echniques of re ellion. pproved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP 00001-0 9-01,04#0 ",ftffl lli O HEIR `ACIi G C P~ 9-0 `open Opposition To Lin Found 'At' Red Parley By PETER J. H MPA [Hong Kong Sureau of The Sun) Hong Kong, April 26-Marsha Lin Piao, China's defense minis- ter and officially designated heir to the Communist party Chair- man, Mao Tse-turn, appears to ,be in political trouble. Though the just-ended Ninth National Communist Party Con- gress was the peak of achieve- ment of a long military and political career, it also' was the scene of reported open opposi tion to Mr. Lin. Position Raised 3 Years Ago A hew party constitution was adopted expressly naming Mars- nal Lin as Chairman Mao's suc- cessor. The mobs was only con. :firmation of the Lin elevation, for he had been raised to No. 2 'in the Communist hierarchy nearly 3 years ago with the fall of former President Liu Shau- chi. Diplomatic sources in Peking, however, reported rumors of strenuous disagrcee7lent with the constitutional provision. Ac- 'cording to these reports, the de- bate was one reason for the length of the congress: 24 days in close secrecy. Poor Health Record Delegates were said to br questioning why Marshal Lir. had to be named in the cons titu? tion, a step never taken before They were said to have askec what would happen to the sun, cession proble if Marshal Lir died before Mr. Mao. Thougl Marshal Lin is 13 years junior tc Chairman Mao, he has a record of poor health, probably arising- out of old war wounds that rd-1 qui:?ed years of hospitalization in the Soviet Union. -Never confirmed is Marshal Lin's reputed tubercular condi tion. Whatever his ailment, it is true that he has had to take long rest periods. Pictures from t~ congress also show a thin and tired look- ing Marashal Lin standing be- 1i9ti4A00~rd80U t0e11abr8,~- CPYRGHT Approved For Rf the conference, In Peking ra- funed to s,.:I:nowlcdge that large ereas c' China had been appropriated by Imperial Russ sia In the iatli century under "uncrlual treaties." Alter tat. torsi=3 along the border built up, finally, exploding In March ? w h o n Chinese aitd Russian frontier guards hlashecl in two major skirmisiies on an isiand,ln the lissuri 1River. About 50 Soviet troops and an unknown num- ber of Chiueso hvere killed.. Agninst this background of conflict, it seems dubious that, the Chines and Soviet repro-~ seritatives scheduled to attend the navigation meeting In Khabarovsk will be .able to: conciliate their, differences! easily. 1951 ShIpphar, Treaty If. It is field, the rn,".ting, will be th,, 35th session of thel wine?Soviet co?omissioh since the group was created under a1 1851 treaty designed to regu-l Into shipping along the. bound. daryrivors. ;, In 18513, the Chinese and So- viet governments signed a new agreement aimed at simplify- ing the rules goverhiing mer- chant shipping on the rivers and lakes. Arnong its other provisions, this agreements guaraotrteed the exchange. of. port facilities by the two sig- natories. After tlrelr dispute.: with' Moscow 2iad worsened In:' 1906, the ('hlnesc? instigated a fresh' not of rnlc:t intended, aceord? Jng to Peking, to "protect tire; sovereignty" of Ch.iita. y'liese rules virtually wrapped any, efforts at joint. , navigation rights, and ubjiseted Soviet, and other 0migil' vc's>5?vl '.to harsh restrlel.ionia: lease 2000/08/29 : CIAl' ay t9qtA000500100001-0 CPYRGHT SOVIET AND CSI N . ARE SAID TO CLASHi Fighting on Central Asian Border Is Reported MOSCOW, May 10 (UPI)-` Well informed sources said to. day that Soviet and Chinese troops clashed in "serious bor- der incidents" in Central Asia several times this week. They said these incidents oc- curred on the border separating Soviet Kazakhstan and China's Sinkiang region. Both sides suffered casualties, tr ese sources said. There was no official confir- mation of the incidents. The Soviet Union is conducting mil itary maneuvers along the Si- berian and Far Eastern stretches of its border with China. At least 50 Russian troops' were killed in border incidents: ..on the Ussuri River in the Far East on March 2 and March 15. Sources said the border in Central Asia has been "very. tense" for scevral ? weeks. There were persistent reports that the border situation be-. tween Sinkiang and Kazakstan has been tense. .since' thb early stages of :the Chinese-Soviet ,dispute. Pravda, the. Communist party newspaperY :.recently disclosed that more than 200 persons weer killed when; they tried to cross from China to the Soviet Union in::'May, 1962. First Ship This Year MOSCOW May 10 (Reuters) -a Soviet ship has started up the Ussuri' River on a voyage that will take it near the scene Of border clashes between China dlid the Soviet Union in March. A' Moscow radio correspond- ent in Khabarovsk reported that the Ship had set out from there on the first voyage of the year up the border river. The ship is heading for Iman, the nearest large town to the scene of the clashes. . . The River was frozen and i covered with ::now at the time) of the border battles in March. It was reported clear of ice at the end of April. The latest account from the area, reported in the '. news paper 'Sovietskaya 'Rossiya on May 1, said the:.Chiriesc had stopped sporadic shelling and were contenting. themselves with shouting insults through bullhorns. Approved For Release 2000/08/19: 444 4 A' 00001-0 CF~Yf~ghT SANOMAT, Helsinki 3 Rele se 2000/QOA?AI 1 pTg 11 Q00500100001-0 FEVER SH MEDIATION IN THE FINNISH COMMUNIST PARTY QUARREL CPYRGHT e communes party o the ovie union is mediating the Internaa disputes of the F nnish Communist Party. Aleksey Belyakov, the chief of the Scandinavian on of the CPSU, has been leading the negotiations with representatives of the different camps of the FCP since last Monday. He has recommended to chairman Aarne Saarinen, former Secretary General Ville Pessi, and one of the opposition leaders, Taisto Sinisalo - who have visited the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki -;the arranging of an extraordinary FCP party congress. The Extraordinary congress would renew the central committee of the FCP in such a way that.. the internal opposition would abandon its plans to found a new communist party, he has suggested. Belyakov, who landed in Helsinki on Monday unnoticed, is accompanied by Pravda's writer Stefan Smirnov - signature "Observer" - and by World Peace Council Secretary Nikolay Voshinin. Aarne Saarinen was immediately called to the Soviet Embassy, where the CPSU representatives are staying, and where he heard the greetings of the CPSU leadership. The previously presented demand of the CPSU, that a split of the opposition's plans to.found a new communist party but also the demands of the supporters of the party's present policy for a party purge. were condemned. As far as is known, the big district organization meeting of next weekend arranged by those who walked out of the 15th Party Congress of the FCP was merely touched on at the meeting; the CPSU representatived did not demand .a cancellation of the meeting. Ville Pessi, formerly Secretary General and presently secretary for International Affairs pf the FCP, arrived at the Soviet Embassy on Tuesday !at noon-time. The CPSU representatives announced that they trust him in a ,mediating role. It was noted in the disscussions that the internal situation in the FCP has led to a blind'alley. One can get out of this dilemma only by the friendly assistance of fraternal parties and by the different FCP camps desire for reconciliation. Belyakov, who before and during the FCP congress tried to bring the FCP's ranks into order, suggested as a possibility that the central committee call together an extraordinary party congress. A compromise proposal, according to which opposition representatives would also be elected to the central committee, would be prepared and accepted by the party's membership before the extraordinary congress. According to the FCP's by-laws,. an extraordinary congress can be con- voked in two weeks. The delegates of the ordinary congress would be .delegates to the extraordinary congress too; in this case, it would be the same delegates as those-who were at the 15th party congress during Easter holidays. One obstacle,however, is the fact that the FCP's by-laws prescribe that the central committee is elected by a regular party congress. Party organization technicians, however, have discovered a way around this: The by-laws say nothing about long the mandate of the central committee is. The by-laws say that "the mandate of the central.committee lasts until a new central coFommittee's members could be persuaded to abandon their seats volunta- A~Yihsrtpsii"bi=0i~ffe'rplos-sibil7Ey wo J" beYgo-c~iange the pes of arty's CPYRGHT MPPI by-laws by a two-thirds majority and then to elect a new leadership. This procedure would, however, take three months. Sinisalo is planned as the leader of a new party Some members of the FCP leadership and certain opposition circles are, however, doubtful about holding an extraordinary party congress. It is assumed that the majority is sharply against compromise proposals. The communists, on the other hand, are waiting for the results of the Stalinist meeting. The Stalinist group which meets on Saturday in Helsinki and on Sunday in Uusimaa might even decide to found a new communist party. Strong groups in the FCP's district organizations of Turku, Uusimaa, Kymenlaakso, south Karelia, Lahti,~and Kuopio are leaning in this direction. Smaller groups have been gathered to support this effort from other district organiz- ations as well; the pensioners in particular have been a welcome power reserv for the FCP opposition in the struggle for power. However, it is surmised within the FCP that the opposition will not, at least at this stage, found a new party. It is assumed that the opposition will stake everything on one card: All or nothing. The opposition has prepared a "Shadow" program. Adoption of this pro- gram would probably lead to the dismissal of some of the opposition leaders from their posts. In such a case, it would be easier to explain the founding of a new party to the membership and the fraternal parties. The opposition group also contains some extreme elements who are of the opinion that the founding of a new communist party cannot be avoided. It has even been planned in some district, organizations that Taisto Sinisalo would become the chairman of the new party. Among the names suggested for the new party are "Finnish communist workers party" or "Finnish workers' communist party." The Opposition Rejected a Proposal on Reconciliation About 2,000 communists from all over the country have been mobilized for the meeting of the opposition on Sunday. Bus-loads of people will come from districts which are loyal to the party leadership. E.G. a bus-load of pensioners from northern Finland will come to Helsinki to approve the resol- utions of the opposition meeting and to become acquainted with Helsinki at the same time. Only dyed-in-the-wool Stalinists have received an invitation to the opposition's meeting. Access to the meeting for persons who support the party's line has been sharply refused. Negotiations about a reconciliation between the different camps of the FCP are being held today. Representatives of the party leadership and the opposition are meeting in Helsinki. They will deal with a conciliatory proposal presented by the official party leadership; the proposal has been rejected by the opposition. The opposition is expected to present its own demands today. -0 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 2 Ed W i i t !r .Q~0~L:Me d lRP,P MO fli3 M CPYRGHT Positions in Opposition Districts ooe0001-0 The information that some of the districts in which the Opposition is in. control have softened their position and are ready to negotiate comes as a surprise if we recall the demand made in the Opposition congress that it be recognized as a faction and that negotiations be held with a 95-member committee of its own choosing. Thus it now seems that the Opposition is not, after all, standing "as solid as granite" as it vowed as late as a couple weeks ago. Thus it seems to be a matter of the regular party leadership, which was stymied on party regulations, winning the opening round on the procedural matter. If certain Opposition districts have in fact softened their position, it means the strengthening of the "third line" on the example of the Tampere District. The decisive, behind-the-scenes factor in this kind of change is the negative attitude of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) con- cerning the establishment of a second Finnish Communist party. Nevertheless, it is not a matter of the whole Opposition going tame. One sign of this is the fact that the Opposition is establishing parallel organiza- tions in districts that are under the control of the regular party leadership. This means that the Opposition itself is breaking up into two parts: "a third line," whose idea is to stay within the regular party, and the "irreconcilables" who are driving toward the establishment of their own party. Or else the party is sitting on two stools: in opening the door to reconciliation just a crack, they are not closing the door that leads to a party split. In undertaking to negotiate district by district, the Opposition stays within the bounds of party regulations and in that way saves its face before the CPSU. At the same time, it saves its face in its own eyes in that negotiators in the districts can at the same time be members of the afore- mentioned negotiating committee of the Opposition as a whole. If no agreement is reached in the negotiations, the Opposition can still claim to have followed party regulations, but at the same time it will have a ready-made party organization. ppositioplirien asenne Jos eraat oppositiopiirit oust to. lohkeamassa kahteen osaan, puo- Tiedat ainakin erai~ien Skp:n lueen sisalla pysymiscen tahtaa- oppositio iirien Bella lieventaneet asenteitaaxt, p pehmenneista vaan "kolmantcen linjaan" ja asenteista ja neuvotteluvalmiu. morkitsee se Tampereen piirin esl- Oman puolueen perustamiseea pyr= desta ovate yl19tt9via, jos palau.te- merkin mukaisen "kolmannen, lin- kiviin "leppymti.ttomiin". Tai sitten taan mieleen opposition suurko- jan" vahvistumista nilssa. T511al- oppositio istuu kahdella tuolilla: kouksen vaatimus sen tunnusta- son muutoksen taustatekij5n9 on raotettaessa sovinnon ovea ei puo- misesta ryhmakunnaksl ja ncu- ratkaisevalta osatta pidettava Neu- luehadaannuksen ovea sulieta. vottelujen kaymisesta sen asetta- vostoliiton kommunistisen puo- Ryhtyessaan neuvottelemaan pii- man 95-jasonisen neuvottelukun- luccn kieltcista kantaa toisen suo- reittaln oppositio pysyy puolue- nan kanssa. Nyt naytt5a sits silts, malalsen kommunistisen puolueen saantojen puitteissa ja siin5 mie- ettel oppositio seisokaan "jyrlcka- perustamista kohtaan. lessa s9lyttaa kasvonsa Nkp:n na kuin Kyseessa ei kuitenkaan ole koko graniitti" ainakaan tassa edessii. Lisaksi se saattaa sailyt- suhteessa, kuten sen taholta vlela opposition kesyyntyminen. Siihen taa kasvonsa myos omissa silmis- pars viilckoa sitten vannottiin. Pa. viittaa jo opposition toimesta tear- satin, sills piirien neuvottelijat remminkin an kysymys. puolue- joitettava rinnakkaisorganisaatiot- voivat 011a myos em. opposition saantoihin tukeutuneen puolue- den perustaminen puoluejohdon neuvottelukunnan jasenia. Jos johdon alkueravoltosta menettely- haliussa oleviin plireihin. Tama ncuvoi touon ar.atn ~ku:ac k n ntnou- tzpakysymyksessa. merkitsee sits, etta oppositio on nrtL;,. as puoluecn saanLuJa Ja .r a Approved For Release 2000/08/29-: CIA-RDFI9"-JI'i MAM6W"P00001-0 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 -CL ERQP79-01194A000500100001-0 69/6-2 UNDIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION. OF EAST GERMANY 1. May 1969 can be. entered on political calendars as the month during which East Germany's Walter Ulbricht thought the pendulum was swinging his way. Official diplomatic recognition granted East-Germany by three non- Communist governments -- Iraq, Cambodia and the Sudan -- has given Ulbricht the entree he thinks he needs to gain broad acceptance of the concept of "GDR sovereignty" in: time to. celebrate his regime's 20th anniversary in October of this year. 2. Our aim is to get our assets and mass media tapped into a concerted propaganda effort to clarify for Third World audiences, and to remind Third World leaders about, the oft-repeated but apparently forgotten fact-of-life concerning Germany and the underlying reason why the pendulum does not swing in Ulbricht's favor: "East Germany" is a temporary, artificial structure whose survival depends mainly on the continuing presence of 20 Soviet Army divisions and, further, that diplomatic recognition of this government does entail a choice between East and West. Third World leaders, even the more radical ones, might well be reluctant to undertake action that would antago- nize Bonn, which in both short and long-range-terms offers greater economic advantages than does Pankow. 3. To accomplish our aim, the following themes are among many which could be embellished in terms of local conditions. Support material from which to draw is found in the attached unclassified backgrounder and samp- ling of current newspaper clips. a. Iraqi, Cambodian and Sudanese diplomatic accords with East Germany represent acts based on emotion, not logic, and were payoffs for services rendered. They were also clearly the result of heavy Soviet pressures. b. Ulbricht gratuitously buttressed the case for non- recognition by his ostentatious May Day military parades and boast of "20 years of socialist military policy." c. The paucity of what East Germany can offer the Third World in terms of trade and aid, particularly in comparison with what West Germany. offers, should not be ignored. Approved For Release 2000/08/29 $C I~QP79-01194A000500100001-0 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 ?rTnT? TT (TTT V June 1969 As a May Day rememberance for 1969, Walter Ulbricht's East German regime was rewarded with a long sought-after prize: cognizance by some non-Communist states of the German Democratic Republic's official exist- ence. Plans to grant diplomatic recognition to East Germany were announced on 30 April by the Government of Iraq and, eight days later, by the Government of Cambodia. At his first press conference held after the 25 May military coup which brought him to power, Sudan's new Premier Awadallah announced his government's intention to emulate Iraq. Ulbricht has long been convinced that just one non-Communist commit- ment would start a chain reaction throughout the Arab, African., and Asian worlds inspiring country after country to scramble onto a bandwagon labeled "GDR sovereignty." The East German regime already is recognized in all but name by many Third World countries through reciprocal trade missions or full-blown consulates. Now it is Ulbricht's ambition that these relationships be dignified by the highest sounding title in time for the East German 20th anniversary celebrations in October 1969 and presumably he believes that recognition thrice in a month will give his scheme the impetus it badly needs. Stepped up efforts to gain official status throughout the Third World can be expected within the next few weeks despite two great stumbling blocks, one military and the other economic, both of which portend a miscarriage of Ulbricht's ambition. May Day Rememberances The Iraqi, Cambodian, and Sudanese diplomatic acceptances of East Germany are matters of vested interest -- born not out of respect for "GDR sovereignty" but out of need to pay for past and probably promised future East German support on ticklish national or international issues. Of at least equal importance is the intense pressure the Soviet Union has exerted on these countries on behalf of East Germany, the leverage for which comes from years of intense cultivation and considerable economic and military aid programs. Iraq, for instance, received advanced-type Soviet MIG fighters well before Egypt. Moscow certainly has a very active interest in securing legitimization outside of the Communist Bloc for the "state" it created in East Germany. East German backing for almost every Arab cause sometimes exceeds even Moscow's pro-Arab endorsements -- particularly with regard to the Palestinian Arabs. The Iraqis specifically cited East German "support for the Palestinian peoples' just struggle to liberate their usurped homelands" as a reason for bestowing diplomatic recognition. On 23 April the East German Foreign Ministry issued a statement supporting Iraq in Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 _A.nnrnven Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 its border dispute with Iran (over Shatt-al-Arab), something the USSR has failed to do, and described Iran's actions as "imperialist provoca- tions." Iraqi gratitude was reflected in Radio Baghdad's statement that,East Germany's "noble attitude toward our national issues" was just another reason for extending recognition.. Cambodia's diplomatic obeisance is another sign of extreme national sensitivity about the lack of world acknowledgment of Cambodian borders. Statements issued in both Pankow and Phnom Penh suggest that the new diplomatic ties are a belated reward to East Germany for her long- standing recognition of the border delineations most acceptable to Cambodia. On 5 May, Sheikh Ali Abdel Rahman, Sudan's leftist Foreign Minister and Deputy Premier, held a press conference at which he said he had recommended to the Sudanese Cabinet that Sudan follow in Iraq's footsteps in recognizing the German Democratic Republic because it was a "friendly country with honorable attitudes toward Arab causes." At that time, the suggestion was intepreted as designed to counteract a movement in the Sudanese Constituent Assembly to reestablish relations with West Germany and the U.S.A. However, the 25 May military coup which overthrew President Ismail el Azhari also thrust radicalism into a much more powerful position in Sudan. The new Prime Minister Babiker Awadalla held his first press conference two days later and announced that his government's first act of foreign policy would be to recognize East Germany because of "the East Berlin regime's opposition to Israel." A May Day Blunder While Moscow and all the other members of the Warsaw Pact this year eschewed their annual spring show of military prowess, Walter Ulbricht celebrated the day with loud and, enthusiastic saber-rattling throughout East Germany. Speeches by military leaders and four parades featuring missiles, tanks, and heavy artillery marked May Day in East Berlin as dedicated to "20 years of socialist military policy." This is the facet of Walter Ulbricht that must be understood by anyone toying with the acceptance of "GDR sovereignty': he remains the ever-ready hangman and executor for the Warsaw Pact, for the Brezhnev Doctrine -- the true "Stalinist" of Central Europe. May Day 1969 in East Berlin rekindled mew-cries of 21 August 1968 when Ulbricht's troops, mercenaries of the Soviet Union, were among those forces that moved into and occupied the sovereign state of Czechoslovakia. Warsaw Pact utilization of German troops, permitting them to march into a neighboring country, above all one previously occupied by Nazi Germany, was a flagrant violation of the Potsdam Agree- ment. Even the USSR, in August 1968, soon saw the grave error of sanctioning GDR military presence in occupied Czechoslovakia: all the wind went out of Soviet propaganda which was trying to portray the West Germans as the "aggressors plotting invasion." Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 00/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 Perhaps Ulbricht relies on man's short-lived memory of painful incidents to help him over this "military " stumbling block of his own making? The False Image The economic stumbling block, also of Ulbricht's personal making since it is the system he imposes which causes the troubles, is equally insurmountable. Facts belie the image of an attractive trading partner which Ulbricht promotes throughout the Third World. However anxious East Germany may be to win political support, the fact remains that this regime has little to offer in economic terms to the Third World, particularly in comparison with West Germany. Jeune Afrique (Paris, 31 March - 6 April 1969) gives details of exports from Western countries to the Near East during 1967, showing that after the United States and Britain, West Germany was the third leading supplier of these countries, with almost twice as much, by value, as Italy and more than twice as much as France. West Germany was the second largest exporter to Iraq and also to the UAR (the value,was U.S. $54,800,000) despite the break in diplomatic relations with West Germany by both countries in 1965. By contrast, the East German-UAR trade protocol for 1969, which represents an increase of 25 percent over 1968, allows for a total-volume of exchanges of only about U.S. $8,500,000. Le Moniteur Africain (Dakar, 3 April 1969) describes the recent growth of West German trade with African countries. Statistics given indicate the African continent as a whole has a very healthy balance of trade with West Germany -- a positive factor for Africa. Overall, 7.52 percent of West German imports come from Africa and that continent in turn absorbs 4.62 percent of West German exports. Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 3 CPYtGHT CPYR HT F i lV6c ':r Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 Y 1969 East Germans, Alone in Soviet Bloc Sprcf.l to The New York TIme. BERLIN, May 1-Commu- .nists and Socialists of all shades 'marked May Day in this divided 'city, today with four parades, including a military show of power in East Berlin. East Germany was the only Soviet-bloc country this year to parade its, forces to 'under- line its military strength. A speaker at the parade on Marx- '.Engcls-Platz in East Berlin ,noted that East Germany had conducted "20 cars of socialist military policy.' The three Western allied commandants condemned the display as a violation of the city's four-power status and held the. Soviet Union re- sponsible for. permitting East German military personnel to take part in the - May Day celebrations. "The militaristic nature', of the celebration was accentu LE MONDE 10 May 1969 Pout-fl appliquer la doctrine fit meme allusion & la possibilito de is reviewin its mea re stock of counter- no uvec !-inrome so seIGOMM9,~-GM-RDP79-044S4A 5004 WaQ1n&cctivc for enh c' so fa~artse~200Oq/O8 9' $A-RDP79-UilI94A07 Q5OO31 1OOQ1n&cctive for dealing with Baghdad's fait accompli, The Bonn, 9 mai.. - A la diffe- rence do 1'Irak, dons la d6ci- 'ion do reconnaitre la R6publi- quo democratique allemande avail ate annonceo a la fin do la semaine derniore, lo cas du Cambodge, qui a pris 'une dyci- sion identique, pose a Bonn uno question do principe. L'Irak, on offot, n'ontretenait plus do relations diplomatiquos avec Ia. Republique f6d6rale depuis Ia crises ongendreo on 1965 par la decision du gouvernoment Erhard do recon. naitre 1'Etat d'Israiil. La famouse doctrine Hallstein -, qui posait en principe, dopuis 1955, 1'impossibilite pour Bonn d'entretenir des relations diplomatiquos avoc un Etat ayant un i ambassadour a Borlin- Est, n'dtait donc pas on cause. La question se pose, on revanche, pour lo Cambodgo, ou la Rypubliquo f6d6rale entrotiont une ambassad.e depuis is 15 novembre 1967 et oil un nouvel ambassadeur, M. ]iirgen Eick, anion porte-parole adjoint de M. Willy Brandt, venait precisement do rojoindro son posts le 1?' avail Appeal by the Mayor Across the wall on West Ber- lin's Square of the Republic, .Mayor Klaus Schiltz called onl the Soviet Union, and East ,Germany to enter 'into an earnest dialojue with the West about the. city s future. "Let us get away from the 'cramped immobility of the past and strive. for peaceful co. existence," he said.: ? He spoke to a ? crowd . of ated by the equipment on dis- play, which included - missiles, tanks and artillery pieces,t' the commandants charged. The 30-minute parade was led by cadets from military academics who marched past a grandstand to salute Walter Ulbricht, the East German lead- er; Marshal Pyotr K. Koshevoi, the commander of Soviet forces in East Germany, and other Alllemagne ' de I Ouest La reconnaissance de Berlin-Est par le Cambodge pose le problerne de Ia validite de Ia < doctrine Hallstein > (De nitre correspond7,.;pcarticulier.) fait en 1957 avec la Yougoslavie et en 1963 avec Cuba ? Depuis, Ia < doctrine . - a subi une premiere entorse, puisque Bonn, apres 1'arri- vae- au pouvoir du gouvornemont do grande coalition Kissinger-Brandt, a admix 1a possibility d'avoir des ambassades dons des pays do d6. mocratio populaire ou Berlin-Est 6tait deja represents. Ce fut le cas, par exemple, pour la Roumanie, avec laquello des relations diplomatiquos ont 6t6 nou6es en janvior 1967. Dons Ia fouled, Bonn roprit en 1968 sea relations avoc Belgrade. Renoncer a rompre avec Phnom- Penh perait porter un nouveau coup a Ia doctrine Hallstein . et inci- terait do nombreux pays d'Afrique et dAsie a suivre 1'exemple du prince Sihanouk. Copendant, M. Strauss, president de 1'aile bavaroise de l'union chre- tienno-d6mocrate, n'a pas hysits, jeudi, a Bonn, au tours dune r6cop- tion, a prendre position contro Ia rupture avec lo Cambodge: Une telle rupture serait une folic, assurait M. Strauss a qui voulait l'ontendre, Display Arms 30,000 as two rival parades wound their way through ,streets. One of them was staged by West Berlin's Communists, the other by the city's revo- lutionary youth groups, Includ- ing Trotskyites, anarchists, Maoists, syndicalists, self-styled "Bolsheviks" and ' so-called "Spartacists. " 1'. Cold and gusty winds kept !most West Berliners at home. The police, out in force, said the only incident occurred when youths hurled stones. to smash windows in the central courthouse on their march from ,the ?Tlergarten district to the workers' borough of Wedding. The radicals-university and high school students as well as a sprinkling of young workers -announced plans to set up ,a "revolutionary, organization" to operate. under the name ' of "Union of Socialigt Workers THE ECONOMIST .10 May 1969 Iraq and Germany First to take the .plunge Although Bonn had been half expecting the Iraqis to recognise east Germany it was none the less painful. When Herr ,Otto Winzer, the east German foreign: minister, arrived in Baghdad on Tuesday to sign. on the dotted line, Bonn knew for: certain it had lost an important diplo- matic battle in the Middle East, if not a' campaign. The first sign of Iraqi readiness to ignore Bonn's susceptibilities came in Fe'b ruary; when the Baath party conference approved a resolution recommending full recognition of east Gerirlany. Then on April Both Radio Baghdad announced that the revolutionary council had decided .Iraq should practise normal relations with .east Berlin ' "in recognition of east .Germany's support of the Arab nation: in its struggle against Zionism and imperialism." Thus Iraq has become not: only the first Arab state to recognise ;Herr Ulbricht's regime but also the first Sniffing an air of spreading rot, Bonn CPYRGHT plomatic excommunication to diploma c mmunicants with Ulbrich t-cann t en be invoked since Bonn has had o', Inn - se 2000/8P G ormal relations with Baghdad sin e. 1965. West Germany has not given a y pital help to Iraq, and only compar t vely little and easily dispensable technic 1 id. What can be done in such circu s ances ? So far Bonn has confined s udgeon to tut-tutting. Reports that the Sudanese foreign sinister is advising his government o' ffillow Iraq's example suggest that oth r rab states may be about to have the cou -' e of their national convictions. Most f t em have forgone diplomatic,relatio s' with Bonn since Dr Adenauer's secret co i- i iitment to deliver arms and equipment o Israel became known in 1965. But 11 ave hitherto shrunk from recognising e t ermany for fear of losing west Germ n' conomic help. It is supposed in Bo n at Moscow may even be, discourage g gypt and Syria from yielding to H r lbricht's blandishments for the time bee g- n the. round that it would cost so mu h money. MLI-N SCIENCE MONITOR CP~ 69 ~e~?~nanyP I Egg r t, Va', e s 6"t from Ira By Barry B. Ellis Staff correspondent of Bonn Iraq has handed Walter Ulbricht a splen- did May Day present, by announcing full diplomatic recognition of his Communist East German regime. - Iraq thus becomes the first non-Commu- nist state to recognize the (East) German Democratic Republic, West Germany can be expected to use its best diplomatic efforts to persuade other Arab governments not to follow Baghdad's; example. But Bonn's position is weak. Nine Arab states, including the "big four" --- Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Algeria-have no diplo- matic relations with the (West German) Federal Republic. Ten Arab governments broke' ties with Bonn in 1965, when the latter recognized Israel. JordarA 1`(3"mt'!cF(3'PI9e4eas X79 1194A000500100001-0 Iraq Link T o East Ger rman y. Strongly Assailed By Bonn By BRIGITTE FALBE [Bonn Bureau of The Sun] Bonn, May 2-The Kissinger Iraq's decision will not necessar a ministration views Iraq's an- n unced intention to recognize tl~e Ulbricht regime as an, "un- fr endly act," a West German s okesman declared here today. he decision is a blow to Bonn's efforts to normalize its r ations with the Arab nations a d is directed against the inter- e tst of the entire German na- ti in, Conrad Ahlers, the deputy g vernment press secretary said a a news conference, r. Ahlers charged that Bagh- d d's step in effect removes I q from the bloc of the non-a- li ned countries and puts it into ti a Communist camp. tto Winzer, the East German f sign minister, in a message t ay to Abdul Karim el-SHeikh- I his Iraqi counterpart, ex- p essed his "deep satisfaction" o rr the decision, lie decision Wednesday fol- l ed Mr. Sheikhly's visit to st Berlin and Moscow about a' onth ago. iolomatic observers believe; CPYRGHT ily unleash a "recognition ava- lanche" although it is consi- ,dered a "test case." ical retaliation:are limited..Un .der the old IIallstein Doctrine it threatened it would break off; diplomatic relations with any non-Communist state recogniz- ing East Germany. However, 'the Arab League states them- selves broke off these contacts in May, 1965, over Bonn's recog- nition of Israel. Trade Partner Since then, only Jordan has reopened diplomatic relations with Bonn. However,this?was in February, 1967," , before the Arab-Israeli -war in which West Germany morally supported Is- rael.. , West Germany is Iraq's .?cc-1 and most important trade part- ner after Great Britain. The mu- tual exchange of goods is twice as large as Iraq's trade with the Eastern European countries, ac- cording to official statistics. Leadership at loggerheads ' Since 1965 East Germany has plied Egypt with credits and aid in an effort to capitalize on Arab anger with Bonn to win diplomatic recogitition from Cairo. ? But President Nasser., possibly with an eye on future economic help from Bonn, -never went further than .to acknowledge the exis- tence of two German states. This included .respect for East Germany's existing,fron- tiers. East German strategists worked. on the theory that, if President Nasser sent an am- bassador to East Berlin, other Arab govern- ments would follow suit. Now the breakthrough has"come from Iraq, whose revolutionary leadership is Oil 'loggerheads with the Syrian 'and Egypt Governments. 2000/08 -0 E4pirov ReI a 2ackWWa/29 : C IA-RDP79-0t1f94AQ Q QIApgpy1thq Nasser gov. Po swayed from his cautious of b Baghdad's action. Syrian authorities Yare held to be less predictable. In addition to Egypt, East German diplo mats have concentrated in recent. years on wooing Syria, Algeria, and India. In all 'cases East Berlin has failed to win recognition. East Berlins rebuked East Germany has consulates general in 10 non-Communist states, all in the so-called third world. Arab states included are Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Yemen, and South Yemen. East Germany boasts two consulates gen. oral in Egypt -- in Alexandria and Cairo. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 8 May 1969 13Y ,ohnt J&, Cooley Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor F? Cairo After Iraq, Sudan may become the second Arab-and ;non-Communist-government to recognize Pommunist East Germany. .Sheikh All Abdel Rahman, the Sudanese. Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister, recom mended this step to the Sudanese Cabinet, the news agency Mena reported from Khar toum. East Germany is a "friendly, country which has honorable attitudes toward Arab' causes" Sheikh All said in a memorandum to President Ismail el Azhari's government, Mena said. On April 30 Iraq became the first non- Communist regime to give full diplomatic' recognition to the East Berlin regime. East German Foreign Minister Otto Winzer tiew' to Baghdad May 6 to arrange details.- Soviet-bloc diplomats here -hope the rest of the Arab world will soon follow -Iraq's, example. Cultural relations Walter Ulbricht's regime carefully did its. staff work for his successful, breakthrough; in the Arab world. Cultural relations have been a main element. Last January and February Paul Scholz, president of the (East) German'- Arab Friendship Society, visited Iraq, Sudan, and the United Arab Republic. He, inaugurated "friendship" societies or "friendship" weeks: in all three, His tour paralleled a series of visits by; Foreign Minister Winzer. Mr. Winzer's stop- over here in January ended with the opening is of a'Apa ~ ~ ,, f~ad~ '~C13f3'ff08/29 : CIA-RDP - fl94A0.00z5?@ p.-OaLIZ, vi, @0O0h1a0 permanent trade offices in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, and Lebanon, plus several ,non-Arab nations. Before, during, and since the 1967 war, East Getmanyhas been unreservedly on` the Arab side in, the conflict between Arabs and Israelis. . , East Germany also has refused to pay compensation to Jewish 'victims of Nazi persecution, on the grounds that the Federal Republic, not East Germany, was the, heir of Hitler's Third Reich. ' Cairo enjoyed diplomatic status.--- ' Apart from the above, East Germany has U. . East Germany has tried unsuccessfully to' win full recognition from the U.A.R. since- Mr. Uibricht visited this country in May,, 1965. East German diplomatic pressure also'. has aimed at the more limited objective of persuading President Nasser's government not to resume relations with Bonn. ,Sequence' sketched , :f Cairo broke relations with Bonn in May',,, 1965, when Bonn formally recognized Israel.. After Egypt, Mr. Winzer visited Syria. In iDamascus he chaired a conference at the, East German consulate of heads of East: German.. missions to 11 Arab and several other Afro-Asian states. This reminded observers of a similar ;meeting of Cuban ambassadors in Daman-,' cus in July, 1968, when Cuba was expanding its relations with "Socialist" Arab states. A detailed East .German-Syrian coin-, +'munique followed Mr. Winzer's. talks with '?President Noureddine 'al-Attasi's govern anent. It indicated that. one aim of his visit` had been to repair damage suffered by East: German prestige in the August, .1968, War 'saw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. - Both sides 'affirmed the need to respect existing. frontiers of the German Democra-` -tic Republic [East Germany] and pointed' ;out that any threat to the GDR or any other socialist country in Europe repre.' isented a danger to world peace." Meanwhile, Irago sought to overcomo: ;embarassment caused by Moscow's lack of sympathy for Baghdad's warfare against' Approved Fodr ~eleaseA000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 Last Feb. the Baghda urdis ne paper al Nour reported that Jalal Talabani,. The Rusk doctrine, Not that the develop- an anti-Barbani ' leftist Kurdish leader,. named for secretary of ment of the new doctrine .had called for Iraqi recognition of East. state Dean Rusk, of stopped with the atomic Germany. course, is not quite so liberation of the "en- The next move in this careful East Ger- forthright and clear-cut as slaved" West German folk. man-Arab courtship was a trip by Iraqi. the Brezhnev doctrine. It Next on the line was Foreign Minister Abdul Karim al Shaykhly apparently extends the Bernhard Fraefrath, an to Moscow and East Berlin March 20 to 31.1 NATO protective umbrel- East Berlin, "people's la to certain' nations in judge." Paper suggests recognition Central Europe and the Fraefrath developed a When he returned to Baghdad, the news- Middle East. This is supplementary theory to paper Al Hurriyah April 3 suggested recog- staunchly denied by U.S. justify the launching of a nition in appreciation of "East Germany's officials who, at the same forceful action against .support for the Arabs." This was the reason time agree, however, that what the East Germans Baghdad Radio gave when it announced rec-, it puts Moscow on notice like to call the West ognition April 30. against further applica- German revenge seekers. Despite many East German trade mis- Lions of the Brezhnev doe- He maintained that the .sions to Arab capitals and a demand for. trine. "anti-fascist" Clauses 53 some products such as machine tools and Ulbricht Next and 107 of the U.N.. Char- cameras, East Germany's trade in the Arab To Brezhnev and the ter allowed partners in. world has lagged far behind that of Bonn. Rusk must now be added regional security pacts to In 1967, West Germany was third only to the Ulbricht doctrine. Al- use force against West the United States and Britain as a leading though it hasn't yet' been Germany without the au- srpplier to the Middle East area as a whole. named for the East Gcr- thorization of the Security West Germany was the second-largest ex man Party boss Walter Council. porter to Iraq and also to the U.A.R.,' de- Ulbricht, the new East . Carrying on deeper into spite' the 1965 break in relations between German philosophizing new uncharted zones of Bonn and all Arab states except Tunisia, clearly outstrips both the political philosophy, Peo- -Morocco, and Libya. Moscow and NATO at- ple's Judge Fraefrath said 11 LOS ANGELES TIMES 1 December 1968 %A Germans Draft Doctrine .of liberatgod BY JOE ALEX MORRIS Times Staff Writer BONN-This is a time for doctrines. First there was the "Brezhnev doctrine," the Soviet Union's elaborate theory' justifying its armed intervention in Czechoslovakia last Au7 gust. It is named for Soviet Communist Party, boss Leonid I. Brezhnev, and roughly says that the Soviet Union has a right to intervene anywhere in the "socialist commonwealth" to protect the holy cause of Marxism. As Sir Isaac Newton said, for every action there must be an equal and opposite reaction. There- fore. it was not long before tempts for sheer ingenuity this applied not only in and tortured thinking. cases of armed aggression It has emerged slowly, in (hy West Germany), but several parts. First came also in cases of a resump- the "military doctrine of tion of the policies of the ' German Democratic "aggression." Republic." The judge specifically This is somewhat diffi- referred to the East Ger- cult' to follow, but thanks man-Russian pact of 1967. to the Communist Party Since Communist propa- newspaper Neues Dcut Banda is daily larded with s c h I a n d, we have this references to the aggres- chain of thinking: sive West German govern- -A war between East ment, the conditions for and West Ger'nany should such an intervention are not be regard :d as a war presumably already there. between brothers but a To add fat to the fire, an "war to defend socialist East German party fune- progress." -Such a war would tionary named Hermann quickly develop into a Axon came up with a new rocket and atomic wea- theory of what constitutes pons war which would end a sovereign state. Only a with the final dostruction of West German imperia Communist state can truly - be considered sovereign, lism." -With t h i s laudable goal in mind, such a war would in fact be a "war of liberation." It is possible to pick some holes in this ar- gument, notably concern- ing the state of East Germany after,, the 7,200 American atomic war- heads stored in Europe are presumably used in retaliation. But these ap- parently did not concern he maintained. The caterwauling out of Last Berlin might seem somewhat unrealistic to the outside world. But not to many Nest Germans who have to live with chronic Berlin crises and this summer went through a real security scare dur- ing the Soviet and War- saw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. The general reaction here was to see Moscow's theA' , 4 r'Release 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79-01194 emer from t e c oisters of hI A T 0 headquarters. outside Brussels. Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 cal antics. This fits in with the general West COMM assumption that East Ger- many is only a tail to be wagged by the Soviet dog. To West Germans, this makes the situation all the more serious because it shows that the Russians are really behind it, all. And since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the West Germans and many other people are not at all sure of the potential limits of Soviet expansionism. "Theoretically, the East bloc is now ready for an attack against the federal republic," was a typical editorial comment. Such dire warnings are not taken too seriously by Western diplomatic circles here, nor indeed by many West Germans. But there has been open anxiety.. for' some weeks now that an- other Berlin crisis may be just around the corner. An expected crisis failed' to develop last month, despite sharp protests: from the East Germans when the Christian Demo- cratic Party held its" an nual .. , party ? meeting in ,West Berlin. But specula- tion has been renewed by an article in the East German foreign policy nia- gaziiae which came out last week. This article repeated East German claims that there were no longer any official agreements con- trolling access to West Berlin, and that it was only the "extraordinary kindness" of East German authorities which permit- ted traffic to continue to flow. 'The article said such traffic must be guided by the people's rights, which forbade traffic through the corridors to West Ber- lin for "aggressive purpo- LE MONITEUR AFRICAIN, Dakar .3 April 1969 1968 WEST GERMAN-AFRICAN TRADE INCREASED ses." Among these purpo- ses, according to the ar- ticle, are included "provo- cative sessions" ' of the West German parliament. Berlin. remains the touchstone of East-West relations in Central Eu- rope, and' it is toward the divided city 'rather than the curious new East. Ger- man doctrine of a war of liberation that attention remains fixed. The new doctrine, unlike the Brezh- nev or Rusk doctrines, appears headed for a short life before returning to the' obscure s o u r e,e s front which it sprang. An American observer recently declared: "The Germans have come to Africa. They are now playing a much more important role and they are .exercising a much greater influence in Africa than at the time of the Kaiser!" Indeed, the Germans are-not only coming as travelling salesmen and instructors for the armies of the young African states. They have also come as investors and as lenders. They are carrying out more than 400 projects in Africa, including plants, ports, and highway networks. They can also be found in the universities. One can hear them on the radio waves, the "German Wave," which broadcasts about 17.5 hours of miscellan- eous programs, i.n various languages, to Africa, each week, in other words, much more than the Voice of America. It must be admitted that people in Africa generally, and quite justifiably, moreover, consider the Germans-to be quite efficient in business, that their merchandise is of good quality and that their in- vestments are quite important. In Nigeria, the Germans are threatening to outstrip the British in investments. Over the past 4 years, they have completed about 30 projects in that country and their investment there is equivalent to 35 billion CFA [African Financial Community). In Liberia, where the Americans were almost at home, even before World War II, the "Salzgitter" West German steel mills have obtained a license covering all mining prospecting. Experts from this cartel are al- ready working with the government in Mcnrovia as industry and mining ad- visers. Bonn has thus selected foreign trade as the principal instrument for its penetration of Africa. By aid to the developing countries, the West'Germans primarily mean exporting their private capital. Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 If we glance at the foreign trade statistics, we see first of all that Africa b and large is not'of primary importance to West.Germany y 9 and that there are places in the interior of Africa where German commercial interests are primarily concentrated, according to all available evidence. Overall, 7.52 percent of German imports come from Africa and that continent in turn absorbs 4.62 percent of German imports whereas Europe gets 61-73.2 percent and America 24-13 percent. The balance of trade with West Germany is thus very positive for Africa. Germany buys from its com- mercial partners in the tropical countries and especially Libya much more in terms of products than it sells to them (right now, Libya supplies al- most 40 percent of Germany's petroleum imports). In Millions DM Imports 1964 1968 Exports 1964 1968 Libya 990 2,365.3 112.8 225.5 South Africa 506.5 982.5 .905.8 1,418.4. Nigeria 367. 192 217.8 266.1 Rhodesia, Zambia, and Malawi 365.5 449.5 55.1 59.6 Algeria 265.7: 556.6 47.3 182 Morocco 235.7 160 126.9 170.9 Liberia 192.6 283.1 ' 137.5 39.1 Ivory Coast 166.3 267.1, 38. 85 Ghana' 162.9 131.5'_ 105.1 107.3 Congo-Kinshasa 148.1 185.7. 96.0 120.9 Kenya and Uganda 137.3 118.3 104.7 146.5 UAR 135 109.3 436.0 264 The above table, covering the 12 regions of Africa, where we find the principal West German suppliers, shows the development of German for- eign trade between 1964 and 1968. The next table draws a parallel be- tween 1967 and 1968 for each African country. Here, we discover.among other things, that the total trade volume, which was 9.4 billion DM in 1967, went up to 10.8 billion DM in 1968, in other words, an increase of ,14.9 percent. Imports Exports In Millions DM 1968 1967 1968 1967 Canary Islands 37,931 33,900 112,770 129,740 Morocco 159,960 172,437 170,932 175,18-6 Algeria 556,648 515,341 182,040 77,270 Tunisia 88,672 78,732 77,642 77,548 Libya 2,365,302 1,402,070 225,457 156,482 UAR 109,258 115,087 264,000 219,792 Sudan 179,772 140,909 54,494 61,015 Mauritania 60,392 67,601 5,686 4,608 Mali 2,079 574 4,276 3,013 Upper Volta 380 8 7,340, 3,339 Niger 485 24 6,347 6,649 Chad 5,923 1,973 5,538 7,281 Senegal 21,454 17,290 41,920 37,442 Gambia 6,631 20 2,376 1,890 Portuguese Guinea 8,405 8,723 2,873 2,299 Guinea 18,607 20,551 11,870 21,485 siApprbwd For Relea%Pe 00/08/29 7:94 RDP7?-?il-J4A00&vObb0001-0 Approv y ass 2000/ 2 3 CIA-RE 194A 6 It 0 X100006',`3901 Ghana 131,432 103,462 107,292 100,286 Togo 28,737 19,384 12,186 16,556 Dahomey 11,527 8,386 7,999 7,767 Nigeria 191,996 376,362 266,121 244,148 Cameroun 114,005 91,042 55,953 46,206 Central African Republic 2,414 1,873 10,202 13,133 Equatorial Guinea 450 687 5,742 4,121 Gabon 66,836 75,868 19,464 13,059 Congo-Brazzaville 78,773 59,206 30,596 31,389 Congo-Kinshasa 185,688 145,495 120,937 78,560 Rwanda 3,435 2,976 6,004 4,139 Burundi 2,259 2,976 9,646 5,863 Angola 90,976 61,448 126,462 156,753 Ethiopia 37,831 24,853 73,533 79,049 French Territory Afars and Issas of 59 175 3,455 2,834 Somalia 656 421 12,231 10,020 Kenya 71,232 83,812 105,172 118,180 Uganda 47,033 63,656 41,294 42,023 Tanzania 68,610 58,003 48,258 47,233 Mozambique 37,044 40,172 71,717 62,163 Madagascar 18,943 13,210 40,420 27,859 Comores 564 322 Reunion 14,575 1,776 7,204 8,137 Zambia 396,351 257,752 67 , 410 61,484 Rhodesia. 53.202 63,903 52,660 50,395 Malawi 13,369 7,140 6,922 7,216 South Africa 982,482 1,045,154 1,418,318 1,251,361 Trade between West Germany and Ivory Coast has been increasing regularly for the past several years, in terms favorable to the latter. Germany exports primarily automotive vehicles, synthetic fabrics and cot- ton, as well as chemical and electrical industry products to Ivory Coast while it imports primarily logs and lumber or de-barked wood, cocoa and canned pineapples. According to the detailed 1967 figures, automotive vehicles accounted for one-third of the German exports, in other words, 1.1 billion CFA; fabrics accounted for 531 millions and electrical and chemical industry products made up 451 millions. Ivory Coast wood ex- ports amount to 6.5 billion,CFA and cocoa bean exports account for 5 bil- lions. Compared to 1966, these figures reveal one fact that is very posi- 'tive for Ivory Coast: the surplus in its balance of trade increased from .7.9 billion'CFA in 1966 to 9.2 billion in 1967. .The total volume of trade between Senegal and West Germany has in- creased quite noticeably. Between 1965 and 1966, Senegal exports to West Germany increased by 15 percent and from 1966 until 1968 this tendency has been further accentuated; likewise, Senegalese sales increased from 17,290,000 DM to 21,454,000 DM:(an increase of 24 percent). It must how- ever be pointed out that German merchandise imports have also gone up, `reaching a figure of 41,920,000 DM in 1968, although Senegal's balance of trade with West Germany shows a deficit, with coverage amounting only to 51 percent. Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 7 A4 rived Fir Releases 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 s erman imports pr mar y consist of phosphates. West Germany purchased about 33 percent of Senegal's phosphate output. Next come pea- nut cakes and miscellaneous peanut by-products used for animal fodder; the export volume here already amounts to a counter value of 30 million. CFA per year. The increase in Senegalese exports to West Germany has reduced the dis-equilibrium in the balance of trade since German imports to Senegal increased in lesser proportions; during fiscal year 1967, the Senegalese trade balance coverage rate with respect to Germany did not exceed 46 per- cent.. It is interesting to note that certain Senegalese exports going to West Germany are handled in an indirect fashion, since they are routed through third countries, especially France, where these raw materials are processed. The German firm of Kathmann, which does about 40 million DM worth of business, selling poultry, eggs, and special fodder for poultry, has assumed majority parzicipation'in the Presh Farm Company which is respons- ible for the technical and commercial management of a large, industry- scale poultry farm in Togo. This project is being carried out with the support of the Joint Development Fund for Africa and the German Development Company. A similar project is under study in Ghana with the participation of the same German firm. We must point out the considerable jump in German imports from Togo which increased from 19,384,000 DM in 1967. to 28,737,000 DM in 1968 (up 48 percent), whereas exports from West Germany decreased about 26 percent, dropping from 16,556,000 DM in 1967 to 12,186,000 DM in 1968. It is-thus evident that the balance of trade between the two countries is for the time being extremely favorable to Togo. West Germany is Cameroun's second-ranking supplier, after France, and occupies fourth place in the import of Cameroun products which include above all cocoa, wood, and coffee. To these figures we must also add those concerning major imports of Cameroun products which Germany obtains through French and Dutch buyers. In conclusion we find that German businessmen so far have been in- terested primarily in English-speaking countries, that is, countries in East Africa, as well as Nigeria and Ghana, in other words, some of the more populated and richer, countries which are traditionally more open to investments and foreign trade because they were in a more privileged posi- tion than the other African states. There is a process of evolution which is about to start here. It seems to be a natural consequence of the association of the French-speaking countries with the Curopean Common Market. To a minor extent this may also be due to the disappointments in the nationalization of German pro- perty in Tanzania and by the events in Nigeria. One of the manifestations of German vitality in the field of trade is illustrated precisely by the sixth "Partners in Progress" import expo- sition which was held in the buildings of the West Berlin Fair-Exposition from 26 September until 6 October 1968, with the participation of 56 de- velopingApproved Forieldase 1bb'O1 / `t 1 P2 '"t9-01194A000500100001-0 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 Thus Congo-Brazzaville, Dahomey, Gabon, Senegal, Niger, and Togo -- as far as Africa is concerned -- were in a position for a leisurely exami- nation of the possibilities of increasing their traditional raw materials exports to West Germany.. The value of such events is quite obvious in the sense that they enable the seller to define the real nature of his partners' needs much better and, in certain cases, to determine much better in advance what the development of the market might be in the future. To some extent, this is an immediate advantage resulting from commercial contacts during these fairs and exhibits. In the specific case of Germany, such contacts with African pro- ducers also make it possible to strengthen business links; these contacts always prove profitable, sooner or later, both in terms of sales and in terms of imports; these contacts defintely promote the development of the German presence in Africa;"this is something both the Bonn Govern- ment and private investors obviously desire. Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA tDP79-01194A000500100001-0 25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 Aaaroved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 June 1969 SOUTH VIETNAM -- DEALING FROM STRENGTH When Nguyen Van Thieu was the Presidency in September 1967, it was to a din of critic's scoffing and Hanoi's-accusations about rigged elections, a military dictatorship being legalized and South Vietnam's citizens going to.the polls at bayonet..point-:..(this.,.despite observations to the contrary by an enormous international::press.corpson the scene). With the perspective that two years offer., only possible to say that no valid challenge to the legality . of. the elections has arisen; it is also possible to say that the men and women who.were.elected at that time (the president, the vice president and.60 members of the Upper House) have, for the most part, performed responsibly and in some cases effectively. President Thieu himself has provided.a good example of political nimbleness and steadily developing qualities of-responsible leadership. He has successfully consolidated his presidential. power, has become in- creasingly sure-footed in Saigon's fluctuating political scene and has contributed measurably to'the consolidation. of the constitutional pro- cesses and the division of self-government. He has won the confidence of his peers --not. simply.the military men who already respected him., but.political professionals, many of whom had been active long before.t.he new president came into the picture. Thieu's skills as a leader and a politician are helping to weld his government into a rallying point for non-Communist:: political elements in Vietnam. This is due, in part at least, Thieu's willingness to share his power with uncommitted political figures such as,the highly esteemed Prime-Minister Tran .Van.Huong. The government., has the nation's major political force, the army,; solidly behind itand its general popularity and power seem to be on the upcurve. These factors have had an effect on the government's international image,?which.isprimarily reflected in the context of the Paris peace talks, where.the.government's domestic strength has given itsdelegation_in Paris added strength_.and some degree of luster and flexibility. If one wished to cite. concrete evidence.of the government's domestic strength and its tie-in with the Paris talks., the elections of March this year would be a fairly dramatic example. On four successive Sundays in March, three million. voters (representing - almost.90% of those eligible) in the villages and hamlets went to the.polls.and elected more than 4,600 village council members and 3,100 hamlet chiefs and deputies. In Paris and other areas of the world the voter turnout.was viewed as a major achieve- ment of the Saigon government which not only proved it could once again carry out wartime elections in the face of Viet Cong threats and violence, but also cast doubt an the National Liberation Front's claim to be the only real representative of the South Vietnamese people. The open nature of the village and hamlet elections conducted by.the Saigon government under the scrutiny of hundreds of foreign newsmen provides an interesting contrast Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 "M 000 . ftwomwiWiiiiii with the unwitnessed and unsubstantiated elections the Viet Cong claimed to have held sometime this past winter to~.estmblish."Peo.ple's Liberation Coun- cils" in the villages and hamlets. Following the village and hamlet elections,.and undoubtedly influenced by the strong popular support their outcome demonstrated for the Saigon government, President Thieu decided to acknowledge the Viet Cong as a fact of life it was no longer necessary to wish away. At.a 25 March news confer- ence the President announced that the Saigon government is ready to inte- grate members of the NLF.into the political?life of South Vietnam as part of an over-all peace settlement. In answer to reporters' questions, Thieu opened the possibility that members of the NLF might be encouraged to form a party in South Vietnam and participate in future elections. On 7 April, in a speech to the South Vietnamese National Assembly, Pre- sident Thieu proposed a Six Point Peace Plan.withthe aim of putting an im- mediate end to the war. One of the points the President included a welcome to "those now fighting against the South who decide to renounce violence ... and abide by the democratic processes" and who will, as a re- sult, "enjoy full political rights and assume the -same obligations as other lawful citizens." On 21 April a top level government group .le-d by President Thieu and Prime Minister Tran.Van Huong traveled-to Vung.Tau for the graduation of village and hamlet officials from a six-week government administration school. These first graduates of a series of six training courses, are expected to instruct more than 16,000 local officials in improving and re- vitalizing local administration. President Thieu reminded the graduates of the need to nurture self-government at every level and stressed the responsibility of.hamlet and village officials in bringing this about. The President discussed the problems of corruption, land reform and im- provement of the present Vietnam economy. He also spoke of the government's plans for postwar development, indicating that. the government is program- ming the current wartime economy to develop as logically as possible into the projected postwar picture. In another speech, on the 26th of April, President Thieu noted that in March 1969 the ChieuHoi (Open Arms) program (the governmental effort to encourage enemy desertions) had received its 100,000th "rallier." He contended that the continuing success of this program, which brings in North Vietnamese regulars as well as Viet Cong guerrillas and political cadre, is an indication that government efforts toward national reconcilia- tion are producing results. Observers are inclined to agree with this con- tention, particularly when many of the so-called ralliers are willing to undergo a period of rehabilitation and then enter into some constructive form of service such as hospital work for the-South Vietnamese people. The increasing success of the Chieu Hoi.program may be an indication that the Viet Cong is losing the hold it had on its followers as it weakens politically and militarily, it may also indicate that the government is Approved For Release 2000/08/129 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 offering sufficiently appealing alternat-ives to Communism to attract a greater number of adherents. On the 8th of May the NLF proposed.a 10-point, the problem of war in Vietnam. Despite the fact that, the points: were based on the same proposals that the NLF? and Hanoi have- made on._ doz?ens o-f previous occasions, Saigon did not reject them outright asit might have been -inclined to do a year ago. Rather., the Saigon government suggested,---in a carefully draft- ed and unusually conciliatory communique -that:-,."talks "talks on three of the ten points can take place immediately in the framework-of the present talks in Paris," or in previously.proposed.,by.Saigon. The free world press praised Saigon's conciliatory-response asa genuine effort to move: the peace talks forward. The relatively high standards of.leadershp=exemplified by the Saigon government are remarkable for a country at war, and -for. one- so newly emerg- ing into nationhood. Certainly the increasing-flexibility of the govern- ment is showing in its dealings with the.NLF and. Hanoi and its growing sense of identification with presentand.postwar--..dome.stic needs of the South Vietnamese people are a leaders.and their nascent maturity. The question of whether they can actually create and carry out badly needed domestic reforms and als..negotiate a peace?.which can lead to some form of effective self-government for. South Vietnam are questions that only the future can answer. Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 App ~W ~ ase 2000/08/29 CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 The village and-- et a., amlet elections In South. .Vietnam by BARRY BROWN WASHINGTON,- Although the guns are blazing again 16 South Vietnam, . it Is impor4 tant to note that the even more decisive political s'rug- 'gle also continues,The South Vietuainese government rece" .tty registedre ano her Impr,r- rant achieventent in this are by completing a new series of village and hamlet Glee- lions on each of the last four Sundays, beginning March 2. The volirg, fn which nearly] .nne million men and women have taken pare, installed village councils and ban,let Chiefs to serve for the next Ihiee years. Despite Viet Cong threats and act-, of terrorism intended to dis- rupt the proceedin?s, from 80 to 95 per cent of those eligible l,r the various com- tnunities have cast their ballots. This brings the num- b"r of villages in which such elections have been held ,luring the past two years to more thar, 1,000 and the runt. ber of hamlets to some 4,500. Tl:e vrogram began in 1967 followed not long afterwards, by a new constitution awl the., election of a popularly-based, national goverr,m1-11t un'Icr, it. The two movemen s-t.,_ ward establishment Of, a strong central authority in Sargon, on the one hand, and toward decentralized local self-government, on the other - have been precisely coinplrmentary. In order to understand this, it Is helpful to recall the old 'Viotnawcsc proverb f it The emperor's law stop, at the Village gate,, Attltougit thig, Was perhaps never literally' true, and it could scarcely be Considered compatible %'ith the current effo"t to build a modern nation in the midst `of a wsr, 85 does suggest how ancient and deep-root..' ; ed the Idea of local aulono. m has-been. For centuries, village Couu Cils and hamlet chiefs chosen by the people did have fu'l responsibility for justice, sccurit3 and fiscal affaias in their Communities. The Viet. namese Emperors, and the French during the colonial period, customarily rcted in' the villages-notably in such matters as tax collections thr, ugh tl;e councils a d local leaders. The eliminaiion of 1hat system in1956 by Pro- sident Ngo Dii.h Diem was larg Jy resl:onsible for the alienation of his popular support. Initially, it may be suhpo. s(d Ibat Diew Ihc:ught it uee ess .ry it substitute village councils appointed from Sai. you for those chosen locally In order to tighten his grip on -tire couulryside and str, ng_ -thin the war effort. But by :eroding the Iraditional defc.' Me of the peas, try, against file central authority and the abuses that have been so C riintnnly associated with it in Vietnamese society, he opened the way to despotis. and his own downfall. The new c nstitulonal regime has il,erefore, wisely co:,cluded' that. if return to file tradition of local self government must b:; an Indispensable part of the effort to erect an effective and responsive Approved For Release 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79-011, t b6'.v d'(fd0001=0 SAIGON Ap ved3For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01 194A000500100001-0 3 April 1969 early 3,000 hamlet C&h1*e1s eleCte; ('1 Pacification and Construction concurrently Minister of Interior, Tuesday, afternoon held .a press conference at the Interior Ministry to announce the, results of the village and hamlet official elections in the last month. The Deputy Prime Minister 'said the government 13 concentrating all its efforts to the control. and execution of _the national sovereignty through bout the countl'y in the Pacification and Construction project for 109. In order to attain tho above' objactive, he added, the coun- try needs an effective adminis- trativa machinery elected Ly the pecpla themselves to take care of the notional iater-~:ts;' 'fharefcre, the es'ablisames.t of, villag3 and hamlet aut'hor,tie3 and el-ction of village peoples cou; eels and hamlet executive cc mmitieas were considered c ne among the eight essaniial objectives of the Pacification., and Construction Program, he said. Deputy Prime Minvter Khiem stress?d the failure of the Gam. mumsts through the first stage elections of village people coun- cils, hamlet ciiiafs and deputy chiefs. Speaking next, Mr. Mr. Le. SAIGON (VP) -- Gen. Than Thien Khiem, Deputy Prime Minister for Van D9, Ir.tarior Ministry's Studies Director, reported on the results of th3 village and hamlet elections in the past month. He said that before Fe- bruary 1939, the number of villag3s having elected coun c,ls amounted to 1,104 not counting 583 villages councils lelected in the first phase of 13G9. At present, 1.693 villages nave completed their elections with a total of 7,85? hamlets chiefs and deputy chiefs. Through the four election. phases in March 1969, 4,698 parsons were elected out of 8,015 candidates. Maantim3 618,483 parsons" went to the pills or 89 per cent of the eligible vct.3ra. As for the election of hamlet and deputy hamlet chiefs.; 3.145 people were elected from 7,133 candidates, Tha` numb r voters g-)ing to the, polls. Schad 837,825 or 88,1 par cert. Mr. Da also made known that by the. end of this year, 'ions will ba `held in the rema- innirg 130 villages and 889 hamlets, The D?puty Prime _ Minister said that in ;he future. the ceni, tral gw>riitiiant~ will have az $p-=c;al taus for village offi.' dials accord'ngto which, th"y will-b4 assigned 18 command` Popular Force, and Ravolutionay? Daveloprn-nt cadres as Well as entitled to use special funds. VIETNAM GUARDIAN 29 March 1969 Thieu's readiness to talk SAIGON (VNG).- A govorti- nient spokesusau said Friday President Nguyen van Thieu's statement to the foreign press earlier this week in which he stated this government is ready to hold secret Talks a ith the National Liber,tiou Front, has been misluterprete:d by certaia elements of the Vietnamese' language press. is "good will escalation" These reports interpreted the President's statement as a change of p thee.. This is an inaccurate con. clusion, the spokesman said. He said that it car4nt read. ing of the President's pre. vious arid most . recant statemen's would reveal that 'there has been no change In positis.ns. We still do not recognize, the NLF as a legal entity,nor 'rill we aceep' any coali'ton? with the comtnunistss, the spokesman said. aWc will not accept the communist Party in S euth Vietuam.a iTha object of the Presi- dent's statement,D he said, was to cese plate th good Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-O'l1Iq4Aoft510 'f 190001-0 WASHINGTON POST Applovvd F)09 Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 By David Hoffman Washlnston Post Forelen Service SAIGON, March 25-President Thieu declared. today that South Vietnam: was 'ready, to. engage in private peace talks .with Hanoi and the National. Liberation front. He set no preconditions. South Vietnam's willingness to bargain in secret has been conveyed to the Communists but neither Hanoi nor the NLF has thus far re- sponded, Thtou Mid, fie said he expect@ Chet The first private meeting talks to. take place.' Ike de has not been scheduled yet, scribed Paris as the ? most but we are working on It," he 11 added. practical? location. He said Asked whether ? Saigon still that Ky "'very possibly" would: insisted that the Communists negotiate for Saigon. And he meet certain conditions be- raised the possibility. of two- fore the beginning of private, party or three-party talks talks, the 45-year-old chief ex between South Vietnam and ecutive suggested they need the NLF, or representatives not. of Hanoi and the NLF in corns, bination. one could raise' any question, and we' might 'consider any problem that arises. Private talks will help in some' way to bring fruitful results and solve what we ? cannot solve in the. official talks," Thieu said. In an obviously, expansive mood, Thieu answered ques-' tions posed by a score of for- eign journalists invited to In-' dependence Palace by the President's office. Sipping a 'Scotch and soda, Thieu spoke in, English without notes. He read no prepared statement. Saigon's refusal to recognize and deal with the NLF, its rival for eventual political con- trol of South Vietnam, has been a major sticking point In efforts to end the war. The current talks in Paris were "In the private talks,"?Thieu' )said, "we do not consider any' longer two sides, four sides,' four men or the number oft delegations." Thieu declined to identify which diplomats conveyed S,aigop's willingness to negoti- ate secretly to the Commu- nists, nor did he say where such overtures were made., But they understand well we are ready," he said. N0.1 YORIZ TD 'ES 27 .:arch 19 $9 IfflEll SAID TO OPEN AN ELECTION ROLE that the nob o aA that tht e treated a5 t be treated FOR ItLF, MEMBERS an equal in the procedural ar- Reported Ready to Integrate Them Into Political Life as Part of Vietnam Accord SAIGON STUDYING PLANSI President Expected to Take Leadership of an Enlarged Pro-Government Party By TERENCE SMITH Spec%l to She New York Times SAIGON, South Vietnam, March 26 - President Nguyen 'Vat] Thleu Is reliably reported' to be ready to Integrate mem ?bers of the National Liberation Front Into the political life of South Vietnam as part of an over-all peace settlement. The president In known to `have, discussed with his ad- visers In recent weeks possible ways In which members of the, .N.L.F. might be permitted to ,compete in elections as mem ambers of- an opposition. 1 In anticipation of a future ';political struggle against the ;Front, Mr. Thicu is also plan- ning to assume personal control, [of an expanded Government ,party. During April, according to sources close to Mr. Thieu, the, President will accept the per-) ' . sonal leadership of an enlarged version of the Peoples Alliance for Social Revolution, a pro- 'Government political organiza- j'tion formed last year. ? Convention Expected An extraordinary convention .of the alliance is expected to jbc held in Saigon during the' month to select Mr. Thieu as 'chairman of its presidium. Additional South Vietnamese political factions are also ex- pected to be accepted into the alliance In an effort to broaden, the base of the Government. Mr. Thicu's closest advisers) have been urging him for sev- :era) months to take a personal] initiative in creating a political' organization that could com- pete with the Front. They-acrd Mr. Thieu--are working on the assumption that some form of political par- ticipation by the Front in South; Vietnam will be part of a peace settlement negotiated in Paris. Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 rangements. Hanoi and the NLF, likewise, do not reco- gnize the Thieu government as the. legitimate government of South Vietnam. South Vietnam's original position was that it would talk only, with Hanoi and the orig- inal Communist position was; that the NLF would talk onlyi with the United States. On Jan. 27, Vice Presidents Ky had said in Paris that; South Vietnam was prepared! for ""private talks with tho' ether Ado if thry arc willing, " but that the time was not ripe for such contacts to' begin,' Today, Thieu was far more specific. THE SAIGCAred For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 8 April 1969 Cites 6 Conditions To End War By Nguyen Duy Lieu President Nguyen Van Thieu said Monday he will ((volunteer) to lad what- he called a political association) and set forth six a basic)) conditions ato end the war in this part of the world,) In a one-hour address before a joint session of the National Assembly, President Thieu said that since his suggestions for strong political parties have not been heeded, he felt it his duty to do the job himself. lie said his political Six Points (4) As the RVN adopts a group will represent ccthe ru- President Titieu said in Knatioual reconcialintion ling tendency, ((calling on tho-, his constant quest for cca policy, those who now are Constructive solution) to the '' fighting against the South, se ,,.?ho share his views and war, the following six poin's but decide to :enounce responsibility to join and help :constitute a cwcasonahle and violence and respect the Ksave riot a solid basis for tho restora- laws of the Renc'blie faith- Tlticu did not elaborate on tion of peace in Vietnam: fully abide by i,'.: 1ecuc:ratic his party and when it would (1) Communist aggression processes, will be welcome 1 be organized formally, 'net' boning only that Kii would should end. In this case Citm- as KfuIh mt:mhers of the be a tightly knit organiza- monist North Vietnam :;Could national coruuu;iity. They large-scale group. give up all its attempts to will enjoy fui! ' iitical rights lion, KMy and only a largeon,l, i said, take over the Republic of and assume t : c,r3nu obtii;a- Vietnam through force. It !inns as other lawful citizens- ((is to help ottrcountry over- difficulties and, should stop violating Ittc ;.) The reunification of come present Demilitarized Zone and the u . two Vielnaots will be de- to (10 whatever is possible RV. frontiers, and end its d by free choice of the. to prevent its loss to the wanton spellings on the inno- people of Vietnam Cote called cent people in the South). through democratic proceses. He called on those who (2) Communist North Viet- 'fltlctt, said that to create disagree with him on the damese troops anti their auxi- an atmosphere conductive to ((procedures and ntethods)o liarv forces and cadres must. national rcunit?icatiou after (of forming such a party) to cotnplctly) withdraw from peace is restored, economic set up their own party which the South. As the military and cultural cx hanges be-- Would then be called an and subversive forces of tween the North a,td South of opposition party Connntutist North Victnatn Vit?tnann' and other conniries Of course the same"nations- polluut, infiltration ceases in the Region (wac, be list ideology must prevail in and the level of violence actively explored, all ogot her any such opposition party,) thus subs;des, the RVN will with other interutediary Thieu said, emphasizing that ask its allies to remove their measures of peaceful coeXis- like any political setup worthy forces, in accordance with te:ice. This, he added, roust of such a uame