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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 111
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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 CPYRGHT
AedrRelease 20
23.May 1969
S V I ET DISSIDEIITS
III PROTEST TO UhN..
.Text Given to Newsmen Says
Rights Are 'Repressed'
CPYRQHT __----
MOSCOW, May 22 - More
than 50 Soviet dissidents,
alarmed at the growing nutn-
ber of arrests of their fellows,
have drawn up a petition to
the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights, calling for
an investigation of "the repres-
sion of basic civil rights in the
Soviet Union."
The petition was drafted two
days ago and it was not known
whether the text had actually
been sent out of the Soviet
Union. The dissidents made it
available to Western corre-
spondents apparently in the
hope of reaching the United
Nations through Western news-
papers.
The petition said the recent!
arrests have compelled us to
think that Soviet punitive
organs have decided finally tol
bar the activity of people pro-;
testing against arbitrariness in
Tour country."
Coincident with the petition,
it was also learned today that
Ilya Burmistrovich, a 31-year-
old mathematician, was sen-
tenced yesterday by a Moscow
court to three years in prison
for circulating typescripts of
works of the imprisoned au-
thors Andrei D. Sinyavsky and
Yuli M. Daniel to some friends.
He was arrested on April 16,
1968, and spent more than a)
year in jail before his one-day
trial.
He was convicted under Ar (
titles 190 and 191 of the Rus-
sian Federation criminal code
against the spreading of anti-
;Soviet slander.
Earlier this week, Ilya Gabai,
n teacher of the Russian lan
guage, was arrested, and docti~
1. tents putting forth the case of
Crimean Tatars were seized.
with him. I
'On Satlin's orders the Crime-
an Tatars were expelled from
their' homeland during World
'War II on charges of collabora-
tion with the Germans. Even
though the minority has been of
,ficially rehabilitated, its mem-
bers have not been able to re-
turn to the Crimean area -
,around the Black Sea from their
,places of exile. mostly in So-
-Viet Central Asia.
Their plight has attracted the
,'.interest of many dissidents,.
who Kaye tried to publiciz'
:,heir case through western
media.
;< The dissident group Is vir-
tually unknown to the Soviet
,public and has little influence.
.But their presence and the pub-
1icity they have received in the
West has been a constant irri
tant to the authorities.
k:Prominent Members Arrested
In recent months some of the
.,more prominent members of
,the, group have been arrested,
'and some of them have been
:sentenced.
The acknwoledged leader and
most active in the group, Pyotr
G. Grigorenko, a former Soviet
;Army general, was arrested
dearly this month In Tashkent,
twhere he had gone at the invi-
;tation of 2,000 Crimean Tatars
to help represent in court 10
other Tatars who are also due
to go on trial on charges of
spreading anti-Soviet slander.
Many of the names on the
`.petition to the United Nations
commission have appeared on
other documents that have
.made their way to the West..
These documents have protest-
red the trials of writers, report-
`e.d evidence of growing Stalin
'fists trends in Soviet Society.
,and denounced the invasion, of
'Czechoslovakia.
The most prominent name on
the petition is that of Pyotr
?Yakir, a historian, now work-
ing as a librarian, who is the
,son of Iona E. Yakir, one of the
most famous Soviet army com-
manders, who was arrested on
lvlay 30, 1937, and executed
that year on June 11 during
a purge of the military conduct-
ed by Stalin.
Pyotr Yakfr, who himself was
arrested in September, 1937,
when he was only 14 years old,
spent the next 14 years in con-
finement in various camps be-
`.fore finally gaining his freedom.
F-, : In 1966, he ran afoul of the
authorities when he began. to
speak out against the campaign
to rehabilitate Stalin's- reputa
-tion in the Soviet Union.
Appeal Not Received
~'?' r Fpeclat to The New York TImea
2. 'UNITED NATIONS,' N. Y.,
May 22-The dissidents' ap at
reported from Moscow has of
reached the United Nations, ac-I
,cording to officials who ha die
'human rights complaints.
Thousands of petitions or et-
?ters alleging violations of ri hts
are received each year--14, 00
in 1968-and accusations ve
been leveled against virtu illy
every government. this is
known to have included ap-
peals from Soviet citizens, ut
sources here were unable to
say whether they had came
from inside the Soviet U ion
or had reached here by o er
routes.
The practice has been to ac-
knowledge and file the ti-
tions. This effectively b ies;
;them unless the authors ub-1
licize them or. a delega ion-
(chooses to raise them in an
`open meeting of the Hu an
(Rights Commission.
A new procedure, backed by
the United States but opp sed
by the Soviet Union, w uld
create machinery that w uld
permit an investigation to be
made when complaints reve led
a consistent pattern of ab es.
Such an Inquiry would eed
the consent of the accused o9
ernment.
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23 May 1969
55 Russians Ask
U.N. For Probe
Of `Suppression's
CPYRGHT
peal circulating privately here ~ghtaA $ii nsaa Pcald,t ' ,o
contends that recent arrests of appeal to the United Nations be.
dissidents threaten a return to cause we have received no in.
Stalinist terror and asks the swer to our protests and cc m.
United Nations to investigate plaints which have been nt
"violation of basic civil rights" over a number of years to he`
by Soviet authorities. highest state and judicial a gm-
So far, the appeal has been ties of the Soviet Union."
signed by 55 Soviet citizens. Some Signers Listed
Its circulation coincided with a The 55 signers included he
report from friends of Ilya Bur. 'most active members of a s all
mistrovich, a scientist, that he protest movement which as
was sentenced yesterday to grown smaller as a result of
three years in a labor camp on a continuing arrests and tri s.
charge of spreading lies about Among the signers were:
the Soviet system by lending 1. Pyotr Yakir, 46, historian a
friends copies ? of critical writ- veteran of 14 years in la r
ings of Andrei Sinyavsky and camps and son of a famed 1 d
Yuli Daniel. Those two satirists Army commander who was s of
have been serving terms in la- in Stalin's purges and later re a-
bor camps for more than a year. bilitated.
ITheir trial in 1966 stirred up: 2. Alexander Yesenin-Vole
`protests both here and abroad.' 45, a poet and mathematiclai,
The appeal in circulation pro son of the well-known poet, S r.
tests the arrest two weeks ago of fgel Yesenin, and a veteran f the best known Soviet dissenter, prisons and mental institutio which are used to imprl n
former Maj. Gen. Pyotr Grigo- protesEem.
ryenko, and the arrest this week
of a fellow dissident, Ilya Gabal,
a poet and teacher.
"These recent arrests force us
to think that' Soviet punitive
,agencies have decided to sup-
press once and for all the activi-
ty of people who protest against
arbitrariness in our country,"
the appeal said. "We feel that
freedom to have and distribute
independent convictions has fi-
nally been placed in jeopardy."
The signers said they were
"deeply indignant over unceas-
ing political persecutions in the
Soviet Union, perceiving in them
a return to Stalin's time when
all our country was in the grip of
terror."
The appeal listed recent trials
Involving intellectuals demand
ing free speech and "people
seeking national equality and
preservation of their national
culture ... Jews demanding the
right to leave for Israel ... and
believers seeking religious liber-
Addressing their petition to
the U.N. Commission on Human
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THE COMMUNIST SCENE
(19 April - 23 May 1969)
June 1969
I. Husak's First Month in Czechoslovakia
II. On the Eve of the World Communist Conference
III. Strange Bedmates in the Balkans
IV. Briefly Noted:
A. Chinese Policy after the Ninth Congress
B. Soviets Meddle in Finnish Communist Affairs
C. Lenin Centennial
I. One Month of the New Husak Regime in Czechoslovakia
On 17 April, with the second Soviet intervention, Gustav Husak became
Secretary General of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CSCP) and thus top
ruler in Czechoslovakia, taking orders from no one except the Soviets. His
reign of something more than a month has been marked by definite steps toward
Soviet-style "normalization" of the country's situation, which for the past
year has been characterized by the Soviets as a "crisis" situation because it
did not conform to the pattern of rule practiced in the Soviet Union and its
other Satellites.
Husak has proceeded in several directions simultaneously in his effort
to satisfy the Soviets. Prospects are that he may restore Czechoslovakia to
passive Communist orthodoxy using little noticeable violent suppression or old-
fashioned Stalinist methods, in fact much less than there was reason to fear
at first. Among Husak's moves are the suspension of some of the more out-
spokenly liberal newspapers and magazines, including the Studentske Listy,
Politika,(a major organ of the Central Committee of his own Communist Party),
Listy, Reporter and others. Other publications that do not actively support
the party line or are critical of the Soviet Union can expect to suffer a
similar fate. On some newspapers, such as the CSCP daily, Rude Pravo, he has
installed a new staff of editors he is sure will propagate his line. Some
observers have noted that Husak is also substituting "reliable" Communists in
place of liberals throughout the party and government hierarchy as an important
measure to insure that his orders will be closely followed.
There have been sporadic unrest and occasional demonstrations by various
elements of the population, as on May Day, on the eve of 6 May (anniversary of
the entry of U.S. troops into Western Czechoslovakia during World War II), and
again on official Liberation Day, 9 May. In each case, Husak has ordered swift
measures to cope with the possibility of mass anti-Soviet, anti-regime demonstra-
tions by having the police round up and arrest as many thousands of demonstra-
tors as necessary. Thus far, even though an estimated 5,000 students and workers
demonstrated at Plzen (Pilsen) on 5 May, none of the popular resentment has
gotten out of control, as far as is known.
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Thus Husak has moved decisively to demonstrate to his Soviet masters
that he intends to fulfill their explicit or unspoken requirements. He has
supported all Soviet foreign policy initiatives, especially doing what he
can to assure that Czechoslovakia will not become a bone of contention
during the World Communist Conference. His most servile move was to make a
speech in Moscow on May Day in which he all but accepted the Soviet version of
the pre-invasion situation in Czechoslovakia, (i.ea, that a counterrevolution
was imminent), and therefore, in effect, seemed to agree that the Soviet-Warsaw
Pact invasion was justified. This, all previous CSCP leaders had refused to
do. The Husak speech was promptly featured in Pravda, but this sensitive
portion was omitted in the version published for the Czechoslovak public.
Seemingly as a reward for Husak's good behavior, the Soviets quietly
suspended publication and distribution of their illegal Czech-language
newspaper Zpr.avy, hated by the Czechs as a brazen symbol of Soviet rule.
Husak may hope that the Soviets will further reward him by removing some
Soviet troops from Czech soil or possibly by granting a hard. currency loan,
which the Czech economy sorely needs in order to buy modern western equipment
and help make the Czechs competitive in world trade.
Some observers believe that the enigmatic Husak personality hides a
strong will, a sense of independence, and a fierce sense of nationalism which
make him not altogether to the Soviets' liking, But thus far, for all practical
purposes, he has shown less independence than his predecessor Alexander Dubcek,
despite extreme pressures kept to his commitment to preserve the important
freedoms of speech, assembly and press.
II. At Issue On the Eye of the World Communist Conference
Czechoslovakia has been the main cause of the considerable disarray in
the world Communist movement, and at the forefront of criticism of the Soviet
Union has been the Italian Communist Party (PCI). The PCI has been critical
both of the military intervention and of the Soviet-inspired effort to snuff
out the Dubcek-led experiment in a humanistic and progressive Communism.
Buts now that a native Czechoslovak is taking the lead in accomplishing Soviet
objectives in Czechoslovakia, the PCI has less reason to point an accusing
finger at the real culprit: the CPSU.
Nevertheless, the invasion of Czechoslovakia and its justification in
the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty gave added strength to pre-
existing centrifugal forces that now threaten to throw more fragments of
parties, if now whole CP's, out of the Soviet gravitational field. The period
between the 23 May Preparatory Commission meeting and the end of the full-
scale World Communist Conference, which starts 5 June, will witness a struggle
between the centrifugal and centripetal forces in the movement. The Soviets
will use every device their ingenuity can invent: pressure, persuasion, black-
mail, bribery, to restore their centralized authority and control. If they
do not succeed during this period in establishing some kind of international
organization (as a latter-day variation of the Comintern or Cominform), they
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are certain to continue this effort after the conference. Centrifugal forces,
foremost among them the PCI, but including also such parties as the Rumanian
and the British, will oppose this Soviet aim and will try to gain acceptance
of their principle of true autonomy for each party.
What sort of equilibrium between these two forces will emerge from the
Conference may become evident from the wording of the document that is finally
adopted by the 60-odd parties expected to attend. The critical portion will
concern the relations between parties, i.e., between the CPSU on the one hand
and individual parties on the other. Reportedly this section is causing
serious difficulty for the drafters. If the Soviets succeed in their effort,
the document should show strong emphasis on the unity of the movement and
the "duty" and "responsibility" of fraternal parties to "proletarian inter-
nationalism" with a secondary role accorded the principles of autonomy and
independence of parties. It might even include a statement suggesting or
implying the desirability of some kind of formal international organization.
If the independent-minded parties are able to persist in their views (their
ultimate weapon being a refusal to sign the final document), it should be
reflected in a corresponding dilution of the importance of unity, duties,
and responsibilities, and a strengthening of the theme of party autonomy.
III. Albania, Yugoslavia, Rumania, China --- Strange Bedmates
Ever since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Rumanians,
Yugoslavs, and Albanians have feared that the Soviets would apply the Brezhnev
Doctrine to their countries and move against them militarily. For those far
removed geographically or psychologically from the danger of Soviet invasion,
it is easy to dismiss such fears as far-fetched or even as being self-serving
propaganda, but it should be remembered that it was just such "detached"
observers who, before the Czech invasion, believed that the deviations repre-
sented by Czechoslovakia were not sufficient cause for the Soviets' taking
such drastic action.
Recently, Soviet attitudes toward Albania raised these Balkan countries'
apprehensions to a new level. The authoritative CPSU journal Kommunist (No.
5, 26 March 1969) claimed that the Chinese had established military bases in
Albania with the intention of installing missiles there. The Albanians re-
jected these accusations (as did their long-time enemies, the Yugoslavs) but
saw in them Soviet establishment of a pretext for military action against
Albania. They were especially apprehensive inasmuch as they had formally
withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact in September 1968 without subsequent Soviet
recognition or acknowledgment of this fact. (Hungarian withdrawal from the
Warsaw Pact was one main reason for the Soviet invasion of Communist Hungary
in 1956.)
The depth of Albanian concern is illustrated by the curious phenomenon
of the Albanians' offering to make common cause with their archenemies, the
Yugoslavs, in defense against a possible Soviet invasion. This position was
made clear in an editorial 11 April in the main Albanian CP paper, Zeri i
Popullit. The Yugoslavs, in turn, while suggesting that some Albanian views
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might be exaggerated, acknowledged that there was reason for concern since
the Soviet accusation was false and therefore could quite logically be
regarded as a trumped-up justification for military action. A military move
against Albania would inevitably involve Yugoslavia, which has for months
actively prepared its citizenry to resist Soviet invasion.
The Albanians at the same time asserted, less surprisingly, that their
fate is also linked to that of Rumania. Rumania has long been aware that,
because of their relative independence of, and often outright opposition to,
the Soviets, they could be the next victim of the Brezhnev Doctrine. In
addition to this common fear, the two countries are bound by their mutual
sympathy for Communist China, though for different reasons and in different
degree. The Rumanians have discreetly supported the Chinese ever since
the latter challenged Soviet claims to dictate the international Communist
line, because the Rumanians themselves aspired to just such independence.
The Albanians in their dispute with the Soviets found a willing ally in the
Chinese and have been as vituperatively anti-Soviet as the Chinese themselves.
The Chinese took until 7 May to register their view of the Albanian
offer to make common cause with Yugoslavia and Rumania. China was able to
acknowledge the logic of Albania's appeal to Rumania but unable to say a
kind word about Yugoslavia, that archetype of revisionism. So the Chinese
simply ignored the Yugpslav role.
This spectacle of tangled Communist international relations clearly has
its ludicrous aspects, but two serious lessons of import emerge. There can be
no doubt that the three deviating Communist countries -- Albania, Rumania,
and Yugoslavia -- despite important dissimilarities, feel threatened by the
Soviet Union as a result of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. And despite the
incredulity with which many may view these fears, they simply cannot be
ignored, any more than the prospect of Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia should
have been underestimated before 21 August 1968.
Secondly, the mutually independent stance of all three countries vis-A-vis
the Soviet Union is clear evidence of the potency of nationalism, even in the
Communist world. This nationalism is one more proof of the falsity of the
Communist myth, invented by Marx and enshrined by Lenin, that Communists as
the vanguard of the working class regard "proletarian. internationalism" as a
greater principle than looking after the national interest (traditionally
contemptuously referred to by the Communists as "bourgeois nationalism").
IV. Briefly Noted
A. Chinese CP Congress and National Policy
As the dust settles after the long Chinese Communist Party Congress
(1 - 28 April), it is evident that it was inconclusive. The length of the
congress, particularly the time it took to put together a new Central Committee,
is one of many tenuous indications suggesting a hard fight took place, with
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tough bargaining and pulling and tugging between two factions in the party.
On the one hand there are the moderates, pragmatists, who want to come to
practical grips with economic and diplomatic realities and whose leader is
generally thought to be Chou En-lai. On the other hand, there are the
fanatic, purist revolutionaries, to whom the Cultural Revolution and Mao
Tse-tung's ideology, bound in a little red book, are the ultimate reality
and an end in themselves. The congress and its aftermath suggest that
both factions continue to have influence on Mao and his heir, Lin Piao, who
are the final arbiters over policy proposals put forth by each faction.
It would appear that Mao sometimes decides in favor of one group and policy
and then reverses himself under the persuasions of the opposing group, so
that policies can veer wildly and change tack even from day to day. This
factional struggle may explain why the Chinese proposal last November to
resume the Warsaw talks with the U.S. (initiated by the moderates) was
abruptly cancelled the following February (by the fanatics). Factionalism,
presided over by an aging and capricious Mao, could also explain the
simultaneous pursuit of contradictory courses, for example the current
Chinese agreement to talk with the Soviets about navigation problems along
common border rivers while renewed armed clashes go on.
B. Continued Soviet Intervention in Finnish CP Affairs
In early April Soviet Politburo member Arvid Pelshe tried to mediate
the dispute between the dominant moderate faction of the Finnish Communist
Party and the Stalinist faction, which walked out of the 15th Party Congress
(3-6 April) with the intention of forming its own Communist party. On 21
April Alexey Belyakov, chief of the Scandinavian Bureau of the CPSU Central
Committee, quietly slipped into Helsinki to continue the Soviet pressure to
prevent either side from perpetrating an organizational split in the Party.
Thus far, Belyakov has been successful in that he has persuaded the two
factions to sit down together and try to find common ground. As of mid-May,
the two factions have not reached agreement and are continuing talks, not
very optimistically. Helsinki newspapers suggest that the Stalinists
themselves may split into one group that favors rejoining the regular party
as an opposition faction and another group which will go ahead and form a
separate party.
C. Lenin Centennial
The 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth falls on 22 April 1970. One
of the major items to be discussed at the World Communist Conference 5 June
will be the celebration of this centennial, which promises to take on vast
proportions. Lenin's 99th anniversary this year was marked by a dull, un-
inspired address by CPSU Secretary Ivan Kapitonov. More interestingly,
Pablo Neruda, well-known Latin American Communist, launched his own celebra-
tion in Santiago, Chile, with a flurry of newspaper features on various aspects
of Lenin's life and work. He has promised to celebrate this god of the
Communist world for the whole year.
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The month that has passed since Gustav Husak'
replaced Alexander Dubcek in the driver's 'seat in..
.Prague has been a somber one'for Czechoslovakia.
The press has been purged, put under. new leadership
and tight censorship, and reduced almost to the level
.of the worst Novotny years. Mr. Husak and his asso-
ciates have gone to great lengths to assert their
.loyalty to the Soviet Union, and to denounce the
"right-wing" forces that were allegedly behind the
trouble during the past year and a half. As a fitting-
climax to a grim month, last week's extensive series
of price increases has administered a. 'stiff dose of
THE ECONOMIST
26 April 1969
nation w ose standard o living as
hardly enviable to begin with,.
Apart from the substantial success Mr. Husak as
enjoyed in imposing normalization (Soviet style) u n
his country, Czechoslovakia's will to resist has ma k
edly deteriorated.
For the moment, evidently, the.. great mass of
;Czechoslovaks have bowed to the threat of Mosco 's'
superior force. But the ideas and aspirations of e
Prague spring in 1968 have not been forgotten, a d,
their political power, is in hibernation-not dead. e'
world knows now what'the people of CzecJtoslov iar
really want--democracy and genuine sovereignt
and the future will 'surely bring a new opportuTx, atospuxsue_ the goals now temporarilyfzustrated..3
cheer for hard-liners.
FROM OUR EAST EUROPE CORRESPONDENT
Dr Gustav Ilusak, the new Czechoslovak
party first secretary, is not interested in
buying popularity. He has already
embarked on a declared policy of
appcasini. and flattering the Russians as
the esscn tial prerequisite for the solution
of all other outstanding problems. If any-
body was in any doubt about this after
his first policy statement to the central
committee last week, these doubts must
have been rapidly dispelled by the erup-
tion of harsh promises to Moscow from
Lubomir Strougal, the conservative
Czech leader, and in the pages of Rude
Pravo, all of which ? would have been
music in the cars of Stalin. By way of
further confirmation, Russian delegations
of every conceivable shape and for every
conceivable purpose have been arriving
in Prague with the clockwork precision
of the military airlift last August.
Politicians and the press have fallen
back into the use of execrable jargon
which, stripped down to essentials,
carries the depressing message that many
of the old orthodox hard-line communists,
who have had a thin time of it since
Novotny fell, are back in command and
have not forgotten the indignities, real
or, imaginary, they suffered at the hands
of the "revisionists." The point is best
summed up by Rude Pravo : " the honest
party members found it hard to tolerate
that in the difficult days of post-,January
development they remained without aid
from higher. party bodies and left to the
Inercy of speculation and exposed to
insults." The paper then speaks of the
sobering-up process " now under way.
The loss of Mr Dubcek and %vIr
e s
ould have put up Mr Strou al
Smrkovsky as effective symbols has been --who was one of 1 ' g
h
a beau blow n he tlatio}~ y,Q~,` the
remluh s four
App" a Fk) 'r a i~Glx~u/ `, CIA-RDP79-C 1' i 4Aa?b5a9O14 OO to deliver
i y statement early this
Dubcek and Smrkovsky: tomorrow week. Or.
C:crnik, Svoboda and the rest." All ove
the country, wall slogans are bein
assiduously painted over in preparation fo
a new era. One hears whispered remarks
"I lave you seen ? The Dubcek sign
is still on the radio building" ; and stifled
sniggers at newspaper cartoons of obscure
and esoteric symbolism. A daring span
boasts that he sat on his hands during
the frenetic applause for Mr Strougzl's
" back to hhlarxism-lemnlsin " speech 'on
Monday,.. in which lie clearly endorsed
the Brezhnev policy of limited sovereignty
in the conuuunist world.
I-Ieavy;handed action against the press,
radio and television is, of course, an
essential preliminary to cwcicnt house-
cleaning. A few knights with shining type-`
writers will continue to fight a rearguard
action, but an efficient, effectively inhple-
mented censorship is hard to by-pass. The
other alternative, adopted by some of the
formerly more strident voices, is to lie
low and keep their powder dry until the
wind drops.
Matters might, it is argued, have been
worse, and one current occupation of
intellectuals is to count up the positive
aspects of life without Mr Dubcek. Dr
Husak, many insist, may prove better
able to negotiate with the Russians for an
eventual withdrawal of troops. He has
more drive, energy, greater physical
stamina and powers of persuasion than
his predecessor. There is also a tenuous
hope that Dr Husak will keep a firm
control of the ultra-conservatives who
could put the clock right back to the
19.50s. If this were the case, it is curious
h
t
at h
h
 CPYRGHT
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Police staged defiant demonstra- rem Pilsen indicated that the Arrcricatt .Digs were detain
lions in Pilsen last night, 24 F-rticipants were mostly st
1 and had their flags confiscate
dents and workers venting their Elsewhere in 'tile city, abo t:
years 'after, United States forces displeasure at the government's 1,500 liberated Gr? city from Nazi Ger_ persons staged a
rencwetf pro=Soviet policies and' stration at a' bus crossindemoR -
many' its attempts to minimize the role y
ports said they placed America
`
llepot?ta from the city in w' ?stk of the Western Allies jr, World flags and portraits of the la k
ern Bohemia said nearly 40O pow` Jar I1. Tomas Afasaryk. first preside t
lice and two water cannons were, The' turbulent' evening began of Czechoslovakia, and the for.'
needed to quell three separate. with an official ceremony mark- mer Foreign Minister, Jan M
demonstrations. Forty-five; Ing the 19.15 uprising against the saryk, at the remains of a t
demonstrators were arrested, Germans in the fhial days of the Army memorial. The mem5ri
and ' three policemen were in, 'European war.. Flags of the was dismantled during the St '
Jured, Czechoslovak informants, Soviet Union, Britain and the linist era.
said. United States were raised at the` Participants stoned police, an
In Prague, the, Communist memorial to the national resist- residents hurled flower pots a
party newspaper *Rude Pravo ance' , movement in peace ' 4heni from apartment house tvi
blamed the disturbance on Square, and wreaths were laid? dows amid whistles and Jeer*
"'criminal elements" fomenting Five persons who reportedly 'reports said. After some scut"
11, anti?state act.iohs." Accounts tried to participate in the' core- ;fling, officers cordoned off Lh i
,many . carrying British and ;area.. , .,., a
CP 7 `'Ij~N'FON POST
11
72.25 Arrests '
Reported
B,%,- cze, Its
PRAGUE, May 3 (UPI)--Po-'
lice arrested 1225 persons in'
Moravia and Bohemia cavlier
this week in what was seen as
a drive to round up possible:
troublemakers.
The Czechoslovak news'
agency CTK said today that'
police booked 524 persons ands
detained 141 of them on crin~i~
nal charges, "mostly violen to.
and theft."
"Quantities of sto'en goods
were reco-; cred, Including 2'
motor vehicles. 10 firearm]
building materials and cith r
goods," the report said.
Last Wednesday, lnterl r
Minister Josef Grocsser sal4
officials in southern Moravl!a
had uncovered "an illegal core
spiratory organization" ctea
Ing weapons allegedly for usb
against Soviet occupatto
troops.
The plotters had "a politic 'l
program and relations It i
,military circles," Groe se
said, adding that "in the en
future it will be possible t
start prosecution.
Grocsser - said . weapon
thefts had 'increased In tb
1t1it'four.or,five months.-
Approved
NEW YORK TIMES
10 . ro M0's(Ccvj Czechs
Absolved of Treachery'
By ALVIN SHUSTER
6pedal to The New York T1mes
PRAGUE, April 16-The Executive Committee of the
ruling Communist party's Presidium today sought to reha-
bilitate in the. eyes of the people a group of conservatives.
'Inc group included men said
to have been selected by Mos-
sow to form a new govern
ment in Czechoslovakia at the
time of the Soviet-led inva.
sion by Warsaw Pact. forces
last August.
On the eve of a crucial ses-
sion of the party's Central
Committee, the eight-man Ex-
ecutive Committee said the "ac-
cusations of treachery and col-
laboration" leveled at the 10
conservatives were unfounded.
It declared that the men had
been slandered on the basis
of unfounded information and
fabrications.
Among those described as
"honorable ' comrades" were
Vasil Bilak, now a member of
the Presidium; Drahomir Koldcr,
a member of the Central Com-I
mittee, and Alois Indra, a sec-
retary of the Central Committee.
Interpretations Vary
It was this group that many
,Czechoslovaks believe was.
picked by the Soviet Union to
assume the leadership at the
time of the invasion. Since then,
their names have been anath-
ema. to Czechoslovaks.
The decision by the Central
Committee was interpreted va-
riously by observers as either a
prelude to the assumption of
new powers by members of this
pro-Moscow faction, or as part
of an arrangement with the
Soviet Union to save liberals
facing possible demotion at the(
session opening tomorrow.
It also cleared the way for a
similar statement from the full
187-member Central Committee.
It has been expected that the
Central Committee will reassert
tight ideological controls and
perhaps determine the political
fate of leading liberals. But the
decision, c-idently taken under
Soviet pressure, came as a sur-
prise to Czechoslovaks.
In its statement, the Execu-
tive Committee said it had de-1
tided to clear the men of tht'
charges against them in the in-
terests of party unity nd in an
effort "to consolidate condi-
tions" in Czechoslovakia.
For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0
 px del r ReleaseO Jflolc P79-O'b~b9 AfltO5449 1s O
ees Gof ' mm~ttce.
r c ll. b ration, it said, b2' t ates)
"were spread aniong the popu- "Among part of the publir could be confirmed.'
"It was not correct that the
"
the Ecxccu-
lation in various ways without and in the party,
anyone setking proof or a fac-
tual and founded justification."
Besides Messrs. Bilak, Kolder
and Indra, the Executive Com-
mittce named the followin?-
Frantisek Barbirek, ht . Slo-
vak Minister of Trade; Jan Pil-
]er, a member of the Presi-
dium; Emil Rigo; Oldrich Svcs
tka, editor of the Communist
party journal Tribuna; Milos
Jakes, chairman of the party's
Central Control and Auditing
Commission; Jozef Ltnart, a
former Premier; and Antonin
Kapek. Both Mr. Lenart and Mr
Kapek ac alternate members
of the party's Presidium.
6 May 1969
;f 7-d tj
party and civic honor of a num-
ber of honest comrades, de-
voted to the party, was allowed
to he tarnished in such a
fashion. It is important that in
the future no accusation should
be overlooked, that proof
!should be demanded from any -
'one who, comes forward with
an accusation and those who
commit untruthful ? slanders
should be dealt with according
to the law.
"The basic criteria for judg-
ing the qualities of publicly ac-
tive persons are socialist
awareness, fidelity to socialist
internationalism and the ability
to apply the ideas of socialism,
responsibly in practice.
"rii;htwing opportunists" and The Ministry statement said'
,
of Commu=
new majority
th
,
e
anti-Communist elements, was,
reported obliquely in the f nists (the newly restored con';
press yesterday in ah ' an?I servatives) had condemned the'
nouucement that the Commu "expression of antl?Soviet na
te- tionalism and chauvinism"
I
'
n
ns of the
nist Party
orga nor Ministry had elected "new that had been heard among
se members of the Ministry and
" i
n a
ty bodies
leading Par
heretofore un were still to be heard, al-
t
a
t ballot a
cre?.? disclosed meeting, on May 12 ;though their voices were
and 13. "dying out."
d by the = A tough-line member of the
e
= a Committee said, "there still.
exists a lack of confidence in-
the comrades accused of col-IL
laboration and treachery."
It noted that there has been
an "organized and spontaneous',
condemnation" of the men and;
in the "lower party -bodies',
many functionaries of the party
and state were unjustly brand
ed and in some cases were ex-`;
posed to terror."
"The Executive Committee'
has discussed the state of of-'
fairs," it went on, "and re-
gards it as its duty to state
publicly that it has no factual,
proof on the basis of which ac-
cusations of alleged treachery
of some sort of collaboration
A statement ssu
Lubomlr
T inistry said that the Commu Party Presidium,
dJ, li nists there had sternly criti-' Strougal, who, was Interior
cized the former Minister, Minister during the former
for Stalinist dictatorship and is
ive
Tosef Pavel, a Progress
-
, Lax An
convinced Chairman Mao that he could try, a loss of three years of education for.
"remold the majority into new men." He' 'the country's youth and the planting of,
believed that subjective will could be, 'savage rivalries deep in China's fabric. It
turned into objective force. With some-.? .cost Chairman Mao whatever faith, the.,
thing like 500,000,000 backward, supersti- intellectuals had in.him:
tious peasants living barely above sub-', Still the more difficult task was the'
sistence in a tired land, China profited by ; rebuilding' of the party, for nothing clsa
a Mao preaching the impossible. 'has been able to run China's 700,000,000?
Chairman Mao's techniques worked un-; people. The rebuilding has to. be done-
til the "great leap forward" when his from the top. The congress was the be
enthusiasm for instant communism ginning of that process, but it is being'
plunged China Into economic despair. done in Chairman Mao's way. This will
Near famine was averted by the bureau- not be easy, for the congress showed it.
crats who turned to pragmatic, rational ; could agree on honoring its old leader but
policies to pull China slowly back togeth- nothing else.
er. Chairman Mao never admitted his It said nothing about education, 'agri
error but fought back to wipe out exactly culture, health or industry. For its Polite
what he feared would ruin his purist. buro, it could not even agree on a peck.
dreams. Ing order below Chairman Mao and Mr..
Peasants were thriving with their ari-:; Lin. Prescribing more and more Mao-
vate plots, private pigs and private mar-, study, it seemed as if , the 75-year-old
-ets. Workers were getting incentive pay' leader had decided to start all over again
ather than laboring for the ideological' to convince the country of the righteoug,
glory. The party was full of experts and ness of his ways:
onagers, drifting from. Chairman Mao's Time, it seems,, has caught up with a'
idealized contact withthe masses. Chair- figure as heroic as Chairman Mao hasp
an Mao never saw nor wanted to see. ben for his China. His ideas are essen-
at China was tially rooted in the past. He talks of
progressing, just. as he,, modernization, but he opposes just' what
ever cared to see Russian progress. All. China needs: the experts to run a moderrf
e could see was his egalitarian vision- .economy. Chairman Mao's ideal of politi
Bing destroyed by his old comrades in .tally loyal workers who think and intel-
rms. lectuals who work just is not goo
arty defeated ". enough. Undoubtedly, Chairman Mao was
told this behind the closed doors of the
By 1962, he was-striking back. Whatth? ninth congress. From what was said;'
utside world saw as a conflict between- publicly, he is not convinced. ?4
deologues and pragmatists was the be. Communist China therefore faces an
?.g of Chairman Mao's Second revo- uncertain unstable future. Chairmani'
ution. By 1966, Chairman Mao alone Mao's heirs today are a group of un?;
'
inexperienced, unsophisticated
arefully ripped otf the head of the party known,
thih
M
A
d
Mao
.A.
n
ti fs too la,e to have a
e had built and slashed at its innards,
third
sing Red Guard students and his mass' Ufa?Lt revolution.
echniques of re ellion.
pproved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP
00001-0
9-01,04#0 ",ftffl
lli O HEIR `ACIi G
C P~
9-0
`open Opposition To Lin
Found 'At' Red Parley
By PETER J. H MPA
[Hong Kong Sureau of The Sun)
Hong Kong, April 26-Marsha
Lin Piao, China's defense minis-
ter and officially designated heir
to the Communist party Chair-
man, Mao Tse-turn, appears to
,be in political trouble.
Though the just-ended Ninth
National Communist Party Con-
gress was the peak of achieve-
ment of a long military and
political career, it also' was the
scene of reported open opposi
tion to Mr. Lin.
Position Raised 3 Years Ago
A hew party constitution was
adopted expressly naming Mars-
nal Lin as Chairman Mao's suc-
cessor. The mobs was only con.
:firmation of the Lin elevation,
for he had been raised to No. 2
'in the Communist hierarchy
nearly 3 years ago with the fall
of former President Liu Shau-
chi.
Diplomatic sources in Peking,
however, reported rumors of
strenuous disagrcee7lent with
the constitutional provision. Ac-
'cording to these reports, the de-
bate was one reason for the
length of the congress: 24 days
in close secrecy.
Poor Health Record
Delegates were said to br
questioning why Marshal Lir.
had to be named in the cons titu?
tion, a step never taken before
They were said to have askec
what would happen to the sun,
cession proble if Marshal Lir
died before Mr. Mao. Thougl
Marshal Lin is 13 years junior tc
Chairman Mao, he has a record
of poor health, probably arising-
out of old war wounds that rd-1
qui:?ed years of hospitalization in
the Soviet Union.
-Never confirmed is Marshal
Lin's reputed tubercular condi
tion. Whatever his ailment, it is
true that he has had to take long
rest periods.
Pictures from t~ congress
also show a thin and tired look-
ing Marashal Lin standing be-
1i9ti4A00~rd80U t0e11abr8,~-
 CPYRGHT
Approved For Rf
the conference, In Peking ra-
funed to s,.:I:nowlcdge that
large ereas c' China had been
appropriated by Imperial Russ
sia In the iatli century under
"uncrlual treaties."
Alter tat. torsi=3 along
the border built up, finally,
exploding In March ? w h o n
Chinese aitd Russian frontier
guards hlashecl in two major
skirmisiies on an isiand,ln the
lissuri 1River. About 50 Soviet
troops and an unknown num-
ber of Chiueso hvere killed..
Agninst this background of
conflict, it seems dubious that,
the Chines and Soviet repro-~
seritatives scheduled to attend
the navigation meeting In
Khabarovsk will be .able to:
conciliate their, differences!
easily.
1951 ShIpphar, Treaty
If. It is field, the rn,".ting,
will be th,, 35th session of thel
wine?Soviet co?omissioh since
the group was created under a1
1851 treaty designed to regu-l
Into shipping along the. bound.
daryrivors. ;,
In 18513, the Chinese and So-
viet governments signed a new
agreement aimed at simplify-
ing the rules goverhiing mer-
chant shipping on the rivers
and lakes. Arnong its other
provisions, this agreements
guaraotrteed the exchange. of.
port facilities by the two sig-
natories.
After tlrelr dispute.: with'
Moscow 2iad worsened In:' 1906,
the ('hlnesc? instigated a fresh'
not of rnlc:t intended, aceord?
Jng to Peking, to "protect tire;
sovereignty" of Ch.iita. y'liese
rules virtually wrapped any,
efforts at joint. , navigation
rights, and ubjiseted Soviet,
and other 0migil' vc's>5?vl '.to
harsh restrlel.ionia:
lease 2000/08/29 : CIAl' ay t9qtA000500100001-0
CPYRGHT
SOVIET AND CSI N .
ARE SAID TO CLASHi
Fighting on Central Asian
Border Is Reported
MOSCOW, May 10 (UPI)-`
Well informed sources said to.
day that Soviet and Chinese
troops clashed in "serious bor-
der incidents" in Central Asia
several times this week.
They said these incidents oc-
curred on the border separating
Soviet Kazakhstan and China's
Sinkiang region. Both sides
suffered casualties, tr ese
sources said.
There was no official confir-
mation of the incidents. The
Soviet Union is conducting mil
itary maneuvers along the Si-
berian and Far Eastern
stretches of its border with
China.
At least 50 Russian troops'
were killed in border incidents:
..on the Ussuri River in the Far
East on March 2 and March 15.
Sources said the border in
Central Asia has been "very.
tense" for scevral ? weeks.
There were persistent reports
that the border situation be-.
tween Sinkiang and Kazakstan
has been tense. .since' thb early
stages of :the Chinese-Soviet
,dispute.
Pravda, the. Communist party
newspaperY :.recently disclosed
that more than 200 persons
weer killed when; they tried to
cross from China to the Soviet
Union in::'May, 1962.
First Ship This Year
MOSCOW May 10 (Reuters)
-a Soviet ship has started up
the Ussuri' River on a voyage
that will take it near the scene
Of border clashes between China
dlid the Soviet Union in March.
A' Moscow radio correspond-
ent in Khabarovsk reported
that the Ship had set out from
there on the first voyage of
the year up the border river.
The ship is heading for Iman,
the nearest large town to the
scene of the clashes. . .
The River was frozen and i
covered with ::now at the time)
of the border battles in March.
It was reported clear of ice at
the end of April.
The latest account from the
area, reported in the '. news
paper 'Sovietskaya 'Rossiya on
May 1, said the:.Chiriesc had
stopped sporadic shelling and
were contenting. themselves
with shouting insults through
bullhorns.
Approved For Release 2000/08/19: 444 4 A'
00001-0
 CF~Yf~ghT SANOMAT, Helsinki
3 Rele se 2000/QOA?AI 1 pTg 11 Q00500100001-0
FEVER SH MEDIATION IN THE FINNISH COMMUNIST PARTY QUARREL
CPYRGHT
e communes party o the ovie union is mediating the Internaa
disputes of the F nnish Communist Party. Aleksey Belyakov, the chief of the
Scandinavian on of the CPSU, has been leading the negotiations with
representatives of the different camps of the FCP since last Monday. He
has recommended to chairman Aarne Saarinen, former Secretary General Ville
Pessi, and one of the opposition leaders, Taisto Sinisalo - who have visited
the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki -;the arranging of an extraordinary FCP
party congress. The Extraordinary congress would renew the central committee
of the FCP in such a way that.. the internal opposition would abandon its
plans to found a new communist party, he has suggested. Belyakov, who landed
in Helsinki on Monday unnoticed, is accompanied by Pravda's writer Stefan
Smirnov - signature "Observer" - and by World Peace Council Secretary Nikolay
Voshinin.
Aarne Saarinen was immediately called to the Soviet Embassy, where the
CPSU representatives are staying, and where he heard the greetings of the CPSU
leadership. The previously presented demand of the CPSU, that a split of the
opposition's plans to.found a new communist party but also the demands of the
supporters of the party's present policy for a party purge. were condemned.
As far as is known, the big district organization meeting of next weekend
arranged by those who walked out of the 15th Party Congress of the FCP was
merely touched on at the meeting; the CPSU representatived did not demand .a
cancellation of the meeting.
Ville Pessi, formerly Secretary General and presently secretary for
International Affairs pf the FCP, arrived at the Soviet Embassy on Tuesday
!at noon-time. The CPSU representatives announced that they trust him in a
,mediating role. It was noted in the disscussions that the internal situation
in the FCP has led to a blind'alley. One can get out of this dilemma only by
the friendly assistance of fraternal parties and by the different FCP camps
desire for reconciliation. Belyakov, who before and during the FCP congress
tried to bring the FCP's ranks into order, suggested as a possibility that
the central committee call together an extraordinary party congress.
A compromise proposal, according to which opposition representatives
would also be elected to the central committee, would be prepared and
accepted by the party's membership before the extraordinary congress.
According to the FCP's by-laws,. an extraordinary congress can be con-
voked in two weeks. The delegates of the ordinary congress would be
.delegates to the extraordinary congress too; in this case, it would be the
same delegates as those-who were at the 15th party congress during Easter
holidays.
One obstacle,however, is the fact that the FCP's by-laws prescribe that
the central committee is elected by a regular party congress. Party
organization technicians, however, have discovered a way around this: The
by-laws say nothing about long the mandate of the central committee is. The
by-laws say that "the mandate of the central.committee lasts until a new
central coFommittee's members could be persuaded to abandon their seats volunta-
A~Yihsrtpsii"bi=0i~ffe'rplos-sibil7Ey wo J" beYgo-c~iange the pes of
arty's
 CPYRGHT
MPPI
by-laws by a two-thirds majority and then to elect a new leadership. This
procedure would, however, take three months.
Sinisalo is planned as the leader of a new party
Some members of the FCP leadership and certain opposition circles are,
however, doubtful about holding an extraordinary party congress. It is
assumed that the majority is sharply against compromise proposals. The
communists, on the other hand, are waiting for the results of the Stalinist
meeting. The Stalinist group which meets on Saturday in Helsinki and on
Sunday in Uusimaa might even decide to found a new communist party. Strong
groups in the FCP's district organizations of Turku, Uusimaa, Kymenlaakso,
south Karelia, Lahti,~and Kuopio are leaning in this direction. Smaller
groups have been gathered to support this effort from other district organiz-
ations as well; the pensioners in particular have been a welcome power reserv
for the FCP opposition in the struggle for power.
However, it is surmised within the FCP that the opposition will not, at
least at this stage, found a new party. It is assumed that the opposition
will stake everything on one card: All or nothing.
The opposition has prepared a "Shadow" program. Adoption of this pro-
gram would probably lead to the dismissal of some of the opposition leaders
from their posts. In such a case, it would be easier to explain the founding
of a new party to the membership and the fraternal parties.
The opposition group also contains some extreme elements who are of
the opinion that the founding of a new communist party cannot be avoided. It
has even been planned in some district, organizations that Taisto Sinisalo
would become the chairman of the new party. Among the names suggested for
the new party are "Finnish communist workers party" or "Finnish workers'
communist party."
The Opposition Rejected a Proposal on Reconciliation
About 2,000 communists from all over the country have been mobilized for
the meeting of the opposition on Sunday. Bus-loads of people will come from
districts which are loyal to the party leadership. E.G. a bus-load of
pensioners from northern Finland will come to Helsinki to approve the resol-
utions of the opposition meeting and to become acquainted with Helsinki at
the same time.
Only dyed-in-the-wool Stalinists have received an invitation to the
opposition's meeting. Access to the meeting for persons who support the
party's line has been sharply refused.
Negotiations about a reconciliation between the different camps of the
FCP are being held today. Representatives of the party leadership and the
opposition are meeting in Helsinki. They will deal with a conciliatory
proposal presented by the official party leadership; the proposal has been
rejected by the opposition. The opposition is expected to present its own
demands today.
-0
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2
 Ed W i i t !r .Q~0~L:Me d lRP,P MO fli3 M
CPYRGHT
Positions in Opposition Districts
ooe0001-0
The information that some of the districts in which the Opposition is
in. control have softened their position and are ready to negotiate comes as
a surprise if we recall the demand made in the Opposition congress that it be
recognized as a faction and that negotiations be held with a 95-member
committee of its own choosing. Thus it now seems that the Opposition is not,
after all, standing "as solid as granite" as it vowed as late as a couple
weeks ago. Thus it seems to be a matter of the regular party leadership,
which was stymied on party regulations, winning the opening round on the
procedural matter.
If certain Opposition districts have in fact softened their position, it
means the strengthening of the "third line" on the example of the Tampere
District. The decisive, behind-the-scenes factor in this kind of change is
the negative attitude of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) con-
cerning the establishment of a second Finnish Communist party.
Nevertheless, it is not a matter of the whole Opposition going tame. One
sign of this is the fact that the Opposition is establishing parallel organiza-
tions in districts that are under the control of the regular party leadership.
This means that the Opposition itself is breaking up into two parts: "a third
line," whose idea is to stay within the regular party, and the "irreconcilables"
who are driving toward the establishment of their own party. Or else the
party is sitting on two stools: in opening the door to reconciliation just
a crack, they are not closing the door that leads to a party split.
In undertaking to negotiate district by district, the Opposition stays
within the bounds of party regulations and in that way saves its face before
the CPSU. At the same time, it saves its face in its own eyes in that
negotiators in the districts can at the same time be members of the afore-
mentioned negotiating committee of the Opposition as a whole. If no agreement
is reached in the negotiations, the Opposition can still claim to have followed
party regulations, but at the same time it will have a ready-made party
organization.
ppositioplirien asenne
Jos eraat oppositiopiirit oust to. lohkeamassa kahteen osaan, puo-
Tiedat ainakin erai~ien Skp:n lueen sisalla pysymiscen tahtaa-
oppositio iirien Bella lieventaneet asenteitaaxt,
p pehmenneista vaan "kolmantcen linjaan" ja
asenteista ja neuvotteluvalmiu. morkitsee se Tampereen piirin esl- Oman puolueen perustamiseea pyr=
desta ovate yl19tt9via, jos palau.te- merkin mukaisen "kolmannen, lin- kiviin "leppymti.ttomiin". Tai sitten
taan mieleen opposition suurko- jan" vahvistumista nilssa. T511al- oppositio istuu kahdella tuolilla:
kouksen vaatimus sen tunnusta- son muutoksen taustatekij5n9 on raotettaessa sovinnon ovea ei puo-
misesta ryhmakunnaksl ja ncu- ratkaisevalta osatta pidettava Neu- luehadaannuksen ovea sulieta.
vottelujen kaymisesta sen asetta- vostoliiton kommunistisen puo- Ryhtyessaan neuvottelemaan pii-
man 95-jasonisen neuvottelukun- luccn kieltcista kantaa toisen suo- reittaln oppositio pysyy puolue-
nan kanssa. Nyt naytt5a sits silts, malalsen kommunistisen puolueen saantojen puitteissa ja siin5 mie-
ettel oppositio seisokaan "jyrlcka- perustamista kohtaan. lessa s9lyttaa kasvonsa Nkp:n
na kuin Kyseessa ei kuitenkaan ole koko
graniitti" ainakaan tassa edessii. Lisaksi se saattaa sailyt-
suhteessa, kuten sen taholta vlela opposition kesyyntyminen. Siihen taa kasvonsa myos omissa silmis-
pars viilckoa sitten vannottiin. Pa. viittaa jo opposition toimesta tear- satin, sills piirien neuvottelijat
remminkin an kysymys. puolue- joitettava rinnakkaisorganisaatiot- voivat 011a myos em. opposition
saantoihin tukeutuneen puolue- den perustaminen puoluejohdon neuvottelukunnan jasenia. Jos
johdon alkueravoltosta menettely- haliussa oleviin plireihin. Tama ncuvoi touon ar.atn ~ku:ac k n ntnou-
tzpakysymyksessa. merkitsee sits, etta oppositio on nrtL;,. as puoluecn saanLuJa Ja .r a
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 -CL ERQP79-01194A000500100001-0
69/6-2
UNDIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION. OF EAST GERMANY
1. May 1969 can be. entered on political calendars as the month during
which East Germany's Walter Ulbricht thought the pendulum was swinging his
way. Official diplomatic recognition granted East-Germany by three non-
Communist governments -- Iraq, Cambodia and the Sudan -- has given Ulbricht
the entree he thinks he needs to gain broad acceptance of the concept of
"GDR sovereignty" in: time to. celebrate his regime's 20th anniversary in
October of this year.
2. Our aim is to get our assets and mass media tapped into a concerted
propaganda effort to clarify for Third World audiences, and to remind Third
World leaders about, the oft-repeated but apparently forgotten fact-of-life
concerning Germany and the underlying reason why the pendulum does not swing
in Ulbricht's favor: "East Germany" is a temporary, artificial structure
whose survival depends mainly on the continuing presence of 20 Soviet Army
divisions and, further, that diplomatic recognition of this government does
entail a choice between East and West. Third World leaders, even the more
radical ones, might well be reluctant to undertake action that would antago-
nize Bonn, which in both short and long-range-terms offers greater economic
advantages than does Pankow.
3. To accomplish our aim, the following themes are among many which
could be embellished in terms of local conditions. Support material from
which to draw is found in the attached unclassified backgrounder and samp-
ling of current newspaper clips.
a. Iraqi, Cambodian and Sudanese diplomatic accords with
East Germany represent acts based on emotion, not logic, and
were payoffs for services rendered. They were also clearly the
result of heavy Soviet pressures.
b. Ulbricht gratuitously buttressed the case for non-
recognition by his ostentatious May Day military parades and
boast of "20 years of socialist military policy."
c. The paucity of what East Germany can offer the Third
World in terms of trade and aid, particularly in comparison with
what West Germany. offers, should not be ignored.
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?rTnT? TT (TTT V June 1969
As a May Day rememberance for 1969, Walter Ulbricht's East German
regime was rewarded with a long sought-after prize: cognizance by some
non-Communist states of the German Democratic Republic's official exist-
ence. Plans to grant diplomatic recognition to East Germany were
announced on 30 April by the Government of Iraq and, eight days later,
by the Government of Cambodia. At his first press conference held after
the 25 May military coup which brought him to power, Sudan's new Premier
Awadallah announced his government's intention to emulate Iraq.
Ulbricht has long been convinced that just one non-Communist commit-
ment would start a chain reaction throughout the Arab, African., and Asian
worlds inspiring country after country to scramble onto a bandwagon
labeled "GDR sovereignty." The East German regime already is recognized
in all but name by many Third World countries through reciprocal trade
missions or full-blown consulates. Now it is Ulbricht's ambition that
these relationships be dignified by the highest sounding title in time
for the East German 20th anniversary celebrations in October 1969 and
presumably he believes that recognition thrice in a month will give his
scheme the impetus it badly needs. Stepped up efforts to gain official
status throughout the Third World can be expected within the next few
weeks despite two great stumbling blocks, one military and the other
economic, both of which portend a miscarriage of Ulbricht's ambition.
May Day Rememberances
The Iraqi, Cambodian, and Sudanese diplomatic acceptances of East
Germany are matters of vested interest -- born not out of respect for
"GDR sovereignty" but out of need to pay for past and probably promised
future East German support on ticklish national or international issues.
Of at least equal importance is the intense pressure the Soviet Union
has exerted on these countries on behalf of East Germany, the leverage
for which comes from years of intense cultivation and considerable economic
and military aid programs. Iraq, for instance, received advanced-type
Soviet MIG fighters well before Egypt. Moscow certainly has a very active
interest in securing legitimization outside of the Communist Bloc for the
"state" it created in East Germany.
East German backing for almost every Arab cause sometimes exceeds
even Moscow's pro-Arab endorsements -- particularly with regard to the
Palestinian Arabs. The Iraqis specifically cited East German "support
for the Palestinian peoples' just struggle to liberate their usurped
homelands" as a reason for bestowing diplomatic recognition. On 23 April
the East German Foreign Ministry issued a statement supporting Iraq in
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its border dispute with Iran (over Shatt-al-Arab), something the USSR
has failed to do, and described Iran's actions as "imperialist provoca-
tions." Iraqi gratitude was reflected in Radio Baghdad's statement
that,East Germany's "noble attitude toward our national issues" was
just another reason for extending recognition..
Cambodia's diplomatic obeisance is another sign of extreme national
sensitivity about the lack of world acknowledgment of Cambodian borders.
Statements issued in both Pankow and Phnom Penh suggest that the new
diplomatic ties are a belated reward to East Germany for her long-
standing recognition of the border delineations most acceptable to
Cambodia.
On 5 May, Sheikh Ali Abdel Rahman, Sudan's leftist Foreign Minister
and Deputy Premier, held a press conference at which he said he had
recommended to the Sudanese Cabinet that Sudan follow in Iraq's footsteps
in recognizing the German Democratic Republic because it was a "friendly
country with honorable attitudes toward Arab causes." At that time, the
suggestion was intepreted as designed to counteract a movement in the
Sudanese Constituent Assembly to reestablish relations with West Germany
and the U.S.A. However, the 25 May military coup which overthrew President
Ismail el Azhari also thrust radicalism into a much more powerful position
in Sudan. The new Prime Minister Babiker Awadalla held his first press
conference two days later and announced that his government's first act
of foreign policy would be to recognize East Germany because of "the
East Berlin regime's opposition to Israel."
A May Day Blunder
While Moscow and all the other members of the Warsaw Pact this year
eschewed their annual spring show of military prowess, Walter Ulbricht
celebrated the day with loud and, enthusiastic saber-rattling throughout
East Germany. Speeches by military leaders and four parades featuring
missiles, tanks, and heavy artillery marked May Day in East Berlin as
dedicated to "20 years of socialist military policy." This is the facet
of Walter Ulbricht that must be understood by anyone toying with the
acceptance of "GDR sovereignty': he remains the ever-ready hangman and
executor for the Warsaw Pact, for the Brezhnev Doctrine -- the true
"Stalinist" of Central Europe.
May Day 1969 in East Berlin rekindled mew-cries of 21 August 1968
when Ulbricht's troops, mercenaries of the Soviet Union, were among
those forces that moved into and occupied the sovereign state of
Czechoslovakia. Warsaw Pact utilization of German troops, permitting
them to march into a neighboring country, above all one previously
occupied by Nazi Germany, was a flagrant violation of the Potsdam Agree-
ment. Even the USSR, in August 1968, soon saw the grave error of
sanctioning GDR military presence in occupied Czechoslovakia: all the
wind went out of Soviet propaganda which was trying to portray the West
Germans as the "aggressors plotting invasion."
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Perhaps Ulbricht relies on man's short-lived memory of painful
incidents to help him over this "military " stumbling block of his own
making?
The False Image
The economic stumbling block, also of Ulbricht's personal making
since it is the system he imposes which causes the troubles, is equally
insurmountable. Facts belie the image of an attractive trading partner
which Ulbricht promotes throughout the Third World. However anxious East
Germany may be to win political support, the fact remains that this
regime has little to offer in economic terms to the Third World, particularly
in comparison with West Germany. Jeune Afrique (Paris, 31 March - 6 April
1969) gives details of exports from Western countries to the Near East
during 1967, showing that after the United States and Britain, West Germany
was the third leading supplier of these countries, with almost twice as
much, by value, as Italy and more than twice as much as France.
West Germany was the second largest exporter to Iraq and also to the
UAR (the value,was U.S. $54,800,000) despite the break in diplomatic
relations with West Germany by both countries in 1965. By contrast, the
East German-UAR trade protocol for 1969, which represents an increase of
25 percent over 1968, allows for a total-volume of exchanges of only
about U.S. $8,500,000.
Le Moniteur Africain (Dakar, 3 April 1969) describes the recent
growth of West German trade with African countries. Statistics given
indicate the African continent as a whole has a very healthy balance of
trade with West Germany -- a positive factor for Africa. Overall, 7.52
percent of West German imports come from Africa and that continent in
turn absorbs 4.62 percent of West German exports.
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3
 CPYtGHT
CPYR HT
F
i lV6c ':r Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0
Y 1969
East Germans, Alone in Soviet Bloc
Sprcf.l to The New York TIme.
BERLIN, May 1-Commu-
.nists and Socialists of all shades
'marked May Day in this divided
'city, today with four parades,
including a military show of
power in East Berlin.
East Germany was the only
Soviet-bloc country this year
to parade its, forces to 'under-
line its military strength. A
speaker at the parade on Marx-
'.Engcls-Platz in East Berlin
,noted that East Germany had
conducted "20 cars of socialist
military policy.'
The three Western allied
commandants condemned the
display as a violation of the
city's four-power status and
held the. Soviet Union re-
sponsible for. permitting East
German military personnel to
take part in the - May Day
celebrations.
"The militaristic nature', of
the celebration was accentu
LE MONDE
10 May 1969
Pout-fl appliquer la doctrine fit meme allusion & la possibilito de is reviewin its mea re stock of counter-
no
uvec !-inrome so seIGOMM9,~-GM-RDP79-044S4A 5004 WaQ1n&cctivc for
enh c' so fa~artse~200Oq/O8 9' $A-RDP79-UilI94A07 Q5OO31 1OOQ1n&cctive for
dealing with Baghdad's fait accompli, The
Bonn, 9 mai.. - A la diffe-
rence do 1'Irak, dons la d6ci-
'ion do reconnaitre la R6publi-
quo democratique allemande
avail ate annonceo a la fin do
la semaine derniore, lo cas du
Cambodge, qui a pris 'une dyci-
sion identique, pose a Bonn
uno question do principe.
L'Irak, on offot, n'ontretenait plus
do relations diplomatiquos avec Ia.
Republique f6d6rale depuis Ia crises
ongendreo on 1965 par la decision
du gouvernoment Erhard do recon.
naitre 1'Etat d'Israiil. La famouse
doctrine Hallstein -, qui posait en
principe, dopuis 1955, 1'impossibilite
pour Bonn d'entretenir des relations
diplomatiquos avoc un Etat ayant un i
ambassadour a Borlin- Est, n'dtait
donc pas on cause.
La question se pose, on revanche,
pour lo Cambodgo, ou la Rypubliquo
f6d6rale entrotiont une ambassad.e
depuis is 15 novembre 1967 et oil
un nouvel ambassadeur, M. ]iirgen
Eick, anion porte-parole adjoint de
M. Willy Brandt, venait precisement
do rojoindro son posts le 1?' avail
Appeal by the Mayor
Across the wall on West Ber-
lin's Square of the Republic,
.Mayor Klaus Schiltz called onl
the Soviet Union, and East
,Germany to enter 'into an
earnest dialojue with the West
about the. city s future.
"Let us get away from the
'cramped immobility of the past
and strive. for peaceful co.
existence," he said.: ?
He spoke to a ? crowd . of
ated by the equipment on dis-
play, which included - missiles,
tanks and artillery pieces,t' the
commandants charged.
The 30-minute parade was
led by cadets from military
academics who marched past
a grandstand to salute Walter
Ulbricht, the East German lead-
er; Marshal Pyotr K. Koshevoi,
the commander of Soviet forces
in East Germany, and other
Alllemagne ' de I Ouest
La reconnaissance de Berlin-Est par le Cambodge
pose le problerne de Ia validite
de Ia < doctrine Hallstein >
(De nitre correspond7,.;pcarticulier.) fait en 1957 avec la Yougoslavie et
en 1963 avec Cuba ? Depuis, Ia
< doctrine . - a subi une premiere
entorse, puisque Bonn, apres 1'arri-
vae- au pouvoir du gouvornemont
do grande coalition Kissinger-Brandt,
a admix 1a possibility d'avoir des
ambassades dons des pays do d6.
mocratio populaire ou Berlin-Est 6tait
deja represents. Ce fut le cas, par
exemple, pour la Roumanie, avec
laquello des relations diplomatiquos
ont 6t6 nou6es en janvior 1967. Dons
Ia fouled, Bonn roprit en 1968 sea
relations avoc Belgrade.
Renoncer a rompre avec Phnom-
Penh perait porter un nouveau coup
a Ia doctrine Hallstein . et inci-
terait do nombreux pays d'Afrique
et dAsie a suivre 1'exemple du
prince Sihanouk.
Copendant, M. Strauss, president
de 1'aile bavaroise de l'union chre-
tienno-d6mocrate, n'a pas hysits,
jeudi, a Bonn, au tours dune r6cop-
tion, a prendre position contro Ia
rupture avec lo Cambodge: Une telle
rupture serait une folic, assurait
M. Strauss a qui voulait l'ontendre,
Display Arms
30,000 as two rival parades
wound their way through
,streets. One of them was staged
by West Berlin's Communists,
the other by the city's revo-
lutionary youth groups, Includ-
ing Trotskyites, anarchists,
Maoists, syndicalists, self-styled
"Bolsheviks" and ' so-called
"Spartacists. "
1'. Cold and gusty winds kept
!most West Berliners at home.
The police, out in force, said
the only incident occurred
when youths hurled stones. to
smash windows in the central
courthouse on their march from
,the ?Tlergarten district to the
workers' borough of Wedding.
The radicals-university and
high school students as well as
a sprinkling of young workers
-announced plans to set up ,a
"revolutionary, organization" to
operate. under the name ' of
"Union of Socialigt Workers
THE ECONOMIST
.10 May 1969
Iraq and Germany
First to take the
.plunge
Although Bonn had been half expecting
the Iraqis to recognise east Germany it
was none the less painful. When Herr
,Otto Winzer, the east German foreign:
minister, arrived in Baghdad on Tuesday
to sign. on the dotted line, Bonn knew for:
certain it had lost an important diplo-
matic battle in the Middle East, if not a'
campaign.
The first sign of Iraqi readiness to
ignore Bonn's susceptibilities came in Fe'b
ruary; when the Baath party conference
approved a resolution recommending full
recognition of east Gerirlany. Then on
April Both Radio Baghdad announced that
the revolutionary council had decided
.Iraq should practise normal relations with
.east Berlin ' "in recognition of east
.Germany's support of the Arab nation:
in its struggle against Zionism and
imperialism." Thus Iraq has become not:
only the first Arab state to recognise
;Herr Ulbricht's regime but also the first
Sniffing an air of spreading rot, Bonn
 CPYRGHT
plomatic excommunication to diploma c
mmunicants with Ulbrich t-cann t
en be invoked since Bonn has had o',
Inn -
se 2000/8P
G
ormal relations with Baghdad sin e.
1965. West Germany has not given a y
pital help to Iraq, and only compar
t vely little and easily dispensable technic 1
id. What can be done in such circu
s ances ? So far Bonn has confined s
udgeon to tut-tutting.
Reports that the Sudanese foreign
sinister is advising his government o'
ffillow Iraq's example suggest that oth r
rab states may be about to have the cou -'
e of their national convictions. Most f
t em have forgone diplomatic,relatio s'
with Bonn since Dr Adenauer's secret co i-
i iitment to deliver arms and equipment o
Israel became known in 1965. But 11
ave hitherto shrunk from recognising e t
ermany for fear of losing west Germ n'
conomic help. It is supposed in Bo n
at Moscow may even be, discourage g
gypt and Syria from yielding to H r
lbricht's blandishments for the time bee g-
n the. round that it would cost so mu h
money.
MLI-N SCIENCE MONITOR
CP~
69
~e~?~nanyP I
Egg
r t, Va', e s 6"t
from Ira
By Barry B. Ellis
Staff correspondent of
Bonn
Iraq has handed Walter Ulbricht a splen-
did May Day present, by announcing full
diplomatic recognition of his Communist
East German regime.
- Iraq thus becomes the first non-Commu-
nist state to recognize the (East) German
Democratic Republic,
West Germany can be expected to use its
best diplomatic efforts to persuade other
Arab governments not to follow Baghdad's;
example.
But Bonn's position is weak. Nine Arab
states, including the "big four" --- Egypt,
Syria, Iraq, and Algeria-have no diplo-
matic relations with the (West German)
Federal Republic.
Ten Arab governments broke' ties with
Bonn in 1965, when the latter recognized
Israel. JordarA 1`(3"mt'!cF(3'PI9e4eas
X79 1194A000500100001-0
Iraq Link T o East Ger rman y.
Strongly Assailed By Bonn
By BRIGITTE FALBE
[Bonn Bureau of The Sun]
Bonn, May 2-The Kissinger Iraq's decision will not necessar
a ministration views Iraq's an-
n unced intention to recognize
tl~e Ulbricht regime as an, "un-
fr endly act," a West German
s okesman declared here today.
he decision is a blow to
Bonn's efforts to normalize its
r ations with the Arab nations
a d is directed against the inter-
e tst of the entire German na-
ti in, Conrad Ahlers, the deputy
g vernment press secretary said
a a news conference,
r. Ahlers charged that Bagh-
d d's step in effect removes
I q from the bloc of the non-a-
li ned countries and puts it into
ti a Communist camp.
tto Winzer, the East German
f sign minister, in a message
t ay to Abdul Karim el-SHeikh-
I his Iraqi counterpart, ex-
p essed his "deep satisfaction"
o rr the decision,
lie decision Wednesday fol-
l ed Mr. Sheikhly's visit to
st Berlin and Moscow about a'
onth ago.
iolomatic observers believe;
CPYRGHT
ily unleash a "recognition ava-
lanche" although it is consi-
,dered a "test case."
ical retaliation:are limited..Un
.der the old IIallstein Doctrine it
threatened it would break off;
diplomatic relations with any
non-Communist state recogniz-
ing East Germany. However,
'the Arab League states them-
selves broke off these contacts
in May, 1965, over Bonn's recog-
nition of Israel.
Trade Partner
Since then, only Jordan has
reopened diplomatic relations
with Bonn. However,this?was in
February, 1967," , before the
Arab-Israeli -war in which West
Germany morally supported Is-
rael.. ,
West Germany is Iraq's .?cc-1
and most important trade part-
ner after Great Britain. The mu-
tual exchange of goods is twice
as large as Iraq's trade with the
Eastern European countries, ac-
cording to official statistics.
Leadership at loggerheads '
Since 1965 East Germany has plied Egypt
with credits and aid in an effort to capitalize
on Arab anger with Bonn to win diplomatic
recogitition from Cairo.
? But President Nasser., possibly with an eye
on future economic help from Bonn, -never
went further than .to acknowledge the exis-
tence of two German states. This included
.respect for East Germany's existing,fron-
tiers.
East German strategists worked. on the
theory that, if President Nasser sent an am-
bassador to East Berlin, other Arab govern-
ments would follow suit.
Now the breakthrough has"come from
Iraq, whose revolutionary leadership is Oil
'loggerheads with the Syrian 'and Egypt
Governments.
2000/08 -0
 E4pirov ReI a 2ackWWa/29 : C IA-RDP79-0t1f94AQ Q QIApgpy1thq Nasser gov.
Po swayed from his cautious of b
Baghdad's action. Syrian authorities
Yare
held to be less predictable.
In addition to Egypt, East German diplo
mats have concentrated in recent. years on
wooing Syria, Algeria, and India. In all 'cases
East Berlin has failed to win recognition.
East Berlins rebuked
East Germany has consulates general in
10 non-Communist states, all in the so-called
third world. Arab states included are Iraq,
Syria, Egypt, Yemen, and South Yemen.
East Germany boasts two consulates gen.
oral in Egypt -- in Alexandria and Cairo.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
8 May 1969
13Y ,ohnt J&, Cooley
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
F? Cairo
After Iraq, Sudan may become the second
Arab-and ;non-Communist-government to
recognize Pommunist East Germany.
.Sheikh All Abdel Rahman, the Sudanese.
Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister, recom
mended this step to the Sudanese Cabinet,
the news agency Mena reported from Khar
toum.
East Germany is a "friendly, country
which has honorable attitudes toward Arab'
causes" Sheikh All said in a memorandum
to President Ismail el Azhari's government,
Mena said.
On April 30 Iraq became the first non-
Communist regime to give full diplomatic'
recognition to the East Berlin regime. East
German Foreign Minister Otto Winzer tiew'
to Baghdad May 6 to arrange details.-
Soviet-bloc diplomats here -hope the rest
of the Arab world will soon follow -Iraq's,
example.
Cultural relations
Walter Ulbricht's regime carefully did its.
staff work for his successful, breakthrough;
in the Arab world. Cultural relations have
been a main element.
Last January and February Paul Scholz,
president of the (East) German'- Arab
Friendship Society, visited Iraq, Sudan, and
the United Arab Republic. He, inaugurated
"friendship" societies or "friendship" weeks:
in all three,
His tour paralleled a series of visits by;
Foreign Minister Winzer. Mr. Winzer's stop-
over here in January ended with the opening
is
of a'Apa ~ ~ ,, f~ad~ '~C13f3'ff08/29 : CIA-RDP - fl94A0.00z5?@ p.-OaLIZ, vi,
@0O0h1a0
permanent trade offices in Algeria, Morocco,
Tunisia, Sudan, and Lebanon, plus several
,non-Arab nations.
Before, during, and since the 1967 war,
East Getmanyhas been unreservedly on` the
Arab side in, the conflict between Arabs and
Israelis. . ,
East Germany also has refused to pay
compensation to Jewish 'victims of Nazi
persecution, on the grounds that the Federal
Republic, not East Germany, was the, heir
of Hitler's Third Reich.
'
Cairo enjoyed diplomatic status.--- '
Apart from the above, East Germany has
U. .
East Germany has tried unsuccessfully to'
win full recognition from the U.A.R. since-
Mr. Uibricht visited this country in May,,
1965. East German diplomatic pressure also'.
has aimed at the more limited objective of
persuading President Nasser's government
not to resume relations with Bonn.
,Sequence' sketched ,
:f Cairo broke relations with Bonn in May',,,
1965, when Bonn formally recognized Israel..
After Egypt, Mr. Winzer visited Syria. In
iDamascus he chaired a conference at the,
East German consulate of heads of East:
German.. missions to 11 Arab and several
other Afro-Asian states.
This reminded observers of a similar
;meeting of Cuban ambassadors in Daman-,'
cus in July, 1968, when Cuba was expanding
its relations with "Socialist" Arab states.
A detailed East .German-Syrian coin-,
+'munique followed Mr. Winzer's. talks with
'?President Noureddine 'al-Attasi's govern
anent. It indicated that. one aim of his visit`
had been to repair damage suffered by East:
German prestige in the August, .1968, War
'saw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.
- Both sides 'affirmed the need to respect
existing. frontiers of the German Democra-`
-tic Republic [East Germany] and pointed'
;out that any threat to the GDR or any
other socialist country in Europe repre.'
isented a danger to world peace."
Meanwhile, Irago sought to overcomo:
;embarassment caused by Moscow's lack of
sympathy for Baghdad's warfare against'
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Last Feb. the Baghda urdis ne
paper al Nour reported that Jalal Talabani,. The Rusk doctrine, Not that the develop-
an anti-Barbani ' leftist Kurdish leader,. named for secretary of ment of the new doctrine
.had called for Iraqi recognition of East. state Dean Rusk, of stopped with the atomic
Germany. course, is not quite so liberation of the "en-
The next move in this careful East Ger- forthright and clear-cut as slaved" West German folk.
man-Arab courtship was a trip by Iraqi. the Brezhnev doctrine. It Next on the line was
Foreign Minister Abdul Karim al Shaykhly apparently extends the Bernhard Fraefrath, an
to Moscow and East Berlin March 20 to 31.1 NATO protective umbrel- East Berlin, "people's
la to certain' nations in judge."
Paper suggests recognition Central Europe and the Fraefrath developed a
When he returned to Baghdad, the news- Middle East. This is supplementary theory to
paper Al Hurriyah April 3 suggested recog- staunchly denied by U.S. justify the launching of a
nition in appreciation of "East Germany's officials who, at the same forceful action against
.support for the Arabs." This was the reason time agree, however, that what the East Germans
Baghdad Radio gave when it announced rec-, it puts Moscow on notice like to call the West
ognition April 30. against further applica- German revenge seekers.
Despite many East German trade mis- Lions of the Brezhnev doe- He maintained that the
.sions to Arab capitals and a demand for. trine. "anti-fascist" Clauses 53
some products such as machine tools and Ulbricht Next and 107 of the U.N.. Char-
cameras, East Germany's trade in the Arab To Brezhnev and the ter allowed partners in.
world has lagged far behind that of Bonn. Rusk must now be added regional security pacts to
In 1967, West Germany was third only to the Ulbricht doctrine. Al- use force against West
the United States and Britain as a leading though it hasn't yet' been Germany without the au-
srpplier to the Middle East area as a whole. named for the East Gcr- thorization of the Security
West Germany was the second-largest ex man Party boss Walter Council.
porter to Iraq and also to the U.A.R.,' de- Ulbricht, the new East . Carrying on deeper into
spite' the 1965 break in relations between German philosophizing new uncharted zones of
Bonn and all Arab states except Tunisia, clearly outstrips both the political philosophy, Peo-
-Morocco, and Libya. Moscow and NATO at- ple's Judge Fraefrath said
11
LOS ANGELES TIMES
1 December 1968
%A Germans
Draft Doctrine
.of liberatgod
BY JOE ALEX MORRIS
Times Staff Writer
BONN-This is a time
for doctrines.
First there was the
"Brezhnev doctrine," the
Soviet Union's elaborate
theory' justifying its
armed intervention in
Czechoslovakia last Au7
gust. It is named for
Soviet Communist Party,
boss Leonid I. Brezhnev,
and roughly says that the
Soviet Union has a right to
intervene anywhere in the
"socialist commonwealth"
to protect the holy cause
of Marxism.
As Sir Isaac Newton
said, for every action there
must be an equal and
opposite reaction. There-
fore. it was not long before
tempts for sheer ingenuity this applied not only in
and tortured thinking. cases of armed aggression
It has emerged slowly, in (hy West Germany), but
several parts. First came also in cases of a resump-
the "military doctrine of tion of the policies of
the ' German Democratic "aggression."
Republic." The judge specifically
This is somewhat diffi- referred to the East Ger-
cult' to follow, but thanks man-Russian pact of 1967.
to the Communist Party Since Communist propa-
newspaper Neues Dcut Banda is daily larded with
s c h I a n d, we have this references to the aggres-
chain of thinking: sive West German govern-
-A war between East ment, the conditions for
and West Ger'nany should such an intervention are
not be regard :d as a war presumably already there.
between brothers but a To add fat to the fire, an
"war to defend socialist East German party fune-
progress."
-Such a war would tionary named Hermann
quickly develop into a Axon came up with a new
rocket and atomic wea- theory of what constitutes
pons war which would end a sovereign state. Only a
with the final dostruction
of West German imperia Communist state can truly
-
be considered sovereign,
lism."
-With t h i s laudable
goal in mind, such a war
would in fact be a "war of
liberation."
It is possible to pick
some holes in this ar-
gument, notably concern-
ing the state of East
Germany after,, the 7,200
American atomic war-
heads stored in Europe
are presumably used in
retaliation. But these ap-
parently did not concern
he maintained.
The caterwauling out of
Last Berlin might seem
somewhat unrealistic to
the outside world. But not
to many Nest Germans
who have to live with
chronic Berlin crises and
this summer went through
a real security scare dur-
ing the Soviet and War-
saw Pact invasion of
Czechoslovakia.
The general reaction
here was to see Moscow's
theA' , 4 r'Release 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79-01194
emer from t e c oisters
of hI A T 0 headquarters.
outside Brussels.
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0
cal antics. This fits in with
the general West COMM
assumption that East Ger-
many is only a tail to be
wagged by the Soviet dog.
To West Germans, this
makes the situation all the
more serious because it
shows that the Russians
are really behind it, all.
And since the invasion of
Czechoslovakia, the West
Germans and many other
people are not at all sure
of the potential limits of
Soviet expansionism.
"Theoretically, the East
bloc is now ready for an
attack against the federal
republic," was a typical
editorial comment.
Such dire warnings are
not taken too seriously by
Western diplomatic circles
here, nor indeed by many
West Germans. But there
has been open anxiety.. for'
some weeks now that an-
other Berlin crisis may be
just around the corner.
An expected crisis failed'
to develop last month,
despite sharp protests:
from the East Germans
when the Christian Demo-
cratic Party held its" an
nual .. , party ? meeting in
,West Berlin. But specula-
tion has been renewed by
an article in the East
German foreign policy nia-
gaziiae which came out
last week.
This article repeated
East German claims that
there were no longer any
official agreements con-
trolling access to West
Berlin, and that it was
only the "extraordinary
kindness" of East German
authorities which permit-
ted traffic to continue to
flow.
'The article said such
traffic must be guided by
the people's rights, which
forbade traffic through
the corridors to West Ber-
lin for "aggressive purpo-
LE MONITEUR AFRICAIN, Dakar
.3 April 1969
1968 WEST GERMAN-AFRICAN TRADE INCREASED
ses." Among these purpo-
ses, according to the ar-
ticle, are included "provo-
cative sessions" ' of the
West German parliament.
Berlin. remains the
touchstone of East-West
relations in Central Eu-
rope, and' it is toward the
divided city 'rather than
the curious new East. Ger-
man doctrine of a war of
liberation that attention
remains fixed. The new
doctrine, unlike the Brezh-
nev or Rusk doctrines,
appears headed for a short
life before returning to the'
obscure s o u r e,e s front
which it sprang.
An American observer recently declared: "The Germans have come to
Africa. They are now playing a much more important role and they are
.exercising a much greater influence in Africa than at the time of the
Kaiser!"
Indeed, the Germans are-not only coming as travelling salesmen and
instructors for the armies of the young African states. They have also
come as investors and as lenders. They are carrying out more than 400
projects in Africa, including plants, ports, and highway networks. They
can also be found in the universities. One can hear them on the radio
waves, the "German Wave," which broadcasts about 17.5 hours of miscellan-
eous programs, i.n various languages, to Africa, each week, in other words,
much more than the Voice of America.
It must be admitted that people in Africa generally, and quite
justifiably, moreover, consider the Germans-to be quite efficient in
business, that their merchandise is of good quality and that their in-
vestments are quite important.
In Nigeria, the Germans are threatening to outstrip the British in
investments. Over the past 4 years, they have completed about 30 projects
in that country and their investment there is equivalent to 35 billion CFA
[African Financial Community).
In Liberia, where the Americans were almost at home, even before
World War II, the "Salzgitter" West German steel mills have obtained a
license covering all mining prospecting. Experts from this cartel are al-
ready working with the government in Mcnrovia as industry and mining ad-
visers.
Bonn has thus selected foreign trade as the principal instrument
for its penetration of Africa. By aid to the developing countries, the
West'Germans primarily mean exporting their private capital.
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If we glance at the foreign trade statistics, we see first of all
that Africa b and large is not'of primary importance to West.Germany
y 9
and that there are places in the interior of Africa where German commercial
interests are primarily concentrated, according to all available evidence.
Overall, 7.52 percent of German imports come from Africa and that
continent in turn absorbs 4.62 percent of German imports whereas Europe
gets 61-73.2 percent and America 24-13 percent. The balance of trade with
West Germany is thus very positive for Africa. Germany buys from its com-
mercial partners in the tropical countries and especially Libya much more
in terms of products than it sells to them (right now, Libya supplies al-
most 40 percent of Germany's petroleum imports).
In
Millions DM
Imports
1964 1968
Exports
1964 1968
Libya
990
2,365.3
112.8
225.5
South Africa
506.5
982.5
.905.8
1,418.4.
Nigeria
367.
192
217.8
266.1
Rhodesia, Zambia, and
Malawi
365.5
449.5
55.1
59.6
Algeria
265.7:
556.6
47.3
182
Morocco
235.7
160
126.9
170.9
Liberia
192.6
283.1
'
137.5
39.1
Ivory Coast
166.3
267.1,
38.
85
Ghana'
162.9
131.5'_
105.1
107.3
Congo-Kinshasa
148.1
185.7.
96.0
120.9
Kenya and Uganda
137.3
118.3
104.7
146.5
UAR
135
109.3
436.0
264
The above table, covering the 12 regions of Africa, where we find
the principal West German suppliers, shows the development of German for-
eign trade between 1964 and 1968. The next table draws a parallel be-
tween 1967 and 1968 for each African country. Here, we discover.among
other things, that the total trade volume, which was 9.4 billion DM in
1967, went up to 10.8 billion DM in 1968, in other words, an increase of
,14.9 percent.
Imports
Exports
In Millions DM
1968
1967
1968
1967
Canary Islands
37,931
33,900
112,770
129,740
Morocco
159,960
172,437
170,932
175,18-6
Algeria
556,648
515,341
182,040
77,270
Tunisia
88,672
78,732
77,642
77,548
Libya
2,365,302
1,402,070
225,457
156,482
UAR
109,258
115,087
264,000
219,792
Sudan
179,772
140,909
54,494
61,015
Mauritania
60,392
67,601
5,686
4,608
Mali
2,079
574
4,276
3,013
Upper Volta
380
8
7,340,
3,339
Niger
485
24
6,347
6,649
Chad
5,923
1,973
5,538
7,281
Senegal
21,454
17,290
41,920
37,442
Gambia
6,631
20
2,376
1,890
Portuguese Guinea
8,405
8,723
2,873
2,299
Guinea
18,607
20,551
11,870
21,485
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RDP7?-?il-J4A00&vObb0001-0
 Approv y ass 2000/ 2 3
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6 It
0 X100006',`3901
Ghana
131,432
103,462
107,292
100,286
Togo
28,737
19,384
12,186
16,556
Dahomey
11,527
8,386
7,999
7,767
Nigeria
191,996
376,362
266,121
244,148
Cameroun
114,005
91,042
55,953
46,206
Central African
Republic
2,414
1,873
10,202
13,133
Equatorial Guinea
450
687
5,742
4,121
Gabon
66,836
75,868
19,464
13,059
Congo-Brazzaville
78,773
59,206
30,596
31,389
Congo-Kinshasa
185,688
145,495
120,937
78,560
Rwanda
3,435
2,976
6,004
4,139
Burundi
2,259
2,976
9,646
5,863
Angola
90,976
61,448
126,462
156,753
Ethiopia
37,831
24,853
73,533
79,049
French Territory
Afars and Issas
of
59
175
3,455
2,834
Somalia
656
421
12,231
10,020
Kenya
71,232
83,812
105,172
118,180
Uganda
47,033
63,656
41,294
42,023
Tanzania
68,610
58,003
48,258
47,233
Mozambique
37,044
40,172
71,717
62,163
Madagascar
18,943
13,210
40,420
27,859
Comores
564
322
Reunion
14,575
1,776
7,204
8,137
Zambia
396,351
257,752
67 , 410
61,484
Rhodesia.
53.202
63,903
52,660
50,395
Malawi
13,369
7,140
6,922
7,216
South Africa
982,482
1,045,154
1,418,318
1,251,361
Trade between West Germany and Ivory Coast has been increasing
regularly for the past several years, in terms favorable to the latter.
Germany exports primarily automotive vehicles, synthetic fabrics and cot-
ton, as well as chemical and electrical industry products to Ivory Coast
while it imports primarily logs and lumber or de-barked wood, cocoa and
canned pineapples. According to the detailed 1967 figures, automotive
vehicles accounted for one-third of the German exports, in other words,
1.1 billion CFA; fabrics accounted for 531 millions and electrical and
chemical industry products made up 451 millions. Ivory Coast wood ex-
ports amount to 6.5 billion,CFA and cocoa bean exports account for 5 bil-
lions. Compared to 1966, these figures reveal one fact that is very posi-
'tive for Ivory Coast: the surplus in its balance of trade increased from
.7.9 billion'CFA in 1966 to 9.2 billion in 1967.
.The total volume of trade between Senegal and West Germany has in-
creased quite noticeably. Between 1965 and 1966, Senegal exports to West
Germany increased by 15 percent and from 1966 until 1968 this tendency has
been further accentuated; likewise, Senegalese sales increased from
17,290,000 DM to 21,454,000 DM:(an increase of 24 percent). It must how-
ever be pointed out that German merchandise imports have also gone up,
`reaching a figure of 41,920,000 DM in 1968, although Senegal's balance of
trade with West Germany shows a deficit, with coverage amounting only to
51 percent.
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s erman imports pr mar y consist of phosphates. West Germany
purchased about 33 percent of Senegal's phosphate output. Next come pea-
nut cakes and miscellaneous peanut by-products used for animal fodder;
the export volume here already amounts to a counter value of 30 million.
CFA per year.
The increase in Senegalese exports to West Germany has reduced the
dis-equilibrium in the balance of trade since German imports to Senegal
increased in lesser proportions; during fiscal year 1967, the Senegalese
trade balance coverage rate with respect to Germany did not exceed 46 per-
cent..
It is interesting to note that certain Senegalese exports going to
West Germany are handled in an indirect fashion, since they are routed
through third countries, especially France, where these raw materials are
processed.
The German firm of Kathmann, which does about 40 million DM worth
of business, selling poultry, eggs, and special fodder for poultry, has
assumed majority parzicipation'in the Presh Farm Company which is respons-
ible for the technical and commercial management of a large, industry-
scale poultry farm in Togo. This project is being carried out with the
support of the Joint Development Fund for Africa and the German Development
Company. A similar project is under study in Ghana with the participation
of the same German firm.
We must point out the considerable jump in German imports from
Togo which increased from 19,384,000 DM in 1967. to 28,737,000 DM in 1968
(up 48 percent), whereas exports from West Germany decreased about 26
percent, dropping from 16,556,000 DM in 1967 to 12,186,000 DM in 1968.
It is-thus evident that the balance of trade between the two countries is
for the time being extremely favorable to Togo.
West Germany is Cameroun's second-ranking supplier, after France,
and occupies fourth place in the import of Cameroun products which include
above all cocoa, wood, and coffee. To these figures we must also add those
concerning major imports of Cameroun products which Germany obtains
through French and Dutch buyers.
In conclusion we find that German businessmen so far have been in-
terested primarily in English-speaking countries, that is, countries in
East Africa, as well as Nigeria and Ghana, in other words, some of the
more populated and richer, countries which are traditionally more open to
investments and foreign trade because they were in a more privileged posi-
tion than the other African states.
There is a process of evolution which is about to start here. It
seems to be a natural consequence of the association of the French-speaking
countries with the Curopean Common Market. To a minor extent this may
also be due to the disappointments in the nationalization of German pro-
perty in Tanzania and by the events in Nigeria.
One of the manifestations of German vitality in the field of trade
is illustrated precisely by the sixth "Partners in Progress" import expo-
sition which was held in the buildings of the West Berlin Fair-Exposition
from 26 September until 6 October 1968, with the participation of 56 de-
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Thus Congo-Brazzaville, Dahomey, Gabon, Senegal, Niger, and Togo --
as far as Africa is concerned -- were in a position for a leisurely exami-
nation of the possibilities of increasing their traditional raw materials
exports to West Germany..
The value of such events is quite obvious in the sense that they
enable the seller to define the real nature of his partners' needs much
better and, in certain cases, to determine much better in advance what the
development of the market might be in the future. To some extent, this is
an immediate advantage resulting from commercial contacts during these
fairs and exhibits.
In the specific case of Germany, such contacts with African pro-
ducers also make it possible to strengthen business links; these contacts
always prove profitable, sooner or later, both in terms of sales and in
terms of imports; these contacts defintely promote the development of
the German presence in Africa;"this is something both the Bonn Govern-
ment and private investors obviously desire.
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 25X1C1Ob
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June 1969
SOUTH VIETNAM -- DEALING FROM STRENGTH
When Nguyen Van Thieu was elected.to the Presidency in September 1967,
it was to a din of critic's scoffing and Hanoi's-accusations about rigged
elections, a military dictatorship being legalized and South Vietnam's
citizens going to.the polls at bayonet..point-:..(this.,.despite observations
to the contrary by an enormous international::press.corpson the scene).
With the perspective that two years offer., it.is.not only possible to say
that no valid challenge to the legality . of. the elections has arisen; it is
also possible to say that the men and women who.were.elected at that time
(the president, the vice president and.60 members of the Upper House) have,
for the most part, performed responsibly and in some cases effectively.
President Thieu himself has provided.a good example of political
nimbleness and steadily developing qualities of-responsible leadership.
He has successfully consolidated his presidential. power, has become in-
creasingly sure-footed in Saigon's fluctuating political scene and has
contributed measurably to'the consolidation. of the constitutional pro-
cesses and the division of responsibilities_inherent..in self-government.
He has won the confidence of his peers --not. simply.the military men who
already respected him., but.political professionals, many of whom had been
active long before.t.he new president came into the picture.
Thieu's skills as a leader and a politician are helping to weld his
government into a rallying point for non-Communist:: political elements in
Vietnam. This is due, in part at least,..to Thieu's willingness to share
his power with uncommitted political figures such as,the highly esteemed
Prime-Minister Tran .Van.Huong. The government., has the nation's major
political force, the army,; solidly behind itand its general popularity
and power seem to be on the upcurve. These factors have had an effect on
the government's international image,?which.isprimarily reflected in the
context of the Paris peace talks, where.the.government's domestic strength
has given itsdelegation_in Paris added strength_.and some degree of luster
and flexibility.
If one wished to cite. concrete evidence.of the government's domestic
strength and its tie-in with the Paris talks., the elections of March this
year would be a fairly dramatic example. On four successive Sundays in
March, three million. voters (representing - almost.90% of those eligible)
in the villages and hamlets went to the.polls.and elected more than 4,600
village council members and 3,100 hamlet chiefs and deputies. In Paris and
other areas of the world the voter turnout.was viewed as a major achieve-
ment of the Saigon government which not only proved it could once again
carry out wartime elections in the face of Viet Cong threats and violence,
but also cast doubt an the National Liberation Front's claim to be the only
real representative of the South Vietnamese people. The open nature of the
village and hamlet elections conducted by.the Saigon government under the
scrutiny of hundreds of foreign newsmen provides an interesting contrast
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"M 000 . ftwomwiWiiiiii
with the unwitnessed and unsubstantiated elections the Viet Cong claimed to
have held sometime this past winter to~.estmblish."Peo.ple's Liberation Coun-
cils" in the villages and hamlets.
Following the village and hamlet elections,.and undoubtedly influenced
by the strong popular support their outcome demonstrated for the Saigon
government, President Thieu decided to acknowledge the Viet Cong as a fact
of life it was no longer necessary to wish away. At.a 25 March news confer-
ence the President announced that the Saigon government is ready to inte-
grate members of the NLF.into the political?life of South Vietnam as part
of an over-all peace settlement. In answer to reporters' questions, Thieu
opened the possibility that members of the NLF might be encouraged to form
a party in South Vietnam and participate in future elections.
On 7 April, in a speech to the South Vietnamese National Assembly, Pre-
sident Thieu proposed a Six Point Peace Plan.withthe aim of putting an im-
mediate end to the war. One of the points covered.by the President included
a welcome to "those now fighting against the South who decide to renounce
violence ... and abide by the democratic processes" and who will, as a re-
sult, "enjoy full political rights and assume the -same obligations as other
lawful citizens."
On 21 April a top level government group .le-d by President Thieu and
Prime Minister Tran.Van Huong traveled-to Vung.Tau for the graduation of
village and hamlet officials from a six-week government administration
school. These first graduates of a series of six training courses, are
expected to instruct more than 16,000 local officials in improving and re-
vitalizing local administration. President Thieu reminded the graduates
of the need to nurture self-government at every level and stressed the
responsibility of.hamlet and village officials in bringing this about.
The President discussed the problems of corruption, land reform and im-
provement of the present Vietnam economy. He also spoke of the government's
plans for postwar development, indicating that. the government is program-
ming the current wartime economy to develop as logically as possible into
the projected postwar picture.
In another speech, on the 26th of April, President Thieu noted that
in March 1969 the ChieuHoi (Open Arms) program (the governmental effort
to encourage enemy desertions) had received its 100,000th "rallier." He
contended that the continuing success of this program, which brings in
North Vietnamese regulars as well as Viet Cong guerrillas and political
cadre, is an indication that government efforts toward national reconcilia-
tion are producing results. Observers are inclined to agree with this con-
tention, particularly when many of the so-called ralliers are willing to
undergo a period of rehabilitation and then enter into some constructive
form of service such as hospital work for the-South Vietnamese people.
The increasing success of the Chieu Hoi.program may be an indication that
the Viet Cong is losing the hold it had on its followers as it weakens
politically and militarily, it may also indicate that the government is
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offering sufficiently appealing alternat-ives to Communism to attract a
greater number of adherents.
On the 8th of May the NLF proposed.a 10-point, solution.to the problem
of war in Vietnam. Despite the fact that, the points: were based on the same
proposals that the NLF? and Hanoi have- made on._ doz?ens o-f previous occasions,
Saigon did not reject them outright asit might have been -inclined to do a
year ago. Rather., the Saigon government suggested,---in a carefully draft-
ed and unusually conciliatory communique -that:-,."talks "talks on three of the ten
points can take place immediately in the framework-of the present talks in
Paris," or in secret.talka.as previously.proposed.,by.Saigon. The free
world press praised Saigon's conciliatory-response asa genuine effort to
move: the peace talks forward.
The relatively high standards of.leadershp=exemplified by the Saigon
government are remarkable for a country at war, and -for. one- so newly emerg-
ing into nationhood. Certainly the increasing-flexibility of the govern-
ment is showing in its dealings with the.NLF and. Hanoi and its growing
sense of identification with presentand.postwar--..dome.stic needs of the
South Vietnamese people are a testimonial.to.its leaders.and their nascent
maturity. The question of whether they can actually create and carry out
badly needed domestic reforms and als..negotiate a peace?.which can lead
to some form of effective self-government for. South Vietnam are questions
that only the future can answer.
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The village and--
et a., amlet elections
In South. .Vietnam
by BARRY BROWN
WASHINGTON,- Although
the guns are blazing again 16
South Vietnam, . it Is impor4
tant to note that the even
more decisive political s'rug-
'gle also continues,The South
Vietuainese government rece"
.tty registedre ano her Impr,r-
rant achieventent in this are
by completing a new series
of village and hamlet Glee-
lions on each of the last
four Sundays, beginning
March 2.
The volirg, fn which nearly]
.nne million men and women
have taken pare, installed
village councils and ban,let
Chiefs to serve for the next
Ihiee years. Despite Viet
Cong threats and act-, of
terrorism intended to dis-
rupt the proceedin?s, from
80 to 95 per cent of those
eligible l,r the various com-
tnunities have cast their
ballots. This brings the num-
b"r of villages in which such
elections have been held
,luring the past two years to
more thar, 1,000 and the runt.
ber of hamlets to some 4,500.
Tl:e vrogram began in 1967
followed not long afterwards,
by a new constitution awl the.,
election of a popularly-based,
national goverr,m1-11t un'Icr,
it. The two movemen s-t.,_
ward establishment Of, a
strong central authority in
Sargon, on the one hand,
and toward decentralized
local self-government, on the
other - have been precisely
coinplrmentary.
In order to understand this,
it Is helpful to recall the old
'Viotnawcsc proverb f it The
emperor's law stop, at the
Village gate,, Attltougit thig,
Was perhaps never literally'
true, and it could scarcely be
Considered compatible %'ith
the current effo"t to build a
modern nation in the midst
`of a wsr, 85 does suggest
how ancient and deep-root..' ;
ed the Idea of local aulono.
m has-been.
For centuries, village Couu
Cils and hamlet chiefs chosen
by the people did have fu'l
responsibility for justice,
sccurit3 and fiscal affaias in
their Communities. The Viet.
namese Emperors, and the
French during the colonial
period, customarily rcted in'
the villages-notably in such
matters as tax collections
thr, ugh tl;e councils a d
local leaders. The eliminaiion
of 1hat system in1956 by Pro-
sident Ngo Dii.h Diem was
larg Jy resl:onsible for the
alienation of his popular
support.
Initially, it may be suhpo.
s(d Ibat Diew Ihc:ught it uee
ess .ry it substitute village
councils appointed from Sai.
you for those chosen locally
In order to tighten his grip on
-tire couulryside and str, ng_
-thin the war effort. But by
:eroding the Iraditional defc.'
Me of the peas, try, against
file central authority and the
abuses that have been so
C riintnnly associated with it
in Vietnamese society, he
opened the way to despotis.
and his own downfall. The
new c nstitulonal regime has
il,erefore, wisely co:,cluded'
that. if return to file tradition
of local self government
must b:; an Indispensable
part of the effort to erect an
effective and responsive
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3 April 1969
early 3,000 hamlet
C&h1*e1s eleCte; ('1
Pacification and Construction concurrently Minister of Interior, Tuesday,
afternoon held .a press conference at the Interior Ministry to announce the,
results of the village and hamlet official elections in the last month.
The Deputy Prime Minister 'said the government 13 concentrating all
its efforts to the control. and execution of _the national sovereignty through
bout the countl'y in the Pacification and Construction project for 109.
In order to attain tho above'
objactive, he added, the coun-
try needs an effective adminis-
trativa machinery elected Ly
the pecpla themselves to take
care of the notional iater-~:ts;'
'fharefcre, the es'ablisames.t of,
villag3 and hamlet aut'hor,tie3
and el-ction of village peoples
cou; eels and hamlet executive
cc mmitieas were considered c ne
among the eight essaniial
objectives of the Pacification.,
and Construction Program, he
said.
Deputy Prime Minvter Khiem
stress?d the failure of the Gam.
mumsts through the first stage
elections of village people coun-
cils, hamlet ciiiafs and deputy
chiefs.
Speaking next, Mr. Mr. Le.
SAIGON (VP) -- Gen. Than Thien Khiem, Deputy Prime Minister for
Van D9, Ir.tarior Ministry's
Studies Director, reported on
the results of th3 village and
hamlet elections in the past
month.
He said that before Fe-
bruary 1939, the number of
villag3s having elected coun
c,ls amounted to 1,104 not
counting 583 villages councils
lelected in the first phase of
13G9. At present, 1.693 villages
nave completed their elections
with a total of 7,85? hamlets
chiefs and deputy chiefs.
Through the four election.
phases in March 1969, 4,698
parsons were elected out of
8,015 candidates.
Maantim3 618,483 parsons"
went to the pills or 89 per
cent of the eligible vct.3ra.
As for the election of hamlet
and deputy hamlet chiefs.;
3.145 people were elected
from 7,133 candidates, Tha`
numb r voters g-)ing to the,
polls. Schad 837,825 or 88,1
par cert.
Mr. Da also made known that
by the. end of this year, ei.ao-
'ions will ba `held in the rema-
innirg 130 villages and 889
hamlets,
The D?puty Prime _ Minister
said that in ;he future. the ceni,
tral gw>riitiiant~ will have az
$p-=c;al taus for village offi.'
dials accord'ngto which, th"y
will-b4 assigned 18 command`
Popular Force, and Ravolutionay?
Daveloprn-nt cadres as Well as
entitled to use special funds.
VIETNAM GUARDIAN
29 March 1969
Thieu's readiness to talk
SAIGON (VNG).- A govorti-
nient spokesusau said Friday
President Nguyen van Thieu's
statement to the foreign
press earlier this week in
which he stated this
government is ready to hold
secret Talks a ith the National
Liber,tiou Front, has been
misluterprete:d by certaia
elements of the Vietnamese'
language press.
is "good will escalation"
These reports interpreted
the President's statement as
a change of p thee..
This is an inaccurate con.
clusion, the spokesman said.
He said that it car4nt read.
ing of the President's pre.
vious arid most . recant
statemen's would reveal that
'there has been no change In
positis.ns.
We still do not recognize,
the NLF as a legal entity,nor
'rill we aceep' any coali'ton?
with the comtnunistss, the
spokesman said. aWc will
not accept the communist
Party in S euth Vietuam.a
iTha object of the Presi-
dent's statement,D he said,
was to cese plate th good
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 WASHINGTON POST
Applovvd F)09 Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0
By David Hoffman
Washlnston Post Forelen Service
SAIGON, March 25-President Thieu declared. today
that South Vietnam: was 'ready, to. engage in private
peace talks .with Hanoi and the National. Liberation
front. He set no preconditions.
South Vietnam's willingness to bargain in secret has
been conveyed to the Communists but neither Hanoi
nor the NLF has thus far re-
sponded, Thtou Mid, fie said he expect@ Chet
The first private meeting talks to. take place.' Ike de
has not been scheduled yet, scribed Paris as the ? most
but we are working on It," he 11
added. practical? location. He said
Asked whether ? Saigon still that Ky "'very possibly" would:
insisted that the Communists negotiate for Saigon. And he
meet certain conditions be- raised the possibility. of two-
fore the beginning of private, party or three-party talks
talks, the 45-year-old chief ex between South Vietnam and
ecutive suggested they need the NLF, or representatives
not. of Hanoi and the NLF in corns,
bination.
one could raise' any question,
and we' might 'consider any
problem that arises. Private
talks will help in some' way to
bring fruitful results and solve
what we ? cannot solve in the.
official talks," Thieu said.
In an obviously, expansive
mood, Thieu answered ques-'
tions posed by a score of for-
eign journalists invited to In-'
dependence Palace by the
President's office. Sipping a
'Scotch and soda, Thieu spoke
in, English without notes. He
read no prepared statement.
Saigon's refusal to recognize
and deal with the NLF, its
rival for eventual political con-
trol of South Vietnam, has
been a major sticking point In
efforts to end the war. The
current talks in Paris were
"In the private talks,"?Thieu'
)said, "we do not consider any'
longer two sides, four sides,'
four men or the number oft
delegations."
Thieu declined to identify
which diplomats conveyed
S,aigop's willingness to negoti-
ate secretly to the Commu-
nists, nor did he say where
such overtures were made.,
But they understand well we
are ready," he said.
N0.1 YORIZ TD 'ES
27 .:arch 19 $9
IfflEll SAID TO OPEN
AN ELECTION ROLE
that the nob o aA
that tht e treated a5
t be treated FOR ItLF, MEMBERS
an equal in the procedural ar-
Reported Ready to Integrate
Them Into Political Life as
Part of Vietnam Accord
SAIGON STUDYING PLANSI
President Expected to Take
Leadership of an Enlarged
Pro-Government Party
By TERENCE SMITH
Spec%l to She New York Times
SAIGON, South Vietnam,
March 26 - President Nguyen
'Vat] Thleu Is reliably reported'
to be ready to Integrate mem
?bers of the National Liberation
Front Into the political life of
South Vietnam as part of an
over-all peace settlement.
The president In known to
`have, discussed with his ad-
visers In recent weeks possible
ways In which members of the,
.N.L.F. might be permitted to
,compete in elections as mem
ambers of- an opposition.
1 In anticipation of a future
';political struggle against the
;Front, Mr. Thicu is also plan-
ning to assume personal control,
[of an expanded Government
,party.
During April, according to
sources close to Mr. Thieu, the,
President will accept the per-)
'
. sonal leadership of an enlarged
version of the Peoples Alliance
for Social Revolution, a pro-
'Government political organiza-
j'tion formed last year.
? Convention Expected
An extraordinary convention
.of the alliance is expected to
jbc held in Saigon during the'
month to select Mr. Thieu as
'chairman of its presidium.
Additional South Vietnamese
political factions are also ex-
pected to be accepted into the
alliance In an effort to broaden,
the base of the Government.
Mr. Thicu's closest advisers)
have been urging him for sev-
:era) months to take a personal]
initiative in creating a political'
organization that could com-
pete with the Front.
They-acrd Mr. Thieu--are
working on the assumption
that some form of political par-
ticipation by the Front in South;
Vietnam will be part of a peace
settlement negotiated in Paris.
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0
rangements. Hanoi and the
NLF, likewise, do not reco-
gnize the Thieu government as
the. legitimate government of
South Vietnam.
South Vietnam's original
position was that it would talk
only, with Hanoi and the orig-
inal Communist position was;
that the NLF would talk onlyi
with the United States.
On Jan. 27, Vice Presidents
Ky had said in Paris that;
South Vietnam was prepared!
for ""private talks with tho'
ether Ado if thry arc willing, "
but that the time was not ripe
for such contacts to' begin,'
Today, Thieu was far more
specific.
 THE SAIGCAred For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0
8 April 1969
Cites 6 Conditions To End War
By Nguyen Duy Lieu
President Nguyen Van Thieu said Monday he will ((volunteer) to lad what- he called a
political association) and set forth six a basic)) conditions ato end the war in this part of the
world,)
In a one-hour address before a joint session of the National Assembly, President Thieu
said that since his suggestions for strong political parties have not been heeded, he felt it his
duty to do the job himself.
lie said his political Six Points (4) As the RVN adopts a
group will represent ccthe ru- President Titieu said in Knatioual reconcialintion
ling tendency, ((calling on tho-, his constant quest for cca policy, those who now are
Constructive solution) to the '' fighting against the South,
se ,,.?ho share his views and war, the following six poin's but decide to :enounce
responsibility to join and help :constitute a cwcasonahle and violence and respect the
Ksave riot a solid basis for tho restora- laws of the Renc'blie faith-
Tlticu did not elaborate on tion of peace in Vietnam: fully abide by i,'.: 1ecuc:ratic
his party and when it would
(1) Communist aggression processes, will be welcome
1
be organized formally, 'net'
boning only that Kii would should end. In this case Citm- as KfuIh mt:mhers of the
be a tightly knit organiza- monist North Vietnam :;Could national coruuu;iity. They
large-scale group. give up all its attempts to will enjoy fui! ' iitical rights
lion, KMy and
only a largeon,l, i said, take over the Republic of and assume t : c,r3nu obtii;a-
Vietnam through force. It !inns as other lawful citizens-
((is to help ottrcountry over-
difficulties and, should stop violating Ittc ;.) The reunification of
come present Demilitarized Zone and the u . two Vielnaots will be de-
to (10 whatever is possible RV. frontiers, and end its d by free choice of the.
to prevent its loss to the wanton spellings on the inno- people of Vietnam
Cote called cent people in the South). through democratic proceses.
He called on those who (2) Communist North Viet- 'fltlctt, said that to create
disagree with him on the damese troops anti their auxi- an atmosphere conductive to
((procedures and ntethods)o liarv forces and cadres must. national rcunit?icatiou after
(of forming such a party) to cotnplctly) withdraw from peace is restored, economic
set up their own party which the South. As the military and cultural cx hanges be--
Would then be called an and subversive forces of tween the North a,td South of
opposition party Connntutist North Victnatn Vit?tnann' and other conniries
Of course the same"nations- polluut, infiltration ceases in the Region (wac, be
list ideology must prevail in and the level of violence actively explored, all ogot her
any such opposition party,) thus subs;des, the RVN will with other interutediary
Thieu said, emphasizing that ask its allies to remove their measures of peaceful coeXis-
like any political setup worthy forces, in accordance with te:ice. This, he added, roust
of such a uame