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25X1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :45MterP79-01194A000500120001-869/4 World-wide Perspectives KEY DATES April 9 Czechoslovakia April 12-21 1968 - Dubcek government announced ful- ler civil rights to be granted under new Action Program. Kuala Lumpur World Fellowship of Buddhists, 9th General Assembly. May 11-17 Mexico City International Meeting of Women Jour- nalists, sponsored by Mexican Associ- ation of Writers and Journalists. May 22 Moscow 1943 - End of Third International (Comintern) announced; the statement declared the autonomy of Communist parties outside USSR. May 23 Meeting of Preparatory Commission for conference of World Communist parties. June 5 (maybe) World Communist Conference June 14-17 Helsinki 6th Congress of Women's International Democratic Federation (Communist). June 21-24 East Berlin 25X1C10b World Peace Assembly, sponsored by WCP, with strong participation expected by other Communist fronts. Also, WCP Council meeting. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 .101.10PP"' 25X1 C1 Ob Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 App0.44104104~91111J1 1.1*/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120401481969 Principal Developments in World Communist. Affairs (21 February -- 21 March 1969) 1. Active Month for the Communist World The month has been an especially active one for the Communist world. World attention inevitably fo(.used on such events as the Sino- Soviet border clash, the Yugoslav Communist Congress, the abortive meeting of the Warsaw Pact powers in Budapest, and the meeting of the Preparatory Commission of the World Communist Conference in Moscow. Less spectacular, but also of considerable importance, were the quiet and continuing pressure toward domestic freedom in Czechoslovakia, and the unobtrusive Soviet recognition of the 50th anniversary of the found- ing of the infamous Comintern. Briefly characterized, the month has been a virtually unbroken series of defeats for Soviet diplomacy in the Communist world. It is difficult to see how the Soviets can go on suf- fering defeat after defeat without some radical change in policy or in the leadership. 2. Yugoslav CP Congress and International Communism Out of courtesy and a need to preserve appearances of Communist unity, the Soviets last month were obliged to attend the Italian Com- munist Party (PCI) Congress and listen to condemnations of their in- vasion of Czechoslovakia and other criticisms. This month the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) held its Ninth Congress, from 10 - 15 March, and again the Soviets were subjected to public criticism, this time by Tito, for violating the integrity of Czechoslovakia and for promulgating the Brezhnev Doctrine. Anticipating the worst, the Soviets boycotted the Yugoslav Congress and pressured their Warsaw Pact allies to stay away. The pressure succeeded, except in the case of Ru- mania, which again asserted her independence and sent veteran Communist leader Emil Bodnaras to the Congress to reiterate Rumania's insistence on the primacy of national independence and sovereignty over the de- mands of loyalty to Soviet requirements. While the Soviet Union and each of her more subservient Satellites sent the LCY a brief, cool, but correct message of greeting, Czechoslovak students demonstrated at home, praising Tito and denouncing Brezhnev for requiring Czechoslovakia to stay from the LCY Congress. Thus Yugoslavia once again became the dramatic symbol of the power- ful trend toward independent Communism undermining Soviet control of the Communist world. It is an example which most, if not all, members of the Soviet Bloc would want to emulate, if only they dared. 3. Czechoslovakia Before Czech students shouted "Tito Yes! Brezhnev No!" in the streets of Prague, another young Czech took his life deliberately Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 following the example of young Jan Palach a month before. This latest tragedy is an awesome measure of the depth to which youthful Czechoslo- vaks have felt the grotesque injustice of the Soviet military invasion and occupation of their country, which, essentially, had tried merely to humanize and democratize Communism. Doggedness in trying to realize pre-invasion goals of a genuinely free Communism in which various social groups are given a means of in- fluencing policy was evident also in an initiative displayed by the Czechoslovak trade union council through its Chairman Karel Polacek. He forthrightly declared at the opening of its 7th Congress on 4 March: "The principled relationship of the trade unions to the party cannot, however, in any way impair their inde- pendent approach, restrict their own attitudes, or push them into a second class position of mere executors of party decisions. We shall also in the future put forward frank and our own standpoints in our work, with a view to preventing the emergence of a policy behind closed doors.... I consider it necessary to repeat once again that by this relationship to the Communist Party we do not intend to and will never be an opposition force against the Party, against socialism. On the contrary, we understand this relationship as an active share in the formation and practical implemen- tation of the policy of the party." There are evidences in other areas of Czechoslovak life as well that groups of citizens, bound by common interests, will insist on being heard in matters of national policy. This trend is dangerously close to genuine democracy, which has always been anathema to the So- viets. Even more dangerous, it is just such manifestations of a taste for democracy which frightened the Soviets into invading Czechoslovakia on that infamous day of 21 August 1968. 4. New Level for Sino-Soviet Conflict Given the fundamentally propagandistic function of Communist "news" media, it is impossible to determine how the fighting along the Soviet- Chinese border in Manchuria started, or who fired the first shot. In- deed, one can be reasonably sure only of the fact that an exchange of fire took place beginning on 2 March and continuing on subsequent days; that is about all Soviet and Chinese news reports agree on. There is also little question but what these incidents have raised the long-standing conflict between the two Communist states to a new level of intensity. It would be hazardous to predict where this suc- cession of armed clashes will lead, but it is clear each side is trying to reap the greatest possible propaganda advantage from the event. The Soviets are trying to use it to rally tightly around the CPSU the Com- munist parties which are more or less loyal to it. This kind of unity Approved For Release 1999/09/0? : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 is all the more important to the Soviets before the forthcoming June conference of the world's Communist parties. The Chinese are using the incident to whip their population into a highly emotional state of na- tionalistic loyalty to the Mao leadership, thereby taking their minds off the chaos and deprivations of the Cultural Revolution, and focusing their attention on the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party to be held sometime sooner or later this year. 5. Warsaw Pact Fiasco Elaborate but quiet preparations had been under way for weeks for a two-day summit meeting of the Warsaw Pact leaders which included from the Soviet Union the most prestigious delegation possible: Brezhnev, Kosygin, Defense Minister Grechko, and Warsaw Pact Commander Yakubovsky. The meeting, which was to take place 17-18 March, was the first since the invasion of Czechoslovakia and was intended to put on a display of unity after the disruption of the invasion, particularly as far as Ru- mania was concerned. Without explanation the meeting was delayed for several hours, then met for two hours (rather than two days), issued a non-committal communiqug, and abruptly adjourned. It seems self-evident that the meeting was a thoroughgoing failure. Most observers believe that Rumania refused to go along with the other members on one or both of two major items presumed to have been on the agenda: a reorganiza- tion of the Warsaw Pact to give it supra-national powers, and a con- demnation of the alleged armed incursion on the Soviet Far Eastern bor- der by the Chinese Communists. Issued simultaneously with the communique from the Warsaw Pact meet- ing was what appears to be a warming over of an old appeal of the Soviets for an "all-European security conference." Whether this appeal and the propaganda accompanying it is an attempt to cover up failures of the War- saw Pact meeting or the beginning of a new campaign to drive a wedge be- tween the United States and its European allies ma Y soon become more clear. 6. The Comintern and the WCC ? As far as can be ascertained, the celebration this March of the 50th anniversary of the first Congress of the Third (Communist) Interna- tional, better known as the Comintern, was marked in the Soviet Union only by a small number of commemorative articles in the press. This seems a minimal way to celebrate such a momentous birthday. Soviet re- luctance to make more of the Comintern anniversary probably stems from their fear of revealing their actual desire to return the world movement to something resembling the discipline and control exercised over it by the Comintern, when Stalin manipulated Communist parties to the exclu- sive service of his foreign policy aims and without regard for the welfare and success of any given party. This Soviet desire lurks behind the fre- quent repetition in propaganda of the crucial need for "unity" in inter- national Communism, for a restoration of the primacy of the spirit of Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA3RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 "proletarian internationalism" (i.e., loyalty to the Soviet Union tak- ing precedence over pursuit of mere national interest). The Soviet Union must advance cautiously and delicately toward this goal in view of the known sensibilities of many important parties which are appre- hensive about this very goal of the Soviets. Attached are statements by Tito at the LCY Congress characterizing the Soviet proclivity from the days of the Comintern to the present day to try to impose a general line on the world Communist movement. Sim- ilar criticism of the Comintern appeared in the Czech and Rumanian par- ty press. An interesting contrast is presented by the idealized account of the founding of the Comintern in current Soviet propaganda on the one hand, and an account of what really transpired given by the first secre- tary the Comintern ever had, veteran socialist and collaborator of Lenin, Angelica Balabanoff. These are also attached. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 tL CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 CPYRGHT CPYR 1-::?:-rob. 1969 fossroads for World Communism Future historians may well coeciude that this present month, March 1969, was the point of no return in the his- tory of world Communism, the time when it became evident beyond argument that the old monolithic internaticinal move- ment of Stalin's day could never . be put together again. Three events above all these., past few weeks have shown how ; irreversibly far modern Commu- nist "polycentrism"?to use the word introduced by the late Italian Communist leader Pal- ; mire Togliatti?has come, and , how little Moscow has retained of its once complete authority over world Communism.., ? ?? The month began with the public announcement,of the So- viet-Chinese mini-war in the Far East. The lives that have been, lost in these battles .on the fro. zen Ussuri River have trans- formed what began seemingly as an ideological 'struggle into a conflict that the Russians see as a reprise of their, war with the Mongols almost a millenium ago. Moscow's fury that it does not enjoy the automatic 'support of all Communists in 'this ter. ritorial ? battle was underlined by the Soviet , weekly, .Litera- , turnaya Gazeta, which. publicly, attacked a Czechoslovak news? paper for taking a neutralist ? stance on the dispute. ? ? Right Wing , ? .- ? ; ? ?pendence. In that "referendum" ' more than a dozen Communist parties voted against Moscow by sending their delegates. Among those who chose this means of demonstrating their, independence were such import- ant Communist parties as those of Italy, France, Rumania, Fin- ' land, and Chile as well as the , Communist parties of Austria, ' Belgium, Norway, Britain, Ven- ' ezuela, Spain and several oth- ers. Moreover a number Of Corn.' ' munist parties that stayed away sent warm messages of greet-, ings to the Yugoslav conclave. Warsaw Pact . ? I Then last week, at the Buda- pest meeting of the War- saw Pact, came a development that Moscow may have consid- ered the most galling event of, the month. At this gathering . with what were once servile Eastern European satellites, the Soviet Union was unable to in-, _corporate into the communique a single word of support for its position in the Chinese struggle,' The Rumanians, in addition,'r; blocked all of Moscow's far-reach- ing plans for turning the Warsaw..: Pact and its associated institu- ,tions into a far more intcgrated ? military, political and economic, force. But even the recital above, does not exhaust the' disorder,, confusion and internal bicker- ing that are now the dominant. feature of Communist politics. For example, by ? no means all the countries that failed to show' up at the Yugoslav Congress support Moscow. Thus the Al- banian, New Zealand, Thai, Ma- laysian, and some othec parties are pro-Chinese. Others, like the Japanese, the North Koreans, and the Cubans have tense and far' from fully smooth relations with both Moscow and Peking. And In some countries, such as India; Almost simultaneously, Soviet relations with the? right wing ,of world Communism reached their lowest point in years. This was evidenced at the Yugoslav Communist Congress in Belgrade which the Soviet Union boy- cotted and forced its Eastern European satellites ? including Czechoslovakia ? to boycott.' The Soviet action turned the Belgrade meeting into a kind of referendum on Communist incle-, sad Israel, 1 there are several Communist parties, each claim- 1g to be, the only legitimate Marxist-Leniiiist group and each en joying varying degrees of rec. c,gnition from:foreign Communist 7 attics. ]'arty Line (Split . The most fundamental point is at there is now no agreed rty line to which .all or al- ost all Communist parties sub- ribe. Two decades ago, in Sta.'s heyday, all Communist par- s automatically accepted hatever position the Soviet Un- 11 took, with, only Yugoslavia ssenting. In 1957 and again in GO fragile compromises were tched up in international Com- unist party meetings in Moscow d these served temporarily as ifying doctrines. Now, except opposition to the United ates in Vietnam and verbal nunciation of capitalism, there nothing approaching a Com- nist consensus on a wide ge of world political and ide- gical issues. Moscow continues to hope it n repair the disarray. It looks yard to the scheduled inter- tional Communist meeting in y as the occasion on which can win support for a corn- n position from at least a . inerical majority of the rld's Communist parties. But eady It Is evident that to per- de enough parties to attend ripscow is having to accept to 0. npromises. The possibility reMS therefore that if and when May meeting takes place, -final result' may be fairly titudinous and the great So- t efforts of recent years to ?ange such a get-fogether may ? eve to have borne little val. ? >ie organizational or ideolog- .1 d, o CI ,44 1 ; ?-?.1-TAIlliY SCHWARTZ Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 Waghin aitted For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001WRGHT 12 MA s.9 'Wanton' Soviet Acts Condemned by 'to By Anatole Shub Washington Post roscign Service 13ELGRADE, March 11?Marshal .Tito defiantly re- ? Persistent, harmful inter- ferenee in Yugoslav affairs by the prewar Communist Inter- national. ? The murder of "dozens" of. Yugoslav Communist lead- ers in Stalin's purges. "Their tragedy was all the 'greater," _2 said, "for their having Wn tortured under the false accusation that they were spies and traitor's, for their having been sent to their death, monstrously accused of crimes they never committed." ? "Misunderstanding" an d "conflict" during World War II, when Stalin "underesti- mated the strength of our, movement and its ability to pass its own decisions." * The Cominform campaign against Yugoslavia from 1948 to 1953, accompanied in East- ern Europe ,by "methods of violence and violation of the ' rule of law, by the stifling of the elementary rights ? of citi- zens, distortion of the truth, the monstrous misuse of prop- da and other wanton ac- "The Comlnform cam- paign," Tito said, "provoked political, economic and ethnic conflicts in various socialist countries" and "helped to spread the cold war." ? Post-Stalinist pressures on Yugoslavia to abandon its in- dependent position, including the 1960 Moscow declaration of 81 Communist Parties which once again attacked Yu- goslavia "arbitrarily and bru- tally." ? Current Soviet attempts to unify the Communist move- ment around some "general line" which, Tito said, must represent "either a dictated or an unprincipled compromise between the very divergent bulwd Moscow today by summarizing 50 years of Yug6. slay Communist history as an unceasing struggle against Kremlin domination, Opening Yugoslavia's 0th Party Congress, Tito shab,Wy, condemned the late Josef Stalin, his associates and hs ,heirs for: views and interests of some parties at the expense of oth- ers." ? Moscow's continuing ef- forts to justify the invasion and occupation of Czechoslo- vakia, which Tito again con- demned as an "outright viola; tion of the sovereignty of a so-1 'cialist country." The 76-year-old Yugoslav President emphasized that his struggle with the Soviet lead- ers was neither personal nor national. Stalin's attack on Yugoslavia, he said, was "the first open conflict between the bureaii-. cratic concepts of a socialist state and the paths to socialist development in the world, evolved in the Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership? which, incidentally, cannot at all be treated merely as some sort of 'personality cult'?and the anti-dogmatic approach, the democratic, humane con- cept of socialist society. . ." "The dilemma faced by the Yugoslav Communists after the war," Tito said, "were no coincidence nor were they only ours . . . They were ac- tually the dilemma of the fur- ther development of socialism ,kenerally, both here and else- where." The Yugoslav' leader spoke several times with obvious contempt of "what is known as the socialist camp," for in both Yugoslav and Russian the word for camp is derived di- rectly from the German "lager," used by Hitler and' Goebbels for their concentra-? tion and death camps. Tito declared triat "the pol- icy of subordination to the temporary state interests and the tactics of Soviet foreign policy did tremendous datnage to various Communist Parties, before the war . . . as well as after it. This kind of policy created bureaucratic relation- ships in the leaderships of the Party . . cutting them off from their own working class and the people of their coun- try." In attacking Yugoslavia in 1948, Tito said, "the Stalinists saw a threat to existing rela- tionships between the socialist countries and to relationships within these countries . . . Those who supported the view that the USSR was the center of revolution and a model of socialism could not reconcile themselves to the tendencies towards independence demon- strated by various parties and movements." Tito skid that, in recalling the Stalinist campaign against Yugoslavia, "we do not do so in order to stir up old passions and hatred against anyone." He recalled Yugoslav sup- port of the 20th Soviet Party Congress in 1056, at which Ni- kita Khrushchev launched "de-Stalinization," and reaf- firmed Yugoslav adherence to the principles of equality and Independence formulated by Khrushchev and himself in the Belgrade declaration of 1955 and the Moscow declara- tion of 1956. "However," Tito continued, "we continue to see that in re-( lations between socialist coun- tries and Communist Parties the principle of internation- alism is sometimes abused so as to impose, in its name, cer- tain one-sided obligations on various parties . . ." After condemning Soviet at- tempts to enforce a new "'gen- eral line" and Kremlin con- duct toward Czechoslovakia, Tito concluded his prepared address in this fashion;' "We, the Communists of Yu- goslavia, do not think we have found the answers to all the contemporary dilemmas of so- __ _ _ cialism and we are aware of the problems, difficulties and shortcomings in the implemen- ' tation of our own policy. Let , the results achieved in devel- opment of new Socialist rela- tions, the degree of humaniza- tion and the freedom of our society, the attainments in im- proving the living conditions of the working people and sat- isfying their material and spir- itual needs, be the yardstick of the correctness and success of our policies and prac- tices . . ." ? In a passage obviously added to his original text, Tito finished by greeting the more than 60 delegations from for- eign Communist, Socialist, So- cial Democratic and third- world nationalist parties. The Rumanian, Italian and most other West European Commu- nist Parties are represented despite a Soviet-bloc boycott. "We very much regret," Tito said, "that certain Communist Parties from the socialist countries, including the Com- munist Party of Czechoslova- kia, canceled their attend- ance . . .01 He concluded that he was accustomed to such behavior "when temporary political mo- tives are involved, but this only heightens the prestige of the Yugoslav League of Com- munists and its historic con- sistency in the eyes of the pro- 'gressive world." Approved For Release 1999/09/92 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 WashinIton Post 17 Ryed For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79- Tuosiai7s ressing' FOr o- ' BELGRADE, March 16? .'we are dred,' a yvuun Yugoslav Journalist re.. ,marked, "of having democ-,, -racy doled out to us from. above, sometimes with an eyedropper, sometimes more generously, but always un- der control. Now the time has come to stop this con- stant waiting for the leader- ship and. to begin pushing for real democracy our- selves." This sentiment, relatively n e w in Yugoslavia, is broadly shared today. Al- though farsighted individu- 'als like 1V1ilovan Djilas rec- ognized the problem -15 ,years ago, they were iso. Djilas spent nine years in prison for having ? expressed "prematurely" :thoughts which are probablY shared today by a. majority of Yugoslav Communists, par- ticularly among the younger, better-educated generation. The process of self-libera.? ?tion from inherited SovieQ dogma has been continuous and gradual. But it was deci- sively accelerated by two! major events in .1968: thei 'massive student uprising here last June, and the drama of Czechoslovakia. from renaissance to military' occupation. , ' The stud ent uprising, which witnessed remarkable.: solidarity ? between students and young professors; and ? among different sections of - the country; has had several' powerful effects. , First, a sorting out: "Everyone got fo know each other very well, and now we. all know exactly who stands where." Although there were, 'small Maoist, Castroite and other utopian groupings, by far the overwhelming ten- dency of the movement?in which hundreds of thousands participated ? was toward democratic socialism. : At the same time, most If not all Party leaders?but- Marshal Tito among them? realized that the younget4 generation was politically engaged, critical, dissatis; fled, impatient?but not sub- versivApproWect FrRelease to the broad socialist eals rarty hag -treanhed if not consistently By Anatole Shub Washington Post Foreign Service practiced. A,Ltnough 1twi ary Luei, no further riots "ordemon- strations, the pressure of the young has continued. The weekly Student has be- come the liveliest and most widely discussed paper ini Belgrade. . The derhands of students and intellectuals generally. were reflected at the just-, ended 9th Party Congress in; numerous. ' for ' ' a. greater role for scientists, specialists, economists, sod.; ologists, intellectuals and, young people generally in framing basic Yugoslav poll.; cies. , There will be an interest- ing test of Party readiness, to grant such a role in the! coming weeks. Belgrade. University students are at; tempting to elect three of: their .most distinguished?; and heretical?professors as deputies to the Federal As- sembly in next month's liamentary elections. .They, would doubtless be elected if permitted to run. Thet question is whether the Party machinesin Serbia will, Intervene to prevent their; candidacies. Czechoslovakia has had an equally deep effect, and not, 'merely in destroying ions about the ?Kremlin:?- What was most/impressive' in the "Prague spring" was .its spontaneous character, the unceasing and many-' sided pressures from below, ?expressed in meetings,"; 'demonstrations, resolutions,! letters and, above all, in the' ,freedom of the Czechoslo-?? 'yak press, radio and?televi-: sion. In a few weeks last March- and April, the Ciechoslovak 'news media attained a de-' gree of freedom which Yu- goslavia (although years ahead 'of "other East .Eu- ropean .press) has yet to at- tain. Czech press freedom was widely, reported and corn-, mented on here. Thus a' growing number. of Yugo- slays, Communists and non- - Communists, journalists and non-journalists, have be- 1999/029i020ovCIA-ROP719-01 swiftest, most direct path to- ..rd calving thio eountry'a CPYRGHT 1200011 v. reeciona truly complex economic, so- cial and ethnic prfAl^-- in freeing the press from all remaining inhibitions?in opening the way for direct; open confrontation of views on even the most sensitive and taboo issues. The debate can no longer. be restricted, many Yufo- slays feel, to Communist leaders both liberal and con- servative, but must be bpeped to thinkers and ex- perts of all persuasions. Marshal Tito, while visit-, tog several editorial offices last month, urged the jour,lik nalists to take greater initia? tives, and the resolutions of the 9th Congress also call for greater press freedom. But. similar promises have 'been made in the past, and , considerably circumscribed In daily practice. The months ahead should show how real the new promises, are. ? Here again, there will be an early test case a the Par- ty's intentions. For this spring, a new book by Dji- las, "The Imperfect So- ciety," will be published in the West. It is not an emo- tional attack on any person, country or party, but a con- templative political-philo- sophical essay. A friend of the" authormh, sums up its possible conse?', quences here as follows: "If Djilas is arrested or even harassed again, it will show 'that we have not made much real progress these last dozeh years. If the hook is completely Ignored, or brushed. off with snide at- tacks and no fair explana- tion of its contents, it will show that we are still stuck somewhere halfway between Stalinism and genuine de- mocracy. "But if the book is pub- lished here or even ex- tracted at length, if its ideas are openly discussed and de- bated, with any serious Yu- goslav political thinker free to agree or disagree publicly and in print, then?no mat- ter how sharp the debate? we will know that we have crossed the Rubicon at last. 194A0005001pOn'h"Illtter the dis- 6 cuss on, 'VW Mer we shall CPYRGHT /24NWSP450-4elease 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A0005001200gP?RGHT Kre lin's Long-Son Communist Summit ? 13y Anatole Shub Washinotoo Post Portion Settles MOSCOW, March 22?The kremlin s. emswe goal of a 'world unity summit 'confer- ence of Communist Parties faded still farther into the fu- ture las the latest preparatory Meeting, involving .67 Parties, ended quietly and inconclu- sively this afternoon. T ii e summit?originally scheduled for last November, later postponed to this coming May?was provisionally set for June 5, which Soviet propa- ganda will doubtless hail for .elomestic consumption as a great victory. However, the participants at this week's .ttneeting, which opened for- mally last Wednesday, sched- uled yet another preparatory ressicin for May 23. Within the next two months, each of the Central Committees of the 67 Parties is to review the basic draft document worked out here, as well as numerous ? amendments which have al- Arcady been submitted. _ ?Observers believe that the heretical and independent Communist Parties, notably ,the Rumanians, Italians and ,rriost other West Europeans, ; have thtui won yet another op- portunity for indefinite delay !,?While the Russians must re- !rmain on their best behavior in ?Czechoslovakia and elsewhere. ,t This we e k's preparatory' meeting, as well as previous sessions and subcommittee, :parleys in a series dating 'back to February, 1068, was 'boycotted by six of the 14 ruling Communist Parties (China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Albania, Cuba and Yugoslavia), plus most other Asian Parties, which are pro. Chinese. Moreover, the Japa- nese, Swiss, Belgian and Norwegian Parties, which at- tended previous preparatory meetings, stayed home this time. ? - _ Of the 67 participating Par- ties, only the eight ruling Par- ties, plus perhaps anotherj dozen, are considerert eignif1-1 cant political movements. Most of the others (like the Approved For Re ' American Communiat have only a few thousand a 13114 w nig A.... .14? derground, exiled or Wit. The basic draft document, which will be sent to the ab- sentees as well as the 'edict. pat-lug parties, is entitled "The tasks of the 'present stage of the struggle against imperialism, and of the unity of action of Communist and Workers' Parties and of all anti-imperialist forces." According to informed Com- munist sources, the document makes absolutely no mention, direct or indirect of China. This would appear to be a re- markable development, con- sidering that the Smilet drive for a world conference was originally-launched by former Party chief Khrushcheri in 1064, and relaunched by his successor Breshnev in 1967, to draw a firm doctrinal line be- tween Soviet orthodoxy and Chinese and other heresies. In view of this month's 'bloody clashes between So- viet and Chinese soldiers on the Uasuri River, Soviet assent to what is being .described as a very bland and vague dacu- trient is not being taken as a sign of strength or self-con- fidence in the Kremlin. Sources report that thd draft document refers to Viet- nam, the Middle Emit, disarm- ?ament and peace ? b u t in .terms sufficiently non-contro- versial to permit at least con- ditional approval by the Ru- manians, Italians.. and. _other Independents. ?.. - Thus, the draft presumably follows what some local cynics term "the UNESCO style" of the Budapest appeal on Euro- peen security,' issued bY the seven Warsaw Pact nations last Monday. That email which pleaded for 000pera- tion in such matters as "hy- giene," as well as a European security conference, managed to earn some 'approval even from the conservative Axel . . Springer newspaper ,chein in West Germany. - ? ? The Budapest appeal ;:was ,epparentlY. !se tepid, fro,* thi ? , ase 1999/09/(12 . CIA-RDIP`7901194A000500i.20CiOlA ' vewpo n o Tem n ant , ' Fr - - - - - I. 1 -: - 1- k ? - - - if --'--i'"a"r' Bonn crusader; that the Soviet leaders felt compelled tonight to reinterpret it. A curiously anonymous state- Ment, issued by the official news agency Tass, declared in the name of the Soviet Party Politburo and ?government Council of Ministers that' the Budapest appeal had "great Importance in view-of the fact that the aggressive imperialist NATO bloc La being activated:" ? The Budapest appeal sal no suchthing, for? the Mime-. nians 'would not, ave. signed if it had. - . . ?' 1 . ? According : to Tess, ? the Politburo and Council - of Mini Inters ? "fully approved thp activity of the Soviet detega!! tion)', at Budapest after discus.? Bing "a report of the .,Soviet. delegation". on tthat meeting. ? Willie the Tasa announced . meat referred only to the Politburo. and Council of Min.': titers, its headline 'declared that the Party Central Com-. . mittee was approving the- Budapest results. Presumably,- the Soviet-Central Committee' _which has not met'etnce last November, ' and then - onyi _ briefly?must be -convened- be: fore May: 23 to discuss '-the basic. draft' on ? "the struggle .. against imperialism." ? , s; ..,,,, -. ? 4 Several of the independent Parties ?represented here,.- et( well as 'outsiders. and -the casse " tive , Czechoslovak's, ..have at)? . parettly been playing for time ? In the hope that, suet'. a 1Cene URI; C, ommittea ? meeting mighn bring changes in Soviet ;0E, icy,. leaders,hip, or lioth.''?vi.-447.* ?.k I I I:, let 4Rf CPYRGHTApproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-011944000500120001-8CPYRGHT r-or solidariti,. with North Viet nam and ti5e yietcong and a de-. claration on the centennial of Lenin's birtivnext year. , While the ,Soviet Union con-' tenders that=fhe purpose of the conference is,to unify the move.' ment ratherethan exeornmuni-; cate any members, the general, belief among Communist ob.' servers is that Moscow intends' to use the cenference to widen the rift 1)eftween Communist Chinaa, and the bulk of the Com- munist movement, including the Soviet Union. , The idea of a world confer- ence of the Communist move- ment originated with Nikita S. Khrushchev before his fall from power irr October; -1964. Mr. Khrushchev's aim was a decla- ration putting the heritical Chi- nese beyond the ;Communist put off lit project for two shchev's successors years.. The idea was revived in November, 1966, and received with considerable coolness by_a_ number of important parties. I The principal objection. and and remains that reading Com; munist China out of the move! merit would restore the Soviet Union as the single principal renter of world Communism. The eerie? of preparatory meetings that began in Buda- pest in February, 1968, set an Oct. 15, 1968, date for the con- ference. That was indefinitely postponed by the invasion, of Czechoslovakia. Last November, a new meet- ing in 'Budapest called for, the conference in May, and set the preliminary meeting that ended today to make the 'final rangements. _ ?.-,, _ . Ulbricht Reports Solid Front special WM* New York Times); ? ; ? ( 7' BERLIN, March 22?Walterl Ulbricht, the,i East German leader, asserted today that all Warsaw Pact countries were unanimous in condemming "Chinese Aggression" at the East-bloc conference in Buda? pest earlier this week. , DIEW YORK TIMES 23 March WORLD RED TALKS PLANNED TO OPEN IN MOSCOW JUNE 6 At Least 6 of 67 Parties Are :-Said to Have Called for , Further Delay ANDTHER PARLEY ADDED Frelinilnary Session May 23 Allow Revisions' in Final Document By HENRY KAMM , &ocelot to The New York Times MOSCOW,, March 22?The conference or tne woild Cuiu munist parties is scheduled to open here on Juno 5, informed Communist sources said today. `The sources said that the dhinese-Soviet border in the Far ?East dispute was the rea- On for a renewed delay in the confertnce, which had been officially announced for May. : In order to avoid the need 'otadopting a major document, of the world Communist move- .ment while the two principal Communist powers were in a _state of open hostility, at least six parties were reported to have moved for a .delay. ? The means they chose, ac- cording to the sources, to de- mand another meeting?set for 'May 23--by the preparatory ;commission, Which has been meeting here since last Wednes, -diy; to put the final touches to the document and set the con- ference date. The purpose 'of the addition al preliminary meeting, in the argument put by the' dissent- ing parties, is to allow the con- ference' to revise the document in the light of suggestions made by the parties between :ion. and May 23. ? Long Delay Sou? ght The principal advocates'. of ,that tactic, according to ?the sources, were the Italian. and British parties. Both parties are in open opposition to the soviet :Union over last year's invasion Of Czechoslovakia .and are be- lieved to favor an indefinite postponement of the world :.conference. 1 With the Soviet Union clear- ly determined to have a con- ',ference, however, Its opponents In the moveinent were thought to be concentrating their' of- ort d on putting it off as ;far .as possible. " The 67-party preparatory I .Commission yielded to the de- Inands and scheduled the May. 23 meeting, according to the .sources: At the same time, it 'provided a major gain for the Soviet-led majority by. setting the date for the ? world con- ference... ' . , , The draft document will be circUlated. to all Communist parties. It is. entitled "The T'n vita fflip PrPRent staee Of toeatruggle Agwinzl. Impt (LI ism and the Unity ,of Action of Communists and Workers Parties and All. Anti-Iniperialist Forces." A communique on the meet- ing that completed' its war today Is expected to be iss,ued tomorrow. According to :4the sources, it will ,reconfirm that all Communist parties, includ- ing those that boycotted ?,the preparatory meeting, would be Invited to the conference. Those boycotting the. talks include six of the 14 'Commu- nist. parties ,that rule .in their, own countries...,They are :China,' Albania, Yugoslavia, North Viet- nam, North Korea and Cuba, None is expected to attend... Reports to ' Be Vague ?' , The document adopted today was reported to be vague enough to make it possible, for those parties that are neutral in the Soviet-Chinese disput, such as Rumania, to sign it, Nonethe- less, Bucharest was reported to have suggested a number of re., visions during the current meet- ing. The world conference N ex- pected to isue three additional declarations: an appeal to all, nations for peace, a statement) 2 M., IND ? His remarks at a congress in East Berlin appeared to con- tradict reports from Budapest saying that. Rumania had re- fused to agree to a condemna- tion of China. "We were unanimous in Budapest in our assessment of those -aggressive acts, all the more' since the Chinese actions were provocations of a clear- cut aggressive and , military nature,' Mr. Ulbricht told the congress of the National Front, the Communist-led popular front or?an iza tion. ? a Ma a ? ??? 8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 Excerpts from Tito's report, 11 March 1969, at the Ninth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia entitled: "Fifty Years' of Revolutionary Struggle of the Communists of Yugoslavia" ....The theoretical discussions on the national question which took place during 1923 and 1924 represented a significant step forward in the efforts of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to adopt correct attitudes and carry out an efficient policy. But there was still a long way to go to a clear program and principled attitudes on this particularly important and delicate question. It is known that the Comintern, and Stalin personally, intervened in the discussion on the national question in our country. Although it sup- ported a positive stand as regards recognition of Yugoslavia's multinational structure, the Comintern with its intervention increased the groping in the dark as regards the practical activity of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. This was particularly the case with the adoption of the stand on the need to break up Yugoslavia, which, according to that stand, was only some kind of artificial structure created by the Versailles Treaty. The Comintern also participated in the adoption of other political attitudes which were not always based on an analysis of reality and the specific situation in Yugoslavia but on various assessments of the Comintern's top leaders -- which in addition kept changing often -- on the situation in our country and in the world in general.... The decision to shift the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia from abroad into the country and to make the party independent in every respect, including financially, was of particular significance in the formation of its correct policy and successful activity. This made it possible for the party to become an independent force of the Yugoslav workers movement, to assess correctly the real situation in the country, to work out an action program, and to apply forms of work which linked the Communist Party of Yugoslavia with the broadest working masses and all its progressive forces. The party, together with the state leader- ship, which was well acquainted with the circumstances there, was in a position to oppose all dogmatic forces in the Comintern which, by refer- ring to former factionalist struggle, proposed the dissolution of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. It became evident, however, that it was the Communist Party of Yugoslavia -- which many in the Comintern in 1938 had already written off -- was in the position to lead the people of Yugoslavia into the liberation war and the revolution in 1941. It was our party -- in which the leadership of the Comintern had no confidence whatever -- that in the fateful days of World War II honorably fulfilled its obli- gations to its peoples and the entire international workers movement. It achieved this under the most difficult conditions by facing the difficulties which came from those who should have helped us most.... Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : eIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 Socialist Yugoslavia itself had to wage a difficult struggle for its independence and equal position in the world, despite the threats, pres- sure, and blackmail of international reaction, both during the war and the early postwar years. The new Yugoslavia was subject to fierce political, economic, and psychological pressure, including pressure 1y countries of the so-called socialist camp which followed Stalin's crit4Osm and attacks on the Yugoslav Communist Party and in the aftermath of the resolution of the Cominform. Today it is known to the entire world that the reasons behind Stalin's attack on Yugoslavia were actually of an entirely different nature from those which were chosen to provide the ostensible occasion for the critique of our party and which, in fact, then foreshadowed a historically inevitable conflict in the international workers movement. The attack on the Yugoslav Communist Party represented the first open conflict between a bureaucratic concept concerning a socialist country and the paths of socialist develop- ment in the world, such as was built in the Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership, which, by the way, cannot be treated merely as a "personality cult," and an antidogmatic approach to and a democratic concept of socialist society, which had come to the fore in the activity of the Yugoslav Communist Party earlier, and especially so after the war. Of course, we did not invent this concept so as to become the inventors of the new "model of socialism," because it had been engendered and molded as a result of specific conditions of revolutionary struggle in our country and deep-rooted changes in the modern world. Events have proved that the dilemmas which faced Yugoslav communists were not something particularly our own. It was demonstrated that they were the dilemmas of the further development of socialism in general, both in our country and in the world, and that they are encountered by many other parties and individual socialist countries. It is known that the Yugoslav Communist Party leadership even earlier, and especially during the national liberation war, occasionally experienced poor understanding and even came into conflict with Stalin's policy. Stalin's policy obviously also reflected belittlement of the strength of our movement and its ability to decide by itself the fateful questions of our development. Such an attitude toward revolution in our country was also an expres- sion of the situation prevailing for many years in the Comintern. This international organization, toward the end of its existence, increasingly became the instrument of USSR policy, or rather Stalin's policy, and respected less and less the independence of individual parties. It is understandable that, after the victory of the October Socialist Revolution, all truly revolutionary movements, ours included, considered as their international debt to give unconditional support to the Soviet Union, the first socialist country. However, the policy of subordination to the momentary state interests of Soviet foreign policy caused on the eve of war and later, not to mention after the war, enormous damage to individual Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :2CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 communist parties. Such a policy created bureaucratic relations in the party leaderships, hampered self-initiative, and, what was even worse, led them to isolation from their own working class and peOple. After World War II, the question of relations with the Soviet Union and relations in the international workers movement in ge4eral became even more topical, because in many countries communist partiescame to power and were faced with the need to find the most suitable way fot:developing socialist social relations. Stalin did not recognize the'W'specific conditions of the sociopolitical development in our counti:iir. In our independence, in the independence of the party, in the deMOcratization and humane relations in socialism, the Stalinist saw a danger for the existing relations between socialist countries and also .for the relations inside these countries. The popularity of the Yugoslav Communist Party and the interest in our experience in other countries and communist parties was obviously in Stalin's way, although we never tried to impose it either then or later. The champions of the idea that the USSR is the center of revolution and an example of socialism could not, it seems, reconcile themselves with the trend of making individual parties and movements independent. This is why it was necessary to compromise the League of Communists of Yugoslavia before the international workers move- ment, denounce it for all alleged betrayal of socialism and transformation into "a counterrevolutionary agency of imperialism," and thus check it in its further independent socialist development, which was the basic meaning of the Cominform action. If we recall today this period, which was certainly the most difficult in the postwar development of Yugoslavia, and for many of us communists the most difficult in the long revolutionary work, we do not do this because we would like to fan old things and hatred against anybody. We have always consistently striven for better and equal relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, emphasizing that the differences in the ways of building socialism should not be a barrier for cooperation but, on the contrary, an impetus to sincere exchange of opinion and experience. In this sense we supported the attitudes of the libe 20th CPSU Congress that each country should find its own way to socialism, that the richness of forms in building socialism no longer mattered and, on the contrary, was strengthening the international workers movement, and that the relations between communist and workers parties and progressive movements must be based on equality and actual mutual respect. The campaign against socialist Yugoslavia and everything which fol- lowed it had serious repercussions for many parties and for the develop- ment of individual socialist countries. Particularly serious harm was done by methods of oppression and infringement of legality, suppression of the citizens' elementary rights, distortion of the truth and monstrous misuse of propaganda, as well as many other actions. This caused Approved For Release 1999/09/023. CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 political, economic, and ethical conflicts in individual s?cialist countries, contributed to fomenting the cold war, and seriously undermined the con- fidence in socialism among many people in the world. In 1948 we were advised by some people, allegedly in he interest of pnity in the international workers movement, to accept these iniquitous accusations, and, for the same reason, to submit to the resolution of the Informburo. The evolution of events confirmed that we were right when we refused to accept this advice because such a capitulation would have amounted to opportunism and betrayal, not only of our rev4ution and our working people whose unbounded confidence we enjoyed, but also the interests of the international workers movement and socialism in general. We can freely assert that in defending the independence of socialist Yugoslavia and the right of each party to its own development, we acted with full responsibility before our peoples and before the international workers and socialist movement. I am stressing because the Yugoslav League of Communists on several subsequent occasions found itself in situations in which it was asked, for the sake of alleged higher interests of the international workers movement, to renounce its ideas and viewpoints, to support an international policy which ran counter to its assessments and to the objective interests of the broad socialist and anti-imperialist movement in the world. One document of this policy is in the declaration of the 1960 con- ference of communist parties in Moscow, in which the League of Communists was again attacked in an arbitrary, crude manner. However, the develop- ment of events has itself eloquently refuted this unprincipled attitude toward Yugoslavia and many other attitudes contained in that resolution, justifying at the same time our doubts about the value of such documents.... However, we continue to witness the practice whereby, in the relations between socialist countries and communist parties, the principles of inter- nationalism are at times misused for the purpose of imposing, in its name, various unilateral obligations on individual parties, as if internationalism were not, before everything else, a reflection of every party's conscience and awareness of the connection between its interests and the international struggle against reaction and imperialism. Attempts are made in the name of internationalism to justify the compulsoriness of some "general line" which, judging from experience thus far, represents either a diktat or an unprincipled compromise between very different concepts and interests of one group of parties at the expense of other parties and movements, which objectively prevent individual parties and movements from seeking their own forms of struggle and solutions in realizing their revolutionary goals. In the name of the alleged higher interests of socialism, attempts are made to justify even the open violation of the sovereignty of a socialist country and the adoption of military force as a means of pre- venting independent socialist development. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 This interpretation of socialism has a grave effect 9n the policy of the communist parties and other progressive forces, as well as on the inter- national anti-imperialist front in general.... ? Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :5CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 "In Honor of the 50th Anniversary of the Creation of the Third Communist International: the Great School Of Internationalism," by Candidate of Historical Sciences, A. Shpynov, Selskaya Zhizn (Rural Life), 2 March 1969. The First (constituent) Congress ef the Communist internationol, convened at the initiative of v.1. Lenin, was held exactly half a century ago in Mosi,ou. The creation of the Third Communist International it an outstanding event in the history . of the freedom struggle of the world proletariat and its vanguard, the 'iY,kci St movement. . The activity of the Comintern continued until 191if). AlLhougn a quartei cf a etitury has elapsed since then, interest in itt history has not decreased but rLiner, increased in recent years. A study of documents, and especially of documents worked out .dith the participation of V.I. Lenin, and an analysis of the theoretical and practical activity'or the Comintern help one gain a better understanding of the sources of the present growth in the political influence of tne world communist movement and raoilitate deeper 'clarification of the natural laws of Its development and consideration for ? everything positive in the accumulated experience of the communist and workors-partierl-;? It must be noted tha': the history of the Comintern is being studied very attentivelz. by the enemies of communism and the revisionists striving to defame its revolution?:1 traditions, falsify its ideas, and undermine the unity of tho world communItc movement. Therefore it is the most important duty of natinnal groups and of the entire world rommunttlt movement to adopt a correct ;Tproach to evaluating the hintorical or the COmintern and itr, heritage, pint; pie, 0110 traditions. The Communist International arose at a historical nere:;sity because of the dcvilopment of scientific socialism and the international worker movement. Two circumstances played a decisive role in preparing and creating the Comintern. First, tl'e revolutionary struggle of the Bolsheviks led by V.1. Lenin against reformism and "centralism" of members of the Second international for uniting-leftist - elements in all countries. Second, the powerful revolutionary influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution on all countries throughout the world, the stormy .revolutionary upsurge of the working masses in most of the countries or :Western Europe and Ameriea, and the upsurge of the national freedom 3truggle in .coloniel and dependent countries. As Clara Zetkin, an outstanding figure in the international prolei.arian movement, noted, the Communist international 'was "not only the creation of a revolutionary time, but also the true child of the revolution itself?the Russian Revolution, the first gigantic forecaster of the ' pm .ietarian world revolution." In fact, the 'real grounds for creating the new Communist International appeared after the victory of the Oct,lber Revolution when the communist parties began to appear. 'The appearance of the first communist parties and cummnoist mr90K; created the :need for an International communist organization. The CFS(J took charge of practical work fir forming and uniting these communist organizations and groups into a new Communist International. V.I. Lenin wrote that "Bolshevism had created the ideological and tactical foundations of the Third International, which was many proletarian and communist and included. both the achiciiment of the peaceful epoch and the experience of the revolutionary period that bud begun. " (complete Collected Works. Vol 37, page 304) The Comintern can be called a creation of Leninis genius in the true senac of the word. The very idea and plan for creating the Comintern as a counterweight to the Second Internatiwial, which had ,nmffered ideulOgical 171(1-political-collapse, belonged to V.1. Lenin. Lenin performed an en)rnms am.unt A' truly titanic work, gradually preparing the nucleus of internationalists in the worker mavement which thArpOridvVa PoTermentoxesin:cetAIRrapneomeitpamootal000tla,- 1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 generalized all the international.and Russian experience ef the revalutienary struggle, ereated the ideulogical,and theoretical platform ef the ComlnU,rn. formulated the vital questions of the political strateu and tactics of the international communist movement, and developed its urganizataonal principles. V.I. Lenin was the acknowledged leader of the world eommunist movement. A central place in the work of the congress was accupied by V. I. Leninls report "On Bourgeoia Demacracy and the Dictatorship af the Proletariat." The report gave a scientific generalization of the experience of the international worker movement and established the main tasks, strategy, and tactics of the international communist movement in the new historical epoch that and begun--the epoch of the transition from capitalism to socialism. V.I. Lenin unmasked the bourgeois and sacial- Teformist efforts to defend bourgeois democracy under the banner of "democracy . in general" or "pure democracy," deeply revealed its class essence, and showed that 'beurgeais democracy is a form of bourgeois dictatorshap. Lenin urged the communist. ;parties to unmask the false nature of bourgeois democracy and lead the struggle of the proletariat and all exploited masses for the victory of the socialist revolution and for a Soviet-style proletarian dictatorship as a truly people's demarracy. The mintern determined that pratecting the warld's first proletarian state was its dast Important international task, considering the Saviet Union as the center of the warla revelutian. fritie theories of V. I, Lenin and the resolution proposed by him were unanimoualy approved and adopted by the first congress as basic programmatic documents and as militant leadership in action. The first clear example of the collective, creative cooperation between represen- tatives of various communist parties, as represented by the first congress which elaborated the ideological and political platform of the Comintern under V.I. Lenin's leadership, appears particularly significant when one looks hack over the last 50 years. This platform analyzed imperialism from a Marxist position, revealed the nature of the new epoch, incarnated Lenin's ideas about tne conditiono for the victory of the socialist revolution and the political and class allies of the proletariat in the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, and so on. The adoption of the platform and the approval of Lenin's resolution on bourgeois democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat was evidenee of the fact that the international communist unity was founded on tee firm Ideological and theoretical base of Leninism. Lenin. wrote: "The world historical significance of the Third Ommailiat Taternational Lies in the fact that It inclnord new uommunist,parties." The GomIntern ma: 1 a. praotical school of Leninism and a schnol of the masses' politleal leadership in the young parties, and it helped them acca and find ways to eombine adialectical principles Ind flexibility in their poliey and to auald that polica on the basis of the peofound scientific analysis of social. development. V.I. aonin showed extreme concern rr the establishment ana development of communist partice, educated their leading eadres, and taught them to always pr end in their actions from a sober and strictly objective consideration of all the warli economic and poLitical fact:opt, and a consideration of the distribution of the elaaS forces in their own country and in the world arena. Prom its fleet steps the Comintern, guided by 1,r:flints ideas, helped the young communist part-lea in a practical manner to master ail forms of sur ugale--leaal and II. Loa I, pcarefuI and nonpeacefui, . parliamentary and nonparTiamentary?to be ready fee a very vapid, unexpected changc from one form of ?struggle to another, and to consider not only the possibility for changing to- the attack, but also for withdrawal. V. I. Lenin aavised thL Comintern and the communist parties always to obtain the support ,f the masses and the working class in their tactical moves, to show constant concern for the masses, to be in vale:Jo contact with them, to work wherever the masses were, and to learn the art of bratiging the masses into revolutionary combat against the beurgeoiale, instructing them on.the basis of their own experience. s'P'oV&1P? Refeffib 1f999/09182,4 GlieteRDP(79,0*-464AGeozaolgoaoi -8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 Inteict a it a Leninist corsisteney and resolution at all stages of its existence. it to en.digh La remember the proletarian solidarity movement with awiet Russia, the Chinese revolution, republican Spain: and the people Is national liberation struggle in various countries. This tradition is being cintinued by the present international communist movement. An example of this is the resolute censure or imperialist, aggress Ion in Vietnam, the Arab oast, and ethen places ln the world, The Cominternls most important principle and legney Is to r1,:ht against open :revisionism of every- hue within the ranks of the communist movement and also against opportunists, sentarians, and dogmatists; to protect the riw!ity of Marxism-Leninism from being distorted and debased by its nnpurtunisto and 'sectarians: and to creatively develop and propagandize the MirxIst Leninist niadir the new conditions:if the class strnggle Jur inc, tie From the first day of its formation the Comintern displayed a Leninist impatience toward any manifestations of national egoism in the communist environment and fought ,resolutely against efforts to counterpose national tasks against general international' tasks. Proletarian internationalism, which permeates the entire activity of the Comintern, demands the correct combination of .the interests Dr the proletarian struggle In one 'country with the interests of this struggle on a world scale. The Comintern considered its primary, most important task the struggle against opportunist, nationalist, and petit-bourgeois distortions of the concept and tactics. of internationalism. The restoration and strengthening of the international links of the working class in all countries that had been broken by the leaders of the Second International, and the education of the communists and workers of all countries in a spirit of proletarian internationalism. Continuing and developing the traditions of the Comintern, the communist and wcrkers parties have, in the process of collective creative cooperation, elaborated a general political line of conduct and new practical forms for coordinating their activtties in the struggle for peace, national independence, democracy-. and socialism! bilateral and multilateral meetings of the representatives of cumionnisL parties anti international conferences. The conferences are a natural form by which independent parties having equal rights can agree on common positions concerning urgent present-aay questicals. It is completly understandable that the goals of every communist party cdnrerence. Imust correspond to the concrete tasks of the historical time, the urgent demands of the struggle, and the interests of the entire communist movement. An important role In developing the common positiLAs of the communist movement at the present !!;tagt,..tind the new forms of international communist relations was,pl,ayed hy thr cisnerrtices held In Moscow In 1957 and 1960. The main Ideas Gttt out In the .documents if these conferences passed the practical tests of the revolutiohary :;truggi:7 with honor, Th-a pre:!cht omplex and dAngevcAis world situation demands that vemmuniats theomnr,ut the woviii .ncrease their responsibility for the fate uf poacP, iceialism, and utmecricy, and that they closely unite and strengthen international party unity. in this connection, it is very important to note that the preparatory work for the: new internaticnal conference of communist and workers parties, planned for May 1969, has entered .its concluding stage. The new conference will be devoted to examining a very urgent problem: the tasks Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 3 of thppricnAd Fpr Rieleasc 1 p 1111 la cm e a ins p e r ??; 111WXYDPACM)124/Cg)141, ccrraro.lni3 tr i.i tilt:: struegle , and the search for ways to achieve unity of action of .cnroLunist ,Hy? workers parties and of all anti-imperialist forces. The MU considers -1-1-1/:?crecarato and nzading of the conference as the main link in the struggle to - ur.11,6: the w5rt d c t muvement at the present stag,k!. Tu. Lenrilit Lra:11L.Lons embodied in the Comintern and the very rich experience acc.urrt...tiated Lif It during its quorter of a century of struggle against imperialism, ar.,1 opportunism are "--f 1.atsurpasseti importance and serve as the golden b'soLf th..! w2rld co:anoln is t movement . SELSKAYA ZHIZN 2 March 1969 K exaalaisi atcihfe/tiieztgzijiiead I. ? . CPYRGHT ..41"4.04E .11figOlA," IMTEPIllAZNEM AN 3: fdil p 08110 110ABEKA nama. a Morima a cocromca sepnbril (ripemrreAl.- MIA) KO0IrpeC0 Kommykuscragecxoro Iltrrepnatosoama. cos:tan:1mi Go ama- ss:ark:De B. II. Aeanna. Co3aaesie Tperb- ero, Kommymacrageotoro Htrrepaanno- nana ? Dblaksomeeca co6brrae a acro- pun ocDoGoattrem,noil 6opb6u anipoao- ro apmerapaara a ero asattrapAa ? 3commvuncrage CX OM A BIS >ICC HIM. TeAbriOCTb Komi:I.:Teens upoao.k6- 3Kmach Ao 1943 roan. 14 xors c 'rex nop (MOIRA? gereeprik :taxa. Illarepec scropm ero a noc.Aeanna roau se ymernanaerca, a aomacraer.- 1,13vgesike AOKyMBLITOB, ocoGenno shipa6crrattabsx C riacinem B. H. Aenana. anaAa3 reo- pernvecxoll a nparnriecxo2 aekrremk- noon: Kommrrepna nomorator Aygme TIOELRM RCTOtIMIKR pocia no.usra4ecx0. TO BARARVIK Milposoro KOMMVIIRcru- liecKoro eanmetras na cospemennom vine. cnoco6craver 6o/tee rav69womv yncneurso oaxouomepkocreii ero 1103. 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B. 11 Ae- : min conerosaA Kommriermy IT KOT.113O0- IMAM I Tax7nc1ecanx ycranonaax ricer. 48 no maccu, na patiognil rAacc. nocroanno sa6orirrbcn o maccax ii 6r.rTb commis B recnoii c0n311. pabo- Tan ecxxsy H se3se. ree ecrb maccw. rrayarrrbca ncayccrBy noesoerrrb match; x Deaomonnomnra 6nTnam c 6vp,av- 43nefl, oGynaa nx Tra nx co6cramtnom ?awry. Bupamai aopennue torrepeda .rpy- eanntxca macc. Kommrrepu c "Lamm- cam) nocAeeonaTeetirocrwo n yearn- TCA1,11(TCTLIO 3aammaii ox ntrrepecw HO BCCT 3Tanax espero cymecrBoaannn. AOMOT0.010 acnomrurrb ermacenne npo- -aerapcxois coaneapnocrn c Couercaoa PoccneA e arrraficaoil periomonneil, ic pecrryt Anaancao9 Ficnanneri, c na- unorldAbt10-0C13060ARTelLbtloa 6opt.6o9 napoeon pnea crpan. Dry rpaAnnmo npo,soexaerH coopemennoe 1.1eXAVITa. 00;11100 aommytincrimecxoe ABPDKCIII1C. np111,1C0 romy - pemareat,noe ?Cl/MAC- /1110 mmepnaencrmrecaoii arpeccnn Bo Bliername. 113 Apn6c/com Bocroae A paAe epyrnx nynx-roa 3emnoro 111808. ' ri,oxneFinnil nonminn Ii 3aneinanne KoNnirrrepaa - 60ph60 nporun orapw. Toro peBn3nonn3ma ,scex macrell a pa- sax' mnp000ro rommviincrunecaoro AB113Kell11/1. d raaate nporna 01117OPTV. 1111CTOB, cearaIrroll 0 aormartmos:, nuira ,131CTOT1s1 map KETI3M8.Aellif IM3Ma OT n3spau3enus n 3nomeenna era on- nornyuncramn H -cerranramn: reopqe- caoe pa3arrrue iv nponaransa mapacn- crcao-aenlincaoll navan B noswx VC. 806113111 KAOCC0002 600b661 8 napalm 06. mero R011311Ce aanirraen3ma. C nepnoro ORR 050830138111111 Komnn? Term 1.10,ACHIITICK13 nponeena nerepim? mocrb ic aio6um 111305113ACH11104 nanno- naebnoro 310113148 a nommynnc-rulecaoff cpeee. peunrreiiblio 6opoaca (morns normrrox npormonocraBeerms tiarma naemmix saeaq o6nrum mrrepnauno- tMAbHUM 3aeanam. rIpoAera pcann nurepnannonaen3m. nporm3unammnit BOO 13C6TeAMIOCTb Komlurrepna rpe6yer npaanebnoro co- neranna lurrepecoa nponerapcmoti 6opb- 6w a oenog crpane C enrepecamn yroa :6opt6hr ao acemnpnom macurr86e. ! Boph6y c onnopmincrugecairmn, na- mionaencrunecanmn n memancanmn 113. apamennamn rromrrna Ii ram= nnrep- naun0naen3m8. aocc-ranoseenne Hva- pen.aenne eurreptiannonnehnwx cosmeti pa6overo Reacca scex crpan, paaopnan- Irrbrx aneepamn VirrrepnatIMMAAa, laocnirranne aommvrincroo a pa6onnx , ocex crpan a erre npoAerapcaoro repnannonaen3m8 Komnirrepa p8ccm8r- nep000nepeeno2 sanKneftmeit caoml 38eana. Ilpozioeman n ' pamununt 'mammas 11.Z;mnrurepna. Kommynncrngecrne paiSogne naprnn a rsponecce KO-VICK. minor? Trioprarcaoro corpvernmecrna nupArioraAn 06111\90 110AUTIPICCKVIO ? noBeAcnna n nonue npaRrune- CICI1C ci,opmw Kooptnnaunn C13011X AO- c-ranil 6ophrie la mnp. 38 nannonaAb- moo II dorm. 33 ACMOK03T1TIO n connas113,4 - ARVM0001111110 11 Cll.' 0;11 nocAcra rmree ^omn3p.-A, me:KAvIlanoenwe Cono.,1.1- unit. 17plinem cortemanna 1311M1/11310? rax ecrecrueunas tt)opma coreaconanna oGnutx coinriii 4e?onnottpaonu- n camocroaTeAmomn 1330111$13111 no aaryaehm.rm sonpocam conoemennocrn. Bnonne ammo, .1110 neen aasaeoro c00ernann9 R01,41111prn0 50/1.1f 061 Mae. ?IdTb R011Kpernwm 321.8.398311 0CT01311.10. CK0f0 ,momenTa. IIKTV3Ab1116114 norpe6.- uocrnm 60rm661. IIIITCDCCOM scare Kola- myuncrunecaoro eaimenna. Ba3anyio P0Ab ? pa3pa6orxe (Annus 0031111112 KOMMYHTICTII4CCK010 ernmenns na cou- pemennom 3rane n nooux (boom nurep- naunonaebnux coalmi Kommvnucros curpaea Conemanna. cocronsmneca 1957 6 8 1960 roeax s Mocana. Genoa- Ewe Keen. naaomennue e eoavmenTax 3Tnx Conemanna. C geCTIITO nweepstaen ncribrramia nparrnan peD0A1Ounonno2 6ophOw. Hume ceoxna.a. onacnan obcranooxa ? mnpe rpeGver or aommvnucroe seen) mupa 13081,1113C/11111 OTOpTCTOCHHOM11 ,381 c'YeE.61.1 mnpa. connaensma iieemoapa. ran. recnoro caaotienns? a vapenaenna mrrepnaunonaabnoro eanncroa naprnik? B C511311 C 3T1114 09C113. Basuto ormerwri.? ?irro noeraromrreebnas pa6erra .a My memAYnapoenomv Copal:minim Row. mvuncrirtrecanx n pabonnx nalmln. no- megennomy na man 1969 rosa. nervnnea ^ 3813Cpuunourvio crams). H013011 co aetnanne nocantuaerca oaccmorpernuo 0,1011b alcryaAbnoil apo6nemw sae& gam 6oph6u c tomeonaen3mom. cope-. ee.Aeinno Doan n macro s Troll 6oph6a aommyuncroa. 0011CK8H arreil eocrn- *enn esnncrna aencrnnil KOMS1V11131., crnnecanx n p36onnx nalyrnit, 'Kea an- rmomermaancrugecanx cii. Kncc paccmarpnnaer noercrronay a trammed- nne COSC111011112 KOK C1CUTT/O141.1108 3/10. no Gopi.6u sa crutolennocri, mnponoro aomminnicrwiecaoro einmenns na CO3. 00340/11104 33.3178. Aemnicane rpaentinn? camanninneca ? Kommrrepne. u 6orareiinnul onhrr, naxoneennwa 1334 sa garnet:as noxa cnoca 60131.61.1 !MOTH? HP.ITICHIVIAII3MO. ?Maam3m& ormoorvniiima. umetor ? no- npexoentnce 3nageime, nnemorca 30. AOT1,0?1 11:1011.80,4 mnponoro KommynlICTIP necaoro Auwacrulx? AL rummon. aanArtAar Ircropunecaux nay& Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001'-8 5 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 Chapter VI from Impressions of Lenin, by Angelica Balabanoff, Ambassador Books, Ltd., Canada, 1964. (Angelica Belabanoff was deply and idealistic- ally involved in the international workers' movement ar6Und the time of World War I, at which time she became associated with Lenin. She acceded to his urging that she become Secretary of the Comintern at its founding. She broke with Lenin and the Comintern when she became onvinced there was no hope of the Cordntern's becoming anything more than 4 tool for the cynical purposes of Lenin and his cohorts.) VI Secretary of the International Although Lenin's aim, from the very beginning of World War I, was the foundation of a new International, and all his overt and hidden strategy was guided by this desire, the foundation of the third International came to him, as well as to his closest collaborators, almost as a surprise. Speaking to me about it, Lenin had already a priori excluded the possibility of getting a sufficient number of dele- gates to Russia to establish there the coveted Third Inter- national. In the meantime, however, some members of the Executive Council of the Russian Communist Party (Zino- viev, Radek, and Bukharin, with the consent and aid of Trotsky and Lenin) tried to obtain by fraud and deception what they had not been able to obtain by normal and honest means. Since only one delegate, the German Eberlin, had answered Chicherin's call, the Bolsheviks put on a farce: they assem- bled members of parties in countries already belonging to Russia, such as Latvia and Lithuania, who were, in fact, members of the Russian Communist Party and did not enjoy, herefore, any autonomy. They called in prisoners who for years had not had any contact with their countries and a few 'emigrants who had left their countries for one reason or an- other and had lived in Russia for a long time. Among the thirty-five assembly members only one had the political right to represent his country and to vote as its delegate. This was the Spartacist Eberlin; he was in possession of a regular mandate. As soon as he realized how contrived the situation was, he publicly declared that in such an assembly no delib- eration could be taken since this gathering could not be con- sidered a constituent assembly for a new International. Thus, it was decided that the meeting was to serve merely as an exchange of ideas. The next day, however, members of the Russian Commu- nist Party, with the usual shrewdness, proposed that the deci- 1The Spartacist League, to which the German left-wing Socialists .belonged, was founded in 1918 in Berlin by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. Later, it was replaced by the Communist Party. The two founders were murdered by the Germans in 1919. CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/021: CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 . CPYRGHT , sions ot the day fferore le a' nnulle-d. They announced gat Approved For c case in n nn n 500120001-8 1 1 an event had taken place which would change the situatiton 1 . completely: the whole of Europe was in revolutionary kr- ment. As it turned out, it was a Bolshevik bluff. A prisoper of German extraction, who, during and after the Revolution ha1 been living in Russia, where he had become a fent Bo shevik,2 had been sent by Radek to Germany for prdpa- ganda action. After the maturation of the deceitful pl2in, whose aim was the creation of a new International, the BO1- sheviks called him back. The enormous difficulties of illegal travel at that time caused him to arrive one day late in Moscow, when the voting had already taken place. He was asked to address the assembly. Partly out of naivete and partly because of the instructions received from Radek, he gave a glowing account of what he had seen and heard: everywhere enormous enthusiasm for the Bolshevik revolu- tion, the workers ready to follow its example, the new Inter- national in the hearts and hopes of all. The voting?shrewdly engineered by the Russian delegates, Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev, and a few others?was this time in favor of an immediate constitution of the new International, in spite of the German delegate's opposition (he was the only one in possession of a mandate) and to the surprise of the others. Since I had declared I would abstain from the vote, there was an exchange of written messages between Lenin and myself containing some severe criticism of my action. "Why don't you vote? You have so many mandates from the Italian Socialist party, you are more than authorized to vote for it; and then, you read Avantil, you are informed." I wrote my reply on the same note: "No! My mandates are not sufficient ' to commit the Italian Party in such a decisive action." "You are making a mistake; in your capacity of secretary of the Zimmerwald Movement you have the right, even the duty, to vote for the Italian Socialist Party.* "I cannot agree with you," I countered. 'I have no direct contacts in this moment with the Italian Party. . . . Here we can decide, protected by the Red army, we are in power. But there, in the capitalist countries, the situation is quite different. I cannot make others assume such grave responsi- bilities without their being able to discuss them first." I was not aware at the time of what was hidden behind the unexpected and illegal proclamation of the new Interna- tional, and I was impatient to return to the Ukraine to work among the masses far from officials and Moscow officialdom. When I met Trotsky in a corridor of the Kremlin, I said good-bye to him. "What, you are going to leave?" he burst out. "You know you have been nominated secretary of the , International!" "I? Not in the least! Let me do my work among the masses . . ." . 2 Not long after his return to Russia, he left the Bolsheviks, disgusted Approved FdthiktifgOOttggtitiN1)612?.t PAVID11671913311W4A00c,500120001-8 ? V Approved For Melase 14)991(19192ne CaliAbROF173914a tfit4hdiQP5 Come with me to Comrade Lenin, he is around here. He will tell you what the Central Committee has decided." From the manner in which Lenin received me, I under- stpod that he had not forgiven my insubordination. I decided ; to come right out with it: "Comrade Trotsky tells me yp want me to take the post of secretary of the International, ibut I ask you to be excused. As long as the work was very Idifficult and taxing, especially in war time, I have never re. fused. Now the secretariat is in a Socialist country, the pro- cedures are normal again; you can find replacement for me." Lenin gave me one of his characteristic looks. "Comrade Balabanoff, discipline must exist for you also . . ." "What does this mean? It was you who advised me to transfer to the Ukraine! I have not even started work there, and you make me return here already. And my commit- ments toward Comrade Rakovsky? And then, all my books and the things I need are already in Kharkov!" "I shall inform Comrade Rakovsky that you are more neces- sary here than in the Ukraine, and I shall have your things sent back here immediately," Lenin said firmly. While I was still remonstrating, Lenin added in an even firmer tone: "The decision, by the way, was taken by the Central Committee, not by me personally." This way of his of attributing to the Central Committee decisions that had been suggested by him was known to me. It meant the decision was final. No sooner had I returned to my hotel room than the phone rang: "The Party's Central Committee informs you of your appointment as secretary of the International. Vladimir Ilyich has informed Comrade Rakovsky that your presence is urgently needed here and that you cannot return to the Ukraine. At the same time, Comrade Lenin has sent word that your things are to be shipped back here." The evening of the day after the proclamation of the Third International a meeting was held in one of the largest Moscow theaters with the participation of the foreign "dele- gates." One can hardly imagine the state of mind of the masses streaming to that convocation. Isolated from the world for so long, they thought they could finally see that prom- ised ray of light, finally hear that long-awaited voice of solidarity that would bring them the liberation promised by their leaders. This joyful anticipation was in the air, one sensed it in ? the people's eagerness to get seats in the hall, in the out-; cries of joy over the possibility of seeing the representatives of the hoped-for world revolution. I admit, this euphoria was transmitted to me to the extent that I identified myself with some of the speakers in translating their addresses. I ? felt that my words struck the listeners' conscience, creating a response that transformed the ball. I too was transformed. I seemed to see before me the protagonist of that epic revo- lution that was destined to create a new world. I was almost grateful to Lenin and Trotsky for hvinz sklizqd e tg FQ1ErgektaagginW09/02 . C IA-RD P /U-Oilu4Au005 Approved CPYRGHT 00120001-8 3 1)0120001-8 Approved For Kiifige'159)04/13sitrir! eiA-RDFic*oini194A000 of e speakers addresses I perceived a strident, demagogic note, something that had a false ring. I could not and woUld not identify myself with the speaker, and I gave a lifeloss, limp translation of his speech, instinctively omitting all that had rung false to me. As soon as the translation was finished, Trotsky came up to me: "Anything the matter, Comrade Angelica? This last translation did not seem to come fcom yon . . ." I said nothing, but I decided not to translate any nre official speeches in Russia. I kept my resolution. Never have I consciously been an accomplice to a fraud. ,The speaker who had caused me so much revulsion was one of the most unconscionable accomplices of Bolshevism. This man, Fritz Platten, a Swiss living in Russia, was shot, accord- ing to press reports, some time later. I was just going to take up again my activity as secretary of the Zimmerwald Movement when I received news that the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party had appointed Zinoviev president of the International. In select- ing him for the office of president, Lenin was guided by one Principle: to put at the head of the International a man who would lend himself to being a tool in the hands of the Central Committee. My appointment as secretary was designed to attract to the new International Socialists of other countries for whom my name warranted integrity and impartiality. Lenin, who counted Zinoviev among the most faithful executors of his orders, knew well every aspect of his char- acter. Lenin asked Zinoviev to do for him things he would not have done himself. True, Lenin treated him with that camaraderie, that trust, which many years of underground work amid serious difficulties had established between them, but he never had, nor could have had, any esteem for him. This was borne out by the fact that in 1917, on the eve of the October Revolution, Zinoviev, for the first time in a posi- tion of direct responsibility, left Lenin's side and opposed the seizure of power. Lenin disowned him, denouncing his vileness and his cowardice?a particularly grave accusation against a revolutionist of that time. I soon realized, not without surprise, that our sessions be- gan and ended with the dispatch of administrative matters. One day I brought this matter up with Vorovsky, who had been assigned to me as collaborator?as I found out later? so that he might influence me and mitigate my intransigence, given our friendship and the esteem in which I held him. "Is it possible," I said to him, "that everything ends up as a bureaucratic institution? To tell you the truth, Vaclav Vacla- vich, I feel ill at ease. Why have they insisted so much on my taking this job? . . . I do nothing useful here." "Dear Angelica," Vorovsky said, looking at me with his wistful eyes, a subtle smile on his face, "you have only one fault, which is a suality, ? erha is: ou know the Interna- ? ? ? ? j . ra- ? I ?,,lia Approved 14 CPYRGHT 0120001-8 0120001-8 Approved Fo sl er um 1 Rtielnekg)g 11.190W/01 dierArsIntroxillnom is onest, you refuse to co laborate witf him. At one of the meetings of the Executive Committee of the International Zinoviev announced radiantly: "I have good news. Our situation is so good that we have decided to estab- lish a branch of the Communist International in the Ukraine, a very important location for future relations with comrades abroad. Comrade Balabanoff %yin be in charge of this office. She will be aided by highly qualified collaborators." "Comrade Balabanoff?" I cut in. "But why do you send me elsewhere again? I have hardly started my new job . . ." "Of course, Comrade Balabanoff," countered the president, of the International. "We need a great name for a position - of such responsibility, do you want us to send there just ; any comrade?" , "These are not arguments to be taken seriously," I replied, I determined not to consider the invitation extended to me. ; But Zinoviev went on to ask me when I was going to leave. 'To put an end to this situation I went to Lenin, confident of ,his support, in the belief that he considered my stay in Mos- 'cow of greater usefulness than the activity in the Ukraine. ' Instead, Lenin said to me: "In the Ukraine, it will be easier for you to establish contacts with foreign countries; and then, why should we keep in Moscow our best propa- ganda forces, our best speakers?" Since I persisted in my refusal, I was called to confer with the secretary of the Party. "We have found a most interesting assignment for you," he told me. "You shall be the leader of a propaganda train leaving for Turkestan." "Why Turkestan?" I burst out. "Is that a joke? I know neither the country nor the psychology of the people, who, no doubt, are very primitive; my propaganda work would be wasted there. Besides, very few understand Russian." "But we need a famous name, like yours," he countered. "I am not a prima donna," I said, turning to the door, "and I don't want to be treated like one!" I soon realized that everything was already arranged for my travel. The mem- bers of the Turkestan expedition called on me to read their report, asking for my approval. I let them go on, partly out of politeness and partly because I liked the kind of work which gave me an opportunity to learn many things. One day, a Communist woman who had shown great friendship for me, put me on the alert. "Watch out! This is a trap that Zinoviev has set. He wants to get rid of you." Much later I learned from the wife of Vorovsky, the first Russian Soviet ambassador to Italy, that her husband?a RUN HT 'At that time in Russia there were trains built and used exclusively for propaganda purposes. These trains were ultra-modern and con- sisted not only of cars for the accommodation of the Moscow emis- saries (two members of each commissariat, whose task it was to super- vise and instruct the local commissariat leaders), but also of a printing car for the publication of daily bulletins and of a movie car. I was to direct the collective work at each stop of the train in important towns ' and to deliver the introductory and closing speech. Approved For Rpipasp qgqingin9 ? CIA-RnP7q-nii cutAnnns 120001-8 5 Approve ).&)0120001-8 Bolshevik of the old guard with whom I had worked in Stockholm during the most tragi_c and decisive months for d Fotn(PyeisaRsevaafiWtOZa:dgArcRgirePrktikANI0 really let this woman die in Turkestan?" The typhus epi- demic that raged there at the time and the poor sanitary conditions of the towns in which our propaganda train was to stop made the probability of contagion extremely high. I wanted to see clearly in all this. At the first meeting of the Executive Council of the Communist International in Petrograd, I asked Zinoviev: "I should like to know," I said, "why I am supposed to leave Moscow at a time when foreign Socialists are likely to arrive. I do not understand, and I , shall not move." Zinoviel.v, not used to being told the truth, could not hide his embarrassment. "I know nothing, it is ' Moscow that decides," he replied lamely. Then he began writing the usual memos asking for help from those members of the Executive Council who were beholden to him and who lent themselves to such services. Indeed, they took the floor to insist on my departure. Turning to Zinoviev, I asked again: "Could you explain to me why I should be thousands of kilometers away from Mos- cow when, after so many years, we finally succeed in making contact with the 'Western Socialists?" Without looking me in the face, he replied: "Because our politics is directed now toward the East, which is of the greatest importance to us." "But what plans are there for me? What is the special assignment in which I cannot be replaced?" "You will be told in Moscow." "Moscow indeed! It is the International that has to de- .cide." Zinoviev had become deadly pale. His lips trembled. ; During the afternoon session of the same day an urgent I telephone call arrived from Kronstadt. "The comrades in Kronstadt want you to give a talk tomorrow," Zinovicv said ? turning to me. "Tomorrow?" I asked in surprise. "How can I be there tomorrow if our work here is not yet finished? And then, there is that session that concerns me personally." "But you will be back by then," Zinoviev said. "Can you assure me of that? I do not like to say no to ? the comrades, but neither should I want to be absent from my work here." "You can do both," Zinoviev assured me. Having never missed an appointment (not even now after fifty-five years of party activity), I decided to call Kronstadt again to make sure of the connections, especially in view of the fact that I was going by boat. I insisted to the man in Kronstadt on a clear and binding answer. He ended by say- ing that he could not guarantee my return in time. I decided not to leave Petrograd. The meeting of the Executive Coun- cil was scheduled for the afternoon, and I accepted an in- vitation in the morning to give a talk to the women convened in special assembly on the occasion of the youth mobilization. This was one of the most memorable speeches I gave in Soviet Russia. I was to persuade the mothers?mostly non- PrOletarians?to make the supreme sacrifice of letting their Approved For Release 1999/09/0? : CIA-RD-P79-01194A000500120001-8 Approve d F9so(ncsateopthagye frfAtoivtgnAyikeiotipt7T9slifi 1040050cRgAW listnEr laces grew fess dent, less hostile. I shall never forget the handwritten notes whiclf were brought to me at the speaker's stand ( this was customary feature of Russian meetings of the time). One note said: "When my daughter volunteered for the Red front, I cured her; now, after having heard Angelica Balabanoff, I give ,her my blessing." And another: "If it is this that our sons are fighting for, our sacrifice cannot be in vain." This was the tone of the many notes that came to me on that occa- sion. A man in his forties came forward: "I move that these notes be all preserved in the Museum of the Revolution!" I Completely exhausted?I had not yet eaten anything?I met on my way to the room where the Executive Council was to meet a group of members on their way out. "How do you happen to be here so early?" I said jocularly. "We have just finished," replied one of Zinoviev's disciples. "What have you finished? Was the session not scheduled, to continue in the afternoon?" "Yes," he replied, "but then we decided otherwise." Zinoviev's baseness and cowardice was revealed to me in all its ugly nakedness. Assuming that I was in Kronstadt, he had called a meeting of the Executive Council and rammed,* through the order of my departure. I waited for him toi come out of the meeting, and I faced him squarely. "So, you have met and decided in my absence a question that, concerns me personally, after you had assured me you would discuss it this afternoon when I would be present." , He grew pale, fiddled with his briefcase, made a step for- ward, as if he wanted to break away; then he said in a lOw voice: "Yes, the Executive Council has decided for your , departure." He said this in the tone of a mere witness who ?has had no influence whatever on the decision. And he 'added: "It is not I who decides, but the Central Committee of the Party." "I am not going," I replied firmly. "And the Party discipline . . . r "I am second to none in the observance of discipline, but this is no longer discipline, this is absurdity, idiocy! You will regret your actions. You want me out of the way exactly when my presence might be useful, when the comrades from abroad finally arrive. And you want me to miss the encounter with the Italian Socialists. I will not stand for that!" I had returned to Moscow the same day, and I heard noth- ing further about that matter until one day the American poet John Reed, one of the most disinterested and coura- geous supporters of the Russian Revolution, came to me greatly perturbed. "Are you, Angelica, the secretary of the Communist International?" "Yes, I am." "And why, then, are you not at the meeting?" "Which meeting?" The meeting of the Executive Council which is taking Approved R4srgeNrises1610109/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A0 0500120001-8 Approved For Fig@ftdeati?9/09/62eF,CIA?- -1611`92*10 5001CPYRGHT20001-8 Zinoviev, muttered some excuse: he a forgotten to invite me . . . forgotten to invite the secretary! At my appr- ,,, ance they felt uncomfortable because of their complicity in the vulgar fraud. "Well," I asked Zinoviev, "what have you decided about the train to Turkestan?" "What? Has Trotsky not told your (Zinoviev used to leave it to some friend of the victim of his plottings to break the news to him; thus he avoided questions and confronta- tions.) "Strange, we have asked him to do so." "But what has Trotsky to do with it? I ask you." "The Central Committee has decided," said the omnipo- tent president of the Third International, "that you may not go to Turkestan, but at the same time you are relieved of the office of secretary of the International. Trotsky will explain to you." Such was my revulsion at this act of baseness that I could not say a word. I returned to the hotel with a load off my mind?relieved of an office which had become intolerable to me with its atmosphere of intrigues, maneuvers, and slavishness. Naturally, ?I did not go to Turkestan. Around that event something like a legend was growing, since this had been the first attempt at relegating an embarrassing rebel to outlying regions of the country. Since Turkestan was a peach- growing region, someone at a congress of the Russian Com- munist Party asked the leaders if they had intended to have me "eat peaches." And when the same method was applied ' later to other opponents, the wry saying circulated: "They wanted him to eat, peaches as they had tried with Comrade Angelica." , A few weeks later, a mellifluous voice came over the phone: "How are you, dear comrade? I should like to visit you with Comrade Olga." "Who is speaking?" , "It is I, Zinoviev. I should like to come and see you with my wife." In the ten years we had known each other we had never exchanged a single word that was not strictly con- nected with our work. When we met on the stairs, we merely greeted each other, without the customary polite exchanges. And now, after having acted toward me in that base manner, he wanted to visit me. "But I am very well. You would not find me at home." , "I wanted to tell you that the Central Committee has unanimously decided to reinstate you as secretary." "I am reinstated?! I have yet to get an explanation for my removal. Besides, you know well how often I resigned from the post, and now, I should accept it again after that foul play of yours in Petrograd?" I felt revulsion rather than indignation at the sight of such cowardice. What could have induced that individual to as- sume such, an apologetic attitude? The riddle was solved soon enough. Radek, returning from Western Europe, re- Approved F r Release 1999109/02 1A-RDP79-0f194A000500120001-8 8 Approve ported to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist d rotaRpkthashelii9/9/09/19261CNIA-Faiie9rWriRg had caused great dissatisfaction among the Socialists of many; Icountries. They had asked him to bring me their greetings; and to beg me to resume my activity. This invitation vas, extended to me personally by Trotsky, on behalf of the Cmy hal Committee. 'Dear Comrade Angelica," Trotsky said, "as you know, we have annulled the absurd decision of the other day i I have always been against your removal, and I voted against Zinoviev's proposal. Now . . "Listen, Lev Davidovich, it is not a matter of revocation or of bow you voted on that occasion, but rather of the whole system of lies and intrigues which you should not toleraie." "What do you want me to do, dear comrade? I know you are right. . . But you must come back to the International." Meeting with firm refusal on my part, Trotsky suggested a compromise. "You do not want the office of secretary? Ac- cept another one then: Comintern correspondent for Italy, as Marx was for Germany." "Thank you very much, but it is no use insisting. You know how often I banded in my resignation, and it was always ignored. You know what gulf separates me from the leaders, just think of Zinoviev and the vile methods with which he has degraded the International . "But he has apologized to you . . "This has only heightened my disgust. Like a schoolboy reprimanded by his teachers!. . This is the exponent of a revolutionary International?* Q50021121115MI=gr Approved For Release 1999/09/052 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500:112M4T DAILY TELEGRAPH MAGAZINE 20 February 1969 RIDS 017 VIM= 46 MERICAN aggression in Vietnam", For years this stock phrase has been ejected from the propaganda machines of China and the oviet Union. Strangely enough, it is a phrase which has fallen just' as easily from the lips of Westerni intel- lectuals. With a masochistic additive, the American intelligentsia, both resident and expatriate, has been in some respects most vocal of all. "I don't think one needs to go to kietnam to have an opinion about VI,ietnam," Mary McCarthy declared during a BBC inverview last January. `.4 thought it was a good idea to say that ,was prejudiced to begin with She Eertainly was. ' Now that the Paris talks are proce- eding, it is useful to stand back for a moment and to observe how grossly the real issues of this war have been mis- represented. Grotesque comparisons have been made (e.g., in The Observer or February 4, 1968) with French experience in both Indo-China and 'Algeria; but in these conflicts the french were trying to re-establish them- selves, whereas America would like no- tjfing better than to quit Vietnam (and orea, for that matter) for good and all. Professor D.W. Brogan's statement in Encounter for May 1968 that "every . Charge against French policy in Indo- ina is a charge against its imitation by the Americans" is thus a downright Tisreading of history. The people most articulate in their alarm at recent events in Vietnam are precisely those who have recently become their, own masters. Why, then, is it legitimate for Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia and others to express fears that what has happened in Vietnam might happen to them, while it is appar- ently illegitimate for th5 South Viet- namese to fear for their own safety and independence? "The crude moral justifications advanced for the American presence in Vietnam," wrote Professor Alasdair Maclntyre in New Society for October 10, 1968, "are in fact an attempt to justify a series of mindless improvisa- tions' . Tell that to the beleaguered South-east Asian peoples, who are currently expressing fears that the presence may be removed! The difficulties besetting.American policy in Vietnam have been due not simply to a Chinese and Soviet- supported invasion, but to a war of propaganda which, for sustained distor- tion and malevolence, has few parallels even in these days of manipulated mass-media. Let us look at the facts. On the with- drawal of the Japanese in August, 1945, the Communist Vietminh seized power in Hanoi. The attempt by France to regain a foothold ended with the Geneva Agreement of 1954, which brought into being the successor states of North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Elections were to be held before July 20, 1956, to decide the terms on which North and South Vietnam could be united. On May 8, 1956, Britain and the Soviet Union, as co- chairmen of the Geneva Agreement, decided to postpone these elections. (This important fact was omitted from The Observer's summary of events on November 3.) Meanwhile, Communist subversion in the South, which had been going on from the start, reached. its climax on March 13, 1959, when ? Hanoi declared that the time had. come "to struggle . . . . perseveringly' to smash the Southern regime". This was followed by systematic attacks, across the border. So much for the identity of the aggressors. What had happened in Korea, in other words, was repeated with even greater ruthlessness in Vietnam; but whereas the United Nations resistance in Korea', with predominant American support, was regarded in the West as legitimate and ' laudable, America's defence of the freedom of the South ' .Vietnamese people has been received,' with mclunting and almost hysterical condemnation. The gigantic American civiliah effort in Vietnam has been ignored.: The existence of the "Caps", fortified villages where Americans live alongside the Vietnamese and provide medical attention as well as defence, is scarcely known. The presence of more than a million refugees from the North is diknissed with a shrug. Despite electoral proof to the cont rat the South Vietnamese Govern, mei* is declared to be both unrepresent- ative and corrupt. Finally, every opportunity has been taken to denigrate the conduct of the American troops, whereas The Times correspondent, writing from Hue last March, declared that "generally speaking the behaviour of American servicemen in a particularly difficult war does them real credit". Of course the Vietnam war has been agonising and destructive. ? Of course America has made mistakes and miscalculations. Of course we should all hope for a just and speedy settlement. But what do our peace- loving "idealists" and their more sinister hangers-on, both here and in America, shout for? S WE know from the demonstra- tion on October 27, last year, they shout not for peace, but for victory for the National Liberation Front, namely, the Communist spear- head of North Vietnam, which is en- deavouring to destroy the freedom of the South as surely as'the Soviet Union is striving to prevent the emergence of freedom in Czechoslovakia. Even the Communist parties of the West have expressed disgust over Russia's action. What sort of mental obfuscation is it that has impelled so many of our Western intellectuals to become the dupes of Communist propaganda over Vietnam? M Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 unrisian CPYRG)Vproved For We1eliii8 113?09/09/02 : CJA-11DP709-01194A00050012000178 CPYRGHT , ?critiers A ose .anno By Ernest Weatherall Special correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor New Delhi .New Delhi iS ribecorning increasingly an- noyed with the anti-Indian broadcasts of Raclin Moscow's "other station." e . "Radio Peace and Progress," as it is termed, has proved a constant critic of the Indian Government ?ever since it began ? beaming its programs to the subcontinent some three years ago. ? ' India's Foreign Minister, DiTiesh Singh, long a champion of Indo-Soviet friendship, , has told Moscow that the broadcasts "will not help relations between the two coun- tries." India's Parliament was told that the Soviet reply to India's objections was, "we will' look into it and see what can, be/done, in the future." The Soviet Union has given a very curious -.explanation as to why Radio Peace ?and Pro- gross has continued its tirades against India it a time when relations between Moscow , and New Delhi are at their zenith. The Russians have told the Indians, they have "no control" over the objectional broad- casts because it is a "private radio station." ?? slo,wed down its attacks ,,on India's Congress Party leaders. : During the brief reign of the left-wing United Front government in West Bengal ? after the national electiens, Radio Peace e Broadcasts monitored ? Radio Peace and Progress began broad- - casting from the Soviet Union late in 1964. . The first programs were Spanish to Latin America on frequencies formerly used by Radio Moscow. Two years later, the Indian Government monitoring station in the Himalayan foothill town of Simla began pick- . ing up broadcasts from the Soviet station in English and Hindi. Later transmissions were in Urdu and other Indian languages. 'Unlike Radio Moscow, which carefully avoided any attacks on the Indian Govern- ment, Radio Peace and Progress went all ' out attacking not only the Indian Govern- , ? rnent, , but the non-Communist opposition , parties. '. With the approach Of India's national elec- ' tions, the number of broadcasts were stepped up on Radio Peace and Progress. They praised leftist V. K. Krishna Mennon, who . was trying to make a political comeback.. They condemned Morarji Desai (now India's Deputy Prime Minister) and S. K. Patil as "imperialist 5accomplices- who 'want to strangle democracy." ? Industrialists assailed , ' But the prime targets were the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, the Swatantra, and other right- ' wing Indian parties, which they branded as "chauvinists, communalists, reactionaries, ? fascists, and stooges for the Americans." , ppromedforuReieasOhl999i99Vi'C las, and others, were targets o he o ret station. When the Indian Government first che tatirorkit 0.1.1 PPEIVEMEI Leila 1 ?it Soviet Union bitterly attacked India's gov- ernment for using "Nazi techniques" when New Delhi dissolved the state legislature in West Bengal and put the floundering state under "president's rule." Americans, of course, came in for their share of tirades. The station continued to. hammer away at a -tory that the United States Government through the Central In- telligence Agency had furnished India's right-wing parties with millions of dollars to help them win the elections. ? Exasperated by the station's bitter broad- casts, United States Ambassador Chester Bowles asked the Russians whether these ti- rades against the United States and India really served the best interests of the Soviet Union on the subcontinent. Apparently the ? Russians felt they did, because the broad- casts have continued. The latest flare-up caused by Radio Peace arid Progress came during India's recent midterm elections. Leaders of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh Party complained that the station ? had kept up a "continuous- barrage of false , and malicious propaganda against them." Demonstration held The Bharatiya Jan Sangh held a demon stration outside the Soviet Embassy in Ne Delhi, protesting that the Russians were in terfering in the internal affairs of India. ' The source of Radio Peace and Progress' material on India is no mystery. It is sup plied by Tass, Novosti, and other Sovie correspondents in the subcontinent. It is interesting to note that the Novost news agency made a deal with India's Pub lie Information Bureau, with the approval o the Minister of Information and Broadcas ing, to distribute Novosti material. When a Indian newspaper broke the story, howls o . protest were heard on both sides of the aisl in Parliament. This ended the arrangemen Soviet specialists say that Radio Peac and Progress was set up "to speak for th international Communist movement." It i they say, the "covert Soviet policy" towar the Communist Party and their allies i India. Radio Moscow, with which it shar broadcast channels, reflects the "open S ? viet policy" toward the Indian Governmen Radio Peace and Progress can say thin that would embarrass Soviet officials India, if they were said over the "official electronic voice, Radio Moscow. Howeve 1AR ,i4isi.4.64&coelylailikirdielsmdre critical ? itlfAlchicrIcfc?Vgti 042000. was the attack on Ram Nath Goenka, p Usher of the respected Indian Express. ? ??? Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 Speech by Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro at Havana University, 13 March (Excerpts) In the beginning the revolution began practically from scratch. It began struggling against illiteracy. After the battle against illiteracy, the battle of general learning, primary education for everyone, began. The problems it involved -- of teachers and schools -- were huge, and many of those problems still exist. Subsequently it was the struggle for six- grade education, which has also produced notable results in the number of workers in our country who have completed all their primary schooling and have gone beyond it. In the near future all the people will discuss the problem of general or compulsory education up to the preuniversity level. That is, only to the sixth grade, not only to junior high school, but up to preuniversity level. The last leap will have to be a much more gradual one, that is, in stages. We are not saying that it will be a leap from the primary to the preuniVersity level. It will take us a long time until we reach the final jump, which will be universal university learning. Indeed, it will not be a jump. It will be simply a result of the earlier jumps, because once learning up to the preuniversity level becomes universal, the step to universalizing university education will flow normally... Therefore, our next basic step will be to establish by the law of all the people, by the participation and understanding of all the people, universal education for all children and all youths of various ages through preuniversity. This will demand enormous effort of all Of us. This will demand enormous effort of all the higher level students because we do not have and we will not have for many years other cadres, other teachers to begin to carry out this program, than the higher level students. And this is being done today on a sizable scale. This will help resolve some contradictions -- the contradiction between defense and studies. This is one of the patent contradictions in the revolutionary process. Let us say that there are three contradictions: The enormous necessity of development, the enormous necessity of the defense of the nation in the conditions in which our revolution is evolving, and the enormous necessity of study. We must overcome these contradictions. These contradictions must be solved. The contradiction between the necessities of underdevelopment and of study are resolved to the degree that work is combined with study. Work combined with study is developing today at the secondary, preuniversity, and university levels. However, it is developing to the extent of our possibilities. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 AppritAitidPealele81999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 23 February 1969 Military School Training (Excerpts) A Camilo Cienfuegos Military School now stands on what was an air base until 17 months ago; there are now nine schools of this type in the country with 2,489 students, and in the coming year, there will be 3,500. Now all students are boys, but this year the first girl students will be enrolled. The school's objective is to provide cultural-political and military training to students until they reach the preuniversity level and then promote them to different cadet schools of the Revolutionary Armed Forces where they will continue their studies until they graduate as infantry, aviation, rocketry command cadres. There are now 170 teachers at this school, although 104 of them are practice teachers, 4th year students of the Enrique J. Varona Institute. Besides engaging in productive work for 45 days, the students receive basic military training in marksmanship, Infantry, physical training; they get a good idea of military life and make periodic trips to various FAR special units. Lt. Martinez is deputy director of this school. Approved For Release 1999/09/02,: CIA-RDP79,01194A000500120001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09102: CIA-RDP79-01194A000t00120001-8 Today we have the school-plus-farmwork plan and in till future we will have schools in the farms. Rural secondary schools will be located, in the farms. And soon we will begin to build the first rural secondary schools in the countryside. This will contribute to the solving of, this con- tradiction. Therefore, the enormous mass of hundreds of thOusands of youths who are taking secondary education will do so in institutions in which they will cod?ine their studies with production activities of the type which is possible at that age. It will be the type or work they are able to do. The technological and preuniversity schools are participating today in the hardest job we have, the sugar harvest. There is no question but that a serious contradiction confronts us. In the face of the tremendous necessity for training technical cadres, three-or four-month periods have to be devoted to productive jobs as a basic necessity.... But it is also urgent and of utmost importance, it is of highest precedence in the revolution, to mechanize the canecutting process. This is one of the problems which at this time occupies the priority attention of the revolution. Logically, we cannot long permit a situation which forces such a vast employment of energy, of students, of workers from industry, because other branches of the national economy, industry and construction, and other sectors demand the investment of such energies.... In addition, we have the third necessity, that demanded by the defense of the nation against imperialism... We will therefore have to reconcile the problem of defense' with the problem of studies and with the problem of production. We shall solve this problem by linking it with the phase of preuniversity education or technological education, as we will call it. Therefore, some day in that phase, studies, military training, and productive work will be done, but in another ratio. In other words, with a different intensity. It cannot be 3 consecutive months, because time will have to be divided among studies, military instruction, and a shorter time than in the past will be spent in productive work -- as training rather than a necessity... The problem of the huge number of repeaters in school, the problem of a comparatively large number of boys and girls who do not attend school -- these problems must be totally overcome, and they must be totally overcome with the active participation of the people. We do not think there is a single conscious citizen in this country who thinks it possible to admit that this society will accept illiterates in the future, that this society will accept ignorant persons in the future. What will be the maladjustments, and what will be the problems of those individuals who, compared with a mass with greater and greater knowledge, remain backward and ignorant of everything... 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 Approved Fo Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 We must learn to see things in perspective, and understand that it is everyone's task to fight tenaciously, decisively against all these short- comings, all these possibilities which still exist that a child does not go to school. They will become society's problems, candidftes for delinquency, for conflict with the society they cannot adaRt to, and in which they can scarcely live. Society still has a long struggle against these faUltp, these vices, the vice of delinquency which still exists and will remain for a long time ? A parasite from the past, a milestone from the past, it feeds on the ranks of all those youngsters without preparation, without knowledge, culture, or consciousness. There are also cases of individuals who use minors for criminal purposes. Since the law punishes robbery with a certain severity, they resort to using minors criminally. The very concept of minors is elastic. It is a sketchy one and some of these concepts will have to be revised. If we consider age 16 old enough to serve in the fatherland's armed forces, protect it, and die for it, why do we not consider them answerable for robbery or other criminal activity of any kind at age 16, 17, or 18? Evidently this is an old concept, and the revolution must analyze it so that society will face this type of problem. There are habitual offenders in society; there are some who are incorrigible, who because of their record, their inveterate habits, are incapable of adapting to normal living -- incorrigible, unrehabilitated, and some on whom prison life has a negative and dismal influence. Our country will have to study the whole problem of its penal institutions for common deliquency, since in recent years the idea of struggle against counterrevolutionary deliquency was upper- most -- persons who acted against the revolution. The other struggle was somewhat behind. In principle, our society believes and feels the need to give every man a change and every chance, but it will also have to face those virtually unsolvable situations, cases of incurable criminals, including those in prison who continued to commit evil deeds, who con- tinued on occasion to commit murder and extend their imprisonment. There is a whole world worthy of sociological study for society to determine what to do with this class .of incorrigible individuals and with the habitual offenders. We may have to face the need of eliminating them radically. It is true that we have individuals who take up this life and practically no method exists to correct them. And some of them even take advantage of that type of impunity after they are penalized in order to continue their criminal activities... The 1970 harvest goes well in one sense -- in the plans for planting cane. All of the basic material for the 1970 harvest is being ensured. The season is favorable in some areas -- relatively dry, or, let us say, without using "relatively," very dry in Oriente Province. However, most of the hydraulic work is being done in Oriente Province. And this province will receive the reinforcement of the necessary equipment for irrigation. 3 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 If nature discriminates against Oriente Province, the revollition will make Oriente a priority in the provision of irrigation equipmentwand in an effort to provide the water that nature denies it. So, drought inOriente will be compensated by such an effort. Hard work is being done on hydraulic projects throughout the island so that we may be able to face a drought. 9 But there is a difficulty still in connection with the present harvest. This harvest has not yet reached the desired rhythm. And this is nota mobilization problem. ?No one believes more mobilization will be necessary. It is a matter of organization. This shows up our weakness in this field... Ignorance in many places is reflected in the orgadization of trans- portation, in the organization of collection centers, in the organization of cane cutting, in the organization of industries. In all this organizing weaknesses are reflected. And during the coming weeks, our country should make a special effort in these Areas of organization. At a moment when the sugar price is satisfactory, at a time when our country is approaching a great achievement in its work, we cannot permit one single cane fit for grinding in 1969 to be left uncut. Always, every year, when the rain starts, at the end, excuses are heard -- too much rain, too many problems. It is the intent of the revolution this year not to order the end of the harvest until every cane is cut in every province of the country. It is not a matter of saying that some of the cane can be cut in the succeeding harvest, which could begin earlier. This is a matter of com- mitments by the country regarding the sugar it must export. It has to do with the needs of the country. It is our duty to win the battle of 1970, but it is basically our obligation also to win the battle of the 1969 harvest. If the 1969 harvest is to prepare the ground for the 1970 harvest, then it will. If we must grind cane in June, we will grind in June; and if we must grind in July and August, we will grind in July and August. And our cadres, our parties, will have to learn to fight and win simultaneous battles, and they will have to learn to put into effect simultaneous plans -- sugar cane, livestock, the 1969 harvest, the 1970 harvest, the rice program, and all the other plans. It is necessary to learn to win simultaneous battles. The people have the ability and dis- position. There is enthusiasm. We must contribute what is missing, that is, comaion sense, organization. We must improve ourselves. ? We were saying that we have many limitations, but we must learn to overcome them. The will of the revolution, the will of the people, con- tinues to be to wage and win the battle completely. The lag in the har- vest implies that it will continue through May and June, while the new plants will be undergoing cleaning and sprouts will be fertilized and cultivated. 4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A0,00500120001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 A tremendous mixture of activity in a limited period of time. Un- fortunately, this results in us getting behind schedule, al:extends the tense pace of work in the six-month period beyond May, beyon$ June. We must face up to this situation and solve it, above all because this har- vest is the forerunner --this year's work will produce therfirst great results of 1970. 5 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8 CPYRGHTApproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001 espy RGHT CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 5 March 1969 ligta?E , ,.1 it' imo Leime . ?7:?1 . ? ''By Paul W?ohl L". , . . Written for The qhristian Scierice,r.fonitor , ..451 ? -Antrilith,:volce has !been iraiSedIn defense f tiutlird'n the Sotief., " t:4*a141';c iticildo the e2:111ed.' physicist:: P,avel IVt,'LitylriOV, 'has add"rd aletter "td 'the_ ":editor bf Sem- rnunisf;"derriandizig a pcisthutrions:Indieti, :1 1.1;! " Th4,;:ldtte..r,s.,dqt0d,,ivi4rp4 ,q, , taxes, issnd wthlq; review of memoir, 5 SOviet.'..A,rrny 'leaders' bY Maj, qen.. E., A'. BO,ItTri in the .sec,oncbjenuaiY kO,ue Of the Int gatincPwhidh .extoed Stalin's milita'ry`and pplitidatinorltg. Of f YO,t413 iletter ,comea,?c190c f9f4ndri ID. .S0tIlEttotal..fa1rious? essay i; flhoughti on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and, Intel iectusi 7recclOrrir !.,!(-P1-110iiShed) 43y?. Norton with ,comtneritS Since taking their respective ,stands, both iornfessot SakharoV.? and , have teen?demoted.:i .1( nt',1 'Professor Sakharov, atop nuclear scion- hes ?lseen dismissed , from his post Of consuitant to the Soviet State CommitT too for Nuclear': Energy; he retains so far 'Mb Membership in the Ae,ademy' Of Sciences.' Mr.,:,yakir,,liewever," is said to ha y? been a," Stiff iniernber ;4 thi:i'adatli drny's institute of, histork.- '''.?; 14i1e ProfesorSakharev'd'essay' Mi ?Yakir!'s letter .Originated 'frorri;(4,'discussionr :in'thiS'daSearriong historian.'" ; Opie,s Of Mr.' Yakir'S whichKorn-, not %ek?P'eCted' to Publish,'''61reti:t; ,late MoscoW..:',Th,bu1kof the leteer:' kir ? P6a1ed, on'M f7,411 qie',reo;ected:riacli,i ,40iy "L Mondo ' fails This g iidt'th irst time -a post iu bus indictment ofiStalini'has,,ifiederriandecV 'Atter! the :22,ni-X, Party. Corigre Ss a ,grotip.-41.,rehabgitated ..vietims ? of; Stalin's persecutions' asked, that the dietater. 'he oSthtirnotiSly expelled from the, Party.: 1Atthat.:timei,d+:104d'Ii.a Sta1in74 crimes, ianct:- failings., ,,was,dra.v.p....'tip,.. ',1:13,14t ;?to,thing, 'icame ; of at., Now ? MI Yak! i ebell Led Poi IA1,11 ,indictment bk-Stalin. 'on ,1.7. 'ccitints',.;referrind neh,ase 'to theapprdpriate..articleS of ,e6de,,vand' :Iccirrebora tine ?"ehargeS frbm rect. ' r teaSioniti tO,;,be:',sentenced ent :while three 'cases' ' should he pronounced, ,44,sainst him.' Extenuating, circumstances are ? 'Out by' thd pa1 cade..:1' St1i?io .sh?iiild b deprived oIaU thULary titles' and: .:-?The Charges :listed, in, Mr."- Yakir!S, hidict- m' pre everwholmine. Thev include 'abuse ? f), t=it writy, unwarranted illass arrests,- the ,introductionixi 1937. of physical torture, thd,7! inUrder of hundreds Of prominent party m efriberi? and: fercign 114 ??beri granted asylum in the Soviet :Of uncounted numbers .?(!ff inventors , an'd. militarY and industrial leaders, Xven the widows and children of :,the-