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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 134
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1 C1 Ob
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World-wide
Perspectives
KEY DATES
April 9 Czechoslovakia
April 12-21
1968 - Dubcek government announced ful-
ler civil rights to be granted under
new Action Program.
Kuala Lumpur World Fellowship of Buddhists, 9th
General Assembly.
May 11-17 Mexico City International Meeting of Women Jour-
nalists, sponsored by Mexican Associ-
ation of Writers and Journalists.
May 22 Moscow 1943 - End of Third International
(Comintern) announced; the statement
declared the autonomy of Communist
parties outside USSR.
May 23
Meeting of Preparatory Commission for
conference of World Communist
parties.
June 5 (maybe) World Communist Conference
June 14-17
Helsinki 6th Congress of Women's International
Democratic Federation (Communist).
June 21-24 East Berlin
25X1C10b
World Peace Assembly, sponsored by
WCP, with strong participation
expected by other Communist fronts.
Also, WCP Council meeting.
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.101.10PP"'
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App0.44104104~91111J1 1.1*/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120401481969
Principal Developments in World Communist. Affairs
(21 February -- 21 March 1969)
1. Active Month for the Communist World
The month has been an especially active one for the Communist
world. World attention inevitably fo(.used on such events as the Sino-
Soviet border clash, the Yugoslav Communist Congress, the abortive
meeting of the Warsaw Pact powers in Budapest, and the meeting of the
Preparatory Commission of the World Communist Conference in Moscow.
Less spectacular, but also of considerable importance, were the quiet
and continuing pressure toward domestic freedom in Czechoslovakia, and
the unobtrusive Soviet recognition of the 50th anniversary of the found-
ing of the infamous Comintern. Briefly characterized, the month has
been a virtually unbroken series of defeats for Soviet diplomacy in the
Communist world. It is difficult to see how the Soviets can go on suf-
fering defeat after defeat without some radical change in policy or in
the leadership.
2. Yugoslav CP Congress and International Communism
Out of courtesy and a need to preserve appearances of Communist
unity, the Soviets last month were obliged to attend the Italian Com-
munist Party (PCI) Congress and listen to condemnations of their in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia and other criticisms. This month the League
of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) held its Ninth Congress, from 10 -
15 March, and again the Soviets were subjected to public criticism,
this time by Tito, for violating the integrity of Czechoslovakia and
for promulgating the Brezhnev Doctrine. Anticipating the worst, the
Soviets boycotted the Yugoslav Congress and pressured their Warsaw Pact
allies to stay away. The pressure succeeded, except in the case of Ru-
mania, which again asserted her independence and sent veteran Communist
leader Emil Bodnaras to the Congress to reiterate Rumania's insistence
on the primacy of national independence and sovereignty over the de-
mands of loyalty to Soviet requirements. While the Soviet Union and
each of her more subservient Satellites sent the LCY a brief, cool, but
correct message of greeting, Czechoslovak students demonstrated at home,
praising Tito and denouncing Brezhnev for requiring Czechoslovakia to
stay from the LCY Congress.
Thus Yugoslavia once again became the dramatic symbol of the power-
ful trend toward independent Communism undermining Soviet control of the
Communist world. It is an example which most, if not all, members of
the Soviet Bloc would want to emulate, if only they dared.
3. Czechoslovakia
Before Czech students shouted "Tito Yes! Brezhnev No!" in the
streets of Prague, another young Czech took his life deliberately
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following the example of young Jan Palach a month before. This latest
tragedy is an awesome measure of the depth to which youthful Czechoslo-
vaks have felt the grotesque injustice of the Soviet military invasion
and occupation of their country, which, essentially, had tried merely
to humanize and democratize Communism.
Doggedness in trying to realize pre-invasion goals of a genuinely
free Communism in which various social groups are given a means of in-
fluencing policy was evident also in an initiative displayed by the
Czechoslovak trade union council through its Chairman Karel Polacek.
He forthrightly declared at the opening of its 7th Congress on 4 March:
"The principled relationship of the trade unions to
the party cannot, however, in any way impair their inde-
pendent approach, restrict their own attitudes, or push
them into a second class position of mere executors of
party decisions. We shall also in the future put forward
frank and our own standpoints in our work, with a view to
preventing the emergence of a policy behind closed doors....
I consider it necessary to repeat once again that by this
relationship to the Communist Party we do not intend to and
will never be an opposition force against the Party, against
socialism. On the contrary, we understand this relationship
as an active share in the formation and practical implemen-
tation of the policy of the party."
There are evidences in other areas of Czechoslovak life as well
that groups of citizens, bound by common interests, will insist on
being heard in matters of national policy. This trend is dangerously
close to genuine democracy, which has always been anathema to the So-
viets. Even more dangerous, it is just such manifestations of a taste
for democracy which frightened the Soviets into invading Czechoslovakia
on that infamous day of 21 August 1968.
4. New Level for Sino-Soviet Conflict
Given the fundamentally propagandistic function of Communist "news"
media, it is impossible to determine how the fighting along the Soviet-
Chinese border in Manchuria started, or who fired the first shot. In-
deed, one can be reasonably sure only of the fact that an exchange of
fire took place beginning on 2 March and continuing on subsequent days;
that is about all Soviet and Chinese news reports agree on.
There is also little question but what these incidents have raised
the long-standing conflict between the two Communist states to a new
level of intensity. It would be hazardous to predict where this suc-
cession of armed clashes will lead, but it is clear each side is trying
to reap the greatest possible propaganda advantage from the event. The
Soviets are trying to use it to rally tightly around the CPSU the Com-
munist parties which are more or less loyal to it. This kind of unity
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is all the more important to the Soviets before the forthcoming June
conference of the world's Communist parties. The Chinese are using the
incident to whip their population into a highly emotional state of na-
tionalistic loyalty to the Mao leadership, thereby taking their minds
off the chaos and deprivations of the Cultural Revolution, and focusing
their attention on the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party to
be held sometime sooner or later this year.
5. Warsaw Pact Fiasco
Elaborate but quiet preparations had been under way for weeks for
a two-day summit meeting of the Warsaw Pact leaders which included from
the Soviet Union the most prestigious delegation possible: Brezhnev,
Kosygin, Defense Minister Grechko, and Warsaw Pact Commander Yakubovsky.
The meeting, which was to take place 17-18 March, was the first since
the invasion of Czechoslovakia and was intended to put on a display of
unity after the disruption of the invasion, particularly as far as Ru-
mania was concerned. Without explanation the meeting was delayed for
several hours, then met for two hours (rather than two days), issued a
non-committal communiqug, and abruptly adjourned. It seems self-evident
that the meeting was a thoroughgoing failure. Most observers believe
that Rumania refused to go along with the other members on one or both
of two major items presumed to have been on the agenda: a reorganiza-
tion of the Warsaw Pact to give it supra-national powers, and a con-
demnation of the alleged armed incursion on the Soviet Far Eastern bor-
der by the Chinese Communists.
Issued simultaneously with the communique from the Warsaw Pact meet-
ing was what appears to be a warming over of an old appeal of the Soviets
for an "all-European security conference." Whether this appeal and the
propaganda accompanying it is an attempt to cover up failures of the War-
saw Pact meeting or the beginning of a new campaign to drive a wedge be-
tween the United States and its European allies ma Y soon become more clear.
6. The Comintern and the WCC
? As far as can be ascertained, the celebration this March of the
50th anniversary of the first Congress of the Third (Communist) Interna-
tional, better known as the Comintern, was marked in the Soviet Union
only by a small number of commemorative articles in the press. This
seems a minimal way to celebrate such a momentous birthday. Soviet re-
luctance to make more of the Comintern anniversary probably stems from
their fear of revealing their actual desire to return the world movement
to something resembling the discipline and control exercised over it
by the Comintern, when Stalin manipulated Communist parties to the exclu-
sive service of his foreign policy aims and without regard for the welfare
and success of any given party. This Soviet desire lurks behind the fre-
quent repetition in propaganda of the crucial need for "unity" in inter-
national Communism, for a restoration of the primacy of the spirit of
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"proletarian internationalism" (i.e., loyalty to the Soviet Union tak-
ing precedence over pursuit of mere national interest). The Soviet
Union must advance cautiously and delicately toward this goal in view
of the known sensibilities of many important parties which are appre-
hensive about this very goal of the Soviets.
Attached are statements by Tito at the LCY Congress characterizing
the Soviet proclivity from the days of the Comintern to the present day
to try to impose a general line on the world Communist movement. Sim-
ilar criticism of the Comintern appeared in the Czech and Rumanian par-
ty press. An interesting contrast is presented by the idealized account
of the founding of the Comintern in current Soviet propaganda on the one
hand, and an account of what really transpired given by the first secre-
tary the Comintern ever had, veteran socialist and collaborator of Lenin,
Angelica Balabanoff. These are also attached.
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CPYRGHT
CPYR
1-::?:-rob. 1969
fossroads for World Communism
Future historians may well
coeciude that this present
month, March 1969, was the
point of no return in the his-
tory of world Communism, the
time when it became evident
beyond argument that the old
monolithic internaticinal move-
ment of Stalin's day could never .
be put together again.
Three events above all these.,
past few weeks have shown how ;
irreversibly far modern Commu-
nist "polycentrism"?to use the
word introduced by the late
Italian Communist leader Pal- ;
mire Togliatti?has come, and ,
how little Moscow has retained
of its once complete authority
over world Communism.., ? ??
The month began with the
public announcement,of the So-
viet-Chinese mini-war in the Far
East. The lives that have been,
lost in these battles .on the fro.
zen Ussuri River have trans-
formed what began seemingly
as an ideological 'struggle into
a conflict that the Russians see
as a reprise of their, war with
the Mongols almost a millenium
ago. Moscow's fury that it does
not enjoy the automatic 'support
of all Communists in 'this ter.
ritorial ? battle was underlined
by the Soviet , weekly, .Litera-
, turnaya Gazeta, which. publicly,
attacked a Czechoslovak news?
paper for taking a neutralist ?
stance on the dispute. ?
?
Right Wing , ? .- ? ; ?
?pendence. In that "referendum" '
more than a dozen Communist
parties voted against Moscow
by sending their delegates.
Among those who chose this
means of demonstrating their,
independence were such import-
ant Communist parties as those
of Italy, France, Rumania, Fin-
' land, and Chile as well as the
, Communist parties of Austria,
' Belgium, Norway, Britain, Ven-
' ezuela, Spain and several oth-
ers. Moreover a number Of Corn.'
' munist parties that stayed away
sent warm messages of greet-,
ings to the Yugoslav conclave.
Warsaw Pact .
?
I Then last week, at the Buda-
pest meeting of the War-
saw Pact, came a development
that Moscow may have consid-
ered the most galling event of,
the month. At this gathering .
with what were once servile
Eastern European satellites, the
Soviet Union was unable to in-,
_corporate into the communique a
single word of support for its
position in the Chinese struggle,'
The Rumanians, in addition,'r;
blocked all of Moscow's far-reach-
ing plans for turning the Warsaw..:
Pact and its associated institu-
,tions into a far more intcgrated ?
military, political and economic,
force.
But even the recital above,
does not exhaust the' disorder,,
confusion and internal bicker-
ing that are now the dominant.
feature of Communist politics.
For example, by ? no means all
the countries that failed to show'
up at the Yugoslav Congress
support Moscow. Thus the Al-
banian, New Zealand, Thai, Ma-
laysian, and some othec parties
are pro-Chinese. Others, like the
Japanese, the North Koreans, and
the Cubans have tense and far'
from fully smooth relations with
both Moscow and Peking. And
In some countries, such as India;
Almost simultaneously, Soviet
relations with the? right wing
,of world Communism reached
their lowest point in years. This
was evidenced at the Yugoslav
Communist Congress in Belgrade
which the Soviet Union boy-
cotted and forced its Eastern
European satellites ? including
Czechoslovakia ? to boycott.'
The Soviet action turned the
Belgrade meeting into a kind of
referendum on Communist incle-,
sad Israel, 1 there are several
Communist parties, each claim-
1g to be, the only legitimate
Marxist-Leniiiist group and each
en joying varying degrees of rec.
c,gnition from:foreign Communist
7
attics.
]'arty Line (Split .
The most fundamental point is
at there is now no agreed
rty line to which .all or al-
ost all Communist parties sub-
ribe. Two decades ago, in Sta.'s heyday, all Communist par-
s automatically accepted
hatever position the Soviet Un-
11 took, with, only Yugoslavia
ssenting. In 1957 and again in
GO fragile compromises were
tched up in international Com-
unist party meetings in Moscow
d these served temporarily as
ifying doctrines. Now, except
opposition to the United
ates in Vietnam and verbal
nunciation of capitalism, there
nothing approaching a Com-
nist consensus on a wide
ge of world political and ide-
gical issues.
Moscow continues to hope it
n repair the disarray. It looks
yard to the scheduled inter-
tional Communist meeting in
y as the occasion on which
can win support for a corn-
n position from at least a .
inerical majority of the
rld's Communist parties. But
eady It Is evident that to per-
de enough parties to attend
ripscow is having to accept to
0. npromises. The possibility
reMS therefore that if and when
May meeting takes place,
-final result' may be fairly
titudinous and the great So-
t efforts of recent years to
?ange such a get-fogether may
? eve to have borne little val.
? >ie organizational or ideolog-
.1
d,
o
CI
,44
1
;
?-?.1-TAIlliY SCHWARTZ
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12 MA s.9
'Wanton' Soviet Acts Condemned by 'to
By Anatole Shub
Washington Post roscign Service
13ELGRADE, March 11?Marshal .Tito defiantly re-
? Persistent, harmful inter-
ferenee in Yugoslav affairs by
the prewar Communist Inter-
national.
? The murder of "dozens"
of. Yugoslav Communist lead-
ers in Stalin's purges. "Their
tragedy was all the 'greater,"
_2 said, "for their having
Wn tortured under the false
accusation that they were
spies and traitor's, for their
having been sent to their
death, monstrously accused of
crimes they never committed."
? "Misunderstanding" an d
"conflict" during World War
II, when Stalin "underesti-
mated the strength of our,
movement and its ability to
pass its own decisions."
* The Cominform campaign
against Yugoslavia from 1948
to 1953, accompanied in East-
ern Europe ,by "methods of
violence and violation of the
' rule of law, by the stifling of
the elementary rights ? of citi-
zens, distortion of the truth,
the monstrous misuse of prop-
da and other wanton ac-
"The Comlnform cam-
paign," Tito said, "provoked
political, economic and ethnic
conflicts in various socialist
countries" and "helped to
spread the cold war."
? Post-Stalinist pressures on
Yugoslavia to abandon its in-
dependent position, including
the 1960 Moscow declaration
of 81 Communist Parties
which once again attacked Yu-
goslavia "arbitrarily and bru-
tally."
? Current Soviet attempts
to unify the Communist move-
ment around some "general
line" which, Tito said, must
represent "either a dictated or
an unprincipled compromise
between the very divergent
bulwd Moscow today by summarizing 50 years of Yug6.
slay Communist history as an unceasing struggle against
Kremlin domination,
Opening Yugoslavia's 0th Party Congress, Tito shab,Wy,
condemned the late Josef Stalin, his associates and hs
,heirs for:
views and interests of some
parties at the expense of oth-
ers."
? Moscow's continuing ef-
forts to justify the invasion
and occupation of Czechoslo-
vakia, which Tito again con-
demned as an "outright viola;
tion of the sovereignty of a so-1
'cialist country."
The 76-year-old Yugoslav
President emphasized that his
struggle with the Soviet lead-
ers was neither personal nor
national.
Stalin's attack on Yugoslavia,
he said, was "the first open
conflict between the bureaii-.
cratic concepts of a socialist
state and the paths to socialist
development in the world,
evolved in the Soviet Union
under Stalin's leadership?
which, incidentally, cannot at
all be treated merely as some
sort of 'personality cult'?and
the anti-dogmatic approach,
the democratic, humane con-
cept of socialist society. . ."
"The dilemma faced by the
Yugoslav Communists after
the war," Tito said, "were no
coincidence nor were they
only ours . . . They were ac-
tually the dilemma of the fur-
ther development of socialism
,kenerally, both here and else-
where."
The Yugoslav' leader spoke
several times with obvious
contempt of "what is known as
the socialist camp," for in both
Yugoslav and Russian the
word for camp is derived di-
rectly from the German
"lager," used by Hitler and'
Goebbels for their concentra-?
tion and death camps.
Tito declared triat "the pol-
icy of subordination to the
temporary state interests and
the tactics of Soviet foreign
policy did tremendous datnage
to various Communist Parties,
before the war . . . as well as
after it. This kind of policy
created bureaucratic relation-
ships in the leaderships of the
Party . . cutting them off
from their own working class
and the people of their coun-
try."
In attacking Yugoslavia in
1948, Tito said, "the Stalinists
saw a threat to existing rela-
tionships between the socialist
countries and to relationships
within these countries . . .
Those who supported the view
that the USSR was the center
of revolution and a model of
socialism could not reconcile
themselves to the tendencies
towards independence demon-
strated by various parties and
movements."
Tito skid that, in recalling
the Stalinist campaign against
Yugoslavia, "we do not do so
in order to stir up old passions
and hatred against anyone."
He recalled Yugoslav sup-
port of the 20th Soviet Party
Congress in 1056, at which Ni-
kita Khrushchev launched
"de-Stalinization," and reaf-
firmed Yugoslav adherence to
the principles of equality and
Independence formulated by
Khrushchev and himself in
the Belgrade declaration of
1955 and the Moscow declara-
tion of 1956.
"However," Tito continued,
"we continue to see that in re-(
lations between socialist coun-
tries and Communist Parties
the principle of internation-
alism is sometimes abused so
as to impose, in its name, cer-
tain one-sided obligations on
various parties . . ."
After condemning Soviet at-
tempts to enforce a new "'gen-
eral line" and Kremlin con-
duct toward Czechoslovakia,
Tito concluded his prepared
address in this fashion;'
"We, the Communists of Yu-
goslavia, do not think we have
found the answers to all the
contemporary dilemmas of so-
__ _ _
cialism and we are aware of
the problems, difficulties and
shortcomings in the implemen-
' tation of our own policy. Let
, the results achieved in devel-
opment of new Socialist rela-
tions, the degree of humaniza-
tion and the freedom of our
society, the attainments in im-
proving the living conditions
of the working people and sat-
isfying their material and spir-
itual needs, be the yardstick
of the correctness and success
of our policies and prac-
tices . . ." ?
In a passage obviously
added to his original text, Tito
finished by greeting the more
than 60 delegations from for-
eign Communist, Socialist, So-
cial Democratic and third-
world nationalist parties. The
Rumanian, Italian and most
other West European Commu-
nist Parties are represented
despite a Soviet-bloc boycott.
"We very much regret," Tito
said, "that certain Communist
Parties from the socialist
countries, including the Com-
munist Party of Czechoslova-
kia, canceled their attend-
ance . . .01
He concluded that he was
accustomed to such behavior
"when temporary political mo-
tives are involved, but this
only heightens the prestige of
the Yugoslav League of Com-
munists and its historic con-
sistency in the eyes of the pro-
'gressive world."
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Tuosiai7s ressing' FOr
o-
' BELGRADE, March 16?
.'we are dred,' a yvuun
Yugoslav Journalist re..
,marked, "of having democ-,,
-racy doled out to us from.
above, sometimes with an
eyedropper, sometimes more
generously, but always un-
der control. Now the time
has come to stop this con-
stant waiting for the leader-
ship and. to begin pushing
for real democracy our-
selves."
This sentiment, relatively
n e w in Yugoslavia, is
broadly shared today. Al-
though farsighted individu-
'als like 1V1ilovan Djilas rec-
ognized the problem -15
,years ago, they were iso.
Djilas spent nine
years in prison for having
? expressed "prematurely"
:thoughts which are probablY
shared today by a. majority
of Yugoslav Communists, par-
ticularly among the younger,
better-educated generation.
The process of self-libera.?
?tion from inherited SovieQ
dogma has been continuous
and gradual. But it was deci-
sively accelerated by two!
major events in .1968: thei
'massive student uprising
here last June, and the
drama of Czechoslovakia.
from renaissance to military'
occupation. , '
The stud ent uprising,
which witnessed remarkable.:
solidarity ? between students
and young professors; and
? among different sections of -
the country; has had several'
powerful effects.
, First, a sorting out:
"Everyone got fo know each
other very well, and now we.
all know exactly who stands
where." Although there were,
'small Maoist, Castroite and
other utopian groupings, by
far the overwhelming ten-
dency of the movement?in
which hundreds of thousands
participated ? was toward
democratic socialism.
: At the same time, most If
not all Party leaders?but-
Marshal Tito among them?
realized that the younget4
generation was politically
engaged, critical, dissatis;
fled, impatient?but not sub-
versivApproWect FrRelease
to the broad socialist eals
rarty hag
-treanhed if not consistently
By Anatole Shub
Washington Post Foreign Service
practiced.
A,Ltnough 1twi ary Luei,
no further riots "ordemon-
strations, the pressure of
the young has continued.
The weekly Student has be-
come the liveliest and most
widely discussed paper ini
Belgrade.
. The derhands of students
and intellectuals generally.
were reflected at the just-,
ended 9th Party Congress in;
numerous. ' for ' ' a.
greater role for scientists,
specialists, economists, sod.;
ologists, intellectuals and,
young people generally in
framing basic Yugoslav poll.;
cies. ,
There will be an interest-
ing test of Party readiness,
to grant such a role in the!
coming weeks. Belgrade.
University students are at;
tempting to elect three of:
their .most distinguished?;
and heretical?professors as
deputies to the Federal As-
sembly in next month's
liamentary elections. .They,
would doubtless be elected
if permitted to run. Thet
question is whether the
Party machinesin Serbia will,
Intervene to prevent their;
candidacies.
Czechoslovakia has had an
equally deep effect, and not,
'merely in destroying
ions about the ?Kremlin:?-
What was most/impressive'
in the "Prague spring" was
.its spontaneous character,
the unceasing and many-'
sided pressures from below,
?expressed in meetings,";
'demonstrations, resolutions,!
letters and, above all, in the'
,freedom of the Czechoslo-??
'yak press, radio and?televi-:
sion.
In a few weeks last March-
and April, the Ciechoslovak
'news media attained a de-'
gree of freedom which Yu-
goslavia (although years
ahead 'of "other East .Eu-
ropean .press) has yet to at-
tain.
Czech press freedom was
widely, reported and corn-,
mented on here. Thus a'
growing number. of Yugo-
slays, Communists and non- -
Communists, journalists and
non-journalists, have be-
1999/029i020ovCIA-ROP719-01
swiftest, most direct path to-
..rd calving thio eountry'a
CPYRGHT
1200011 v.
reeciona
truly complex economic, so-
cial and ethnic prfAl^--
in freeing the press from all
remaining inhibitions?in
opening the way for direct;
open confrontation of views
on even the most sensitive
and taboo issues.
The debate can no longer.
be restricted, many Yufo-
slays feel, to Communist
leaders both liberal and con-
servative, but must be
bpeped to thinkers and ex-
perts of all persuasions.
Marshal Tito, while visit-,
tog several editorial offices
last month, urged the jour,lik
nalists to take greater initia?
tives, and the resolutions of
the 9th Congress also call
for greater press freedom.
But. similar promises have
'been made in the past, and
, considerably circumscribed
In daily practice. The
months ahead should show
how real the new promises,
are. ?
Here again, there will be
an early test case a the Par-
ty's intentions. For this
spring, a new book by Dji-
las, "The Imperfect So-
ciety," will be published in
the West. It is not an emo-
tional attack on any person,
country or party, but a con-
templative political-philo-
sophical essay.
A friend of the" authormh,
sums up its possible conse?',
quences here as follows:
"If Djilas is arrested or
even harassed again, it will
show 'that we have not made
much real progress these
last dozeh years. If the hook
is completely Ignored, or
brushed. off with snide at-
tacks and no fair explana-
tion of its contents, it will
show that we are still stuck
somewhere halfway between
Stalinism and genuine de-
mocracy.
"But if the book is pub-
lished here or even ex-
tracted at length, if its ideas
are openly discussed and de-
bated, with any serious Yu-
goslav political thinker free
to agree or disagree publicly
and in print, then?no mat-
ter how sharp the debate?
we will know that we have
crossed the Rubicon at last.
194A0005001pOn'h"Illtter the dis-
6 cuss on, 'VW Mer we shall
CPYRGHT
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Kre lin's Long-Son
Communist Summit
? 13y Anatole Shub
Washinotoo Post Portion Settles
MOSCOW, March 22?The
kremlin s. emswe goal of a
'world unity summit 'confer-
ence of Communist Parties
faded still farther into the fu-
ture las the latest preparatory
Meeting, involving .67 Parties,
ended quietly and inconclu-
sively this afternoon.
T ii e summit?originally
scheduled for last November,
later postponed to this coming
May?was provisionally set for
June 5, which Soviet propa-
ganda will doubtless hail for
.elomestic consumption as a
great victory. However, the
participants at this week's
.ttneeting, which opened for-
mally last Wednesday, sched-
uled yet another preparatory
ressicin for May 23. Within
the next two months, each of
the Central Committees of the
67 Parties is to review the
basic draft document worked
out here, as well as numerous
? amendments which have al-
Arcady been submitted. _
?Observers believe that the
heretical and independent
Communist Parties, notably
,the Rumanians, Italians and
,rriost other West Europeans,
; have thtui won yet another op-
portunity for indefinite delay
!,?While the Russians must re-
!rmain on their best behavior in
?Czechoslovakia and elsewhere.
,t This we e k's preparatory'
meeting, as well as previous
sessions and subcommittee,
:parleys in a series dating
'back to February, 1068, was
'boycotted by six of the 14
ruling Communist Parties
(China, North Korea, North
Vietnam, Albania, Cuba and
Yugoslavia), plus most other
Asian Parties, which are pro.
Chinese. Moreover, the Japa-
nese, Swiss, Belgian and
Norwegian Parties, which at-
tended previous preparatory
meetings, stayed home this
time. ? - _
Of the 67 participating Par-
ties, only the eight ruling Par-
ties, plus perhaps anotherj
dozen, are considerert eignif1-1
cant political movements.
Most of the others (like the
Approved For Re
' American Communiat
have only a few thousand a
13114 w nig A.... .14?
derground, exiled or Wit.
The basic draft document,
which will be sent to the ab-
sentees as well as the 'edict.
pat-lug parties, is entitled
"The tasks of the 'present
stage of the struggle against
imperialism, and of the unity
of action of Communist and
Workers' Parties and of all
anti-imperialist forces."
According to informed Com-
munist sources, the document
makes absolutely no mention,
direct or indirect of China.
This would appear to be a re-
markable development, con-
sidering that the Smilet drive
for a world conference was
originally-launched by former
Party chief Khrushcheri in
1064, and relaunched by his
successor Breshnev in 1967, to
draw a firm doctrinal line be-
tween Soviet orthodoxy and
Chinese and other heresies.
In view of this month's
'bloody clashes between So-
viet and Chinese soldiers on
the Uasuri River, Soviet assent
to what is being .described as
a very bland and vague dacu-
trient is not being taken as a
sign of strength or self-con-
fidence in the Kremlin.
Sources report that thd
draft document refers to Viet-
nam, the Middle Emit, disarm-
?ament and peace ? b u t in
.terms sufficiently non-contro-
versial to permit at least con-
ditional approval by the Ru-
manians, Italians.. and. _other
Independents. ?.. -
Thus, the draft presumably
follows what some local cynics
term "the UNESCO style" of
the Budapest appeal on Euro-
peen security,' issued bY the
seven Warsaw Pact nations
last Monday. That email
which pleaded for 000pera-
tion in such matters as "hy-
giene," as well as a European
security conference, managed
to earn some 'approval even
from the conservative Axel
. .
Springer newspaper ,chein in
West Germany. - ?
? The Budapest appeal ;:was
,epparentlY. !se tepid, fro,* thi ? ,
ase 1999/09/(12 . CIA-RDIP`7901194A000500i.20CiOlA
' vewpo n o Tem n ant ,
' Fr - - - - - I. 1 -: - 1- k ? - - - if --'--i'"a"r'
Bonn crusader; that the
Soviet leaders felt compelled
tonight to reinterpret it. A
curiously anonymous state-
Ment, issued by the official
news agency Tass, declared in
the name of the Soviet Party
Politburo and ?government
Council of Ministers that' the
Budapest appeal had "great
Importance in view-of the fact
that the aggressive imperialist
NATO bloc La being activated:"
? The Budapest appeal sal
no suchthing, for? the Mime-.
nians 'would not, ave. signed
if it had. - . . ?' 1 .
? According : to Tess, ? the
Politburo and Council - of Mini
Inters ? "fully approved thp
activity of the Soviet detega!!
tion)', at Budapest after discus.?
Bing "a report of the .,Soviet.
delegation". on tthat meeting.
? Willie the Tasa announced .
meat referred only to the
Politburo. and Council of Min.':
titers, its headline 'declared
that the Party Central Com-. .
mittee was approving the-
Budapest results. Presumably,-
the Soviet-Central Committee'
_which has not met'etnce last
November, ' and then - onyi
_
briefly?must be -convened- be:
fore May: 23 to discuss '-the
basic. draft' on ? "the struggle ..
against imperialism." ? , s; ..,,,, -. ?
4
Several of the independent
Parties ?represented here,.- et(
well as 'outsiders. and -the casse
" tive , Czechoslovak's, ..have at)?
. parettly been playing for time
? In the hope that, suet'. a 1Cene
URI; C, ommittea ? meeting mighn
bring changes in Soviet ;0E,
icy,. leaders,hip, or lioth.''?vi.-447.*
?.k
I
I I:,
let
4Rf
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r-or solidariti,. with North Viet
nam and ti5e yietcong and a de-.
claration on the centennial of
Lenin's birtivnext year. ,
While the ,Soviet Union con-'
tenders that=fhe purpose of the
conference is,to unify the move.'
ment ratherethan exeornmuni-;
cate any members, the general,
belief among Communist ob.'
servers is that Moscow intends'
to use the cenference to widen
the rift 1)eftween Communist
Chinaa, and the bulk of the Com-
munist movement, including the
Soviet Union. ,
The idea of a world confer-
ence of the Communist move-
ment originated with Nikita S.
Khrushchev before his fall from
power irr October; -1964. Mr.
Khrushchev's aim was a decla-
ration putting the heritical Chi-
nese beyond the ;Communist
put off lit project for two
shchev's successors
years.. The idea was revived in
November, 1966, and received
with considerable coolness by_a_
number of important parties.
I The principal objection.
and and remains that reading Com;
munist China out of the move!
merit would restore the Soviet
Union as the single principal
renter of world Communism.
The eerie? of preparatory
meetings that began in Buda-
pest in February, 1968, set an
Oct. 15, 1968, date for the con-
ference. That was indefinitely
postponed by the invasion, of
Czechoslovakia.
Last November, a new meet-
ing in 'Budapest called for, the
conference in May, and set the
preliminary meeting that ended
today to make the 'final
rangements. _ ?.-,,
_
. Ulbricht Reports Solid Front
special WM* New York Times); ? ; ? (
7' BERLIN, March 22?Walterl
Ulbricht, the,i East German
leader, asserted today that all
Warsaw Pact countries were
unanimous in condemming
"Chinese Aggression" at the
East-bloc conference in Buda?
pest earlier this week. ,
DIEW YORK TIMES
23 March
WORLD RED TALKS
PLANNED TO OPEN
IN MOSCOW JUNE 6
At Least 6 of 67 Parties Are
:-Said to Have Called for
, Further Delay
ANDTHER PARLEY ADDED
Frelinilnary Session May 23
Allow Revisions' in
Final Document
By HENRY KAMM
, &ocelot to The New York Times
MOSCOW,, March 22?The
conference or tne woild Cuiu
munist parties is scheduled to
open here on Juno 5, informed
Communist sources said today.
`The sources said that the
dhinese-Soviet border in the
Far ?East dispute was the rea-
On for a renewed delay in the
confertnce, which had been
officially announced for May.
: In order to avoid the need
'otadopting a major document,
of the world Communist move-
.ment while the two principal
Communist powers were in a
_state of open hostility, at least
six parties were reported to
have moved for a .delay.
? The means they chose, ac-
cording to the sources, to de-
mand another meeting?set for
'May 23--by the preparatory
;commission, Which has been
meeting here since last Wednes,
-diy; to put the final touches to
the document and set the con-
ference date.
The purpose 'of the addition
al preliminary meeting, in the
argument put by the' dissent-
ing parties, is to allow the con-
ference' to revise the document
in the light of suggestions
made by the parties between
:ion. and May 23. ?
Long Delay Sou? ght
The principal advocates'. of
,that tactic, according to ?the
sources, were the Italian. and
British parties. Both parties are
in open opposition to the soviet
:Union over last year's invasion
Of Czechoslovakia .and are be-
lieved to favor an indefinite
postponement of the world
:.conference. 1
With the Soviet Union clear-
ly determined to have a con-
',ference, however, Its opponents
In the moveinent were thought
to be concentrating their' of-
ort d on putting it off as ;far
.as possible. "
The 67-party preparatory I
.Commission yielded to the de-
Inands and scheduled the May.
23 meeting, according to the
.sources: At the same time, it
'provided a major gain for the
Soviet-led majority by. setting
the date for the ? world con-
ference... ' . , ,
The draft document will be
circUlated. to all Communist
parties. It is. entitled "The
T'n vita fflip PrPRent staee Of
toeatruggle Agwinzl. Impt (LI
ism and the Unity ,of Action
of Communists and Workers
Parties and All. Anti-Iniperialist
Forces."
A communique on the meet-
ing that completed' its war
today Is expected to be iss,ued
tomorrow. According to :4the
sources, it will ,reconfirm that
all Communist parties, includ-
ing those that boycotted ?,the
preparatory meeting, would be
Invited to the conference.
Those boycotting the. talks
include six of the 14 'Commu-
nist. parties ,that rule .in their,
own countries...,They are :China,'
Albania, Yugoslavia, North Viet-
nam, North Korea and Cuba,
None is expected to attend...
Reports to ' Be Vague ?' ,
The document adopted today
was reported to be vague
enough to make it possible, for
those parties that are neutral in
the Soviet-Chinese disput, such
as Rumania, to sign it, Nonethe-
less, Bucharest was reported to
have suggested a number of re.,
visions during the current meet-
ing.
The world conference N ex-
pected to isue three additional
declarations: an appeal to all,
nations for peace, a statement)
2
M., IND ?
His remarks at a congress
in East Berlin appeared to con-
tradict reports from Budapest
saying that. Rumania had re-
fused to agree to a condemna-
tion of China.
"We were unanimous in
Budapest in our assessment of
those -aggressive acts, all the
more' since the Chinese actions
were provocations of a clear-
cut aggressive and , military
nature,' Mr. Ulbricht told the
congress of the National Front,
the Communist-led popular
front or?an iza tion.
? a Ma a ? ???
8
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Excerpts from Tito's report, 11 March 1969, at the Ninth Congress of the
League of Communists of Yugoslavia entitled: "Fifty Years' of Revolutionary
Struggle of the Communists of Yugoslavia"
....The theoretical discussions on the national question which took place
during 1923 and 1924 represented a significant step forward in the efforts
of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to adopt correct attitudes and carry
out an efficient policy. But there was still a long way to go to a clear
program and principled attitudes on this particularly important and delicate
question.
It is known that the Comintern, and Stalin personally, intervened in
the discussion on the national question in our country. Although it sup-
ported a positive stand as regards recognition of Yugoslavia's multinational
structure, the Comintern with its intervention increased the groping in the
dark as regards the practical activity of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.
This was particularly the case with the adoption of the stand on the need
to break up Yugoslavia, which, according to that stand, was only some kind
of artificial structure created by the Versailles Treaty. The Comintern
also participated in the adoption of other political attitudes which were
not always based on an analysis of reality and the specific situation in
Yugoslavia but on various assessments of the Comintern's top leaders --
which in addition kept changing often -- on the situation in our country
and in the world in general....
The decision to shift the leadership of the Communist Party of
Yugoslavia from abroad into the country and to make the party independent
in every respect, including financially, was of particular significance
in the formation of its correct policy and successful activity. This
made it possible for the party to become an independent force of the
Yugoslav workers movement, to assess correctly the real situation in the
country, to work out an action program, and to apply forms of work which
linked the Communist Party of Yugoslavia with the broadest working masses
and all its progressive forces. The party, together with the state leader-
ship, which was well acquainted with the circumstances there, was in a
position to oppose all dogmatic forces in the Comintern which, by refer-
ring to former factionalist struggle, proposed the dissolution of the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia. It became evident, however, that it was
the Communist Party of Yugoslavia -- which many in the Comintern in 1938 had
already written off -- was in the position to lead the people of Yugoslavia
into the liberation war and the revolution in 1941. It was our party --
in which the leadership of the Comintern had no confidence whatever --
that in the fateful days of World War II honorably fulfilled its obli-
gations to its peoples and the entire international workers movement. It
achieved this under the most difficult conditions by facing the difficulties
which came from those who should have helped us most....
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Socialist Yugoslavia itself had to wage a difficult struggle for its
independence and equal position in the world, despite the threats, pres-
sure, and blackmail of international reaction, both during the war and the
early postwar years. The new Yugoslavia was subject to fierce political,
economic, and psychological pressure, including pressure 1y countries of
the so-called socialist camp which followed Stalin's crit4Osm and attacks
on the Yugoslav Communist Party and in the aftermath of the resolution of
the Cominform.
Today it is known to the entire world that the reasons behind Stalin's
attack on Yugoslavia were actually of an entirely different nature from
those which were chosen to provide the ostensible occasion for the critique
of our party and which, in fact, then foreshadowed a historically inevitable
conflict in the international workers movement. The attack on the Yugoslav
Communist Party represented the first open conflict between a bureaucratic
concept concerning a socialist country and the paths of socialist develop-
ment in the world, such as was built in the Soviet Union under Stalin's
leadership, which, by the way, cannot be treated merely as a "personality
cult," and an antidogmatic approach to and a democratic concept of
socialist society, which had come to the fore in the activity of the
Yugoslav Communist Party earlier, and especially so after the war. Of
course, we did not invent this concept so as to become the inventors of
the new "model of socialism," because it had been engendered and molded
as a result of specific conditions of revolutionary struggle in our country
and deep-rooted changes in the modern world. Events have proved that the
dilemmas which faced Yugoslav communists were not something particularly
our own. It was demonstrated that they were the dilemmas of the further
development of socialism in general, both in our country and in the world,
and that they are encountered by many other parties and individual
socialist countries.
It is known that the Yugoslav Communist Party leadership even earlier,
and especially during the national liberation war, occasionally experienced
poor understanding and even came into conflict with Stalin's policy.
Stalin's policy obviously also reflected belittlement of the strength of
our movement and its ability to decide by itself the fateful questions of
our development.
Such an attitude toward revolution in our country was also an expres-
sion of the situation prevailing for many years in the Comintern. This
international organization, toward the end of its existence, increasingly
became the instrument of USSR policy, or rather Stalin's policy, and
respected less and less the independence of individual parties. It is
understandable that, after the victory of the October Socialist Revolution,
all truly revolutionary movements, ours included, considered as their
international debt to give unconditional support to the Soviet Union, the
first socialist country. However, the policy of subordination to the
momentary state interests of Soviet foreign policy caused on the eve of
war and later, not to mention after the war, enormous damage to individual
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communist parties. Such a policy created bureaucratic relations in the
party leaderships, hampered self-initiative, and, what was even worse,
led them to isolation from their own working class and peOple.
After World War II, the question of relations with the Soviet Union
and relations in the international workers movement in ge4eral became even
more topical, because in many countries communist partiescame to power and
were faced with the need to find the most suitable way fot:developing
socialist social relations. Stalin did not recognize the'W'specific
conditions of the sociopolitical development in our counti:iir. In our
independence, in the independence of the party, in the deMOcratization
and humane relations in socialism, the Stalinist saw a danger for the
existing relations between socialist countries and also .for the relations
inside these countries. The popularity of the Yugoslav Communist Party
and the interest in our experience in other countries and communist
parties was obviously in Stalin's way, although we never tried to impose
it either then or later. The champions of the idea that the USSR is the
center of revolution and an example of socialism could not, it seems,
reconcile themselves with the trend of making individual parties and
movements independent. This is why it was necessary to compromise the
League of Communists of Yugoslavia before the international workers move-
ment, denounce it for all alleged betrayal of socialism and transformation
into "a counterrevolutionary agency of imperialism," and thus check it
in its further independent socialist development, which was the basic
meaning of the Cominform action.
If we recall today this period, which was certainly the most difficult
in the postwar development of Yugoslavia, and for many of us communists
the most difficult in the long revolutionary work, we do not do this
because we would like to fan old things and hatred against anybody. We
have always consistently striven for better and equal relations with the
Soviet Union and other socialist countries, emphasizing that the
differences in the ways of building socialism should not be a barrier for
cooperation but, on the contrary, an impetus to sincere exchange of
opinion and experience. In this sense we supported the attitudes of the
libe 20th CPSU Congress that each country should find its own way to socialism,
that the richness of forms in building socialism no longer mattered
and, on the contrary, was strengthening the international workers
movement, and that the relations between communist and workers parties
and progressive movements must be based on equality and actual mutual
respect.
The campaign against socialist Yugoslavia and everything which fol-
lowed it had serious repercussions for many parties and for the develop-
ment of individual socialist countries. Particularly serious harm was
done by methods of oppression and infringement of legality, suppression
of the citizens' elementary rights, distortion of the truth and monstrous
misuse of propaganda, as well as many other actions. This caused
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political, economic, and ethical conflicts in individual s?cialist countries,
contributed to fomenting the cold war, and seriously undermined the con-
fidence in socialism among many people in the world.
In 1948 we were advised by some people, allegedly in he interest of
pnity in the international workers movement, to accept these iniquitous
accusations, and, for the same reason, to submit to the resolution of the
Informburo. The evolution of events confirmed that we were right when we
refused to accept this advice because such a capitulation would have
amounted to opportunism and betrayal, not only of our rev4ution and our
working people whose unbounded confidence we enjoyed, but also the interests
of the international workers movement and socialism in general.
We can freely assert that in defending the independence of socialist
Yugoslavia and the right of each party to its own development, we acted
with full responsibility before our peoples and before the international
workers and socialist movement. I am stressing because the Yugoslav
League of Communists on several subsequent occasions found itself in
situations in which it was asked, for the sake of alleged higher interests
of the international workers movement, to renounce its ideas and viewpoints,
to support an international policy which ran counter to its assessments
and to the objective interests of the broad socialist and anti-imperialist
movement in the world.
One document of this policy is in the declaration of the 1960 con-
ference of communist parties in Moscow, in which the League of Communists
was again attacked in an arbitrary, crude manner. However, the develop-
ment of events has itself eloquently refuted this unprincipled attitude
toward Yugoslavia and many other attitudes contained in that resolution,
justifying at the same time our doubts about the value of such documents....
However, we continue to witness the practice whereby, in the relations
between socialist countries and communist parties, the principles of inter-
nationalism are at times misused for the purpose of imposing, in its name,
various unilateral obligations on individual parties, as if internationalism
were not, before everything else, a reflection of every party's conscience
and awareness of the connection between its interests and the international
struggle against reaction and imperialism. Attempts are made in the name
of internationalism to justify the compulsoriness of some "general line"
which, judging from experience thus far, represents either a diktat or an
unprincipled compromise between very different concepts and interests of
one group of parties at the expense of other parties and movements, which
objectively prevent individual parties and movements from seeking their
own forms of struggle and solutions in realizing their revolutionary
goals. In the name of the alleged higher interests of socialism, attempts
are made to justify even the open violation of the sovereignty of a
socialist country and the adoption of military force as a means of pre-
venting independent socialist development.
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This interpretation of socialism has a grave effect 9n the policy of
the communist parties and other progressive forces, as well as on the inter-
national anti-imperialist front in general....
?
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"In Honor of the 50th Anniversary of the Creation of the Third Communist
International: the Great School Of Internationalism," by Candidate of
Historical Sciences, A. Shpynov, Selskaya Zhizn (Rural Life), 2 March 1969.
The First (constituent) Congress ef the Communist internationol, convened at
the initiative of v.1. Lenin, was held exactly half a century ago in Mosi,ou. The
creation of the Third Communist International it an outstanding event in the history
. of the freedom struggle of the world proletariat and its vanguard, the 'iY,kci St
movement.
. The activity of the Comintern continued until 191if). AlLhougn a quartei cf a etitury
has elapsed since then, interest in itt history has not decreased but rLiner, increased
in recent years. A study of documents, and especially of documents worked out .dith
the participation of V.I. Lenin, and an analysis of the theoretical and practical
activity'or the Comintern help one gain a better understanding of the sources of the
present growth in the political influence of tne world communist movement and raoilitate
deeper 'clarification of the natural laws of Its development and consideration for
? everything positive in the accumulated experience of the communist and workors-partierl-;?
It must be noted tha': the history of the Comintern is being studied very attentivelz.
by the enemies of communism and the revisionists striving to defame its revolution?:1
traditions, falsify its ideas, and undermine the unity of tho world communItc movement.
Therefore it is the most important duty of natinnal groups and of the entire world
rommunttlt movement to adopt a correct ;Tproach to evaluating the hintorical
or the COmintern and itr, heritage, pint; pie, 0110 traditions.
The Communist International arose at a historical nere:;sity because of the dcvilopment
of scientific socialism and the international worker movement.
Two circumstances played a decisive role in preparing and creating the Comintern.
First, tl'e revolutionary struggle of the Bolsheviks led by V.1. Lenin against
reformism and "centralism" of members of the Second international for uniting-leftist -
elements in all countries. Second, the powerful revolutionary influence of the
Great October Socialist Revolution on all countries throughout the world, the
stormy .revolutionary upsurge of the working masses in most of the countries or
:Western Europe and Ameriea, and the upsurge of the national freedom 3truggle in
.coloniel and dependent countries. As Clara Zetkin, an outstanding figure in
the international prolei.arian movement, noted, the Communist international
'was "not only the creation of a revolutionary time, but also the true child of the
revolution itself?the Russian Revolution, the first gigantic forecaster of the '
pm .ietarian world revolution." In fact, the 'real grounds for creating the new
Communist International appeared after the victory of the Oct,lber Revolution when
the communist parties began to appear.
'The appearance of the first communist parties and cummnoist mr90K; created the
:need for an International communist organization. The CFS(J took charge of practical
work fir forming and uniting these communist organizations and groups into a new
Communist International. V.I. Lenin wrote that "Bolshevism had created the
ideological and tactical foundations of the Third International, which was many
proletarian and communist and included. both the achiciiment of the peaceful epoch
and the experience of the revolutionary period that bud begun. " (complete
Collected Works. Vol 37, page 304)
The Comintern can be called a creation of Leninis genius in the true senac of the
word. The very idea and plan for creating the Comintern as a counterweight to
the Second Internatiwial, which had ,nmffered ideulOgical 171(1-political-collapse,
belonged to V.1. Lenin. Lenin performed an en)rnms am.unt A' truly titanic work,
gradually preparing the nucleus of internationalists in the worker mavement which
thArpOridvVa PoTermentoxesin:cetAIRrapneomeitpamootal000tla,-
1
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generalized all the international.and Russian experience ef the revalutienary
struggle, ereated the ideulogical,and theoretical platform ef the ComlnU,rn.
formulated the vital questions of the political strateu and tactics of the
international communist movement, and developed its urganizataonal principles.
V.I. Lenin was the acknowledged leader of the world eommunist movement.
A central place in the work of the congress was accupied by V. I. Leninls report
"On Bourgeoia Demacracy and the Dictatorship af the Proletariat." The report
gave a scientific generalization of the experience of the international worker
movement and established the main tasks, strategy, and tactics of the international
communist movement in the new historical epoch that and begun--the epoch of the
transition from capitalism to socialism. V.I. Lenin unmasked the bourgeois and sacial-
Teformist efforts to defend bourgeois democracy under the banner of "democracy .
in general" or "pure democracy," deeply revealed its class essence, and showed that
'beurgeais democracy is a form of bourgeois dictatorshap. Lenin urged the communist.
;parties to unmask the false nature of bourgeois democracy and lead the struggle of the
proletariat and all exploited masses for the victory of the socialist revolution
and for a Soviet-style proletarian dictatorship as a truly people's demarracy.
The mintern determined that pratecting the warld's first proletarian state was
its dast Important international task, considering the Saviet Union as the center of the
warla revelutian.
fritie theories of V. I, Lenin and the resolution proposed by him were unanimoualy
approved and adopted by the first congress as basic programmatic documents and
as militant leadership in action.
The first clear example of the collective, creative cooperation between represen-
tatives of various communist parties, as represented by the first congress which
elaborated the ideological and political platform of the Comintern under V.I. Lenin's
leadership, appears particularly significant when one looks hack over the last
50 years. This platform analyzed imperialism from a Marxist position, revealed
the nature of the new epoch, incarnated Lenin's ideas about tne conditiono for
the victory of the socialist revolution and the political and class allies of
the proletariat in the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, and
so on. The adoption of the platform and the approval of Lenin's resolution on
bourgeois democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat was evidenee of the
fact that the international communist unity was founded on tee firm Ideological
and theoretical base of Leninism.
Lenin. wrote: "The world historical significance of the Third Ommailiat Taternational
Lies in the fact that It inclnord new uommunist,parties." The GomIntern ma: 1 a.
praotical school of Leninism and a schnol of the masses' politleal leadership in
the young eommuni.st parties, and it helped them acca and find ways to eombine
adialectical principles Ind flexibility in their poliey and to auald that polica
on the basis of the peofound scientific analysis of social. development. V.I. aonin
showed extreme concern rr the establishment ana development of communist partice,
educated their leading eadres, and taught them to always pr end in their actions
from a sober and strictly objective consideration of all the warli economic and
poLitical fact:opt, and a consideration of the distribution of the elaaS forces in
their own country and in the world arena. Prom its fleet steps the Comintern,
guided by 1,r:flints ideas, helped the young communist part-lea in a practical manner
to master ail forms of sur ugale--leaal and II. Loa I, pcarefuI and nonpeacefui, .
parliamentary and nonparTiamentary?to be ready fee a very vapid, unexpected changc
from one form of ?struggle to another, and to consider not only the possibility for
changing to- the attack, but also for withdrawal. V. I. Lenin aavised thL Comintern
and the communist parties always to obtain the support ,f the masses and the working
class in their tactical moves, to show constant concern for the masses, to be in
vale:Jo contact with them, to work wherever the masses were, and to learn the art of
bratiging the masses into revolutionary combat against the beurgeoiale, instructing
them on.the basis of their own experience.
s'P'oV&1P? Refeffib 1f999/09182,4 GlieteRDP(79,0*-464AGeozaolgoaoi -8
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8
Inteict a it a Leninist corsisteney and resolution at all stages of its existence.
it to en.digh La remember the proletarian solidarity movement with awiet Russia,
the Chinese revolution, republican Spain: and the people Is national liberation struggle
in various countries. This tradition is being cintinued by the present international
communist movement. An example of this is the resolute censure or imperialist,
aggress Ion in Vietnam, the Arab oast, and ethen places ln the world,
The Cominternls most important principle and legney Is to r1,:ht against open
:revisionism of every- hue within the ranks of the communist movement and also
against opportunists, sentarians, and dogmatists; to protect the riw!ity of
Marxism-Leninism from being distorted and debased by its nnpurtunisto and
'sectarians: and to creatively develop and propagandize the MirxIst Leninist
niadir the new conditions:if the class strnggle Jur inc, tie
From the first day of its formation the Comintern displayed a Leninist impatience
toward any manifestations of national egoism in the communist environment and fought
,resolutely against efforts to counterpose national tasks against general international'
tasks.
Proletarian internationalism, which permeates the entire activity of the Comintern,
demands the correct combination of .the interests Dr the proletarian struggle In one
'country with the interests of this struggle on a world scale.
The Comintern considered its primary, most important task the struggle against
opportunist, nationalist, and petit-bourgeois distortions of the concept and tactics.
of internationalism. The restoration and strengthening of the international links
of the working class in all countries that had been broken by the leaders of the
Second International, and the education of the communists and workers of all countries
in a spirit of proletarian internationalism.
Continuing and developing the traditions of the Comintern, the communist and wcrkers
parties have, in the process of collective creative cooperation, elaborated a general
political line of conduct and new practical forms for coordinating their activtties
in the struggle for peace, national independence, democracy-. and socialism! bilateral
and multilateral meetings of the representatives of cumionnisL parties anti international
conferences.
The conferences are a natural form by which independent parties having equal rights
can agree on common positions concerning urgent present-aay questicals.
It is completly understandable that the goals of every communist party cdnrerence.
Imust correspond to the concrete tasks of the historical time, the urgent demands of
the struggle, and the interests of the entire communist movement.
An important role In developing the common positiLAs of the communist movement at
the present !!;tagt,..tind the new forms of international communist relations was,pl,ayed
hy thr cisnerrtices held In Moscow In 1957 and 1960. The main Ideas Gttt out In the
.documents if these conferences passed the practical tests of the revolutiohary
:;truggi:7 with honor,
Th-a pre:!cht omplex and dAngevcAis world situation demands that vemmuniats theomnr,ut
the woviii .ncrease their responsibility for the fate uf poacP, iceialism, and utmecricy,
and that they closely unite and strengthen international party unity.
in this connection, it is very important to note that the preparatory work for the:
new internaticnal conference of communist and workers parties, planned for May 1969,
has entered .its concluding stage.
The new conference will be devoted to examining a very urgent problem: the tasks
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8
3
of thppricnAd Fpr Rieleasc 1 p 1111 la cm
e a ins p e r ??; 111WXYDPACM)124/Cg)141,
ccrraro.lni3 tr i.i tilt:: struegle , and the search for ways to achieve unity of action of
.cnroLunist ,Hy? workers parties and of all anti-imperialist forces. The MU considers
-1-1-1/:?crecarato and nzading of the conference as the main link in the struggle to -
ur.11,6: the w5rt d c t muvement at the present stag,k!.
Tu. Lenrilit Lra:11L.Lons embodied in the Comintern and the very rich experience
acc.urrt...tiated Lif It during its quorter of a century of struggle against imperialism,
ar.,1 opportunism are "--f 1.atsurpasseti importance and serve as the golden
b'soLf th..! w2rld co:anoln is t movement .
SELSKAYA ZHIZN
2 March 1969
K exaalaisi atcihfe/tiieztgzijiiead
I. ? .
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001-8
CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
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Chapter VI from Impressions of Lenin, by Angelica Balabanoff, Ambassador
Books, Ltd., Canada, 1964. (Angelica Belabanoff was deply and idealistic-
ally involved in the international workers' movement ar6Und the time of
World War I, at which time she became associated with Lenin. She acceded
to his urging that she become Secretary of the Comintern at its founding.
She broke with Lenin and the Comintern when she became onvinced there was
no hope of the Cordntern's becoming anything more than 4 tool for the cynical
purposes of Lenin and his cohorts.)
VI
Secretary of the International
Although Lenin's aim, from the very beginning of World
War I, was the foundation of a new International, and all
his overt and hidden strategy was guided by this desire, the
foundation of the third International came to him, as well
as to his closest collaborators, almost as a surprise.
Speaking to me about it, Lenin had already a priori
excluded the possibility of getting a sufficient number of dele-
gates to Russia to establish there the coveted Third Inter-
national. In the meantime, however, some members of the
Executive Council of the Russian Communist Party (Zino-
viev, Radek, and Bukharin, with the consent and aid of
Trotsky and Lenin) tried to obtain by fraud and deception
what they had not been able to obtain by normal and honest
means.
Since only one delegate, the German Eberlin, had answered
Chicherin's call, the Bolsheviks put on a farce: they assem-
bled members of parties in countries already belonging to
Russia, such as Latvia and Lithuania, who were, in fact,
members of the Russian Communist Party and did not enjoy,
herefore, any autonomy. They called in prisoners who for
years had not had any contact with their countries and a few
'emigrants who had left their countries for one reason or an-
other and had lived in Russia for a long time. Among the
thirty-five assembly members only one had the political right
to represent his country and to vote as its delegate. This was
the Spartacist Eberlin; he was in possession of a regular
mandate. As soon as he realized how contrived the situation
was, he publicly declared that in such an assembly no delib-
eration could be taken since this gathering could not be con-
sidered a constituent assembly for a new International. Thus,
it was decided that the meeting was to serve merely as an
exchange of ideas.
The next day, however, members of the Russian Commu-
nist Party, with the usual shrewdness, proposed that the deci-
1The Spartacist League, to which the German left-wing Socialists
.belonged, was founded in 1918 in Berlin by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl
Liebknecht. Later, it was replaced by the Communist Party. The two
founders were murdered by the Germans in 1919.
CPYRGHT
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, sions ot the day fferore le a' nnulle-d. They announced gat
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1 an event had taken place which would change the situatiton
1 .
completely: the whole of Europe was in revolutionary kr-
ment. As it turned out, it was a Bolshevik bluff. A prisoper
of German extraction, who, during and after the Revolution
ha1 been living in Russia, where he had become a fent
Bo shevik,2 had been sent by Radek to Germany for prdpa-
ganda action. After the maturation of the deceitful pl2in,
whose aim was the creation of a new International, the BO1-
sheviks called him back. The enormous difficulties of illegal
travel at that time caused him to arrive one day late in
Moscow, when the voting had already taken place. He was
asked to address the assembly. Partly out of naivete and
partly because of the instructions received from Radek, he
gave a glowing account of what he had seen and heard:
everywhere enormous enthusiasm for the Bolshevik revolu-
tion, the workers ready to follow its example, the new Inter-
national in the hearts and hopes of all.
The voting?shrewdly engineered by the Russian delegates,
Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev, and a few others?was
this time in favor of an immediate constitution of the new
International, in spite of the German delegate's opposition
(he was the only one in possession of a mandate) and to the
surprise of the others.
Since I had declared I would abstain from the vote, there
was an exchange of written messages between Lenin and
myself containing some severe criticism of my action. "Why
don't you vote? You have so many mandates from the Italian
Socialist party, you are more than authorized to vote for it;
and then, you read Avantil, you are informed." I wrote my
reply on the same note: "No! My mandates are not sufficient
' to commit the Italian Party in such a decisive action."
"You are making a mistake; in your capacity of secretary
of the Zimmerwald Movement you have the right, even the
duty, to vote for the Italian Socialist Party.*
"I cannot agree with you," I countered. 'I have no direct
contacts in this moment with the Italian Party. . . . Here
we can decide, protected by the Red army, we are in power.
But there, in the capitalist countries, the situation is quite
different. I cannot make others assume such grave responsi-
bilities without their being able to discuss them first."
I was not aware at the time of what was hidden behind the
unexpected and illegal proclamation of the new Interna-
tional, and I was impatient to return to the Ukraine to work
among the masses far from officials and Moscow officialdom.
When I met Trotsky in a corridor of the Kremlin, I said
good-bye to him. "What, you are going to leave?" he burst
out. "You know you have been nominated secretary of the ,
International!"
"I? Not in the least! Let me do my work among the
masses . . ." .
2 Not long after his return to Russia, he left the Bolsheviks, disgusted
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Come with me to Comrade Lenin, he is around here. He will
tell you what the Central Committee has decided."
From the manner in which Lenin received me, I under-
stpod that he had not forgiven my insubordination. I decided
;
to come right out with it: "Comrade Trotsky tells me yp
want me to take the post of secretary of the International,
ibut I ask you to be excused. As long as the work was very
Idifficult and taxing, especially in war time, I have never re.
fused. Now the secretariat is in a Socialist country, the pro-
cedures are normal again; you can find replacement for me."
Lenin gave me one of his characteristic looks. "Comrade
Balabanoff, discipline must exist for you also . . ."
"What does this mean? It was you who advised me to
transfer to the Ukraine! I have not even started work there,
and you make me return here already. And my commit-
ments toward Comrade Rakovsky? And then, all my books
and the things I need are already in Kharkov!"
"I shall inform Comrade Rakovsky that you are more neces-
sary here than in the Ukraine, and I shall have your things
sent back here immediately," Lenin said firmly. While I was
still remonstrating, Lenin added in an even firmer tone: "The
decision, by the way, was taken by the Central Committee,
not by me personally." This way of his of attributing to the
Central Committee decisions that had been suggested by
him was known to me. It meant the decision was final.
No sooner had I returned to my hotel room than the phone
rang: "The Party's Central Committee informs you of your
appointment as secretary of the International. Vladimir
Ilyich has informed Comrade Rakovsky that your presence
is urgently needed here and that you cannot return to the
Ukraine. At the same time, Comrade Lenin has sent word
that your things are to be shipped back here."
The evening of the day after the proclamation of the
Third International a meeting was held in one of the largest
Moscow theaters with the participation of the foreign "dele-
gates." One can hardly imagine the state of mind of the
masses streaming to that convocation. Isolated from the world
for so long, they thought they could finally see that prom-
ised ray of light, finally hear that long-awaited voice of
solidarity that would bring them the liberation promised by
their leaders.
This joyful anticipation was in the air, one sensed it in
? the people's eagerness to get seats in the hall, in the out-;
cries of joy over the possibility of seeing the representatives
of the hoped-for world revolution. I admit, this euphoria
was transmitted to me to the extent that I identified myself
with some of the speakers in translating their addresses. I
? felt that my words struck the listeners' conscience, creating
a response that transformed the ball. I too was transformed.
I seemed to see before me the protagonist of that epic revo-
lution that was destined to create a new world. I was almost
grateful to Lenin and Trotsky for hvinz sklizqd e tg
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of e speakers addresses I perceived a strident, demagogic
note, something that had a false ring. I could not and woUld
not identify myself with the speaker, and I gave a lifeloss,
limp translation of his speech, instinctively omitting all that
had rung false to me. As soon as the translation was finished,
Trotsky came up to me: "Anything the matter, Comrade
Angelica? This last translation did not seem to come fcom
yon . . ."
I said nothing, but I decided not to translate any nre
official speeches in Russia. I kept my resolution. Never
have I consciously been an accomplice to a fraud. ,The
speaker who had caused me so much revulsion was one of
the most unconscionable accomplices of Bolshevism. This
man, Fritz Platten, a Swiss living in Russia, was shot, accord-
ing to press reports, some time later.
I was just going to take up again my activity as secretary
of the Zimmerwald Movement when I received news that
the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party had
appointed Zinoviev president of the International. In select-
ing him for the office of president, Lenin was guided by one
Principle: to put at the head of the International a man who
would lend himself to being a tool in the hands of the Central
Committee.
My appointment as secretary was designed to attract to
the new International Socialists of other countries for whom
my name warranted integrity and impartiality.
Lenin, who counted Zinoviev among the most faithful
executors of his orders, knew well every aspect of his char-
acter. Lenin asked Zinoviev to do for him things he would
not have done himself. True, Lenin treated him with that
camaraderie, that trust, which many years of underground
work amid serious difficulties had established between them,
but he never had, nor could have had, any esteem for him.
This was borne out by the fact that in 1917, on the eve of
the October Revolution, Zinoviev, for the first time in a posi-
tion of direct responsibility, left Lenin's side and opposed
the seizure of power. Lenin disowned him, denouncing his
vileness and his cowardice?a particularly grave accusation
against a revolutionist of that time.
I soon realized, not without surprise, that our sessions be-
gan and ended with the dispatch of administrative matters.
One day I brought this matter up with Vorovsky, who had
been assigned to me as collaborator?as I found out later?
so that he might influence me and mitigate my intransigence,
given our friendship and the esteem in which I held him.
"Is it possible," I said to him, "that everything ends up as a
bureaucratic institution? To tell you the truth, Vaclav Vacla-
vich, I feel ill at ease. Why have they insisted so much on
my taking this job? . . . I do nothing useful here."
"Dear Angelica," Vorovsky said, looking at me with his
wistful eyes, a subtle smile on his face, "you have only one
fault, which is a suality, ? erha is: ou know the Interna-
? ? ? ? j . ra- ? I ?,,lia
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is onest, you refuse to co laborate witf him.
At one of the meetings of the Executive Committee of the
International Zinoviev announced radiantly: "I have good
news. Our situation is so good that we have decided to estab-
lish a branch of the Communist International in the Ukraine,
a very important location for future relations with comrades
abroad. Comrade Balabanoff %yin be in charge of this office.
She will be aided by highly qualified collaborators."
"Comrade Balabanoff?" I cut in. "But why do you send me
elsewhere again? I have hardly started my new job . . ."
"Of course, Comrade Balabanoff," countered the president,
of the International. "We need a great name for a position -
of such responsibility, do you want us to send there just ;
any comrade?"
, "These are not arguments to be taken seriously," I replied, I
determined not to consider the invitation extended to me.
; But Zinoviev went on to ask me when I was going to leave.
'To put an end to this situation I went to Lenin, confident of
,his support, in the belief that he considered my stay in Mos-
'cow of greater usefulness than the activity in the Ukraine.
' Instead, Lenin said to me: "In the Ukraine, it will be
easier for you to establish contacts with foreign countries;
and then, why should we keep in Moscow our best propa-
ganda forces, our best speakers?" Since I persisted in my
refusal, I was called to confer with the secretary of the Party.
"We have found a most interesting assignment for you," he
told me. "You shall be the leader of a propaganda train
leaving for Turkestan."
"Why Turkestan?" I burst out. "Is that a joke? I know
neither the country nor the psychology of the people, who,
no doubt, are very primitive; my propaganda work would be
wasted there. Besides, very few understand Russian."
"But we need a famous name, like yours," he countered.
"I am not a prima donna," I said, turning to the door, "and
I don't want to be treated like one!" I soon realized that
everything was already arranged for my travel. The mem-
bers of the Turkestan expedition called on me to read their
report, asking for my approval. I let them go on, partly out
of politeness and partly because I liked the kind of work
which gave me an opportunity to learn many things.
One day, a Communist woman who had shown great
friendship for me, put me on the alert. "Watch out! This is
a trap that Zinoviev has set. He wants to get rid of you."
Much later I learned from the wife of Vorovsky, the first
Russian Soviet ambassador to Italy, that her husband?a
RUN HT
'At that time in Russia there were trains built and used exclusively
for propaganda purposes. These trains were ultra-modern and con-
sisted not only of cars for the accommodation of the Moscow emis-
saries (two members of each commissariat, whose task it was to super-
vise and instruct the local commissariat leaders), but also of a printing
car for the publication of daily bulletins and of a movie car. I was to
direct the collective work at each stop of the train in important towns
' and to deliver the introductory and closing speech.
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Bolshevik of the old guard with whom I had worked in
Stockholm during the most tragi_c and decisive months for
d Fotn(PyeisaRsevaafiWtOZa:dgArcRgirePrktikANI0
really let this woman die in Turkestan?" The typhus epi-
demic that raged there at the time and the poor sanitary
conditions of the towns in which our propaganda train was to
stop made the probability of contagion extremely high.
I wanted to see clearly in all this. At the first meeting of
the Executive Council of the Communist International in
Petrograd, I asked Zinoviev: "I should like to know," I said,
"why I am supposed to leave Moscow at a time when foreign
Socialists are likely to arrive. I do not understand, and I
, shall not move." Zinoviel.v, not used to being told the truth,
could not hide his embarrassment. "I know nothing, it is
' Moscow that decides," he replied lamely. Then he began
writing the usual memos asking for help from those members
of the Executive Council who were beholden to him and
who lent themselves to such services. Indeed, they took the
floor to insist on my departure.
Turning to Zinoviev, I asked again: "Could you explain to
me why I should be thousands of kilometers away from Mos-
cow when, after so many years, we finally succeed in making
contact with the 'Western Socialists?" Without looking me in
the face, he replied: "Because our politics is directed now
toward the East, which is of the greatest importance to us."
"But what plans are there for me? What is the special
assignment in which I cannot be replaced?"
"You will be told in Moscow."
"Moscow indeed! It is the International that has to de-
.cide." Zinoviev had become deadly pale. His lips trembled.
; During the afternoon session of the same day an urgent I
telephone call arrived from Kronstadt. "The comrades in
Kronstadt want you to give a talk tomorrow," Zinovicv said
? turning to me. "Tomorrow?" I asked in surprise. "How can
I be there tomorrow if our work here is not yet finished? And
then, there is that session that concerns me personally."
"But you will be back by then," Zinoviev said.
"Can you assure me of that? I do not like to say no to
? the comrades, but neither should I want to be absent from
my work here."
"You can do both," Zinoviev assured me.
Having never missed an appointment (not even now after
fifty-five years of party activity), I decided to call Kronstadt
again to make sure of the connections, especially in view of
the fact that I was going by boat. I insisted to the man in
Kronstadt on a clear and binding answer. He ended by say-
ing that he could not guarantee my return in time. I decided
not to leave Petrograd. The meeting of the Executive Coun-
cil was scheduled for the afternoon, and I accepted an in-
vitation in the morning to give a talk to the women convened
in special assembly on the occasion of the youth mobilization.
This was one of the most memorable speeches I gave in
Soviet Russia. I was to persuade the mothers?mostly non-
PrOletarians?to make the supreme sacrifice of letting their
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d F9so(ncsateopthagye frfAtoivtgnAyikeiotipt7T9slifi 1040050cRgAW
listnEr laces grew fess
dent, less hostile. I shall never forget the handwritten notes
whiclf were brought to me at the speaker's stand ( this was
customary feature of Russian meetings of the time). One
note said: "When my daughter volunteered for the Red front,
I cured her; now, after having heard Angelica Balabanoff,
I give ,her my blessing." And another: "If it is this that our
sons are fighting for, our sacrifice cannot be in vain." This
was the tone of the many notes that came to me on that occa-
sion. A man in his forties came forward: "I move that these
notes be all preserved in the Museum of the Revolution!" I
Completely exhausted?I had not yet eaten anything?I
met on my way to the room where the Executive Council
was to meet a group of members on their way out. "How do
you happen to be here so early?" I said jocularly. "We have
just finished," replied one of Zinoviev's disciples.
"What have you finished? Was the session not scheduled,
to continue in the afternoon?"
"Yes," he replied, "but then we decided otherwise."
Zinoviev's baseness and cowardice was revealed to me in
all its ugly nakedness. Assuming that I was in Kronstadt, he
had called a meeting of the Executive Council and rammed,*
through the order of my departure. I waited for him toi
come out of the meeting, and I faced him squarely. "So,
you have met and decided in my absence a question that,
concerns me personally, after you had assured me you
would discuss it this afternoon when I would be present." ,
He grew pale, fiddled with his briefcase, made a step for-
ward, as if he wanted to break away; then he said in a lOw
voice: "Yes, the Executive Council has decided for your
, departure." He said this in the tone of a mere witness who
?has had no influence whatever on the decision. And he
'added: "It is not I who decides, but the Central Committee
of the Party."
"I am not going," I replied firmly.
"And the Party discipline . . . r
"I am second to none in the observance of discipline, but
this is no longer discipline, this is absurdity, idiocy! You
will regret your actions. You want me out of the way exactly
when my presence might be useful, when the comrades from
abroad finally arrive. And you want me to miss the encounter
with the Italian Socialists. I will not stand for that!"
I had returned to Moscow the same day, and I heard noth-
ing further about that matter until one day the American
poet John Reed, one of the most disinterested and coura-
geous supporters of the Russian Revolution, came to me
greatly perturbed. "Are you, Angelica, the secretary of the
Communist International?"
"Yes, I am."
"And why, then, are you not at the meeting?"
"Which meeting?"
The meeting of the Executive Council which is taking
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Zinoviev, muttered some excuse: he a forgotten to invite
me . . . forgotten to invite the secretary! At my appr-
,,,
ance they felt uncomfortable because of their complicity in
the vulgar fraud.
"Well," I asked Zinoviev, "what have you decided about
the train to Turkestan?"
"What? Has Trotsky not told your (Zinoviev used to
leave it to some friend of the victim of his plottings to break
the news to him; thus he avoided questions and confronta-
tions.) "Strange, we have asked him to do so."
"But what has Trotsky to do with it? I ask you."
"The Central Committee has decided," said the omnipo-
tent president of the Third International, "that you may not
go to Turkestan, but at the same time you are relieved of
the office of secretary of the International. Trotsky will
explain to you."
Such was my revulsion at this act of baseness that I could
not say a word. I returned to the hotel with a load off my
mind?relieved of an office which had become intolerable
to me with its atmosphere of intrigues, maneuvers, and
slavishness.
Naturally, ?I did not go to Turkestan. Around that event
something like a legend was growing, since this had been
the first attempt at relegating an embarrassing rebel to
outlying regions of the country. Since Turkestan was a peach-
growing region, someone at a congress of the Russian Com-
munist Party asked the leaders if they had intended to have
me "eat peaches." And when the same method was applied
' later to other opponents, the wry saying circulated: "They
wanted him to eat, peaches as they had tried with Comrade
Angelica." ,
A few weeks later, a mellifluous voice came over the phone:
"How are you, dear comrade? I should like to visit you with
Comrade Olga." "Who is speaking?" ,
"It is I, Zinoviev. I should like to come and see you with
my wife." In the ten years we had known each other we
had never exchanged a single word that was not strictly con-
nected with our work. When we met on the stairs, we merely
greeted each other, without the customary polite exchanges.
And now, after having acted toward me in that base manner,
he wanted to visit me. "But I am very well. You would not
find me at home." ,
"I wanted to tell you that the Central Committee has
unanimously decided to reinstate you as secretary."
"I am reinstated?! I have yet to get an explanation for my
removal. Besides, you know well how often I resigned from
the post, and now, I should accept it again after that foul
play of yours in Petrograd?"
I felt revulsion rather than indignation at the sight of such
cowardice. What could have induced that individual to as-
sume such, an apologetic attitude? The riddle was solved
soon enough. Radek, returning from Western Europe, re-
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had caused great dissatisfaction among the Socialists of many;
Icountries. They had asked him to bring me their greetings;
and to beg me to resume my activity. This invitation vas,
extended to me personally by Trotsky, on behalf of the Cmy
hal Committee. 'Dear Comrade Angelica," Trotsky said, "as
you know, we have annulled the absurd decision of the other
day i I have always been against your removal, and I voted
against Zinoviev's proposal. Now . .
"Listen, Lev Davidovich, it is not a matter of revocation
or of bow you voted on that occasion, but rather of the whole
system of lies and intrigues which you should not toleraie."
"What do you want me to do, dear comrade? I know you
are right. . . But you must come back to the International."
Meeting with firm refusal on my part, Trotsky suggested a
compromise. "You do not want the office of secretary? Ac-
cept another one then: Comintern correspondent for Italy,
as Marx was for Germany."
"Thank you very much, but it is no use insisting. You
know how often I banded in my resignation, and it was
always ignored. You know what gulf separates me from the
leaders, just think of Zinoviev and the vile methods with
which he has degraded the International .
"But he has apologized to you . .
"This has only heightened my disgust. Like a schoolboy
reprimanded by his teachers!. . This is the exponent of
a revolutionary International?*
Q50021121115MI=gr
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DAILY TELEGRAPH MAGAZINE
20 February 1969
RIDS 017 VIM=
46
MERICAN aggression in Vietnam",
For years this stock phrase
has been ejected from the
propaganda machines of China and the
oviet Union. Strangely enough, it
is a phrase which has fallen just' as
easily from the lips of Westerni intel-
lectuals. With a masochistic additive,
the American intelligentsia, both
resident and expatriate, has been in
some respects most vocal of all.
"I don't think one needs to go to
kietnam to have an opinion about
VI,ietnam," Mary McCarthy declared
during a BBC inverview last January.
`.4 thought it was a good idea to say that
,was prejudiced to begin with She
Eertainly was.
' Now that the Paris talks are proce-
eding, it is useful to stand back for a
moment and to observe how grossly the
real issues of this war have been mis-
represented. Grotesque comparisons
have been made (e.g., in The Observer
or February 4, 1968) with French
experience in both Indo-China and
'Algeria; but in these conflicts the
french were trying to re-establish them-
selves, whereas America would like no-
tjfing better than to quit Vietnam (and
orea, for that matter) for good and all.
Professor D.W. Brogan's statement
in Encounter for May 1968 that "every
. Charge against French policy in Indo-
ina is a charge against its imitation by
the Americans" is thus a downright
Tisreading of history.
The people most articulate in their
alarm at recent events in Vietnam are
precisely those who have recently
become their, own masters. Why, then,
is it legitimate for Malaysia, Singapore,
Cambodia and others to express fears
that what has happened in Vietnam
might happen to them, while it is appar-
ently illegitimate for th5 South Viet-
namese to fear for their own safety
and independence?
"The crude moral justifications
advanced for the American presence
in Vietnam," wrote Professor Alasdair
Maclntyre in New Society for October
10, 1968, "are in fact an attempt to
justify a series of mindless improvisa-
tions' . Tell that to the beleaguered
South-east Asian peoples, who are
currently expressing fears that the
presence may be removed!
The difficulties besetting.American
policy in Vietnam have been due not
simply to a Chinese and Soviet-
supported invasion, but to a war of
propaganda which, for sustained distor-
tion and malevolence, has few parallels
even in these days of manipulated
mass-media.
Let us look at the facts. On the with-
drawal of the Japanese in August, 1945,
the Communist Vietminh seized power
in Hanoi. The attempt by France to
regain a foothold ended with the
Geneva Agreement of 1954, which
brought into being the successor states
of North and South Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia. Elections were to be held
before July 20, 1956, to decide the terms
on which North and South Vietnam
could be united. On May 8, 1956,
Britain and the Soviet Union, as co-
chairmen of the Geneva Agreement,
decided to postpone these elections.
(This important fact was omitted from
The Observer's summary of events on
November 3.) Meanwhile, Communist
subversion in the South, which had
been going on from the start, reached.
its climax on March 13, 1959, when
?
Hanoi declared that the time had.
come "to struggle . . . . perseveringly'
to smash the Southern regime". This
was followed by systematic attacks,
across the border. So much for the
identity of the aggressors.
What had happened in Korea, in
other words, was repeated with even
greater ruthlessness in Vietnam; but
whereas the United Nations resistance
in Korea', with predominant American
support, was regarded in the West as
legitimate and ' laudable, America's
defence of the freedom of the South '
.Vietnamese people has been received,'
with mclunting and almost hysterical
condemnation. The gigantic American
civiliah effort in Vietnam has been
ignored.: The existence of the "Caps",
fortified villages where Americans live
alongside the Vietnamese and provide
medical attention as well as defence,
is scarcely known. The presence of more
than a million refugees from the North
is diknissed with a shrug.
Despite electoral proof to the cont
rat the South Vietnamese Govern,
mei* is declared to be both unrepresent-
ative and corrupt. Finally, every
opportunity has been taken to denigrate
the conduct of the American troops,
whereas The Times correspondent,
writing from Hue last March, declared
that "generally speaking the behaviour
of American servicemen in a particularly
difficult war does them real credit".
Of course the Vietnam war has
been agonising and destructive. ? Of
course America has made mistakes
and miscalculations. Of course we
should all hope for a just and speedy
settlement. But what do our peace-
loving "idealists" and their more
sinister hangers-on, both here and in
America, shout for?
S WE know from the demonstra-
tion on October 27, last year,
they shout not for peace, but
for victory for the National Liberation
Front, namely, the Communist spear-
head of North Vietnam, which is en-
deavouring to destroy the freedom of
the South as surely as'the Soviet Union
is striving to prevent the emergence of
freedom in Czechoslovakia.
Even the Communist parties of the
West have expressed disgust over
Russia's action. What sort of mental
obfuscation is it that has impelled so
many of our Western intellectuals to
become the dupes of Communist
propaganda over Vietnam? M
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unrisian
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CPYRGHT ,
?critiers
A
ose
.anno
By Ernest Weatherall
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
New
Delhi
.New Delhi iS ribecorning increasingly an-
noyed with the anti-Indian broadcasts of
Raclin Moscow's "other station." e .
"Radio Peace and Progress," as it is
termed, has proved a constant critic of the
Indian Government ?ever since it began ?
beaming its programs to the subcontinent
some three years ago. ? '
India's Foreign Minister, DiTiesh Singh,
long a champion of Indo-Soviet friendship, ,
has told Moscow that the broadcasts "will
not help relations between the two coun-
tries." India's Parliament was told that the
Soviet reply to India's objections was, "we
will' look into it and see what can, be/done,
in the future."
The Soviet Union has given a very curious
-.explanation as to why Radio Peace ?and Pro-
gross has continued its tirades against India
it a time when relations between Moscow
, and New Delhi are at their zenith. The
Russians have told the Indians, they have
"no control" over the objectional broad-
casts because it is a "private radio station." ??
slo,wed down its attacks ,,on India's Congress
Party leaders. :
During the brief reign of the left-wing
United Front government in West Bengal
?
after the national electiens, Radio Peace
e
Broadcasts monitored
? Radio Peace and Progress began broad- -
casting from the Soviet Union late in 1964.
. The first programs were 8eamect.in Spanish
to Latin America on frequencies formerly
used by Radio Moscow. Two years later, the
Indian Government monitoring station in the
Himalayan foothill town of Simla began pick-
. ing up broadcasts from the Soviet station in
English and Hindi. Later transmissions were
in Urdu and other Indian languages.
'Unlike Radio Moscow, which carefully
avoided any attacks on the Indian Govern-
ment, Radio Peace and Progress went all
' out attacking not only the Indian Govern- ,
? rnent, , but the non-Communist opposition ,
parties.
'. With the approach Of India's national elec- '
tions, the number of broadcasts were stepped
up on Radio Peace and Progress. They
praised leftist V. K. Krishna Mennon, who
. was trying to make a political comeback..
They condemned Morarji Desai (now India's
Deputy Prime Minister) and S. K. Patil as
"imperialist 5accomplices- who 'want to
strangle democracy."
?
Industrialists assailed ,
' But the prime targets were the Bharatiya
Jan Sangh, the Swatantra, and other right- '
wing Indian parties, which they branded as
"chauvinists, communalists, reactionaries,
? fascists, and stooges for the Americans." ,
ppromedforuReieasOhl999i99Vi'C
las, and others, were targets o he o ret
station. When the Indian Government first
che tatirorkit
0.1.1 PPEIVEMEI Leila 1 ?it
Soviet Union bitterly attacked India's gov-
ernment for using "Nazi techniques" when
New Delhi dissolved the state legislature in
West Bengal and put the floundering state
under "president's rule."
Americans, of course, came in for their
share of tirades. The station continued to.
hammer away at a -tory that the United
States Government through the Central In-
telligence Agency had furnished India's
right-wing parties with millions of dollars to
help them win the elections.
? Exasperated by the station's bitter broad-
casts, United States Ambassador Chester
Bowles asked the Russians whether these ti-
rades against the United States and India
really served the best interests of the Soviet
Union on the subcontinent. Apparently the
? Russians felt they did, because the broad-
casts have continued.
The latest flare-up caused by Radio Peace
arid Progress came during India's recent
midterm elections. Leaders of the Bharatiya
Jan Sangh Party complained that the station
? had kept up a "continuous- barrage of false
, and malicious propaganda against them."
Demonstration held
The Bharatiya Jan Sangh held a demon
stration outside the Soviet Embassy in Ne
Delhi, protesting that the Russians were in
terfering in the internal affairs of India. '
The source of Radio Peace and Progress'
material on India is no mystery. It is sup
plied by Tass, Novosti, and other Sovie
correspondents in the subcontinent.
It is interesting to note that the Novost
news agency made a deal with India's Pub
lie Information Bureau, with the approval o
the Minister of Information and Broadcas
ing, to distribute Novosti material. When a
Indian newspaper broke the story, howls o
. protest were heard on both sides of the aisl
in Parliament. This ended the arrangemen
Soviet specialists say that Radio Peac
and Progress was set up "to speak for th
international Communist movement." It i
they say, the "covert Soviet policy" towar
the Communist Party and their allies i
India. Radio Moscow, with which it shar
broadcast channels, reflects the "open S
? viet policy" toward the Indian Governmen
Radio Peace and Progress can say thin
that would embarrass Soviet officials
India, if they were said over the "official
electronic voice, Radio Moscow. Howeve
1AR ,i4isi.4.64&coelylailikirdielsmdre critical ?
itlfAlchicrIcfc?Vgti 042000.
was the attack on Ram Nath Goenka, p
Usher of the respected Indian Express.
?
???
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Speech by Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro at Havana University, 13 March
(Excerpts)
In the beginning the revolution began practically from scratch. It
began struggling against illiteracy. After the battle against illiteracy,
the battle of general learning, primary education for everyone, began.
The problems it involved -- of teachers and schools -- were huge, and many
of those problems still exist. Subsequently it was the struggle for six-
grade education, which has also produced notable results in the number of
workers in our country who have completed all their primary schooling and
have gone beyond it.
In the near future all the people will discuss the problem of general
or compulsory education up to the preuniversity level. That is, only to
the sixth grade, not only to junior high school, but up to preuniversity
level. The last leap will have to be a much more gradual one, that is, in
stages. We are not saying that it will be a leap from the primary to the
preuniVersity level. It will take us a long time until we reach the final
jump, which will be universal university learning. Indeed, it will not be
a jump. It will be simply a result of the earlier jumps, because once
learning up to the preuniversity level becomes universal, the step to
universalizing university education will flow normally...
Therefore, our next basic step will be to establish by the law of
all the people, by the participation and understanding of all the people,
universal education for all children and all youths of various ages
through preuniversity. This will demand enormous effort of all Of us.
This will demand enormous effort of all the higher level students because
we do not have and we will not have for many years other cadres, other
teachers to begin to carry out this program, than the higher level
students. And this is being done today on a sizable scale.
This will help resolve some contradictions -- the contradiction
between defense and studies. This is one of the patent contradictions
in the revolutionary process. Let us say that there are three contradictions:
The enormous necessity of development, the enormous necessity of the
defense of the nation in the conditions in which our revolution is evolving,
and the enormous necessity of study.
We must overcome these contradictions. These contradictions must be
solved. The contradiction between the necessities of underdevelopment and
of study are resolved to the degree that work is combined with study. Work
combined with study is developing today at the secondary, preuniversity,
and university levels. However, it is developing to the extent of our
possibilities.
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23 February 1969
Military School Training
(Excerpts)
A Camilo Cienfuegos Military School now stands on what was an
air base until 17 months ago; there are now nine schools of this type
in the country with 2,489 students, and in the coming year, there
will be 3,500. Now all students are boys, but this year the first
girl students will be enrolled. The school's objective is to provide
cultural-political and military training to students until they reach
the preuniversity level and then promote them to different cadet
schools of the Revolutionary Armed Forces where they will continue
their studies until they graduate as infantry, aviation, rocketry
command cadres. There are now 170 teachers at this school, although
104 of them are practice teachers, 4th year students of the Enrique
J. Varona Institute. Besides engaging in productive work for 45
days, the students receive basic military training in marksmanship,
Infantry, physical training; they get a good idea of military life
and make periodic trips to various FAR special units. Lt. Martinez
is deputy director of this school.
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Today we have the school-plus-farmwork plan and in till future we will
have schools in the farms. Rural secondary schools will be located, in the
farms. And soon we will begin to build the first rural secondary schools
in the countryside. This will contribute to the solving of, this con-
tradiction. Therefore, the enormous mass of hundreds of thOusands of
youths who are taking secondary education will do so in institutions in
which they will cod?ine their studies with production activities of the
type which is possible at that age. It will be the type or work they are
able to do.
The technological and preuniversity schools are participating today
in the hardest job we have, the sugar harvest. There is no question but
that a serious contradiction confronts us. In the face of the tremendous
necessity for training technical cadres, three-or four-month periods have
to be devoted to productive jobs as a basic necessity....
But it is also urgent and of utmost importance, it is of highest
precedence in the revolution, to mechanize the canecutting process. This
is one of the problems which at this time occupies the priority attention
of the revolution. Logically, we cannot long permit a situation which
forces such a vast employment of energy, of students, of workers from
industry, because other branches of the national economy, industry and
construction, and other sectors demand the investment of such energies....
In addition, we have the third necessity, that demanded by the
defense of the nation against imperialism...
We will therefore have to reconcile the problem of defense' with the
problem of studies and with the problem of production. We shall solve
this problem by linking it with the phase of preuniversity education or
technological education, as we will call it.
Therefore, some day in that phase, studies, military training, and
productive work will be done, but in another ratio. In other words,
with a different intensity. It cannot be 3 consecutive months, because
time will have to be divided among studies, military instruction, and a
shorter time than in the past will be spent in productive work -- as
training rather than a necessity...
The problem of the huge number of repeaters in school, the problem
of a comparatively large number of boys and girls who do not attend
school -- these problems must be totally overcome, and they must be
totally overcome with the active participation of the people. We do
not think there is a single conscious citizen in this country who thinks
it possible to admit that this society will accept illiterates in the
future, that this society will accept ignorant persons in the future.
What will be the maladjustments, and what will be the problems of those
individuals who, compared with a mass with greater and greater knowledge,
remain backward and ignorant of everything...
2
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We must learn to see things in perspective, and understand that it is
everyone's task to fight tenaciously, decisively against all these short-
comings, all these possibilities which still exist that a child does not
go to school. They will become society's problems, candidftes for
delinquency, for conflict with the society they cannot adaRt to, and in
which they can scarcely live.
Society still has a long struggle against these faUltp, these vices,
the vice of delinquency which still exists and will remain for a long time ?
A parasite from the past, a milestone from the past, it feeds on the ranks
of all those youngsters without preparation, without knowledge, culture,
or consciousness. There are also cases of individuals who use minors
for criminal purposes. Since the law punishes robbery with a certain
severity, they resort to using minors criminally.
The very concept of minors is elastic. It is a sketchy one and some
of these concepts will have to be revised. If we consider age 16 old enough
to serve in the fatherland's armed forces, protect it, and die for it, why
do we not consider them answerable for robbery or other criminal activity
of any kind at age 16, 17, or 18?
Evidently this is an old concept, and the revolution must analyze it
so that society will face this type of problem. There are habitual offenders
in society; there are some who are incorrigible, who because of their
record, their inveterate habits, are incapable of adapting to normal living
-- incorrigible, unrehabilitated, and some on whom prison life has a
negative and dismal influence. Our country will have to study the whole
problem of its penal institutions for common deliquency, since in recent
years the idea of struggle against counterrevolutionary deliquency was upper-
most -- persons who acted against the revolution. The other struggle was
somewhat behind. In principle, our society believes and feels the need
to give every man a change and every chance, but it will also have to face
those virtually unsolvable situations, cases of incurable criminals,
including those in prison who continued to commit evil deeds, who con-
tinued on occasion to commit murder and extend their imprisonment. There
is a whole world worthy of sociological study for society to determine
what to do with this class .of incorrigible individuals and with the
habitual offenders. We may have to face the need of eliminating them
radically. It is true that we have individuals who take up this life
and practically no method exists to correct them. And some of them even
take advantage of that type of impunity after they are penalized in order
to continue their criminal activities...
The 1970 harvest goes well in one sense -- in the plans for planting
cane. All of the basic material for the 1970 harvest is being ensured.
The season is favorable in some areas -- relatively dry, or, let us say,
without using "relatively," very dry in Oriente Province. However, most
of the hydraulic work is being done in Oriente Province. And this province
will receive the reinforcement of the necessary equipment for irrigation.
3
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If nature discriminates against Oriente Province, the revollition will make
Oriente a priority in the provision of irrigation equipmentwand in an effort
to provide the water that nature denies it. So, drought inOriente will be
compensated by such an effort. Hard work is being done on hydraulic projects
throughout the island so that we may be able to face a drought.
9
But there is a difficulty still in connection with the present harvest.
This harvest has not yet reached the desired rhythm. And this is nota
mobilization problem. ?No one believes more mobilization will be necessary.
It is a matter of organization. This shows up our weakness in this field...
Ignorance in many places is reflected in the orgadization of trans-
portation, in the organization of collection centers, in the organization
of cane cutting, in the organization of industries. In all this organizing
weaknesses are reflected. And during the coming weeks, our country should
make a special effort in these Areas of organization.
At a moment when the sugar price is satisfactory, at a time when our
country is approaching a great achievement in its work, we cannot permit
one single cane fit for grinding in 1969 to be left uncut.
Always, every year, when the rain starts, at the end, excuses are
heard -- too much rain, too many problems. It is the intent of the
revolution this year not to order the end of the harvest until every cane
is cut in every province of the country.
It is not a matter of saying that some of the cane can be cut in the
succeeding harvest, which could begin earlier. This is a matter of com-
mitments by the country regarding the sugar it must export. It has to do
with the needs of the country. It is our duty to win the battle of 1970,
but it is basically our obligation also to win the battle of the 1969
harvest. If the 1969 harvest is to prepare the ground for the 1970 harvest,
then it will. If we must grind cane in June, we will grind in June; and
if we must grind in July and August, we will grind in July and August.
And our cadres, our parties, will have to learn to fight and win
simultaneous battles, and they will have to learn to put into effect
simultaneous plans -- sugar cane, livestock, the 1969 harvest, the 1970
harvest, the rice program, and all the other plans. It is necessary to
learn to win simultaneous battles. The people have the ability and dis-
position. There is enthusiasm. We must contribute what is missing, that
is, comaion sense, organization. We must improve ourselves.
? We were saying that we have many limitations, but we must learn to
overcome them. The will of the revolution, the will of the people, con-
tinues to be to wage and win the battle completely. The lag in the har-
vest implies that it will continue through May and June, while the new
plants will be undergoing cleaning and sprouts will be fertilized and
cultivated.
4
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A tremendous mixture of activity in a limited period of time. Un-
fortunately, this results in us getting behind schedule, al:extends the
tense pace of work in the six-month period beyond May, beyon$ June. We
must face up to this situation and solve it, above all because this har-
vest is the forerunner --this year's work will produce therfirst great
results of 1970.
5
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CPYRGHTApproved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500120001 espy RGHT
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
5 March 1969
ligta?E
, ,.1
it'
imo Leime
. ?7:?1
. ?
''By Paul W?ohl L". ,
. .
Written for The qhristian Scierice,r.fonitor ,
..451
? -Antrilith,:volce has !been iraiSedIn defense
f tiutlird'n the Sotief., "
t:4*a141';c iticildo the
e2:111ed.' physicist:: P,avel IVt,'LitylriOV, 'has
add"rd aletter "td 'the_ ":editor bf Sem-
rnunisf;"derriandizig a pcisthutrions:Indieti,
:1
1.1;! "
Th4,;:ldtte..r,s.,dqt0d,,ivi4rp4 ,q, , taxes, issnd
wthlq; review of memoir, 5 SOviet.'..A,rrny
'leaders' bY Maj, qen.. E., A'. BO,ItTri in the
.sec,oncbjenuaiY kO,ue Of the Int gatincPwhidh
.extoed Stalin's milita'ry`and pplitidatinorltg.
Of f YO,t413 iletter
,comea,?c190c f9f4ndri ID.
.S0tIlEttotal..fa1rious? essay i; flhoughti on
Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and, Intel
iectusi 7recclOrrir !.,!(-P1-110iiShed) 43y?. Norton
with ,comtneritS
Since taking their respective ,stands, both
iornfessot SakharoV.? and , have
teen?demoted.:i .1( nt',1
'Professor Sakharov, atop nuclear scion-
hes ?lseen dismissed , from his post Of
consuitant to the Soviet State CommitT
too for Nuclear': Energy; he retains so far
'Mb Membership in the Ae,ademy' Of Sciences.'
Mr.,:,yakir,,liewever," is said to ha y? been
a," Stiff iniernber ;4 thi:i'adatli
drny's institute of, histork.- '''.?;
14i1e ProfesorSakharev'd'essay' Mi
?Yakir!'s letter .Originated 'frorri;(4,'discussionr
:in'thiS'daSearriong historian.'"
; Opie,s Of Mr.' Yakir'S whichKorn-,
not %ek?P'eCted' to Publish,'''61reti:t;
,late MoscoW..:',Th,bu1kof the leteer:' kir ?
P6a1ed, on'M f7,411 qie',reo;ected:riacli,i
,40iy "L Mondo
'
fails
This g iidt'th irst time -a post iu bus
indictment ofiStalini'has,,ifiederriandecV
'Atter! the :22,ni-X, Party. Corigre Ss
a ,grotip.-41.,rehabgitated ..vietims ? of;
Stalin's persecutions' asked, that the dietater.
'he oSthtirnotiSly expelled from the, Party.:
1Atthat.:timei,d+:104d'Ii.a Sta1in74 crimes,
ianct:- failings., ,,was,dra.v.p....'tip,.. ',1:13,14t ;?to,thing,
'icame ; of at.,
Now ? MI Yak! i ebell Led Poi IA1,11
,indictment bk-Stalin. 'on ,1.7. 'ccitints',.;referrind
neh,ase 'to theapprdpriate..articleS of
,e6de,,vand' :Iccirrebora tine
?"ehargeS frbm rect.
' r
teaSioniti
tO,;,be:',sentenced
ent :while three 'cases'
' should he pronounced,
,44,sainst him.' Extenuating, circumstances are
?
'Out by' thd pa1 cade..:1' St1i?io
.sh?iiild b deprived oIaU thULary titles' and:
.:-?The Charges :listed, in, Mr."- Yakir!S,
hidict-
m' pre everwholmine. Thev include 'abuse ?
f), t=it writy, unwarranted illass arrests,- the
,introductionixi 1937. of physical torture, thd,7!
inUrder of hundreds Of prominent party
m efriberi? and: fercign 114
??beri granted asylum in the Soviet
:Of uncounted numbers .?(!ff inventors , an'd.
militarY and industrial leaders,
Xven the widows and children of :,the-