PROPAGANDA NOTES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000500130001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 14, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 13, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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PROPAGANDA NOTES
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1 Attachment: unclassified, per para 1.
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C R E A T I V E T H I N K I N G
I N P R O P A G A N D A
Most people who professionally communicate with their fellow-men, whether
as novelists, composers, journalists, publishers, artists (including cartoonists)
or in any other capacity, run the risk of falling into routines and of repeating
-- or trying to repeat -- what had been successful before. Authors whose first
books were bestsellers are often, consciously or not, following the same formula
in all their further books, usually with diminishing returns (Erich Maria REMARQUE;
Mika WALTARI). Columnists, whose interpretations or forecasts were initially
proven to be correct, are inclined to rely on their intuition from then on --
often to an extent that the attentive reader can easily predict their stand on
the latest problem.
The present paper is intended to warn the propagandist -- whether he happens
to be a political leader, a publisher or editor, a commentator or a cartoonist,
or plays any other part in the multi-faceted propaganda game -- against gradually
falling into a similar rut. If he does a good job, for instance, if his articles
are applauded, if the circulation of his magazine is growing, if his party gains
more members -- he may not try hard enough to do a better job, for instance,
write articles which are not only applauded, but lead to desired action; focuses
the circulation of his magazine upon the particular people he is most interested
in influencing; or recruits not only new members, but strengthens his party by
having the new members actively participate in party work. A propagandist who
has successfully solved a given problem -- e.g. defeated a hostile move against
his cause by exposing the attacker --, may be inclined to apply the same solution
every time a similar problem arises. This may not only make him overlook more
effective solutions for these new cases, but may completely baffle him when a
truly novel problem confronts him, for which he has no precedent, no past record
and which he may therefore handle poorly -- or perhaps even try to avoid altogether.
Criticize and Analyze your Output
If you want to avoid sliding into routine, don't be satisfied with what
superficially may look like success, but examine a-.1 1 elementsof?youar problem and
determine whether your effort could and should not be further improved -- or
whether it needs changes in order to prevent monotony or because the situation is
no longer the same as at the time of your first success in that field.
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The propagandist cannot measure the success of his publication by circulation
figures a 1 o n e -- even though such figures, if properly interpreted, may be
very helpful. For instance, circulation has increased by 10% during the last year:
don't be satisfied with that statement, unless you have learned
ratio between circulation and intended audience: if a magazine is
meant for university students and their number increased 50% during
the last year,.a circulation increase of 10% is hardly a success --
especially not if the circulation was small to begin with, compared
to the total number of students, (say 5,000 copies for 200,000
students a year ago: now 5,500 copies for 300,000 students);
the success of competing publications: if, in the above case, other
student magazines gained 20 or 30% in circulation during the same
year, your increase of 10% provides even less reason for complacency;
whether your publication reaches the intended audience: assume the
student magazine has a numerically satisfying circulation -- you
ought also to know who actually reads it; even if specially written
for students, non-students may find it interesting, perhaps for
extraneous reasons -- its sports page, its fiction, its book reviews,
or what have you. A little "spill-over" to readers for whom the
magazine is not meant may be unavoidable and even a sign of its
success -- but if a sizeable portion of the press run never reaches
any student, something ought to be done about it (perhaps selling
subscriptions on campus, instead of at news stands or in book stores).
There are other yardsticks for the impact of a publication -- which may
include (but are not necessarily limited to) the following:
Letters to the editor: are they getting more or less frequent, more
or less friendly?
Interviews with a cross section of readers: do they increasingly
approve or disapprove of editorial policies? Why?
Questionnaires addressed to readers, discussion meetings with readers
may furnish the same type of clues;
Reprints of articles by other papers (this might be stimulated by sending
galley proofs or reprints of articles, deemed particularly suitable,
to the editors of provincial newspapers or other publications, likely
to accept second-hand copy);
Hostile reactions: polemics in the opposition press, attacks in
parliament or in public meetings, libel suits.
The final test for any propaganda output is: does it make people d.o what
the propagandist wants them to d.o? Such action may range from the very modest
and simple (contribute to the fund for political prisoners; elect X as shop
steward) to the ambitious and complex (take up arms to defend your country against
subversion;
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vote in a referendum for constitutional changes). In some instances, the
success is easily measured -- e.g. if X does get elected shop`rsteward, or if
sufficient funds for political prisoners are raised. In other cases (for
instance, for propaganda countering Communist or Fascist ideologies), results
ought to be gauged by special efforts, perhaps through public opinion polls,
through interviews with readers, or the like.
If the results of a given propaganda campaign are unsatisfactory (the
opposition wins the election, the referendum is voted down, the party loses
instead of gains members), do not jump to the conclusion that the objective was
unrealistic, or that overwhelming trends of public opinion defeated you. Perhaps
this is true: but resign yourself to this conclusion only after you have. examined
all other aspects of the campaign and convinced yourself that it could not have
been conducted much more effectively. Ask yourself questions like the following:
Were the most effective media used? Instead of (or in addition to)
newspapers and magazines, perhaps posters, radio or TV broad-
casts, or public mass meetings might have been more successful?
Were the arguments (themes) well chosen? Other aspects of the problem --
e.g. how a bill affects the voters' pocket book rather than its
constitutionality -- may have impressed the audience more strongly.
Was the message couched in effective language? Perhaps the
(spoken or printed) texts used were too verbose, or used language
which went above the heads of the audience or, on the contrary, was
too low-level and coarse, offending some readers or listeners.
Did the campaign reach as much of the audience as possible? If the
output was mailed, were the address lists up-to-date and complete?
If messages were broadcast, was the time favorable for reaching the
intended listeners? Did enough of the intended listeners have
receivers?
Was the campaign properly timed? Election propaganda before the majority
of the voters become interested in the election or after most of them
have made up their minds, may be wasted. Audiences may react adversely
if they are approached at a time when they are otherwise pre-occupied
(Christmas shopping, big sports event, annual vacations, university
examinations).
After you have asked these and other questions, you may learn how to revise your
next efforts -- and not blame fate or the inexorable forces of history for the
setback your cause may have suffered.
Know your Enemy
If your propaganda has to cope with strong opposition, whether Communist,
Fascist or otherwise, learn its propaganda first-hand, i.e.
listen to its broadcasts,
read its books, periodicals, pamphlets,
attend its public meetings(where possible),
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debate with some of its activists or sympathizers.
Even where the volume of hostile propaganda and your own workload forces you to
rely largely upon summaries and analyses,of hostile propaganda, prepared by some-
body else, you should frequently experience the direct impact of that propaganda.
This is particularly important when the opposition issues important policy
statements, a new party program or the like, especially since journalists report-
ing these items may not be too well versed in that particular ideology and its
jargon and may not give you a correct idea of the statement in question.
Study the history of the major opposition parties and the biographies of
their leaders, including those of upcoming candidates for top leadership
positions whether available in books, in files of newspaper clippings, or
as interviews with knowledgeable persons). Such information will not only
assist you in interpreting or anticipating the moves of your antagonists, but
may also come handy when you write about those leaders. "Human Interest"
stories are almost always popular, especially if the person is controversial
and currently in the news (or maiipulating the news from behind the scenes).
Inadequate or obsolete. knowledge of an audience, of its interests, motiva-
tions and preoccupations has caused some of the worst failures in propaganda.
Nazi broadcasts to Italians during World War Two, for instance, tried to dissuade
them from collaborating with the U.S. forces by telling them the U.S. would never
accept them as "belligerents", merely employ them as cooks etc., disregarding
the fact that many Italians were not at all eager to fight in the war and delighted
with the prospect of non-military jobs. Or, the Soviets had unexpected results
when showing the film "The Grapes of Wrath": Russian audiences were fascinated
by the fact that those "miserable victims of capitalism" wore leather shoes and
drove cars (jalopies, to be sure) -- both out of the reach of the "liberated
proletariat" in the Soviet Union in the Twenties.
Your knowledge of your audience must therefore be up-to-date and as close
and detailed as possible. Even if you were a few years earlier part of that same
audience (say, a student of the university for which you are now editing a magazine),
you cannottake if for granted that the interests and attitudes of the students
of today are the same they were in your time. Therefore, wherever possible, talk
to members of that audience, visit their favorite meeting places (whether beer
halls, concert halls, political or union meetings, or what not) and supplement your
personal observations with public opinion polls and other relevant materials.
If circumstances impede or exclude such personal contacts and observations,
try at least
to interview persons who have had such close contacts; or
to invite the audience to speak up (letters to the editor,
answers to questionnaires, participation in a contest).
Public opinion polls are usually satisfied. with finding out how many people are
for .,or.`agai t a certain olic or ro osal or how man voters would cast their
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ballots for parties A, B or C, respectively. This often interests the
propagandist, too, but he usually needs to know more. For instance, he solicits
votes for party A, but learns that a majority of the voters are inclined to vote
for other parties. He ought to know
how strong their sympathies for the other parties are, and
what principal reasons make them reject party A.
This will indicate to him what chances he has to obtain a majority for his own
party and on what subjects (arguments) he ought to concentrate to make initially
hostile voters change their preferences.
This is true not only of election campaigns but for any other type of
propaganda, too. If, for instance, you want to induce Communist Party members to
leave their party, the most impressive argument that and why Communist doctrine
is wrong and dangerous will not help you, if the persons in question have not
joined the CP because they are convinced of the truth of its ideology, but perhaps
because they are afraid that, if the Communists seize power, they will be in danger
unless they join the party now, or perhaps because the Communists control the city
council (as they do in many industrial towns of France and Italy) and you cannot
get an apartment in a city housing development, unless the party recommends you.
It may not be practicable to make a public opinion poll among CP members, but
well arranged interviews, scrutiny of the party press etc. may give you enough
clues how to approach your problem realistically.
Where to find New Ideas
If you decide that you have to change any current propaganda operation
(either because it has not been sufficiently successful or because you feel that
it is getting monotonous and likely to lose momentum), or if you are confronted
with a new problem, a new challenge in propaganda -- a new, controversial issue,
a different type of opposition, major shifts in operating conditions --, you will
want to take an entirely new look, revise your effort thoroughly or begin afresh.
Here are several unconventional suggestions which may help you to develop new
ideas, new approaches, new campaign plans.
Ask yourself: has this (or a closely similar) problem turned up before and
how was it solved that time? If the solution was successful: can it be used now?
If the solution was unsuccessful: how can I learn from it to avoid similar
mistakes in solving the present problem? Most of the basic problems confronting
a propagandist now have occurred throughout history -- e.g. elections (in ancient
Greece and Republican Rome, inter alia), support of, and opposition to, wars and
civil wars, ideological conflicts (in past centuries mostly of a religious
character), and quite a few others. Merely certain technical means -- radio and
TV, rotary presses, leaflet drops from aircraft -- are modern, the underlying job
of human communications has hardly changed. Rules of Greek/Roman oratory may
guide the public speaker, the radio or TV commentator, even today.
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To quote a few examples:
When Alexander the Great occupied huge territories in Asia, he
needed pacification and reconciliation propaganda, aimed at the
conquered populations, quite similar to the problems facing the
Allied Armies at the end of World War Two in occupied Germany
and Japan.
When Genghis Khan conquered one country after another, he reportedly
sent agents, disguised as refugees, ahead of him, telling the next
prospective victims how invincible and terrible the armies of the
Great Khan were, thus softening them up for surrender. The Nazis,
showing in France films of their conquest of Poland, and in the
U.S. films of their conquest of France, did essentially the same.
Exiles played political/psychological roles throughout history, from
the Greek exiles who aided the Persian. invasion of Greece, to the
present.
Most problems confronting a propagandist have also occurred in other countries:
he can learn from those other experiences, even though he has to take into account
the differences in country situations, in political traditions and in psychological
conditions. This is facilitated by the existence of international press (wire)
services, international broadcasts, of multi-lingual periodicals with world-wide
circulation (e.g. READERS DIGEST or WORLD MARXIST REVIEW) -- all of which
contribute to publicizing the same information, the same opinions, some times also
the same cartoons across major portions of the globe.
Such geographic transfer will be facilitated if a propagandist looks in foreign
countries for models (causes, audiences) similar to his own. A labor union in a
developing country,. for instance, may learn from unions in advanced industrial
nations how they recruited new members, campaigned for new labor legislation,
enhanced the public image of their movement. The propaganda office of a newly
independent nation may study what countries of a similar character (who may have
achieved independence 20 or 50 years earlier) did in support of their countries'
interests abroad or in order to stabilize their regimes at home.
You may also learn from the propaganda experiences of other countries which
were faced with the same type of opposition. Countries afflicted by Communist
armed uprisings who succeeded in defeating the rebellion (e.g. Philippines,
Malaya, India, Venezuela) offer useful object lessons to countries still threatened
by Communist guerrillas. Countering "peaceful" Communist Parties also poses
virtually the same problem the world around since these parties, whatever their
shadings in allegiance to Moscow or Peking, their degree of maturity and other
local characteristics, are basically the same everywhere, based on the same
ideology, using the same patterns of organization and virtually the same propaganda
tactics.
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Transfer from the Enemy
Copying propaganda ideas or techniques from your antagonist might imply a
confession that they were better (more successful) than those you previously
used. Moreover, many aspects of totalitarian (Communist or Fascist) propaganda
are not useable for propagandists of the free world, since they are based on
coercion, a monopoly of communications, frequent refusal to debate other ideas
on.grounds of equality etc. -- premises not normally acceptable to us. Never-
theless, study of enemy propaganda, past and present, is not only recommended,
but often essential and certain techniques, successfully used by our opponents,
may serve as models for ourselves -- provided we can adapt them to our own
ideas and objectives.
The following features, common to all totalitarian -- both Communist and
Fascist -- propaganda deserve careful study and possible adaptation:
Members, on all levels of the party and of its auxiliaries
(fronts), are called upon to participate actively in propaganda,
either as volunteers or for pay;
Elaborate training and indoctrination programs, up to "post-
graduate" courses of several years' duration, teach members
party doctrine and ideology, as well as organizing and
propaganda techniques and tactics;
Most propaganda is closely integrated with party policies and
often serves specific organizational ends;
Propaganda is conducted on a continuous, year-round basis
(not merely at election times);
Much propaganda is heavily emotional: adulating the top leaders,
commemorating achievements and martyrs ("cult of the anniversary"
hating and despising the enemy.
Noteworthy techniques of Nazi propaganda, 1920 -- 1945, included inter alia:
Large-scale use of both text and picture posters;
Effective ritual for mass meetings, including open-air
rallies (ceremonious entry of massed colors, show of strength
with uniformed storm troopers, choruses of "battle songs", etc.);
Exploitation of Germany's past history, personalities, artistic and
literary achievements;
Spiteful campaigns against selected enemy personalities, occasionally
outlasting the person's death (as with President Roosevelt).
In current Communist propaganda, we note, as deserving special attention,
features such as these:
Owing to complete control of all media in all Communist-ruled countries,
Communist propaganda is able to treat th2 same theme at the same time
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in different, even contradictory ways /e.g. when Khrushchev was
President Eisehhower's guest, official, media like PRAVDA praised
E. unreservedly, while party-internal media like WORLD MARXIST
REVIEW chided E. for advocating peace only because of the military
strength of the Communist camp and the pressure of world opinion;
at the same time, black (unattributed) Communist radio stations
attaaked and insulted E. in the rudest termio
Communists make wide use of non-Communist and even anti-Communist
media, partly by furnishing them news via TASS and other
Communist press agencies, partly through letters to the editor,
partly through planting or bribing journalists and editors.
Communists skilfully time their propaganda for maximum impact:
in particular, they schedule scoops so that they will divert
world attention from some major event in the free world Post
recent incident: Moscow released a "peace and disarmament offer"
on the very morning of President Nixon's inauguration, 20 January
1969 -,- thus not only seizing much press and radio space which
might have otherwise been devoted to the inauguration, but also
making N.'s statement on peace and disarmament appear as due to
Moscow's initiativ7.
Communist propaganda is often "bolstered" by references to documents or
statements which were either freely invented, or misleadingly torn
out of context or attributed to an author to whom the Communist
outlet frequently ascribes an importance which he does not have at
all. Even quotations from Communist "c;::E.assics" (Marx, Lenin,
Stalin, etc.) are usually so vaguely sourced that it is difficult to
determine when, in what context and before what audience the quoted
statement was made.
You may also get new ideas - - or improve the techniques of your propaganda
efforts -- by looking outside the field of propaganda proper and borrow experiences
and tactics from elsewhere.
. Commercial Advertising is the most obvious source. Certain types of political
propaganda are virtually identical with commercial, publicity, for instance,
selling books,
soliciting subscriptions for newspapers and p:eriodical.s,
recruiting members, especially if the appeal is primarily material
(a labor union may offer vacation centers or job training, a veterans
group sickness benefits or contributions to burial costs, or the like).
Other aspects of commercial advertising can and should. be adapted for
political propaganda, e.g.:
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A manufacturer uses marketing research to determine customer
needs, interests and preferences before starting a new production
and sales campaign: the propagandist should pre-test major
campaigns -- slogans, posters, letters or other products --, by
trying a small number on a representative cross section of his
intended audience, before undertaking a large-scale, expensive and
time-consuming campaign.
Commercial ads or folders often contain coupons or reply cards with
which the reader may obtain a catalog or a free sample of merchandise
Political publications may similarly use coupons or cards, offering
a pamphlet, a sample issue of.a periodical, etc., thereby building up
address lists (for mailings or personal contacts) and gauging
readers' reactions.
In technical matters -- choice of reproduction method, lay-outs,
attention-getting headlines or pictures --, commercial publicity
faces virtually the same problems as political propaganda Leven
though not all techniques are freely transferable: for instance,
sex appeal, so commonly used to promote sales, is rarely suitable
for propaganda, whereas political appeals to patriotic emotions or
cherished principles are not often used in commercial publicit
Military Strategy and Tactics can provide much useful advice for the propagan-
dist. Both war and propaganda aim fundamentally at making one's objective,
interest and determination prevail and at overcoming any opposition obstructing
this aim (killing people or occupying-enemy territory is only a means to an end
in war, not usually an end in itself). War-time propaganda unavoidably uses
various military devices -- leaflet shells fired across the enemy lines, loud-
speakers and radio transmitters mounted on aircraft -- , but even peace-time,
non-military political propaganda can learn much from the principles of military
strategy and tactics, for instance:
Offensive is usually the stronger military tactic, even if the over-all
objective happens to be defensive. In propaganda, too, the offensive --
seizing the initiative and not merely reacting to hostile moves -- is
generally preferable: it permits you to choose the themes, the media
and the time.
Frontal attack may be very costly in war, especially if directed against
a strongly armed, well entrenched enemy: pincer movements, attacking
the enemy from the flanks or from the rear, may be preferable She
"double envelopment", used by Hannibal to annihilate the Roman army at
Cannae, is a classical exampi 7. In propaganda, too, a frontal attack
-- for instance, telling a hostile audience that they are wrong and
ought to change sides -- may often be futile: flanking and turning
maneuvers (gradual and oblique approaches) are probably more effective.
A general responsible for a long stretch of border will usually not spread
his troops evenly along the entire line, but will concentrate most of
his strength in a few points, vital for either attack or defense. A
propagandist, too must not stretch his efforts too thizily, i.e. attempt
to cover every conceivable issue or to attack every enemy vulnerability,
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but ought. to concentrate his campaign on one or very few issues
which are either vitally important to the audience or which constitute
the weakest point(s) of his opponent.
Surprise is often a major, some times a decisive, factor in war beginning
with Odysseus' Trojan Hors. In propaganda, too, surprise -- in
timing, choice of subject, switch in media -- can be highly effective.
Release of the forged Zinoviev letter a few days before the British
General elections of 1924 did not allow the Labor Party time even to
expose the fake, let alone to rebut it and contributed much to its
defeat at the polls. World-wide distribution of Khrushchev's secret
speech at the 20th CPSU Congress 1956 was another effective surprise.
Religious factors, too, should be carefully weighed by every propagandist.
Occasionally, a Church enters directly a political or military contest, e.g.
Russian Orthodox Church support for Stalin's defense of the Soviet Union; in other
instances, religious issues become a major propaganda theme, e.g. atheism and
persecution of believers in Communist-ruled countries. But even without any such
direct role of Church or religious issues on the political scene, the propagandist
(regardless of his or the audience's attitude towards a particular religious
doctrine or church) can derive valuable suggestions from Church organization and
activities, for instance:
The emotional impact of religious ceremonies, its ritual, processions,
symbols, music, commemoration of saints and martyrs has been effectively
imitated by political movements, especially by Nazis and Communists,
regardless of their irreligious and aggressively atheist attitudes.
Church elites are usually formed in a priesthood and in monastic orders,
based on intensive education and indoctrination and organized as a
closely structured hierarchy with rigid discipline. Political move-
ments ' especially authoritarian movements, have searched for similarly
effective elite structures the Nazis called their top-level indoctrina
ation and training institutions Ordensburgen, that is, "castles of the
order".
Most churches have been afflicted during. most of their history by internal
schisms and heresies and by external contests with other religions,
with agnostics and atheists and occasionally with the power of the state.
These conflicts,. usually bitter and often resulting in decades of
bloodshed Crusades, Thirty Years War7, far from destroying or even
greatly weakening the major churches, have developed, in the surviving
Church hierarchies, unparalleled capabilities for debate, argument,
indoctrination and propaganda: the very word 'propaganda' is derived
from an office of the Catholic Church, Con re atio de Propaganda Fide
("Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith . Political propagandists
cannot only learn from such "high-level" propaganda, but should also
deduce from the survival of Churches after-centuries of-Internecine feud
that the current'.schisms ih ?the .~Ccommunist camp are not likely to prove
fatal for their cause.
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How To Get Started
After you have absorbed the suggestions outlined in this paper, try to come
up with some ideas of your own. Translate our generalizations into particulars,
applicable to your country and to your specific problem. Try to enrich your
thoughts
through reading (you will find many pertinent ideas and
precedents in articles and books whose main subject may be
remote from propaganda); or
through discussing the problem with your associates or with other
knowledgeable persons.
Whatever you read or discuss, or even when you watch a stage play or a movie,
observe a street scene or what not, keep in the back of your mind the question
"Can I use this for'propaganda? How?". If it is nothing you can use right away,
make a note (or clip the newspaper item) to remind you of it later.
Thus prepared, apply your new thoughts to the propaganda operation you.want
to improve or to plans for a future operation. Assemble all available data about
the audience;
the available media;
the subject (theme) and source material for its effective presentation;
the opposition;
and whatever else may be pertinent to your specific problem.
Draft a plan in writing -- even if it is intended only for yourself, you are
more likely to discover gaps in your information or in your preparations, when you
write out a check list and note your requirements.
Everybody knows that propaganda requires
qualified personnel (idea men, writers,
distributors, clerical help);
adequate funds;
researchers, printers,
necessary facilities (access to a printing plant, to a radio station,
address lists, reference books and files, or whatever else your
scenario may call for).
But.many people overlook that a
realistic time table (how much time do you need to recruit and train
your personnel, raise funds, to do any necessary research when
is your campaign to start and how long is it to last) --
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is equally essential or any operational plan..
In some instances, timing should not be too difficult -- e.g..if preparing
for an event scheduled in advance (elections dated by law, major anniversary,
important political congress). If you know that an important event is due to
occur bpt you don't know when (elections scheduled on short notice; deathof an
elderly national leader), prepare as much as you can in advance (compile bio-
graphical files on your candidates and on those of the opposition, train speakers,
build up address lists, etc.) so that your campaign can get effectively under way
even if little lead time is allowed. Other propagandistically important events
are entirely unpredictable -- certain wars or civil wars erupt without warning;.
national leaders, though young and healthy, may be killed by. murder (Kennedy) or
accident (Magsaysay); crop failures may provoke hunger riots. You cannot make
contingency plans for every possible emergency, but if. you maintain an efficient
propaganda apparatus on a year-round basis, with reserves to be called upon in a
crisis (writers or speakers available on call, extra printing and broadcasting
equipment), even the most unpleasant surprise should not. leave you entirely help-
less. In any case, try not merely to react to other people's moves, but seize
and hold the initiative and come up with some surprises of your own'.
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R E C 0 M M E N D E D R E A D I N G
Almond, Gabriel A. and others: The Appeals of Communism. 415 pp. Princeton
University Press 1954. An analysis of the motives inducing people
to join, or to leave the Communist Party.
Brown, J.A.C.: Techniques of Persuasion: frdm Propaganda to Brainwashing.
325 pp. London, Penguin Books 1963. A survey for the general reader,
written by a psychiatrist.
Carroll, Wallace: Persuade or Perish. 392 pp. Boston, Houghton & Mifflin
1948. World War Two propaganda, especially U.S. propaganda in
Europe.
Daugherty, William E. and Morris Janowitz (editors): A Psychological Warfare
Casebook. 880 pp. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press 1958. Numerous
contributions on many aspects of psychological warfare.
Flesch, Rudolf: The ABC of Style. A Guide to Plain English. 303 pp., New
York, Harper & Row 1964. In dictionary form, warns against misuse
and overuse of words in English writing.
Fraser, Lindley: Propaganda. 218 pp. London, Oxford University Press 1957.
General review of the entire subject.
Harter, Donald L., and John Sullivan: Propaganda Handbook. 440 pp.
Philadelphia, 20th Century Publishing Co., 1953. A competent basic
introduction and reference manual.
Kruglak, Theodore E.: The Two Faces of study of the Soviet~newsversity
of Minnesota Press 1958. Documented service monopoly, including its espionage role.
Lerner, Daniel: Sykewar. Psychological Warfare against Germany. D-Day to VE-
Day. 463 pp., New York, Stewart. 1949. Experiences with the U.S.
Office of War Information.
Meerloo, Abraham M.: The Rape of the Mind. The psychology of thought control, menticide and brainwashing. 320 pp. Cleveland, Ohio, World Publishing
Co 1956. Based on the Dutch author's experiences in his Nazi-occupied
homeland.
Melcher, Daniel and Nancy Larrick: Printing and Promotion Handbook. 438 pp.
New York, Mc Graw Hill 1956. Illustrated manual of all phases of
printing and production of printed matter.
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Millard, Oscar E.: Uncensored, The True Story of a Clandestine Newspaper,
LA LIBRE BELGIQUE. London, Hale 1937. Detailed, factual account of
an underground newspaper in World War One.
Pyatnitskiy, Osip A.: Memoirs of a Bolshevik. New York, International Publishers
1935. This autobiography of a once leading official of the CPSU and
of the COMINTERN tells also about pre-1917 clandestine Bolshevik
propaganda.
Schramm, Wilbur: The Process and Effects of Mass Communications. University of
Illinois Press, Urbana 1954. A basic textbook.
Shackford, R.H.: The Truth about Soviet Lies. 224 pp., Washington, D.C., Public
Affairs Press 1962. Standard claims of Soviet propaganda, with
brief refutations.
Shaw, Clifford A. (editor): Newspaper Promotion Primer. 124 pp., National
Newspaper Promotion Association, Charleston, W. Va., 1955. Introduc-
tion for beginners, showing how to increase circulation and advertising
for provincial U.S. newspapers.
Words into Type. 596 pp. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964. Guide for
the preparation of manuscripts; printing styles, proofreading and
related matters -- for writers, editors, proofreaders and-printers.
Wyckoff, Edith H.: Editing and Producing the small Publication. 289 pp., New
York, Van Nostraxid Co, 1956. Editing, printing (or mimeographing),
advertising and distribution for small newspapers and periodicals.
Calendar of Significant Political Events. 64 pp. 1967.
How to Make a Leaflet (adapted from Communist original). 31 pp., 1962.
Making a Propaganda Move. Introduction to the Basic Elements of Propaganda.
62 pp., 1962.
Primer of the Sino-Soviet Conflict. Dictionary of Dissensions in the Communist
Camp. 39 pp., 1963.
Propaganda in Mass Organizations. 71 pp., 1962.
Soviet Propaganda Defensive on Two Fronts. Conference of Moscow Agitprop officials
-seeks Position against Communist Critics and against Western Influences.
77 pp. 1964.
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