THE SPLIT IN THE VORSTER CABINET: ITS MEANING AND IMPLICATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00457A000100060001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 24, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Split in the Vorster Cabinet:
Its Meaning and Implications
Confidential
PS 77-10006
July 1977
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Note
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In the past couple of months-and particularly since Vienna-members
of the Vorster cabinet have aired in public what appear to be sharp
differences over policy direction. The division is generally along traditional
verligte-verkrarpte lines. Interest in this particular debate is heightened by
the fact that a group of cabinet ministers has publicly challenged the
government in the most crucial area: domestic race policy. Moreover one
conservative minister seems to have joined the challengers, while the Prime
Minister, himself appears to be weighing in with the verkrampte.
None of the challengers proposes establishing majority rule or
dismantling separate development. But the issue is critical: should there be
movement and accommodation in the government's race policy, or should it
try to hold the line? Indeed, there may be a more immediate issue at stake:
future control of the National Party.
In this paper the issues and the advocates are briefly delineated, based
on the information so far available; their meaning is assessed in terms of two
alternate models of political behavior: a "prudence" model and a "tension"
model; and tentative conclusions are drawn.
This study was written in the Center for Policy Support in CIA's Intelligence
Directorate. It is intended primarily to stimulate further discussion and
analysis of a question to which the answers are not yet known. Although it
has had the benefit of comments and suggestions from OSI and ORPA, the
hypothesis is the author's, and does not represent an Agency or DDI
"position". Comments and queries may be addressed to
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CONTENTS
Issues in contention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The meaning of the split . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Its implications . . . . . . . ...
Annex: Summary of NP Officials' Statements
on Constitutional Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1
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The Split in the Vorster Cabinet:
Its Meaning and Implications
Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
July 1977
Issues in contention
Since May, Vorster's cabinet has divided publicly on at least three
issues: discriminatory laws (petty apartheid), future constitutional
development, and laws against inter-racial sex. Those urging movement in
these areas are the generally more progressive, or "verligte ", ministers: Pik
Botha (Foreign Affairs), Piet Koornhof (National Education, Sport, and
Recreation), and Hendrik Schoeman (Agriculture). On at least one major
issue P. W. Botha, Minister of Defense, has joined the verligte. The
"verkrampte, " who have taken a conservative, stand-pat position on all three
issues are Andries Treurnicht, (Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration),
Connie Mulder, (Minister of Information), and-on occasion-Vorster,
himself.
The form of debate has been, for the most part, indirect. A verligte
challenge has been followed by a verkrampte response, sometimes on the
same day.
On 11 May, Foreign Minister Pik Botha won a landslide victory in a
parliamentary by-election. According to the South African press, this
sequence of public statements followed:
Botha (11 May): the.victory is a mandate for the government to
move away from racial discrimination [i.e., petty apartheid].
Mulder (11 May): the victory is a mandate only for Vorster to
continue negotiating with the Western nations over problems of
southern Africa.
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Treurnicht (12 May): future changes in policy will not include
;repeal of discriminatory laws, since maintaining separate political
;truclures would be senseless if social separation were abandoned.
Thus even in the area of petty apartheid., where most South African
white,, are prepared to see considerable relaxation of the color bar,' the
cabinet's leading verkramptes publicly repudiated a verligte member.
On Constitutional Change
A more fundamental issue is the question of future constitutional
arranf.emer. ts. A Cabinet Committee chaired by the Minister of Defence, P.
W. Bctha, has been examining the present constitution to assess how well it
meets South Africa's needs, as seen by the ruling National Party (NP), and to
recommend changes.
Although the Committee has not yet announced its findings, the
intensity of the public debate over this issue in May and June suggests that
tentat. ve recommendations, at least, may already have been aired within the
cabinet.
Both :;ides have emphasized that there are "no basic differences of
opinion" on the subject within the Party; yet a careful reading of the verligte
and verkranipte statements on future constitutional development has shown
the two to be, in fact, quite far apart.2
The vcrkrampte view has been explained by Mulder, starting last fall
when :pie proposed substituting the term "plural democracy" for "separate
development." Acknowledging that he was looking for something that would
gain international acceptance, Mulder spoke generally of relaxing
discrimination somewhat, and minimizing rigidly enforced separation. Later
he explained the meaning of plural democracy as "...the acceptance of the
currenr division of peoples in a political system." (italics added) Vorster
appear,; to support this general position. He has publicly rejected power
sharing, and sees no political rights for blacks outside the homelands "in the
foreseeable future."
In the verligte view, power sharing is precisely what South Africa
should be striving toward. Koornhof, in a 24 May speech, which he himself
'Accordii=g to re: ent opinion polls.
2The Annex is a summary of the major statements on this subject by SAG officials.
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billed as "an important message," said that the government is moving toward
a system not unlike that in Switzerland. White, Coloured, and Indian people
would be drawn into a "collective decision-making process. " (italics added)
He raised two additional questions: the possibility that urban blacks might
eventually be included in this system, and an enhanced future role for the
Cabinet Council.' A couple of days later P. W. Botha gave his support to the
cantonal system-an idea he had first suggested last September. He added the
heretical suggestion that there could even be a common South African
nationhood.
During the next couple of weeks Mulder, Treumicht, and Vorster all
weighed in against Koornhof. In a BBC interview Vorster tried to reduce the
Koornhof proposal to the idle talk of dreamers, not practical politicians. The
strongest attack came in two speeches by Treurnicht, who rejected joint
decision-making by Whites, Coloureds, and Indians, as well as the notion of a
super-parliament to govern everyone. He indirectly rebuked Koornhof for
the "dangerous" view that Whites, Coloureds, Asians, and urban blacks could
form one plural political community.
In early July verligte cabinet members challenged the party line in what
is probably the most sensitive area of race policy: the prohibition of sex and
marriage between whites and non-whites. The persistence of strong feelings
on this subject among Afrikaners was demonstrated in a poll taken last fall,
in which only 25 percent of the Afrikaners interviewed favored abolition of
the Immorality Act, and less than 20 percent were in favor of scrapping the
Mixed Marriages Act. Vorster, himself vigorously defended both Acts in a
June TV interview.
Yet Hendrik Schoeman, Minister of Agriculture, told a National Party
meeting in early July that the Immorality Act is not needed. He noted that
South Africa "must be the only country in the world with such an act." He
was supported by Pik Botha, who issued a statement a couple of days later
reiterating Schoeman's point that "these laws are not needed for our [i.e.,
white] survival."
Schoeman's statement prompted an immediate rebuttal by Treurnicht,
who stressed that the National Party was formally pledged to maintain both
Acts. Schoeman, himself, under pressure to uphold Party unity, recanted
3An advisory council to the Government consisting of white cabinet ministers and representatives of
the Coloured and Indian communities. 3
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two days later by re-asserting his support for retaining the two laws. Botha
has told Ambassador Bowdler that he, too, is under pressure to retract his
statement of a few days ago. Treurnicht has delivered another stinging attack
on indiviiualhm and liberalism, spelling out what he sees as the serious
implicatic,ns for Afrikaner identity if the two Acts were repealed.
The mear ing of the split
In South Africa, as in the USSR, the really important policy decisions
are reached after consultation among a very small circle of men, and without
open discussion or broad sounding of public opinion. Although a number of
NP parlianenta fans are consulted as individuals, many MPs-particularly
those in the opposition-learn of impending legislation only when it is
formally tabled in parliament. This closed decision-making process is
enhanced--indeed, is made possible-by the fact that South Africa's leaders
come front a single and exclusive cultural background; have a common view
of themselves and their country; represent a small and relatively
homogeneous constituency; and share a common perception of
"others"-i.e., the non Afrikaner world.
As in the Soviet case, insiders are under severe constraints against
"leaks" to outs: ders, and seldom have an incentive to break the bond of
silence. As a result, divisions within the leadership are difficult to detect,
almost impossibl, to corroborate, and hazardous to interpret.
What .an be said., then, about the differences which have recently
surfaced among South African cabinet ministers? Are they real? Are they
what they appe ar to be, or do they reflect divisions over even more
fundamental issues?
First, while -abinet ministers have in the past expressed divergent views
on a particular issue (e.g., sports policy), it is unusual to see them in such a
flurry of co.lflict.ing statements, and arguing with such intensity, on major
policy quest: ons. Second, the airing of differences must be seen as political
behavior-i.e , it is neither idle nor spontaneous talk, and need not reflect
personal convicticns, but is undertaken with the persuasion of a particular
audience in mind. The question is, what audience, and to what (apparently
opposing) ends?
Availabl,s factual evidence, alone, eaunot carry the analysis any further.
To provide a more useful perspective for assessing the data at hand, a brief
look at two sf parale models of South African political behavior follows.
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The prudence model starts from an assumption of Afrikaner
exclusivism: the common cultural background, perceptions, and sense of
belonging shared by South Africa's leaders give them an unusual cohesion
and unity. In a culture which places great value on conservatism, conformity,
and loyalty to the group, those who rise to the top are likely to show an
abundance of these virtues. Conversely, mavericks, loners, and defenders of
unpopular causes are not likely to become leaders in that society.
Hence the prudence model perceives South Africa's leaders as men who
will go to great lengths to preserve the harmony and unity of the group, and
who tend to place their common goal-the survival and well-being of the
Afrikaner people-above personal ambition and petty politics.
Seen from this perspective, the recent series of apparently conflicting
policy statements by Vorster's ministers lacks political drama. If this model
prevails, then such statements are only an airing of various views on matters
where decisions have yet to be made. It is a way to stimulate broad,
grass-roots discussion of issues coming before provincial NP caucuses. A case
could even be made that these apparent "differences" are being purposely
exaggerated in order to lull the outside world into believing that significant
movement and change are imminent..
It is the argument of this paper, however, that the prudence model is
inadequate in explaining how South Africa's leadership would act under
extreme pressure. When things are going well for the Afrikaner yolk, it is
easy for the leadership to remain unified, and for individuals to submit to
the leader's will or to submerge their own views in the group consensus. But
what happens to this unified, happy family when things go wrong? In the
prudence model, how do the actors respond to failure? To disaster? How do
they apportion blame? And what if they lose confidence in the leader?
In this situation a tension model seems to offer a better guide to
understanding the Vorster cabinet's behavior. The tension model
acknowledges all the peculiarities of the Afrikaner culture, as well as its
impact on South Africa's leaders. But it also recognizes these men as political
animals, each with an ego, ambitions, a sense of personal destiny, and
confidence in his own powers (no matter whence derived).
It is suggested here that serious or prolonged crisis will tend to diminish
the unity and cohesion of the leadership, and can lead individual leaders to
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assert them::elves Such self-assertion would, of course, be rationalized as
being in the best interests of the Afrikaner people.
For the tersion model to be operative, South Africa's leaders must
perceive that the nation is in a serious crisis. There are more than enough
"objective" indicators that it is:
? In 1! 076 South Africa had its most serious racial disturbances of
this century,
? South Africa's abortive invasion of Angola has had adverse
political repercussions, at home and abroad.
? The rapid economic growth of the 1960s has given way to a
three-year recession. Black unemployment is large and growing, and
foreign investment (which has been critical to South African growth)
has diminished drastically.
? The end of Portuguese colonial rule, and the apparently
imminent collapse of white rule in Rhodesia, face South Africa
with black-riled and potentially hostile neighbors along all its
borders
? In the firsi four months of 1977, nearly 8,600 people emigrated
from South Africa: the highest outflow since records started in
1924. Moreover, preliminary records suggest that the largest single
group of emi,1res was professional people.
There is little doubt that South Africa's leaders recognize that the
country is facing multiple crises. Vorster's New Year's Day message to his
people warned of sacrifices ahead as South Africa stands alone in an.
increasingly Threalening environment. In addition:
? South Afr:.ca's leaders express deep concern over its growing
isolation from the West.
? Defense outlays were increased by 30 percent in 1975/76, and
over 20 percent in 1977/78.
? A Write Faper on Defence in April noted that the security
threat to South Africa "has increased in tempo, and is closer in
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? Recent legislation on internal security is aimed at strengthening
the authority of the police and at allowing the Defence Force to
be used against internal disorders.
In a parliamentary address in April, Mulder compared South Africa to a
ship at sea which is threatened from all sides. "The real threat is that the
seamen on the ship begin a mutiny. Therefore you will have to talk with
your own people, the wages of the seamen will have to be adjusted, and
there will have to be mutual discussion as to who is in charge of things."
If the country is perceived as being in a crisis, in what ways is the
leadership's behavior consistent with the tension model?
First, individual leaders are proposing significant shifts away from
established policy. The Schoeman-Pik Botha suggestion that the Immorality
Act be abolished is a clear departure from the established policy line. So,
too, is Koornhof's original call for a "collective decision-making process"
involving Whites, Coloureds, and Indians, with the possibility of later
inclusion of urban blacks. That this was indeed what Koornhof had in mind
is confirmed by a recent conversation between Pik Botha and Ambassador
Bowdler.
Second, verligte cabinet ministers and other NP officials have broken
party discipline by going public with their proposals. The pressure on
Schoeman and Pik Botha to recant belies the notion that these men had
Vorster's blessing to float their deviant views as trial balloons. Moreover the
risk of incurring party sanctions for breach of discipline seems high.4
Third, both the verligte and verkrampte sides have publicly endorsed or
backed the positions taken by spokesmen for their point of view. Treurnicht
seconded Mulder in rebuking Pik Botha. P. W. Botha, departing from his
traditionally conservative stance, endorsed Koornhof on constitutional
change, while Treurnicht, Mulder, and Vorster attacked Koornhof's position.
Pik Botha supported Schoeman's statement on the Immorality Act.
Such endorsements suggest that these positions represent the views of
two opposing groups, not merely those of individual ministers speaking for
4In April, Piet Marais, an outspoken verligte MP, told parliament that the Bantustan policy "simply
would not work," and that Coloureds and Asians should enjoy the same rights as Whites. He was
immediately rebuked by the Party whip for speaking out on such issues outside the Party caucus. A
month later, when asked to comment on the Koornhof proposal, Maras said, "I do not want to
comment, because I believe in party discipline"-suggesting that he may have been severely chastened
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themselves. In short, cabinet ministers have gone beyond breaking party
discipline: they have given signals in public that the cabinet is divided and
that the sides have formed on what, to white South Africans, are important
issues in domestic race policy.
Its Implication>>
If th,- tension model is assumed to apply, then the current split in the
cabinet must be viewed as a serious and conscious challenge to Vorster's
leadership. The recent public proposals by verligte ministers in the area of
race policy go beyond a departure from established policy and a breach of
party discipline: they are a bold appeal, over Vorster's head, to the Party and
the electorate. Yet the appeal can only be to those whites-until now
thought 1 o bc a small minority-who are prepared to see significant
movement (in terms of South African white perceptions) in South Africa's
handling cf its I-ace problem.
Why would men like Pik Botha, Piet Koornhof, P. W. Botha, and
Hendrik Schoelnan take such a political gamble? This is particularly relevant
in the case of Koornhof and Pik Botha, neither of whom is believed to have a
solid political base of his own. The most plausible explanation is that they
believe that Vorster has failed to respond to the internal and external crisis
which they now see threatening South Africa; that they see him as a political
prisoner of th verkrampte, a leader committed to resisting significant
change in long-entrenched policy at a time when change is urgently needed.'
It also seems likely that they would have undertaken such a challenge only if
assured of strong support from important groups of white South Africans.
The liming of the verligte challenge-a month or so before the opening
of provincial NP congresses-suggests that it was launched in time to allow
local Party officials to take grass roots soundings among their constituents
before taking up these issues in the Party. Perhaps this is the opening gambit
of a verligte bid to wrest control of the Party from Vorster and the
verkrampt
In a larger sense, we may be seeing the beginning of a serious erosion of
Afrikaner unite. This prospect was foreseen more than a year ago by
5In a recent s;,eech to a large trades union gathering, Vorster said "The world demands of us certain
things and certain actions to which we cannot agree, no matter what happens in the future. Certain
people are prepared jo submit to those demands. As far as I am concerned, I am not prepared to do
it." (italics adc'ed)
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Heribert Adam, a leading authority on Afrikaner politics.' Arguing that
South African whites now lack a motivating ideology, and that apartheid is
no more than "a tactical device invented in response to pressure," Adam
noted that, in such circumstances,
...there is no correct line to guarantee the survival of White
privileges for Afrikaners. Politics has become more of an ad hoc
maneuvering, with few taboos and guiding threads except the
preservation of the group position as the sole goal.
As a result, group cohesion will suffer, says Adam, and splits over tactics will
occur. Adam predicted that, in the future, South African whites will have to
react much more to the pressure of events than on the basis of forward
planning and a controlled system of racial domination.
For US policy the implications are several.
First, South Africa's rulers should be seen as an increasingly
differentiated group, and not as a monolith. Since the US relationship is a
critical one in South African eyes, this should offer future opportunities for
quiet and possibly fruitful contacts between the United States and those
South African leaders who are trying to bring about significant change. The
latter face a long and difficult struggle, which will be made somewhat easier
if they receive signs of understanding and encouragement from outside.
Second, signs of disagreement and divisions among the ruling elite
should be taken seriously-despite protestations of Mulder and others that all
is placid and harmonious. Careful weighing and analysis of such signals
should provide useful insights into issues of contention and possible policy
shifts, and might well offer sudden opportunities for US policy initiatives.
Third, a growing split on race policy would bring back into political
participation those various groups of whites who seek meaningful change,
but who had given up hope of finding support from their leaders. If they
perceive that there are serious advocates of change within the NP leadership,
this could open up new lines of dialogue between the government and the
public, and could lead to significant political realignments.
6In Social Dynamics,University of Capetown. No. 2 1976, His is by no means a universally shared viexN
among academicians, however.
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FL 11 participation by non-whites in the political process remains a long
way of', at best. But if one takes a longer run perspective-say 20 years,
which in light of the US civil rights campaign seems not unduly long for
profour d social change to be brought about-then recent developments are
encouraging. Serious proposals to end petty apartheid, to bring Coloureds
and Asians into some sort of joint decision-making process, to abolish laws
against inter-racial sex-such moves, when they come, will have consequences
for South African race relations that go far beyond the intrinsic value of the
measures themselves.
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ANNEX
Summary of NP Officials' Statements on Constitutional Change
15 Sep 1976:
Mulder: coins term "plural democracy" in place of separate
development or apartheid. Would abviate color discrimination,
minimize rigidly enforced separation, safeguard ethnic
identification of each group, and design a policy that will win
international acceptance.
11 Mar 1977: Vorster: has "great expectations of expanded powers for the Joint
Cabinet Council," but rejects a U.P. proposal for a multi-racial,
Turnhalle-type conference. "This side of the house will never
support power sharing."
24 May 1977: Koornhof: The Government is moving toward a system not unlike
that in Switzerland. White, Coloured, and Indian people would be
drawn into a "collective decision-making process" operating on a
consensus basis. "There is a school of thought which believes" the
urban blacks should in time be drawn into the new dispensation.
"Only time will tell whether this line of thought is feasible or
not." Says his speech is "an important message." "The question
arises whether the new Cabinet Council... could not be viewed as
the beginning of a process of institutional evolution which will
culminate in a sophisticated parliamentary system specially
tailored to the needs of South Africa's multi-ethnic population
structure."
27 May 1977
P. W. Botha: a canton-type system should guarantee
the biggest measure of self-rule for each race group over its own
affairs. Afrikanerism and South Africanism need not be in
conflict... there is a real desire for a common South African
nationhood.
30 May 1977: Vorster (On BBC interview): Koornhof "put forward certain
possibilities of what people could discuss and what they could
think about." But Koornhof did not say that separate
development should be scrapped..."he made a sort of future
projection, without saying in the least-because I did not read it
that way-that the urban black [should be divorced from his
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people-i.e., homeland]. Q: (On rights for urban blacks outside the
homelands.) "I for one do not foresee it in the foreseeable future.
It is something people can talk about, ...will talk about...but it is
certainly not practical politics at this stage whatsoever."
31 May 197'1: Mulder in plural democracy there is no question of a master body
with division of power-in contrast with the canton system and
cultural pluralism. Plural democracy means the acceptance of the
current division of peoples in a political system. Has serious
objections to the Swiss canton system; especially its weak central
power.
31 May 197;': Mulder and Koornhof stress there are "no basic differences of
opinion" within the NP; Koornhof: "We stand together and
behind our Prime Minister."
7 June 1977 Treurnicht (at NP local meeting): accepting the canton system
means accepting a form of federalism, and this is excluded by NP
policy. "We do not want one parliament that will govern everyone.
South Africa is not a plural society, but a plurality of societies."
16 June 1977: Treurnicht (to SABRA meeting): Rejects joint decision-making by
Whites, Coloureds, and Indians; rejects a super-parliament;
pressures are being exerted from all sides; said it was necessary to
talk about change "with discretion"; it is dangerous to view
Whites, Coloureds, Asians, and Blacks outside the homelands as
one plural political community.
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