ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 27, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Economic Intelligence
Weekly Review
On file Department of
Agriculture release
instructions apply. --
3000Q 7II001=9
Secret
COPY
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW
Israeli Economy: Growth With Austerity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
With the economy posting a good growth record in 1977, Prime Minister
Begin's immediate concerns are keeping the lid on domestic consumption
and juggling the country's limited manpower resources.
Brazilian Coffee: Holding Out for Higher Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Intensified Brazilian efforts to prop up sagging world coffee prices are only
delaying further price reductions, as larger supplies confront curtailed
consumer demand.
Romania: More Consumer and Labor Pains Ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Ceausescu government is trying to impose a harsher work pace on the
economy despite growing disgruntlement over wages and living standards.
Malta: "The British are Leaving! The British are Leaving!" . . . . . . . . . 10
The closing of the British NATO base in 1979 threatens increases in
unemployment and deterioration in the balance of payments.
i
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The Israeli economy is well out of the 1974-75 recession after a pause brought
on by preelection jitters and strikes. GNP is now rising at an annual rate of about 5
percent, unemployment is down to roughly 3 percent, and an export boom is
cutting down the balance-of-payments deficit. Prime Minister Begin's immediate
concerns are keeping the lid on domestic consumption and juggling the country's
limited resources, particularly manpower. He will continue the previous
IS(j/\EL GNP and Industrial
Production
100
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77
1. Jan - June 1977
2. Projected
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government's efforts to spur exports and to limit the growth in civilian imports
through periodic devaluations and fiscal restraints on domestic demand.
Recession Years and Interrupted Recovery
Israel's most severe economic slump in 25 years was brought on by (a) the
severe balance-of-payments difficulties resulting from the massive defense program
after the 1973 war and (b) the global economic downturn in 1974. This combina-
tion of factors pushed the 1974 goods and services deficit to $3.5 billion, forcing Tel
Aviv to adopt austerity measures to curb private consumption and import demand.
The program had the intended effect on the civilian economy; household spending
in real terms stagnated in 1975, and fixed investment fell sharply. Even so, the trade
and services deficit rose to a record $4.0 billion; military purchases abroad rose by
$500 million, while civilian imports stayed the same.
For 1976 as a whole, real GNP increased less than 2 percent. Although the
economy was picking up momentum in the first half, preelection uncertainties and
labor unrest stifled the revival. More than one-third of government workers-who
make up 25 percent of the civilian labor force-were out on strike at various times in
November-December, taking advantage of the forthcoming election to seek higher
wages. Wage rates in both the government and private sectors kept pace with the
country's 40-percent inflation rate.
By constraining demand
the government managed to Israel: Migration
cut the 1976 goods and serv-
ices deficit to $3.2 billion, a
gap easily covered by trans-
fers, aid, and other capital in-
flows. The payments position
was bolstered by substantial
export gains, helped by almost
monthly minidevaluations to-
taling 20 percent against the
US dollar for the year. Despite
Persons
Immigrants
Emigrants
Net Immigration
1970 ....................
31,043
12,759
18,284
1971 ....................
37,078
16,756
20,322
1972 ....................
52,353
16,996
35,357
1973 ....................
52,238
15,326
36,912
1974 ....................
29,722
30,528
- 806
1975 ....................
18,104
19,979
-1,875
1976 ....................
17,772
22,492
-4,720
continued austerity, the economy operated essentially on a full-employment basis.
Key reasons for the continued high employment included reduced immigration,
increased emigration, and higher military manpower requirements.
The economy has gained considerable momentum this year following a rough
fourth quarter 1976, when real GNP dipped slightly. The subsequent strong re-
bound, based primarily on increased exports of goods and services, should assure a
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5-percent growth rate for 1977. Industrial production rose 9 percent in January-
June, compared with second half 1976, and the improvement continued into the
third quarter. Inventories are being worked down, and new investment in plant and
equipment has picked up.
With recovery under way, the Begin government is carefully containing private
consumption to accommodate export and military priorities. As part of the effort,
government spending has continued to shrink after dropping 20 percent in real terms
in early 1977. Large cuts in food subsidies and regular minidevaluations are also
working to sop up purchasing power. In the last three and a half months, the Israelis
have had six devaluations of nearly 2 percent each. Since November 1974 the value
of the pound has dropped from 25 cents to less than a dime, one of the largest
currency changes undertaken by any country in recent years.
The recent devaluations and subsidy cuts have fueled inflation, pushing
consumer price increases to a 35-percent annual rate since mid-year compared with
ISIjAE L Consumer Price Index
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the 20-percent annual rate recorded between December 1976 and June 1977. The
acceleration in inflation is now eroding most of the 9-percent gain in real hourly
wages enjoyed by labor in the first half; as a result the rise in real wages for 1977 as
a whole will probably be held to about 3 percent. The issue of wage restraint
promises to heat up in the next few months as the negotiations on next year's wage
settlements draw near. The Begin government appears to be taking a much harder
line on the need for restraints than its predecessor and is holding to its promise of
further austerity measures if settlements lead to real wage gains in 1978 of more
than 2 percent. Indeed, Minister Ehrlich announced this week a further round of
subsidy cuts.
Manpower Gets Tighter
The economic rebound is seriously straining the already tight labor market,
adding to inflationary pressures. The squeeze is tightest in industry, where the
number of unfilled job openings stood at 20,000 in mid-September, according to
Finance Minister Erhlich. This shortfall equals 5 to 10 percent of the total industrial
labor force.
Shortages of skilled workers have become more acute, not only because of the
recovery but also because of continuing high military needs. Increased military
requirements, including reserve time, now absorb upwards of 75,000 man-years
more than in 1973.
Shortages of unskilled laborers are not as apparent, largely because the cutback
in public construction remains in effect. The construction sector relies heavily on
Arab laborers from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Roughly half of these
workers-some 80,000 in 1973-have been attracted to higher paying jobs in other
Middle East countries. In Jordan, for instance, semiskilled workers earn at least
double the wage of their counterparts in Israel. The continued decline in the arrival
of Jewish immigrants, a traditional source of new labor, combined with substantial
Israeli emigration, is intensifying the supply problem.
Because of the tight manpower situation, many plants areable to operate only
single shifts in spite of a growing backlog of orders. Moreover, government policies
tend to inhibit overtime because of very high marginal tax rates. The average factory
worker reportedly would pay out 50 percent or more of overtime or night differ-
ential in taxes. Government policies do, however, encourage increased housewife
participation by exempting from taxes the first 2,000 Israeli pounds of income.
The Payments Problem
The Begin government still sees reduction of the current account deficit as its
top economic priority. Rapid growth in commodity export earnings together with
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the boom in tourism will drop the deficit slightly to $3.0 billion in 1977. Merchan-
dise exports in January-August were 30 percent above the same 1976 period, while
tourist receipts jumped roughly 40 percent. Civilian imports of goods and services
are expected to increase 10 percent in 1977, to $7 billion, with about half the gain
reflecting higher dollar prices. The 5-percent volume increase is the first rise since
1974. The military import bill is expected to remain close to last year's level of $1.6
billion.
Transfers-both private and official-and capital inflows will more than cover
the projected 1977 goods and services deficit. US aid drawdowns will be about $2.2
billion, $1.8 billion in US FY 1977 appropriations and another $400 million from
previous authorizations. These inflows will also offset a substantial rise in debt
repayment costs of $765 million this year, up from $600 million in 1976. Israel
should end the year with a cushion of about $350 million, part of which will be used
to reduce short-term debt accumulated in 1975.
With continued US assistance at the $1.8 billion level and a normal flow of
other loans and transfers, Israel should be able to maintain a comfortable foreign
economic position at least through 1978. We believe the deficit on the goods and
services account could be reduced another $250 million to $350 million next year.
The prospects for export growth are especially bright given the large backlog of
export orders accumulated this year. Because of labor shortages, some manufactur-
ing plants are reporting export backlogs as long as eight months.
The domestic economy also should continue to strengthen gradually during the
next year or two. We think GNP probably will rise by about 5 percent again next
year; a higher growth rate would quickly overheat the economy. With a growth of
only 1 to 2 percent in the labor force and productivity gains of 3 to 4 percent, the
economy simply cannot accommodate a faster rise in demand. To help meet labor
and productivity growth targets, Tel Aviv has announced a 3-percent cut in total
public service employment to shift workers to industry. The government is also
encouraging voluntary movement to industry by continuing the former Labor
government's practice of trying to keep public wages below comparable industrial
rates.
With the focus on exports and labor shortages, the government will have to
hold the line on real wages and, in turn, on personal consumption. In these
circumstances, only gradual easing at best can be expected in present austerity
measures over the next six months. If domestic demand rises too fast and is met by a
sudden rise in civilian imports, austerity may well be tightened another notch.
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BRAZILIAN COFFEE: HOLDING OUT FOR HIGHER PRICES
Brazil's efforts to shore up sagging coffee prices until demand revives have
intensified in recent weeks in the face of continued softening of the world market.
Despite a wide range of tactics, Brazilian efforts to manipulate the market have only
delayed further declines in world coffee prices as larger supplies confront reduced
roaster and consumer demand. Brasilia is under pressure from financially pressed
exporters and disenchanted growers to adjust its policy to current market
conditions. Moreover, unless a policy reversal occurs quickly, Brazil will see this
year's expected trade surplus turn into a deficit. Already rumors are circulating that
Brazil may soon begin discounting its official price to stimulate sales.
Market Manipulation
Since midyear, Brazil has pulled out all stops in the attempt to bolster world
coffee prices. Beginning in July the government prohibited new export contracts
while maintaining a minimum export price of $3.20 per pound, which effectively
priced Brazilian coffee out of the market. Although the prohibition on new export, contracts was lifted in early October, the minimum price has been maintained while
export taxes have been raised from $1.22 to $1.67 per pound. In addition to these
measures the Coffee Institute of Brazil (IBC) bought 750,000 bags on world markets
between July and September.
Brazil's market intervention thus far has done little more than slow the decline
in coffee prices, which have dropped from the April 1977 peak of $3.36 per pound
to the current $1.80. The market expects the drop to continue. Price quotes for
December 1977 delivery contracts fell to less than $1.50 per pound in New York
last week, with longer futures ranging downward to less than $1.25 per pound for
December 1978 deliveries.
Brazilian efforts to manipulate the market since midyear have been based on a
conviction that coffee prices will rebound as seasonal roaster demand comes into
play by November. IBC technocrats have persisted in believing that consumer
demand will fully recover from the slide experienced since prices first began to
escalate in 1976 and that the global supply is sufficiently tight to bring back a
sellers' market. These beliefs are hardly consistent with present market realities.
While roaster demand can be expected to show some seasonal improvement in
fourth quarter 1977, requirements are likely to remain depressed. Roaster demand
in the United States continues to run nearly 30 percent below last year's average,
reflecting a sharp drop in final consumption, continued inventory drawdowns, and
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the expectation of continued price declines. Despite the drawdown in US roaster
stocks, inventories are more than adequate to cover consumption needs for the
remainder of 1977.
Global production for the current crop year should be up 15 percent, largely
on the strength of increased Brazilian output. The Brazilian crop just harvested
amounted to 17 million bags
(estimate of USDA attache),
nearly 80 percent above last Brazil's Coffee Balance
year's disastrous crop. Carib- Million Bags
bean, African, and Central 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79
American suppliers once again
expect reasonably good pro- Opening stocks 16.0 22.1 23.1 8.0 7.0
duction; these crops will be Production ............ 27.5 23.0 9.5 17.0 19.5
harvested over the next three Total supply ......,. 43.5 45.1 32.6 25.0 26.5
Net exports ...... -13.4 -14.0 -17.1 -12.0' -12.0'
to six months and should con- Domestic con-
tribute to downward price sumption ...... -8.0 -8.0 -7.5 -6.02 -6.02
pressures. Stocks in most pro- Final stocks ........ 22.1 23.1 8.0 7.0 8.5
ducing countries other than ' Coffee year beginning the month of July.
Brazil are unusually low; mod- Projected by the Coffee Institute of Brazil (IBC).
erate accumulation is expected
in 1978.
Brazil's hard-line policy is coming under increasing attack from domestic
growers and exporters. By pricing its coffee out of the market and hiking export
taxes, the government has effectively forced the private sector to accumulate
excessive inventories. These have created serious cash-flow problems for both
growers and exporters. Coffee trading companies were briefly soothed by a
government decision in September to provide about $45 million in 90-day working
capital loans to carry them over until 1978. Even so, at least one exporter has gone
bankrupt and several others are in serious financial straits.
The government so far has offered little relief to growers. Despite demands for
an immediate 25-percent price hike and a further increase in three months, the
government has granted only a 25-percent increase effective January 1978. The
delay in the price hike tends to backstop the government's policy of discouraging
exports during fourth quarter 1977.
If the de facto ban on coffee exports continues, the cost in foreign exchange
earnings will be substantial. Coffee earnings have been averaging only $30 to $40
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million per month since July, compared with a $313 million monthly average during
January-June. The cost of withholding 3 million bags from the market during
July-September amounted to nearly $600 million. Withholding coffee from the
market for the remainder of 1977 would bring the foreign exchange forgone to at
least $1 billion for 1977 as a whole.
Brazil's only alternatives to growing market isolation are to (a) make a major
cut in prices or (b) enter the market in a very agressive manner by purchasing several
million bags during the remainder of 1977. While massive purchases would bolster
prices, the advantage would fall to other producers, and the foreign exchange costs
would total at least $400 million above the present cost of withholding exports.
Brazil, already burdened by a massive foreign debt, cannot afford this course of
action.
The Brazilian Government may be reconsidering its obdurate stand. Rumors are
circulating that Brazil has or will soon offer discounts to large importers of perhaps
$1.50 per pound below the official export floor price of $3.20. Any such last
minute reversal of policy could force the resignation of Camillo Calazans, president
of the IBC and the strongest proponent of the hard-line pricing policy.
Little help can be expected from other producing countries, even though most
of them are sympathetic to Brazil's efforts to bolster prices. Indeed, last Friday,
producers of mild Arabica coffee agreed to at least temporarily withhold exports to
world markets. Nonetheless, prospects for extended producer unity are poor. For
example, Colombia, the second largest coffee exporter, has steadily been reducing
export prices since August to clear stocks of 2 million bags.
Despite a reduction in investment goals, mounting energy and labor shortages,
and hard currency constraints, the Ceausescu government is intent on maintaining
rapid economic growth. The regime's difficulties are compounded by the damage to
fixed structures caused by the March 1977 earthquake. Industrial productivity per
worker is slated to grow by an unrealistic 10.4 percent per year for the balance of
the 1976-80 plan. Even the attempt to achieve this target means further increases in
the work pace and overtime of the already disgruntled Romanian worker. This
intensified pressure will not be matched by parallel increases in wages or consumer
goods.
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The level of personal consumption in Romania is only two-thirds of the level in
Bulgaria and one-half the level in East Germany. Meat consumption per capita in
1975 totaled only 46 kilograms compared with 61 kilograms for Bulgaria and up to
82 kilograms for Czechoslovakia. Acute shortages of meat, sugar, and cooking oil
have persisted. Housing is cramped and in short supply. High-quality clothing and
other consumer goods also are scarce.
The government still expends much effort on concealing rather than solving
consumer shortages. Fearing that formal rationing or steep price increases might
provoke unrest, the regime has continued to ration scarce items informally on a
first-come, first-served basis. Ceausescu tried to placate Bucharest residents last year
by having choice cuts of meat displayed temporarily in stores during a speaking tour
of suburban markets.
Little Relief in Sight
The Romanian consumer will have to remain content with small improvements
in his frustrating life style. For example, per capita meat consumption is to rise less
than 4 percent a year, down considerably from the 8-percent rate claimed for
1971-75. Slowdowns are also projected in the growth of social welfare benefits and
in supplies of refrigerators, as well as such luxury goods as TV sets and automobiles.
Money income will continue to outpace supplies of popular consumer goods, with
shortages, queues, and poor quality continuing as features of everyday life. Further-
more, Ceausescu made it clear that any improvement in living standards will be
closely linked to fulfillment of production plans.
Prior to the earthquake in March 1977, the housing plan for 1976-80 had been
increased from 815,000 to 1 million units, compared with 780,000 built in 1971-75.
Meeting the higher goal would require sharp increases in construction productivity
and output of basic materials-both unlikely developments. The earthquake made
this goal even more difficult to achieve, since repairs are now necessary on more
than 200,000 damaged homes.
Ceausescu has stepped up demands on the labor force to counter increasing
labor shortages and the impact of the March earthquake. Since March, the regime
has lengthened the workweek, decreeing payless Sunday overtime in many factories
and postponing its repeated promises to trim the workweek from 48 to 44 hours. In
late June, the government promulgated a new pension law, which requires five years'
more work before retirement and calls for annuities to increase more slowly than
wages. In a move reminiscent of Chinese and Cuban experiments, Ceausescu ordered
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thousands of workers transferred from offices to factories and fields. In an August
speech, he called for industrial labor productivity per worker to grow at an
unrealistic 10.4 percent a year in 1978-80-up from the 6.5 percent claimed for
1971-75. Finally, the regime is threatening to dock wages up to 20 percent for
inferior work.
In protest against some of these measures, the normally undemonstrative
Romanian workers have staged a series of brief but ominous, stoppages. The first,
and most disruptive, occurred last August in the Jiu Valley coal mine, where workers
were out three days and resumed work only after Ceausescu agreed to hear their
grievances personally. According to one report, these same miners have staged
one-hour-a-day stoppages since late September. Work interruptions also have
occurred in a large machinery plant and, reportedly, in a textile mill. The chief
complaints concerned the new pension law, payless overtime, and poor housing
conditions. In addition, the coal miners have been worried that stepped-up mechani-
zation of mining operations would result in many job losses.
Ceausescu is running some risk in pushing rapid economic expansion at the
expense of the worker-consumer. The recent disturbances suggest that the popula-
tion is not responding to his exhortations for harder work and a conservative life
style. If strikes and general unrest become widespread, Ceausescu will have to settle
for lower growth, a reduction in factory speed-up plans, and increased emphasis on
the consumer sector.
MALTA: "THE BRITISH ARE LEAVING!
THE BRITISH ARE LEAVING!"
Malta faces the threat of dramatic increases in unemployment and serious
deterioration in the balance of payments when the British NATO base closes in
1979. Hoping to head off the problems, Prime Minister Dom Mintoff has visited
various Arab, European, and Asian countries to drum up joint ventures with the
Maltese Government and $300 million in financing. Because his political support
comes from the left side of the political spectrum, Mintoff so far has done little to
encourage private foreign investment that does not include participation by Valletta.
Economy Moving Along Smartly
Malta's economy has been performing well:
? In 1976, for the second consecutive year, GNP advanced 20 percent in
real terms, reaching $ 524 million.
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? Consumer prices rose less'than 1 percent in 1976, compared with almost
9 percent in 1975.
? The official unemployment rate slipped to 4.2 percent, compared with
4.6 percent in the previous year.
Despite the large trade deficit-imports are almost double exports-Malta's
foreign payments position is strong. The current account has been in surplus since
1970, thanks largely to foreign exchange receipts from the British base. Foreign
reserves now exceed $622 million, enough to finance 18 months of imports.
Under Mintoff's socialist guidelines, the government's role in the economy has
grown substantially since 1971:
? By 1976, public spending equaled 42 percent of GNP and accounted for
more than half of gross fixed investment.
? Consumer prices have been held down by government subsidies on
necessities such as flour products, milk, sugar, and kerosene. While some
of these subsidies were eliminated early this year, the government has
provided households direct cash payments to offset the impact of higher
prices.
? The government directly employs one-fourth of the labor force. The
public works job corps alone accounts for 7 percent of the total labor
force.
Industry remains largely in private hands. The government has part or sole
ownership of 51 companies, including all telecommunications facilities and
commercial banks. Valletta has entered into joint ventures with local and foreign
entrepreneurs and with foreign governments, including China, Czechoslovakia,
Libya, and North Korea. Mintoff has concentrated recent government efforts in
export-oriented industries, led by textiles, clothing, footwear, printed matter, and
ship building and repair. Many of the enterprises in which the government is
involved are small and should be flexible in responding to changes in market
conditions. Some, notably several joint ventures with Communist countries, are
doing badly.
Private foreign investors have remained active in Malta despite Mintoff's bias in
favor of state enterprise. West German investors in particular have recently increased
their stake. Last year, the company providing the largest share of Malta's
exports-21 percent-was a wholly American owned enterprise producing Wrangler
jeans.
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In 1976, the British-operated NATO base provided about $73 million in foreign
exchange-equivalent to 14 percent of GNP-and directly or indirectly employed
more than 4 percent of the
Maltese labor force of
115,300. Rent paid for the
base amounted to $30.6 mil-
lion. In addition, $8 million :in
soft loans linked to the base
rental were provided by four
n
it
e
h
e
U
coun
r
i
es-
t
t
NATO
d States, Canada, West Ger-
many, and Italy. The remain-
ing $34.6 million in foreign
exchange came from base ex-
o
d
s
___A.4-__,
ese goo
M
a
lt
and services. The British di-
rectly employed 3,600 Maltese
at a cost of $14.1 million.
British expenditures on sup-
plies, local contractors, utili-
ties, and other services came
to $20.5 million-estimated to
provide employment for
another 1,300 Maltese.
Malta: Current Account Balance
Million US $
1975
1976
Trade balance ........................................................
-210.9
-193.7
Exports, fob . ....................... .........
167.5
229.0
Imports, f.o.b .......................................................
378.4
422.7
Net services ...............
200.2
182.2
........................
Tourism .......................................
6I.6
53.9
Investment income ..............................................
47.9
45.2
Transportation .....................................................
27.8
30.8
Earnings from British base ................................
44.8
34.6
Ship repair .......................................................
32.2
27.3
....... ..._
. ...............
Net transfers ..........................................................
.
76.5
75.1
Public
Rent from British base ....................................
35.4
30.6
Other ..................................................................
11.0
4.7
Private
Worker remittances ..........................................
24.9
30.2
Other ............................
Current account balance ......................................
65.8
63.6
Employment Difficulties Starting in 1979
Because of the closing of the British NATO base, scheduled for 1979 under an
agreement signed in 1972, the years of exceptional economic growth will be
followed by lean years of unemployment unless a strong development effort is
mounted. Without sustained large-scale growth in both investment and exports, far
too few new jobs will be created to offset those eliminated by the base closing and
employ the expected large additions to the labor force.
According to Maltese estimates, 23,700 new jobs will be needed by 1979 to
keep unemployment from rising. This is a phenomenal number, considering that
total employment in 1976 was only 110,400 persons and that the last 20,000-plus
increment took 10 years. About 4,900 of these new jobs are needed to offset the
base closure; the remaining 18,800 are needed for other reasons, including
anticipated increases in the labor force and plans to reduce the public works job
corps.
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The government claims that expan-
sion of employment in existing industries
and services and new projects on the
drawing boards will create at most 11,700
new jobs by the end of 1979. The econ-
omy could indeed generate this many jobs
if Malta can continue to expand exports
as fast as in the recent past. Two factors
make Malta highly competitive in interna-
tional markets: low labor costs and a cen-
tral location relative to European, North
African, and Middle Eastern markets.
Wages fall considerably below wages in
major West European countries and even
below wages in Spain and Greece.
Tunisia!
Despite the slowness of economic recovery in many of its major markets,
Malta's exports grew an amazing 43 percent in volume last year, and export
industries provided 4,000 new jobs. According to Valletta's estimate, however,
further growth is likely to leave about 12,000 persons looking for work two years
hence, over and above those already unemployed. In the absence of further
measures, the unemployment rate thus would rise to about 13 percent by the end of
1979-a level that almost certainly would spell the end of Dom Mintoff's political
career.
Financial Difficulties Manageable
The loss of foreign ex- Selected Countries: Average Hourly Earnings
change earnings due to the in Manufacturing 1
base closure no doubt will
cause Malta to incur a sizable
current account deficit at least
initially. The high import con-
tent of Maltese exports means
that even substantial export
growth will be insufficient to
cover the loss of base-related
income. By the end of 1979
,
us
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
France ......................
1.07
1.20
1.48
1.93
2.16
2.80
Greece ......................
0.60
0.66
0.71
0.85
1.06
1.22
Italy ..........................
0.97
1.13
1.35
1.66
1.85
3.32
Malta ........................
0.56
0.60
0.68
0.80
0.93
1.11
Portugal ....................
NA
0.37
0.45
0.58
0.89
1.05
Spain ........................ 0.56
0.65
0.81
1.07
1.37
1.82
Malta's current account could ` Maltese data are from the Maltese statistical office; others are from
well be running deficits at an International Labour Office Yearbook.
Estimated.
annual rate of $100 million.
Nevertheless, by drawing down foreign exchange reserves, the government could
cover this size gap for several years, providing the economy additional time to
adjust.
Malta ; va?e?a
,Mediterranean
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 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
Loss of the substantial base-related government revenues should not pose
insurmountable budget difficulties. Nevertheless, the problem is compounded by
expected reductions in revenue from other sources. Tariff rates on imports from the
Economic Community, for example, are diminishing in line with the stipulations of
the EC-Malta association agreement; customs revenues and excise taxes cover about
23 percent of government expenditures. Also, central bank profits, which finance
about 17 percent of the budget, may fall. Most of these profits are derived from
interest income on Malta's foreign exchange holdings. If reserves are drawn down to
finance a balance-of-payments deficit-as seems inevitable-interest. income will
drop.
By continuing the vigorous economic expansion of the past few years, Malta
should be able to compensate for most of the lost revenues. A growing economy
would generate additional tax revenues. Lower tariff rates probably would be offset
by an absolute increase in the volume of imports. While the government probably
would have to resort to some form of deficit financing, the inflationary potential of
such action is small; a large share of any borrowing and spending will be in foreign
exchange and will not directly affect activity in the domestic economy.
Malta's Options
Despite little likelihood of major financial problems, Mintoff has asked West
European and Arab countries-primarily West Germany, France, Italy, and Libya-to
provide Valletta $28 million in 1979, $19 million in 1980, and $9 million 1981.
These grants are to be split 50-50 between the Europeans and the Arabs. While the
Europeans support this idea in principle, they have not made definite commitments.
Maltese officials claim Libya. is ready to come forward with its share; little evidence
exists to support their assertion. Undoubtedly, Mintoff hopes to play one party
against the other.
Malta's most pressing task will be expansion of export industries to employ the
growing labor force and reduce the impending current account deficit. Promising
industries include clothing, footwear, printed matter, and plastics. Expanded
clothing sales alone accounted for almost 40 percent of the growth in exports last
year.
Valletta claims that creating a second batch of 12,000 jobs by the end of 1979
would require almost $300 million in investment projects not yet planned. Mintoff
hopes to obtain project grants through bilateral agreements with individual
countries. To date, however, only the EC has made a concrete commitment, agreeing
to provide $30 million in development aid by 1979. Requests to France and Italy
have brought delegations to discuss investment possibilities. Given the weakness of
the response from official sources, Mintoff may decide to offer new inducements to
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 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
foreign private investors. In any case, the industries with the best potential seem
better suited to private than to state development.
Malta probably could get by without finding so many jobs. Mintoff's estimate
assumes the public works job corps will be reduced to lessen the burden on the
budget. If the public works corps remains at its current strength, as few as 5,000
jobs (beyond those more or less in view) might have to be created to keep
unemployment around 4.5 percent.
25X1
25X1
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 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
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 Secret
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 Nati 1
,or Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
Assessment
Center
Economic Indicators
Weekly Review
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 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
This, publication is prepared for the use of U.S. Government
officials. The format, coverage and contents of the publication are
designed to meet the specific requirements of those users. U.S.
Government officials may obtain additional copies of this document
directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Non-U.S. Government users may obtain this along with similar
CIA publications on a subscription basis by addressing inquiries to:
Document Expediting (DOCEX) Project
Exchange and Gifts Division
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540
Non-U.S. Government users not interested in the DOCEX
Project subscription service may purchase reproductions of specific
publications on an individual basis from:
Photoduplication Service
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540
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 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
Note: As a result of a reorganization, effective 11 October 1977,
intelligence publications formerly issued by the Directorate of
Intelligence are now being issued by the National Foreign Assessment
Center. Publication titles have been adjusted to reflect this change.
This publication was formerly titled Economic Indicators.
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i
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
1. The Economic Indicators Weekly Review provides up-to-date information
on changes in the domestic and external economic activities of the major non-
Communist developed countries. To the extent possible, the Economic Indicators
Weekly Review is updated from press ticker and Embassy reporting, so that the
results are made available to the reader weeks-or sometimes months-before receipt
of official statistical publications. US data are provided by US government agencies.
2. Source notes for the Economic Indicators Weekly Review are revised every
few months. The most recent date of publication of source notes is 20 October 1977.
Comments and queries regarding the Economic Indicators Weekly Review are
welcomed.
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 1NDUSTR1ALp' ftEJ dNO7iW8tO4f P=7PWP igPggls lr9
.-1973 AVERAGE 120
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126.
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
United Kingdom Semilogarithmic Scale
? < i ? ? si i w 1 1 i f 3 1
JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT
United States
SEP 77
0.4
3.6
6.1
4.9
Japan
JUL 77
-2.0
3.7
0.1
-2.1
West Germany
AUG 77
0
2.1
France
AUG 77
0
3.1
0
-3.1
LATEST
MONTH
1 United Kingdom JUL 77
Italy AUG 77
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Change
from
Previous
1 Year
3 Months
Month
1970
Earlier
Earlierl
2.8
0.4
-1.0
-8.5
-2.6
1.6
-1.0
-32.7
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UNEMPLOYMENT PERCENT OF LABOR FORCE
Japan
West Germany
France
JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
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 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
United Kingdom
A labor force survey based on new definitions of economic activity sharply raised the official estimate of Italian unemployment in first quarter 1977. Data for earlier periods thus are not comparable.
sl Italian data are not seasonally adjusted.
Italy (quarterly)
JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN
THOUSANDS OF PERSONS UNEMPLOYED
1 Year 3 Months
Earlier Earlier
United States SEP 77 6,773 7,448 6,962 ; United Kingdom
Japan JUN 77 1,190 1,120 1,050 $ Italy
West Germany AUG 77 1,052 1,049 1,038 ? ? Canada
France SEP 77 1,159 941 1,150
APR JUL OCT
1977
SEP 77
1,446
1,319
1,353
/7 III
1,692
776
1,432
JUL 77
859
751
870
NOTE: Data are seasonally adjusted. Unemployment rates for France are estimated, The rates shown for Japan, Italy and Canada are
roughly comparable to US rates. For 1975-77, the rates for France and the United Kingdom should be increased by 5 percent and
15 percent respectively, and those for West Germany decreased by 20 percent to be roughly comparable with US rates.
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DOMESTIC PRICES1 INDEX: 1970=100
United States
Japan
150
125
France
225
200
JAN APR JUL OCT JAN
1972
Semilogarithmic Scale
144
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United Kingdom
Percent AVERAGE ANNUAL
Change GROWTH RATE SINCE
SEP 77 0.5 8.5 7.1 6.7 United Kingdom
AUG 77 -0.1 5.2 1.9 -0.3 Canada
SEP 77 -0.1 5.5 3.7 1.4 $
Percent
Change
AVERAGE ANNUAL
GROWTH RATE SINCE
AUG 77
0.9
14.8
20.0
13.4
JUL 77
0.3
15.7
14.7
5.0
AUG 77
0.7
13.2
20.1
9.9
JUN 77
-0.2
10.0
9.6
2.2
JUL 77
0.9
7.5
8.4
10.3
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 GNP' Approved For Release 2004/07/11
5 :
F&& [P
1$00457A000300010001-9
A
I
Constant Market Prices
Constant Prices
Average
Average
Annual Growth Rate
Since
Annual Growth Rate Since
Percent Change
Percent Change
Latest
from Previous I Year
Previous
Latest
from Previous
1 Year
3 Months
Quarter
Quarter 1970 Earlier
Quarter
Month
Month
1970
Earlier
Earlier r
United States 77 III
0.9 3.2 4.6
3.8
United States
Aug 77
1.6
3.3
4.7
-3.7
Japan 77 II
1.9 5.6 5.6
7.6
Japan
Jun 77
-0.1
9.8
2.6
1.4
West Germany 77 11
-0.2 6.3 2.4
-1.0
West Germany
Aug 77
3.4
2.9
7.9
14.5
France 76 IV
0 3.9 4.9
0
France
Jun 77
7.7
-0.3
1.0
-8.1
United Kingdom 77 I
-1.9 1.6 -1.3
-7.5
United Kingdom
Aug 77
0.2
1.1
- 1.6
9.5
Italy 76 IV
1.1 3.0 5.5
4.6
Italy
Apr 77
-0.4
2.8
1.0
-3.1
Canada 76 IV
-0.6 4.8 3.4
-2.5
Canada
Jun 77
-0.7
4.1
-3.7
-8.7
Season* adjusted.
Seasonally adjusted.
Average far latest 3
months compared with average for previous 3 months.
FIXED INVESTMENT'
WAGES IN MANUFACTURING'
Non-residential; constant prices
Average
Annual Growth Rate Since
Average
Percent Change
Annual Growth Rate
Since
Latest
from Previous
1 Year
3 Months
Percent Change
Period
Period
1970
Earlier
Earlier'
Latest
from Previous 1 Year
Previous
Quarter
Quarter 1970 Earlier
Quarter
United States
Jul 77
0.6
7.5
7.6
8.1
United States 77 III
1.0 2.1 7
8
4
2
.
.
Japan
Jun 77
1.7
17.3
12.5
8.7
Japan 77 II
0.5 1.1 4.5
2.0
West Germany
77 II
1.7
9.5
7.5
7.2
West Germany 77 II
- 1.6 0.4 3.4
-6.4
France
77 I
2.3
14.1
13.9
9.5
France 75 IV
8.8 4.2 2.9
40.1
United Kingdom
Jun 77
0.3
15.7
3.4
3.6
United Kingdom 77 I
-0.6 0 3.4
-2.5
Italy
May 77
5.3
21.1
29.4
33.2
Italy 76 IV
5.2 3.0 15.4
22.4
Canada
Jun 77
1.3
11.5
10.7
11.7
Canada 76 IV
8.5 6.8 5.1
38.7
1 hairy earrings (seasonally adjusted)
for the United States, Japan, and Canada;
hourly wage
' Seasonally adjusted.
rates for others. West German and French data refer
to the begi
nning of the quarter.
'Average for latest 3
months compared with that for previous
3 months.
MONEY MARKET RATES
Percent Rate of Interest
1 Year
3 Months
1 Month
Representative ra
tes
Latest Date
Earlier
Earlier
Earlier
United States
Commerical paper
Oct 12 6.43
5.19
5.38
6.01
Japan
Call money
Oct 14 5.00
6.75
5.63
4.88
West Germany
Interbank loans (3 months)
Oct 12 4.06
4.80
4.19
4.07
France
Call money
Oct 14 8.38
9.75
8.63
8.50
United Kingdom
Sterling interbank loans (3 months)
Oct 12 5.18
14.24
7.89
6.09
Canada
Finance paper
Oct 12 7.09
9.44
7.25
7.50
Eurodollars
Three-month deposits
Oct 12 7.19
5.46
5.75
6.49
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 EXPORT PRI Sproved For Release 2004/07/16 :
IP I R E)MOR$7A000300010001-9
US $
National Currency
Average
Average
Annual Growth Rate Since
Annual Growth Rate
Since
Percent Change
Percent Change
Latest from Previous 1 Year 3 Months
Latest from Previous 1 Year
3 Months
Month Month 1970 Earlier Earlier
Month Month 1970 Earlier
Earlier
United States Jul 77 - 0.6 9.6 4.7 -1.7
United States Jul 77 -0.6 9.6 4.7
- 1.7
Japan Jun 77 2.0 10.8 14.9 10.1
Japan Jun 77 0.4 6.5 4.7
- 1.0
West Germany Aug 77 - 1.1 11.4 9.1 7.9
West Germany Aug 77 -0.2 4.5 -0.1
0.6
France Jul 77 1.5 11.3 8.2 10.2
France Jul 77 -0.1 9.2 8.7
1.7
United Kingdom Aug 77 2.9 11.0 13.9 15.7
United Kingdom Aug 77 1.9 16.1 16.7
10.1
Italy Apr 77 -0.3 11.1 17.4 12.6
Italy Apr 77 1.9 16.9 18.5
16.6
Canada May 77 0.3 9.7 -0.8 -0.8
Canada May 77 0.1 9.7 6.1
7.4
IMPORT PRICES
OFFICIAL RESERVES
National Currency
Average
Annual Growth Rate Since
Billion US $
Percent Change
Latest Month
Latest from Previous 1 Year 3 Months
1 Year
3 Months
Month Month 1970 Earlier Earlier
End of Billion US $ Jun 1970 Earlier
Earlier
United States Jul 77 0.6 13.4 7.9 7.6
United States Aug 77 19.1 14.5 18.6
19.2
Japan Jun 77 -0.8 10.9 0.3 -14.8
Japan Sep 77 17.9 4.1 16.5
17.4
West Germany Aug 77 0.6 4.4 -0.7 3.3
West Germany Aug 77 34.9 8.8 34.3
34.8
France Jul 77 0.1 10.3 14.3 -0.3
France Jul 77 9.9 4.4 9.4
10.0
United Kingdom Aug 77 -1.0 19.3 13.9 1.7
United Kingdom Sep 77 17.2 2.8 5.2
11.6
Italy Apr 77 1.0 21.1 13.7 15.1
Italy Jul 77 10.5 4.7 6.2
6.8
Canada May 77 0.5 8.6 11.9 18.2
Canada Jun 77 5.1 4.3 6.0
5.1
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE'
BASIC BALANCE'
Current and Long-Term-Capital Transactions
Cumulative (Million US $)
Cumulative (Million
US $)
Latest
Latest
Period Million US $ 1977 1976 Change
Period Million US $ 1977 1976
Change
United States' 77 II -4,605 -8,763 1,070 -9,833
United States No lo ger published:
Japan Aug 77 660 5,321 1,255 4,066
Japan Aug 77 260 3,781 1,472
2,309
West Germany Aug 77 -726 684 177 506
West Germany Aug 77 -1,048 -3,403 883
-4,287
France 77 II -438 -2,101 -2,052 -50
France 77 I - 1,354 -1,354 -2,015
660
United Kingdom 77 I -773 -773 -502 -271
United Kingdom 76 IV -277 N.A. -4,171
N.A.
Italy 77 I -929 -929 1,413 484
Italy 76 III 779 N.A. 1,096
N.A.
Canada 77 1 -1,530 -1,530 1,911 381
Canada 77 I -550 -550 882
-1,432
'Converted to US dollars at the current market rates of exchange.
'Converted to US dollars at the current market rates of exchange.
2 As recommended by the Advisory Committee on the Presentation of Balance of Payments
' Seasonally adjusted.
Statistics, the Department of Commerce no longer publishes a basic balance
.
TRADE-WEIGHTED EXCHANGE RATES'
EXCHANGE RATES
Sot Rate
Spot
As of 14 Oct 77
Change from
Percent Change from
As of 14 Oct 77
US $ 1 Year 3 Months
1 Year 3 Months
Per Unit 19 Mar 73 Earlier Earlier 7 Oct 77
19 Mar 73 Earlier Earlier 7 Oct 77
Japan (yen) 0.0040 3.94 14.08 4.85 2.17
United States 5.39 1.18 0.12 -
0.34
West Germany 0.4398 24.22 7.36 0.37 0.71
Japan 9.88 16.38 5.06
2.04
(Deutsche mark)
West Germany 27.44 5.66 0.08
0.18
France (franc) 0.2061 -6.50 2.22 0.10 0.32
France -7.70 -0.57 -0.49 -
0.28
United Kingdom 1.7675 -28.18 6.19' 2.79 0.50
United Kingdom -28.81 5.97 3.28
0.06
(pound sterling)
Italy -39.18 -7.56 -0.15 -
0.44
Italy (lira) 0.0011 -35.82 -4.54 0.26 0.09
Canada -7.05 -12.18 -3.85 -
1.06
Canada (dollar) 0.9113 - 8.66 -11.29 - 3.49 -0.86
' 'Weighting is based on each listed country's trade with 16 other industrialized countries to
i
es.
reflect the competitive impact of exchange rate variations among the major currenc
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Exports to (f.o.b.)
Imports from (c.i.f.)
World
Big
Seven
Other
OECD OPEC 2
Com-
munist
Other
World
Big
Seven
Other
OECD
OPEC 2
Com-
munist
Other
UNITED STATES 3
1974 .............
98,507
45,866
15,630
6,723
3,406
26,882
100,218
49,490
9,415
15,636
1,282
24,395
1975 .............
107,592
46,926
16,191
10,765
3,699
30,011
96,140
46,715
8,170
17,083
1,156
23,016
1976 .............
114,997
51,298
17,612
12,567
3,936
29,584
120,677
56
626
9
058
017
25
1
445
28
531
1st Qtr ........
27,360
12,184
4,088
2,751
1,144
7,193
27,319
,
12,884
,
2,226
,
5,570
,
327
,
6,312
2d Qtr ........
29,695
13,383
4,496
3,113
1,088
7,615
28,367
14,332
2,242
5,582
372
5,839
3d Qtr ........
27,437
11,944
4,073
3,106
850
7,464
32,452
14,285
2,228
6,952
389
8,598
4th Qtr ........
30,505
13,787
4,955
3,597
854
7,312
32,539
15,125
2,362
6,913
357
7,782
1977
1st Qtr ........
29,454
13,752
4,716
3,136
951
6,899
34,990
15,124
2,566
8,324
366
8,610
2d Qtr ........
31,673
14,282
4,707
3,389
816
8,479
37,907
17,059
2,578
8,673
411
9,186
JAPAN
1974 .............
55,610
18,591
6,862
5,450
4,367
20,340
62,074
18,755
6,219
19,970
3,684
13,446
1975 .............
55,812
16,468
6,091
8,423
5,283
19,547
57,853
16,917
6,083
19,404
3,382
12,067
1976 .............
67,364
22,406
8,588
9,278
5,049
22,043
64,895
17,534
7
777
21
877
2
926
14
781
1st Qtr ........
14,429
4,848
1,827
1,872
1,289
4,593
14,832
4,083
,
1,696
,
5,213
,
671
,
3,169
2d Qtr ........
16,431
5,402
2,092
2,271
1,348
5,318
15,903
4,347
1,948
5,400
667
3,541
3d Qtr ........
17,542
5,897
2,272
2,476
1,135
5,762
16,818
4,497
2,137
5,406
747
4,031
4th Qtr ........
1977
18,962
6,259
2,397
2,659
1,277
6,370
17,342
4,607
1,996
5,858
841
4,040
1st Qtr ........
17,911
5,848
2,449
2,459
1,409
5,746
17,452
4,717
1,845
6,246
801
3,843
Apr & May .....
13,017
4,404
1,611
1,823
875
4,304
11,988
3,195
1,380
3,925
575
2
913
WEST GERMANY
,
1974
.............
89;365
30,820
36,431
4,066
9,473
8,575
69,659
23,878
25,504
9,211
5,153
5,913
1975
.............
90,181
28,331
36,406
6,776
10,629
8,039
74,986
27,085
27,761
8,239
5,526
6,375
1976
.............
101,980
33,443
41,811
8,245
10,310
8,171
88,211
31,281
32,632
9
720
718
6
7
860
1st
Qtr ........
23,467
7,918
9,519
1,710
2,430
1,890
20,147
7,130
7,577
,
2,189
,
1,502
,
1,749
2d
Qtr
24,570
8,215
10,110
1,838
2,421
1,986
21,571
7,704
8,133
2,223
1,625
1,886
3d
Qtr ........
25,147
8,003
10,272
2,235
2,510
2,127
21,791
7,565
7,894
2,575
1,699
2,058
4th
Qtr ........
28,796
9,307
11,910
2,462
2,949
2,168
24,701
8,883
9,028
2,732
1,891
2,167
1977
1st
Qtr ........
27,804
9,281
11,609
2,307
2,156
2,451
24,084
8,465
8,828
2,578
1,270
2,943
Apr
...........
9,230
3,058
3,849
799
694
830
7,991
2,892
2,949
756
428
966
FRANCE
1974
.............
45,914
19,361
14,854
3,017
2,265
6,417
52,874
22,062
13,620
10,117
1,714
5,361
1975
.............
52,189
19,960
15,454
4,909
3,477
8,389
54,238
23,039
14,350
9,665
2,065
5,119
1976
.............
55,680
22,438
16,081
5,067
3,558
8,536
64,256
27
750
16
894
11
336
2
384
5
892
1st
Qtr ........
13,639
5,524
3,921
1,240
917
2,037
15,529
,
6,567
,
4,157
,
2,818
,
595
,
1,392
2d
Qtr ........
14,769
5,911
4,395
1,221
1,059
2,183
16,187
7,149
4,324
2,610
593
1,511
3d
Qtr ........
12,409
4,922
3,446
1,280
729
2,032
14,841
6,431
3,733
2,723
577
1,377
4th
Qtr ........
14,863
6,081
4,319
1,326
853
2,284
17,699
7,603
4,680
3,185
619
1,612
1977
1st
Qtr ........
15,323
6,250
4,540
1,392
847
2,294
17,885
7,494
4,840
3,056
600
1,895
Apr
...........
5,232
2,193
1,569
460
288
722
5,788
2,499
1,543
879
194
673
UNITED
KINGDOM
1974
.............
38,615
11,704
15,544
2,554
1,458
7,355
54,107
18,158
17,968
8,695
1,870
7,416
1975
.............
43,751
12,399
16,310
4,535
1,768
8,739
53,260
18,387
18,370
6,912
1,726
7,865
1976
.............
46,312
14,016
17,492
5,133
1,619
8,052
56,029
19
653
18
732
7
292
2
143
8
209
1st
Qtr ........
11,637
3,415
4,362
1,238
433
2,189
13,641
,
4,704
,
4,597
,
1,824
,
510
,
2,006
2d
Qtr ........
11,553
3,532
4,307
1,259
420
2,035
14,052
5,041
4,547
1,738
579
2,147
3d
Qtr ........
11,058
3,430
4,100
1,262
386
1,880
13,787
4,744
4,547
1,893
528
2,075
4th
Qtr ........
12,064
3,639
4,723
1,374
380
1,948
14,549
5,164
5,041
1,837
526
1,981
1977
1st
Qtr ........
13,150
4,008
5,145
1,521
413
2,063
15,575
5,786
5,068
1,783
514
2,424
2d
Qtr ........
14,375
4,195
5,700
1,687
530
2,263
16,623
6,009
5,718
1,702
602
2,592
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
Developed Countries: Direction of Trade
(Continued)
Exports to (f.o.b.)
Imports from (c.i.f.)
World
Big
Seven
Other Com-
OECD OPEC' munist
Other
World
Big
Seven
Other
OECD OPEC 2
Com-
munist
Other
ITALY
1974 .............
30,252
13,894
7,135
2,238
2,701
4,284
40,682
17,949
6,394
9,384
2,513
4,442
1975 .............
34,825
15,626
7,519
3,718
3,228
4,734
37,928
17,284
6,189
7,854
2,431
4,170
1976 .............
35,364
16,698
8,276
4,027
2,592
3,771
41,789
18,585
7,755
7,831
3,000
4,618
1st Qtr ........
7,398
3,513
1,713
756
597
819
9,092
4,063
1,708
1,689
608
1,024
2d Qtr ........
8,705
4,157
2,040
951
623
934
10,716
4,786
1,918
2,092
744
1,176
3d Qtr ........
9,398
4,505
2,191
1,057
657
988
10,335
4,497
1,860
2,035
792
1,151
4th Qtr ........
9,863
4,523
2,332
1,263
715
1,030
11,646
5,239
2,269
2,015
856
1,267
1977
1st Qtr ........
9,668
4,520
2,264
1,236
655
993
11,299
4,964
2,130
2,166
720
1,319
Apr & May .....
7,480
3,435
1,719
981
540
805
8,523
3,829
1,561
1,605
523
1,005
CANADA 4
1974
.............
32,390
26,827
1,970
626
851
2,116
32,408
25,965
1,508
2,613
343
1,979
1975
.............
31,778
25,885
1,753
827
1,255
2,058
34,050
27,181
1,579
3,126
311
1,853
1976
.............
37,746
31,415
2,048
930
1,270
2,083
37,922
30,383
1,661
3,171
363
2,344
1st
Qtr ........
8,539
7,197
424
167
334
417
9,159
7,331
367
843
85
533
2d
Qtr ........
10,015
8,441
496
183
345
550
10,290
8,175
421
954
95
645
3d
Qtr ........
9,216
7,486
568
271
354
537
8,834
6,965
433
716
91
629
4th
Qtr ........
9,976
8,291
560
309
237
579
9,639
7,912
440
658
92
537
1977
1st
Qtr ........
9,672
8,201
524
248
231
468
9,640
7,850
391
742
87
570
2d
Qtr ........
10,740
9,055
540
278
292
575
10,841
9,007
430
677
96
631
1 Data are unadjusted. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
2Including Gabon.
3Import data are f.a.s.
4Import data are f.o.b.
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
FOREIGN TRADE BILLION US $, f.o.b., seasonally adjusted
United States
14.0
12.0
10.0
Japan
7.0
West Germany
10.0
8.0
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
United Kingdom
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.3
3.3
JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT
CUMULATIVE (MILLION US $)
MILLION
US $ 1977
1976
CHANGE
5,095
41,159
32,650
26.1?b
4,936
44,196
37,511
17.8%
159
-3,037
-4,861
1,824
4,022
29,216
23,305
25.4?0
3,489
29,071
25,696
13.1%
533
146
-2,391
2,537
3,325
20,711
18,774
10.3?a
3,311
20,020
18,940
5.7%
14
691
-166
857
LATEST
MONTH
MILLION
US $ 1977
1976
CHANGE
LATEST
MONTH
9
563
79
668
75,383
5.710
United States
,
12,232
,
97,251
77,646
25.2%
-2,670
-17,583
-2,263
-15,320
521
6
51
989
42
541
22.2?a
Japan
AUG 77
,
,
,
AUG 77
5,466
40,645
35,772-
13.6%
Balance
1,055
11,344
6,769
4,575
Balance
West Germany
AUG 77
9,849
7,808
76,165
62,796
64,855
53,654
17.4".
17.0%
JUN 77
Balance
2,041
13, 369
11,201
2,169
Balance
5
510
964
41
37
453
12.0?6
France
,
5,888
,
44,174
,
39,000
13.3%
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
FOREIGN TRADE PRICES IN US $1
West Germany
106
04
1-Export and import plots are based on five month weighted moving averages.
A-14
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada
ins
103
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
 Approve W2gm 2000 /V~LOPING COUNTRIES 010001-9
MONEY SUPPLY'
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION'
Avera
ge
Average
Annual Growth
Rate Since
Annual Growth Rate Since
Percent Change
Percent Change
Latest
from Previous
1 year
Latest
from Previous
1 Year
3 Months
Month
Month
1970
Earlier
Period
Period
1970
Earlier
Earlier r
Brazil
May 77
1.5
36.3
41.7
Brazil
76 II
0.1
11.0
10.7
0.4
Egypt
Apr 77
1.2
18.6
23.0
India
Feb 77
3.5
5.5
6.8
18.8
India
Apr 77
0.9
12.2
19.7
South Korea
Jun 77
8.3
22.8
14.7
22.8
Iran
Jun 77
-4.5
28.8
26.5
Mexico
May 77
1.9
5.9
2.4
27.1
South Korea
Jul 77
1.9
31.6
39.6
Nigeria
76 IV
0.2
11.3
9.0
0.7
Mexico
Jun 76
-0.3
17.0
16.6
Taiwan
Jul 77
-2.0
14.2
8.9
12.7
Nigeria
Feb 77
5.9
35.9
54.8
' Seosanafy adj
usted.
Taiwan
May 77
0.6
24.1
21.0
Average for latest 3 months compared with average for previous 3 months.
Thailand
May 77
1.5
13.5
13.0
' Seasonally adjusted
.
' Average far latest
3 months compared with average far previous 3 months.
CONSUMER PRICES
WHOLESALE PRICES
Average
Annual Growth Rote Since
Average
Percent Change
Annual Growth
Rate Sims
Latest
from Previous
1 Year
Percent Change
Month
Month
1970
Earlier
Latest
from Previous
1 Year
Month
Month
1970
Earlier
Brazil
May 77
3.5
26.9
44.4
India
Apr 77
0.3
8.1
8.3
Brazil
Aug 77
0.9
27.2
37.0
Iran
Jun 77
1.6
12.5
29.9
India
May 77
2.0
9.5
10.2
South Korea
Aug 77
1.3
14.6
9.7
Iran
Jun 77
0.1
10.9
21.6
Mexico
Jul 77
1.1
14.7
32.9
South Korea
Aug 77
0.7
16.3
9.2
Nigera
Mar 77
3.4
14.9
13.6
Mexico
Jul 77
0.7
16.4
48.2
Taiwan
Jul 77
0.4
10.6
7.2
Taiwan
Jul 77
0
9.1
4.1
Thailand
Jul 77
0.4
8.6
9.4
Thailand
Jul 77
1.0
10.1
7.1
EXPORT PRICES
OFFICIAL RESERVES
US $
Million US $
Latest
Month
Average
Annual Growth Rote Since
1 Year
3 Months
Percent Change
End of
Million US $ Jun 1970
Earlier
Earlier
Latest
from Previous
1 Year
3 Months
Brazil
Feb 77
5,873 1,013
3,667
5
139
Period
Period
1970
Earher
Earlier
Egypt
Apr 77
405 155
375
,
389
Brazil
Mar 77
4.5
16.5
35.4
-34.4
India
Jun 77
4,559 1,006
2,449
3,747
India
Nov 76
-2.1
9.4
10.5
-4.0
Iran
Jul 77
11,592 208
8,426
10,548
Iran
Jun 77
0
36.0
18.9
0
South Korea
Jul 77
3,656 602
2,128
3,247
South Korea
77 1
1.7
8.8
11.9
6.9
Mexico
Mar 76
1,501 695
1,479
1,533
Nigeria
May 76
-0.1
33.2
8.2
6.6
Nigeria
Jun 77
4,663 148
5,885
4,931
Taiwan
May 77
0.4
12.3
9.4
14.7
Taiwan
Jun 77
1,411 531
1,394
1,349
Thailand
Dec 76
2.0
13.3
13.1
77.7
Thailand
Jul 77
2,017 978
1,929
2,006
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
FOREIGN TRADE, f.o.b.
Latest 3 Months
Percent Change from
3 Months 1 Year
Latest Period
Earlier'
Earlier
1977
1976
Change
Jun 77 Exports
190.5
37.3
6,199
4,410
40.6%
Jun 77 Imports
47.0
-0.4
5,963
5,938
0.4%
Jun 77 Balance
236
- 1,528
1,764
76 IV Exports
-9.0
-33.3
NA
NA
NA
76 IV Imports
76 IV Balance
177.6
15.7
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Apr 77 Exports
109.3
13.0
1,890
1,670
13.2%
Apr 77 Imports
-56.3
5.6
1,456
1,434
1.5%
Apr 77 Balance
434
236
198
Iran
Jun 77 Exports
-4.4
4.2
11,984
10,968
9.3%
May 77 Imports
143.6
6.8
5,268
5,050
4.3%
May 77 Balance
4,845
3,926
919
South Korea
Jun 77 Exports
107.4
23.8
4,518
3,414
32.3%
Jun 77 Imports
158.0
31.7
4,692
3,625
29.4%
Jun 77 Balance
-174
-211
37
Mexico
Jun 77 Exports
17.1
25.3
2,162
1,661
30.2%
Jun 77 Imports
73.5
-21.5
2,340
2,971
-21.2%
'Jun 77 Balance
-178
-1,310
1,132
Nigeria
May 77 Exports
17.1
24.5
1,965
1,570
25.2%
Dec 76 Imports
Dec 76 Balance
73.5
8.4
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Taiwan
Jul 77 Exports
207.0
22.1
5,078
4,458
13.9%
Jul 77 Imports
92.6
16.8
4,441
3,924
13.2%
Jul 77 Balance
637
534
103
Thailand
Apr 77 Exports
34.3
22.9
1,221
963
26.8%
Mar 77 Imports
30.1
22.7
940
766
22.7%
Mar 77 Balance
- 22
- 39
17
Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
 Approved For Release 2004/07/16 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300010001-9
AGRICULTURAL PRICES MONTHLY AVERAGE CASH PRICE
1-19 OCT
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
0
1973 1974
500 World Raw New York No. 11
n
1 19 OCT
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 0 0 1973 1974 1975 1976 1-19 11
197,
COTTON
1.0 $ PER POUND
19 OCT 0.5027
12 OCT 0.5015
SEP 77 0.4963
OCT 76 0.7827
1-19 OCT 11
TEA COFFEE
2,000 London Auction Milds Washed, New York
COFFEE /TEA
400 6 PER POUND $ PER METRIC TON
350
19 SEP
85.2
12 SEP
93.5
300
AUG 77
99.2
1,500
OCT 76
76.0
1975w
1.19OCTIl
1976 1977