CUBAS FOREIGN POLICY APPARATUS AND HOW IT WORKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00457A000400010001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
RECORD COPY
i,,at rrR to PPC/R F?f3
Paragraphs classlfled by:
Cuba's Foreign Policy Apparatus
and How It Works
Secret
RP 77-10164
July 1977
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Cuba's Foreign Policy Apparatus
and How It Works
Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
July 1977
Key Judgments
Cuba's foreign policy is primarily in the hands of Fidel Castro, the
members of the party's Political Bureau and Secretariat, and the officials of
the party Central Committee's departments. The Foreign Ministry plays only
a minor role, if any, in deciding policy options and is primarily an
administrative body. The Cuban foreign minister is a legitimate spokesman
for the Cuban government, but his duty is to support policy decisions rather
than make them.
Some of the key considerations in Cuban foreign policy formulation
? Castro's personal prestige in the international arena.
? His perception of Cuba's third world leadership responsibilities.
? The Castro regime's reputation as a truly revolutionary and
anti-imperialist administration.
? Havana's cooperative relationship with Moscow and . adversary
relationship with the US.
? Cuba's economic well-being.
? Domestic reaction in Cuba.
Castro's pre-eminence in the process determining Cuba's foreign policy
is not likely to change in the near future, if his good health continues. His
power base is secure and will probably remain so for years. Thus, Cuban
foreign policy will continue to reflect many of the characteristics of his
personality-daring, aggressiveness, and commitment to change.
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It will also continue to display some of the weaknesses that have
plagued it since 1959. While Castro is less prone to foolish gambles than in
earlier years, his deep commitment to "proletarian internationalism" is likely
from time to time to continue to cause him grief. He is beginning to find
Angola a quagmire, for example, and may find himself hard pressed to
choose between assuaging Cuban public opinion and compromising his
revolutionary principles.
In Soviet-related matters, Castro has little maneuverability, and the
trend will be toward greater Soviet influence. At the same time, his deeply
ingrained suspicion of the US and his need for a scapegoat to justify
continued domestic austerity will rule out any dramatic shift in his
fundamental attitude toward Washington despite the successes that may be
scored in improved relations with the US. Hostility toward the US is likely
to remain a basic element of Cuban foreign policy at least until Castro passes
from the scene.
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Page
Key Judgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Foreign Policy and the Cuban Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Party Political Bureau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Party Secretariat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Party Central Committee Departments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Council of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Other Agencies and Offices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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Cuba's Foreign Policy Apparatus
and How It Works
Foreign Policy and the Cuban Leadership
Cuban foreign policy has always been largely
in the purview of Fidel Castro. He still makes all
major policy decisions and probably many of
the minor ones as well. He has matured con-
siderably since 1959 and appears less prone to
the foreign policy gambles and quick decisions
that marked the early days of his administra-
tion. In the late 1960s, faced with the growing
complexity of Cuba's foreign ties and the
realization that his record was not that impres-
sive, he began withdrawing from his practice of
depending almost entirely on his political in-
stincts and began to give more attention to
advice from other members of the Cuban
leadership as well as from experienced foreign
leaders and officials.
Moreover, in recent years he has become
much less involved in the details of domestic
political and economic affairs, leaving him more
time for foreign affairs and trips such as his
six-week sojourn in March and April 1977. In
the first 13 years of his rule, for example, he
traveled abroad only five times, visiting seven
countries-the USSR twice. Since November
1971, on the other hand, he has taken six trips
and visited 24 countries-the USSR and Algeria
four times each, Guinea three times, and four
other countries twice each. This has given him
greater exposure to foreign influences and has
helped broaden his understanding of other areas
of the world and the role that his country can
play in the international community.
Travel to Cuba by foreign leaders has also
increased in recent years, strengthening Castro's
personal contacts and further whetting his
appetite for an international role. As time goes
on, his predilection for the limelight is likely to
cause him to devote even more time to interna-
tional politics than to the less prestigious
domestic scene, where tough economic prob-
lems remain unsolved. The culmination of his
current efforts to achieve center stage will occur
in 1979 when the next nonaligned summit
meets in Havana. Until then, domestic matters
will probably be left primarily to others in the
leadership.
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Foreign Travel by Fidel Castro
Since January 1959
April 16- May 8, 1959 US and Canada
Uruguay, Brazil,
and Argentina
November 10 - Chile
December 4, 1971
Algeria
Bulgaria
Romania
Hungary
Poland
East Germany
Czechoslovakia
USSR
December 19-24,1972 Morocco
USSR
April 16-28
April 28 - May 8
Visit to the United
Nations
Brief stop in Peru
and Ecuador on
December 4
May 3-8. Few hours
in Sierra Leone
on May B
May 8-17
May 17-26
May 26-30
May 30-June 6
June 6-13
June 13-21
June 21-26
June 26 - July 5
December 19
December 20-24
Trinidad-Tobago
Guinea
Algeria
Iraq
India
North and South
Vietnam
Czechoslovakia
February 22 - USSR
March 16, 1976
Yugoslavia
Bulgaria
Algeria
Guinea
March 1 - April 8, 1977 Algeria
Libya
South Yemen
Somalia
Ethiopia
South Yemen
Tanzania
Mozambique
Angola
Algeria
East Germany
USSR
September 3
September 4
September 5-9 (non-
aligned conference)
September 10-11
September 11-12
September 12-17
March 6-8
March 8-12
March 12-14
March 14-16
March 1
March 1-10
March 10-12
March 12-14
March 14-16
March 16-17
March 17-21
March 21-23
March 23-31
March 31 - April 2
April 2-4
April 4-8
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... Libyan President Qadhafi
in March.
Castro's interest in the third world is not, of
course, solely ego-related. He sees an alliance of
the "have nots" as the most effective way of
gaining concessions from the "haves," and he
thus places great stress on expanding Cuba's
formal ties throughout the world. Caught in a
superpower environment, he pursues alignment
with a host of small, "nonaligned" countries as
a means of achieving leverage with the US and
the USSR. Aware of the weaknesses and rival-
ries that tend to divide the "have not" nations
and dilute the impact of their joint efforts, he
strives to provide the vibrant leadership that the
nonaligned movement requires to be effective.
He is aware, however, that his credibility is
often undercut by other leaders' perceptions of
him as a Soviet pawn; yet his domestic eco-
nomic situation and his desire to retain a
counterbalance to the US require him to main-
tain strong ties to the USSR in spite of the
price. The frustration this "puppet" role has
brought has pushed Castro toward a bipolar
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...Tanzanian President
Nyerere in March.
concept of international politics in which na-
tions are assigned to only two camps, socialist
and imperialist; or more simply stated, those
"who are with us and those who are against us."
He probably overestimates his ability to maneu-
ver outside the Soviet orbit and seems to have
less and less trouble rationalizing his subordina-
tion of Cuban foreign policy to that-of Moscow.
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Castro thus is a very unlikely candidate for the
role of unifier of the nonaligned movement and
will probably continue to find himself and Cuba
in the ranks of the movement's radicals.
Rating just as high as prestige in Castro's list
of personal priorities is his reputation as a
revolutionary. He finds distasteful any policy
decision that leaves him vulnerable to criticism
from the left. When attacked bitterly by a few
Latin American guerrilla chieftains for having
reduced or withdrawn Cuban assistance in the
late 1960s, for example, he reacted with a
stinging denunciation of "pseudo-leftists" who
had the opportunity to bring about revolution-
ary change but muffed the chance. He ignored
the fact that these critics had undertaken, often
at great personal sacrifice, to carry out revolu-
tion using the very blueprint he had urged upon
them. His acute sensitivity in this area makes it
difficult for him to embark on the path of
rapprochement with the "imperialist" US; as
prospects for normal relations improve, he
considers himself under increasing pressure to
convince the world's revolutionaries that he ha,
not sold them out. He. would rather have his
Cubans tighten their belts another notch than
give the appearance of having seriously com-
promised his revolutionary principles for nar-
row national interests.
Belt-tightening has its limits. The political
reality in Cuba, however, is such that Castro, if
he chose to do so, could virtually ignore
popular sentiment and rule by large-scale repres-
sion. There is no organized opposition to
challenge him or provide a nucleus around
which dissidents could form to offer resistance;
in any event, the security forces are strong
enough to control anything short of widespread
popular disturbances.
Nevertheless, Castro prefers to rule through
genuine popular support rather than repression
and pays close attention to mass sentiment both
through personal contact on trips throughout
the country and through the party's public
opinion polling apparatus. He was staggered, for
example, upon finding in 1970 that public
confidence in him had dropped to an all time
low.
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Out of respect for public opinion, he has for
more than a year and a half withheld from the
Cuban people the full story of the Cuban
intervention in Angola. Alerted by the negative
response of many of the first reservists called
upon to volunteer for combat, he has mini-
mized the extent of the Cuban involvement-
even to the point of giving the Popular Move-
ment credit for military victories earned by
Cuban units-and particularly Cuban casualties. Were he to speak frankly to the Cuban people,
revealing the cost in lives and money as well as
the projected cost over the coming years,
popular reaction might well cause him to alter
his policy on Angola.
He has already given clear signs that he
realizes there are limits to popular support of
his African policy. In an address to a mass
gathering in Havana last summer, he implied
that a maximum of 3,000 Cuban technicians
might be required for service in Angola, a figure
far short of the number he was actually
planning to send. Apparently in deference to
popular fears, he denied that Cuba was de-
priving itself by its foreign assistance programs,
saying, "Let no one think that a people loses
something when it helps another." Three
months later, in another public address, he
minimized Cuban assistance to Sao Tome and
Principe,
On the other hand, popular opinion in Cuba
is not always a restraining force. The spontane-
ous reaction of the Cuban masses after the
bombing of a Cuban airliner in Barbados last
October is a case in point. So widespread was
the public's feeling of revulsion and grief that
Castro was impelled to react harshly toward the
US at a time when he would have preferred to
adopt a more moderate stance. As a sop to the
public outrage, he announced the cancellation
of the bilateral understanding on hijacking. At
the same time, however, he quietly postponed
indefinitely his plans for an extended television
spectacular allegedly revealing US intelligence
operations against his regime. He belatedly
recognized that the bombing incident, in which
57 Cubans died, had inflamed public opinion to
the point where official agitation would have
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resulted in a reaction guaranteed to upset his
timetable for improving relations with Washing-
ton.
In recognition of its importance, he takes
great pains to manipulate both Cuban and
world public opinion. To circulate views that he
wants to appear in the world-but not the
Cuban press-he holds impromptu press confer-
ences with foreign correspondents covering
local events or grants private interviews to
selected journalists or visiting political figures
who can be trusted to "tell all" upon returning
home. The news he wants in the Cuban press is
fed into the tightly controlled propaganda
apparatus, in which he takes considerable per-
sonal interest. After delivering a major address,
for example, he visits the office of the party
daily and personally edits his speech, often even
supervising the layout of the newspaper's cover-
age of the event. He nevertheless appears to be
aware that even his remarkable ability to mold
public opinion has its limits.
Castro is very much an activist. Rather than
waiting for developments to occur, he prefers to
serve as a catalyst, making moves that precipi-
tate reactions. He is a strong proponent of
continuing revolution and in fact sees change as
a means of maintaining the initiative in interna-
tional affairs and increasing his foreign policy
options. He sees the status quo as a negative
factor to be overcome, and his activism has
resulted in his promotion of change both at
home and abroad.
In constructing the Cuban leadership, he has
deliberately surrounded himself largely with
loyal comrades-in-arms from his guerrilla days
who think much as he does and in some cases
are even stronger proponents of continuing
revolution than he is. He has thus given a
significant leadership role to an element that
sees virtue in boldness and interprets caution as
indecision and weakness. This element tends to
view events and political options in simplistic
terms, sometimes failing to appreciate fully the
complexities and subtleties of particular politi-
cal situations or courses of action. It is inclined
toward extremes, seeing only black and white
where different shadings exist. The strongest
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characteristic of this group, however, is loyalty
to Fidel, and it backs him fully once he makes a
decision. The group is built around-but. not
restricted to-Raul "Castro, the military estab-
lishment, and the security forces of the Interior
Ministry.
In contrast, Castro has also brought into the
leadership a more sophisticated faction that i
less inclined toward radical action and more
closely in tune with thinking in Moscow. This
faction is more experienced in politics than the
loyalist guerrilla faction, has its origins mainly
in the pre-Castro Communist party, and owe
its present influence in large part to Castro'
need for Soviet support. This faction's member
are generally a generation older than their
guerrilla counterparts, some having survived in
Cuban politics since the 1930s. Although this
"old Communist" faction is small-and growing
smaller as its members die off-it has dispropor-
tionate power because of its invaluable service
as a bridge between Moscow and Havana and its
skills in basic political organization in Cuba. Its
main spokesmen are party Political Bureau
members Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Blas
Roca.
The "old Communist" faction was badly
compromised in March 1962 when some of its
members attempted to wrest power from Castro
by replacing his loyalists in the nascent, post-
revolution party structure with long-time Com-
munist militants. Castro reacted quickly and
forcefully, and the old Communists were
obliged to keep a low profile until the end of
the decade when the guerrilla elite was faced
with the realization that its policies had brought
the country to the brink of political and
economic disaster. Since 1970, the old Com-
munists have been increasing their influence
gradually, generally serving as a restraining
factor on the headstrong loyalist guerrillas and
promoting broad institutionalization by which
they hope to consolidate their gains.
Gradually gaining influence in the leadership
is a third, less well-defined faction made up
mainly of technocrats and economists whose
main impact on foreign policy stems from their
need for foreign goods and technology that can
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spell success or failure in their respective gov-
ernmental responsibilities. Whereas the loyalist
guerrilla faction, for example, views improved
ties with the US as threatening Cuba's "ideolog-
ical purity," the technocrats stress the benefits
of US trade and technology in helping to
achieve production goals. In this they are
aligned with the "old Communists" who want
to reduce the economic burden on the USSR.
While the technocrats and economists have no
recognized spokesmen and rank far behind the
loyalist guerrillas and the "old Communists" in
the hierarchy, their influence is bound to
increase as Cuba's economic problems multiply,
the government becomes more institutionalized,
and Moscow's patience with Cuban waste and
mismanagement wears thin.
Of the three main groups, only the first two
are strong enough to challenge each other on
major issues. The term factions is perhaps a
misnomer because it suggests contentiousness
where none-at least on the surface-is now
present. The two currently do not seem to have
an adversary relationship. Moreover, the "old
Communists" are keenly aware of the superi-
ority of the loyalist guerrillas, and they conduct
their affairs accordingly. While little is known
of their interaction, there is apparently enough
give and take to permit the ironing out of
differences without occasioning the destructive
internecine strife that marked disagreements in
the early and mid-1960s. The extremist ele-
ments of both factions have been removed over
the years, and this has left a more closely knit,
smooth-working leadership. When opposing
views are irreconcilable, Fidel Castro is the final
arbiter, and both factions acknowledge his
unquestioned supremacy in the decisionmaking
process.
Party Political Bureau
The party's Political Bureau is the highest
policymaking body in Cuba-the party having
precedence over the government. Although this
polieymaking function theoretically rests with
the Central Committee of the party, in practice
it is the Political Bureau that decides-and Fidel
Castro dominates the Political Bureau. Presum-
's-sf~c, tom,.
The Csibap Communist Party Political Bureau
Fidel Castro first secretary
taut Castro, second secretary
.luau Almeidalex-guerrilla):
Present duties unspecified
Ranvro Valdes (ex-guerrilla):
upervises all construction activity
ui erino arcia _(ex-guerrilfa): -
Supervises fransporiafion and' communications
Armando Hart : (ex-underground};_
Minister of Culture
Pedro Miret_(ex-guerrilla):
= Party Secretariat official
Jose Ramon. Machado Ventura (ex-guerrilla)
Present duties unspecified
Osvaldo Dorticos (ex-underground'):
Present duties unspecified
gergio del Valle (ex-guerilla):
r Minister of Interior
Car osiafael 1odriguez ("old'Communist")' ....
ipen0ses foreign relations and economic matters
alas l3sca"o!d Communist"):
-Supervises legal matters; national assembly president
Arnaldo Milian ("old Communist"):
Present cfs.rtjps unspecified
'Linked tenuously to Castro's rebels as well as the "old Commu-
rtlsts," Dorticos' primary loyalty lies with Castro.
ably because it comprises the leadership of the
Central Committee, its decisions apparently are
considered as having the blessing of the entire
committee membership. Thus, much of the
Central Committee is left out of the policy,
making process on a regular basis.
IF, on the other hand, the circumstances of a
particular situation indicate to Castro that the
appearance of a strong, unified leadership is
required, a special session of the Central Com-
mittee may be called to reinforce his position.
The Central Committee was convened in Janu-
ary 1968, for example, to purge right-wing
elements of the "old Communist" faction-a
purge undertaken to stress Castro's displeasure
with the political and economic pressure Mos-
cow was exerting on him. Fidel and Raul Castro
were the main actors in the scenario, but the
punitive action itself was carried out under the
Central Committee's aegis. Again in July 1972,
upon Castro's return from a trip to Eastern
Europe and the USSR, the Central Committee
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was convened to issue a resolution underscoring
the Cuban leadership's support for Castro's
dissatisfaction with certain elements of Soviet
foreign policy. Castro looked upon "detente" as
selling out to the US, and he believed Moscow
was not giving enough support to North Viet-
nam. The most recent meeting of the Central
Committee occurred on June 10 to approve a
set of international and domestic policy actions
set forth by Castro. In effect, the Central
Committee remains little more than a rubber
stamp for decisions already made by Castro and
the Political Bureau.
In the 13-man Political Bureau itself, only
Fidel, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and Raul Castro
are involved in foreign policy decisions on a
regular basis. Others become involved appar-
ently when their specific duties so require or
when special circumstances exist. Juan Almeida,
for example, is not normally concerned with
foreign affairs, but was dispatched on visits to
Jamaica, Guyana, Angola, and Congo because
he is Cuba's highest ranking black and the
occasions of his visits called for emphasis of
Cuba's "negritude." Guillermo Garcia, on the
other hand, has gone abroad for meetings
dealing with his prime responsibilities: trans-
portation and communications. Both undoubt-
edly report fully to Fidel upon their return, and
thus have some impact on his decisions. They
are not known, however, to be prime actors in
the foreign policymaking process.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, on the other hand,
is a key factor in foreign policy decisions and
has great influence on Fidel. Rodriguez is highly
intelligent and has considerable experience i
bilateral negotiations as well as in international
forums. Held back in the first decade o
Castro's rule because of the "old Communist"
guerrilla elite conflict, he has emerged in the
past seven years as the most influential of the
surviving "old Communists," achieving a seat on
the Political Bureau during the party's first
congress in December 1975. He is the regime's
main go-between in relations with Moscow and
since 1972 has served as overseer de jure of
Cuba's foreign relations. He is the main archi-
tect of the campaign since the late 1960s to
bring Cuban foreign policy more into line with
that of Moscow.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez Raul Castro
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Rodriguez has had some success in bringing
the Cuban foreign policy apparatus under his
personal control. Late last year he succeeded in
replacing maverick Foreign Minister Raul Roa
with Isidoro Malmierca, an "old Communist"
militant. Roa, a feisty intellectual from the
1930s who did not fit into either the guerrilla
or "old Communist" molds, proved too in-
dependent for Rodriguez, whereas Malmierca
can be expected to work easily with Rodriguez
and closely reflect his views. The Foreign
Ministry, however, is concerned more with the
mechanics of foreign policy than with policy
formulation-a task left to the departments of
the Central Committee. Rodriguez appears to
have less control over the departments.
While Raul Castro for years had concerned
himself primarily with domestic matters-
creating an effective military establishment and
developing the armed forces as a source of
leadership for the government-he has in recent
times become more involved in international
matters. His Armed Forces Ministry provided
the bulk of the military personnel sent to
Angola and has been sending combat troops,
military advisers, and military construction
personnel to other countries for years. Raul has
traveled abroad on a number of occasions-
spending long visits in the USSR-and is prob-
ably the adviser Fidel trusts more than anyone
else. Although his primary responsibilities
remain in the military and security fields, his
counsel is sought by Fidel on a broad range of
foreign policy matters, particularly those in-
volving Cuba's relations with the USSR and the
US.
Raul has developed a good relationship with
the Soviets
au s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t ie oviets
is closely tied to his position as armed forces
minister; virtually all of the weapons, ammuni-
tion, and equipment used by the Cuban armed
forces come from the USSR, and all of it,
according to public statements by Fidel and
Raul, is supplied free of charge.
Raul has tried to establish close ties with
military establishments in Latin America both
by personal diplomacy and by inviting foreign
delegations to large-scale military maneuvers
held in Cuba at year's end. His success has been
less than spectacular, however, in part because
he apparently is unable to project a personal
warmth. Moreover, his military extravaganzas
often have the effect of impressing visitors to
the point of making them afraid of Cuban
military prowess. Rain's direct dogmatism con-
trasts sharply with Rodriguez' smooth, realistic
approach.
As Interior Minister, Sergio del Valle has an
important impact on foreign policy even though
domestic affairs appear to be his main focus.
His ministry is charged with foreign intelligence
collection and counterintelli ence
Del Valle, a practicing medical doctor before
joining Fidel's guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra,
was serving as one of Che Guevara's lieutenants
when the war against Batista ended. Like many
other top Cuban officials, he rose through the
ranks of the military establishment and for
several years was Raul Castro's deputy. A
charter member of the Political Bureau, he was
chosen to replace fellow Political Bureau mem-
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ber Ramiro Valdes as interior minister when
idel was searching for someone to reverse the
eterioration in conditions in the ministry-run
rison system. (Valdes remained on the Political
ureau and was put in charge of all construc-
tion activity in Cuba.) Del Valle proved to be a
welcome change from the ruthless Valdes and is
generally credited with bringing about a signifi-
cant improvement in the prisons. Trusted by
both Fidel and Raul, he appears to be one of
the more moderate members of the leadership.
Party Secretariat
The Secretariat is theoretically the house-
keeping organ of the party's Central Commit-
tee. When the present party was formed in the
fall of 1965 by the merger of Fidel's followers,
the old Communist party, and a third political
group, the Secretariat was a paper organization
because the new party itself was largely a paper
organization. It was intended to serve as organi-
zational window dressing for Fidel's dictatorial
rule and was the regime's response to critics
who complained of a lack of a political struc-
ture.
The Secretariat, peopled principally by the
same individuals who served on the Political
Bureau and headed as usual by Fidel and Raul,
actually had little to do. At that time, Fidel
approved the appointment of several old Com-
munists to the Secretariat as a sop because he
was not yet ready to admit them to the real seat
of power-the Political Bureau.
The Cuban Communist Party Secretariat
Fidel Castro, first secretary
Raul Castro, second secretary
Bias Roca ("old Communist")
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez ("old Communist")
Pedro- `Miret (ex-guerrilla)
Jorge Risquet (ex-guerrilla)
Antonio Perez Herrero (ex-guerrilla)
Raul Garcia Pelaez (ex-guerrilla)
Arnaldo Milian ("old Communist")
With the beginning of the institutionalization
process in the early 1970s, however, new life
was breathed into the Secretariat: new person-
nel were added, and members were given
substantial responsibility for specific tasks
relating to the party, government, or society.
To enable him to carry out his functions, each
Secretariat member was put in charge of one or
more Central Committee departments, which
were created to formulate policy, present policy
options to the Political Bureau, relay the
Political Bureau's decisions to the appropriate
party or government offices, and monitor the
progress of the policy as it was implemented.
Changes in the Secretariat were made at the
first party congress in 1975 in an effort to
reflect the revamping that had taken place in
the previous five years. For the first time, since
the 1962 power struggle, the "old Communists"
assumed positions of importance in the party
structure, paralleling the increased influence of
Moscow in Cuba's foreign and domestic affairs.
The Secretariat's membership was reduced to
nine, and the appointment of one of its
members, Malmierca, to head the Foreign Min-
istry temporarily reduced it to eight. The
appointment of Milian restored it to nine. Again
Fidel, Raul, and Rodriguez are the primary
figures involved in foreign affairs.
Another Secretariat member, Raul Garcia
Pelaez, is concerned with foreign policy in his
role of liaison with other Communist parties.
He served for years as Castro's ambassador in
Moscow and most likely is consulted on Cuba's
Soviet policy. He and his brother Pedro served
with Fidel during the guerrilla war; Pedro, like
his brother, is a Central Committee member.
Pedro is also chief of one of Cuba's three
armies, and a veteran of Angola.
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As the Secretariat's ideological watchdog,
Antonio Perez Herrero is also involved in
foreign policy. A close associate of Raul Castro
since the 1950s, he is responsible for ensuring
that Cuban ideological teachings do not stray
too far from those of Moscow. fie also heads
the apparatus that coordinates Cuban prop-
aganda with Soviet propaganda. He is typical of
the faction in the leadership that sees things
only in terms of extremes. During his reign as
vice minister and chief political officer of the
armed forces, he initiated a campaign of repres-
sion of Cuban intellectuals-pre-empting the
party in what was basically a political, not
military, matter.
"Old Communist" Blas Roca, who now is on
both the Secretariat and the Political Bureau,
probably offers foreign policy advice to Fidel in
support of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, but he does
not appear to be a major contributor to foreign
policy decisions. His main responsibility appears
to be in the field of law; he was the principal
drafter of the new Cuban constitution and the
architect of the electoral system adopted last
year for local, provincial, and national assem-
blies. From time to time, he also receives the
credentials of foreign diplomats as Fidel's
designee on the Council of State; he is also
president of the National Assembly.
Party Central Committee Departments
Of the numerous departments of the Central
Committee, three are involved primarily with
foreign affairs: the General Department of
Foreign Relations headed by "old Communist"
Raul Valdes Vivo; the America Department
headed by Manuel Pineiro Losada, better
known as Barba Raja (Red Beard); and the
Africa - Middle East Department headed by
Osmany Cienfuegos Gorriaran. Little is known
of the functioning of the departments or even
their subordination. Under the jurisdiction of
the Secretariat, they could be the responsibility
of Rodriguez or, more likely, they could be
under Fidel himself. Valdes Vivo would prob-
ably have no problem working under Rod-
riguez, but Cienfuegos and Pineiro, particularly
the latter, are very close to Fidel and would
probably find subordination to Rodriguez un-
bearable. Both appear to have direct access to
Fidel.
Pineiro and Cienfuegos have long been in-
volved in foreign affairs, both having been
kingpins in Cuba's subversive apparatus of the
1960s. As a vice minister, Pineiro headed the
Interior Ministry's General Directorate of Intel-
ligence (DGI), which planned, directed, and
executed the subversive operations in Africa
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and Latin America for which the Castro regime
became so well known. Cienfuegos, on the
other hand, was named head of the Asian,
African, and Latin American People's Solidarity
Organization (AALAPSO), an umbrella organi-
zation founded in Havana in January 1966 to
link leftist and Communist governments with
revolutionary movements throughout the
world.
With the failure in October 1967 of the
DGI's most spectacular operation headed by
Che Guevara in Bolivia, a gradual de-emphasis
of the "armed struggle" philosophy took place
in Havana. Pineiro, whose penchant for violent
revolution had caused serious problems between
Havana and Moscow, left the DGI, and Cien-
fuegos' AALAPSO shrank to little more than a
paper organization useful only for an occasional
propaganda release. With the restructuring of
the party in the early 1970s, however, both
reappeared heading their respective party de-
partments.
Less is known of the workings and personnel
of the Africa - Middle East Department, u it
presumably functions in much the same as ion
as the America Department. Cienfuegos travels
frequently to Africa to mee with top leaders
and has first hand knowledge of the situations
in virtually all of sub-Sahara African countries
and many of the Arab countries as well. He was
once a member of the youth wing of the
pre-Castro Communist party and thus is ostensi-
bly eligible for characterization as an old
Communist; he apparently broke party dis-
cipline to join Castro's revolutionary movement
during the guerrilla war, however, and this
would give him favorable standing among the
former guerrillas.
Whereas Pineiro is openly identified as chief
of the America Department, Cienfuegos is
invariably identified as secretary of the Council
of Ministers and of its executive committee.
This is basically a housekeeping job for the
leadership of the Council of Ministers, but it
links Cienfuegos closely to Fidel. It is common
for members of the Cuban leadership to hold
two positions, one in the party and the other in
the overnment
Where possible, department personnel
travel frequently to their areas of responsibility,
establish personal contact with key local party
and government officials, develop links with
opposition leaders, and serve as contacts when
any of these people visit Cuba. Where travel is
inopportune-such as in Chile, Nicaragua,
Guatemala, Paraguay, and Uruguay-depart-
ment personnel work with exiles and with local
opposition groups and revolutionary move-
ments. They thus are well briefed on events and
personalities in their areas of responsibility and
are well qualified to formulate policy and
explain policy options to the Political Bureau.
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Valdes Vivo is a relative newcomer to the
party hierarchy, having gained membership in
the Central Committee only in December 1975.
He, nevertheless, has had extensive experience
in foreign affairs. He traveled widely as a
journalist for the official Cuban press agency
and served under trying conditions as Cuba's
ambassador to North Vietnam, Cambodia, and
the Provisional Revolutionary Government of
South Vietnam. He was present in Luanda to
cover the trial of the foreign mercenaries in
1976 and wrote a book on the event that was
widely circulated by Havana. In a previous
book, he described his experiences in Vietnam.
An old Communist, he is probably linked
closely with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez.
Other departments of'the Central Committee
no doubt are drawn into foreign policy from
time to time but none is so involved on a
continuing basis as are the three already men-
tioned. The Military Department under Briga-
dier General Calixto Garcia, for example, prob-
ably has had such a role as Cuban military
intervention has escalated in recent years. There
is no evidence, however, that ex-guerrilla
Garcia-nor any of the remaining department
chiefs-has been a key factor in foreign policy
decisions.
Council of State
The Council of State and its subordinate
Council of Ministers become involved in the
execution rather than the formulation or deter-
mination of foreign policy. Fidel and Raul
Castro are president and first vice president,
respectively, of both, and all Political Bureau
members have seats on the Council of State.
With one exception, the lesser members of these
two governing bodies have an impact on foreign
policy decisions only to the extent that they
advise the leadership of the capability of their
respective offices to carry out tasks in support
of those decisions.
Fishing Industry Minister Anibal Velaz, for
example, advises on his ministry's ability to
cooperate with and provide technical and
material assistance to foreign countries: at times
he even conducts negotiations arranging fo
such Cuban support with foreign officials, bu
he does so under policy limitations laid dow
by the Political Bureau. Similarly, Hector Rod-
riguez Llompart as chief of the State Committee
for Economic Cooperation handles a broad
range of Cuban assistance to other countries as
well as foreign assistance to Cuba, but he is
basically an executor of policy. Even the
foreign minister, Isidoro Malmierca, is in this
category.
The one exception is Food Industry Minister
Jose Naranjo. Despite his title, Naranjo appar-
ently has little to do with the food industry.
Instead, he spends virtually all his time with
Fidel. When Castro is seen in public, Naranjo is
usually close by, and when Castro travels, either
within Cuba or abroad, Naranjo invariably goes
with him
Ile clearly is very close to i e an
may we Influence him on both domestic and
foreign policy matters. On the other hand, he
may be Castro's constant companion simply
because of his congeniality and may have no
more impact on policy than serving as a
sounding board for Castro's musings.
With the creation of the Council of State in
December 1976, the Council of Ministers was
reduced in importance. Until that time, it had
been the highest administrative and executive
body of the state. It had expanded enormously,
however, and had finally become too unwieldy
to carry out its functions efficiently. As a
temporary remedial measure, an executive
committee of the Council of Ministers was
formed in 1972 composed of Fidel, Raul, and
eight other top officials who were placed in
charge of eight broad areas of government
called sectors. The functions of the sector chiefs
are now performed by the eight vice presidents
of the Council of Ministers. No personnel
changes occurred: the same eight men merely
have new titles.
Last December, a new constitution was
adopted that subordinated this refined structure
to an indirectly elected legislature called the
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of his authority.
foreign affairs to "approving the general out-
lines of foreign policy," according to the
constitution. In the only Assembly session held
so far, this "approval" apparently consisted of
the applause that greeted Fidel's 13-hour read-
ing of the General Report. Castro clearly has no
intention of letting the Assembly pre-empt any
People's Assembly is limited in the field of
"supreme organ of state power," the National
National People's Assembly. As the new
society and of the state."
Other Agencies and Offices
Virtually any government entity can be-and
is-used for the conduct of Cuban foreign
policy. Cubana Airlines and Mambisas Shipping
Lines, for example, are used for Cuba's military
airlift and sealift to Angola in sup ort of
President Neto's Popular Movement.
The Council of State functions in the Assem-
bly's stead when the Assembly is not in session.
The Council, therefore, also has the power to
"approve the general outline of foreign
policy"-a meaningless authority since the en-
tire Political Bureau heads the Council-and to
ratify or reject treaties and grant or refuse
recognition to foreign diplomats. As for the
Council of Ministers, it is empowered by the
constitution only to "conduct"-not formulate
or determine-foreign policy. These latter two
duties are left to the party, which is recognized
in Article 5 as "the highest leading force of the
The Ministries of Public Health, n erior,
Education, Construction, Armed Forces, Sugar
Industry, Fishing Industry, and Foreign Trade
are all used to channel aid to foreign countries
for political purposes. The first advances in
Cuban influence in Equatorial uinea, for
example, were made through the Cuban For-
estry Institute, while the National Poultry
Enterprise helped to consolidate Havana's rela-
tions with South Yemen.
Great investments are made in the field o
sports, first to select and develop the country'
most outstanding athletes, and second to us
these athletes' victories in international com
petition as proof of the superiority of th
Cuban political system and way of life. Eve
the Cuban mass organizations promote foreign
policy goals. Several supply friendly govern-
ments with experienced organizers to help them
develop a broad base of popular support
through the creation of their own mass organi
zations.
The Federation of Cuban Women has estab-
lished ties with numerous women's groups in
Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa to
foster strongly politicized national women's
federations. The National Association of Small
Farm Owners has done the same with the
peasantry of several countries, mainly in Latin
America. The Young Communist League, the
party's youth arm, appears to be particularly
active in African countries helping to organize
and politicize students and youth in general.
Officials of the Committees for the Defense of
the Revolution, most likely in conjunction with
the Armed. Forces and Interior Ministries, are
helping to form and train militias in several
African countries.
Various Cuban educational institutions are
also deeply involved in foreign policy. Students
from a wide range of countries, from Vietnam
to Congo, have been granted admission to the
University of Havana, for example, for medical
training and other courses, and many Cuban
technical schools such as the Andres Gonzalez
Lines Advanced Fishing School have opened
their doors for would-be technicians from
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abroad. The various schools of the armed
forces, presumably including the Maximo
Gomez War College, also enroll foreign students
and trainees.
Cultural institutions are not exempt from
pursuing foreign policy goals. The prestigious
Casa de las Americas literary and artistic organi-
zation in Havana headed by a member of the
Central Committee and Council of State holds
annual contests and awards coveted prizes for
several categories of literary works by Latin
American authors, poets, and playwrights. After
the party decided to focus hemispheric policy
efforts on the Caribbean. the Casa expanded its
contests to include entrants from the English-
speaking countries. Noted figures in the Cuban
cultural world, such as poet Nicolas Guillen and
prima ballerina Alicia Alonso, are sent abroad
to bolster Cuba's prestige while others, such as
Alejo Carpentier and Fayad Jamis, are assigned
to strategic Cuban embassies as cultural attaches
to promote Cuban policy in foreign artistic
communities. Even a few carefully selected
officials of various church groups in Cuba are
sent abroad.
Conclusions
In Cuba, foreign policy options are debated
by a small clique of officials at the very top of
the party structure, with final decisions left to
Fidel Castro. For years, Castro acted arbitrarily
in exercising the power of decision, but since
the late 1960s he appears to have been paying
greater heed to advice from others in the
leadership, particularly those with traditional
links to Moscow. Friction between Moscow and
Havana still exists, but it is not so intense and
its fluctuations are less pronounced. While
Havana may frequently get out ahead of Mos-
cow on foreign policy matters, the Castro
regime is much less likely now to adopt a policy
that is on a collision course with Soviet policy.
This trend toward closer collaboration with
Moscow does not negate the possibility of the
adoption of radical policies on matters that
Fidel considers of great importance to Cuba.
For example, he continues to align Cuba with
the radical element in the nonaligned movement
because a more pragmatic stance-despite it
benefits-would leave him vulnerable to accusa-
tions of having made an accommodation with
"imperialism" and having abandoned the cause
of revolutionaries around the world.
In his decisionmaking responsibilities he i
subject to pressures from two key groups in the
leadership-his former comrades-in-arms and th
pre-Castro Communists-and also from a thin
group, the technocrats, which is gainin
strength and influence as its role in the
economy expands. Although the ex-guerrilla
are by far the strongest faction, their views d
not always predominate. Castro's belated sup-
port for the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovaks
in 1968, for example, was the "old Com-
munist" faction's first major foreign polic
victory over the ex-guerrillas. Although thes
victories have increased and the trend is likely
to continue, the "old Communists" are unlikely
to develop sufficient power to threaten the
domination of Fidel Castro and his brothe
Raul.
Castro is also subject to pressure from Cubai
public opinion, and this may confront him witl
his most serious political problem since 197(
should Angola turn into Cuba's Vietnam. Vera
serious economic problems caused by a corn
bination of factors apparently are perceived by
the public-whether accurately or not is im
material-to be stemming from Cuban foreigr
assistance programs, particularly the one foi
Angola. Continued mobilizations for Angola,
persistent casualty drain, increased governmeni
mismanagement, and greater austerity measure;
seem to be inevitable and unquestionably wil
be unpopular. Castro's problems will be com?
pounded should Cuba be drawn into a sub,
stantial military involvement in some other
country such as Ethiopia.
Because of the nature of the foreign policy
apparatus Castro has forged, Cuba is committee
to a policy that is based more on idealism thar
realism. Its lack of flexibility bodes ill for Cubs
as well as for the countries that have to deal
with Cuba.
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The author of this paper is
Latin America Division, Office of Regional
and Political Analysis. Comments and queries
should be directed to Mr.
I I
SECRET 15
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Secret
Secret
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i. -/l~6 f
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert Pastor
NSC Staff Chief for Latin America
I believe you will find the attached
memorandum informative and useful. It is not
just a primer on the Cuban foreign policy
making apparatus, but contains a number of
analytical judgments about how and why the
Cubans view the world the way they do. It
also contains political insights into the
personalities of the key officials. If you
have time, I would appreciate receiving any
comments you might have to offer, particularly
if you perceive any errors in judgment.
Chief, Latin America Division
Office of Regional & Political
Analysis
5-075 101 USE PREVIOUS
p
have tame , WW
comments you might have to offer, particularly
n
Date 15 July 1977
i believe you will find the attached
memorandum informative and useful. It is not
just a primer on the Cuban foreign policy
making apparatus, but contains a number of
analytical judgments about how and why the
Cubans view the world the way they do. It
also contains political insights into the
personalities of the key officials. if you
preciate receiving any
i uld a
.
if you perceive any errors in 7u-Pe
1 -O ' Date 15 Tlsly 1 Q77
Chief, Latin America Division
office of Regional & political
is
E!!!!
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard Arellano
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs
I believe you will find the attached
memorandum informative and useful. It is not
just a primer on the Cuban foreign policy
making apparatus, but contains a number of
analytical judgments about how and why the
Cubans view the world the way they do. It
also contains political insights into the
personalities of the key officials. If you-
have time, I would appreciate receiving any
comments you might have to offer, particularly
if you perceive any errors in judgment.
Chief, Latin America Diva. s ion
Office of Regional & Political
Analysis
rt-3
5-75 101 EDITIONS PREVIOUS
Date 15 July 19 7 7
MEMORANDUM FOR: Culver Glysteen
Chief/CCO/ARA
I believe you will find the attached
memorandum informative and useful. It is not
just a primer on the Cuban foreign policy
making apparatus, but contains a number of
analytical judgments about how and why the
Cubans view the world the way they do. It
also contains political insights into the
personalities of the key officials. If you
have time, I would appreciate receiving any
comments you might have to offer, particularly
if you perceive any errors in judgment.
Chief, Latin America Division
Office of Regional & Political
Analysis
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03 ~ Date 15 July 1977
8 25X1
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Richard E. Cavazos
C/ISA/LA
I believe you will find the attached
memorandum informative and useful. It is not
just a primer on the Cuban foreign policy
making apparatus, but contains a number of
analytical judgments about how and why the
Cubans view the world the way they do. It
also contains political insights into the
personalities of the key officials. If you
have time, I would appreciate receiving any
comments you might have to offer, particularly
if you perceive any errors in iudamPnt_
25X1
ze Latin America Division
Office of Regional & Political
Analysis
F5_O7RM ?01 EDITIONS PREVIOUS
Date 15 _July 1977
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158' 1d0 l7Se Pa'evloUe i3d3tfaxzet
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