THE POLICY VIEWS OF NIKOLAY PODGORNY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00457A000400020001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

.P
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79600457A000400020001-7
25X1
25X1A
The Policy Views of Nikolay Podgorny
Top Secret
RP 77-10165CX
I 25X1
June 1977
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000400020001-725
Copy
25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79600457A000400020001-7
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79600457A000400020001-7
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79600457A000400020001-7
The Policy Views of Nikolay Podgorny
Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
June 1977
25X1
OVERVIEW
The abrupt, unceremonious removal of Nikolay Podgomy from the
Politburo indicates a serious political split within the leadership.
While concern for his institutional position apparently precipitated
Podgomy's actions, his ouster may eventually affect the political consensus
within the Soviet leadership on a number of other questions. Most of
Podgorny's policy views seem to parallel those of Politburo member and
Central Committee secretary Mikhail Suslov, although the latter has, on
occasion, exhibited more flexibility than Podgorny. Podgomy is politically
both doctrinaire and conservative. He is less pragmatic, flexible, or
innovative than either Brezhnev or Kosygin. He has, in particular, been less
enthusiastic than Brezhnev about the developing relationship with the US
and more skeptical about its benefits to the USSR.
11-1is removal, tneretore, aoes subtract irom tne policy equatroTra-
distinctive viewpoint on a number of political issues.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79600457A000400020001-7
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79600457A000400020001-7
The Policy Views of Nikolay Podgorny
Podgorny's Foreign Policy Views
As a consequence of his position, Podgorny
had an active role in the conduct of Soviet
foreign policy. He traveled to various countries
in the Middle East and other parts of the
underdeveloped world. Most recently, he made
a highly publicized trip to Africa, an area of
increasing importance to Soviet foreign policy.
In addition, he frequently met with visiting
foreign leaders in Moscow. Whil
,hhe certainly
did not Brezhnev as foreign policy
spokesman, both his institutional role and his
mem s ers ip on t e S e ense Council
provided him with opportunities to articulate
his views on significant foreign policy questions.
Soviet-US Relations
Podgorny over the last decade was consis-
tently more suspicious of the West than some of
his senior colleagues. On several occasions he
publicly complained at length about past West-
ern treatment of the USSR, noting Western
rejection of the Soviet Union's peace initiatives
and Western efforts to cordon, contain, and
suppress the Soviet Union. Even as late as 1974,
Podgorny coupled "imperialist" efforts to de-
feat socialism during World War II with at-
tempts by the West to contain the Soviet Union
during the cold war.
Podgorny's questioning of Western motives
carried over to his attitude toward the US.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Podgorny did generally support detente. At
various times he used such phrases as "making
detente irreversible," "detente has established
deep roots," "supplement political detente with
military detente," "strengthening of peace and
cooperation is the only wise policy," to indicate
his support. Podgorny has nevertheless been
among the Politburo's least enthusiastic propo-
nents of detente. He often lagged behind his
colleagues in advancing his support, and was
notably less optimistic that further obstacles
could be overcome. He went out of his way to
stress that cooperation with capitalist countries
would not be established all at once or on all
questions. He also warned, long before other
Politburo members began to do so this year,
that some in the West sought to use detente to
gain unilateral military advantages. Further-
more, he criticized some of his colleagues, in
veiled terms, for incorrectly assessing the nature
and strength of the opposition to detente. Thus
in December 1974, less than one month after
Vladivostok, he declared that "it would be
intolerably nearsighted to fail to take full
account of the activity of certain circles to
undermine the ?understandings reached and to
wish to force along the arms race and return to
the tactics of supercharging tension."
In light of Podgorny's skeptical view of
detente and US motives, his emphasis on
continued efforts to "strengthen the defensive
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79600457A000400020001-7
25X1
25X1
ved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79600457A000400020001-7
t o t e mo erland" and to "increase the
ombat ability of our armed forces" is not
surprising. While Brezhnev and KosygM have
expressed concern about a military buildup in
the West, neither has recently linked this to an
increase in Soviet strength; Brezhnev and at
times Defense Minister Ustinov have even as-
serted that the Soviet armed forces have all that
is necessary, a view more moderate than Pod-
gorny's position.
25X1
Podgorny's dismissal, therefore, eliminates
one of the leadership's more prominent skeptics
regarding the appropriate limits of detente. It is
not clear, however, whether his removal will
give Brezhnev additional room for maneuver on
the Soviet relationship with the United States.
Sino-Soviet Relations
While differences within the Soviet leadership
over the Chinese question are difficult to
discern, Podgorny's views are certainly hardline.
Shortly after the border incidents in March
1969, he warned the Chinese that any attempt
to violate the territorial integrity of the USSR
or Mongolia would be given a "shattering
rebuff." A year later he became the first civilian
leader to echo Grechko's call for a defense
buildup in the east as well as the west. He
attacked Mao by name, accused the Chinese
leadership of imposing a barracks-style dictator-
ship on the Chinese people, asserted that the
Maoists are working in concert with imperialist
circles, and expressed public concern over Chi-
na's nuclear missile potential. Even so, in the
context of Soviet leadership opinion about
China over the last 15 years, Podgorny's per-
spective was not extreme. It is doubtful that his
departure will have any impact on soviet
25X1 thinking on policy toward the Chinese.
Soviet Policy in the Middle East
Podgorny was in the forefront in articulating
Soviet policy on the Middle East. His views for
the most part closely paralleled those of other
Soviet leaders. In particular he supported the
military buildup of the Egyptian and Syrian
armed forces. He also apparently favored the
Soviet Union's deepening political involvement
anrm. itaryce in tgypt. It was Podgomy
who succeeded in convincing Sadat to sign the
USSR-Egypt Treaty of Friendship.
Nevertheless, certain of Podgorny's actions
and statements suggest that his views on Soviet
policy toward the area did not coincide exactly
with those of his senior colleagues. Sadat has
credibly alleged, for example, that in 197.1
Podgorny promised the Egyptians certain types
of military equipment that the Soviet leadership
subsequently was unwilling to supply.
his removal may have eased the way for
adoption of a more flexible position when and
if Brezhnev deems it appropriate.
Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe
The invasion of Czechoslovakia was an acid
test of the attitudes of Soviet leaders toward
Eastern Europe. By all accounts, the Soviet
leaders were divided; some favored the use of
force to suppress the Czechoslovak experiments
while others, for a variety of reasons, opposedl
it. Podgomy, I
SU
o ted ? ression ot Czech-
oslovakia. Its harsh public remarks on y one
mo1-11Tore the invasion contrasted sharply
with the restrained treatment accorded this
subject by Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Suslov.
Podgorny charged that "rightwing, antisocialist
forces" were using the reform measures "to
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79600457A000400020001-7
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79600457A00040
discredit the Czechoslovak Communist Party, to
deprive it of its leading role...." He noted that
representatives of Warsaw Pact countries had
declared "that they would never agree to the
historic gains of socialism being possibly endan-
gered or to imperialism's making a breach in the
socialist system?be it by peaceful or nonpeace-
ful means, be it from within or without."
Finally, adding a message of support to pro-
Soviet elements within the Czechoslovak leader-
ship, he noted, "Our Czechoslovak friends do
not have to doubt that the Communist and all
Soviet people will, by implementing their inter-
national du render them every assistance and
25X1 support....'
25X1
25X1
In general, however, Po gorny a. op e. a
doctrinaire attitude toward reformist develop-
ments in both Eastern and Western EurouA
tin
an article in Kommumst in November 19 /6,she
observed that the various prescriptions for "im-
proving socialism" would create a system in
which "the working class and the Communist
Party would play no leading role, where there
would be no democratic centralism or proletarian
internationalism...." Such a system, according to
Podgorny, is one in which "socialism, deprived of
25X1 its basic principles, stops being socialism."
Podgorny, of course, was not the only Soviet
eader with an ideologically conservative view-
oint of developments in Eastern Europe and
elations with West European Communist par-
ies. In fact, Moscow currently appears to be
dopting ea more conservative stance in both
re a7.-Th
25X1
)020001-7
? turas has significantly affected the leadership
consensus on these questions in the short run.
Whether" his removal will have any long-range
impact is questionable.
Podgorny's Views on Domestic Policy
Much of the leadership debate on domestic
issues during the Brezhnev era is still extremely
murky. With the exception of the Shelest affair
in 1972, serious leadership disagreement over
internal policy has rarely become public. But
the following five issues appear to be the major
political questions on which the leadership has
experienced some division: economic reorgani-
zation, center-periphery relations, economic pri-
orities, socialist legality and social control, and
the drafting of a new constitution.
Economic Reorganization
The Brezhnev regime has made several at-
tempts to deal with the problems of a declining
rate of economic growth, poor quality control,
ineffective economic planning, and unaccept-
able levels of labor productivity. Podgorny
appears to have supported the status quo during
the leadership debates about the best organiza-
tional and managerial solutions to these prob-
lems. When some thought was apparently being
given to far-reaching reorganization of the
branch system, he defended the existing sector-
ial principle of industrial organization. He also
was less enthusiastic than Brezhnev, Romanov,
and others about the creation of production
associations.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Podgorny's views on these questions have
puzzled analysts. Kpsygin would seem to have
beene.a more likely pmutnent ot such views
since these reorganizations would directly affect
his institutional position. Conceivably, Pod-
gorny resisted adopting these organizational
chanes because he believed they mightexp- and
the power of the party apparatus to intervene in
economic maim- ?? - ? .?? - ? ? an cept-
able increase in Brezhnev's influence_in one-of
the_ 1.2.119( areas he has not dominated in
recent years.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79600457A000400020001-7
3
25X1
15X1
a5X1
IApproved or Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79600457A000400020001-7
Economic Priorities
woods. This
the 1960s, Podgorny had advocated
e allocation of more resources for consumer
oods. This is one of the few aspects of
conomic policy where he assumed a forward,
ctivist position. At times he even linked
'ndustrial and agricultural development to reali-
zation of this objective.
25X1 During the last eight years, however, he
began to qualify his pro-consumer attitude. In
1971, for example, Podgorny asserted that "it is
not a simple matter to guarantee high rates and
roportional development of all sections of the
ational economy." He went on to say that
ndustrial production, particularly heavy indus-
ry, must be given a leading role in economic
ask of the new plan, Kosygin asserted, was
xpansion. During this same period, Kosygin
as arguing for different priorities. The main
'ensuring...adherence to all basic proportions in
the development of branches of the national
economy...(and) ensuring that the balance of all
its parts is maintained...." He added, in obvious
criticism of the position that consumer goods
production must be sacrificed, that "we have
the capability of producing an additional great
quantity of assorted goods for the population."
25X1
In contrast to Brezhnev and Kosygin, Pod-
gorny placed the responsibility for raising the
standard of living squarely on the backs of the
Soviet worker. The three men agreed that
further increases in consumer production de-
end on expansion of national income, and
ven that increases in labor productivity are
quired to accomplish this objective. But they
isagree sharply about the method for doing so.
Brezhnev and Kosygin find the solution
rirnarily in organizational and managerial re-
orm, improved utilization of productive re-
ources, adoption of a new management system,
stablishment of production associations, and
cceleration of scientific and technological prog-
ess. Podgorny, on the other hand, found the
emedy in greater labor discipline. He noted
hat "all substantial losses, defects in produc-
tion, and failure to fulfill plans are connected
4
with violation of labor discipline." There is only
one way to increase national wealth and the
well-being of the Soviet people he argued: "It is
work, conscientious, selfless, and highly produc-
tive work."
Center-Periphery Relations
Podgorny's attitude toward nationality pol-
icy has been very complex. On the one hand, he.
is a Ukrainian with well-established ties to the_
renithlir
pin the other hand, he at
tunes oosequiousty praised the contributions of
the "Great Russian people" to Soviet develop-
ment. On one occasion he said that other Soviet
peoples "justly give them (the Russians) first
place among the builders of Communism." He
added that it was no accident that "abroad all
citizens of our multinational country are fre-
quently described as Russians."
His ambivalence was also reflected in remarks
more directly concerned with policy. For the
most part, Podgorny adopted the mild formula-
tion "comprehensive, flourishing, and gradual
rapprochement" to describe the prevailing state
of relations between nationalities, while Brezh-
nev has been less inclined to qualify the process
of "drawing together" and has been more
critical of attempts to "artificially consolidate
national distinctiveness." Brezhnev has also
argued that the national problem has been
settled "completely, finally, and for good," a
formulation never endorsed by Podgorny.
Although Podgorny has used moderate "buzz
words" to signal some restraint on nationality
policy, he did, unlike former Ukrainian First
Secretary Shelest, support an economic devel
opment program based on national needs rather
than republican interests. He was one of the
first national leaders to assert that the economic
inequality of the former feudal outposts of the
Tsarist empire had been eliminated. Spelling out
the corollary that excessive emphasis on local
economic needs could therefore no longer be
justified, he argued that economic development
questions must be resolved from the viewpoint
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79600457A000400020001-7
25X1
3
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/10/15: CIA-RDP79600457A00040
of the USSR national economy, not the particu-
lar concerns of individual republics. "Experi-
ence has shown," he said, "that economic
progress for the USSR as a whole creates
favorable conditions for the all-round develop-
ment of each republic's economy...." In sup-
porting this principle, however, Podgorny did
not go as far as certain of his colleagues. For
example, unlike Brezhnev and Shcherbitsky, he
avoided giving special emphasis to Siberian
development, the great rival claimant to re-
gional investment resources desired by the
various republics.
Socialist Legality and Social Control
Podgomy struck a careful balance in his
dvic responsibility. He worried about the nu-
ch as alcoholism, and about a decline in the
'ews on this subject. Like other Soviet leaders,
u
i
e articulated a highly moralistic attitude to-
yard violations of the law and abrogations of
erous manifestations of antisocial behavior,
eological tempering and willingness to sacri-
fice of the Soviet people. He, along with Suslov,
Masherov, and occasionally Brezhnev, attacked
the conversion of mateiial goods into a "self-
seeking objective" among some elements of the
Soviet people and called for "the creation of an
atmosphere of social intolerance toward con-
sumerism, grabbing, and money-grubbing."
25X1
no mThese practical concerns found their theoreti-
al clothing in Podgoy's continued emphasis
f "the dictatorship of the proletariat," a
hrase used to justify repressive measures em-
loyed in the transition from a capitalist to a
cialist society. Even though the term "state of
he whole people" has been used for over 15
ears and is now enshrined in the new constitu-
tion, Podgomy failed to emphasize it even in his
1976 Kommunist article. For Podgomy, law
25X1 and order and firm discipline were the founda-
tions for Soviet development, the "most impor-
25X1 tant and necessary factors of true democracy."
Yet, Podgomy also appears to be a "strict
onstructionist." He advocated "socialist legal-
ty" and criticized the aberrations of the "cult
f ersonalit ." Thus in 1966 at the 23rd Party
1)020001-7
Congress, he was the only major leader who
stressed the linkage between these principles.
Later, Podgomy continued to devote more
attention to the importance of socialist legality
than did other prominent leaders. In his 1974
election speech he described how Lenin had
been urged "to sidestep the legally established
order, supposedly in the interests of the cause."
After noting Lenin's categoric rejection of this
view, Podgomy emphasized to his audience that
"violations of the law and attempts to get
around them cannot be justified by any refer-
ence to objective reasons, no matter how valid
they may appear at first glance." Brezhnev's
treatment of this theme during his election
speech in the same year was more cursory and
restrained.
Podgomy, for the most part, avoided com-
menting on the most sensitive law-and-order
question currently facing the Soviet leadership:
the dissidents. U1211..g. liedly, he had no sympa-
thy for them or their views, and he probably
opposed any relaxation of the regiineVartud
toGiard them. I
He did not, however, participate in the
growing public clamor against them. In his
25X1
25X1
25X1
speech to the 23rd Congress in 1966, not long
after the Sinyavsky-Daniel affair, he, in sharp
contrast to Brezhnev, did not mention the issue.
While he in the last several years roundly
denounced efforts by foreign countries to tell
the Soviet Union "how to live," he did not take
an active role in castigating the potential recipi-
ents of such help.
The New Soviet Constitution
Brezhnev has been far in front of his col-
leagues in promoting the need for a new USSR
Constitution. The Centratfcimmitteapproval
of the draft, in principle, and its publication for
disc ssioipersonal triumph for him. It is
less clear how important the specifics of the
new Constitution were in Podgomy's demise.
Podgomy was one of the few Soviet leaders
to mention the new Constitution prior to its
5
Approved For Release 2003/10/15: CIA-RDP79600457A000400020001-7
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79600457A000400020001-7
acceptance by the Central Committee. In his
Kommunist article in 1976 he noted that it
25X1 would mark "the crowning of all efforts to
develop legislation." His brief rationale for the
new Constitution was similar to Brezhnev's
statements on this subject.
gorny s motives are unc ear, e
npparently was opposed to any significant
hange in the basic organization of the econ-
my. It is not at all certain, however, how
trong his opposition to restrictions in republi-
an authority was. His ties with the Ukrainian
arty apparatus now led by Brezhnev protege,
hcherbitsky, had probably weakened over the
years. His defense of central ministries, his
25X1 lukewarm acceptance of production a.s..ocia-
lions, and his support for the _primacy of
national economic needs over republican inter-
ests have suggested a definite centralist bias.
Even if we assume that these two constitu-
tional developments were opposed by Pod-
6
gomy, other aspects of the draft appear to
concur with his positions. In institutional terms,
the new constitution represents a significant
increase in the status of the Soviets in general
and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in
particular. Podgomy had pushed for this since
1966. The draft also has a strong ideological
overtone, a feature that Podgomy as well as
Suslov would have favored. In essence, the draft
appears to be a balanced document that reflects
a vanety or viewpoints. ma omy-s?mterests,
had beremained in the leadership, would have
benefited at least A much as they would have
been harmed.
If, however, Brezhney intended to ease Pod-
gomy out of ../11.e_leadrishin over the next five
months in order to obtain the presidency?a
vier supported by the constitutional provision
creating a First Deputy Chairman of the Presi-
dium of the Supreme Soviet?it is quite conceiv-
able thoelodgorny would have stronglY rested
by attacking various aspects of the reform. Such
an attacic could well have isolated him in a
leadership that was not willing to challenge
Brezithis question. In this case,
Podgomy's actions would have speeded up. the
timetable and increasrAii.h.e politia_l drama, but
would not have altered the eventual outcome.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79600457A000400020001-7
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP791300457A000400020001-7
Top Secret
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79600457A000400020001-7
25X1 Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79600457A000400020001-7
Next 13 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79600457A000400020001-7
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79600457A000400020001-7
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79600457A000400020001-7
STAT
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79600457A000400020001-7
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79600457A000400020001-7