USSR: PRODUCTION OF ELECTRONIC INSTRUMENTS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00457A000700070001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
USSR: Production
of Electronic Instruments
Secret
ER 77-10483
August 1977
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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REL This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 015319
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of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
?5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
date impossible to determine
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SECRET
Noforn
USSR: Production of Electronic Instruments
Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
Key judgments
? Soviet output of electronic instruments has grown at an average
annual rate of 15 percent over the past decade, reaching an
estimated level of $1.6 billion in 1976.
? The technological level of output remains 10 years or so behind
the level in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan,
primarily due to a shortage of modem semiconductors.
? Imports of electronic instruments, which were valued at an
estimated $50 million in 1975, feature advanced types in short
supply or types not produced at all in the USSR; roughly
70 percent of imports came from East Germany, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia in the late 1960s, and this proportion probably
holds true today.
? Soviet technical and engineering personnel are often handi-
capped by an inability to obtain modern, high quality instruments,
which affects productivity and in some cases limits the quality of
their work.
? Because of continuing rapid advances in Western technology, the
USSR will have to struggle to keep the gap in electronics
instruments from widening over the next several years.
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SECRET
Noforn
USSR: Production of Electronic Instruments
This report analyzes Soviet production of
electronic instruments, discussing the types and
level of output, the quality of output, its ade-
quacy for domestic needs, foreign trade in elec-
tronic instruments, and the organization and
management of the domestic industry. The dis-
cussion is limited to instruments in series pro-
duction used by the general scientific-engi-
neering community and does not analyze Soviet
technical capabilities in highly specialized types
built in small quantities or assess the scientific
state-of-the-art.
The term "electronic instruments" is used
throughout this report as essentially equivalent
to Standard Industrial Classification Category
3825-Instruments for Measuring and Testing of
Electricity and Electrical Signals. Examples in-
clude general-purpose test-and-measuring instru-
ments such as oscilloscopes and signal genera-
tors, component testers, chart recorders, and
indicating meters. The term does not include
such items as aircraft instruments, medical in-
struments, industrial process instruments, or in-
struments for measuring chemical or physical
properties.
Production and Domestic Supply
Production of electronic instruments in the
USSR grew steadily at an average annual rate of
15.5 percent from 1965 to 1975 (table 1).'
Output in 1975 was valued at 1.1 billion rubles,
or about $1.4 billion. This compares with a
1975 output in the US of $2.1 billion (figure
1).2
The value of production of electronic instru-
ments in 1976 and planned output for the
Tenth Five-Year Plan have not been announced.
The output of instruments of all types is
' In the USSR, electronic instruments are classified, somewhat
arbitrarily, into two categories, electrical measuring and radio
measuring. Electrical measuring instruments include panel me-
ters, chart recorders, low frequency voltmeters, galvanometers,
and bridges. Radio measuring instruments include oscilloscopes,
spectrum analyzers, high frequency voltmeters, and frequency
standards. Electrical measuring instruments may generally be
thought of as operating at DC or low frequencies and oriented to
industrial applications. Radio measuring instruments tend to
operate at higher frequencies and are oriented to testing elec-
tronic equipment such as computers, communications equip-
ment, or radar.
2Figures for the dollar value of Soviet output given in the text
and figure 1 were derived using a rate of one ruble equals $1.3.
This ratio is based on a fragmentary comparison of Soviet and
US instrument prices; it should be considered subject to a wide
margin of error.
Total ..........................
260
306
356
401
Electrical Measur-
ing ........................
159
193
224
253
287
314
351
402
461
533
623
715
Radio Measuring.
101
113
132
148
176
225
250
293
341
410
475
545
Factory wholesale prices of 1 July 1967.
Estimated.
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._ rpd~~t~Qn~o
eciTon c.. _astruments
E
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planned to grow at about the same rate during
the period 1976-80 as was actually achieved in
1970-75. Therefore it is likely that the output
of electronic instruments will continue to grow
at about 15 percent per year. Even though
growth in Soviet industrial output as a whole
has been gradually slackening, output of elec-
tronic instruments enjoys priority as part of
high-technology industry and is proceeding from
a comparatively small base.
Despite the rapid growth and high value of
output of electronic instruments, shortages are
widespread. In 1974 a senior industry official
privately stated that Soviet capability to manu-
facture all the various types of electronic instru-
ments will remain behind consumer needs for
the indefinite future.
Soviet emigres and many qualified visitors to
the USSR have reported that available labora-
tory instruments are greatly inferior not only to
those commonly found in US laboratories, but
also to the better types in Soviet catalogs. Soviet
scientists who have had an opportunity to work
in US installations often express amazement at
the high quality of instruments routinely avail-
able to their American counterparts.
Such comments and observations indicate
that Soviet production of electronic instruments
is weighted toward older types. The allocation
system limits access to better quality instru-
ments to the military and other high-priority
users. Thus, the listing of an instrument in a
catalog does not necessarily imply its ready
availability to the entire scientific-engineering
community.
In many instances, the general lag in Soviet
technology means that an engineer can get by
with a less advanced electronic instrument than
would be standard in a leading Western econ-
omy. For example, extremely fast integrated
circuits are not mass produced in the USSR;
thus, less demand exists for wide bandwith oscil-
loscopes that are needed for design and mainte-
nance of end equipment using such circuits.
In other instances, shortages of advanced elec-
tronic instruments do matter. One problem area
is in production test equipment for semiconduc-
tors, including integrated circuits.' The Soviets
are making a major effort to build an advanced
semiconductor industry and have imported con-
siderable amounts of equipment to supply their
semiconductor production facilities.
The shortage of high quality instruments also
causes problems for Soviet researchers. For in-
stance, a physicist in an institute developing
semiconductors claimed that his coworkers con-
sidered their work on III-V materials to be in-
3An essential part of the manufacturing process for semiconduc-
tors is the testing of individual devices to eliminate rejects (for
some extremely complex devices the number of defective units
can exceed the number of acceptable ones) and to classify the
remaining units according to their technical parameters.
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ferior to similar US work because high quality
oscilloscopes were not available from domestic
sources and could not be imported.' Similarly,
physicists at another institute complained that
their work in semiconductor research was hurt
by inability to obtain sensitive electrometers for
measuring small currents, despite the fact that
such electrometers were in production in the
USSR at the time.
Visitors to Soviet research facilities have
noted that a high percentage of technical per-
sonnel were doing routine measurements and
data reduction. The advantage of many modern
instruments is that the routine work of multiple
measurement, calculation, and presentation of
the result is performed within the instrument,
freeing technical personnel for other work.
Foreign Trade
The USSR imports about twice as many elec-
tronic instruments as it exports. Both imports
and exports have increased over the last 10
years, although at a slower rate than domestic
production (table 2).5
Soviet exports have been weighted toward
simpler instruments such as multimeters and in-
expensive, obsolescent oscilloscopes for educa-
tional institutions. Imports, on the other hand,
have emphasized advanced types that are in
short supply or not produced in the USSR.
Several US instrument manufacturers active in
4The III-V compounds are a group of semiconductor materials
with applications in laser diodes, radiation detectors, solar cells,
and microwave devices.
5 Data in table 1 on production and table 2 on trade are not
directly comparable because different methodologies were used
to compile the value figures.
exporting to the USSR have stated that Soviet
demand for simpler types is too small to warrant
a major marketing effort. However, they have
reported high Soviet interest in importing types
near or above the COCOM export control levels.
Little useful statistical information is avail-
able on Soviet trade in electronic instruments
with specific countries.' In 1967, the three
major East European producers of instruments,
East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia,
supplied about 70 percent of Soviet imports.
Most of the remainder came from Japan and
Western Europe, a considerable portion from US
subsidiaries or distributors, but less than 2 per-
cent came directly from the US.' Over 90 per-
cent of Soviet exports were to Eastern Europe,
Asian Communist countries, and Cuba. Al-
though precise figures for recent years are not
available, the distribution of trade probably has
not greatly changed.
The elimination of US unilateral export con-
trols and the relaxation of COCOM controls,
both in terms of removal of items from control
and in willingness to approve exports of items
still on the control list, appear to have had little
effect in alleviating the overall Soviet shortage
of higher quality electronic instruments. Prestige
and influence, as well as technical need, are
major factors in determining allocations of hard
currency for importing instruments, and the
6The USSR ceased publishing such information in 1968. Foreign
trade statistics published by other countries are generally too
aggregative either as to commodities or countries to be useful.
'Such direct US exports to the USSR were valued at about
$600,000 in 1974 and $700,000 in 1975 (FAS point of export).
The value of sales of US instruments made indirectly through
foreign subsidiaries or distributors cannot be recovered from the
statistics of third countries.
Exports ..................
8.3
7.7
8.4
9.0
10.1
12.0
13.8
15.7
15.5
17.3
18.8
Imports ..................
15.9
12.3
12.2
14.9
18.6
21.0
25.1
29.2
27.3
30.1
38.2
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procedures for obtaining such allocations are
bureaucratic and time consuming.
Organization and Administration
The Soviet electronic instrument industry has
21 major production facilities, located mainly in
the western USSR. Electronic instruments are
mostly produced by the Ministry of the Radio
Industry (MRP) and the Ministry of Instrument
Building, Means of Automation, and Control
Systems (Minpribor). A small amount of output
comes from enterprises, institutes, and design
bureaus of other ministries and departments.
The Sixth Main Administration of the MRP
has primary responsibility for production of
radio measuring instruments. The MRP is of-
ficially classified as part of the defense industry.
Although instruments produced by the MRP are
described in catalogs and other open source ma-
terial, information on production facilities (in-
cluding in some cases even the mere fact of their
existence) is considered highly sensitive. Many
MRP instrument plants are never mentioned in
the open literature. Others have been mentioned
by name, but with no information about the
nature of production.
Production of electrical measuring instru-
ments is the responsibility of Minpribor's
Soyuzelektropribor Industrial Association. In
contrast to the MRP, information on
Minpribor's instrument plants is less closely
held, even though many of them produce items
for the military.
Table 3 lists the major Soviet producers of
electronic instruments. It is believed to include
all facilities of Minpribor that are major pro-
ducers of electrical measuring instruments, but,
in the case of the MRP, evidence exists of an-
other four or five instrument producers. These
other producers are probably either recently es-
tablished plants not yet identified or Scientific
Research Institute (NII's) where the existence of
production facilities has not been confirmed.
Technology
The technology of more complex Soviet elec-
tronic instruments lags behind Western levels by
about 10 years. For example, portable oscillo-
scopes are limited to 50 MHz bandwidth, com-
pared to 350 MHz in the West. Conventional
laboratory types are only available in the USSR
with bandwidths up to 100 MHz; 500 MHz
versions are made in the US.
Soviet instruments using digital techniques
show a similar technological lag. The best Soviet
digital counter operates at a 100 MHz direct
count rate, or at 200 MHz with prescaling. Com-
parable figures for the US are 500 MHz and
1000 MHz. Even those Soviet instruments that
have the same major technical characteristics as
Western instruments are generally inferior in
other important parameters. For example, So-
viet oscilloscopes typically have poorer sensi-
tivity (amount of deflection on the screen per
unit signal applied) than Western models with
the same bandwidth. Soviet spectrum analyzers
have poorer resolution and sensitivity (strength
of minimum detectable signal) than Western
models operating in the same frequency range.'
The reason for the Soviet lag is primarily a
lack of modern electronic components, espe-
cially semiconductors. The Soviets are far be-
hind the West in mastering the production of
economical, high-performance planar transistors.
Mass production of monolithic digital integrated
circuits in the USSR did not begin until the
early 1970s.
Until recent years Soviet instruments were
based primarily on electron tube designs, al-
though there was some use of germanium tran-
sistors. In the early 1970s, the use of transistors
and integrated circuits began to increase in
newer designs. However, many older models
with designs dating back at least 10 years con-
tinue to be produced, implying that many So-
viet engineers and technical personnel do not
have access to more modern Soviet instruments.
'See appendix A for a detailed discussion of several classes of
Soviet electronic instruments.
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Bryansk
Instrument plant'
Cheboksary
CEAZ Electrical Measuring Appa-
ratus
Gorkiy
Frunze Plant
MRP
Kiev
Tochelektropribor
Minpribor
Radiopribor
MRP
Kishinev
Mikroprovod
Minpribor
Vibropribor
Minpribor
Krasnodar
Measuring Instruments Plant
Minpribor
Kursk
Instrument plant'
MRP
Leningrad
Vibrator
Minpribor
L'vov
V. I. Lenin Production-Technical
MRP
Association
ment Plant
Omsk
Elektrotochpribor
Tallinn
Punane Ret
MRP
Uman
Megommetr
Minpribor
Vilnyus
Radio Measuring Instruments Plant
MRP
Scientific Research Institute for
Radio Measuring Instruments
MRP
(NIIRIP)
Vitebsk
Electrical Measuring Instrument
Plant
Minpribor
Yerevan
Elektrotochpribor
Minpribor
Zhitomir
Elektroizmeritel'
Minpribor
Continued production of obsolete instru-
ments could be the result of any or all of the
following: the common Soviet bureaucratic re-
luctance on the part of plant management to
give up the production of established profitable
models; a recognition that in many cases obso-
lete instruments are adequate; and a shortage of
the components needed to build newer models.
The latter seems the most likely explanation,
however. The Soviets are still in the early stages
of building up capability to produce modern
silicon semiconductors, and consumers other
Panel meters, digital voltmeters, miscellaneous electrical measuring
instruments.
Major signal generator producer.
Major producer of electrical measuring instruments.
Miscellaneous radio measuring instruments.
Microwire resistance standards and bridges.
Direct-writing oscillographs, tape recorders.
Miscellaneous electrical measuring instruments.
Suspected producer of network analyzers, sweep generators.
Large producer of miscellaneous electrical measuring instruments.
Former Izmeritel Plant No. 125. Major producer of radio measuring
instruments including oscilloscopes, voltmeters, digital counters,
and frequency meters.
Former Teplokontrol Plant. Miscellaneous electrical measuring
instruments, including bridges, potentiometers, also micromodule
and hybrid integrated circuits.
Reportedly now part of the Etalon Association. Miscellaneous radio
measuring instruments.
Major producer of panel-mounted and laboratory electrical
measuring instruments.
Miscellaneous radio measuring instruments.
Panel meters.
Former Plant No. 555. Major producer of oscilloscopes, signal
generators, microwave instruments.
In addition to designing instruments, NIIRIP reportedly manufac-
tures oscilloscbpes, signal generators, and other instruments.
Miscellaneous electrical measuring instruments.
Microammeters, millivoltmeters.
Miscellaneous measuring instruments.
than the instrument industry may have higher
priority for obtaining semiconductor devices.
The belief that components are in short supply
is further borne out by the fact that some Soviet
technical personnel have said that although they
had access to modern Soviet instruments with
integrated circuits, it was extremely difficult to
get replacement parts.
Several recent articles in Minpribor's monthly
technical journal have sharply criticized the
Ministry of the Electronics Industry (MEP),
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which traditionally has had the responsibility
for production of electronic components in the
USSR. The articles, written by personnel of the
Soyuzelektropribor Association, state that the
MEP is unable to supply Minpribor's instrument
producers with linear integrated circuits of ac-
ceptable quality and that medium- and large-
scale integration circuits are not available at all.
Although the more secretive MRP has not
made similar public criticisms, it is known that .a
high percentage of the integrated circuits sup-
plied to its computer producers by the MEP is
unacceptable. Given the high priority of the
computer industry, it is likely that the MRP's
instrument producers suffer from the same
problems as Minpribor's.
New Soviet instrument designs, as evidenced
by preliminary data sheets and exhibitions of
prototypes at trade fairs, indicate a growing
technological capability in electronic instru-
ments. Notable examples include a 250 MHz
portable oscilloscope, a microwave spectrum an-
alyzer with 8 GHz displayed bandwidth, and a
low-frequency, time-compression, real time
spectrum analyzer.' Whether this design capa-
bility will be translated into practical capability
will depend on whether the Soviets can master
production of the necessary transistors and inte-
grated circuits and deliver them in sufficient
quantity to instrument manufacturers.
Even if the Soviets are successful in mass
producing recent instrument designs, they will
still lag behind the West in technology. The
current trend in Western instrument technology
is to use complex integrated circuits in new
types of "intelligent" instruments which contain
the equivalent of a small computer. The slow
rate of technical progress in the Soviet inte-
grated circuit industry will not allow the USSR
to move very rapidly in this direction. For at
least the rest of the decade, the main task of
Soviet instrument designers will be to equal the
West's technological level of the 1960s.
9 See appendix A for more detail.
Dependence on the West
The Soviet instrument industry is actively en-
gaged in reverse engineering of Western instru-
ments. Although most imports are for actual
use, several Soviet research-and-development fa-
cilities have sections that examine and adapt the
designs of US, West European, and Japanese
instruments, many of them acquired in contra-
vention of COCOM controls.
Although the USSR has traditionally ex-
ploited foreign technology in this way, in the
1960s it was largely unable to take advantage of
Western advances in instrument design. The in-
troduction into widespread use of silicon planar
transistors in the early 1960s and monolithic
digital integrated circuits in the middle of the
decade revolutionized electronic instrument de-
sign in the West. Since these components were
not available in quantity to Soviet instrument
producers, it was impractical to copy Western
designs. By the late 1960s, Soviet component
technology had improved to the point that
Western designs could be usefully adapted.
There are no indications that Soviet activity
in copying or adapting Western designs reflects
any lack of ability on the part of their design
engineers. The unavailability of more advanced
electronic components largely restricts the ac-
tivity of Soviet designers to attempting to equal
Western achievements. Articles in the Soviet
open technical literature have reminded instru-
ment designers that their foreign counterparts
have often solved many of the design problems
facing Soviet industry and that it is more effi-
cient to take selective advantage of foreign
successes than to work in isolation.
Soviet instrument designers have taken this
advice to heart, even when the level of tech-
nology is within their own capability. The re-
sulting Soviet product sometimes bears a star-
tling resemblance to its Western ancestor (see
figures 2 and 3). However, no cases have been
noted where the Soviet copy equals the Western
product technically.
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Figure 2
Comparison of Soviet and US Synthesizers
Comparison of Soviet and
US Oscilloscopes
The recent wave of activity by the Soviets in
signing agreements on scientific and technical
cooperation with Western companies has not
generated any activity in the field of electronic
instruments. The Soviets have signed such agree-
ments with at least two major Western manu-
facturers of instruments. However, they amount
to undertakings to explore the possibility of
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joint research and have not yet led to specific
projects for electronic instruments. This may be
because the Soviets would have little to con-
tribute in the field of electronic instrument
technology.
The Soviets also have not been active in seek-
ing manufacturing licenses for electronic instru-
ments. Only two recent inquiries about such
licenses are known; one for semiconductor pro-
duction test equipment and one for data acquisi-
tion systems and system components. No
licenses are known to have been actually pur-
chased. In any case, it would be difficult for the
Soviets to make any major improvement in their
electronic instrument technology by seeking for-
eign licenses without either an accompanying
improvement in electronic component tech-
nology or a willingness and ability to import
components from the West.
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Technical Characteristics of Soviet Instruments
This appendix is intended to provide a greater insight into Soviet
instrument technology than was possible in the body of the paper and to
elaborate on some of the analysis therein.
The sources of information for this appendix are Soviet catalogs of
electronic instruments offered for sale on the domestic market and prelimi-
nary data sheets describing instruments in the development state that have
not yet been scheduled for production.
Although there is no reason to believe that instruments described in
catalogs are not in fact in production, the reader should not assume that
such instruments are freely available for sale to any consumer with the
necessary funds. There is a seller's market for instruments in the USSR,
especially for the newer, more advanced types, which are available only in
limited quantities to users with high priorities.
Oscilloscopes
Soviet technology in wide bandwidth oscilloscopes lags behind that of
the West by seven to 10 years. Western portable and laboratory scopes are
available with five to seven times the bandwidths of the best Soviet models
(table 4).
Portable ............................
50 MHz
350 MHz
Laboratory ......................
100 MHz
500 MHz
Sampling .........................
6 GHz
18 GHz
Direct access ...................
1.2 GHz
4.5 GHz
It is often possible to compensate for a lack of conventional wide
bandwidth oscilloscopes by using less versatile sampling or lower sensitivity
direct access types.' ? The USSR has sampling scopes with rated bandwidths
101n direct access oscilloscopes, the signal is applied directly to the cathode ray tube without
amplification.
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of 6 GHz (6000 MHz), including one programmable model with an associ-
ated analog-digital converter and digital readout appropriate for production
testing of high-speed semiconductors. A direct access scope with a rated
bandwidth of 1.2 GHz and sensitivity of 2 volts per centimeter is available
for specialized applications such as laser research, high-energy physics, and
nuclear weapons testing. These levels have long been exceeded in the West.
The USSR has made great progress during the past decade in oscillo-
scope technology. In 1965, Soviet scopes were of generally poor quality by
Western standards for bandwidth, sensitivity, sweep versatility, accuracy,
linearity, size, and weight. Advances in cathode ray tube (CRT) design and
the growing availability of semiconductors, combined with a deliberate
effort to copy Western designs, permitted a slow but steady increase in scope
capabilities. Although Soviet scopes cannot approach Western capabilities in
bandwidth and do not have such convenience features such as digital CRT
readout, newer Soviet models are of modern appearance with electrical
characteristics generally comparable to their Western counterparts of the
1960s.
The USSR developed several new oscilloscopes and planned to intro-
duce them into production by the end of 1976." The most significant are a
sampling scope rated for 10 GHz and a portable dual trace scope using
integrated circuits with 250 MHz bandwidth and 10 my/cm sensitivity.
Successful mass production of these units would indicate a considerable
improvement in Soviet component and instrument technology and would be
of great assistance in the development of high speed computers, fast inte-
grated circuits, and sophisticated digital cryptographic and communications
equipment. Nevertheless, their successful production would only maintain
and not close the traditional gap between the USSR and the West of seven or
more years.
Although Soviet oscilloscope technology is deficient at wider band-
widths, it is adequate for all but the most demanding applications. However,
production of the more modem types does not meet demand. The most
important facilities have priority access to instruments, leaving lower priority
needs unsatisfied. For example, visitors to a Soviet laser research facility
have observed several of the more advanced Soviet oscilloscopes in use. On
the other hand, a group of Soviet geophysicists, when shown a 10-year-old
US 50 MHz scope, stated that they had no access to "such fine gear."
Spectrum Analyzers
Scanning Analyzers
The USSR currently produces several microwave spectrum analyzers
with maximum operating frequencies from 2 to 40 GHz. However, their
1 1 There is no available evidence to indicate whether or not this plan was successfully carried out.
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Table 5
Microwave Spectrum Analyzer Capabilities
Dynamic Range .........................
53 dB
70-100 dB
Displayed Bandwidth ...............
1.3 GHz
8-10 GHz
Sensitivity ....................................
-110 dBm
-125 dBm
IF Filter Bandwidth ................
1 KHz
30-100 Hz
Residual FM (stabilized)..........
300 Hz
10-100 Hz
technical characteristics lag well behind US standards (table 5). The dynamic
range of Soviet models is quite limited compared to modern US types. Most
Soviet models have maximum display bandwidths of only 80 MHz, probably
due to Soviet deficiencies in tunable transistorized local oscillators and
preselector filters. One recently developed Soviet model is capable of dis-
playing a 1.3 GHz spectrum, implying an improvement in local oscillator
capability. However, there are no indications of any use of YIG-tuned
preselector filters which would permit tuning with harmonics of the local
oscillator to achieve several GHz of displayed bandwidth. Soviet microwave
spectrum analyzers are also less sensitive than US models and have poorer
resolution due to less stable oscillators and wider IF filter bandwidths. There
is no evidence of any new microwave analyzers scheduled for production in
the near future.
The USSR also makes lower frequency spectrum analyzers with maxi-
mum frequencies from 20 KHz to 270 MHz. At frequencies to 100 MHz and
below, their display bandwidths approach or equal the maximum operating
frequency, as do Western types. However, as with microwave analyzers, their
technical characteristics are inferior in sensitivity, resolution, and dynamic
range. They also lack sophisticated features, such as digital memories, track-
ing generators, or adaptive sweep, which extend the applications of analyzers
or overcome problems limiting their usefulness.
Two new models with 60 KHz and 600 KHz frequency ranges were
scheduled for production by the end of 1976. They are the first Soviet
spectrum analyzers to incorporate tracking generators. Their other technical
characteristics continue to lag behind Western standards.
Unlike oscilloscopes, currently produced Soviet spectrum analyzers
show no sign of having been copied from recent Western models. A lag in
technology for high-frequency components has probably prevented the
Soviets from implementing modern Western designs. However, newer models
being developed in the USSR rely on Western designs, implying an improve-
ment, actual or anticipated, in component technology.
Brochures of Soviet instruments distributed at a Moscow exhibition in
mid-1975 describe a modular system of spectrum analyzers with 600 KHz,
110 MHz, and 40 GHz operating frequencies, obviously copied from a
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 Approved For Release 2001/03/22 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000700070001-9
five-year-old Hewlett-Packard design. The 40 GHz microwave analyzer has an
80 dB dynamic range and an 8 GHz display bandwidth, implying the use of
YIG-tuned preselectors. However, in contrast to other items in the bro-
chures, no model number was given for the analyzer. Thus it was probably in
an early state of development and should not be taken as an index of current
or imminent Soviet production capabilities. The 600 KHz and 110 MHz
units have been assigned model numbers and are probably at a later stage of
development, although there is no evidence that they have been scheduled
for production. Their electrical parameters are similar to the US models from
which they were copied, but the sensitivity, accuracy, and resolution are
poorer.
Real Time Analyzers
The Soviets have long been aware of the inverse relation between high
resolution and speed of processing when using conventional scanning spec-
trum analyzers.' 2 They have been active in developing various types of real
time analyzers to overcome this problem.
The Soviets have developed time compression analyzers using dispersive
delay lines for use at radio frequencies. In 1966 they began production of
the model S4-14 microwave analyzer (table 6). A 1974 catalog lists the much
improved model S4-47/S4-50 as being in production. These analyzers were
probably developed to aid in Soviet research and development of equipment
with complex modulation schemes such as chirp radar. They could also be
used in Elint and electronic warfare applications.
Frequency range
Basic analyzer ..........................................
Including mixer .......................................
Pulse width ..................................................
Pulse repetition frequency ........................
Displayed bandwidth
Pulse signals .............................................
CW signals ...............................................
Resolution (CW signals) ............................
Weight (with mixer) ..................................
100 MHz
300 MHz-7.5 GHz
0.4-3 microseconds
one pulse-2000 Hz
unknown
unknown
unknown
250 Kilograms
160 MHz
10 MHz-39.6 GHz
0.4-6 microseconds
one pulse-3000 Hz
10 MHz
3 MHz
100 KHz
65 kilograms
The decrease in weight by almost 75 percent for the newer model
reflects the Soviet improvement in solid-state technology over the last
decade. However, the resolution of this model is much poorer than that of
current US designs.
12 For example, a scanning spectum analyzer with 0.1 Hz resolution requires more than one hour and
20 minutes to analyze an acoustic signal with So Hz bandwidth.
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At lower frequencies, the USSR has developed a number of real time
compressive spectrum analyzers using recirculating delay lines. This may be
the result of a high Soviet priority in areas such as high-resolution, real time
analysis of acoustic signals for ship quieting and antisubmarine warfare, or
vibration testing of aircraft. Such analyzers are general purpose in use, with a
wide variety of applications. However, Soviet models are described in the
technical literature but, with one exception, are not assigned standard
nomenclatures and do not appear in instrument catalogs for sale to the
general scientific-engineering community.
Soviet articles in 1966 and 1967 described the models using magneto-
strictive, ultrasonic, and magnetic drum delay lines (table 7). These models
were capable of resolutions of fractions of a -Hz, although the operating
frequency range was limited.
Magneto-
strictive
Ultra-
sonic
Magnetic
Drum
Ferrite
Core S4-54
Frequency .................
5 Hz
400 Hz
5 Hz
1-20 Hz 0.05-2 Hz
DC-20 Hz
5-100 Hz to
to
25-500 Hz 50 Hz-2 KHz
DC-50 KHz
Resolution lines' ......
500
500
125
200 200
400
Resolution' ................
0.01 Hz
0.8 Hz
0.04 Hz
0.1, 0.5, 2.5 Hz 0.01-10 Hz
0.05-125 Hz
Analysis time ...........
1 sec
0.625 sec
5 sec
6 sec 0.03 sec
0.16 sec
' The resolution of a compressive analyzer equals the maximum frequency divided by the number of resolution lines. Thus if
a specific model has several selectable frequency ranges, the resolution will be better at the lower frequencies.
A 1972 article described a Soviet type using ferrite core memory as the
delay line element. Contemporary Western low-frequency compressive ana-
lyzers use integrated circuit shift register delay lines. The use of core
memory permits the Soviets to compensate for their deficiencies in inte-
grated circuits at the expense of equipment complexity, maximum fre-
quency, and processing time (the analyzer cannot operate in real time on its
two higher frequency ranges).
The most recent Soviet low-frequency compressive analyzer, the model
S4-54, was described in a data sheet distributed at an exhibition in June
1975. It is the first such analyzer to be assigned a standard nomenclature,
implying that it is intended for mass production and general use. The
technical characteristics imply the use of integrated circuit shift registers.
However, the Soviets commonly require several years to organize actual
serial production after the first appearance of data sheets describing a new
instrument. Therefore, it is probable that the S4-54 is not yet in production,
although small quantities of it or similar units might be available for priority
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 Approved For Release 2001/03/22 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000700070001-9
users.13 Although successful production of the S4-54 would improve Soviet
capability for low-frequency analysis, especially in terms of analysis time and
wider input bandwidths, it would not represent any challenge to Western
equipment. Table 7 shows specifications of a typical US low-frequency
compressive analyzer for comparison.
Little is known about Soviet capabilities in Fourier transform spectrum
analyzers. The Soviets have reported the use of general purpose computers
for Fast Fourier Transform analysis. A 1974 book on diagnosis and reduc-
tion of shipboard machinery vibration mentions a more efficient specialized
FFT processor which "is almost completely made from Soviet integrated
microcircuits." No specifications for this specialized unit are given.
Digital Counters and Frequency Meters
Until the late 1960s, Soviet digital counters were limited to a 10 MHz
maximum direct count rate, the same rate as the first commercial high-speed
counter developed in the US in the early 1950s. By 1970 the Soviets were
able to reduce their technological lag to about 10 years by taking advantage
of improved components and introducing into production units rated for 50
MHz and 80 MHz. Data sheets on these instruments are ambiguous. The 80
MHz unit apparently was a basic 20 MHz counter with an internal scaler
permitting operation to 80 MHz with some loss in versatility. The 50 MHz
unit may have used a similar principle of operation.
As Soviet semiconductor capabilities improved in the early 1970s,
digital counters were able to keep pace. Designs from the 1972-73 period,
still in production, include two models rated for 50 MHz and two rated for
200 MHz. Of the latter, one appears to use 100 MHz decade counting units
and the other, 50 MHz units, with the 200 MHz ratings being obtained with
internal scalers. In the US, units are available with direct decade counting
units operating above 500 MHz, or operating with internal scalers to beyond
1000 MHz.
In the Soviet instrument industry, it is common practice to publish data
sheets describing new instruments well before serial production has begun
and to demonstrate prototypes at exhibitions. This serves to create an overly
favorable impression among foreign observers as to Soviet technical capa-
bilities and to alert Soviet engineering and technical personnel as to what
may become available in the future. For the last several years, however, no
data sheets or prototypes of new Soviet high-speed digital counters have
been observed. At a 1975 Soviet exhibition of instruments, many prototypes
of oscilloscopes, spectrum analyzers, and other types of instruments were
shown. However, the digital counters at the exhibition were the older 50 and
200 MHz units described above.
13At a more recent exhibition, a Soviet national commented that difficulties were being experienced
with the development of an unidentified time compression processor because of a lack of components.
14 SECRET
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The lack of new digital counters is probably an indication of problems
with developing high speed semiconductors. The maximum frequency of a
digital counter is largely determined by the speed of the digital scaler (if any)
and decade counting circuits. It is likely that the Soviets either have been
unable to mass-produce sufficiently fast semiconductors or are not able to
produce a sufficient number to meet the demands of the instrument industry
as well as higher priority consumers.
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 Approved For Release 2001/03/22 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000700070001-9
Data on production of electrical measuring instruments for all years and
of radio measuring instruments through 1969 were taken from the yearly
statistical handbook Narodnoye Khozyaistvo SSSR. Through 1969 the hand-
books indicated the total ruble volume of output of instruments of all types,
together with a breakdown into 10 subsectors, two of which were electrical
and radio measuring instruments. In 1970 the USSR stopped publishing data
on the output of radio measuring instruments, giving only the total output
and nine subsectors. However, the missing figure can easily be derived by
subtracting the output of the nine subsectors from the total. Data on
production of radio measuring instruments for 1970 and later years were
derived in this way.
The author of this paper is -Soviet
Machinery Branch, Office of Economic Re-
search. Comments and queries are welcome
and should be directed to- 351-6716.
25X1A
25X1A
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