INTERNATIONAL ENERGY BIWEEKLY REVIEW 16 NOVEMBER 1977

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00457A001100010001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 119
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 16, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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16 November j 977
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
?5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on;
date impossible to determine
ye, '
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SECRET
NOFORN
Page
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Economic Impact and Consequences of
Another OPEC Price Rise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Most Importers Unlikely To Appeal for OPEC Restraint . . . . . . . . . . 15
France: Energy Conservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
i
SECRET
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SECRET
NOFORN
At the moment, agreement on an increase of 5 to 10 percent in the price of
Saudi benchmark crude seems probable as cartel members prepare for their
December meeting in Caracas. Whatever the outcome at Caracas, the next OPEC
price rise will occur in the midst of an already troubled economic environment.
Almost without exception the economic outlook for developed countries is
poor-real growth is slowing almost across the board, unemployment is high and
creeping still higher, and inflation remains stuck at double the long-term rate. Each
of these problems will be aggravated by higher oil prices. In the event of a
10-percent oil price rise, the loss in Big Seven real GNP will approximate half a
percent while nearly a full percentage point will be added to the rate of inflation.
The damage to growth could be substantially worse if oil-related losses in real
income and price stability spark a strong negative reaction from consumers and
investors.
Smaller industrial countries will be hit harder than the Big Seven by the oil
price rise on several counts. For one thing, the direct loss in GNP will be larger since
the smaller countries spend a higher proportion of their income on imported oil. In
several cases, notably Turkey, severe payments problems and inability to finance
higher oil import costs will necessitate still larger reductions in real GNP, perhaps as
much as 2 percent in some instances. For non-OPEC LDCs, the chief impact of
higher oil prices will be a more than $2 billion worsening in their current account
deficit. In these circumstances, developing countries would need offsetting increases
in foreign exchange drawdowns or added foreign borrowing to maintain imports and
avoid losses in consumption and growth.
Our analysis does not attempt to assess the impact of the next OPEC price rise
on longer term problems, particularly the issue of future oil supply shortages. Given
the lead times involved in developing new supplies, the main adjustments will have
to be made on the demand side through higher real prices and in turn slower
economic growth, as well as stricter government-mandated conservation measures.
At this point, it is impossible to assess how much of an impact toward closing the
potential energy supply gap a 10-percent nominal price increase will have.
Despite the potential adverse effects of an oil price rise, foreign governments
are not inclined to appeal to OPEC for restraint. The developed countries-large and
Note: Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome. They may be
directed to of the Office of Economic Research, telephone [phone].
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small-are convinced that only the United States can put effective pressure on
OPEC. While many would join in a move to try to hold ell prices down, they believe
it would be merely a pro forma exercise. Others, which want to preserve what they
believe are special relationships with OPEC countries, would try_ to avoid any
involvement. The non-OPEC LDCs may argu, against an oil Trice hike but would do
it privately and on their own. Association with the developed countries on this issue
would be politically unthinkable. (Confidential)
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ECONOMIC IMPACT AND CONSEQUENCES OF
ANOTHER OPEC PRICE RISE
The following analysis by the Office of Economic Research discusses the
potential impact of a 10-percent rise in OPEC oil prices this December, under certain
assumptions about government policies in the major developed countries. OER
assumes (a) that fiscal policies are not adjusted either to offset or to reinforce the
contractionary effects of an oil price hike and (b) that monetary policy is neutral,
that is, money supply is permitted to adjust to changes in the demand for money
due to oil price hikes. In reality, policy reactions will differ widely from country to
country, and no one can prejudge the action that will be taken. Nor can anyone
prejudge the psychological impact on consumer and investor confidence, elements
which could prove overriding during a period of sharp economic slowdown.
Impact on Major Countries
The contractionary impact of a 10-percent oil price rise on domestic demand
would directly reduce real GNP in major countries from what it would have been.
Additional losses would occur as income declines in one country are transmitted to
others through reduced trade flows. Altogether, these income losses would reduce
real GNP in the Big Seven countries by roughly half a percent next year.* At the
same time, higher oil prices would add nearly 1 percentage point to inflation in the
industrial countries while causing a roughly $7 billion deterioration in their
combined trade balance.
Given the impacts, we estimate higher oil prices would pose considerable risks
to the already weakening pace of economic recovery. If expansion continues to
languish or worsen, as we now expect, the oil-related losses in real income and price
stability could spark a strong negative reaction from consumers and investors. The
risks of this occurring are particularly high if prices rise at a time when recession
psychology is already setting in and households increase savings rates in response to
higher inflation and oil-related job losses. In these circumstances the possibility of
Note: The results in this paper were calculated through use of an econometric model
linking the domestic and international operations of the Free World economies. See
appendixes A to C.
*The calculation of GNP loss assumes that the full contractionary impact of higher oil prices occurs within one
year. Most econometric models employed in examining the impact of the 1973-74 oil price hikes assumed that
75 percent of the impact occurred in the first 12 months and the remainder in the next 12 months. If we assume
the same pattern, real GNP would be cut by 0.4 percent in 1978. The cumulative effect would still bea0.5-
percent decline in real GNP from what it would have been.
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Big Seven: Impact on Real 1978 GNP of a 10-Percent Oil Price Rise
Percent Change
Total Impact
Oil-Related
Losses
Oil-Related
Gains
United States ..............................
-0.4
-0.6
0.2
Japan ..........................................
-0.8
- 1.2
0.4
West Germany ..........................
-0.5
-0.8
0.4
France ........................................
-0.6
-1.0
0.4
United Kingdom ........................
-0.1
-0.5
0.3
Italy ............................................
-0.9
-1.3
0.4
Canada ........................................
-0.2
-0.4
0.2
Weighted Average ................
-0.5
-0.8
0.3
Direct and indirect GNP losses due to higher oil prices.
Direct and indirect GNP gains due to price rises for exports to OPEC.
Big Seven: Impact on 1978 Inflation of a 10-Percent Oil Price Rise
Percentage Point Change
(:NP Deflator
Index
Consumer Price
Index
Wholesale Price
Index
United States ..............................
0.5
0.5
0.5
Japan ..........................................
1.0
0.9
1.5
West Germany ..........................
0.7
0.6
1.0
France ........................................
0.8
0.7
1.3
United Kingdom ........................
1.3
1.2
1.1
Italy ............................................
1.1
1.0
1.3
Canada ........................................
0.6
0.5
0.5
Big Seven: Change in 1978 Trade Due to a 10-Percent Oil Price Rise
Million US $
Oil
Imports
Non-Oil
Iinoorts
Exports
Total Trade
Deficit
Total ..........................................
10,080
- 2.490
280
7,310
United States ..........................
3,970
-660
110
3,150
Japan ......................................
2,650
-490
270
1,890
West Germany ......................
1,230
--450
-160
940
France ....................................
1,000
- 370
I ()
620
United Kingdom ....................
270
- 70
101)
100
Italy .........................................
910
-340
110
460
Canada ....................................
50
-110 1.0
-211)
150
Including an increase in exports to OPEC countries resulting from the higher oil revenues due to an
assumed 10-percent price hike. These increases total $670 million for the United States, $490 million for
Japan, $440 million for West Germany, $270 million for France, $270 million for the United Kingdom,
$220 million for Italy, and $50 million for Canada.
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oil price hikes turning a moderate cyclical downturn into a serious one cannot be
completely ruled out.
Country Impacts
Even if a recession response is avoided, the impact on growth will be
considerable, reducing real Big Seven GNP by approximately $21 billion from what
it would have been. Italy would be the biggest loser, with real GNP dropping almost
1 percent. Japan and France would face losses exceeding 0.5 percent, while the
other countries would experience smaller income reductions. In the case of West
Germany-the only foreign country for which the impact on individual components
of final demand can be readily calculated-the rise in oil prices would reduce growth
in 1978 personal consumption by nearly 0.4 percentage points and growth in fixed
investment by nearly 1 percentage point.
Higher oil prices would have a significant impact on the rate of inflation in
major countries. General price levels, as measured by the GNP deflator, would be
increased by 0.7 percent on average; the rise in consumer prices would be roughly
the same. The United Kingdom and Italy, where inflation remains high, would
experience the largest oil-related price rises. The United States would be more
vulnerable to the inflationary impact than in the past, since imports now account for
almost 50 percent of US oil supplies. In all cases, the impact would be comparable
to a more than 20-percent price hike four years ago, because of the increased share
of oil in industrial production costs. In addition to the direct impact on production
costs, higher oil prices will add indirectly to inflation pressures by fueling wage
demands.
The oil price hike would cause at least a $7 billion deterioration in the total
trade balance of the Big Seven. Their net oil import bill will increase by roughly $10
billion, with the United States accounting for almost 40 percent of the rise. Higher
oil bills will be only partly offset by reduced import demand caused by oil-related
income losses and increased sales to OPEC members. We estimate that the
price-induced rise in exports to OPEC would amount to little more than $2 billion
next year for the Big Seven as a group. West Germany and Japan would account for
about 40 percent of the increase, given their share of the OPEC market. Even with
increased sales to OPEC, Canada will face an erosion in its non-oil trade balance
because of the fall-off in US demand for Canadian goods.
Country Risks
West European countries will have the hardest time dealing with the effects of
higher oil prices. France and Italy would face particularly tough sledding. With
unemployment stubbornly high, Paris would be in a bad position to absorb any
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oil-related job losses. Acting alone to compensate for these losses by taking
stimulative measures would add substantially to France's already large current
account deficit. Italy, for its part, would be constrained from acting because of its
still high inflation rate. Offsetting the contractionary effect on demand would add
about $350 million to Italy's import bill next year.
West Germany is in a much stronger position to offset the effects of oil price
hikes by taking stimulative fiscal measures. Bonn, however, is unlikely to add to the
$6 billion package recently announced because of continuing concern over inflation.
In these circumstances, West German forcasts of 3.5-percent real GNP gains next
year may well prove overly optimistic, especially if oil price hikes further erode
consumer and business confidence. The United Kingdom can Drobably absorb the oil
effects fairly well in view of increasing North Sea production. Given its dependence
on foreign trade, however, the UK would be hurt in the event of large shortfalls in
growth in Germany, France, and elsewhere.
Big Seven: Fiscal Stimulus Required to Offset the Impact
on GNP of a 10-Percent Oil Price Rise
Increase in Government
Expenditures
Reduction in Taxes
Unilateral
Action
Simultaneous
Action
Unilateral
Action
Simultaneous
Action
United States ............
2,680
1,780
3,770
2,890
Japan ........................
1,790
1,067
2,960
1,820
West Germany ........
1,040
540
1,510
680
France ......................
740
440
1,000
620
United Kingdom ......
150
100
170
70
Italy ..........................
610
450
780
620
Canada ......................
240
70
300
30
Japan's position is similar to that of West Germany, although it enjoys a larger
growth cushion. Offsetting the contractionary effects of oil prices on demand,
however, would require a nearly $2 billion increase in government expenditures or a
$3 billion tax cut:. Given Tokyo's concern over large budget leficits and continuing
high inflation, the government will be reluctant to take such measures. The fiscal
requirements would be cut roughly in half if all major countries did so
simultaneously. Canada's economic problems will be exacerbated less by the direct
effects of the oil price rise on domestic demand than by the loss in exports
associated with the oil-induced reduction in US GNP.
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The smaller industrial countries will be hit harder than the Big Seven by the oil
price rise. The direct contractionary impact on domestic demand would be larger
since a higher proportion of their income is spent on imported oil. Their heavy
reliance on sales to the major industrial countries also makes many of them
vulnerable to the oil-induced reductions in Big Seven demand. Altogether, the
smaller countries as a group would experience a roughly 0.6-percent decline in real
GNP from what it would have been and a roughly $2.0 billion deterioration in the
trade balance. Given the severity of growth and payments problems that many of
these countries already face, there is relatively little room to offset the income
effects without exacerbating payments difficulties.
Growth and Trade Impacts
The 10-percent oil price rise will have a pronounced impact on the growth of
most smaller industrial countries, with the Mediterranean countries facing the
biggest losses. In the case of Greece and Portugal, for example, real GNP will be
reduced 0.7 percent below what it would have been, according to our calculations.
Spain would face a similar loss, while the-decline in Sweden will approximate half a
percent. Other big losers include Austria, Turkey, Denmark, and Finland, all heavily
dependent on oil imports. At the other extreme, the Netherlands and Norway
should make out reasonably well because of large net exports of oil and gas.
Selected Smaller Industrial Countries: Estimated
Impact of a 10-Percent Oil Price Rise
Oil-Related Loss
in GNP
(Percent)
Oil-Related Rise
in Trade Deficit
(Million US $)
Australia ................................
0.2
150
Austria ....................................
0.7
20
Belgium ................................
0.6
120
Denmark ..............................
0.7
120
Finland ................................
0.5
100
Greece ..................................
0.7
80
Portugal ................................
0.7
50
Spain ....................................
0.6
400
Sweden ..................................
0.5
260
Switzerland ..........................
0.6
150
Turkey ..................................
0.5
140
On the trade front, the increase in prices would add more than $2.8 billion to
the net oil import bill of smaller industrial countries, bringing their total costs to
almost $30 billion. Like the Big Seven, only a small part of the additional oil bill will
be offset by increased sales to OPEC countries resulting from the oil price hikes. The
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oil-induced erosion of demand will also reduce non-oil imports, but only slightly
faster than the oil-related fail in exports fe Big Seven countries. Even with these
offsets, the 17 smaller industrial countries will face at least a $2 billion increase in
their combined trade deficit as a result of the 10-percent price rise.
The smaller countries, of Smaller Industrial Countries Yvith Payments Constraints:
course, would ].ace a subs-an- GNP Loss Required To Prevent Trade Balance
tially larger trade deterioration if Deterioration
they attempt to maintain normal GNP Loss GNP Loss
income levels in the face of the (Percent) (Percent)
oil price hike. According to our Austria .................. 0.7 Portugal ............. 1.3
calculations, their combined Denmark ........... 1.1 Spain ................. 2.2
ficit --1'l b
Finland .............. 1.5 Sweden ............... 1.2
t
de d
ra
e
y
;about $4.0 billion instead of ....... ...r`r ...............
$2.0 billion if they take stimu-
lative measures sufficient to offset the GNP impact of the oil price rise.*
Alternatively, if they choose to avoid any deterioration in their trade accounts, as
some will have to do, the oil-related reduction in real GNP would amount to nearly
1.5 percent instead of 0.6 percent. Big Seven countries would also incur additional
income losses as a result of the steeper decline in small country import demand.
Danger Points
The magnitude of the income and payments effects of an oil price hike will
pose problems for several smaller industrial countries. Turkey, in particular, will face
serious debt and payments problems even without higher oil prices. In addition to
knocking one-half percentage point from its already dim growth prospects. the
10-percent oil price rise will add at least $140 million to Turkey's current account
deficit-an amount Ankara s:!mply cannot finance. If Ankara is unable to obtain
offsetting financing, it will have to reduce income by at least an additional 1.5
percent, bringing the total oil-related loss to 2 percent.
The oil price hike will also aggravate problems for Spain and Portugal,
impairing their ability to correct growth and payments difficulties. For Spain, the
total foreign exchange costs will amount to $400 million; the costs would rise to
nearly $600 million if the Spanish Government tries to avoid the 0.6-percent loss in
GNP that would accompany the oil price rise. The comparable cost for ]Portugal
would be $50 million or more, an amount Lisbon can ill afford. Among other
small countries, Sweden and Denmark will also have to make adjustments to absorb
their increased deficits of $260 million and $1 20 million., respectively.
*"this calculation assumes that the smaller 17 countries act simultaneously and that the Big Seven do nor take
stimulative measures to offset the oil-price impact on GNP.
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Impact on Developing Countries
For non-OPEC LDCs, the chief impact of higher oil prices will be on their
foreign economic position. The price rise would appreciably worsen their current
account deficit by adding roughly $2.2 billion directly and indirectly to import costs.
In these circumstances, developing countries would need offsetting increases in
foreign exchange drawdowns or added foreign borrowing to maintain imports and
avoid further losses in consumption and growth. Some losses in exports could also
be expected to occur. Altogether, the non-OPEC LDCs would experience roughly a
2-percent deterioration in the terms of trade as a result of the price hikes.
Trade Impact Non-OPEC LDCs: Impact of a 10-Percent Oil Price Rise on
Import Costs
price rise would add
nearly $1.4 billion to the
net oil import bill of non-
OPEC LDCs as a group,
raising their total oil bill
(net) to about $15 bil-
lion. Brazil, South Korea,
Taiwan, and India would
face the largest increase
in costs. The 50 or more
LDCs that import only
about 10,000 b/d would
each pay $4 million more
annually for their oil pur-
Of which:
Argentina ..............................
58
29
Brazil ....................................
421
357
Chile ......................................
45
33
India ......................................
179
143
Peru ......................................
21
4
South Korea ..........................
221
169
Taiwan ..................................
185
134
Zaire ......................................
10
3
Zambia ..................................
16
9
Additional costs of oil imports resulting from higher oil prices.
$ Additional costs of non-oil imports resulting from higher oil prices.
chases. With the possible exception of Mexico, even the non-OPEC LDCs that are
now small net oil exporters may not come out ahead. A rise in their non-oil import
costs and a loss in export volume will at least partly offset gains from higher prices
for their oil.
Non-OPEC LDCs: Impact on Non-Oil Unit Import
Costs of a 10-Percent Oil Price Rise
By raising production costs in de-
veloped countries, the 10-percent rise
in oil prices would add almost $900
million to developing countries' non-
fuel import costs in 1977. By our calcu-
lations, non-OPEC LDC import prices
for foodstuffs, intermediate products,
and finished goods would increase
0.8 percent on the average if oil prices
rise 10 percent.
The 10-percent oil
Imports from the Big Seven' .................... 0.8
United States ............................................ 0.4
Japan ........................................................ 1.3
West Germany ........................................ 0,8
France ...................................................... 0.7
United Kingdom ...................................... 1.0
Italy .......................................................... 1.1
Canada ...................................................... 0.4
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At the same time, oil-related loss in d(-,,eloped countries real GNP would
adversely affect LDC export volume by reducin;. demand for industrial raw materials
below what it would have been. We estimate that the volume losses could cost
non-OPEC LDCs almost $400 million. Some, particularly exporters of light
manufactured goods, would compensate by raising export prices in line with
oil-related increases in production costs. Raw material exporters may face softer
markets because of oil-weakened demand in maior countries.
Trouble Spots
For a. number of countries, the oil price mikes will com :)licate already serious
international financial problems. Zaire, now facing severe financial difficulties, will
see its import bill rise by $ 10 million, absorbing almost 15 percent of this year's
growth in export earnings. The cost to Zambia, also facing tough economic times
because of weak copper prices, will be a more than $15 million rise in import costs.
The added costs to Peru, Chile, Jamaica, and (1-hana, although small by international
standards, will be quite large relative to their ,ability to pay. As a share of exports,
the cost increase will be largest in the case of Jamaica. In all these instances, even
small rises in import costs will impose special burdens unless offset by increased aid.
Among the larger developing countries, Brazil will have the toughest time
absorbing the foreign exchange costs of higher oil prices. Altogether, oil-related cost
increases will add at least $400 million to $500 million to Brazil's import bill next
year. These added costs, together with the recent sharp decline ir. prices for key
Brazilian exports, will give a strong push to the current account deficit and, at a
minimum, delay plans to relax economic austerity measures. Other countries likely
to have problems absorbing oil-related foreign exchange costs include the Philippines
and Morocco, both of which are already incurring larg=_r current iccount deficits
than they can sustain.
The risks of higher oil prices having a substantially worse impact than we have
estimated are not inconsequential, particularly if present projections of 1978 GNP
growth in the absence of the oil price rise prove overly optimistic. As it is, estimates
of 1977 growth are being sharply revised downward, especially in Western Europe. If
economic activity should continue this downward drift. the rise in oil prices would
occur when recessionary psychology may already be settiig in. This would be in
marked contrast to the timing of last year's OPEC action, which occurred when re-
covery, though slow, appeared fairly well entrenched.
The real question is whether already weakening consumer confidence will be
further eroded by the effect of higher oil prices on income, prices, and employment.
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If, for example, the momentum of events leads to an increase in household savings
rates, the impact on aggregate demand would prove serious. By our calculations, an
increase in the savings rate of 1 percentage point, coupled with the oil price rise,
would reduce real growth next year in Big Seven. countries to only one-half of what
is now projected. In these circumstances, real GNP gains would be limited to a mere
2 percent. This is substantially worse than what would occur as a result of a normal
response to oil price hikes.
Western Europe is particularly vulnerable to this recession scenario. Even
without the oil price rise, real growth in Western Europe will average at best 3
percent. The oil price hike, combined with a recession response, would cut growth
to only 1 percent or so. This of course assumes that governments take no measures
to compensate for the contractionary impact of the oil price rise on demand. Taking
such action would help forestall a recessionary response on the part of consumers
and investors. Weaker governments in Western Europe, including the Mediterranean
countries, may lack the balance-of-payments flexibility needed to take corrective
domestic action unless the stronger economies do likewise.
Appendix A
Determining the Impact of Higher Oil Prices
on GNP in Developed Countries
Major Industrial Countries: Base Case Impact
To measure the impact of higher oil prices on real and nominal GNP, we first
calculated appropriate tax and expenditure multipliers* using 1960-73 data for each
economy. In determining the multipliers, we linked the major economies together
using marginal propensities to import and estimated 1976 trade shares. This
procedure allows measurement of income losses in each country, including the
indirect losses that are transmitted among countries through reduced international
trade-a necessary approach in view of the simultaneous impact of higher oil prices
on most economies.
Before applying these multipliers, nominal 1978 GNP was increased to take
into account the higher rate of inflation caused by the oil price hike. (The methods
used in deriving the inflationary effects are discussed in Appendix B.) Because the
increase in oil prices will have the same effect on consumer purchasing power as a
tax increase, we applied the tax multiplier to the rise in oil costs in deriving the full
impact on nominal GNP as the oil price increase works its way through the
economy.
*These multipliers measure the total change in GNP caused by a change in taxes or in government expenditures.
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There will be some natural offsets that will tend to r~.!dece the impact on GNP,
The most important of these will he the rise n developed country exports to OPEC
that is caused by the increase in OPEC revenims attributable to higher oil prices. As
with all exports, these sales to OPEC will have a stimulative effect similar to that
brought about by a rise in government expenditures; we thus applied an expenditure
multiplier to determine the full effects of thrise increased saes on national income.
When these effects are combined with the contractionary effects of the oil price
hike, they yield the net loss in nominal GNP To derive the loss in real GNP, these
nominal values were deflate,] bv_ the oil-adjusted GN? price deflator for each
country.
Major Industrial Countries: Recession Case Impact
The impact of higher oil prices on real t;NP would be substantially greater if
consumers reacted by inereising their savings. To calculate the effect: of an
oil-induced rise in savings rates, we assumed that households would permanently
shift 1 percent of their consumption into savings; thus, in in economy where desired
savings are 15 percent, this would imply almost a 1-percentage-point increase in the
savings rate.
Smaller Industrial Countries: Growth Impact
To assess the impact of a 10-percent (-it price rise or the real GNP of the
smaller industrial countries, we used a reduced form model that links 29 countries or
regions through their foreign trade sector. We simulated the :ail-price-rise impact in
this model by introducing an autonomous shock into the GNP equation for :each
country or region that was equivalent to the size of the income drain from higher oil
prices. Thus, GNP in each of `he countries initially dropped )y an amount equal to
the size of the increased oil payments. This initial shack and its international
feedback provided the estimated GNP impact of the oil price hike on the smaller
industrial countries.
We compared, for each of the Big Seven countries, tie results of both the
reduced form and larger link models. We fund the GNP impacts were similar.
Consequently, we feel the results estimated by the reduced form model for the
smaller industrial countries are comparable with the estimates l'or the Big Seven.
Appendix t;
Determining the Impact of Higher Oil Prices
on Inflation Rates in Major Developed Countries
To calculate the impact of higher oil prices on inflation rates in the major
developed countries, input-output tables for the Unit~d States, Japan, West
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Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy were used. The tables enabled us
to measure how a change in oil prices affects unit costs for individual items. We then
assumed that workers will strive to maintain real wages in the face of the increased
inflation caused by oil, forcing nominal wages to rise faster than they would have in
the absence of higher oil prices. These oil-induced wage increases provide the
second-round impact of an oil price hike on general price levels.
The input-output tables have a somewhat different structure for each country.
For the United States we used the Department of Commerce's 87-sector table for
1967. For Japan, we used the Economic Planning Agency's 60-sector table for 1970.
For France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, 75-sector tables were used, and for West
Germany, a 43-sector table. Each table was aggregated to a common format and
updated to take account of relative price movements through mid-1976 using
disaggregate wholesale price data for each country. By updating the price weights,
we were able to take account of changes in relative prices across national economies.
The major factor, of course, is the sharp rise in importance of energy costs since the
tables were originally constructed.
To derive the initial impact of higher oil prices on unit costs for each sector,
the updated coefficients in the relevent row in the inverted input-output tables
((I-A)-') were increased by the change in crude oil prices. We judgmentally adjusted
prices for other primary energy sources because the rise in oil prices tends to pull up
these prices as well. In the case of the United States, however, the oil price rise was
weighted by taking into account price controls on domestic production. The
resulting sectoral changes in unit costs were then used to construct wholesale and
consumer price indexes reflecting the expected rise in oil prices. National weights for
each economy were used in this construction.
We then adjusted wage rates for the rise in price levels caused by higher oil
prices. The adjustments were made on the basis of quantitative relationships
established between changes in the consumer price index and changes in hourly pay
rates. The oil-induced portion of wage rate increases in turn caused a secondary rise
in price levels by adding to unit production costs. In general, two iterations were
made on each economy to capture what we believe would be most of the effect of a
rise in oil prices.
The process, which assumes a dollar-for-dollar pass-through in costs, provided
the cumulative oil impact on wholesale and consumer prices in each economy. We
then used these results to derive the impact on the implicit GNP price deflator for
each economy. This measurement was obtained by establishing the quantitative
relationship between changes in the consumer price index and changes in the GNP
deflator for each country.
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Appendix C
Determining the Impact of Higher
Oil Prices on Trade Balances
Major Countries
The rise in oil prices will increase net oil import costi across the board. To
determine the impact on these costs, we first estimated 1978 net oil import volumes
for each major country.* These estimates put 1978 import demand at 22.1 million
b/d for the group as a whole. At this level of demand, each 5-percent oil price rise
would add nearly $5 billion to the oil import bill of the major countries.
While oil import costs would increase, non-oil imports would be lower than in
the absence of oil-induced income losses. To determine the reduction in such
imports, we estimated the marginal propensitti to import for each major country; in
so doing, we could measure the change in import demand associated with a given
change in GNP. With import demand reduced, exports of e ch major country will
also be reduced since the largest share of non-oil imports by Big Seven countries
comes from within the group. Using our multiplier model (see Appendix: A).. we
distributed the reduction in each country's imports among the major exporters.
Smaller Industrial Countries
The impact on the smaller industrial countries' trade balances was calculated
using the reduced form link model. The impact of the oil price rise on each
country's imports volume was calculated by considering the effect of the oil-induced
change in real GNP on import demand. The impact on each countries' export
volume was calculated by considering the fill in trading partners' imports. The
change in trade volume was then converted to value terms using assumed oil-induced
changes in export prices and changes in import prices calculated from the change in
trading partners' export prices. The results obtained for Big Seven trade balances
using the reduced form model were similar to the estimates provided by the larger
link model. This again suggests the results for the smaller industrial countries are
comparable to those for the Big Seven.
Developing Countries
For non-OPEC LDCs the chief impact of higher oil prices w1l be on their
foreign economic position. To calculate trade balance effects. the direct impact of
higher crude prices on the non-oil LDCs' net oil import hil was first calculated.
*We assume that oil import volume will be essentially unchane l from what it would have been in the absence of
an oil price hike. Experience since 1973 indicates a high inelasticity in demand for oil; given the small response
to the 400-percent rise in crude oil prices in 1973-74, a 5-, 10- or 15-percent price rise should have little effect.
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Indirect trade effects were then calculated. These consist primarily of oil-induced
price increases in developed economies' exports to the non-oil LDCs. The 0.5-percent
reduction in developed countries' GNP would also reduce non-OPEC LDC export
volume, although all or part of the loss of revenue was assumed to be offset as LDC
exporters raise their prices to compensate for oil-related increases in production
costs of manufactured goods. For the purpose of this analysis, we assumed that the
volume of non-oil LDC imports was not affected by the oil price rise. To the extent
this assumption proves faulty the erosion of the trade balances of industrial
countries would be greater than we have calculated. (Confidential)
MOST IMPORTERS UNLIKEILY TO APPEAL
FOR OPEC RESTRAINT
No foreign government is likely to beat the drums against an oil price increase
despite the potential negative impact on its economy. Most developed countries are
convinced that they would have no influence on OPEC by themselves and very little
more by acting in concert with the United States. The non-OPEC LDCs, individually
or as a group, will not take an open stand against OPEC and certainly would not join
in a US appeal, even though many might privately welcome it.
Developed Countries
The developed countries maintain that only the United States can have an
impact on OPEC decisionmaking. They believe that the key to US influence is its
role in the Arab-Israeli dispute. The West Europeans and Japanese see their own
Middle East policies as more even-handed than those of the Americans but have little
hope of influencing thinking in Washington. These governments also cite increasing
US demand for imported oil as the chief economic pressure behind an OPEC price
rise. In their view, the lack of an effective US national energy policy undercuts any
appeal to OPEC to hold the line on prices.
Since government attitudes toward OPEC actions are shaped more by political
than economic realities, the severity of the economic impact of an oil price increase
is a poor guide to a country's political response. To date, none of the developed
country governments has indicated interest in a concerted move against a price hike.
While we anticipate that several oil importing countries would be willing to join the
United States in public and private appeals to OPEC countries, a number of others
would stand aloof. The United Kingdom and Norway, which have their own oil,
would be unlikely to do anything.
Among the major foreign industrial nations, West Germany, Japan, and Canada
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probably would be receptive in varying degr.es to a U~ initiative to forestall an
OPEC price rise:
The West Germans, who have been protected from We full impact of
OPEC price rises by the appreciation of the Deutschemark, believe that
an appeal would carry little weight, parti,Allarly in view of the inability of
the United States to curb demand for imported oil.
The Japanese, determined to avoid even the appearance of confrontation
with their Arab suppliers, probably would endorse a de narche only if it
were supported by numerous other developed countri,.-s.
The Canadians have few political hangups regarding the Middle East and
probably would urge OPEC restraint; Ottawa already is dipping into
general tax revenues to subsidize prices in oil-short eastent Canada.
Among the smaller developed countries with large current account deficits,
Austria and Denmark would likely support an appeal to OPEC. Both are relying on
export growth to pull them out of the doldrums and thus fear the adverse effect of
an oil price rise on their trading partners. Portugal might be persuaded to go along
but would need prodding. Lisbon is likely to be extremely ci~utious in the wake of
Arab reaction to its recent recognition of Israel.
A sizable group of developed countries, most of whi"h already are contending
with serious balance-of-payments problems, see no advantage to a consumer country
plea to OPEC:
The French probably would shun what they consider a futile gesture,
which inevitably would smack of confrontation.
The Italians want to preserve their perceived role as ..t bridge between the
Middle East and North Africa and Western Europe and would be reluctant
to join any action that might jeopardize this role or the numerous barter
deals Italian firms have arranged with OPEC countries
The Spanish., who do not recognize Israel and took a pro-Arab stance
during the 1973 war, probably could not be persuaded of the value of an
appeal to OPEC; Madrid has received about $150 million in loans from the
Saudis this year and does not want to close the door To future borrowing.
The Turks believe that OPEC has the right to set pries where it will, and
they would be unlikely to work against a price rise for fear of losing what
few benefits they receive from their large concessionary oil contract with
Iraq.
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Two developed countries-the United Kingdom and Norway-probably con-
sider silence the best policy. Norway already is a net oil exporter, and the United
Kingdom is expected to become a net exporter by 1980; both have consistently
pegged their own oil prices to those of OPEC.
Non-OPEC LDCs
Despite private grumblings about OPEC stinginess, most non-OPEC LDCs are
willing to suffer another 10-percent oil price rise without public protest. Any appeal
to OPEC would be independent of the developed countries' positions; the non-OPEC
LDCs would not risk their prized political solidarity by joining a US-sponsored
effort:
Brazil, which has the largest oil bill among the LDCs, has been courting
Arab favor and capital since the 1973 embargo and probably would once
again press OPEC for preferential treatment for all LDCs.
India already has privately expressed concern to OPEC members about a
further oil price increase but is unlikely to speak out publicly against
countries that regularly provide substantial loans. Officials in New Delhi
maintain that they have no right to criticize OPEC because its members
were so long "exploited by colonial powers."
Mexico, a net oil exporter, would tacitly support a price hike by OPEC
and then follow suit.
The small African states do not want to offend OPEC countries and thereby
risk losing the little aid that they receive, even though their prospects for getting
more assistance are not all that good. Prosperous Asian countries such as South
Korea and Taiwan would not want to diminish their small influence in LDC circles
by joining in a US-sponsored appeal to OPEC. (Confidential)
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FRANCE:: ENERGY CONSERVATION
This is the second is a series of arti, les on ene,g conservation-
France is a leading enemy saver among the major industrialized countries. A
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strong public conservation program combined with higher energy prices resulted in
about a 305,000 b/d oil equivalent energy savings in 1976-8 percent below what
consumption would have been in the absence of higher fuel prices. Energy conserva-
tion in France in 1976 was somewhat above the average for OECD countries that we
estimated in "The International Energy Situation: Outlook to 1985," April 1977.
Moreover, relative energy savings in France amounted to nearly twice the UK
performance. The government's long-term goal is to achieve a 900,000 b/d energy
saving in 1985-about 15 percent of expected consumption.
The latitude given policymakers under the French presidential system has
enabled Paris to implement an impressive energy conservation program since the
1973 oil crisis. Moreover, unlike most other countries that have lifted the draconian
measures imposed during the embargo, Paris has continued to strengthen its pro-
gram. In July, Paris announced plans to spend $200 million next year to reduce
energy consumption in the industrial sector, which has lagged other sectors in
savings. The government also decided to tax industrial energy users and drop
incentives to consumption now offered by elec-
tric and gas utilities.
The French conservation program aims
mainly at reducing oil use, especially in the resi-
dential sector, where the bulk of the energy sav-
ings has occurred. The oil industry has criticized
the government's one-sided attack on oil and ar-
gued for equal treatment of other energy sources.
Oil accounts for over 60 percent of total energy
consumption.
France is the only major developed country
to ration heating oil. Since mid-1974 heating oil
sales have been limited to 95 percent of the
previous year's sales plus an adjustment for a
natural expansion due to an increased housing
stock. The rationing system is supported by fines.
In addition, quantities delivered above the official
limits are deducted from individual company
quotas the following year. Heating oil use in 1977
will probably run about 20 percent below 1973
levels.
France: Energy Savings
from Conservation,
by Sector, 1976
Thousand b/d
Total: 305
The government has also set an upper temperature limit of 20?C in all homes,
apartments, offices, and public buildings since 1974. Government agents are
authorized to make spot checks and issue fines to offenders.
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In September 1 975 the government ordered that all new multiple-unit buildings
with a central heating system must be equipped to permit an allocation of individual
heating costs. Moreover, all buildings must he equipped by September 1977 with
devices to permit individual allocation of hot water costs. "f he government has set
insulation standards in all new buildings and implemented financial incentives to
promote increased insulation in existing buildings.
Major government efforts to encourage conservati::m n the industrial sector
include regulations and financial incentives. In September 1975 the government
imposed a special levy on heavy fuel oil consumption above a certain limit equiva-
lent to $4.70 a barrel, about 40 percent of the current spot narket price. Industries
making energy-saving investments are entitled to financial aid of up to 25 percent of
the project. The government subsidizes up to 50 percent of a demonstration
project's cost.
The most visible part of the government's conservation program is the annually
announced oil import ceiling. The ceiling has been used more as a goal or success
indicator, however, than a conservation measure. The government has yet to restrict
imports to meet the limit. Ia fact, to meet the 1976 ceiling of $10.7 billion the
government juggled the books. Prime Minister Barre announced in February 1977
that crude oil that entered France in the last 10 days of 1976 (prior to the oil price
increase) for stocking by refiners would be considered part of the 1977 ceiling of
$11.1 billion.
In contrast., France's finance minister tined Electricite de France-the state-
controlled power utility-the equivalent of about $1 million for violating; govern-
ment limits on oil consumption last year. 'I he fine occL:rred despite utility claims
that they had to step up production of electric power in oil-fired power plants
sharply because a severe drought last sumtr.er had depleted hydroelectric power
sources. The ministry acted on a complaint of the state .'nergy agency that accused
the utility of violating a government edict that industrial fuel consumption in 1976
be held at 1973 levels. Moreover, the 1977 limit on heavy fuel use by the utility is
20 percent below last year's consumption level.
Growth, Consumption, and Savings
In 1976 France's energy consumption was I percen-: below pre-embargo 1973
levels. Oil use alone registered a 6-percent drop. Had the trend in energy use
continued at the 1968-73 annual rate of 6.6 percent, energy consumption would
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have averaged 4.3 million b/d instead
of 3.6 million b/d actually consumed.
The difference reflects both energy
savings from conservation and the eco-
nomic recession. Last year, real GNP
was only 8 percent above the 1973
level; if the long-term annual growth
rate of 5.9 percent had continued,
GNP would have increased 19 percent
from 1973.
Prior to 1973 energy use by sec-
tor had registered mixed trends. Be-
tween 1968 and 1973 energy use by
(a) the transportation sector, (b) the
energy sector, (c) the industrial sector,
and (d) the residential, commercial,
public services, and agricultural sector
rose at an average annual rate of 8.5
France: Industrial Output and
Energy Consumption
76
percent, 6.7 percent, 4.9 percent, and 7.3 percent, respectively. The rapid growth in
energy use by the transportation sector stemmed from a sharp rise in registered
motor vehicles, rising real disposable income, and a drop in the real price of gasoline.
Moderate growth in industrial energy consumption was due in part to a shift
away from energy-intensive products. From 1968 through 1973 total industrial
output rose at an average annual rate of 7.2 percent while the energy-intensive steel
industry grew by 3.9 percent annually. This trend along with technological improve-
ments is partly responsible for a 2.2 percent annual decline in energy consumption
per unit of industrial output between 1968 and 1973. Efficiency trends in most
other sectors deteriorated. The amount of energy used per dwelling, for example,
grew steadily during the period, stemming partly from an increase in the use of
energy-intensive appliances.
Savings Record by Sector
We estimate energy savings from conservation amounted to about 305,000 b/d
last year. This estimate is derived from a sector-by-sector analysis of consumption
and efficiency patterns since 1973. To determine the amount of savings in each
sector, we assumed that the 1968-73 efficiency trends would have continued
through 1976 in the industrial, energy, and residential sectors with or without the
rise in fuel costs. In estimating savings in the transport sector, we related fuel
consumption per registered motor vehicle to changes in real disposable income.
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France: Energy Consumption by Sectors, 1976
Industrial
Residential,
Commercial,
Public
Services.,
Transportation Agricultural
Energy
Total
thousand b/d Oil Equivalent
1968-73 trend ..................................
1,370
810 1,475
670
4,325
Growth adjusted ..............................
1,180
720 1,395
560
3,855
Actual ................................................
1,160
670 1,190
530
3,550
Implied saving ................................
20
50 205
30
305
Savings as a share of growth
adjusted consumption .................. 1.7 69 14.7 5.4 7.9
Residential, Commercial, Public Services, and Agricultural Sector
Savings in the residential.. commercial, public services, and agricultural sector in
1976 amounted to an estimated 205,000 b/d: 15 percent b ~1ow what would have
occurred in the absence of higher fuel
prices and government measures. Sav-
ings in this sector far outpaced France: Prices of Fuels
achievements in all other major sec- 250
tors. Most of the saving occurred in
the residential sector, which accounts
for nearly 85 percent of total con-
sumption.
This estimate is based on trends
in energy use per square meter of liv-
ing space adjusted for temperature.
From 1968 through 1973 .this ratio
had been increasing at an average an-
nual rate of 5 percent, largely reflect-
ing an increase in the use of energy-
using appliances. In 1976 this ratio
was 7 percent below 1973 levels. An
agressive government conservation
program along with higher fuel oil
prices are mainly responsible for the
impressive savings record. Since mid-
1974 the government has rationed
heating oil sales and set a temperature
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limit in homes, offices, and public
buildings-both supported by fines.
Moreover, the government has
adopted attractive financial incentives
to promote increased insulation. From
1973 through 1976 the weighted aver-
age retail price of energy used by the
residential sector jumped by more
than 70 percent. Heating oil, which
supplies about 60 percent of resident-
ial energy requirements, rose by
roughly 90 percent during the period
to 53 cents per US gallon. Home heat-
ing oil prices continued to rise in 1977
and by March were 59 cents per US
gallon.
France: Energy Efficency Trends
Residential, Commercial, and
Public Services 'L
The industrial sector saved an es-
timated 20,000 b/d in 1976, less than
2 percent of consumption. Higher en-
ergy prices and to a lesser extent gov-
ernment-financed incentive programs
were the primary factors behind the
energy saving. The weighted average
retail price of energy used by industry
rose 125 percent between 1973 and
1976. Oil accounts for about 40 per-
cent of energy required by the indus-
trial sector. The impact of financial
incentives on conservation has likely been
1968 70 72 74 76
1. Derived from energy used per dwelling.
2. Output per unit of energy input.
small thus far. It will take a few years
before pilot energy saving projects are adopted industry wide. The small savings in
1976 are primarily the result of low cost investments and better maintenance.
Investments made in 1976 amounting to about $200 million will start to show a
return this year.
Paris is disappointed with the modest amount of industrial energy saving
achieved thus far. Industries claim that the recession, a lack of funds, and the high
cost of borrowing have caused a postponement of investments not directly related to
production capacities. The energy-intensive iron and steel industry in 1976, for
example, used 2 percent more energy to produce a ton of steel than in 1973, thus
reversing the pre-embargo trend. Between 1968 and 1973 the iron and steel industry
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energy output ratio had been dropping at in annual rate of 0.5 percent. This
industry accounts for roughly 25 percent of industrial erergy use. The loss in
efficiency in the industry since 1973 is mainly the result of drop in output, which
adversely affects the efficiency of heating installations. Iro- and steel output last
year was nearly 10 percent below 1973 levels.
Transportation Sector
The transportation sector regis-
tered energy savings of about 50,000
b/d in 1976.* This saving is roughly 7 175
percent below what would have oc-
curred in the absence of higher prices,
and equals the savings achieved in the
United Kingdom. To calculate the sav-
ings, we related energy use per regis-
tered motor vehicle to changes in real = 150
disposable income. Higher motor fuel
prices, better vehicle maintenance,
and a change in driving habits were
responsible.
From late 1973 to yearend 1976
retail premium gasoline prices rose by
two-thirds, reaching $1.71 per US gal-
lon. During this period taxes rose
nearly 50 percent to over $ .00 per
US gallon. Last year the amount of
energy consumed per registered vehi-
cle was 7 percent below 1973 levels.
From 1968 through 1973 this ratio
was climbing at an annual rate of 3
percent.
1973
Oct
Nominal
1. No miia pnc;s deflated
by consamer price index.
77
Sep
Despite the savings, the amount of fuel used per vehicle rose last year for the
first time since 1973. A small decline in the real prit cf gasohne was partly
*in measuring energy savings in the transport sector we compared actual energy Gse with ccnsumption obtained
by assuming that the pre-embargo relationship between energy use per registered motor vehicle and real
disposable income remained the same. Road transport accounts for about 85 percent of energy consumption in
the transportation sector.
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reponsible for this develop-
ment. The real price of pre-
mium gasoline, however,
turned upward again from Jan-
uary-June this year because of
higher crude oil prices and a
tax increase of 5 cents per gal-
lon.
France: Retail Gasoline Taxes
US cents per gallon
Premium
Regular
Diesel
Fuel
Oct
1973......
65
69
39
1974......
71
75
44
1975......
73
77
44
47
1976 ...... 79
84
Jun 1977 d ...... 101
108
54
Energy Sector
Savings in the energy sector totaled an estimated 30,000 b/d last year. About
10,000 b/d were saved by reducing energy losses in electric power generation.
Between 1968 and 1973 the amount of energy loss per unit of fuel input dropped at
an average annual rate of 2 percent. Had this trend continued, the ratio in 1976
would have been 6 percent below the 1973 level instead of the 16 percent drop
actually achieved. Although the precise amounts cannot be quantified, some addi-
tional savings were achieved from the continue shift to natural gas, which burns
more efficiently than coal and oil.
Savings of about 15,000 b/d were achieved in primary energy production,
conversion, and transportation of fuels. Most of the savings was achieved in bunker
usage. Because of slow steaming, bunker consumption declined 5 percent since 1973
while export volume rose 15 percent. Savings in energy production, conversion, and
internal transportation were small last year. The amount of energy used in these
industries remained proportional to final energy consumption. Between 1968 and
1973 this ratio declined at an average annual rate of 0.3 percent. In 1976 the ratio
was less than 1 percent below the pre-embargo trend, indicating a marginal gain in
efficiency.
Despite large investments by oil refiners, savings by this sector last year
averaged only about 5,000 b/d. In 1975 refiners invested $30 million to save energy
and fight pollution. Savings by the refining industry have been hindered by sharply
reduced capacity utilization, which fell from 86 percent in 1973 to 69 percent last
year. Savings should mount rapidly as higher demand raises operating refinery rates.
In the United States, for example, where operating refinery utilization has remained
high, refiners have reaped impressive energy savings of more than 12 percent.
Outlook
The prospects for France reaching its 1985 savings goal of 900,000 b/d are
good. France's limited resource base gives it few alternatives in the short or medium
term in reducing its oil dependence. Consequently, it will likely continue to be
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committed to conserving energy. In July, for example, Paris strengthened its conser-
vation program by dropping incentives to use electricity and by penalizing builders
of dwellings supplied by electricity.
Additional savings will he more difficult than the low-cost, good-housekeeping
type measures already made. Future investments will undoubtedly be less profitable,
requiring the inconvenience of shutting down some installations that have not been
fully amortized. Slow economic growth will also hinder energy saving investment
projects.
Nevertheless, Paris recognizes that an acceleration in energy saving investment
will be required to meet its 1985 goal. The government is particularly disappointed
in the modest savings attained by the industrial sector thus far. To spur efforts in
this sector, Paris recently allocated $200 million next year to industries making
energy-saving investments. Moreover, Paris will implement a tax of 1 to 3 percent on
energy used by industry, effective 1 January 1978.
Appendix
France: Government Conservation Program
The French energy program has placed more emphasis on energy conservation
than most other major industrialized countries. Faced with a poor energy resource
base, Paris believes that energy conservation together with nuclear power is the most
efficient means of increasing French energy independence and security of supply. In
1976 France imported about 75 percent of its energy supplies.
Energy Conservation Agency
In November 1974 the government created an Energy Conservation Agency
(ECA) answerable to the Ministry of Industry and Research and administered by an
executive committee chaired by the Delegate General for Energy. With a staff of 50,
the agency has the following major functions:
? To propose and administer conservation programs.
? Advise the general public on ways to save energy.
? Launch energy-saving demonstration projects.
? Provide assistance for certain energy-saving projects..
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The goal of the agency is to reduce 1985 energy use by 900,000 b/d oil
equivalent-15 percent below the level forecast prior to the energy crisis. To meet
this goal, the agency has a three-pronged attack on all major energy sectors including
actions designed:
? To reduce energy waste.
? Encourage investment in energy-saving devices.
? Promote research and development in the energy conservation field.
Residential, Commercial, and Public Sector
The brunt of the government's conservation policy is on heating requirements.
The Energy Savings Act of 1974 contains two provisions aimed at the residential
sector: one authorizes the government to take measures for controlling or allocating
energy products and for banning advertising; the other authorizes it to adopt
measures to reduce consumption specifically for heating purposes.
The ECA launched a publicity campaign in 1975. Six films appeared on
television a total of 65 times and six advertisements appeared in daily newspapers
and magazines (a total of 250 times). This campaign was continued in 1976 and
1977. The ECA conducts a telephone answering service allowing the public to obtain
energy conservation information.
Since mid-1974 the government has rationed heating oil sales. Oilcompanies'
sales are limited to 95 percent of the previous year's sales plus an adjustment for a
natural expansion due to an increased housing stock. The rationing system is
supported by fines. In addition, quantities delivered above the official limits are
deducted from individual company quotas the following year. The quota was met in
1974 but exceeded by 2 percent in 1975/76 heating year (1 July-30 June).
Preliminary data indicate sales in 1976/77 heating season were 5 percent below the
quota. The quota for 1977/78 is tentatively set at only 2 percent above last year's
consumption level.
In December 1974 the government set an upper temperature limit of 20?C in
all homes, apartments, offices, and public buildings. Agents of the Measuring Instru-
ments Service are authorized to make spot checks and through 1976 nearly 21,000
checks had occurred. Fines of $120 to $200 can be issued for infractions of
temperature limits. A total of 370 warnings or fines were issued in 1975.
In September 1975 the government ordered. that all new multiple-unit buildings
with a central heating system be equipped to permit an allocation of individual
heating costs. Moreover, all multiple-unit buildings had to be equipped by September
1977 with devices to permit individual allocation of"hot water costs.
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Transport Sector
Because gasoline, the major fuel used in the transpo;-t sector, had been re-
strained by a high tax prior to the oil crisis, Paris believes the potential for
conservation in this sector is limited. Moreover, because energy use in this sector is
relatively small, a 50-percent drop in energy use would result in only a 9-percent drop
in total energy use. Nevertheless, the government's 1985 energy-saving target is
120,000 b/d.
Government efforts to promote savings in this sector include a publicity
campaign and the promotion of public transportation. The ECA furnishes energy-
saving information to the public indicating ways of reducing consumption. The
government has circulated several hundred thousand pamphlets indicating the fuel
efficiency of all motor vehicles sold in France_
Since late 1973 the tax on regular gasoline has jumped by 55 percent to 101
cents per US gallon. The automobile property tax is now based on fuel efficiency as
opposed to horsepower as in the past and the government has set speed limits.
Because the speed limits are excessive, 129 kilometers per hour on major highways,
their impact on consumption has been negligible.
In liaison with specialized laboratories the ECA has established methods for
testing fuel-saving devices and measuring fuel efficiency. To receive approval from
the ECA, a saving device must improve efficiency by 8 percent. Since April 1976 the
standard fuel efficiency of private automobiles must be included in all advertising
referring to fuel consumption, power, and performance.
To promote public transportation, the government in my 1974 .reduced the
VAT (value-added tax) on public transportation from 17.6 percent to 7 percent. At
the same time the government raised the gasoline tax.
The government encourages private companies and institutions to research and
develop energy-saving automobiles and fuel. Last May, Elf Aquitaine began market-
ing a new more efficient gasoline called Elf-Moins. Tests have indicated that the
properties of a new additive result in a 6-percent energy saving. Elf Aquitaine
devotes about $5 million, or 10 percent, of its research and development budget to
energy saving.
The 1985 energy-saving target for industry is 320,000 b/d oil equivalent. This
saving will require a 25-percent drop in energy consumption per unit of output. To
attain this objective the ECA estimates that energy investment spending must total
$4 billion from now until. 1985.
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Government efforts to encourage conservation in the industrial sector include a
publicity campaign, regulations, and financial incentives. The aim of the publicity
campaign is to increase awareness of the need to conserve and to inform industry of
existing or new energy-saving techniques, processes, or products. The agency advises
companies on the organization of conservation training courses and, in association
with specialized laboratories, assesses the performance of energy-saving equipment.
In May 1974 the government ordered authorized experts to examine energy use
in major industrial plants. More than 100 experts have been appointed to assess
about 4,000 establishments. The aim of this measure is to force industry to take a
critical look at potential energy savings. In February 1975 the government estab-
lished minimum yields required for boilers.
One of the more visible conservation measures is a special levy imposed in
September 1975 on heavy fuel oil consumption above a certain quota and below a
certain quota. The tax of $4.70 a barrel is equivalent to about 40 percent of the
current spot market price for heavy fuel oil. The levy is partly responsible for the
4-percent drop in heavy fuel oil use since 1973. Individual plants pay the tax on
consumption above 87 percent of 1973 levels. The tax is not imposed on consump-
tion above 112 percent of 1973 levels so as not to penalize growing industries. To
avoid red tape, the tax is not imposed on plants that consume less than 6,700 barrels
annually. The total tax may not exceed 0.4 percent of a plant's annual sales.
Revenue from the levy helps subsidize energy-saving investments. The tax may be
wholly or partially suspended for five years if plants undertake Sectoral Agreements
established by the government industry and trade unions to make energy-saving
investments.
The standard contract Sectoral Agreement is for five years and sets:
? 1980 conservation targets.
? Financing provisions.
? Types of investments qualifying for aid.
? Provisions for metering energy use in plants.
? Procedures for periodic consultations with ECA officials on choices of
energy sources.
The maximum rate of aid was raised from 15 percent to 25 percent this year. In
1976, 17 agreements were concluded with trade organizations covering more than
1,000 plants and representing 65 percent of industrial energy use. The goal of these
agreements is to achieve an annual saving of 100,000 b/d by 1980.
16 November 1977 SECRET
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The government has set insulation standards on ill new buildings. Financial
incentives have been adopted to promote increased insulation in existing dwellings.
'Taxpayers are allowed a tax credit of up to $1,400 plus $200 per person to cover
insulation costs.
Other energy conservation measures in this sector include bans on:
? Interior lighting of unoccupied buildings.
? Lighting advertising signs from I OPM to 7AM.
? Advertising of portable heaters.
In the public sector each ministry is required to develop its own conservation
program. To encourage conservation, the budget for heating is separated in each
ministry and the purchase of automobiles is subject to approval by the Minisrry of
Industry and Research.
The ECA promotes new technology products and processes through a demon-
stration projects scheme. The following are criteria for thi scheme:
? It must he a full scale project.
? The prospects of profitability must be sufficient.
? It must be suited to such general use that appreciable energy savings can
be expected on a national scale.
The government subsidizes up to 50 percent of a project's costs (the average is
20 percent). To date 54 of 80 demonstration projects have been launched in
industry. The projects represent a total investment of about $32 million, including
subsidies of $7 million. The government estimates that these projects will save nearly
200,000 b/d annually by 198.5. At yearend 197612 projects had been completed
with expected energy savings achieved or bettered in 10 of the projects.
Since December 1974 the
Total
Positive
Negative
ECA has banned all advertising
aimed at enc
i
Opinions ......
40
29
11
ourag
ng energy
Applications
28
15
13
consumption. In 1975 a
warnings ....,.
36
special commission set up to
monitor advertising met 1 1 times and handed down over 100 opinions, shown
in the accompanying tabulation.
The advertising law is supported by a prison sentcnence of from ?; tc 12
SECRET 16 November 1977
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months, and a fine of $100 to $5,400, or both to repeat offenders. In 1975, two
citations were issued.
France Toughens Program
Paris has continued to strengthen its conservation program. The budget for
administering the government's program doubled in 1977 to $13 million. In May
1977 a series of new conservation measures were approved, including controls on
water heating and increased insulation standards in new construction. The Industry
Ministry expects the new measures will save 100,000 b/d oil equivalent annually.
In July the government announced plans to spend $300 million next year to
reduce energy consumption. Two-thirds of this will be available to industries that
intend to make energy-saving investments. The government has also decided to tax
industrial energy users and drop incentives to consumption now offered by elec-
tricity and gas utilities. A tax of I to 3 percent on energy used by industries will
start on 1 January 1978, but companies that make energy-saving investments will be
exempted. These new measures stem from the government's disappointment with
industrial energy savings.
In addition to adjusting utility rates to remove advantages of increased con-
sumption, builders of dwellings supplied entirely by electricity will be penalized. A
$500 tax will be imposed on new apartments and $700 on new private homes. From
June 1978 the estimated heating cost will be required in all advertisements of new
homes.
The government also plans to implement recommendations of a special com-
mission that include utilization of waste heat from the thermal power plant at
Cordemais in the Nantes-Saint Nazaire region and the Brigey Plant in the Lyon region
and installation of gas turbines to supply the urban heating system in the northern
Paris suburbs. (Confidential)
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
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 National
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Assessment
Center
International Energy
Biweekly Statistical
Review
16 November 1977
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
This publication is prepared for the use of U.S. Government
officials. The format, coverage and contents of the publication are
designed to meet the specific requirements of those users. U.S.
Government officials may obtain additional copies of this document
directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Non-U.S. Government users may obtain this along with similar
CIA publications on a subscription basis by addressing inquiries to:
Document Expediting (DOCEX) Project
Exchange and Gifts Division
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540
Non-U.S. Government users not interested in the DOCEX
Project subscription service may purchase reproductions of specific
publications on an individual basis from:
Photoduplication Service
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
STATISTICAL REVIEW
Total Free World Oil Production (Chart)
OAPEC Oil Production (Chart)
Non-Arab OPEC Oil Production (Chart)
Free World and USSR Oil Production (Chart)
Inland Oil Consumption (Chart)
Net Oil Imports (Chart)
World Crude Oil Production, Excluding Natural Gas Liquids ............................
1
Free World Crude Oil Production, Including Natural Gas Liquids ..................
2
World Natural Gas Liquid (NGL) Production ......................................................
2
OAPEC and OPEC Countries: Crude Oil Production ........................................
3
OAPEC and OPEC Countries: Crude Oil Production Capacity ..........................
3
Estimated Proved and Probable Petroleum Reserves ..........................................
4
Estimated Imports of Crude Oil and Refined Products, 1976 ............................
5
Selected Developed Countries: Crude Oil Imports, by Source ............................
6
Selected Developed Countries: Trends in Oil Trade ............................................
10
Developed Countries: Exports to OPEC ................................................................
13
Developed Countries: Imports from OPEC ..........................................................
14
Selected OECD Countries: Trends in Inland Oil Consumption ..........................
16
Selected OECD Countries: Oil Stocks .....................................................................
20
OECD Oil Consumption ..........................................................................................
21
Western Europe: Oil Spot Market Prices, 1974-77 ..............................................
21
Selected Developed Countries: Retail Petroleum Product Prices ........................
22
OPEC Countries: Crude Oil Prices ..........................................................................
23
USSR: Crude Oil Production ..................................................................................
24
USSR: Regional Production of Crude Oil ..............................................................
24
USSR: Imports of Oil ................................................................................................
24
USSR: Exports of Oil ................................................................................................
25
USSR: Oil Consumption ..........................................................................................
25
USSR: Natural Gas Production ................................................................................
26
USSR: Regional Production of Natural Gas ..........................................................
26
USSR: Natural Gas Trade ........................................................................................
26
USSR: Consumption of Natural Gas ..................................................
Eastern Europe: Oil Production and Consumption ..............................................
27
Eastern Europe: Oil Trade ........................................................................................
28
Eastern Europe: Natural Gas Production and Consumption ..............................
28
Eastern Europe: Natural Gas Trade ......................................................................
29
PRC: Oil Production, Consumption, and Trade ..................................................
29
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 WVr"CLdZJIL4/Offdl5tiC.I IUIV401MILLION BID
Including Bahrain, Egypt, end Syria which are not members of OPEC.
Non-OPEC Including about 1 million bid of Free World net imports from the Communist countries.
1973
ilncluding natural gas liquids
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 OARIEC6rCMi6aR MMJCTIINAW996WMg1 Wib 10001-0
Saudi Arabia
Including about one-half of Neutral Zone production.
Kuwait
Including about one-half of Neutral Zone production.
3.5
Iraq
1973 1974 1975 1976 :1977
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1973
iMajor producers
NON-ARAB OPEC OIL PRODUCTION 1 MILLION B/D
Venezuela
Nigeria
V
2.0 2.0
JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
iMajor producers 574475 11-77
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~'IEE WORLD AND
USSR OIL PRODUCTION MILLION B/D
10.0
USSR
United States
s
10.0
--8.4-
- 0.9
United Kingdom
1973 AVERAGE -0.032-
574476 11-77
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INLAND OIL CONSUMPTION' MILLION B/D
ao IEA Total 26 United States
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
3 West Germany
United Kingdom
3
JAN
Italy
Principal products only.
3 France
Canada
3
JAN APR JUL OCT
I-Except for the United States, excluding bunkers, refinery fuel, and losses.
574392 10-77
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NET OIL IMPORTS MILLION B/D
25
23
Big Seven
Japan
3 United Kingdom
12 United States
Bureau of the Mines data
through Feb 1976, thereafter API.
1977
~-~? 1976
1975
1974
1973
West Germany France
3 Italy
iCanada
1
JAN APR JUL OCT
-1
JAN APR Jul. OCT
'574477 11-77
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World
55,755
55,875
52,990
57,350
59,130
59,200
57,910
58,700
Free World
45,850
45,145
41,470
45,110
46,520
48,400
45,000
45,750
Western hemisphere
16,145
15,290
14,135
13,820
13,850
13,740
13,860
14,400
United States'
9,210
8,770
8,370
8,120
7,960
8,040
8,190
8,460
8,650
Venezuela
3,365
2,975
2,345
2,290
2,350
2,170
2,200
2,280
Canada'
1,800
1,695
1,460
1,300
1,320
1,280
1,130
1,320
1,210
Mexico'
465
580
720
850
910
980
1,050
1,050
Argentina
420
410
390
390
430
430
450
450
Ecuador
210
175
160
190
200
170
150
190
140
Other
675
685
690
680
680
670
690
650
Eastern hemisphere
29,705
29,855
27,335
31,290
32,670
32,660
31,140
31,350
Western Europe
370
380
550
850
1,290
1,320
1,300
1,410
Norway
30
35
190
280
340
200
220
270
United Kingdom
Negl.
Negl.
20
240
630
800
770
820
Other
340
345
340
330
320
320
310
320
Middle East
21,215
21,855
19,590
22,180
22,300
22,140
21,110
21,020
Saudi Arabia
7,595
8,480
7,075
8,580
9,310
9,400
9,800
8,620
8,660
Iran
5,860
6,020
5,350
5,900
5,790
5,420
4,710
5,660
5,970
Kuwait
3,020
2,545
2,085
2,150
1,850
1,850
1,630
1,790
2,250
Iraq
2,020
1,970
2,260
2,420
2,230
2,330
1,900
1,900
2,100
United Arab Emirates
1,535
1,680
1,665
1,940
2,010
2,070
2,050
1,930
Abu Dhabi
1,305
1,410
1,370
1,590
1,660
1,720
1,720
1,600
1,650
Dubai
230
240
255
310
320
320
310
310
Sharjah
0
30
40
40
40
30
20
20
Qatar
570
520
440
490
420
410
390
500
340
Oman
295
290
340
370
370
350
330
330
Syria
100
120
185
200
200
190
180
180
Other
220
230
190
130
120
120
120
110
Africa
5,900
5,370
4,980
5,790
6,330
6,420
5,940
6,140
Nigeria
2,055
2,255
1,785
2,070
2,220
2,240
2,060
2,020
Libya
2,175
1,520
1,480
1,930
2,130
2,150
1,890
2,130
Algeria
1,070
960
960
990
1,070
1,060
1,000
1,000
Gabon
150
200
225
220
220
220
230
230
230
Egypt
165
145
250
330
370
430
440
440
Angola/Cabinda
160
170
140
110
170
160
160
160
Other
125
120
140
140
150
160
160
160
Asia-Pacific
2,220
2,250
2,215
2,470
2,750
2,780
2,790
2,780
Australia
370
390
410
420
430
430
440
440
Indonesia
1,340
1,375
1,305
1,500
1,690
1,700
1,690
1,680
1,670
Malaysia-Brunei
320
290
300
330
380
400
410
410
Other
190
195
200
220
250
250
250
250
Communist Countries
9,905
10,730
11,520
12,240
12,610
12,800
12,910
12,950
USSR
8,420
9,020
9,630
10,170
10,510
10,660
10,740
10,780
China
1,090
1,310
1,490
1,670
1,700
1,740
1,770
1,770
Romania
285
290
290
290
290
290
290
290
Other
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
' Natural gas liquids amounted to an estimated 1.6 million b/d in Sep.
Q Natural gas liquids amounted to an estimated 340,000 b/d in Sep.
s Natural gas liquids amounted to an estimated 95,000 b/d in Aug.
Including about one-half of Neutral Zone crude oil production, which amounted to about 320,000 b/d in Sep.
1
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 Approved For Rele r e;OQd1(p411 IA RDP 9.90457A0101a 00015001-0
on, ng
1973
1974
1975
1976
Free World'
48,975
48,565
44,970
48,940
Non-OPEC Producers
17,665
17,505
17,425
17,755
United States
10,950
10,460
10,000
9,725
Canada
2,120
2,005
1,770
1,620
United Kingdom
Negl.
Negl.
25
280
Norway
30
35
195
300
Mexico
535
660
800
935
Other 2
3,530
3,545
3,735
3,795
OPEC
31,310
31,060
27,545
31,185
Saudi Arabia
7,685
8,610
7,215
8,765
Kuwait
3,080
2,595
2,135
2,205
Libya
2,210
1,540
1,510
1,965
Iraq
2,020
1,970
2,260
2,420
UAE
1,535
1,680
1,665
1,940
Abu Dhabi
1,305
1,410
1,370
1,590
Dubai
230
240
255
310
Sharjah
0
30
40
40
Algeria
1,100
1,010
1,020
1,080
Qatar
570
525
450
500
Iran
5,900
6,065
5,395
5,945
Venezuela
3,455
3,060
2,420
2,365
Nigeria
2,055
2,255
1,785
2,070
Indonesia
1,340
1,375
1,305
1,520
Gabon
150
200
225
220
Ecuador
210
175
160
190
1st Qtr
2d Qtr
Jul
Aug
Sep
50,240
50
120
48
720
49
480
18,170
,
18,350
,
18,440
,
18,970
9,540
9,620
9,770
10,040
10,230
1,660
1,620
1,470
1,660
1,550
680
850
820
870
375
235
255
305
1,005
1,075
1,145
1,145
4,010
4,050
4,080
4,050
32,070
31,770
30,280
30,510
9,510
9,600
10,000
8,820
8,860
1,910
1,910
1,690
1,850
2,310
2,165
2,185
1,925
2,165
2,235
2,335
1,905
1,905
2,020
2,080
2,060
1,940
1,670
1,730
1,730
1,610
310
320
310
310
40
30
20
20
1,170
1,160
1,100
1,100
430
420
400
510
350
5,840
5,470
4,760
5,710
6,020
2,430
2,250
2,280
2,360
2,220
2,240
2,060
2,020
1,720
1,730
1,720
1,710
220
220
230
230
230
200
170
150
190
140
1 Free World and Non-OPEC Producers totals include net Communist imports of about 500,000 b/d in
900,000 b/d in 1975, 1,100,000 b/d in 1976, and 900,000 b/d in 1977.
2 Including Bahrain, Egypt, and Syria.
Including about one-half of Neutral Zone production.
World
2,845
2,860
2,855
2,995
3,095
Middle East
190
230
245
295
335
Free World
2,625
2,620
2,600
2,730
2,820
Saudi Arabia
90
130
140
185
200
OPEC
345
385
410
515
580
Iran
40
45
45
45
50
Non-OPEC
2,280
2,235
2,190
2,215
2,240
Kuwait
60
50
50
55
60
Western Hemisphere
2,275
2,220
2,150
2,140
2,150
Qatar
0
5
10
10
10
United States
1,740
1,690
1,630
1,605
1,580
Abu Dhabi
0
0
0
0
10
Venezuela
90
85
75
75
80
Iraq
0
0
0
0
5
Canada
320
310
310
320
340
Africa
65
70
90
125
135
Mexico
70
80
80
85
95
Libya
35
20
30
35
35
Other
55
55
55
55
55
Algeria
30
50
60
90
100
Eastern Hemisphere
350
400
450
590
670
Asia-Pacific
60
65
70
95
110
Western Europe
35
35
45
95
120
Australia
50
50
50
55
60
Norway
0
0
5
20
35
Indonesia
0
0
0
20
30
United Kingdom
0
0
15
40
50
Other
10
15
20
20
20
Other
35
35
35
35
35
Communist Countries
220
240
255
265
275
USSR
210
230
240
250
260
China
Other
N. A.
10
N.A.
10
N.A.
15
N. A.
15
N.A.
15
2
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
OAPEC' and OPEC 0 Countries: Crude Oil Production
1973
1974
1975
1976
1st Qtr
2d Qtr
Jul
Aug
Total OAPEC (thousand b/d)
18,090
17,735
16,165
18,740
19,300
19,600
19,010
18,210
% change from Sep 1973'
-11
-19
-6
-4
-2
-5
-9
% change from Dec 1976'
-8
-7
-10
-14
Total OPEC (thousand b/d)
30,965
30,675
27,135
30,670
31,490
31,190
29,700
29,930
% change from Sep 1973 s
-7
-18
-7
-4
-5
-10
-9
% change from Dec 1976 4
-8
-8
-13
-12
' The members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries are Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.
E The membership of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries consists of OAPEC members (excluding Bahrain, Egypt, and
Syria), plus Dubai, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Sharjah, and Venezuela.
In Sep 1973, the pre-crisis level of output, OAPEC countries produced 20,038 b/d and OPEC countries 32,956 b/d.
In Dec 1976, the post-crisis peak of output, OAPEC countries produced 21,060 b/d and OPEC countries 34,070 b/d.
OAPEC and OPEC Countries: Crude Oil Production Capacity
Underutilization
of Productive
Capacity
Estimated Productive
Capacity'
July
Aug
Saudi Arabia 2
10,500
700
1,880
Kuwait 2
3,500
1,870
1,710
Libya
2,500
610
370
Iraq
3,000
1,100
1,100
Abu Dhabi
2,000
280
400
Algeria
1,080
80
80
Qatar
700
310
200
Egypt
450
10
10
Syria
200
20
20
Bahrain
60
0
10
Total OAPEC
23,990
4,980
5,780
Iran
6,700
1,990
1,040
Venezuela
2,600
400
320
Nigeria
2,300
240
280
Indonesia
1,800
110
120
Dubai
340
30
30
Gabon
250
20
20
Ecuador
225
35
35
Sharjah
50
30
30
Total OPEC
37,545
7,845
7,615
Estimated at maximum efficient rate (MER) of production. In some cases output can exceed the MER
for short periods of time without damaging the fields.
z Including about one-half of Neutral Zone capacity production.
OAPEC members (excluding Bahrain, Egypt, and Syria), plus the other countries shown.
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
A Note on Petroleum Reserves
Any estimate of oil and natural gas reserves must be treated as rough approxima-
tion. Few countries publish official reserve estimates, and there is no consistent
rigorous definition of reserves. Moreover, the volume of oil and/or gas in place, even
in a well-delineated field, can never be precisely accurate; estimates of commercially
recoverable oil and natural gas are usually made not by reference to existing
technology but by reference to the production system currently in use, and even this
can provide only an approximation. Assessments of proved reserves therefore do not
mean absolute world availability; they are only an indication of the quantity of oil that
is technically and economically feasible to extract with current techniques at current
prices.
CIA's reserve figures are for proved and probable reserves and are based on the
best available published information and on our own judgemental analysis in cases
where we have unique information. CIA uses the restrictive definition of probable
reserves (as differentiated from possible reserves), common in the industry. Our proved
and probable figure does not differ greatly from the proved figure in many cases, such
as Venezuela, Iran, and Libya. In these countries, extensive exploration has taken
place and extent:ions of known fields are considered unlikely. In other cases-such as
Saudi Arabia, Mexico, and the United Kingdom-differences between proved and
proved and probable reserves are considerably larger.
Area and Country
Crude Oil
Billion
Barrels
Natural Gas
Trillion
Cubic
Feet
Area and Country
Crude Oil
Billion
Barrels
Natural Gas
Trillion
Cubic
Feet
World
665
2,626
Africa
59
211
Free World
600
1,764
Libya
25
25
Western Hemisphere
96
426
Nigeria
19
46
United States 2
39
219
Algeria
7
127
Mexico
25
43
Egypt
4
3
Venezuela
14
43
Gabon
1
Negl.
Canada 2
8
71
Angola-Cabinda
1
Negl.
Ecuador
2
11
Tunisia
1
7
Argentina
2
11
Other
1
3
Brazil
1
7
Western Europe
31
177
Colombia
1
7
United Kingdom
20
46
Peru
2
7
Norway
8
25
Trinidad and Tobago
2
7
Netherlands
Negl.
71
Eastern Hemisphere
504
1,338
Spain
1
Negl.
Middle East
392
845
Other
2
35
Saudi Arabia
158
106
Asia-Pacific
22
105
Kuwait
71
35
Indonesia
14
21
Iran 3
60
600
Brunei
2
11
Iraq
36
35
Malaysia
2
14
United Arab Emirates
34
Australia
2
35
Neutral Zone
17
India
2
3
Qatar
7
Pakistan
Negl.
21
Oman
6
Communist Countries
65
862
Syria
2
USSR
40
812
Other
1
China
20
25
Other
5
25
' Equivalent to 470 billion barrels of oil.
2 Including Arctic gas deposits and natural gas liquids.
' Including recent discoveries.
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
Estimated Imports of Crude Oil and Refined Products
1976
West
Belgium/
Other
US `
Western Ger-
Japan Canada Europe many
France
UK
Italy
Nether-
lands
Luxem-
bourg
Spain
Western
Europe
Algeria
437
2
14
430
213
94
19
70
3
3
28
0
Bahrain
3
32
0
8
1
0
6
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
Egypt
17
1
2
34
1
13
8
0
11
1
1
87
264
Iraq
38
128
33
1,171
35
327
105
318
34
131
Kuwait
9
450
6
674
38
86
229
13
111
8
58
8
Libya
532
41
25
1,150
424
63
57
237
12
0
89
26
45
Qatar
69
6
0
293
24
58
94
22
50
0
0
7
Saudi Arabia
1,371
1,719
122
3,262
379
877
370
516
354
293
376
0
9
0
Syria
1
0
0
107
23
53
3
0
0
28
0
206
UAE
319
530
16
813
138
234
74
20
115
26
Total OAPEC
2,796
2,909
218
7,942
1,276
1,805
965
1,196
691
360
638
1,011
Ecuador
63
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Gabon
46
0
12
65
11
29
1
0
3
0
21
3
Indonesia
573
613
0
6
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
Iran
548
974
162
2,341
383
291
399
290
327
73
179
399
46
Nigeria
1,124
17
36
699
181
155
76
16
195
30
0
Venezuela
985
6
302
226
38
36
41
26
11
3
23
48
5
7
Total OPEC
6,114
4,486
730
11,130
1,867
2,250
1,465
1,528
1,215
437
861
1,
0
Canada
599
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Mexico
91
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Other
470
716
24
2,362 a *
917
282
570
740
208
288
123
1,766
273
Total
7,295
5,235
756
13,641
2,809
2,598
2,052
2,268
1,435
754
984
2,
Products traced to source of crude oil.
2 OAPEC members excluding Bahrain, Egypt, and Syria plus other countries shown.
s Because of intra-European trade, components do not add to the totals shown.
Other and unknown.
5
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
Selected Developed Countries: Crude Oil Imports, by Source
United States
Algeria
Egypt
Iraq
Kuwait
Libya
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
United Arab Emirates'
Other2
Total OAPEC
Ecuador
Gabon
Indonesia
Iran
Nigeria
Venezuela
Total OPEC
Canada
Mexico
UK
Norway
Other
Total
Canada
Algeria
Egypt
Iraq
Kuwait
Libya
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
United Arab Emirates'
Other 2
Total OAPEC
Ecuador
Gabon
Indonesia
Iran
Nigeria
Venezuela
Total OPEC'
Other
Total
Sep 1973
(P
re-
Crisis
Level)
1974
1975
1976
1st
Qtr
Apr
May
124
180
264
408
527
654
381
0
9
5
17
12
16
82
17
0
2
26
28
52
168
44
5
4
1
64
67
51
153
4
223
444
641
776
749
41
17
18
24
39
34
94
599
438
701
1,222
1,371
1,429
1,716
88
69
117
255
336
324
237
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
1,066
722
1,334
2,397
3,024
3,352
3,478
33
42
57
51
51
53
77
0
23
27
26
37
26
42
249
284
379
536
565
474
480
205
463
278
298
518
517
535
409
697
746
1,014
1,278
1,238
1,060
405
319
395
241
173
285
251
2,367
2,541
3,211
4,546
5,628
5,929
5,841
998
791
600
371
282
313
248
8
2
70
87
144
145
174
0
0
Negl.
13
86
35
50
0
1
12
35
54
0
59
98
133
207
218
308
347
367
3,471
3,477
4,105
5,287
6,520
6,785
6,821
Sep 1973
(Pre-
Crisis
Est
2d
Level)
1974
1975
1976
Qtr
Qtr
Jul
0
12
Negl.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
23
10
31
29
17
6
36
0
25
29
2
0
0
0
56
9
9
20
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
82
91
165
109
188
168
145
49
24
46
57
4
11
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
210
171
282
217
209
185
182
13
6
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
149
199
202
157
145
126
94
39
14
17
28
11
7
0
485
351
265
269
263
262
215
896
741
770
671
828
580
491
44
79
54
49
83
109
123
940
820
824
720
711
689
614
Sep May
1973 1977
3.6 5.6
0 1.2
0.5 2.5
1.3 0.7
4.4 11.0
1.2 1.4
17.3 25.2
2.5 3.5
0 0
30:7 51.0
0.9 1.1
0 0.6
7.2 7.0
5.9 7.8
11.8 15.5
11.7 3.7
68.2 85.6
28.8 3.6
0.2 2.6
0 0.7
0 0.9
2.8 5.4
100.0 100.0
Sep Jul
1973 1977
0 0
0 0
2.4 5.9
0 0
6.0 0
0 0
8.7 23.6
5.2 0.2
0 0
22.3 29.6
1.4 0
0 0
0 0
15.9 15.3
4.1 0
51.6 35.0
95.3 80.0
4.7 20.0
100.0 100.0
6
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
Selected Developed Countries; Crude Oil Imports, by Source
(Continued)
Japan
Algeria
Egypt
Iraq
Kuwait
Libya
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
United Arab Emirates'
OtherI
Total OAPEC
Ecuador
Gabon
Indonesia
Iran
Nigeria
Venezuela
Total OPEC 3
Other
Total
United Kingdom
Abu Dhabi
Algeria
Egypt
Iraq
Kuwait
Libya
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Other 3
Total OAPEC
Dubai
Ecuador
Gabon
Indonesia
Iran
Nigeria
Sharjah
Venezuela
Total OPEC 3
Other
Total
Sep 1973
(P
-
re
Crisis
Level)
0
0
0
488
31
0
1,148
511
0
2,181
0
0
638
1,554
101
7
4,481
397
4,878
1974
5
2
40
479
70
6
1,304
533
0
2,439
0
0
671
1,222
87
9
4,428
370
4,798
1975
6
0
92
416
59
3
1,355
408
0
2,339
0
0
518
1,147
71
5
4,080
459
4,539
1976
0
Negl.
127
342
41
2
1,572
530
0
2,814
0
0
553
928
17
6
4,118
483
4,601
1st
Qtr
0
0
162
350
11
28
1,846
586
0
2,983
0
0
669
957
0
7
4,616
568
5,184
2d
Qtr
4
0
162
399
35
21
1,429
494
0
2,544
0
0
665
771
0
7
3,987
485
4,472
Jul
0
0
318
255
13
0
1,445
486
0
2,517
0
0
628
666
0
7
3,818
580
4,398
Aug
11
0
132
403
21
51
1,723
579
0
2,920
0
0
706
824
0
0
4,450
490
4,940
Sep 1973
(P
-
re
Crisis
Level)
1974
1975
1976
Qtr
Qtr
Jul
Aug
28
86
47
29
35
44
45
41
46
10
29
18
14
8
12
12
0
5
16
3
0
11
37
0
67
64
52
105
114
110
50
80
293
343
218
229
181
217
183
147
98
175
53
45
20
50
62
32
73
96
77
94
78
24
34
20
530
712
444
370
405
457
361
275
0
0
16
3
0
0
0
0
1,135
1,491
952
896
847
921
784
807
48
26
30
45
36
36
14
74
0
0
0.
0
0
0
0
0
0
14
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
317
290
351
398
414
269
145
243
188
158
117
76
70
13
16
18
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
66
66
64
29
16
22
18
33
1,754
2,040
1,482
1,438
1,383
1,250
940
975
163
226
261
326
263
240
170
288
1,917
2,271
1,775
1,770
11,648
1,501
1,147
1,263
Sep
Aug
1973
1977
0
0.2
0
0
0
2.7
10.0
8.2
0.6
0.4
0
1.0
23.5
34.9
10.5
11.7
0
0
44.7
59.1
0
0
0
0
13.1
14.3
31.9
16.7
2.1
0
0.1
0
91.9
90.1
8.1
9.9
100.0
100.0
1973
1977
1.5
3.2
2.4
1.0
0
0
3.5
6.3
15.3
11.6
5.1
2.5
3.8
1.6
27.6
21.8
0
0
59.2
48.1
2.5
5.9
0
0
0
0
0
0
16.5
19.2
9.8
1.4
0 0
3.4 2.6
91.5 77.2
8.5 22.8
100.0 100.0
7
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
Selected Developed Countries: Crude Oil Imports, by Source
(Continued)
Sep 1973
(Pre-
Crisis
Level)
1974
1975
1976
Qtr
Qtr
Jul
1973
1977
West Germany
Algeria
239
201
204
210
227
164
215
10.4
10.5
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
Egypt
Iraq
43
73
28
35
31
21
0
1.9
0
Kuwait
102
82
54
25
24
16
0
4.4
0
Libya
418
320
296
421
470
354
408
18.2
20.0
Qatar
18
20
25
24
13
24
0
0.8
0
Saudi Arabia
710
514
371
378
376
404
545
30.9
26.7
United Arab Emirates'
162
169
158
125
155
156
140
7.1
6.9
Other 2
26
19
16
25
22
25
26
1.1
1.3
Total OAPEC
1,718
1,398
1,156
1,243
1,318
1,164
1,334
74.8
65.3
Ecuador
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Gabon
32
19
21
11
10
0
1.4
0
Indonesia
0
0
0
4
25
8
1
0
Negl.
Iran
248
265
281
380
338
319
288
10.8
14.1
Nigeria
168
241
202
181
162
177
227
7.3
11.1
Venezuela
42
38
43
28
16
18
31
1.8
1.5
Total OPEC'
2,182
1,942
1,686
1,822
1,844
1,671
1,855
95.0
90.8
UK
0
0
0
14
52
66
51
0
2.5
Norway
Negl.
a
12
23
38
12
27
0
1.3
Other
89
86
89
95
62
81
83
3.9
4.1
Total
2,297
2,050
1,807
1,979
2,018
1,855
2,042
100.0
100.0
Sep 1973
(Pre-
Crisis
Level)
1974
1975
1976
Qtr
Qtr
Jul
Aug
1973
1977
France
Abu Dhabi
249
268
210
202
186
214
158
147
9.0
6.2
4
5
Algeria
227
181
118
95
99
92
81
107
8.2
.
1
0
4
13
11
3
0
0
Negl.
0
Egypt
Iraq
375
330
240
335
379
274
436
447
13.6
18.9
Kuwait
316
246
134
86
103
57
84
59
11.4
2.5
Libya
131
74
44
62
38
42
74
46
4.7
1.9
Qatar
69
70
47
58
84
35
59
60
2.5
2.5
Saudi Arabia
623
842
669
870
832
813
834
987
22.5
41.8
Other 2
12
10
41
60
49
60
60
18
0.4
0.8
Total OAPEC
2,003
2,021
1,507
1,781
1,781
1,595
1,786
1,871
72.5
79.3
Dubai
27
36
43
33
52
31
41
62
1.0
2.6
Ecuador
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Gabon
33
43
27
29
53
44
42
36
1.2
1.5
Indonesia
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Iran
216
174
266
294
336
197
102
85
7.8
3.6
Nigeria
253
208
175
150
127
160
168
150
9.2
6.4
Sharjah
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Venezuela
36
28
15
t6
10
14
17
31
1.3
1.3
Total OPEC'
2,555
2,500
1,988
2,230
2,299
1,973
2,096
2,217
92.4
93.9
UK
0
0
0
7
0
28
37
31
0
1.3
Norway
0
2
18
46
0
22
17
14
0
0.6
Other
196
92
69
61
113
91
79
80
7.1
3.4
Total
2,7644
2,604
2,120
2,417
2,472
2,182
2,289
2,380
100.0
100.0
8
Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
Selected Developed Countries: Crude Oil Imports, by Source
(Continued)
4th Qtr
1973 (Pre-
Crisis 1st 2d
Level) 1974 1975 1976 Qtr Qtr
Italy
Algeria 61 49 77 51 22 20
0 0 0 0 0 0
Egypt
Iraq 383 269 374 312 331 327
212 130 82 47 167 114
Kuwait
Libya 597 478 260 340 302 328
21 57 26 26 24 20
Qatar
Saudi Arabia 692 824 527 545 605 694
United Arab Emirates 0 13 33 50 99 34
0 0
Other E 0 0 0 0
Total OAPEC 1,966 1,820 1,379 1,371 1,550 1,537
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gabon 3 10 6 1 10 0
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iran 277 301 258 292 250 296
Nigeria 9 63 7 7 10 18
Venezuela 18 13 20 16 12 34
273 2,207 1,670 1,687 1,832 1,885
,
l OPEC' 2
a
t
T
o
0
4th Qtr
2d Qtr
1973
1977
2.4
0.9
0
0
15.2
15.0
5.3
23.7
15.0
0.8
0.9
27.5
31.8
0
1.6
0
0
78.2
70.5
0
0.1
0
0
0
11.0
13.6
0.4
0.8
0.7
1.6
90.4
86.5
0
UK 0 0 0 13 4
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other' 241 190 271 371 348 295 9.6 13.5
T5Other'
2,514 2,397 1,941 2,071 2,184 2,180 100.0 100.0
Total o
'Including oil imports from Abu Dhabi and possibly from Dubai and Sharjah, which are not members of OAPEC.
Including, when applicable, Bahrain and Syria.
Consisting of OAPEC members (excluding Bahrain, Egypt, and Syria) plus the other countries shown.
Estimated.
Including data that cannot be distributed by area of origin.
Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
 Approved For Release 2dOlf6 ?v1l?1 21 DR79'BOO457AO0141M010001-0
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Annua
Dec Average
United States'
1973
Crude imports
P
d
2,732
2,873
3,162
3,049
3,215
3,220 3,501
3,593
3,471
3
740
3
452
2
891
3
244
ro
uct imports
3,079
3,501
3,413
2,551
2,603
2,659 2,671
2,913
2
903
,
2
785
,
3
412
,
3
055
,
3
012
Total imports
5,811
6,374
6,575
5,600
5,818
5,879 6,172
6,506
,
6
374
,
6
525
,
6
864
,
5
946
,
6
256
Exports
210
260
224
275
237
215 240
217
,
242
,
221
,
202
,
227
,
231
Net imports
1974
5,601
6,114
6,351
5,325
5,581
5,664 5,932
6,289
6,132
6,304
6,662
5,719
6,025
Crude imports
2,382
2,248
2,462
3,267
3,908
3,925 4,091
3,924
3
797
3
810
3
958
3
869
3
477
Product imports
T
2,973
2,973
2,753
2,703
2,580
2,493 2,397
2,434
,
2
225
,
2
320
,
2
704
,
2
853
,
2
611
otal imports
5,355
5,221
5,215
5,970
6,488
6,418 6,488
6,358
,
6
022
,
6
130
,
6
662
,
6
722
,
6
088
Exports
207
203
196
243
247
238 253
247
,
171
,
221
,
186
,
231
,
220
Net imports
1975
5,148
5,018
5,019
5,727
6,241
6,180 6,235
6,111
5,851
5,909
6,476
6,491
5,868
Crude imports
P
d
4,029
3,828
3,656
3,378
3,486
3,905 4,192
4,581
4
689
4
389
4
623
4
476
4
105
ro
uct imports
T
l
2,832
2,348
2,074
1,662
1,728
1,502 1,767
1,717
,
2
115
,
1
940
,
1
796
,
1
949
,
1
951
ota
imports
E
6,861
6,176
5,730
5,040
5,214
5,407 5,959
6,298
,
6,804
,
6
329
,
6
419
,
6
425
,
6
056
xports
228
248
213
190
202
224 186
203
205
,
187
,
166
,
262
,
209
Net imports
1976
6,633
5,928
5,517
4,850
5,012
5,183 5,773
6,095
6,599
6,142
6,253
6,163
5,847
Crude imports
4,594
4,208
4,738
4,790
4,669
5,621 5,792
5,556
5
875
5
699
5
955
5
925
5
287
Product imports
T
l
2,016
2,423
1,946
1,805
1,654
1,858 2,099
1,826
,
2,038
,
1
808
,
2
115
,
2
353
,
2
008
ota
imports
6,610
6,631
6,684
6,595
6,323
7,479 7,891
7,382
7
913
,
7
507
,
8
070
,
8
278
,
7
295
Exports
N
156
241
185
222
180
213 242
220
,
196
,
198
,
348
,
309
,
226
et imports
1977
6,454
6,390
6,499
6,373
6,143
7,266 7,649
7,162
7,717
7,309
7.720
7,969
7,069
Crude imports
6,288
6,652
6,633
6,785
6,821
6,947 6,656
572
6
6
580
Product imports
2,594
3,278
2,529
1,886
1,754
1,855 1
800
,
010
2
,
2
170
Total imports
8,882
9,930
9,162
8,671
8,575
,
8,802 8
456
,
8
582
,
8
750
Exports
192
234
207
223
288
,
256 212
,
228
,
214
Net imports
Canada
8,690
9,696
8,955
8,448
8,287
8,546 8,244
8,354
8,536
1973
Crude imports
P
d
945
975
932
772
930
741 1,058
937
940
799
934
802
897
ro
uct imports
163
93
55
37
119
121 122
153
105
132
140
149
130
Total imports
1,108
1,068
987
809
1,049
862 1,180
1,090
1
045
931
1
074
951
1
027
Exports
1,357
1,500
1,364
1,472
1,495
1,446 1,162
1,298
,
1
300
1
363
,
1
357
1
237
,
1
364
Net imports
1974
-249
-432
-377
-663
-446
-584 18
-208
,
-255
,
-432
,
-283
,
-322
,
-337
Crude imports
822
988
717
718
971
763 816
817
672
787
'798
721
820
Product imports
T
l
96
44
142
33
114
125 89
104
58
75
87
74
83
ota
imports
918
1,032
859
751
1,085
888 905
921
730
862
885
795
903
Exports
1,180
1,402
1,056
1,266
1,270
1,220 956
978
1,026
988
1
110
981
1
086
Net imports
1975
-262
-370
-197
-515
-185
-332 -51
- 57
-296
-126
,
-225
-186
,
-183
Crude imports
P
d
1,052
915
849
804
1,067
850 678
946
716
516
562
929
824
ro
uct imports
T
l
48
68
27
46
56
56 48
50
40
57
26
27
41
ota
imports
E
1,100
983
876
850
1,123
906 726
996
756
573
588
956
865
xports
N
1,122
1,068
834
815
745
702 893
903
936
921
1
017
848
899
et imports
1976
- 22
- 85
42
35
378
204 -167
93
-180
-348
,
-429
108
-34
Crude imports
d
738
783
870
802
793
832 825
728
409
565
690
596
720
Pro
uct imports
21
26
30
16
45
45 43
54
23
60
50
20
36
Total imports
E
759
809
900
818
838
877 868
782
432
625
740
616
756
xports
N
1,029
669
569
636
650
676 815
571
603
605
625
612
646
et imports
1977
-270
140
331
182
188
201 53
211
-171
20
115
4
110
Crude imports
729
645
752
585
679
802 614
Product imports
28
25
27
19
49
60 37
Total imports
757
670
779
604
728
862 651
Exports
611
568
522
526
515
506 523
Net imports
Japan
146
102
257
78
213
356 128
1973
Crude imports
P
d
4,662
4,775
4,830
4,864
4,918
5,043 4,697
5,550
4,878
5
483 5
029
5
139
4
992
ro
uct imports
T
l
640
803
650
542
664
640 523
507
443
,
,
592 533
,
486
,
584
ota
imports
5,302
5,578
5,480
5,406
5,582
5,683 5,220
6,057
5
321
6
075 5
562
5
625
5
576
Exports
N
11
33
23
28
19
13 39
31
,
21
,
,
25 13
,
25
,
24
et imports
5,291
5,545
5,457
5
378
5
563
5
670 5
181
6
026
5
1974
,
,
,
,
,
,300
6,050 5,549
5,600
5,552
Crude imports
P
d
4,467
5,008
4,886
5,120
4,794
4,878 5,204
4,601
4
214
4
763 4
818
4
834
4
798
ro
uct imports
T
l
648
671
684
625
858
823 755
624
,
531
,
,
529 569
,
597
,
662
ota
imports
5,115
5,679
5,570
5,745
5,652
5,701 5,959
5,225
4
745
5
292 5
387
5
431
5
460
Exports
N
14
25
16
20
24
17 25
93
,
135
,
,
46 79
,
179
,
56
et imports
5,101
5,654
5,554
5,725
5,628
5,684 5,934
5,132
4,610
5,246 5,308
5,252
5
404
Approved For Release 2001/04/11 : CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
,
10
 Selected Developed Countries: Trends in Oil Trade
Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CI 4EIIP9BOO457AOO11OOO1OOO1-0
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Annual
Dec Average
Japan (Continued)
1975
Crude imports
Product imports
Total imports
Exports
Net imports
1976
Crude imports
Product imports
Total imports
Exports
Net imports
1977
Crude imports
Product imports
Total imports
Exports
Net imports
France
4,581
471
5,052
80
4,972
3,901
699
4,600
3
4,597
5,023
584
5,607
7
5,600
4,502
367
4,869
52
4,817
4,683
649
5,332
5
5,327
4,857
686
5,543
8
5,535
4,773
466
5,239
40
5,199
4,586
704
5,290
9
5,281
5,671
665
6,336
8
6,328
4,304
445
4,749
38
4,711
4,989
563
5,552
4
5,548
4,210
632
4,842
6
4,836
4,765
439
5,204
61
5,143
4,217
593
4,810
4
4,806
4,955
682
5,637
4
5,633
3,956
361
4,317
40
4,277
4,469
637
5,106
5
5,101
4,234
729
4,963
11
4,952
4,401
487
4,888
42
4,846
4,690
669
5,359
5
5,354
4,398
561
4,959
8
4,951
4,120
489
4,609
17
4,592
4,391
651
5,042
6
5,036
4,940
644
5,584
5
5,579
4,637
461
5,098
5
5,093
4,492
747
5,239
9
5,230
4,928
518
5,446
7
5,439
4,642
504
5,146
4
5,142
4,611
545
5,156
5
5,151
5,165
615
5,780
9
5,771
4,880
574
5,454
6
5,448
5,019
634
5,653
6
5,647
4,539
469
5,008
32
4,976
4,601
634
5,235
6
5,229
1973
7
053
3
549
2
728
2
Crude imports
2,897
2,699
2,955
2,728
2,540
2,676
2,288
2,791
2,764
2,79
171
,
126
,
117
,
147
Product imports
137
174
148
142
176
128
138
169
139
8
179
3
666
2
875
2
Total imports
3,034
2,873
3,103
2,870
2,716
2,804
2,426
2,960
2,903
2,96
,
253
,
279
,
269
Exports
255
260
232
226
317
290
246
307
307
261
707
2
926
2
387
2
606
2
Net imports
2,779
2,613
2,871
2,644
2,399
2,514
2,180
2,653
2,596
,
,
,
,
1974
5
322
2
686
2
604
2
Crude imports
2,686
2,942
2,508
2,990
2,476
2,555
2,580
2,529
2,274
2,72
,
134
,
200
,
138
Product imports
80
121
80
121
144
98
180
152
188
157
456
2
886
2
742
2
Total imports
2,766
3,063
2,588
3,111
2,620
2,653
2,760
2,681
2,462
2,882
6
,
220
,
211
,
224
Exports
269
230
258
277
257
225
210
211
186
16
16
236
2
675
2
518
2
Net imports
2,497
2,833
2,330
2,834
2,363
2,428
2,550
2,470
2,276
2,7
,
,
,
1975
199
203
2
462
2
120
2
Crude imports
2,234
2,056
2,095
2,047
1,952
1,989
2,130
2,201
2,136
2,
113
,
131
,
131
,
158
Product imports
213
266
203
165
127
162
180
100
118
2
334
2
593
2
278
2
Total imports
2,447
2,322
2,298
2,212
2,079
2,151
2,310
2,301
2,254
2,31
4
,
267
,
259
,
227
Exports
209
221
175
217
190
230
182
302
264
21
098
2
067
2
334
2
051
2
Net imports
2,238
2,101
2,123
1,995
1,889
1,921
2,128
1,999
1,990
,
,
,
,
1976
180
767
2
704
2
417
2
Crude imports
2,175
2,447
2,600
2,500
2,188
2,039
2,456
2,370
2,517
2,
,
170
,
151
,
181
Product imports
134
143
158
158
128
233
266
218
199
223
3
937
2
855
2
598
2
Total imports
2,309
2,590
2,758
2,658
2,316
2,272
2,722
2,588
2,716
2,40
7
,
268
,
288
,
249
Exports
276
325
395
316
272
324
244
288
274
20
196
669
2
567
2
349
2
Net imports
2,033
2,265
2,363
2,342
2,044
1,948
2,478
2,300
2,442
2,
,
,
,
1977
Crude imports
2,711
2,508
2,198
2,537
1,944
2,079
2,289
2,360
Product imports
123
117
169
166
145
183
171
216
Total imports
2,834
2,625
2,367
2,703
2,089
2,262
2,460
2,576
1
Exports
277
266
286
356
366
276
278
35
Net imports
2,557
2,359
2,081
2,347
1,723
1,986
2,182
2,225
Italy
1973
548
2
844
1
A
N
567
2
Crude imports
2,308
2,448
2,600
2,598
2,498
2,996
2,779
2,784
2,606
,
29
,
65
.
.
N
A
,
102
Product imports
76
133
97
98
154
98
109
137
232
909
1
.
.
A
N
669
2
Total imports
2,384
2,581
2,697
2,696
2,652
3,094
2,888
2,921
2,838
2,577
30
,
515
.
.
A
N
,
579
Exports
604
628
513
595
678
671
775
725
586
6
947
1
394
1
.
.
A
N
090
2
Net imports
1,780
1,953
2,184
2,101
1,974
2,423
2,113
2,196
2,252
,
,
.
.
,
1974
270
2
285
2
237
2
397
2
Crude imports
1,576
2,850
2,270
2,527
2,961
2,435
2,575
2,800
2,254
,
225
,
378
,
283
,
119
Product imports
71
60
92
145
126
108
219
190
241
663
2
520
2
516
2
Total imports
1,647
2,910
2,362
2,672
3,087
2,543
2,794
2,990
2,495
2,495
3
,
375
,
363
,
423
Exports
198
645
413
583
444
397
546
433
407
29
202
2
288
2
157
2
093
2
Net imports
1,449
2,265
1,949
2,089
2,643
2,146
2,248
2,557
2,088
,
,
,
,
1975
117
2
752
1
990
1
941
1
Crude imports
1,858
1,688
1,724
1,841
1,659
1,949
1,706
1,918
2,236
,
202
,
191
,
229
,
180
Product imports
172
229
246
246
319
181
219
142
138
19
943
1
219
2
121
2
Total imports
2,030
1,917
1,970
2,087
1,978
2,130
1,925
2,060
2,374
2,3
4
,
252
,
236
,
291
Exports
240
264
212
240
246
308
285
413
394
32
691
1
983
1
1,830
Net imports
1,790
1,653
1,758
1,847
1,732
1,822
1,640
1,647
1,980
1,995
,
,
Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDR79BOO457AO01100010001-0
 Approved For Release 2d6`476A/'f??IUFA- untine G 0d1 X3010001-0
Italy (Continued)
Jan Feb
Mar Apr
May Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Annual
Dec Average
1976
Crude imports
P
d
2,024 2,024
2,024
2,014
2,014
2,014
2,115
2,115
2,115
2
131
2
131
2
131
2
071
ro
uct imports
T
l
160 160
160
216
216
216
219
219
219
,
194
,
194
,
194
,
197
ota
imports
E
2,184 2,184
2,184
2,230
2,230
2,230
2,334
2,334
2
334
2
325
2
325
2
325
2
xports
N
t i
271 271
271
337
337
337
322
322
,
322
,
289
,
289
,
289
,268
305
e
mports
19772
1,913 1,913
1,913
1,893
1,893
1,893
2,012
2,012
2,012
2,036
2,036
2,036
1,963
Crude imports
2,198 2,198
2,198
2,370
1,931
2,145
1
966
2
025
1
971
Product imports
232 232
232
198
141
196
,
145
,
134
,
161
Total imports
2,430 2,430
2,430
2,568
2,072
2,341
2
111
2
159
2
132
Exports
368 368
368
341
365
434
,
290
,
358
,
292
Net imports
United Kingdom
2,062 2,062
2,062
2,227
1,707
1,907
1,821
1,801
1,840
1973
Crude imports
Product imports
2,276
615
2,090
533
2,273
2,248
2,402
2,535
2,175
2,818
1,917
2,892
2,415
2,004
2
329
Total imports
2
891
2
623
457
2
730
359
488
439
323
417
361
416
326
208
,
409
Exports
,
464
,
311
,
3
2,607
2,890
2,974
2,498
3,235
2,278
3,308
2,741
2,212
2
738
Net imports
2
427
2
312
23
2
40
329
332
257
430
555
496
464
488
293
,
396
1974
,
,
,
7
2,278
2,558
2,717
2,068
2,680
1,782
2,844
2,253
1,919
2,342
Crude imports
P
d
2,593
2,439
2,486
2,437
2,486
2,442
2,182
1,994
2
144
2
534
2
259
1
941
2
27
ro
uct imports
T
t
l i
440
372
353
306
364
291
326
252
,
246
,
324
,
372
,
385
,
1
314
o
a
mports
E
3,033
2,811
2,839
2,743
2,850
2,733
2,508
2,246
2
390
2
858
2
631
2
326
2
xports
N
i
491
256
204
238
344
373
331
364
,
353
,
385
,
268
,
314
,585
32
et
mports
1975
2,542
2,555
2,635
2,505
2,506
2,360
2,177
1,882
2,037
2,473
2,363
2,012
1
2,264
Crude imports
P
d
2,216
2,030
1,491
1,849
1,802
1,926
1,748
1,776
1
687
2
032
1
429
1
599
1
775
ro
uct imports
T
t
l i
442
329
267
290
231
257
262
247
,
240
,
303
,
348
,
344
,
292
o
a
mports
E
2,658
2,359
1,758
2,139
2,033
2,183
2,010
2,023
1
927
2
335
1
777
1
943
2
0
xports
N
i
310
343
224
226
262
303
317
308
,
357
,
423
,
299
,
261
,
67
300
et
mports
1976
2,348
2,016
1,534
1,913
1,771
1,880
1,693
1,715
1,570
1,912
1,478
1,683
1,767
Crude imports
P
d
1,888
1,986
1,762
1,938
1,698
1,814
1,688
1,615
1,779
1
474
2
112
1
724
1
77
ro
uct imports
T
t
l i
302
314
421
301
318
267
297
220
221
,
200
,
251
,
283
,
0
282
o
a
mports
E
2,190
2,300
2,183
2,239
2,016
2,081
1,985
835
1
2
000
1
674
2
363
2
007
2
0
xports
N
t i
333
264
384
332
349
328
407
,
399
,
488
,
464
,
522
,
447
,
52
392
e
mports
1977
1,857
2,036
1,799
1,907
1,667
1,753
1,578
1,436
1,512
1,210
1,841
1,560
1,660
Crude imports
1,756
1,511
1
672
1
347
1
701
1
449
1
1
Product imports
253
238
,
261
,
272
,
312
,
286
,
47
261
1,263
313
Total imports
2,109
1,749
1,933
1,619
2,013
1
735
1
408
1
576
Exports
546
575
589
538
539
,
732
,
597
,
747
Net imports
1,563
1,174
1,344
1,081
1,474
1
003
811
829
West Germany
,
1973
Crude imports
P
d
2,177
2,217 2,226
2,201 2,173
2,306 2,091
2,140
2
297
2
359
2
274
2
067
2
2
ro
uct imports
T
l
776
788 690
831 870
748 789
710
,
828
,
904
,
859
,
709
,
10
836
ota
imports
E
2,953
3,005 2,916
3,032 3,043
3,054 2,889
2,850
3
125
3
263
3
133
2
776
3
0
xports
N
i
153
177 164
135 184
174 177
185
,
155
,
239
,
235
,
141
,
46
17
et
mports
1974
2,800
2,828 2,752
2,897 2,859
2,880 2,712
2,665
2,970
3,024
2,898
2,635
7
2,869
Crude imports
P
d
2,050
1,891 1,973
1,962 1,990
2,245 2,080
2,147
2
055
2
048
2
244
1
918
2
05
ro
uct imports
T
t
l i
613
774 767
646 795
740 882
891
,
806
,
756
,
669
,
689
,
0
74
o
a
mports
2,663
2,665 2
649
2
608 2
785
2
985 2
962
6
Exports
N
t i
180
,
178 238
,
,
147 236
,
,
141 170
3,038
214
2,861
193
2,804
165
2,913
184
2,607
186
2,796
199
e
mports
1975
2,483
2,487 2,411
2,461 2,549
2,844 2,792
2,824
2,668
2,639
2,729
2,421
2,597
Crude imports
1,684
1,614 1
453
1
798 1
754
1
911 1
67
Product imports
T
t
l i
583
,
766 606
,
,
824 575
,
,
6
920 794
1,839
767
1,810
873
2,051
789
2,075
667
1,935
718
1,807
709
o
a
mports
E
2,267
2,380 2,059
2,622 2,329
2,831 2,470
2
606
2
683
2
840
2
742
2
653
xports
N
t i
158
120 113
132 100
121 137
,
120
,
133
,
125
,
161
,
126
2,509
12
e
mports
1976
2,109
2,260 1,946
2,490 2,229
2,710 2,333
2,486
2,550
2,715
2,581
2,527
9
2,380
Crude imports
1,669
1,836 1
717
1
823 1
830
1
847 2
050
Product imports
T
t
l
761
,
978 792
,
,
808 833
,
,
871 850
2,168
991
2,220
811
2,068
645
2,233
690
2,273
899
1,979
8
o
a
imports
E
2,430
2,814 2,509
2,631 2,663
2,718 2,900
3,159
-3
031
2
713
2
923
3
172
30
2
8
xports
N
i
113
115 148
115 131
101 176
128
,
168
,
116
,
132
,
160
,
09
et
mports
1977
2,317
2,699 2,361
2,516 2,532
2,617 2,724
3,031
2,863
2,597
2,791
3,012
134
2,675
Crude imports
2,140
2,020 1,894
1,774 1,871
1
920 2
042
Product imports
705
615 680
813 751
,
,
921 969
Total imports
2,845
2,635 2
574
2
587 2
622
2
841 3
0
Exports
78
,
155 128
,
,
113 152
,
,
11
147 117
Net imports
2,767
2,480 2,446
2,474 2,470
2,694 2,894
Bureau of the Mines data through Apr 1977.
Estimated.
Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457A001100010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79BOO457AO01100010001-0
Developed Countries: Exports to OPEC'
~~?+w?
? .-Av.
United St
t
Algeria
dor Gabon
nesia Iran
Iraq
Kuwait
Libya Nigeria Qatar Arabia
UAE
zuela
Total
a
es
1974
315.1
325.8
32.5
530.5 1,733.6
284.7
208.5
139.4 286.4
33.6
835.1
229.7
1
767
7
6
722
6
1975
631.8
409.8
58.7
810.1 3,243.7
309.7
386.1
231.5 536.3
50.3
1,501.8
372.2
,
.
2
243
3
,
.
10
765
3
1976
487.0
415.8
45.9
1,038.0 2,778.0
381.8
471.5
276.6 769.9
78.7
2,774.1
424.8
,
.
2
827.8
,
.
12
565
9
1st Qtr
75.7
91.3
9.1
271.1 748.3
78.6
111.9
33.1 127.4
16.5
484.9
111.2
,
591
7
,
.
2
750
8
2d Qtr
165.5
99.8
9.0
286.7 617.1
95.4
110.3
52.5 161.6
19.6
743.3
112.0
.
640
1
,
.
3
112
9
3d Qtr
113.0
105.1
8.0
244.5 624.5
159.0
114.6
118.1 197.8
8.5
714.2
81.0
.
617
4
,
.
3
105
7
4th Qtr
1977
132.8
119.6
19.8
233.7 786.1
48.8
134.7
72.9 283.1
34.1
831.7
120.6
.
778.6
,
.
3,596.5
1st Qtr
116.0
98.0
9.3
187.8 592.7
53.7
152.3
68.5 203.6
24.6
739.5
147.0
669.2
3
062
2
2d Qtr
Japan
145.7
133.4
9.5
197.1 609.8
49.5
157.1
89.0 239.6
19.0
838.1
134.3
766.8
,
.
3,388.9
1974
154.5
113.8
7.4
1,453.3 1,014.9
474.4
279.5
234.4 285.1
46.7
677.5
309.2
399
0
5
449
7
1975
260.9
177.8
14.2
1,849.9 1,855.3
818.8
367.1
240.2 586.0
122.3
1,350.4
420.2
.
360
2
,
.
8
423
3
1976
204.4
133.8
16.7
1,842.4 1,709.4
626.2
720.4
327.2 575.0
229.0
1,892.7
638.8
.
563
6
,
.
277
9
4
1st Qtr
44.3
21.6
1.8
361.6 400.0
128.0
126.2
68.1 112.6
56.5
330.8
130.8
.
89
4
,
.
1
871
7
2d Qtr
56.6
32.8
2.7
381.1 400.0
191.4
172.9
75.0 124.8
42.2
529.6
143.4
.
118
6
,
.
2
271
1
3d Qtr
33.5
34.8
7.3
435.8 437.4
156.4
199.1
93.7 133.2
60.6
569.8
165.1
.
149
1
,
.
2
475
8
4th Qtr
1977
70.0
44.4
4.9
463.9 472.0
150.4
222.2
90.4 204.4
69.7
462.5
197.5
.
206.5
,
.
2,658.8
1st Qtr
52.0
38.2
5.9
390.6 427.2
131.3
237.5
67.9 211.1
73.2
425.8
224.5
173
8
2
459
0
Apr
West Germany
48.4
20.8
1.3
124.4 141.8
92.9
84.6
16.6 69.1
34.8
174.1
77.8
.
79.9
,
.
966.5
1974
482.9
82.3
28.3
324.3 1,139.1
373.4
159.9
402.4 346.0
20.9
286.0
90.2
330.6
4
068
3
1975
610.1
76.5
23.9
392.7 2,105.1
1,047.7
203.2
535.9 653.4
47.0
564.8
145.1
371
2
,
.
6
776
4
1976
740.2
93.2
27.1
478.4 2,294.3
884.4
304.8
523.3 867.2
87.7
1,191.1
233.3
.
540.5
,
.
8
245
5
1st Qtr
178.1
17.5
5.2
97.6 484.5
216.6
56.0
121.4 185.5
15.0
182.8
45.9
104
2
,
.
1
710
3
2d Qtr
152.5
17.9
6.8
104.2 539.7
182.9
63.7
102.0 176.6
22.3
302.3
50.0
.
117
3
,
.
1
838
2
3d Qtr
198.0
34.1
7.5
123.7 590.1
269.2
83.0
153.6 214.2
11.3
324.1
58.3
.
167
7
,
.
2
234
8
4th Qtr
1977
211.6
23.7
7.6
152.9 680.0
215.7
102.1
146.3 290.9
19.1
381.9
79.1
.
151.3
,
.
2,462.2
1st Qtr
312.8
35.2
8.4
98.4 608.4
205.1
79.6
136.6 260.4
24.5
298.1
81.3
158
4
2
307
2
Apr
France
69.8
7.4
2.7
28.9 221.1
81.7
28.2
49.0 104.6
6.0
107.4
34.9
.
57.6
,
.
799.3
1974
1,297.5
18.4
185.0
103.9 257.5
214.4
63.9
362.7 175.0
9.4
120.0
68.6
140.9
3
017
2
1975
1,904.2
18.2
335.8
120.6 631.6
409.0
97.5
405.5 482.9
15.0
198.6
134.1
175.8
,
.
4
908
8
1976
1,475.2
17.7
389.8
219.3 652.7
473.5
225.9
348.7 531.8
31.7
339.3
190.8
170
4
,
.
5
068
8
1st Qtr
392.7
4.3
84.4
63.2 176.3
134.8
34.7
94.2 102.7
7.3
65.3
44.1
.
36.3
,
.
1
240
3
2d Qtr
330.2
4.8
90.6
56.3 162.8
110.4
53.8
99.2 133.7
7.2
92.0
41.1
39
0
,
.
1
221
1
3d Qtr
383.1
5.2
114.2
49.5 173.8
111.3
48.1
73.0 136.6
6.6
78.7
50.2
.
49.4
,
.
1
279
7
4th Qtr
369.2
3.4
100.6
50.3 139.8
117.0
89
3
82
3 158
8
10
6
103
3
,
.
1977
.
.
.
.
.
55.4
45.7
1,325.7
1st Qtr
363.7
5.5
121.0
56.2 154.3
127.7
36.4
98.6 184.8
20.7
114.3
52.2
56
2
1
391
6
Apr
United Kingdom
104.3
1.5
45.6
19.7 57.0
32.2
18.0
33.3 55.0
4.1
59.4
13.6
.
16.0
,
.
459.7
1974
128.1
31.8
8.4
109.2 653.2
139.9
139.9
148.5 520.3 51.8
280.4
227.0
117
8
2
554
1
1975
173.7
38.4
6.3
133.4 1,097.7
302.2
217.5
236.8 1,125.9 121.6
440.0
440.8
.
200.3
,
.
4
534
6
1976
183.7
41.2
7.3
144.4 921.1
273.5
257.1
241.8 1,389.0 155.9
710.6
579.0
229.9
,
.
5
134
5
1st Qtr
50.0
7.0
2.1
33.4 235.3
95.5
52.0
57.1 339.8 38.3
131.7
141.1
55.1
,
.
1
238
4
2d Qtr
47.0
9.1
1.9
38.7 250.9
60.8
59.8
61.0 338.4 44.3
161.0
137.4
48
9
,
.
1
259
2
3d Qtr
43.9
11.4
1.5
32.2 226.2
63.4
69.8
64.7 340.5 34.0
193.8
130.3
.
50
8
,
.
1
262
5
4th Qtr
42.8
13.7
1.8
40.1 208.7
53.8
75.5
59.0 370.3 39.3
224.1
170.2
.
75
1
,
.
1
374
4
1977
.
,
.
1st Qtr
43.8
22.3
2.0
42.7 274.3
66.4
79.1
61.9 407.2 42.6
209.7
209.1
59.8
1
520
9
2d Qtr
34.3
26.1
3.4
30.2 282.6
70.0
113.6
77.5 482.9 57.0
250.9
194.7
64.2
,
.
1,687.4
13
Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79BOO457AO01100010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79BOO457AO01100010001-0
Developed Countries: Exports to OPEC'
(Continued)
Algeria
dor
Gabon
nesia
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait Libya Nigeria
Qatar Arabia
UAE
zuela
Total
Italy
1974
325.7
25.5
6.6
58.0
282.4
96.0
65.7
853.8
131.0
11.0
133.2
37.3
211.8
2,237.8
7
717
1975
559.7
30.2
13.9
85.5
566.3
259.5
116.5
1,032.2
298.5
22.6
323.3
87.6
321.9
.
3,
4
4
026
1976
408.5
22.6
14.9
53.1
730.6
203.2
175.2
955.5
317.4
25.7
636.1
:133.2
350.4
,
.
8
755
1s
t Qtr
104.5
4.3
2.4
12.3
140.4
42.7
26.3
186.0
46.2
6.7
96.3
23.8
63.9
.
7
950
2
d Qtr
77.9
4.8
3.2
18.4
193.5
67.6
39.1
232.8
74.2
5.2
127.5
28.8
77.7
1
.
056
6
1
3
d Qtr
97.1
6.2
4.0
11.8
198.6
48.4
46.9
265.6
92.4
7.5
155.0
31.0
92.
7
.
,
263
3
1
4t
h Qtr
129.0
7.3
5.3
10.6
198.1
44.5
62.9
271.1
104.6
6.3
257.3
49.6
116.
.
,
1977
126
8
9
5
3
7
5
11
193.6
53.6
53.9
269.7
122.4
9.0
211.4
45.6
124.8
1,235.5
1st Qtr
.
.
.
.
4
3
102
7
5
9
160
5
33
97.1
980.9
Apr & May
99.4
6.9
6.7
6.8
153.6
33.0
43.8
229.
.
.
.
.
Canada
25
8
3
6
18
0
9
3
253
3
625.6
1974
161.2
13.4
0
54.9
61.1
19.6
4.9
5.9
.
.
.
.
.
26
6
1975
99.3
21.4
0.5
83.7
144.7
66.5
15:7
22.4
37.6
1.5
34.3
4.5
314.5
.
8
5
2
1976
94.6
24.5
2.5
77.1
145.9
36.2
22.6
9.6
32.6
4.3
107.8
11.4
360.4
9
9.
167
2
1st Qtr
7.1
1.9
0.1
7.9
32.4
21.7
3.9
3.3
9.0
1.2
30.6
2.5
45.6
.
8
183
2d Qtr
20.6
13.5
1.3
15.4
35.2
8.2
2.6
3.7
6.6
0.2
12.8
3.1
60.6
.
270
0
3d Qtr
32.4
4.5
0.4
20.9
42.7
5.1
4.7
1.4
6.8
1.4
13.7
2.5
133.5
7
.
5
308
4th Qtr
34.5
4.6
0.7
32.9
35.6
1.2
11.4
1.2
10.2
1.5
50.7
3.3
120.
.
1977
1
247
1st Qtr
29.6
3.3
0.6
24.7
35.1
22.1
1:3.2
2.0
9.8
1.1
28.6
3.4
73.6
.
278
1
2d Qtr
31.0
5.3
0.3
10.4
31.2
11.8
8.3
5.5
6.5
0.6
22.7
5.1
139.4
.
Developed Countries: Imports From OPEC'
Ecua-
Algeria dor Gabon
Indo-
nesia
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait Libya Nigeria
Saudi
Qatar Arabia
UAE
Vene-
zuela
Total
United States
6
79
2
671
1
3
368
871
1
4
636.2
15
1974
1,090.5
473.0
162.3
1,688.1
2,132.2
0.9
13.4
1.4
3,286.2
.
.
,
.
.
,
,
2
1975
1,358.8
460.8
196.9
2,220.6
1,399.8
19.1
111.4
1,045.7
3,281.5
56.5
2,624.6
683.8
3,823.9
17,083.
6
9
1976
2,209.4
539.0
189.8
3,004.3
1,480.1
110.0
37.6
2,243.4
4,937.6
119.0
5,212.9
1,359.2
3,574.8
.
25,01
70
4
1st
Qtr
447.5
109.4
51.3
714.4
378.0
1.2
25.7
485.0
1,016.8
22.2
1,152.9
272.7
893.3
.
5,5
2d
Qtr
529.9
123.5
65.0
692.5
345.3
0.3
4.3
478.7
1,141.5
8.2
1,166.2
288.2
738.1
5,581.7
3d
Qtr
674.8
136.2
20.3
851.1
397.1
35.1
4.9
603.9
1,365.3
57.4
1,506.3
363.9
935.5
6,951.8
13
0
4th
Qtr
557.2
169.9
53.2
746.3
359.7
73.4
2.7
675.8
1,414.0
31.2
1,387.5
434.4
1,007.7
.
6,9
1977
324
0
8
1st
Qtr
695.7
155.4
58.2
914.0
657.5
45.1
66.2
820.5
1,646.7
41.1
1,603.2
405.8
1,214.6
.
,
72
6
2d
Japan
Qtr
743.2
171.1
62.3
926.7
699.3
126.3
72.5
1,080.5
2
64
1,598.1
448
9
74.3
1
22
1,720.8
2
238
5
439.0
2
116
6
958.5
46.4
.
8,6
19,969.6
1974
34.3
22.3
6.8
4,569.3
4,767.0
201.6
2,131.9
.
3
.
.
.
,
,
.
1975
38.4
13.5
12.8
3,431.2
4,978.3
395.8
2,009.7
280.1
278.6
27.8
6,132.9
1,773.4
33.9
19,404.0
7
1976
10.3
22.0
17.9
4,093.3
4,453.8
579.1
2,015.9
206.7
108.7
30.4
7,834.0
2,471.6
33.6
21,87
.3
212
8
1st Qtr
8.7
6.0
5.9
962.5
974.2
119.3
535.1
16.0
73.7
9.4
1,856.7
635.5
9.8
.
5,
399
8
2d Qtr
0.1
6.6
4.3
1,002.0
1,179.1
136.2
466.4
62.3
11.5
4.8
1,954.7
564.2
7.6
.
5,
4
3d Qtr
0.7
4.1
4.8
1,021.7
952.6
119.1
505.1
69.0
18.2
11.3
2,064.4
629.5
5.9
5,406.
58
3
4th Qtr
0.8
5.3
2.9
1,107.1
1,347.9
204.5
509.3
59.4
5.3
4.9
1,958.2
642.4
10.3
.
5,8
1977
45
8
1st Qtr
1.7
5.0
2.5
1,252.5
1,181.0
187.4
514.8
14.3
3.8
45.1
2,328.1
699.0
10.6
.
6,2
6
5
Apr
West Germany
0
1.6
0.4
390.9
249.6
62.4
181.1
2.7
4.2
101
4
1
23.5
92
9
678.9
1
044
2
177.4
1
752
3.8
243
9
.
1,77
211.4
9
1974
1,090.8
66.1
97.7
188.7
1,240.3
305.3
355.0
1,633.1
.
,
.
.
,
.
.
,
1
239
1975
1,025.4
82.0
107.4
153.4
1,467.4
127.9
226.9
1,391.1
962.4
124.0
1,823.1
738.0
232.1
.
8,
14
Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79BOO457AO01100010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
Developed Countries: Imports From OPEC'
(Continued)
Ecua- Indo-
Saudi
Vene-
Algeria
dor Gabon nesia
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait Libya
Nigeria
Qatar Arabia
UAE
zuela
Total
West German
y
(Continued)
1976
1,145.7
67.3
69.3
213.6
1,987.5
154.7
182.1
2,103.3
975.1
124.6
1,798.1
691.1
207.9
9,720.3
1st Qtr
264.0
13.4
21.2
48.2
426.0
27.3
51.3
473.6
251.6
26.3
388.7
153.6
44.3
2,189.5
2d Qtr
292.8
14.4
21.2
35.4
410.3
33.2
55.3
474.9
232.8
41.3
367.3
167.4
76.7
2,223.0
3d Qtr
305.7
12.1
13.0
62.1
526.8
57.0
38.1
544.0
238.7
0.1
554.8
177.9
45.1
2,575.4
4th Qtr
283.2
27.4
13.9
67.9
624.4
37.2
37.4
610.8
252.0
56.9
487.3
192.2
41.8
2,732.4
1977
1st Qtr
328.6
20.8
16.0
96.8
496.1
38.8
44.6
623.8
232.3
16.6
436.7
197.0
30.0
2,578.1
Apr
66.0
7.3
4.0
24.0
160.2
0.5
20.0
152.5
84.2
22.3
131.7
72.4
10.5
755.6
France
1974
957.7
9.7
320.8
61.5
716.3
1,242.3
938.5
388.8
872.8
264.0
3,028.3
1,184.6
133.5
10,116.8
1975
747.2
15.7
246.8
55.2
1,286.1
1,128.5
652.0
200.6
859.4
211.9
3,041.6
1,134.4
86.1
9,665.5
1976
691.4
13.2
293.8
97.2
1,436.1
1,590.6
409.1
320.3
749.4
326.1
4,079.1
1,235.3
94.0
11,335.8
1st Qtr
179.8
3.7
64.2
14.4
358.9
281.5
63.1
78.7
207.3
98.4
982.4
452.7
32.6
2,817.7
2d Qtr
170.7
2.8
74.1
21.5
315.8
331.6
120.4
89.4
173.0
74.2
977.1
238.5
20.7
2,609.8
3d Qtr
155.3
1.9
79.1
27.1
331.4
400.0
111.7
65.4
152.6
80.0
1,033.5
264.4
20.3
2,722.7
4th Qtr
185.6
4.8
76.4
34.2
430.0
577.5
113.9
86.8
216.5
73.5
1,086.1
279.7
20.4
3,185.4
1977
1st Qtr
196.5
5.5
88.1
30.7
448.6
470.7
125.5
65.4
209.4
99.5
1,033.5
263.5
19.5
3,056.4
Apr
54.5
3.5
32.8
13.6
134.1
135.4
23.8
16.3
84.9
16.4
304.5
53.3
6.0
879.1
United Kingdom
1974
83.8
5.1
66.1
33.8
1,202.9
248.6
1,334.0
913.8
860.8
388.5
2,757.8
483.9
315.9
8,694.8
1975
189.8
4.8
8.1
33.2
1,554.3
226.1
935.5
288.5
685.0
348.5
1,915.3
356.6
366.8
6,912.3
1976
147.3
4.8
16.3
39.9
1,879.0
492.6
1,042.7
297.4
574.9
456.1
1,783.9
362.6
215.4
7,292.7
1st Qtr
54.6
0.9
1.2
7.8
425.9
70.1
223.3
70.1
160.9
149.0
492.1
98.2
70.1
1,824.2
2d Qtr
30.2
1.2
9.6
8.9
478.6
69.5
230.0
42.0
167.9
145.3
386.5
103.0
64.9
1,737.6
3d Qtr
41.4
1.3
3.0
13.4
473.3
196.7
225.7
98.2
138.4
103.3
444.9
103.2
50.8
1,893.6
4th Qtr
21.1
1.2
2.5
9.8
501.2
156.3
363.7
87.1
107.7
58.5
440.4
58.2
29.6
1,837.3
1977
1st Qtr
26.8
0.9
2.3
9.2
482.0
138.5
224.3
29.8
159.3
99.4
498.6
92.0
19.9
1,783.0
2d Qtr
20.7
2.2
1.1
11.0
359.3
146.0
282.7
81.0
68.9
32.7
558.7
102.1
35.3
1,701.7
Italy
1974
268.2
25.1
56.0
72.4
1,123.3
1,186.4
478.6
2,364.8
360.6
208.1
3,047.0
108.3
105.3
9,384.1
1975
405.3
34.0
41.7
53.4
1,134.5
1,672.3
357.9
1,248.4
67.6
127.1
2,351.2
201.1
159.7
7,854.2
1976
296.8
25.4
16.4
114.7
1,218.9
1,304.2
203.2
1,587.0
55.8
140.1
2,423.8
236.8
208.1
7,831.2
1st Qtr
81.3
4.8
1.9
21.4
290.5
313.3
17.9
351.8
10.7
33.5
471.3
62.9
27.8
1,689.1
2d Qtr
73.1
6.1
5.0
24.9
309.1
284.5
26.5
481.4
12.7
39.9
729.8
49.6
49.1
2,091.7
3d Qtr
76.5
7.8
5.5
30.1
303.4
356.9
71.9
403.1
17.8
18.9
632.6
41.5
68.9
2,034.9
4th Qtr
65.9
6.7
4.0
38.3
315.9
349.5
86.9
350.7
14.6
47.8
590.1
82.8
62.3
2,015.5
1977
1st Qtr
40.5
7.7
13.2
33.3
340.9
370.9
168.2
355.1
30.5
26.5
644.8
96.5
37.5
2,165.6
Apr & Ma
32.7
7.9
5.3
26.7
249.6
297.0
96.2
273.8
17.3
20.0
517.7
41.0
20.2
1,605.4
Canada
1974
6.9
40.0
4.9
4.7
833.6
37.2
68.0
31.3
55.1
0
325.4
88.0
1,320.0
2,613.1
1975
1.7
20.8
25.4
14.0
745.3
131.7
108.7
35.5
77.0
6.3
733.3
138.2
1,088.0
3,125.9
1976
66.1
30.6
82.4
18.4
704.9
135.5
22.7
108.1
157.8
0
488.8
62.8
1,314.8
3,170.7
1st Qtr
19.1
3.8
11.2
2.2
211.0
30.6
6.4
51.1
85.1
0
118.3
36.0
268.2
843.0
2d Qtr
19.5
7.2
8.1
4.2
211.5
28.4
6.5
35.0
48.8
0
126.6
19.7
439.3
954.8
3d Qtr
4.4
5.0
22.8
6.0
132.5
47.9
9.8
20.0
15.9
0
141.4
7.1
302.4
715.2
4th Qtr
23.1
14.6
20.3
6.0
149.9
28.6
0
0
7.8
0
102.5
0
304.9
657.7
1977
1st Qtr
9.2
22.1
13.8
3.9
125.7
23.0
0
0
13.3
0
191.9
0
338.8
741.7
2d Qtr
11.0
15.9
0
6.4
136.5
0.1
0
0
0.1
0
167.3
0
339.5
676.8
I Data are unadjusted.
2 Data are f.a.s.
S Data are f.o.b.
15
Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79BOO457AO01100010001-0
Selected OECD Countries: Trends in Inland Oil Consumption
Thousand b/d
United States'
Annual
Average
16,367
17,308
16,653
16,322
17,444
Jan
16,735
18,713
17,286
18,004
18,598
20,481
Feb
17,861
19,094
17,366
17,084
17,429
20,427
Mar
16,870
17,216
16,104
16,315
17,299
18,056
Apr
15,529
15,921
15,929
16,048
16,671
17,570
May
14,801
16,626
15,726
15,155
15,977
(est.)
17,252
Jun
15,615
16,481
16,117
15,610
16,836
(est.)
17,600
Jul
14,821
16,372
16,349
15,740
16,613
(est.)
17,697
Aug
15,936
17,499
16,550
15,806
16,642
(est.)
18,533
Sep
15,489
16,656
16,024
15,768
16,825
(est.)
17,885
Oct
16,455
17,202
17,050
16,377
17,052
Nov
17,610
18,492
17,351
15,777
18,847
Dec
18,738
17,538
18,013
18,185
20,506
Canada
Annual
Average
1,511
1,597
1,630
1,595
1,658
Jan
1,536
1,667
1,823
1,691
1,785
1,797
Feb
1,793
1,747
1,863
1,872
1,754
1,919
Mar
1,612
1,584
1,659
1,558
1,747
1,664
Apr
1,367
1,431
1,560
1,592
1,518
1,526
May
1,374
1,486
1,577
1,471
1,509
1,523
Jun
1,334
1,474
1,455
1,550
1,560
1,633
Jul
1,294
1,490
1,534
1,493
1,531
1,530
Aug
1,394
1,557
1,463
1,449
1,585
Sep
1,402
1,427
1,415
1,469
1,514
Oct
1,577
1,680
1,680
1,555
1,560
Nov
1,685
1,801
1,714
1,577
1,822
Dec
1,782
1,828
1,831
1,880
2,008
Japan
Annual
Average
N.A.
5,000
4,872
4,568
4,786
Jan
N.A.
5,036
5,103
4,729
4,941
5,428
Feb
N.A.
5,352
5,664
5,191
5,246
6,019
Mar
N.A.
5,306
5,407
4,918
5,165
5540
Apr
N.A.
4,737
4,706
4,202
4,526
4,713
May
N.A.
4,597
4,568
4,041
4,218
4,313
Jun
N.A.
4,776
4,520
4,135
4,429
4,480
Jul
N.A.
4,586
4,385
4,265
4,416
4,700
Aug
N.A.
4,684
4,576
4,234
4,461
Sep
N.A.
4,778
4,720
4,543
4,517
Oct
N.A.
5,093
4,614
4,409
4,523
Nov
N.A.
5,559
4,925
4,747
5,160
Dec
N.A.
5,526
5,330
5,447
5,846
Austria
Annual
Average
203
227
203
199
215
Jan
189
220
236
183
207
200
Feb
221
225
220
190
208
208
Mar
212
224
160
172
209
182
Apr
183
204
169
184
156
197
May
174
210
172
156
169
166
Jun
181
200
169
186
189
208
Jul
179
221
214
210
219
192
Aug
187
222
218
223
229
213
Sep
213
227
222
232
246
Oct
227
253
243
226
233
Nov
246
276
215
201
252
Dec
230
234
203
229
261
Belgium /Luxembourg
Annual
Average
485
505
440
416
449
Jan
535
543
512
550
498
552
Feb
591
589
528
558
547
507
Mar
546
570
392
410
469
517
Apr
470
565
383
465
460
Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-FlOP79BOO457AO01100010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79BOO457AO01100010001-0
Selected OECD Countries: Trends in Inland Oil Consumption
(Continued)
Belgium/Luxembourg
(Continued)
May
454
483
419
363
357
Jun
464
463
376
366
383
Jul
346
359
339
288
308
Aug
367
389
352
331
361
Sep
479
465
478
372
425
Oct
484
556
534
442
424
Nov
563
558
427
439
532
Dec
530
503
542
508
628
Denmark
Annual
Average
301
307
Jan
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
332
358
370
Feb
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
380
398
405
Mar
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
317
367
362
Apr
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
354
307
340
May
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
258
242
241
Jun
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
257
250
236
Jul
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
218
184
192
Aug
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
264
261
293
Sep
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
262
274
Oct
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
302
280
Nov
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
324
356
Dec
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
353
414
France
Annual
Average
1,985
2,219
2,094
1,925
2,071
Jan
2,276
2,743
2,523
2,190
2,432
2,518
Feb
2,450
2,687
2,389
2,243
2,492
2,386
Mar
2,100
2,528
2,249
1,952
2,372
2,109
Apr
1,848
2,296
1,970
2,202
2,116
2,044
May
1,743
1,890
1,915
1,640
1,795
1,846
Jun
1,597
1,685
2,103
1,642
1,603
1,717
Jul
1,444
1,566
1,703
1,491
1,624
1,349
Aug
1,441
1,495
1,506
1,300
1,668
1,390
Sep
1,950
1,932
1,996
1,785
1,966
1,789
Oct
2,106
2,482
2,045
1,917
1,908
Nov
2,332
2,593
2,260
2,077
2,204
Dec
2,574
2,768
2,492
2,658
2,687
Italy
Annual
Average
1,435
1,525
1,521
1,468
1,502
Jan
1,720
1,781
1,755
1,792
1,775
1,683
Feb
1,756
1,866
1,760
1,767
1,743
1,809
Mar
1,450
1,710
1,579
1,558
1,641
1,548
Apr
1,169
1,420
1,421
1,530
1,423
1,363
May
1,138
1,285
1,349
1,174
1,253
1,252
Jun
1,101
1,255
1,314
1,289
1,236
1,324
Jul
1,175
1,303
1,368
1,234
1,355
1,233
Aug
1,129
1,255
1,287
1,105
1,372
1,135
Sep
1,450
1,462
1,527
1,465
1,592
1,682
Oct
1,650
1,610
1,569
1,679
1,464
Nov
1,702
1,551
1,580
1,448
1,393
Dec
1,899
1,698
1,753
1,600
1,779
Netherlands
Annual
Average
496
507
444
412
487
Jan
509
584
468
399
480
521
Feb
591
586
522
430
542
524
Mar
557
542
438
379
543
518
Apr
512
541
530
474
443
424
May
453
475
432
390
453
393
Jun
430
436
427
403
462
456
Jul
374
408
415
354
426
388
Aug
435
437
414
364
446
Sep
440
485
440
412
493
Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RD1779BOO457AO01100010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
Selected OECD Countries: Trends in Inland Oil Consumption
(Continued)
Netherlands (Continued)
Oct
515
594
472
440
469
Nov
581
503
440
419
517
Dec
Annual
567
505
433
484
576
Norway
Average
N.A.
N.A.
143
150
163
Jan
N.A.
N.A.
155
142
161
177
Feb
N.A.
N.A.
154
171
180
202
Mar
N.A.
N.A.
124
137
181
189
Apr
N.A.
N. A.
126
149
145
162
May
N.A.
N.A.
118
145
147
150
Jun
N.A.
N.A.
141
130
153
159
Jul
N.A.
N.A.
113
120
130
131
Aug
N.A.
N.A.
125
140
146
156
Sep
N.A.
N.A.
151
161
168
Oct
N.A.
N.A.
161
162
167
Nov
N:A.
N.A.
174
181
175
Dec
Annual
N.A.
N.A.
180
162
197
Spain
Average
471
581
626
667
744
Jan
483
539
610
720
758
740
Feb
508
568
639
682
785
727
Mar
461
564
571
625
769
660
Apr
447
537
595
688
742
634
May
444
523
620
622
685
669
Jun
472
530
608
610
714
672
Jul
457
466
630
624
755
677
Aug
462
667
617
584
685
615
Sep
477
576
636
667
734
Oct
459
669
677
713
742
Nov
500
646
653
706
780
Dec
Annual
515
681
650
735
782
Sweden
Average
N.A.
533
490
478
529
Jan
N.A.
603
521
511
565
606
Feb
N.A.
555
415
547
530
600
Mar
N.A.
540
427
479
539
545
Apr
N.A.
506
441
532
450
499
May
N.A.
524
495
392
395
466
Jun
N.A.
420
464
511
410
409
Jul
N.A.
387
423
362
382
377
Aug
N.A.
455
463
459
483
Sep
N.A.
492
516
503
571
Oct
N.A.
656
553
462
585
Nov
N.A.
645
568
446
697
Dec
Annual
N.A.
618
581
538
740
United Kingdom
Average
1,954
1,974
1,857
1,633
1,603
Jan
2,121
2,315
2,045
1,981
1,679
1,830
Feb
2,401
2,313
2,127
1,907
1,865
1,844
Mar
2,249
2,271
2,133
1,731
1,879
1,818
Apr
2,027
2,038
1,899
1,826
1,716
1,670
May
1,851
1,939
1,704
1,482
1,417
1,546
Jun
1,745
1,697
1,545
1,416
1,416
1,454
Jul
1,519
1,637
1,531
1,322
1,346
1,302
Aug
1,527
1,615
1,513
1,208
1,276
Sep
1,703
1,727
1,663
1,501
1,477
Oct
1,959
2,150
2,049
1,707
1,544
Nov
2,194
2,258
2,108
1,723
1,750
Dec
2,132
1,906
1,983
1,821
1,869
18
Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
Selected OECD Countries: Trends in Inland Oil Consumption
(Continued)
West Germany
Annual
Average
2,521
2,693
2,408
2,319
2,507
Jan
2,545
2,868
2,556
2,183
2,464
2,389
Feb
2,803
2,850
1,969
2,455
2,497
2,441
Mar
2,525
2,707
2,173
2,234
2,747
2,519
Apr
2,347
2,809
2,539
2,431
2,339
2,425
May
2,335
2,546
2,403
2,253
2,320
2,359
Jun
2,632
2,674
2,414
2,106
2,393
2,495
Jul
2,188
2,196
2,548
2,319
2,624
2,381
Aug
2,444
2,738
2,476
2,360
2,515
2,468
Sep
2,487
2,618
2,473
2,309
2,521
Oct
2,522
2,969
2,613
2,328
2,391
Nov
2,667
2,883
2,432
2,361
2,700
Dec
2,783
2,481
2,261
2,502
2,571
' Including bunkers, refinery fuel, and losses.
'Principal products only.
19
Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
United
States
Japan
Canada
Austria
Belgium Denmark
France
Ireland
Italy
1.973 Sep
1,057,911
300,000
113,193
N.A.
N.A.
30,996
194,122
5,555
N.A.
1974 Jan
1,017,333
275,000
125,289
7,650
35,018
25,017
174,594
5,490
N.A.
Mar
995,365
257,000
116,060
8,358
25,404
25,849
171,229
6,037
143,876
Jun
1,102,467
325,000
N. A.
10,454
31,375
28,025
196,406
6,190
163,922
Sep
1,156,105'
359,000
148,305
9,278
37,011
34,507
238,630
6,504
177,310
Dec
1,115,916'
334,000
142,233
9,402
40,274
37,223
235,848
7,424
173,609
1975 Jan
1,099,144
330,000
136,590
9,826
40,406
33,609
230,271
7,687
147,431
Mar
1,076,360
296,000
133,805
9,220
38,902
34,595
215,365
7,439
150,124
Jun
1,071,150
314,000
140,617
10,257
36,704
34,566
203,831
7,665
169,776
Sep
1,147,338
330,000
147,939
8,913
41,420
44,238
223,942
7,599
174,010
Dec
1,132,955
325,000
138,462
7,329
40,194
40,325
195,998
7,081
N.A.
1976 Jan
1,102,282
308,000
128,356
6,877
38,508
39,223
182,887
6,825
N.A.
Mar
1,060,489
290,000
121,490
N.A.
N. A.
N. A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Jun
1,108,703
325,000
132,174
6,855
41,676
31,193
167,017
7,315
N.A.
Sep
1,206,690
365,000
138,211
8,110
41,537
40,661
209,692
7,877
N.A.
Dec
1,129,445
359,000
125,934
7,680
43,092
37,478
203,407
7,628
157,687
1977 Jan
1,064,915
364,000
126,025
7,059
43,683
36,383
192,676
7,242
155,811
Feb
1,050,507
315,000
120,857
8,358
42,880
33,544
188,347
7,271
154,322
Mar
1,086,822
327,000
125,757
9,074
42,880
33,361
183,303
7,110
151,110
Apr
1,121,008
332,000
122,770
9,454
43,187
32,551
187,048
7,154
166,973
May
1,171,222
358,000
129,467
9,373
44,085
34,128
166,710
8,497
170,983
Jun
1,209,500
362,000
138,808
8,541
43,618
36,215
N.A.
9,388
N.A.
Jul
1,239,100
356,000
139,053
N.A.
N.A.
N A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Aug
1,251,800
361,000
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Sep
1,284,900
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
W
Luxem-
Nether-
Switzer-
United
est
bourg
lands
Norway Portugal Spain
Sweden
land
Turkey
Kingdom
Germany
1973 Sep
N.A.
N.A.
8,045
7,125 N.A
. 43,398
26,514
N.A.
152,261
172,010
1974 Jan
N.A.
N.A.
8,446
5,745 40,449 37,668
25,995
N.A.
131,239
149,190
Mar
N.A.
N.A.
9,176
7,840 47,414 39,128
26,382
9,979
134,816
165,549
Jun
N.A..
N.A.
10,476
7,307 50,217 43,034
26,966.
9,446
167,637
170,827
Sep
N.A..
N.A.
10,541
7,264 53,538 47,815
28,309
12,527
175,236
187,968
Dec
N.A.
66,452
7,037
7,037 53,261 44,749
29.638
9345
160,593
187,938
1975 Jan
1,708
65,269
8,650
6,344 40,449 43,727
29,025
8,234
169,623
171,192
Mar
1,745
61,430
9,672
6,110 50,611 39,785
26,928
8,088
145,248
158,169
Jun
2,102
62,941
9,789
5,928 48,633 34,675
27,652
10,220
147,949
161,520
Sep
2,139
63,758
10,986
6,446 51,677 40,114
29,623
11,213
154,921
184,267
Dec
2,044
60,086
11,614
8,541 50,201 43,180
29,762
N.A.
138,941
186,668
1976 Jan
2,015
53,195
12,410
5,533 48,728 42,742
29,200
N.A.
N.A.
184,829
Mar
1,832
52,932
9,570
7,234 N.A. 37,668
27,528
N.A.
N.A.
175,483
Jun
1,971
54,560
11,154
6,658 N.A. 37,194
28,587
N.A.
135,291
189,092
Sep
1,986
61,656
12,038
6,066 50,582 37,194
29,799
N.A.
140,686
201,845
Dec
2,008
56,568
12,468
8,176 N.A. 48,326
31,178
9,541
136,065
218,540
1977 Jan
2,008
53,618
12,673
9,855 61,320 45,954
32,047
8,636
133,320
217,474
Feb
1,964
52,772
9,526
9,162 60,240 42,012
31,383
7,884
130,378
217,620
Mar
1,978
53,078
9,833
7,205 66,576 40,478
31,032
7,169
124,217
211,423
Apr
2,015
54,013
11,198
7,650 75,154 40,260
31,463
9,716
121,976
215,394
May
1,993
59,546
11,665
7942 64,860 46,362
31,901
11,972
125,531
214,562
Jun
2,022
58,765
12,695
7,753 67,240 46,070
33,514
10,731
129,020
219,781
' Estimated.
2 As of January 1977, US Bureau of Mines changed the reporting of crude oil stocks to include foreign crude oil not yet received at
refineries. Figures for 1976 and 1977 have been computed on the new basis.
20
Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
Estimated OECD Oil Consumption'
Million b/d
1st Qtr
2d Qtr
3d Qtr
4th Qtr
1973
43.2
37.6
36.8
42.4
1974
39.6
35.9
36.3
39.0
1975
37.9
34.2
34.2
37.6
1976
39.9
35.7
36.2
41.1
1977
42.5
37.1
' Excluding Australia and New Zealand, and including
US refinery gain.
F.O.B. Rotterdam'
F.O.B. Italy'
Heavy Fuel Oil
Heavy Fuel Oil
1%
Sulfur
3.5%
Sulfur
Gas Oil
Gasoline
(Premium)
1%
Sulfur
3.5%
Sulfur
Gas Oil
Gasoline
(Premium)
1974
1st Qtr
14.02
12.77
15.13
19.76
13.87
12.88
13.95
19.26
2d Qtr
10.15
9.70
11.77
19.61
9.90
9.35
10.93
18.77
3d Qtr
9.87
9.24
12.34
13.92
9.61
9.23
11.96
13.15
4th Qtr
11.09
10.11
12.33
13.26
10.29
9.96
11.68
12.08
1975
1st Qtr
11.97
10.49
11.18
14.20
10.57
10.24
11.10
13.23
2d Qtr
10.61
9.68
12.90
15.95
10.40
10.16
12.24
15.28
3d Qtr
9.33
8.62
14.40
15.02
8.81
8.30
13.87
14.64
4th Qtr
9.53
8.33
14.84
15.85
8.99
8.38
14.56
15.24
1976
1st Qtr
10.39
9.84
13.79
17.10
9.95
9.65
13.59
16.48
2d Qtr
10.40
9.56
14.08
19.24
10.18
9.73
13.90
18.30
3d Qtr
11.06
9.99
14.40
18.02
10.34
10.06
14.19
17.37
4th Qtr
12.07
10.76
14.57
17.44
11.64
10.85
14.48
16.83
1977
Jan
13.51
12.21
16.03
16.94
13.75
12.30
15.70
16.51
Feb
13.52
11.88
15.83
16.80
13.99
12.30
16.39
16.65
Mar
12.71
11.04
15.54
16.71
12.85
11.59
15.57
16.51
Apr
12.49
10.81
15.64
17.57
12.10
10.87
15.62
16.82
May
12.62
10.70
15.81
17.46
12.22
10.75
15.74
16.48
Jun
12.41
10.80
15.78
16.74
12.42
11.03
15.76
16.14
Jul
12.50
11.26
15.94
16.69
12.30
11.18
15.76
15.94
Aug
12.47
11.36
15.61
16.63
12.43
11.34
15.73
15.95
Sep
12.44
11.38
15.45
16.48
12.54
11.35
15.60
15.72
Oct
12.57
11.58
15.60
16.51
12.54
11.64
15.62
15.58
' Barge lot-minimum 3,500 barrels.
2 Cargo lot-minimum 130,000 barrels.
21
Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
 Approved For Releaselg1?6I9efd~0001~OIlon
Regular
Gasoline
Premium
Gasoline
Diesel Fuel
Price'
Tax
Price'
Tax
Price'
Tax
United States
1973 Oct
40
12
44
12
23
12
1974 Jan
46
12
50
12
32
12
Jun
55
12
59
12
36
12
1975 Jan
53
12
57
12
50
12
Jun
57
12
61
12
51
12
1976 Jan
58
12
63
12
52
12
Jun
59
12
64
12
52
12
1977 Jan
60
12
65
12
54
12
Jun
63
12
69
12
57
12
Jul
63
12
69
12
57
12
Japan
1973 Oct
88
39
105
39
48
21
1974 Jan
115
39
133
39
54
21
Jun
137
47
155
47
71
21
1975 Jan
152
47
170
47
78
21
Jul]
155
47
172
47
82
21
1976 Jan
156
47
174
47
86
21
Jul)
157
47
175
47
93
27
1977 Jan
167
59
185
59
93
27
Jun
167
59
185
59
88
25
West Germany
1973 Oct
112
81
124
82
112
76
1974 Jan
137
83
149
84
139
79
Jun
137
83
149
84
139
79
1975 Jan
129
84
140
84
137
76
Jun
129
84
143
84
137
76
1976 Jan
141
84
151
85
141
79
Jun
144
84
154
85
141
79
1977 Jan
144
84
154
84
141
79
Jun
141
84
150
86
140
79
Sep
140
84
149
86
140
79
France z
1973 Oct
95
65
103
69
66
39
1974 Jan
123
69
133
73
79
41
Jun
123
69
133
73
79
41
1975 Jan
129
73
139
77
88
38
Jun
129
73
139
77
85
46
1976 Jan
134
75
145
80
95
47
Jun
134
76
149
80
95
48
1977 Jan
159
97
171
103
99
48
Jun
167
101
180
108
109
54
Sep
167
101
180
108
109
54
United Kingdom
1973 Oct
51
32
53
32
51
32
1974 Jan
55
32
57
32
55
32
Jun
76
39
79
39
78
39
1975 Jan
100
39
104
39
79
39
Jun
100
39
104
39
78
39
1976 Jan
107
54
109
53
88
39
Jun
107
54
109
54
88
39
1977 Jan
112
55
115
56
111
52
Jun
119
64
122
64
120
59
Italy Sep
1.09
55
112
55
120
59
1973 Oct
75
56
79
58
41
26
1974 Jan
81
57
85
59
48
27
Jun
105
69
111
70
58
27
1975 Jan
122
69
128
87
58
27
Jun
122
83
128
87
60
28
1976 Jan
128
84
134
87
62
27
Jun
164
107
171
110
70
29
1977 Jan
205
147
213
153
72
29
Jun
205
148
213
153
66
19
Sep
205
148
213
153
66
19
Canada 9
1973 Oct
44
17
48
17
48
23
1974 Jan
44
17
48
17
48
23
Jun
51
17
55
17
55
23
1975 Jan
52
17
56
17
56
23
Jun
54
17
58
17
56
23
1976 Jan
66
25
70
25
61
31
Jun
66
25
70
25
62
31
1977 Jan
70
25
74
25
65
31
Mar
72
25
76
25
68
31
' Including tax.
'Government price ceilings in effect.
' Toronto prices.
Approved For ReleaserhOt1T ` :'2 X0fYPl'9tf00457A001100010001-0
 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
US $ per Barrel
4th Qtr 1975
1978
1st Qtr 1977
2d Qtr 1977
July 1977
Operating
Company
Cost
Direct
Sales
Price
Operating
Company
Cost
Direct
Sales
Price
Operating
Company
Cost
Direct
Sales
Price
Operating
Company
Cost
Direct
Sales
Price
Operating
Company
Cost
Direct
Sales
Price
OPEC averages
11.41
11.75
11.48
11.77
12.45
12.74
12.46
12.76
12.70
13.02
Saudi Arabia
Light 34? API 1.70% sulfur
11.27
11.51
11.27
11.51
11.84
12.09
11.84
12.09
12.45
12.70
Berri 39? API 1.16% sulfur
11.62
11.87
11.62
11.87
12.22
12.48
12.22
12.48
12.95
13.22
Heavy 27? API 2.85% sulfur
10.90
11.14
10.85
11.08
11.13
11.37
11.13
11.37
11.77
12.02
Medium 31? API 2.40% sulfur
11.09
11.33
11.07
11.30
11.44
11.69
11.44
11.69
12.07
12.32
Iran
Light 34? API 1.35% sulfur
11.40
11.62
11.40
11.62
12.59
12.81
12.59
12.81
12.59
12.81
Heavy 31? API 1.60% sulfur
11.28
11.50
11.15
11.37
12.27
12.49
12.27
12.49
12.27
12.49
Iraq 35? API 1.95% sulfur
11.21
11.43
11.46
11.46
12.62
12.62
12.60
12.60
12.60
12.60
Nigeria 34? API 0.16% sulfur
12.11
12.51
12.64
12.93
13.91
14.22
14.17
14.52
14.17
14.52
UAE 391 API 0.75% sulfur
11.62
11.92
11.62
11.92
12.08
12.50
12.08
12.50
12.73
13.26
Kuwait 31? API 2.50% sulfur *
11.15
11.30
11.11
11.26
12.22
12.37
12.22
12.37
12.22
12.37
Libya 40? API 0.22% sulfur
12.08
12.32
12.21
12.47
13.68
13.92
13.68
13.92
13.92
14.20
Venezuela 26? API 1.52% sulfur
11.19
N.A.
11.13
11.33
12.52
12.72
12.52
12.72
12.52
12.72
Indonesia 351 API 0.09% sulfur
10.65
12.80
11.10
12.80
12.15
13.55
12.15
13.55
12.15
13.55
Algeria 42? API 0.10% sulfur
12.62
12.75
13.01
13.01
14.29
14.29
14.29
14.29
14.45
14.45
Qatar 40? API 1.17% sulfur
11.54
11.85
11.54
11.85
12.88
13.19
12.88
13.19
12.88
13.19
Gabon 29? API 1.26% sulfur
9.23
10.50
10.29
11.55
10.45
11.55
11.23
12.60
11.23
12.60
Ecuador 28? API 0.93% sulfur
10.41
11.70
10.81
11.46
10.81
11.46
N.A.
13.00
N.A.
13.00
'Total average f.o.b. costs paid by present or former concessionaires.
F.o.b. prices set by the government for direct sales and, in most cases, for the producing company buy-back oil.
'Weighted by the volume of production.
* A 10-cent-per-barrel discount will be offered to buyers provided they meet their minimum contractual lifting volumes for second half
1977. The discount will be credited to the lifting companies' accounts beginning in first quarter 1978.
23
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
7.06
7.54
8.01
8.58
9.18
9.82
10.37
10.64
10.69
10.83
10.85
10.86
10.93
10.95
10.97
Total
7.06
7.54
8.01
8.58
9.18
9.82
10.4
Urals-Volga
4.17
4.23
4.31
4.40
4.44
4.50
4.5
West Siberia
0.63
0.90
1.25
1.75
2.33
2.96
3.6
Central Asia
0.58
0.66
0.71
0.76
0.79
0.81
0.8
Azerbaydzhan SSR
0.40
0.38
0.37
0.36
0.36
0.34
0.3
North Caucasus
0.68
0.72
0.69
0.59
0.53
0.47
0.4
Ukrainian SSR
0.27
0.28
0.28
0.27
0.25
0.23
0.2
Komi ASSR
0.11
0.12
0.13
0.13
0.14
0.14
0.2
Belorussia SSR
0.08
0.11
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.16
0.2
Far East
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.04
Negl.
Other
0.09
0.09
0.10
0.13
0.13
0.17
0.1
Including natural gas liquids.
2 Preliminary.
Total
Middle East
Egypt
40
40
20
4
3
5
3
Iraq
0
0
80
220
78
108
116
Other
50
90
80
66
29
37
9
24
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
Total
1,920
2,110
2,140
2,380
2,340
2,600
2,970
Other Communist countries
1,010
1,110
1,200
1,350
1,440
1,550
1,680
Eastern Europe
805
895
975
1,100
1,180
1,260
1,370
Asia
30
25
20
20
30
40
40
Cuba
120
130
140
150
155
160
175
Yugoslavia
55
60
65
80
75
90
95
Free World countries
910
1,000
940
1,030
900
1,050
1,290
North America
5
0
10
30
20
15
23
Canada
0
0
0
0
3
5
2
United States
5
0
10
30
17
10
21
Western Europe
760
830
815
880
750
880
1,102
Finland
155
170
170
200
180
175
190
France
50
90
60
105
30
70
117
Italy
205
180
170
175
135
135
240
Netherlands
30
35
50
65
60
60
53
Sweden
95
90
90
65
60
70
55
West Germany
125
120
125
115
125
150
145
Other
100
145
150
155
160
220
302
Near and Middle East
60
60
50
30
30
45
56
Egypt
30
32
30
7
4
5
5
Greece
20
20
18
16
20
38
40
Other
10
8
2
7
6
2
11
Africa
25
30
35
35
23
20
23
Ghana
10
12
13
12
6
3
5
Morrocco
14
17
19
19
13
13
13
Other
1
1
3
4
4
4
5
Asia
60
80
30
55
52
60
65
India
5
10
8
10
20
25
22
Japan
54
66
20
41
25
26
35
Other
1
4
2
4
7
9
8
Latin America
0
0
0
0
25
30
21
Brazil
0
0
0
0
25
30
21
1970
5.15
1971
5.46
1972
5.92
1973
6.33
1974
6.79
1975
7.20
1976
7.55
25
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
USSR: Natural Gas Production
Million cm/d
1970 542.3
1971 581.9
1972 604.9
1.973 647.5
1974 713:8
1975 792.6
1976 876.0
1977
Jan 958.1
Feb 971.4
Mar 958.1
Apr 933.3
May 912.9
Jun 903.3
Jul 900.0
Aug 909.7
Total 542.3 581.9 604.9 647.5 713.8 792.6 876.0
Central Asia 131.7 148.1 162.8 196.0 226.0 260.0' 285.6
Ukrainian SSR 166.8 177.0 184.1 186.6 187.2 188.2 187.7
North Caucasus 104.8 99.1 82.1 70.8 68.0 65.1 60.03
West Siberia 26.5 26.5 31.1 45.0 67.7 103.0 131.1
Komi ASSR 17.0 27.5 36.4 38.2 46.7 50.71 53.6
Azerbaydzhan SSR 15.0 15.9 18.7 22.9 24.9 27.1 30.1
Urals-Voga and other produc-
ing regions in the RSFSR 80.5 87.8 89.7 88.0 93.3 98.5' 127.9
Revised.
2 Preliminary.
Estimate based on average rate of decline during 1970-75.
Exports 9.0 12.5 13.9 18.7 38.5 53.0 70.4
Eastern Europe 6.4 8.6 9.4 13.3 23.4 31.0 36.7
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0.3 3.2 6.1
Czechoslovakia 3.7 4.5 5.3 6.5 8.9 10.1 11.7
East Germany 0 0 0 2.1 7.9 9.1 9.2
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 1.7 2.7
Poland 2.7 4.1 4.1 4.7 5.9 6.9 7.0
Western Europe 2.6 3.9 4.5 5.4 15.1 22.0 33.7
Austria 2.6 3.9 4.5 4.4 5.8 5.1 7.6
Finland 0 0 0 0 1.2 2.0 2.4
France 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.7
Italy 0 0 0 0 2.2 6.4 10.1
West Germay 0 0 0 1.0 5.9 8.5 110.9
Imports 9.7 22.3 30.2 31.3 32.7 34.0 3:2.2
Afghanistan 7.1 6.9 7.8 7.5 7.8 7.8 6.8
Iran 2.6 15.4 22.4 23.8 24.9 26.2 25.4
26
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
543.0
591.7
621.2
660.1
708.0
773.6
837.8
Production
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Yugoslavia
Consumption
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Yugoslavia
384 393 404 410 417 423 429
7 6 5 4 3 2 2
4 4 4 3 3 3 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
39 39 40 40 40 40 43
8 8 7 8 11 11 9
268 276 283 286 290 292 294
57 59 64 68 69 74 78
1,236 1,385 1,525 1,797 1,822 1,977 N.A.
179 208 218 244 262 284' N.A.
207 236 256 294 308 330' N.A.
191 209 272 293 297 3321 N.A.
128 145 163 179 186 204 N.A.
170 192 214 266 259 280 N.A.
207 227 239 270 276 310' N.A.
154 168 163 251 234 237 N.A.
27
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79BOO457AO01100010001-0
Eastern Europe: Oil Trade
Crude Oil
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
(Est.)
Imports
879
1,013
1,171
1,401
1,445
1,550
USSR
679
800
921.
1,044
1,118
1,214
OPEC
102
117
107
233
270
287
Iraq
40
53
28
53
86
146
Iran
62
64
71
94
63
14
Algeria
0
0
6
0
5
14
Libya
0
Negl.
2
0
4
9
Kuwait
0
0
0
4
0
0
Other OPEC
0
0
0
82 z
1121
104 '
Other Non-OPEC
98
96
143
124
57
49
Belgium
0
0
0
0
6
4
West Germany
0
0
0
6
4
0
Netherlands
0
0
0
0
2
11
Syria
Negl.
0
7
3
Negl.
5
France
0
7
1
0
0
0
Other
Petroleum products
98
89
135
115
45
29
Imports
166
152
158
175
176
138
Bulgaria
58
51
47
47
48
22
Czechoslovakia
22
20
21
25
27
20
East Germany -
2
4
11
2
2
2
Hungary
19
15
13
18
17
13
Poland
48
45
47
61
60
63
Yugoslavia
17
17
19
22
22
18
Exports
200
179
218
201
233
225
Czechoslovakia
15
18
20
13
10
13
East Germany
26
20
47
48
58
48
Hungary
17
7
11
10
7
4
Poland
26
21
34
27
24
32
Romania
107
107
102
99
129
124
Yugoslavia
9
6
4
4
5
4
Crude oil exports are negligible.
2 Including data that cannot be distributed by country of origin.
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Production
101.86
111.93
122.65
134.98
140.20
144.22
Bulgaria
1.30
0.90
0.60
0.61
0.49
0.40'
Czechoslovakia
2.22
2.11
1.81
1.73
1.64
1.64
East Germany
3.38
7.67
13.70
19.18
21.92
21.92'
Hungary
9.50
10.15
11.26
13.21
13.96
14.24
Poland
14.20
14.75
15.95
16.51
15.72
16.28
Romania
68.58
73.20
75.93
80.10
82.51
85.491
Yugoslavia
2.68
3.15
3.40
3.64
3.96
4.25
Consumption
108.48
120.46
131.74
148.10
181.98
169.13
Bulgaria
1.30
0.90
0.60
0.61
1.33
1.76'
Czechoslovakia
5.70
6.32
6.85
7.99
9.01
9.85
East Germany
3.82
7.97
13.70
21.34
29.70
30.95 '
Hungary
10.05
10.72
11.81
13.76
14.51
14.79
Poland
16.95
18.83
20.06
21.19
21.52
22.37
Romania
68.03
72.65
75.38
79.57
81.95
84.96'
Yugoslavia
2.63
3.07
3.34
3.64
3.96
4.25
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
Imports
7.46
9.50
10.02
13.92
22.34
25.44
Bulgaria
0
0
0
0
0.84
1.36
Czechoslovakia
3.72
4.55
5.36
6.53
7.37
8.21
East Germany
0.44
0.30
Negl.
2.16
7.78
9.03
Hungary
0.55
0.57
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.55
Poland
2.75
4.08
4.11
4.68
5.80
6.29
Exports
0.84
0.97
0.93
0.80
0.56
0.53
Czechoslovakia
0.24
0.34
0.32
0.27
Negl.
0
Romania
0.55
0.55
0.55
0.53
0.56
0.53'
Yugoslavia
0.05
0.08
0.06
Negl.
0
0
0.84
0.97
0.93
0.80
0.56
0.53
Crude Oil Production
570
730
860
1,090
1,310
1,490
1,670
Crude Oil Consumption
500
630
740
920
1,030
1,300
1,500
Oil Trade
Crude Exports
Japan'
0
0
0
20
80
164
136
Philippines'
0
0
0
0
2.8
10.0
10.0
Thailand '
0
0
0
0
0
5.0
0
Product Exports
North Korea
10
10
10
5
5
5
5
Thailand '
0
0
0
0
0
0
6.2
Vietnam
20
20
20
8
9
11
11
' Data represent contracts, not all of which were delivered.
29
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Secretary of Commerce
1- The Honorable Sidney Harman
Under Secretary of Commerce-Designate
1- The Honorable Jerry J. Jasinowski
Asst. Secretary for Policy-Designate
1- Mr. Haslam
General Counsel-Designate
1-
Asst. Secretary for Administration
1- Mr. S. Stanley Katz
Deputy Asst. Secretary
Bureau of International Economic
Policy and Research
1- Mr. Edward Miller
Acting Deputy Secretary for
Energy & Strategic Resources Policy
1- The Honorable Robert J. Blackwell
Asst. Secretary for Maritime Affairs
3~$ Mr. Robert E. Shepherd
Deputy Asst. Secretary
Bureau of Resources and Trade Assistance
Dept. of Commerce
319 Mr. Robert G. Shaw
Deputy Asst. Secretary
Bureau of International Commerce
Dept. of Commerce
Director, Office of East-West Country Affairs
DIBA-Dept. of Commerce
Room 4814-A
Z64/ Mrs. Lucy Falcone , Director
Office of Policy Development
Office of the Secretary, Dept. of Commerce
Mrs. Hertha Heiss
Chief, USSR Division
Office of East-West Trade Development
Bureau of East-West Trade, Room 4323
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Mr. Jack Gaines
Chief, Energy Resources Division
Department of Commerce
3cAl Mr. Frank Vargo
Director
Office of Economic Research,DIBA
Department of Commerce
~-Ro'oom 4824
3 5Ms. Wendy Raimes
Project Manager
Major Export Products' Division
BIC Department of Commerce
Room 3414 1
Zrs. Francis L. Hall
Director
International Trade Analysis Staff
DIBA-Department of Commerce
Room 5618
-3 Mr. Louis J. Moczar
Balance of Paymentd Division
Bureau of Economic Analysis
1401 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Room 408
Mr. Cherie Laustaunau
Commerce Action Group for the Near East
Room 3015
Department of Commerce
933')
(2 cys) Mr. Steven V. Dunaway
Balance of Payments Division
Bureau of Economic Analysis
Room 408
1401 K Street, N.W.
33` Mr. Maurice Kd)gon
Deputy Director
Market Planning
DIBA-Department of Commerce
Room 3203
3 3 L=Zr. Richard Garitz
Acting Director
Office of International Marketing
DIBA-Department of Commerce
Room 4015-B
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'2Mr. Eric Forman
Maritime Administration
Department of Commerce
(2 cys) 'TOP/Economics Adviser
3,31
337
United States Information Agency
curity Agency
Energy Research & Development Administration
Division of International Security Affairs
Suite 5221, Room. 3n
20 Mass. Ave.,N.W.
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FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD
(2 cys) Mr. Edwin M. Truman
Director
Division of International Finance
Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System
(2 cys) Mr. Mr. John Reynolds
Counselor to the Director
Division of International Finance
Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System
(2 cys ) 3'S9, ' . Samuel Pizer, Adviser
Division of International Finance
Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System
2 cys) 1Q Mrs. Cynthia Sutton
Division of International Finance
Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System
Mr. Sam Y. Cross
U.S. Executive Director
International Monetary Fund
Dr. Raymond J. Albright & Canada
Vice President for Europe
Export-Import of the U.S.
Roman 1105
811 Vermont Ave.,N.W.
5Mr. James C. Cruse
Vice President for Policy Analysis
Room 1203
Export Import of the U.S.
811 Vermont Ave.,N.W.
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('The Honorable Dale Hathaway
Assistant Secretary for
International Affairs and Cor nudity Programs
Department of Agriculture
309 Mr. Havard W. Hjort
Director
Economic Policy Analysis & Budget
Department of Agriculture
Mr. Thomas Hughes
Administrator
Foreign Agricultural Service
Department of Agriculture
Mr. Brice Meeker
Assistant Mrrd nistrator
Foreign Commodity Analysis
Foreign Agriculture Service
Mr. Richard Dunhman
Chairman
Federal Power Commission
Attn: Mr. George Vivian
Room 3106
941 N. Capitol Street, NE
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(4 cys) Ms. Sylvia Posner
Roan 5039
Main Interior Bldg.
18th & C Street
Washington, D.C.
1- Assistant Secretary for Energy & Minerals
Department of the Interior
1- Mr. Carl H. Cotterill
Bureau of the Mines
Department of the Interior
Room 727, Columbia Plaza
2401 E Street, N.W.
1- Mr. David A. Page
Special Assistant
Secretary for Energy
Department of Interior
Mrs. Barbara Burns
D/Office of International Affairs
Departme~it of the Interior
Roan 5312
18th & C Streets, N.W.
3,75- Director
a egic Warning Staff
Roan 1C925, Pentagon
Mr. John Gersic
Bicentennial Bldg. Room 661
U.S. International Trade Canmission
701 E Street, N.W.
? Department of Justice
Office of Management & Finance
Security Programs Section
Roan 6531
Main Justice Bldg.
For: Richard Levine
Anti-Trust Division
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 rob
1
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDE L
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
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DATE
INITIALS
1
SA /ER
2
4F-32
a
PPGIR&D
4
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5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
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FILE
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CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
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Remarks:
ER I0D 77-023, 16 Novemberl977:
Please indicate the items releasable
l CAAM-.6 . Prti,v4s
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FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67
 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457A001100010001-0
ER IOD 77-023 -- 16 November 1977
Overview ............................ 1
Title changed to "Prospects for Oil Price Increase"
also delete "Note" at bottom of page.
Economic Impact and Consequences of Another
OPEC Price Rise ........................... 3
NO DELETIONS
Appendix A; B; and C also released
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INFO: FILE
SUBSTANCE FROM OVERVIEW RPO11 OER'S INTERNATIONAL ENERGY
D12~1T'r~~.
MESSAGE REfERENGE NUMBER
127542!
INDEx DISSEM BY7
(,J RETURN TO PER
NOVEMBER.197?. IS APPROVED FOR PASSING
AT CONFIDENTIAL LEVEL UNDER THE TITLE OF
OIL PRICE INCREASE." E2, IMPDET
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Remarks :
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/11 : CIA-RDP79B00457AO01100010001-0
SECRET
NOFORN
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY BIWEEKLY REVIEW
V
t the moment, agreement on an increase of 5 to 10 percent in the price of
Sau f'benchmark crude seems probable as cartel members prepare for their
December meeting in Caracas. Whatever the outcome at Caracas, the next OPEC
price rise will occur in the midst of an already troubled economic environmen
Almost without exception the economic outlook for developed countries is
poor-real growth is slowing almost across the board, unemployment is high and
creeping still higher, and inflation remains stuck at double the long-term rate. Each
of these problems will be aggravated by higher oil prices. In the event of a
10-percent oil price rise, the loss in Big Seven real GNP will approximate half a
percent while nearly a full percentage point will be added to the rate of inflation.
The damage to growth could be substantially worse if oil-related losses in real
income and price stability spark a strong negative reaction from consumers and
investors.
Smaller industrial countries will be hit harder than the Big Seven by the oil
price rise on several counts. For one thing, the direct loss in GNP will be larger since
the smaller countries spend a.higher proportion of their income on imported oil. In
several cases notably Turkey, severe payments problems and inability to finance
higher oil imrt costs will necessitate still larger reductions in real GNP, perhaps as
much as 2 percent in some instances. For non-OPEC LDCs, the chief impact of
higher oil prices will be a more than $2 billion worsening in their current account
deficit. In these circumstances, developing countries would need offsetting increases
in foreign exchange drawdowns or added foreign borrowing to maintain imports and
avoid losses in consumption and growth.
"fur analysis does not attempt to assess the impact of the next OPEC price rise
on longer term problems, particularly the issue of future oil supply shortages. Given
the lead times involved in developing new supplies, the main adjustments will have
to be made on the demand side through higher real prices and in turn slower
economic growth, as well as stricter government-mandated conservation measures.
At this point, it is impossible to assess how much of an impact toward closing the
potential energy supply gap a 10-percent nominal price increase will have. _.__ i
Despite the potential adverse effects of an oil price rise, foreign governments
are not inclined to appeal to OPEC for restraint. The developed countries-large and
Note: Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome. They may be 71
directed to of the Office of Economic Research, telephone [phone].
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/11: CIA-RDP79B00457A001100010001-0
small-are convinced that only the United States can put effective pressure on
OPEC. While many would join in a move to try to hold oil prices down, they believe
it would be merely a pro forma exercise. Others, which want to preserve what they
believe are special relationships with OPEC countries, would try, to avoid any
involvement. The non-OPEC LDCs may argue against an oil price hike but would do
it privately and on their own. Association wit .4he developed countries on this issue
would be politically unthinkable. (Confidential) I
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 .3t..,w1\w. 1
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supported stem and irlformc;tion must be gathered in a formatted fashion. Therefore, each analyst will completa he NON-
SHADED parts of suction I and II of this form. Please type or print legibly. Questions should be directed to A/Comp/^&E Room
3E63 x 7871 black x 1724 red .
CARD2 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX lXXXXXXXX
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Geography
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(13-1B)
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AREA
(25-28)
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USE OF INFORMATION FROM COLLECTION PROGRAMS IN FINISHED INTELLIGENCE
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Rating forms will be completed for each finished intelligence publication prepared by DDI/Components. This is a machine-
supported system and information must be gathered in a formatted fashion. Therefore, each analyst will complete the NON-
SHADED parts of section I and II of this form. Please type or print legibly. Questions should be directed'to A/Comp/R&E Room
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CLASSIFICATION:,:' CLASSIFICATION CONTROLS:
0 7
TOPICAL CATEGORY GEOGRAPHIC AREA CATEGORY
Internal Politics USSR
International Relations Eastern Europe
Economics Western Europe
Military China
Science & Technology Other For East
Near East 'N. Africa
Geography
Biography South Asia
Africa
Latin Americo
LIST SPECIFIC COUNTRIES: -7, jf t6' ?- ,~-'?f~tirL -t*'`?`r`r -
TO BE COMPLETED BY R & E
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USE OF INFORMATION FROM COLLECTION PROGRP.MS IN FINISHED INTELLIGENCE
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Rating forms will be completed for each finished intelligence publication prepared by DDI/Components.' This is a machine-
supported system and information must be gathered in a formatted fashion. Therefore, each analyst will complete.the NON-
SHADED parts of section I and II of this form. Please type or print legibly. Questions should be directed to A/Comp/R&E Room
3E63 x 7871 black x 1724 red
k -7 ~4 . / UJ '(:~ -
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TOPICAL CATEGORY
Internal Politics
International Relations
Economics
Military
Science 8. Technology
Geography
Biography
CONTROL NO.
(21.22)
03 OSA C6 OCR 08 OW'I
30 OIA 1(1 DIA 6n 5.1 4T L
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GEOGRAPHIC AREA CATEGORY
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Western Europe
China
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Near East N. Africa
South Asia
Africa
Latin America
TO BE COMPLETED BY R & E
TOPIC
(23-24)
AREA
(25.28)
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 25X1 B
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 1ZEMSse -
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L
USE OF INFORMATION FROM COLLECTION PROGRAMS IN FINISHED INTELLIGENCE
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Rating forms will be completed for each finished intelligence publication prepared by DDI/Components. This is a machine-
supported system and information must be gathered in a formatted fashion. Therefore, each analyst will complete the NON-
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3E63 x 7871 (black) x 1724 (red).
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CARD I XX
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1 ' 1 ~~_ E I v 0 -I 1- v
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04 OGCR
07 OSI
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(1-2)
(3.61
03 OSR
06 OCR
08 OWI
20 ORPA
2
30 OIA
40 DIA
60 STATE
59 NSA
JOINT OFFICE (peclfy):
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CLASSIFICATION:
CLASSIFICATION CONTROLS:
TOPICAL CATEGORY
GEOGRAPHIC AREA CATEGORY
Internal Politics USSR
International Relations Eastern Europe
Economics Western Europe
Military Chino
Science & Technology Other For East
Geography Near East/N. Africa
Biography South Asia
Africa
Latin America
LIST SPECIFIC COUNTRIES:
TO BE COMPLETED BY R & E
CONTROL NO.
TOPIC
s AREA
121.221
(23.24)
125-281
441.L04L1'L:-CIA
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