A DOLLAR COST COMPARISON OF SOVIET AND US DEFENSE ACTIVITIES 1966-76

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00457A001300100001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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A Dollar Cost Comparison of Soviet and US
Defense Activities, 1966-76
Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center
Key Judgments
This publication is a detailed classified supplement to an
unclassified paper issued under the same title in January of
this year. The key judgments are the same as those presented
in the earlier paper. The reader is cautioned that the dollar
cost estimates used in this comparison of Soviet and US
defense activities must be viewed in terms of the limitations,
reliability factors, and conceptual framework explained in the
introduction.
Total Defense Programs
For the 1966-76 period, the cumulative estimated dollar costs of Soviet
defense activities-that is, the costs of reproducing them in the United
States-are about the same as US outlays for defense. The trends of the
defense activities of the two countries, however, are quite dissimilar.
? When expressed in constant US prices, the trend of the dollar costs of
Soviet activities is one of continuous growth throughout the period,
averaging about 3 percent per year. Growth is evident in nearly all the
major elements of the Soviet defense establishment.
? Despite increases in current dollar terms, US outlays in constant dollars
show a continuous decline after 1968, and since 1972 they have been
below the 1966 level. This decline reflects reductions in nearly every
major component since the Vietnam buildup of the late sixties.
Note: As a result of a reorganization, effective 11 October 1977, intelligence
publications formerly issued by the Directorate of Intelligence and by the
National Intelligence officers are now being issued by the National Foreign
Assessment Center.
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As a result of these diverging trends, the estimated dollar costs of Soviet
defense activities exceed US defense outlays by a widening margin in every
year after 1971. For 1976 they are about $120 billion (1975 prices)-about
one-third higher than total US outlays. If pensions are excluded from both
sides-leaving only the costs of current defense activities-the estimated
dollar costs of Soviet activities in 1976 exceed US outlays by about 40 percent.
If personnel costs are removed from both sides, US defense outlays exceed
the estimated dollar costs of Soviet defense activities by about 10 percent over
the 1966-76 period, although by 1976 the Soviet level is about 30 percent
higher than the US. Alternatively, if research, development, testing, and
evaluation (RDT&E)-for which estimates are considerably less reliable than
those for other activities-and pensions are subtracted from each side, the
estimated Soviet figure in 1976 is about 35 percent higher than that for the
United States, and the cumulative totals are about the same.
Resource Category Comparisons
The estimated costs of reproducing Soviet military investment-the
procurement of weapons and equipment (exclusive of RDT&E costs) and the
construction of facilities-are about 20 percent greater than comparable US
outlays for the 1966-76 period. They exceed US outlays by increasing
proportions after 1970, and in 1976 are about twice as large.
Operating
US outlays for operating military forces exceed the estimated dollar costs
of operating Soviet forces until 1973. Since then the Soviet activity level has
been higher in dollar cost terms. For 1976, the estimated dollar cost of
operating Soviet forces, exclusive of pensions, is about 15 percent above US
outlays.
The estimated dollar costs of Soviet military RDT&E grow over
the period, while US outlays in this category decrease. For the period as a
whole, estimated Soviet costs exceed US outlays by almost 10 percent.
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Military Mission Comparisons
Strategic Attack
The estimated dollar costs of Soviet strategic attack programs for the
1966-76 period are twice those of the United States. For 1976, the Soviet
figure is almost three times the US total. The Soviet figure, however, includes
a large peripheral attack force for which the United States has no direct
counterpart. For intercontinental attack forces only, the estimated costs of
Soviet activities in 1976 were about twice the US total.
Strategic Defense
For the 1966-76 period, the estimated costs of Soviet strategic defense
forces were almost four times US outlays. Moreover, US outlays have been
declining, and in 1976 the Soviet level was 10 times the US.
General Purpose
US outlays for general purpose forces are about 10 percent larger than the
estimated dollar costs of comparable Soviet forces for the period. Since 1971,
however, the Soviet level has been higher than that of the US-one-third
higher in 1976-reflecting the post-Vietnam reduction in US forces.
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CONTENTS
Page
Key judgments .............................................................................................. i
Preface ............................................................................................................ vii
Introduction .................................................................................................... 1
Total Defense Activities .............................................................................. 3
Resources .................................................................................................... 3
Military Missions ........................................................................................ 3
Military Manpower .................................................................................. 3
Resource Categories ...................................................................................... 7
Investment .................................................................................................. 7
Operating ..................................................................................................... 8
RDT&E ........................................................................................................ 14
Military Missions ............................................................................................. 14
Strategic Forces ........................................................................................ 14
General Purpose Forces ............................................................................ 19
Support Forces .......................................................................................... 22
Page
APPENDIX A: Production Data ................................................................ 23
APPENDIX B: Costing Methodology ........................................................ 27
APPENDIX C: Revisions in Data and Methodology .............................. 31
APPENDIX D: Statistical Data .................................................................. 33
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Page
Fig 1 Total US and Soviet Defense Activities ........................................ 4
Fig 2 Distribution by Resource Category of US and Soviet Defense
Programs ...................................................................................... 5
Fig 3 US and Soviet Active Military Manpower .................................. 6
Fig 4 US and Soviet Military Investment .............................................. 8
Fig 5 US and Soviet Investment in Strategic Forces .............................. 9
Fig 6 US and Soviet Investment in General Purpose Forces .............. 10
Fig 7 Operating Costs for US and Soviet Forces .................................... 11
Fig 8 Personnel Costs for US and Soviet Forces .................................. 12
Fig 9 O&M Costs for US and Soviet Forces .......................................... 13
Fig 10 Operating Costs for US and Soviet Strategic Forces .................. 14
Fig 11 Operating Costs for US and Soviet General Purpose Forces ..... 15
Fig 12 US and Soviet RDT & E Programs ................................................ 16
Fig 13 US and Soviet Forces for Strategic Offense .................................. 16
Fig 14 US and Soviet General Purpose Forces ........................................ 20
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PREFACE
This report presents the latest dollar cost estimates of Soviet defense
activities and compares them with corresponding US defense outlays. The
dollar cost estimates reflect the cost of reproducing the Soviet activities in the
United States, using US cost factors and pay rates.
The Soviets, however, would view the distribution of their total defense
effort quite differently from the way it is shown in this report. Neither the
system of accounts nor the structuring of expenditures by military mission or
resource category is the same for the Soviet Ministry of Defense and the US
Department of Defense. Most important, the price structures in the two
countries are substantially different. The Soviet view, of course, would
influence program choices in the USSR.
This report is a detailed supplement to the unclassified study issued under
the same title in January of this year. It supersedes a study issued in July 1976
titled A Dollar Cost Comparison of Soviet and US Defense Activities, 1965-
75 (SR 76-10165).
The report contains three major sections and four appendixes. The first
section summarizes the overall trends in US and Soviet defense activities. The
second compares these activities by resource categories-investment, operat-
ing, and RDT&E. The third section compares the activities by major military
missions. The missions as defined in this report-strategic forces, general
purpose forces, and support forces-agree with the guidelines given in the US
Defense Department's Defense Planning and Programming Categories of
April 1976.
Appendix A presents US and Soviet production data for selected military
weapon systems. Appendix B contains an explanation of the methodology used
to cost Soviet activities and to structure the cost estimates to achieve
comparability with US authorizations. Appendix C discusses changes to the
data base and methodology since last year's study. Appendix D presents
summary tables of the costs of defense activities.
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A Dollar Cost Comparison of Soviet and US
Defense Activities, 1966-76
Introduction
The military establishments of the Soviet
Union and the United States are difficult to
compare because they differ considerably in mis-
sions, structure, and political environment. The
common denominator used here to measure the
defense activities of the two countries is dollar
cost. The approach is to estimate how much it
would cost to produce and man in the United
States a military force of the same size and with
the same inventory of weapons as the Soviet force
and to operate that force as the Soviets do. These
estimated dollar costs are then compared year by
year with US outlays for similar activities.
This approach provides a means of comparing
the overall magnitudes and trends of defense
activities in the two countries. Dollar cost data
also provide a means for aggregating dissimilar
elements of each country's military activities into
comparable categories and thus can show trends
and relationships that are difficult to discern and
measure in other ways. This approach, however,
does not give an appreciation of the size of the
weapons inventories in any particular year, nor
does it reveal changes in the inventories over
time.
The data presented here are expressed in aver-
age calendar year 1975 prices. A constant price
base is used so that trends in the cost estimates
will reflect changes in military forces and activi-
ties rather than the effects of price changes. The
US data are for fiscal years, while the dollar costs
of Soviet activities are for calendar years.
Defense activities used in this comparison are
(1) those that in the United States would be
funded by the Department of Defense (less for-
eign military aid), (2) defense nuclear activities
such as those which have been funded in the
United States by the Department of Energy
(DOE), and (3) the activities of the US Selective
Service System, the US Coast Guard, and the
Soviet militarized security forces (border guards
and internal security troops). Excluded from this
definition are (1) space activities that in the
United States would be funded by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
(2) civil defense except for the pay and
allowances of uniformed personnel engaged in
such activities, and (3) veterans' benefits.
US dollar cost data are in terms of outlays.
They include outlays derived from the Total
Obl.igational Authority (TOA) series in The Five-
Year Defense Program issued by the Department
of Defense in October 1976. They also include
Coast Guard and Selective Service outlays and
DOE outlays related to nuclear weapons and
military reactors. The US data have been con-
verted to constant prices and have been adjusted
somewhat to achieve accounting coverage com-
parable with the dollar estimates made for the
USSR. The US figures in this report, therefore, do
not match actual budget authorizations or
appropriations.
The estimates of the dollar costs of Soviet
activities presented in this report have a margin
of error which could be substantial for some
items. Our confidence is highest in the aggregate
totals but is considerably less at the lower levels of
aggregation. Moreover, the reliability of our dol-
lar cost estimates varies from category to cate-
gory, depending on the reliability of our esti-
mates of the size and characteristics of Soviet
military forces and on the accuracy of the cost
factors applied to those estimates.
We have our greatest confidence in estimates
in the investment category-procurement of
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weapons and equipment and construction of fa-
cilities-which makes up about one-third of the
total estimated dollar costs of Soviet defense
activities for the period.
Manpower costs, constituting about 40 percent
of the total estimated dollar costs of Soviet activi-
ties, are the largest and most reliable component
in the operating category. For other operating
costs, representing some 15 percent of the total,
both the quantity and quality of information are
less reliable.
The estimated dollar costs of Soviet RDT&E
should be regarded as significantly less reliable
than estimates for either investment or operating.
On balance, we believe that the overall dollar
cost estimate for Soviet defense activities as de-
fined is unlikely to be in error by more than 15
percent. This judgment, while informed, is none-
theless subjective and not the result of rigorous
statistical measurement.
Because of the problems of comparing such
disparate activities, the uncertainties of the esti-
mates of Soviet costs, and the organization of the
US data, the comparisons in this paper should not
be considered precise measurements. Any com-
mon denominator used for comparative sizing is
imperfect, and its limitations must be understood
in interpreting such comparisons. Any conclu-
sions drawn from this dollar cost analysis must be
tempered by an appreciation of what it does not
do:
? It cannot be used alone to draw inferences
about the relative military effectiveness or
capabilities of US and Soviet forces. Other
data, such as the size and technical charac-
teristics of the forces, the geographical loca-
tions of the two countries, their allies' capa-
bilities and requirements, strategic doctrine
and tactical concepts, morale, and command
and control capabilities must also be consid-
ered for such judgments.
? It does not measure actual Soviet defense
expenditures or their burden on the Soviet
economy. These questions are addressed by
different analytical techniques yielding esti-
mates of the ruble costs of Soviet military
activities.
? It does not reflect the Soviet view of the
distribution of the USSR's defense effort.
The price structures in the two countries are
substantially different. Additionally, neither
the system of accounts nor the structuring of
expenditures by military mission or resource
category is the same for the Soviet Ministry
of Defense and the US Department of
Defense.
Finally, dollar cost calculations tend to over-
state Soviet defense activities relative to those of
the United States because of a basic measurement
problem common to all international economic
comparisons and known to economists as the
index number problem. Given different resource
endowments and technologies, countries tend to
use more of the resources that are relatively
cheap-and less of those that are relatively ex-
pensive-for a given purpose. A comparison
drawn in terms of the prices of one country thus
tends to overstate the relative value of the activi-
ties of the other. This tendency is more pro-
nounced the greater the disparity between the
economies.
The degree of overstatement of Soviet defense
activities relative to the US that is inherent to the
dollar cost comparison cannot be measured with
precision. An appreciation of the magnitude of
the index number problem can be obtained,
however, by calculating the other extreme-that
is, by examining the ratio of Soviet to US defense
activities measured in ruble cost terms, which
overstates US activities relative to Soviet. The
dollar cost comparison shows Soviet defense ac-
tivities to exceed those of the United States by
about 40 percent in 1976. If both are measured in
terms of estimated ruble costs, the Soviet activi-
ties are about 25 percent larger than the US.
Thus, the effect of the index number problem is
not large enough to alter the basic conclusion that
Soviet defense activities overall are currently
larger than those of the United States.
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Total Defense Activities
For 1976 the estimated dollar cost of Soviet
defense activities, about $118 billion expressed in
1975 prices, is more than 40 percent higher than
the US defense outlay of $84 billion. If the costs
of pensions for retired personnel are included on
both sides, the dollar cost of Soviet activities is
still about one-third greater than outlays for US
activities. For the 1966-76 period as a whole, the
total dollar cost of Soviet activities is roughly
equal to the total US outlay. After 1971, however,
the Soviet total exceeds that of the United States
by over 25 percent (see figure 1).
Throughout the period the dollar cost estimates
of Soviet defense activities grow at a rate of about
3 percent a year-from an estimated $87 billion
in 1966 to $118 billion in 1976. This trend is
evident in nearly all major components of the
Soviet defense establishment.
share for investment and RDT & E both decline
after 1968.
Military Missions
For 1976 the estimated dollar costs of Soviet
activities exceed US outlays in all major military
missions. For strategic forces they are more than
three and one-half times US outlays, for general
purpose forces, one-third greater, and for support
forces. almost 10 percent higher.
Over the 1966-76 period, support forces ac-
count for the bulk of total costs for both coun-
tries-about 40 percent of estimated Soviet dollar
costs and almost 50 percent of US outlays. Gen-
eral purpose forces costs constitute about 30
percent of the total for both countries, with the
strategic programs taking less than 20 percent for
the Soviet and less than 10 percent for the US
activities.
Quite a different picture is seen for the United
States. Despite increases in the current dollar
costs of US defense activities, defense outlays
expressed in constant dollar terms decline con-
tinuously after the peak of 1968, and after 1971
are below the 1966 level.
For 1976, estimated dollar costs of Soviet ac-
tivities exceed US outlays in all three major
resource categories. In investment, the category
in which we have the highest confidence, they
are 100 percent greater than the US figure; in
operating costs, nearly 15 percent greater; and in
RDT&E, just over 65 percent higher. This con-
trasts with the Vietnam-era peak US spending
year of 1968, when US outlays exceed estimated
dollar costs of Soviet activities in all three cate-
gories by 30 to 40 percent.
For the period 1966-76 as a whole, the compo-
sition of the dollar costs for the two countries is
similar: roughly 60 percent for operating, 30
percent for investment, and 10 percent for
RDT&E. The Soviet share for investment is
remarkably constant over the period, while the
share for RDT&E has risen (see figure 2). The US
Military Manpower
Military manpower trends parallel those for
total costs in the two defense establishments.
Estimated Soviet military manpower grows
throughout the period, increasing by more than
800,000 men between 1966 and 1976. The level
of US military manpower has fallen steadily since
the peak of the Vietnam buildup in 1968, and in
1976 is less than in 1966 (see figure 3).
Over 60 percent of the estimated growth in
Soviet military manpower occurred in the ground
forces, although all elements of the Soviet defense
establishment have grown during the period.
Several factors have contributed to these in-
creases. A general modernization and expansion
of all force elements played a part, as did the
emergence of China as a potential enemy and the
attendant increase in the number of troops de-
ployed along the Sino-Soviet border. Periods of
heightened tensions-for example, the invasion
of Czechoslovakia in 1968-have also served as
an impetus for growth.
The Soviets historically have assigned their
military a broader range of responsibilities than
the United States. As a result, their "military"
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TOTAL US AND SOVIET DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
r~'v a^y e-;z?'Y av' a. _9 ilS j :._"~l%esn1 Ir Ff'4('? E 1''*.
BILLION 1975 DOLLARS
140
40
1966 67
BILLION 1975 DOLLARS
01
1966 67
BILLION 1975 DOLLARS
US
USSR
1773aw 1773mm ED= Mm
70 71 72 73 74 75 76
RDT&E Pensions
The dollar cost estimates reflect the cost of producing and manning in the US a military force of the same inventory of weapons
and size as that of the Soviets, and operating that force as the Soviets do. The costs for Soviet investment and operating are best
estimates, with possible error margins of 15 percent displayed. The estimated costs of Soviet RDT&E are derived in the aggregate,
using a less certain methodology, and should be viewed only as rough measures. For this reason, they have been excluded from the
totals and are shown separately. Military pensions, which reflect payments for past rather than present defense activities, have also
been excluded from the totals and are shown separately. The US defense costs are in terms of outlays based primarily on Department
of Defense Total Obligational Authority (TOA) in The Five-Year Defense Program, October 1976. The US data are for fiscal years,
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DISTRIBUTION BY RESOURCE CATEGORY OF
US AND SOVIET DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Comparison of US Outlays with E~3timateci
->liar Costs of Soviet Proerarrs it Duplicated in the US
BILLION 1975 DOLLARS
140 -
120'
BILLION 1975 DOLLARS
140
120 RDT&E
100=-
25X1
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US AND SOVIET ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER
01 1
The USSR total includes border guards, internal security troops, and construction troops,
for which the US Armed Forces have no counterpart. The lower USSR line excludes these men,
manpower includes border guards, internal secu-
rity troops, and construction troops-forces for
which the United States has no direct counter-
parts. Even if these forces are excluded, Soviet
military manpower is nearly double the US total
in 1976.
Effect of Manpower Costs
In estimating the dollar costs of Soviet military
manpower, 1975 pay rates for the US all-volun-
teer force have been used for the entire 1966-76
period. The higher level of Soviet military man-
power results in dollar cost estimates for military
manpower that are more than 60 percent higher
than US outlays in 1976. If 1968 (prevolunteer
force) pay rates converted to 1975 prices were
used, the Soviet figure would be 35 percent
greater than that for the United States, and the
total estimated dollar cost for all Soviet defense
activities would be 30 percent greater than total
US defense outlays in 1976.
Regardless of which pay rates are used, the
estimated dollar costs of the overall Soviet de-
fense effort remain higher than US outlays from
1972 to 1976. If all costs for military personnel
are subtracted from both sides, total estimated
dollar costs for Soviet defense activities are almost
30 percent higher than total US outlays in 1976.
Impact of Pension Costs
The cost of US and Soviet military pensions has
been excluded from the comparative calculations
made elsewhere in this paper. If they are added
to each side, the estimated dollar costs of Soviet
activities in 1976 exceed US outlays by about 30
percent.
The estimated dollar cost of Soviet pensions is a
small share of the total that grows slowly over the
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1966-76 period. The US military retirement ac-
tivities, however, are broader in coverage, and
over the period the portion of US outlays devoted
to pensions more than doubles. In 1976, US
retirement costs, at $7 billion, represent about 8
percent of US outlays.
The impact of including pensions in the com-
parative calculations of dollar costs of defense
activities for both countries is insignificant until
1970. From 1970 onward, adding retirement
costs has the effect of decreasing in each year the
proportion by which the dollar cost of Soviet
defense activities exceeds US outlays.
Resource Categories
The comparisons of estimated dollar costs for
Soviet defense activities and US defense outlays
are presented in this section by resource cate-
gory-investment, operating, and RDT&E.
? The investment category covers the dollar
costs of activities to modernize or expand
forces through the procurement of equip-
ment, including major spare parts, and con-
struction of facilities. Investment cost repre-
sents the flow of equipment and facilities
into the defense establishment. It is not an
indication of the size of the force in any
given year.
? Operating costs are those associated with
maintaining current forces, including per-
sonnel costs. Operating costs are directly
related to the size of the forces and to their
level of activity.
? Dollar costs for RDT & E are those for activ-
ity devoted to exploring new technologies,
developing advanced weapon systems, and
improving existing systems.
Within the investment and operating categor-
ies, the shares of US outlays are shown by major
missions. For illustrative purposes we have ar-
rayed the estimated dollar costs of Soviet activi-
ties in a similar format, but it should be empha-
sized that the shares shown for Soviet missions
within resource categories are only very rough
approximations. At this level of detail, the deci-
sion to assign Soviet costs to a particular mission
often becomes arbitrary. This is particularly true
in assigning costs among the support forces.
For 1976 the estimated dollar cost of Soviet
investment activities is nearly $40 billion, about
twice the amount of the US outlay for invest-
ment. Weapon system procurement is the driving
component for both countries, accounting for
about 90 percent of the investment totals for each
throughout the 1966-76 period (see figure 4).
The estimated total cost of Soviet investment
for the entire period is about 20 percent greater
than the US outlay, but the total for the last five
years is about 65 percent greater. Soviet invest-
ment activities between 1966 and 1976 reflect an
increase of about 20 divisions in the ground forces
and the construction of more than 80 major naval
surface combat ships, over 50 nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines, about 3,000 intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 270 heavy and
medium bomber-type aircraft, and 8,000 fighter
aircraft.
The estimated dollar costs of Soviet investment
grow at an average rate of about 3 percent per
year throughout the 1966-76 period, surpassing
US outlays in 1971, and continuing at levels
higher than those of the United States through
1976. US outlays for investment during this pe-
riod reach their peak in 1968 and fall by 1976 to
about 70 percent of the 1966 level.
If dollar costs for investment are categorized
by mission-strategic, general purpose, and sup-
port-the greatest difference between the United
States and the USSR in this period is in invest-
ment for strategic forces. Estimated dollar costs
for Soviet investment in this category are about
two and one-half times US outlays from 1966
through 1976 (see figure 5).
For both countries, the dollar costs of invest-
ment in general purpose forces are much higher
than those for the other two mission categories-
about 50 percent of estimated dollar costs for
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US AND SOVIET MILITARY INVESTMENT
Dollar Costs of Soviet Programs if Duplicated in the US
BILLION 1975 DOLLARS
50
10i--
II
68 69 70 7:1
Soviet investment and about 55 percent of US
investment. Cumulative and average US outlays
for general purpose forces investment over the
period are close to the comparable estimated
dollar costs for the Soviets.
The US and Soviet trends over the period,
however, are quite different (see figure 6). From
1966 through 1968, US outlays rise considerably
more rapidly than Soviet dollar costs, reflecting
heavy US investment in ordnance and equipment
for general purpose forces in Southeast Asia.
From 1968 through 1971, annual US outlays fall
by $10 billion, and by 1971 are below the level of
comparable Soviet dollar costs. The trend of US
outlays since 1971 has been more gradually
downward, but Soviet investment has grown
more rapidly after 1971 than before. By 1976, the
estimated dollar cost of Soviet investment in
general purpose forces is about $20 billion, over
80 percent above the comparable US outlay.
Operating
The largest portion of operating activities for
both the United States and the USSR for the
1966-76 period is that associated with military
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US AND SOVIET INVESTMENT IN STRATEGIC FORCES
A Comparison of US Outlays with Estimated
Dollar Costs of Soviet Programs if Duplicated in the US
BILLION 1975 DOLLARS
15
0L__ -1.
1966 67 68 69 70
personnel. Dollar costs for personnel include pay
and allowances for active and reserve military
manpower but exclude pay and benefits for
military retirees. The remaining portion of oper-
ating costs covers the operation and maintenance
(O&M) of military equipment and facilities.
For 1976 the total estimated dollar cost of
operating all Soviet defense forces is $63 billion,
nearly 15 percent greater than comparable US
outlays. For the 1966-76 period as a whole, US
outlays exceed the estimated Soviet operating
costs by almost 15 percent. For the seventies,
however, they are about the same for both coun-
tries (see figure 7).
Estimated dollar costs for operating Soviet
forces increase by more than 25 percent between
1966 and 1976. This upward trend reflects an
increase in manpower and in the equipment
holdings of the Soviet armed forces.
US outlays for operating, on the other hand,
decline sharply after peaking in 1969. The down-
ward trend ends in 1974, and there are slight
increases in both 1975 and 1976.
Dollar cost estimates for Soviet military person-
nel show sustained growth throughout the 1966-
76 period. The trend for the United States is one
of declining outlays for military personnel from
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US AND SOVIET INVESTMENT IN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
parison or US Outlays with Estimated
i:. +t?iiar Costs of Soviet Programs if Duplicated in the US
BILLION 1975 DOLLARS
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A Comparison of US Outlays with Estimated
Dollar Costs of Soviet Programs if Duplicated in the US
BILLION 1975 DOLLARS
80
70
1 I_ I I I I _`__I
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1969 through the end of the period (see figure 8).
As Soviet forces are more manpower intensive,
estimated dollar costs for Soviet personnel ac-
count for a larger portion of operating costs.
US outlays for O&M, unlike those for other
resource categories, are larger every year than
the estimated cost of Soviet activities (see figure
9). In the sixties this is largely a result of the
involvement in Southeast Asia. There is also a
difference in operating concepts that has an
effect throughout the period-in general, the
United States tends to operate its equipment
more than the Soviets, who, for example, use
more simulation in training.
Although in absolute terms the US level for
O&M is higher than that for the Soviets, the
trends for both countries are the same as those for
total operating costs. For the period as a whole,
US outlays for O&M are about 75 percent higher
than estimated Soviet costs. In 1976, however, the
US level is only about 45 percent higher than that
of the Soviets.
PERSONNEL COSTS FOR US AND SOVIET FORCES
ornnarison of US Outlays with Estimated
,Uar Costs of Soviet Programs if Duplicated in the US
Ft(JPF 8
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O&M COSTS FOR US AND SOVIET FORCES
A Comparison of US Outlays with Estimated
Dollar Costs of Soviet.Programs if Duplicated in the US
40
I I ___ _j
73 74 75 76
A comparison, by mission, reveals that for the
1966-76 period as a whole the largest portion of
operating costs for both the United States and the
USSR is for the support forces. The second largest
share for both countries is for general purpose
forces, and the smallest share is for strategic
forces. There is a marked contrast, however,
between US and Soviet operating costs for each
mission.
The estimated dollar cost of operating the
Soviet strategic forces is more than twice as large
as US outlays for the 1966-76 period. The Soviet
level is greater than that of the United States
throughout the entire period, and in 1976 is over
two and one-half times greater (see figure 10).
Within the strategic mission, personnel costs
make up about 80 percent of total operating costs
for the Soviets and about 50 percent for the
United States.
In the general purpose forces, US outlays for
operating exceed estimated Soviet costs for the
period as a whole by about 30 percent (see figure
11). Personnel costs again account for the largest
portion of total operating costs for both coun-
tries--about 70 percent for the United States and
almost 90 percent for the USSR.
US outlays for operating the support forces
exceed the estimated dollar costs for the Soviets
by about 20 percent for the period. Estimated
Soviet costs rise steadily throughout the period,
however, while US outlays decline rapidly from
1969 to 1974 and then level off. Soviet costs
surpass those of the United States for the first
time in 1974, and in 1976 are about 10 percent
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OPERATING COSTS FOR US AND SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES
A Comparison of US Outlays with Estimated
dollar Costs of Soviet Programs if Duplicated in the US
BILLION 1975 DOLLARS
Military Missions
higher. For the USSR, estimated costs for person-
nel make up about 60 percent of total operating
costs for the period, while for the United States
the share is about 45 percent.
Estimates of dollar costs for Soviet RDT & E
activities are based on analysis of published Soviet
data and are considerably less reliable than any
other body of data in this report (see appendix B).
They are derived only in the aggregate and
include RDT&E activities for military uses of
nuclear energy. These costs grow throughout the
1966-76 period and exceed comparable US out-
lays by increasing amounts in the seventies (see
figure 12). To achieve comparability, the US data
include all Department of Defense outlays for
RDT & E and defense-related RDT & E outlays of
the DOE.
In this section the costs of military activities for
the US and USSR are separated and discussed in
detail according to mission-strategic forces, gen-
eral purpose forces, and support forces. This is
not the way the Soviets themselves organize their
military missions, nor does it represent the way
they would view the allocation of their resources
for defense. Mission cost estimates are organized
in accordance with the Defense Department's
Defense Planning and Programming Categories.
This categorization permits comparison of the
estimated dollar costs of Soviet defense activities
with categories often used in US defense analysis.
Strategic Forces
Strategic forces include all forces assigned to
intercontinental and peripheral attack, strategic
defense, and strategic command, control, and
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OPERATING COSTS FOR
US AND SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
A Comparison of US Outiavs with Estimated
Dollar Costs of Soviet Nroarams if Duplicated in the US
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US AND SOVIET RDT&E PROGRAMS
.., , n~ sax+~.4 ~^F`.~eea'.e.~e it =BLS re3=r. ante=?x'? in ni-iw 1. i?ti
BILLION 1975 DOLLARS
20
0
1966 67
US AND SOVIET FORCES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSE
+.;== r_ outlays with Estimatecl
f Prntsramw it 1-1e it)licatE!rl in thca US
15
0 z _... ~._......1,__1~ _I_ L _N
1966 68 70 72 74
NOTE: The strategic offense mission is defined according to the US Defense Planning and Programming
Categories of April 1976. Minor adjustments have been made to attain comparability with Soviet data.
Costs for pensions, nuclear materials for warheads, and RDT&E are excluded.
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warning. Over the 1966-76 period, the level of
Soviet activity for strategic forces measured in
dollars is almost two and one-half times that of
the United States, with the difference growing
since 1969. In 1976, the Soviet level is over three
and one-half times that of the US.
Intercontinental Attack
This mission includes the strategic weapon
systems and manpower which are designated for
an intercontinental attack role. Land-based
ICBM systems, ballistic missile submarines for
intercontinental attack, and intercontinental
bombers are the components of this mission. Over
the entire 1966-76 period, the Soviet intercon-
tinental attack activities account for 10 percent of
the total estimated dollar costs of Soviet defense
activities. In 1976, Soviet ICBM activities account
for about 60 percent of the estimated dollar costs
for this mission, missile submarine activities for
about 35 percent, and bombers for the
remainder.
At $8.3 billion, the estimated dollar cost of
activities allotted to the Soviet intercontinental
attack mission in 1976 is more than twice the
outlays for comparable US activities. For the
period as a whole, estimated dollar costs for
Soviet intercontinental attack forces are nearly
one and one-half times US outlays. US outlays for
intercontinental attack activities are at about the
same level in 1976 as in 1966 (see figure 13).
The estimated dollar cost of Soviet land-based
ICBM activities in 1976 is about $4.9 billion,
compared with about $0.8 billion in US outlays.
Estimated dollar costs of Soviet ICBM activities
for the entire 1966-76 period are over four times
US outlays for ICBMs. Early in the period, the
Soviets began to deploy the SS-9, SS-11, and SS-
13, and estimated dollar costs-reaching about
$4.8 billion in 1967-reflect this activity. Deploy-
ment of these missiles was complete by 1972, and
in that year estimated dollar costs for Soviet
ICBMs reached their low point for the period. In
1973, early efforts for the new generation of
ICBMS--the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19-caused an
upturn in estimated dollar costs which continued
through 1976.
By comparison, the United States had nearly
completed its planned ICBM deployment by the
beginning of the period. US outlays since 1966
have remained relatively steady at close to $1
billion, reflecting operating costs and upgrading
of the Minuteman force.
Ballistic Missile Submarines for Intercontinental
Attack
This element includes all US ballistic missile
submarine systems and the Soviet ballistic missile
submarines which are estimated to have an inter-
continental attack role. Soviet ballistic missile
submarines which are believed to have a periph-
eral attack function are included in the strategic
peripheral mission. For both countries, nonstrate-
gic or attack submarines are included with the
general purpose naval forces.
At $2.9 billion, the estimated dollar costs of
Soviet ballistic missile submarine activities for
1976 are 50 percent higher than US outlays. For
the entire 1966-76 period, Soviet activities exceed
those of the United States by about 40 percent.
Rising dollar costs for Soviet activities in the
late sixties are caused by production of the Y-class
submarine with the SS-N-6 missile. In the early
seventies costs again increase, reflecting the
D-class program with its longer range missile, the
SS-N-8. These costs begin to decline again after
1974, as Y-class production comes to an end.
The United States, in contrast, completed pro-
duction of its Polaris force in the early sixties.
Operating expenditures and costs associated with
improvements to the Polaris system and the shift
f roan Polaris to Poseidon missiles determine the
trend through 1972, with outlays for the Trident
program beginning after that.
Intercontinental Bombers
This category includes the heavy bomber sys-
tems and other aircraft which have an intercon-
tinental attack role as their primary mission.
Costs of heavy bomber operations are included
here even though the operations may have been
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nonstrategic in nature-such as the use of the US
B-52 fleet in Southeast Asia. Estimated dollar
costs of the Soviet Badger, Blinder, and Backfire
bombers are included under strategic peripheral
attack. '
In 1976 the estimated dollar costs of Soviet
intercontinental bomber activities are just over
one-third of outlays for US heavy bombers. Over
the 1966-76 period, estimated costs for Soviet
activities are about one-fourth of US outlays for
comparable activities.
The relatively low level of estimated dollar
costs for the Soviet intercontinental bomber pro-
gram reflects the static nature of the force. As no
new heavy bombers were produced over the
1966-76 period, only operating costs of the exist-
ing Bear and Bison bomber fleet were incurred.
Costs associated with US bombers decreased as
use of the bomber fleet in Southeast Asia ceased,
production of the FB-111 came to an end,
the B-58 was phased out, and older B-52s were
retired. US bomber outlays remain nearly three
times the estimated dollar costs of the Soviet
program, reflecting the larger size of the US
force, more intensive US operating and training
schedules, and the B-52 modernization program.
Strategic Peripheral Attack
Included in peripheral attack are the
Soviet forces-medium-range ballistic missiles
(MRBMs), intermediate-range ballistic missiles
(IRBMs), medium bombers, and some ballistic
missile submarines-whose mission is largely con-
fined to attacking targets along the periphery of
the USSR. 2 Under current definitions, the United
States has no direct counterpart to these periph-
eral attack forces. 3
' All intelligence agencies except DIA, the Air Force, and the
Army believe it unlikely that the Backfire bomber will be specifi-
cally assigned to intercontinental attack missions
2 A portion of the G- and H-class ballistic missile submarine force
was assigned intercontinental attack missions until the early seven-
ties, and the dollar costs associated with these submarines are
included in the intercontinental mission until that time.
' US forward-based attack aircraft are included in the tactical air
portion of the general purpose force mission.
In 1976, total estimated dollar costs for the
peripheral attack mission are $3.2 billion, about
40 percent of the amount estimated for the
intercontinental attack effort. This relationship is
true for the period 1966-76 as a whole. The
estimated dollar cost of Soviet peripheral attack
activities rises moderately after 1970 as a result of
the procurement of the Backfire bomber and the
SS-X-20 IRBM program. This upward trend fol-
lows a period of decline during the latter half of
the sixties, when there is relatively little invest-
ment in new peripheral attack systems and oper-
ating costs dominate the total (see figure 13).
Land-based missiles and peripheral bombers
account for nearly all the dollar costs during the
period. The SS-4 MRBM, whose deployment
reached its peak in 1965 with some 600 launch-
ers, has substantial operating costs. Dollar costs of
operating over 600 medium bombers are another
significant part of the peripheral attack total.
Costs for the G- and H-class submarines-largely
operating costs but also including costs for con-
version and procurement of missiles-constitute
an insignificant share of the peripheral attack
program.
Strategic Defense
The strategic defense mission includes all US
and Soviet elements assigned the role of defense
against strategic air or missile attack. Costs of this
mission include those for strategic surface-to-air
missiles, interceptor aircraft, and ABMs. The
mission does not include systems whose purpose is
to provide protection in a tactical role; these are
accounted for in the general purpose forces
mission.
For the 1966-76 period, estimated dollar costs
of Soviet strategic defense are about 5 percent of
the total dollar cost of defense activities. This
constrasts with US outlays, which are just over 1
percent of the total. In 1976, estimated dollar
costs for Soviet activities are $5.7 billion, more
than 10 times the level of US outlays. For the
period as a whole they are about four times as
great.
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US strategic defense activities are markedly
different from those of the Soviets-both in
magnitude and trend-reflecting the differing
perceptions of the bomber threats to the two
countries. US outlays decline sharply after 1971,
and in 1976 are about one-fourth their level in
the peak year of 1969.
Interceptors
Estimated dollar costs for Soviet interceptor
activities are $3.4 billion in 1976, about 60 per-
cent of the total for the strategic defense mission.
Over the entire 1966-76 period, Soviet intercep-
tor costs are $37 billion, nine times the US total.
Soviet interceptor activities fluctuate moderately
over the period, with peaks in the late sixties and
in 1974 reflecting procurement of new aircraft
such as the TU-128 Fiddler, the SU-15 Flagon,
and the MIG-25 Foxbat.
SAMs
Estimated dollar costs of Soviet strategic sur-
face-to-air missiles also peak in the late sixties as a
result of an intensive effort to improve low-
altitude and long-range defense capabilities
against bomber attack. High costs for operation
and maintenance of the extensive SAM network
along with continuing SA-3 and SA-5 deployment
are responsible for keeping the level relatively
high throughout the period despite the phasing
out of some older systems.
ABMs
Both Soviet and US costs for ABM activities
decline sharply to an insignificant portion of the
total defense effort after the early seventies,
when the agreement limiting ABM deployment
was reached. Over the 1966-76 period, US outlays
are about 20 percent higher than Soviet costs,
reflecting the more advanced technology of the
US system.
Command, Surveillance, and Warning
This category includes central communications
systems and command centers for strategic
forces, early warning radar systems, and airborne
command posts. Estimated Soviet dollar costs for
these elements are more than two-and-one-half
times US outlays for the 1966-76 period as a
whole. During the period, Soviet costs rise while
US outlays decline, and in 1976 the Soviet level is
more than four times that of the US.
General Purpose Forces
The general purpose forces mission includes
the ground forces, tactical air forces, and those
naval forces that do not have a strategic attack
mission. This mission accounts for a greater por-
tion of dollar costs than any other combat mis-
sion. The dollar costs for Soviet general purpose
forces exceeded US outlays for similar forces by
some $9 billion in 1976. In contrast, during the
height of the war in Vietnam the US outlays
exceeded the Soviets' by nearly $20 billion. Fol-
lowing 1968, US outlays for general purpose
forces begin to decline. This development, cou-
pled with the steady increase in estimated dollar
costs for Soviet forces, reverses the relative posi-
tions after 1970. Cumulative US outlays for the
entire period, however, are some 10 percent more
than comparable estimates for Soviet activities
(see figure 14).
The largest component of Soviet general pur-
pose force dollar cost estimates is the ground
forces. Ground force activities, estimated at about
$15 billion annually, average just under 50 per-
cent of total general purpose force dollar cost
estimates. Naval force costs average about $9
billion and constitute about 30 percent of annual
general purpose force costs for the period, with
costs for 1975 and 1976 somewhat higher. Dollar
costs for the tactical air mission in general in-
crease from 1966 to 1976. The averge annual cost
of the tactical air mission over the period is just
under $5 billion, amounting to about 15 percent
of total general purpose force costs. Mobility
forces (airlift and sealift) are at a low level
throughout the period in both absolute and rela-
tive terms, with their average annual cost ap-
proaching $2 billion and the average annual
share of total general purpose force costs about 5
percent.
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US AND SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
A Comparison of US Outlays With Estimated
Dollar Costs of Soviet Programs if Duplicated in the US
For the United States, the ground forces are billion. The Navy generally acquires a growing
also the largest component of the general purpose share of the general purpose mission over the
force mission, averaging about $13.5 billion an- period, increasing from over 20 percent in 1966
nually for the 11 years. At the beginning of the to more than 30 percent in 1976. Mobility forces
period ground forces accounted for more than 40 decline slightly to under 5 percent by 1976.
percent of the outlays for the general purpose
mission. The post-Vietnam cutback reduced the Ground Forces
share of land force outlays to an average of about
35 percent for the 1971-76 period. As with US and Soviet ground force components of the
ground forces, tactical air and mobility forces general purpose forces follow the same general
outlays increase during the height of the Vietnam pattern exhibited by the totals. US outlays exceed
war and generally decline thereafter. In 1976, US Soviet costs through 1970 when, because of US
tactical air outlays still amount to over $7.5 withdrawal from Vietnam and Soviet expansion
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and modernization, the Soviet costs become
larger. By 1976, the additional forces along the
Sino-Soviet border as well as general force mod-
ernization drive the estimated dollar cost of
Soviet activities to some $17 billion, nearly $8
billion more than comparable US outlays.
US outlays for tactical air forces are greater
than Soviet costs throughout the period. The US
margin is greatest during the mid- to late-sixties,
peaking at about $10 billion in 1968. A sharp US
decline comes at about the same time that Soviet
tactical air costs begin to increase, decreasing the
US margin to between $1 billion and $2 billion
for the rest of the period. The increase in dollar
cost estimates for Soviet tactical air forces results
from the introduction of new and more expensive
systems-such as the SU-17 Fitter, MIG-23 and
MIG-27 :Flogger, MIG-25 Foxbat, and the SU-19
Fencer--to improve their capabilities against
NATO and the Chinese.
The comparisons of US and Soviet tactical air
costs include US naval carrier forces as part of the
US force. This Defense Department accounting
practice adds an element to the US force that
does not exist for the Soviets, and any comparison
must take account of the impact of these forces.
The US carrier forces average about 35 percent of
the total tactical air mission, with annual outlays
of about $3.5 billion.
General Purpose Naval Forces
The general purpose naval forces include all
major and minor surface combatants, attack sub-
marines, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft
carriers and aircraft, land-based naval air forces,
amphibious warfare ships, and support ships.
Ballistic missile submarines and US attack car-
riers and their aircraft are not included in this
category.
In 1976 the estimated dollar cost of Soviet
general purpose navy programs, at $9.6 billion, is
some 20 percent higher than comparable US
outlays. For the period estimated Soviet dollar
costs of these activities are nearly 10 percent
greater than the US outlays, and exceed the US
level in every year except 1970 and 1972. For
both the USSR and the United States, the dollar
costs of the general purpose naval forces repre-
sent less than 10 percent of total defense costs
throughout the 1966-76 period.
Soviet forces with the primary mission of ASW
and fleet air defense ? account for over 80 percent
of the estimated dollar costs of the general pur-
pose navy mission in 1976, and average nearly $7
billion annually from 1966 to 1976. During the
period several new naval systems were intro-
duced, including the Moskva-class guided-missile
helicopter ships; the Kara and Kresta-II guided-
missile cruisers; the Krivak guided-missile de-
stroyer; the first Soviet ASW carrier, the Kiev;
and the C- and V-class attack submarines. Com-
parable US general purpose navy outlays for 1976
are $6.3 billion. For the 1966-76 period US
outlays for ASW and fleet air defense average
about $5.7 billion annually, or 70 percent of the
general purpose navy total. Prominent among the
US naval activities during this period are the
construction programs of the California- and
Virginia-class nuclear-powered guided-missile
cruisers, the gas turbine-powered Spruance de-
stroyers, and the Sturgeon- and Los Angeles-class
nuclear-powered attack submarines.
With the exception of the small costs associated
with amphibious forces, the remainder of the
Soviet general purpose navy costs during the
period are associated with auxiliary ships. US
outlays for amphibious and auxiliary ships de-
crease over the period in both absolute and
relative terms. In 1976, US outlays for am-
phibious forces are $0.6 billion, 9 percent of
general purpose naval outlays. US outlays for
auxiliaries amount to over $1 billion in 1976-14
percent of general purpose naval outlays.
Mobility Forces
US outlays for mobility forces, consisting of
airlift and sealift elements, are greater than com-
parable Soviet costs for the first six years of the
' These forces include major and minor surface combatants,
attack submarines, land-based naval aircraft, and ASW carriers and
associated aircraft.
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period. 5 Both US and Soviet forces increase over
that time, after which the US force begins a sharp
decrease resulting in a Soviet margin in each of
the last three years of about $0.7 billion. Al-
though Soviet costs are higher at the end of the
period, the cumulative US outlays are more than
$4 billion greater than Soviet costs.
Support Forces
Auxiliary Support
Auxiliary support consists primarily of intelli-
gence and military space activities, the US Coast
Guard, and the Soviet border guards. US outlays
for auxiliary support forces have exceeded the
estimated Soviet dollar cost in every year of the
1966-76 period. Over the entire period US costs
for this mission exceed dollar cost estimates for
Soviet auxiliary support forces by over 75 per-
cent. The Soviet level, however, has been rising
continually throughout the period, while the US
level has been declining since 1969. In 1976 US
outlays are only about 15 percent higher than
estimated Soviet dollar costs for these forces.
s Research needed to compute the cost of Soviet sealift forces on a
comparable basis with the US has not been completed. The
comparison given here is nevertheless indicative, since the cost of US
mobility forces is dominated by airlift; sealift costs average about 1
percent of the annual total for mobility forces over the 11-year
period.
The author of this paper is
Military-Economic Analysis Center,
O ice o Strategic Research. Comments and
queries are welcome and should he directed to
Mission Support
The mission support category includes most
major headquarters and support activities from
specific missions. Estimated Soviet dollar costs for
mission support exceed US outlays in every year
of the 1966-76 period, and are about 50 percent
higher for the entire period. The difference has
grown over the period, however, and in 1976 the
Soviet level is twice that of the US.
Central Support
This mission encompasses all logistics-related
activities, other activities of a central support
nature '6 the Soviet internal security troops, and
the costs of uniformed military personnel en-
gaged in civil defense activities. During the 1966-
76 period, US outlays for this mission have
exceeded estimated Soviet dollar costs by over 45
percent. As with auxiliary support forces, how-
ever, the Soviet level has been rising throughout
the period, while the US level has been declining
since 1969. In 1976, US outlays for central sup-
port forces exceed estimated Soviet dollar costs by
less than 15 percent.
" Central support activities include, for example, basic training,
family housing, recruiting, medical care, printing and publishing,
and leased communications.
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Appendix A
Data on US and Soviet production of military
weapon systems are useful in comparing the size
of each country's military activities over time.
This information, taken with other measures, can
increase our understanding of Soviet defense
activities. Production comparisons, however, can-
not be used by themselves as measures of capa-
bility. No net assessment of US and Soviet activi-
ties can be drawn exclusively from these data.
Production comparisons can complement dol-
lar cost comparisons, but caution must be exer-
cised in relating the two bodies of data. The costs
for some systems, such as those for ships, are
phased over several years and are not as directly
related to production as those for smaller systems.
Although the following comparisons of US and
Soviet weapons production are far from compre-
hensive, we have attempted to address those
systems which were prominent and dynamic.
The production data discussed in this annex
represent only the production of weapon systems
by the United States and the USSR for the direct
use of their own military forces. Production for
RDT&E and for military aid to other countries
has been excluded.
ICBMs
The Soviets are estimated to have produced
over 3,000 intercontinental ballistic missiles be-
tween 1966 and 1976, more than twice the
number produced in the United States during this
period. During the late sixties, the Soviets were
building up their SS-9 and SS-11 forces and
introducing a small force of SS-13s. Estimated
Soviet ICBM production supporting this buildup
averaged between 300 and 400 missiles per
year. In the early seventies, production dropped
sharply as deployment of the SS-9 and SS-13
ended, but rose again near the end of the period
with the introduction of the new-generation
ICBMs.
The United States, on the other hand, had
nearly completed its planned ICBM deployment
by the beginning of the period. Although the
United States deployed no new ICBM launchers
after 1967, more than 1,300 missiles were pro-
duced during the period as the Minuteman sys-
tem was improved.
MRBMs and IRBMs
In addition to their ICBM forces, the Soviets
maintain an extensive force of medium- and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The United
States has no counterpart for these systems. Be-
cause there was virtually no new deployment of
MRI3M and IRBM systems during the 1966-76
period, production of these missiles dropped from
about 100 per year at the beginning of the period
to only a few each year by the late sixties. There
was a marked increase starting in 1973, however,
as the SS-X-20 IRBM neared deployment.
Soviet production of submarine-launched bal-
listic missiles is estimated to have been about 80
percent greater than that of the US during the
1966-76 period. Estimated annual Soviet SLBM
production, driven largely by the introduction of
the SS-N-6, rose steadily from less than 100 in
1966 to about 200 in 1971 and 1972. At that time,
production of the SS-N-6 began to decline, al-
though the decrease was somewhat offset by the
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introduction of an improved SLBM system with a
considerably longer range, the SS-N-8. Total esti-
mated SLBM production declined gradually to
about 120 in 1975 but then increased slightly to
about 150 in 1976.
The pattern of US SLBM production is clearly
delineated by the two major activities under way
during the 1966-76 period. Production of Polaris
missiles, which marked the early part of the
period, had essentially ended in 1968. The Posei-
don system entered production in 1971, and,
though declining from a peak of about 150 in
1972 to less than 30 in 1976, averaged over 100
missiles a year for the seventies.
US production of air-to-surface missiles during
the 1966-76 period is about 25 percent higher
than that estimated for the Soviets. US production
rates peaked in 1968 at 7,000 per year, reflecting
the heavy use of ASMs in Vietnam. Afterwards,
the level dropped sharply to less than 500 in 1971
and 1972, but increased again, regaining the
7,000-per-year rate in 1976 with the introduction
of the short-range attack missile (SRAM) and
Maverick.
We estimate that Soviet production of ASMs
rose steadily from about 600 at the beginning of
the period to about 7,500 in 1976.
Estimated Soviet production of surface-to-air
missiles was nearly five times US production
during 1966-76. Except for a pause in 1971,
annual production of SAMs for the Soviets in-
creased steadily from about 10,000 in 1966 to
about 24,000 in 1976. In recent years, added
emphasis has been placed on tactical SAMs,
notably the SA-7, SA-8, and SA-9, the largest
contributors to the high levels of production in
the mid-seventies.
The US has also emphasized tactical surface-to-
air missile (SAM) systems. Redeye and Chaparral
production exceeded 11,000 in 1969 and totaled
about 37,000 for the period. In the seventies, a
considerable number of Hawk missiles was pro-
duced. Unlike the Soviets, however, the United
States has not devoted much effort to strategic
SAMs, and virtually ended production of these
missiles in 1970.
ASW Missiles
Over the period, US production of missiles for
antisubmarine warfare-nearly 6,000-was more
than two and one-half times that estimated for
the Soviets during the period. ASROC and
SUBROC production reached over 1,700 in 1967,
but declined thereafter, and by 1973 had ended
entirely. The pattern of Soviet production of
ASW missiles is the opposite of the US pattern;
Soviet production began in 1967 and has in-
creased each year to nearly 500 annually in 1976.
Comparison of US and Soviet aircraft produc-
tion can be misleading because of the extensive
qualitative differences in the aircraft produced
by each country. In this report, dollar cost com-
parisons are based on the role or mission of the
aircraft for consistency with the other mission
comparisons. Comparisons of production are
more appropriately based on similarity of oper-
ational capabilities.
Heavy and Medium Bombers
The Soviets produced about 270 heavy and
medium bomber-type aircraft (including recon-
naissance and support models) during the 1966-
76 period. At the beginning of the period, they
were producing the Blinder at an estimated rate
of between 30 and 40 a year. Production of this
aircraft declined sharply after 1968, however,
and ended in 1970. Annual production of the
Backfire, which began in 1971, has steadily in-
creased to about 25 per year. The Backfire is the
only bomber currently being produced by the
Soviets, although an ASW version of the Bear is
still in production.
The only US bomber produced during this
period was the FB-111, with fewer than 80 built
between 1968 and 1971.
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Fighters and Tactical Attack Aircraft
The Soviets produced just over 8,000 fighters
and tactical attack aircraft during the 1966-76
period-about a third more than the United
States. An interesting aspect of production in this
category is the change, for both countries, in the
type of aircraft produced. During the sixties, the
Soviets concentrated on producing aircraft de-
signed for a specific mission, introducing several
new interceptors-including the Flagon, Fiddler,
and Firebar-to enhance their air defense capa-
bilities. During the seventies, they began to pro-
duce more versatile multipurpose aircraft. They
introduced the Flogger and the later variants of
the Fishbed-the J, K, and L-all of which have
both interceptor and ground attack roles.
For the United States the trend was reversed.
Large numbers of the F-4 multipurpose fighter
were produced during the sixties, but beginning
in the seventies the production of aircraft de-
signed for a specific role, such as the F-14 all-
weather high-performance interceptor, predomi-
nated.
Helicopters
Annual Soviet production of helicopters rose
steadily from just over 100 in 1966 to more than
900 in 1975. The increase has been highlighted
by production of the Hip, running at about 600
per year near the end of the period.
Once again, the trend for US production is the
reverse of that estimated for the Soviets. US
production of helicopters, as with the fighters and
attack aircraft, strongly reflects the requirements
of the Vietnam conflict. Annual production
reached a peak of over 2,700 in 1968 but declined
rapidly in subsequent years, and by 1976 had
fallen below 100. Despite the downward trend,
however, US production of helicopters over the
1966-76 period was nearly two and one-half
times that estimated for the Soviets.
Land Arms
Limitations of the data available at this time
restrict our comparisons of US and Soviet land
arms production to armored vehicles-tanks and
armored personnel carriers (APCs). The USSR
produced more than 65,000 armored vehicles
between 1966 and 1976. During the same period,
the United States produced just over 18,000.
Tanks
The Soviets produced about six times as many
tanks as the United States during the 1966-76
period-about 30,000 compared with 5,000. Em-
phasis was on the production of medium tanks
(approximately 40 tons)-the T-55 with a 100-
millinleter gun, the T-62 with a 115-mm smooth-
bore gun, and the T-72 with a large-caliber,
smoothbore weapon. On the US side, most of the
deliveries were the 16-ton Sheridan M551 ar-
mored reconnaissance vehicle with a 152-mm
gun, and the 52-ton M60A1 tank with a 105-mm
gun.
Armored Personnel Carriers
The Soviets produced nearly 37,000 APCs dur-
ing the period, nearly three times more than the
United States. Among the Soviet carriers were the
BTR-50 and BTR-60 series, which carry about a
squad of infantry troops, BRDM wheeled am-
phibious armored reconnaissance vehicles, which
carry four to five troops, and BMP tracked
amphibious armored infantry combat vehicles,
which carry a squad. US production was domi-
nated by the 11-ton tracked M113 vehicle, which
can carry about a squad of troops.
Naval Combatant Ships
Although many types of ships were delivered
to each country's fleets during the 1966-76 pe-
riod, only naval combatants and submarines-the
ships that contribute most directly to naval war-
fare capabilities-are discussed in this section.
The Soviets built about 830 surface combatant
ships and submarines during the period, while the
United States built about 215. The disparity is not
as great, however, when considered in terms of
ship tonnage. The Soviets tended to build smaller
ships than the United States, and total Soviet
production amounted to about 1,400,000 tons.
This is about 80 percent greater than the US
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production of about 800,000 tons. The Soviet
preference for smaller ships, however, is true only
for surface combatants. Attack submarines are
about the same size for both countries, and Soviet
ballistic missile submarines tend to be somewhat
larger than those of the United States.
Surface Combatants
During the period, the Soviets delivered about
690 surface combatants to their active fleet,
versus about 160 for the United States.' The
tonnage for both countries, however, was nearly
equal at about 550,000.
The United States added two new attack carri-
ers during the period. While the Soviets have no
equivalent, they did build two Moskva-class ASW
helicopter ships in the late sixties, and in 1975
completed the first Kiev-class ASW carrier,
which has a complement of fixed-wing vertical
and short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft.
The Soviets built 18 guided-missile cruisers
during the 1966-76 period-five of the Kara
class, four of the Kresta-I class, and nine of the
Kresta-II class. US guided-missile cruiser produc-
tion during the same period consisted of six ships
of the conventionally powered Belknap class and
four nuclear-powered cruisers-one Truxtun, two
California, and one Virginia class.
Both the United States and the USSR added
destroyers to their deployed forces during the
period. The Soviets built 13 ships each of the
' Includes major and minor surface combatants (including Coast
Guard cutters and patrol craft) but excludes amphibious warfare
ships and assault helicopter carriers.
Kashin and Krivak classes. The United States
added five Spruance-class destroyers to its fleet.
The Soviets had three active frigate programs-
the Petya, Mirka, and Jaguar classes-with a total
production of 35 ships. The United States also had
three frigate programs-the Knox, Garcia, and
Brooke classes-totaling 57 ships.
The Soviets added 19 Nanuchka-class guided-
missile patrol gunboats, 30 Grisha-class guided-
missile escorts, 44 Osa-class guided-missile boats,
and a number of other minor combatants to their
inventory. The United States added 17 patrol
gunboats during the period.
Attack Submarines
During the period, the USSR built 87 attack
submarines, 48 of which were nuclear powered.
The Soviets pursued both nuclear and diesel
submarine programs; the US built only nuclear
submarines. The E, C, and V nuclear classes and
the F, T, and J diesel classes accounted for most
of the attack submarines produced in the USSR.
The United States built 46 nuclear-powered at-
tack submarines; all except the latest-the Los
Angeles-were of the Permit and Sturgeon
classes.
Ballistic Missile Submarines
During the 1966-76 period, the Soviets com-
pleted 56 submarines of the Y and D classes.
Completion in 1966 and 1967 of the final eight
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines of
the Benjamin Franklin class accounted for the US
deliveries.
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Appendix B
COSTING METHODOLOGY
Definition of Dollar Estimates
Dollar costs of the Soviet defense effort are
estimates of what it would cost the United States
to purchase the same military equipment and
supplies, pay the same number of people, carry
on the same types of RDT&E, and pursue the
same operations and maintenance activities as the
Soviets. These estimated dollar costs are com-
pared year by year with US outlays for similar
activities.
Constant and Current Prices
The dollar cost data presented in this report are
expressed in terms of average calendar year 1975
US resource prices. A constant price base is used
so that all changes in spending from year to year
reflect changes in the military forces and activi-
ties themselves, rather than price changes result-
ing from inflationary factors. Dollar costs ex-
pressed in current prices show trends that are
quite different. A current price series would
reflect, for example, the increase in US military
pay authorizations related to the transition to the
all-volunteer army, as well as the inflation that
has affected the US economy.
The US and Soviet data bases were converted
to constant 1975 resource prices by the applica-
tion of resource input indexes. Resource input
indexes were used in the absence of appropriate
output price indexes for military items.
The US and Soviet data were indexed this year
by a more detailed methodology than was used
for past defense cost comparisons. Indexing has
been extended to a greater number of producers'
material and labor inputs, and provision was
made for changing the relative proportions of
labor and materials through time. The impact of
the new methodology will vary throughout the
timespan of these comparisons.
Estimating the Dollar Costs of Soviet Activities
The dollar costs of Soviet defense activities are
developed for the most part on the basis of a
detailed identification and listing of Soviet mili-
tary forces. The force components listed are
multiplied by estimates of what they would cost
in the United States in dollars. The results are
then aggregated both by military mission and by
resource category.
The reliability of the estimates depends on the
precision and accuracy of our estimate of the
Soviet: activities and of the cost factors applied to
that data base. The data base on forces and
weapons reflects the combined collection and
analytical efforts of the intelligence community.
Available intelligence information has made it
possible to develop a detailed inventory of the
numbers and kinds of weapons and units that
make up the Soviet armed forces. This extensive
data base includes information on such items as
physical and performance characteristics of So-
viet weapons and equipment and their produc-
tion; deployment levels of Soviet strategic attack,
strategic defense, and general purpose forces; and
the manpower levels of these forces and their
support elements.
Investment
Investment costs are those for procurement of
equipment and spare parts and for construction
of facilities. While the specific technique varies
according to the information available, the pro-
curement costs of most weapons-aircraft, mis-
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siles, and ships-are derived through the use of
cost estimating relationships (CERs). These
CERs-equations which relate US weapon char-
acteristics (for example, weight, thrust, or speed)
to costs-are applied to Soviet weapon character-
istics which can usually be ascertained with rea-
sonable confidence through intelligence methods.
For a few items of Soviet equipment which have
become available, cost analysts from US weapons
manufacturers have been contracted to estimate,
part by part, the production costs. In addition to a
more detailed estimate for the items examined,
these cost analyses in some cases have provided
the basis for adjusting the CER-derived costs
estimated for similar weapons.
The lack of necessary data on some systems
makes it impossible to use either of the two
approaches described above. In these cases, direct
analogy-using the cost of similar US equip-
ment-or some other gross approximation of cost,
such as estimating total cost as a function of total
weight, is used. Some ammunition items, for
example, are costed using these less refined
methods.
Construction cost estimates are based on a good
knowledge of Soviet construction practices and
ruble construction costs. These estimated costs are
converted into dollars by the use of a ruble-to-
dollar ratio based on the cost of similar construc-
tion in the United States.
Operating
Operating costs are the sum of personnel
costs-pay, subsistence, and other allowances-
and operations and maintenance costs. O&M
costs include those which support the functioning
of the defense establishment, and cover such
diverse items as fuel consumption and mainte-
nance of facilities.
Dollar costs for Soviet military personnel are
estimated by applying US factors for pay and
allowances to estimates of Soviet military man-
power. Average factors are derived for each US
service by dividing total pay and allowances for
each service by total manpower in that service.
The appropriate factor is then applied to the
manpower estimated for each Soviet military
unit.
Some O&M cost estimates are based on US
analogy. The costs of overhauls for armored
vehicles, for example, are related to the original
procurement costs of the equipment using per-
centage factors based on US experience. Adjust-
ments are made, however, to reflect Soviet oper-
ating rates when they are known to differ from
US practices. The cost of petroleum, oils, and
lubricants (POL) is based on estimated Soviet
consumption rates for each weapon system. For
example, the estimated fuel consumption rate of
a particular model of Soviet aircraft is applied to
the average number of flying hours for that type
of aircraft. The resulting quantities of POL are
then costed at US prices. In general, the informa-
tion on operating rates is not as complete in
quantity or quality as the physical-manpower
and equipment-data on the forces.
Facility maintenance costs are based on the
assumed life of the facility and are a function of
the cost of constructing it. US and Soviet experi-
ence is believed to be similar in this area.
The direct costing approach described above is
not used to estimate the dollar cost of Soviet
military RDT & E because the type of data needed
for direct costing of observed activities is not
readily available. Instead, published Soviet statis-
tical data and descriptive material about scien-
tific activities are used as a basis for estimating
military RDT&E and space activities in rubles.
The dollar costs of these activities are obtained by
converting the ruble estimate into dollars with a
ruble-to-dollar ratio. The estimate corresponds in
coverage to the categories of US RDT&E activity
funded by the Department of Defense and the
defense-related portion of the Department of
Energy (DOE) research program.
For several reasons, the estimated dollar costs
presented for Soviet RDT&E should be regarded
as less reliable than the dollar costs estimated for
investment and operating. First, because the basic
information comes from Soviet publications,
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there is an element of uncertainty about its
reliability and about our understanding of it.
Second, the distribution of Soviet RDT&E expen-
ditures between military and civil applications
continues to be a difficult problem. Finally, the
conversion from rubles to dollars presents a num-
ber of theoretical complexities as well as practical
problems.
Organization of the US and Soviet Data
The definition of defense activities used in this
comparison encompasses those activities that in
the United States would be funded by the De-
partment of Defense (less all but the personnel
costs of foreign military assistance and civil de-
fense), defense nuclear activities such as those
funded in the United States by the DOE, the
activities of the US Coast Guard and the Soviet
militarized security forces (border guards and
internal security troops), and activities of the
Selective Service type.
US dollar cost data are in terms of outlays.
They include outlays derived from the Total
Obligational Authority series in The Five-Year
Defense Program issued by the Department of
Defense in October 1976. Because the data have
been converted to outlays in constant price terms
and have been adjusted to achieve accounting
coverage comparable with the dollar estimates
made for the USSR, they do not match actual
budget authorizations or appropriations.
The organization of the US and Soviet military
mission comparisons follows the mission structure
outline in the Defense Department's Defense
Planning and Programming Categories. Utiliza-
tion of the DPPC guidelines has permitted a
more complete allocation of entities which in
previous estimates were included in the category
of "command, support and other."
This report also presents comparisons of US
and Soviet defense efforts on a resource category
basis. These data were structured in accordance
with current FYDP and budget resource account-
ing definitions. Because these definitions have
varied over time, adjustments were required to
achieve consistency of the resource category defi-
nitions throughout the period of analysis.
The comparisons in this report-both by mis-
sion and by resource category-are subject to a
degree of uncertainty and therefore should not be
considered as precise measurements. This is par-
ticularly true in areas where the difference be-
tween US and Soviet levels is estimated to be
small or where the comparisons are made at a low
level of aggregation.
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Appendix C
A number of important changes have been
made in this year's comparisons on both the
Soviet and US sides.
? The estimates of Soviet defense manpower
were completely reexamined during the past
year, resulting in an overall downward revi-
sion of about 6 percent in the estimated total
manpower of the Soviet defense establish-
ment, including civilians working for the
Ministry of Defense. This resulted in a re-
duction in estimated costs of about $3 billion
per year.
? To remove an element of double counting in
previous estimates, Soviet construction
troops have been excluded from military
manpower. These costs are more properly
captured in construction costs, which are
estimated directly and carried under invest-
ment costs. This resulted in an estimated
reduction of about $4 billion per year.
? New intelligence information and improved
costing methodologies have caused numer-
ous changes in estimates of production and
dollar costs of Soviet military equipment. On
balance, however, these changes had little
effect on the total dollar cost estimates.
? The price deflators used to convert US data
from current to constant dollars have been
improved. The use of new deflators has, on
balance, raised the constant price costs, with
the largest effect in earlier years and almost
no effect in recent years.
? Coast Guard and Selective Service outlays-
about $1 billion per year-have been in-
cluded to achieve better comparability.
? The conversion of Total Obligational Au-
thority figures to outlays makes the US data
more compatible with the data used for
estimating the dollar costs of Soviet activi-
ties. For the period of this report, outlays
have averaged about 3 percent lower than
TOA. The difference, however, fluctuates in
any given year. Most of the difference is in
the investment category, because money au-
thorized for investment in one year is gener-
ally spent over several years. Investment
TOA in 1976, for example, is $3 billion
higher than for 1975. Investment outlays,
however, decline almost $1 billion between
1975 and 1976 because some of the author-
ized amount will be spent in 1977 and later
(see figure 6).
Changes affecting both sides:
? This year the mission categories follow the
definitions outlined in the Defense Planning
and Programming Categories. This revision
provides mission categories that are more
familiar to US planners than those used last
year.
? This year's comparison is in constant 1975
dollar prices instead of 1974 prices. The
change in base year results in an apparent,
not real, overall increase in dollar costs for
both sides throughout the period.
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Appendix D
STATISTICAL DATA
The financial data in this appendix are based on a detailed single-value
statement of the Soviet and US forces which was specified solely for costing
purposes. Key elements of the forces usedlfor costing are shown in summary
form in tables 11 and 12.
Figures for all activities are expressed in constant 1975 resource prices.
Figures for the USSR are for calendar years and those for the United States are
for fiscal years.
The estimated dollar costs do not include costs for Soviet civil space
activities, costs for retired pay (unless othewise specified), or costs for military
assistance or civil defense (except for the pay and allowances of uniformed
personnel engaged in such activities).
Estimated Costs of Soviet Defense Programs
If Duplicated in the United States, by Mission
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Strategic forces ......................
17.6
18.6
19.6
20.9
20.1
18.8
18.2
19.4
20.7
20.7
20.9
General purpose forces ........
25.8
26.2
27.8
27.8
29.4
31.6
32.6
33.8
33.3
34.7
35.0
Support forces ........................
34.8
36.5
38.7
39.3
40.3
41.4
41.9
43.6
44.0
44.8
45.6
RDT&E ..................................
8.5
9.1
9.7
10.3
11.0
11.8
12.6
13.4
14.3
15.2
16.3
Total. ............................
86.7
90.4
95.8
98.3
100.9
103.6
105.3
110.2
112.3
115.4
117.8
' These estimated dollar costs are designed to indicate the general size of the Soviet forces and programs by showing what they would cost
if purchased and operated in the United States. The costs shown for the major force missions include costs for personnel, other operating costs,
procurement of hardware, and construction of facilities. Estimated dollar costs for military RDT&E have been aggregated and are included in
the RDT&E mission (excluding military personnel costs). All costs for civil space, nonpersonnel military assistance programs, and civil defense
activities except for the pay and allowances of uniformed personnel engaged in such programs have been excluded. Costs for strategic forces
and general purpose forces include only those costs associated with combat or combat support units. Those costs not associated with combat or
combat support units (except RDT&E) have been aggregated within the "support forces." This mission also includes all costs for civilian and
retired personnel as well as costs which, because of present data limitations, cannot be assigned for both countries to other missions. Data are
for calendar years.
9 Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
SECRET 33
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US Defense Outlays by Mission '
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Strategic forces ......................
7.5
8.0
9.9
11.5
9.1
9.1
8.1
7.6
6.8
6.7
5.8
General purpose forces ........
34.0
42.6
47.2
44.7
39.6
31.1
28.2
25.9
26.9
25.1
26.3
Support forces ........................
49.6
57.2
60.2
61.5
58.0
53.7
49.3
45.1
43.1
43.0
42.3
RDT&E ..................................
'
11.1
12.2
12.9
12.1
11.0
10.6
11.0
11.1
10.8
10.0
9.7
Total
............................
102.0
120.1
130.2
129.7
117.6
104.5
96.6
89.7
87.6
84.8
84.2
' The outlays shown are developed from appropriate editions of The Five-Year Defense Program, the Budget of the United States, and
related data. To achieve as high a degree of comparability as possible, US program data have been reaggregated and converted to constant
calendar 1975 dollars. Data are for fiscal years.
2 Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
Estimated Costs of Soviet Strategic Forces
Programs If Duplicated in the United States, by Element
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Intercontinental attack ..........
6.0
6.9
7.4
7.9
7.8
6.7
6.6
7.4
8.3
8.4
8.3
Peripheral attack ..................
3.4
3.3
3.2
2.9
2.8
2.9
3.0
3.2
3.1
3.1
3.2
Strategic defense ....................
5.1
5.4
5.9
7.1
6.4
5.9
5.3
5.5
5.9
5.7
5.7
Command, surveillance, and
warning ..............................
2.0
1.9
1.9
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.5
Nuclear weapons ..................
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.0
1.1
1.1
1.1
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.1
Total' ............................
17.6
18.6
19.6
20.9
20.1
18.8
18.2
19.4
20.7
20.7
20.9
' These estimated dollar costs are designed to indicate the general size of the Soviet strategic forces by showing what they would cost if
purchased and operated in the United States. The estimated costs shown include costs for military personnel, other operating costs,
procurement of hardware, and construction of facilities for strategic attack systems and for systems assigned to the defense of the USSR against
air, missile, and space attack, except the antisubmarine warfare forces, which are included in general purpose naval forces. This mission also
encompasses the regional control and warning network and all SAMs, ABMs, antisatellite systems, and aircraft assigned to the National Air
Defense Forces. No RDT&E costs are included. Data are for calendar years.
' Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
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Intercontinental attack ..........
4.0
4.4
6.0
7.0
5.0
5.0
4.9
4.9
4.5
4.6
4.1
Strategic defense ....................
1.8
1.8
1.9
2.4
1.9
2.3
1.6
1.0
0.9
0.6
0.5
Command, surveillance, and
warning ..............................
1.0
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.7
0.8
0.6
0.6
0.6
Nuclear weapons ..................
0.7
0.8
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.8
0.9
0.8
0.7
Total' ............................
7.5
8.0
9.9
11.5
9.1
9.1
8.1
7.6
6.8
8.7
5.8
' The outlays shown are developed from appropriate editions of The Five-Year Defense Program. To achieve as high a degree of
comparability as possible, US program data have been reaggregated and converted to constant calendar 1975 dollars. Data are for fiscal years.
E Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
Estimated Costs of Soviet Intercontinental
and Peripheral Attack Programs If Duplicated
in the United States, by Element'
Strategic intercontinental
attack:
ICBMs ................................
4.4
4.8
4.5
4.6
4.4
3.5
3.3
3.8
4.3
4.8
4.9
Submarines ........................
1.0
1.5
2.4
2.8
2.9
2.7
2.7
3.1
3.4
3.0
2.9
Bombers ..............................
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
Total' ............................
6.0
6.9
7.4
7.9
7.8
6.7
6.6
7.4
8.3
8.4
8.3
Strategic peripheral attack:
MRBMs and IRBMs ..........
1.9
1.8
1.7
1.6
1.6
1.5
1.5
1.7
1.6
1.6
1.7
Submarines ........................
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
Bombers ..............................
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.2
1.1
1.3
1.3
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
Total' ............................
3.4
3.3
3.2
2.9
2.8
2.9
3.0
3.2
3.1
3.1
3.2
' These estimated dollar costs are designed to indicate the general size of the Soviet strategic intercontinental and peripheral attack forces by
showing what they would cost if purchased and operated in the United States. The estimated costs shown include costs for military personnel,
other operating costs, procurement of hardware (excluding nuclear warheads), and construction of facilities for long-range attack weapon
systems. No RDT&E costs are included. The United States has no force with an assigned mission comparable to the Soviet strategic peripheral
attack mission. For this reason, the intercontinental and peripheral attack missions have not been totaled together to obtain a single dollar cost
estimate for strategic attack. Data are for calendar years.
' Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
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US Strategic Intercontinental Attack Outlays by Element'
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
ICBMs ....................................
0.9
1.1
1.1
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.2
1.0
1.0
0.8
0.8
Submarines ............................
1.0
1.1
1.8
2.2
2.0
2.0
1.6
2.1
2.0
2.4
1.9
Bombers ..................................
2.1
2.3
3.1
3.5
1.8
1.8
2.1
1.8
1.5
1.4
1.4
TotalI ............................
4.0
4.4
8.0
7.0
5.0
5.0
4.9
4.9
4.5
4.6
4.1
' The outlays shown are developed from appropriate editions of The Five-Year Defense Program. To achieve as high a degree of
comparability as possible, US program data have been reaggregated and converted to constant calendar 1975 dollars. The United States has no
force with a mission comparable to the Soviet strategic peripheral attack mission. Data are for fiscal years.
2 Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
Estimated Costs of Soviet General Purpose
Forces If Duplicated in the United States, by Element
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Ground forces ........................
11.8
12.2
14.1
14.1
14.7
15.7
16.2
16.7
16.8
17.0
17.2
Naval forces ? ........................
9.0
9.2
8.8
8.8
8.8
9.0
8.6
8.4
8.4
9.3
9.6
Tactical air forces 8 ..............
3.6
3.5
3.2
3.1
4.1
5.1
6.0
6.5
6.2
6.4
6.2
Mobility forces 4 ....................
1.4
1.3
1.7
1.7
1.8
1.8
1.8
2.2
2.0
1.9
2.0
Total ` ............................
25.8
26.2
27.8
27.8
29.4
31.6
32.6
33.8
33.3
34.7
35.0
' These estimated dollar costs are designed to indicate the general size of Soviet general purpose forces by showing what they would cost if
purchased and operated in the United States. These estimated dollar costs include costs for military personnel, other operating costs,
procurement of hardware (excluding nuclear warheads), and construction of facilities for systems assigned to Soviet general purpose forces. No
RDT&E costs are included. Data are expressed in calendar years.
These costs are for surface combatants, naval aircraft, and general purpose submarines. The estimated dollar costs for ballistic missile
submarines are included within the strategic intercontinental or peripheral attack missions.
5 These costs are for fixed-wing aircraft that are assigned a tactical combat support role. ASW aircraft and ASW carrier costs are allocated to
the general purpose naval forces in accordance with the fiscal guidance category allocation of the US Department of Defense.
These costs are for airlift forces.
Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
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US General Purpose Forces Outlays by Element'
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Ground forces ........................
14.2
18.0
21.7
20.3
16.0
11.6
9.2
8.5
9.4
9.2
9.5
Naval forces E ........................
7.7
8.7
8.3
7.9
9.1
8.3
8.8
7.6
8.0
7.3
8.0
Tactical air forces 8 ..............
9.6
13.1
13.9
13.5
11.2
8.8
8.5
8.5
8.3
7.6
7.6
Mobility forces * ....................
2.4
2.9
3.3
3.0
3.3
2.4
1.7
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.2
Total ? ............................
34.0
42.6
47.2
44.7
39.6
31.1
28.2
25.9
26.9
25.1
26.3
' The outlays shown are developed from appropriate editions of The Five-Year Defense Program. To achieve as high a degree of
comparability as possible, US program data have been reaggregated and converted to constant calendar 1975 dollars. Data are for fiscal years.
2 These outlays are for surface combatants, aircraft, and general purpose submarines. Outlays for attack carriers and their aircraft are
considered as part of tactical air forces outlays. Those for ballistic missile submarines are included in the strategic intercontinental attack
mission.
3 These outlays are for land- and sea-based fixed-wing aircraft that are assigned a tactical combat support role. In accordance with the
Defense Department's fiscal guidance category structure, outlays related to attack carriers are included in tactical air forces outlays. Those for
ASW carrier and ASW aircraft are included in general purpose naval forces.
* These costs are for airlift and sealift forces.
Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
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Estimated Costs of Soviet Defense Programs
If Duplicated in the United States, by Resource Category
1966-76
1966-
Cumulative
76
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Total
Average
RDT&E ..................................
8.5
9.1
9.7
10.3
11.0
11.8
12.6
13.4
14.3
15.2
16.3
132.2
12.0
Investment ..............................
28.7
29.9
31.5
32.7
33.3
33.8
33.8
36.4
37.1
38.4
38.8
374.5
34.0
Procurement ......................
25.8
27.1
28.6
29.5
30.2
31.0
31.2
33.8
34.6
35.8
36.4
344.0
31.3
Facilities ............................
2.9
2.9
2.9
3.2
3.1
2.8
2.6
2.6
2.5
2.6
2.4
30.5
2.8
Operating ..............................
49.5
51.4
54.6
55.2
56.5
58.0
58.9
60.4
61.0
61.8
62.7
629.8
57.3
Active and reserve military
personnel ........................
34.5
35.8
38.1
38.4
39.2
Operations and mainten-
ance ................................
15.0
15.6
16.5
16.7
17.3
17.8
18.1
19.0
19.2
19.5
19.9
194.6
17.7
Total S ............................
86.7
90.4
95.8
98.3
100.9
103.6
105.3
110.2
112.3
115.4
117.8
1,136.6
103.3
Retired military ........
1.7
1.7
1.8
1.8
1.9
2.0
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.3
21.8
2.0
' These estimated dollar costs are designed to indicate the general size and
overall trends in Soviet defense programs by showing what they would cost if
purchased and operated in the United States. They do not represent precise
resource allocations as the Soviets would see them. To achieve as high a degree of
comparability as possible, adjustments have been made to the basic data available
for both the United States and the USSR. All estimated costs for RDT&E activities
(excluding military personnel pay and allowances) associated with military pro-
grams have been aggregated and are included under RDT&E. All costs for nuclear
weapons (excluding RDT&E) have been accounted for in procurement. All costs
for civil space activities, all nonpersonnel costs for military assistance programs, and
costs of civil defense except for the pay and allowances of uniformed personnel
have been excluded. Data are for calendar years.
2 Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
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US Defense Outlays by Resource Category'
1966-76
1966-
Cumulative
76
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Total
Average
RDT&E ..................................
11.1
12.2
12.9
12.1
11.0
10.6
11.0
11.1
10.8
10.0
9.7
122.4
11.1
Investment ..............................
27.7
34.7
40.6
39.2
33.8
28.0
25.0
23.2
23.1
20.0
19.2
314.5
28.6
Procurement ......................
24.9
32.0
38.0
36.7
31.6
26.1
23.0
21.2
21.0
18.1
17.0
289.5
26.3
Facilities ............................
2.8
2.7
2.6
2.6
2.1
2.0
2.0
1.9
2.1
1.9
2.2
25.0
2.3
Operating ..............................
63.3
73.2
76.7
78.4
72.8
65.8
60.6
55.4
53.7
54.8
55.2
710.0
64.5
Active and reserve
military personnel ........
34.4
38.5
40.5
40.6
38.8
35.3
31.4
28.8
27.1
26.6
26.2
368.2
33.5
Operations and
maintenance ..................
28.9
34.6
36.2
37.8
34.0
30.5
29.2
26.7
26.6
28.2
29.0
341.8
31.1
Totals ............................
102.0
120.1
130.2
129.7
117.6
104.5
96.6
89.7
87.6
84.8
84.1
1,146.9
104.3
Retired military ........
3.2
3.5
3.9
4.3
4.7
5.1
5.4
5.8
6.2
6.6
7.0
55.7
5.1
' The outlays shown were derived from the total obligational authority series RDT&E. Defense-related DOE outlays for RDT&E are also included in RDT&E.
in The Five-Year Defense Program, the Budget of the United States, and related All other defense-related DOE outlays have been accounted for in procurement.
data. To achieve as high a degree of comparability as possible, adjustments have All outlays for civil space activities, military assistance, and civil defense programs
been made to the basic data available for both the United States and USSR. All have been excluded. Data are for fiscal years.
outlays for RDT&E activities (excluding military personnel pay and allowances) P Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
associated with military programs have been aggregated and are included under
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Deployment of Major Soviet Strategic Weapon Systems'
Strategic intercontinental attack:
ICBM launchers 2 ..........................
239
514
796
1,018
1,291
1,489
1,527
1,461
1,393
1,385
1,380
Ballistic missile submarines ..........
18
18
19
24
30
38
35
44
48
48
3
54
Ballistic missile submarine launch
tubes ..........................................
54
54
70
150
259
387
443
573
621
700
788
LRA heavy bombers and tankers
200
200
200
200
195
195
195
195
195
194
189
Strategic peripheral attack:
MRBM and IRBM launchers 2 ..
693
677
673
653
633
594
587
583
583
583
571
Ballistic missile submarines..........
19
19
18
17
15
15
23'
23
21
28
9
27
Ballistic missile submarine launch
tubes ..........................................
51
51
48
46
42
42
66
67
63
85
82
LRA medium bombers tankers ?
760
740
735
730
725
710
675
675
650
665
655
Strategic defense
SAM launchers ............................
8,460
8,550
8,820
9,100
9,460
9,820
9,950
9,840
9,660
9,620
9,693
Interceptors ....................................
3,610
3,450
3,355
3,370
3,310
3,205
3,075
2,820
2,655
2,620
2,595
ABM launchers ..............................
-
-
24
4:3
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
' These single-value estimates have been developed for costing purposes and are consistent with the appropriate National Intelligence
Estimates. Although they fall within the ranges of likely alternative force structures presented in the National Intelligence Estimates, they do
riot necessarily match any particular force. Data are expressed in midyear terms.
P Excludes systems under construction, being dismantled, or off line for conversion or retrofit.
Reflects transfer of ballistic missile submarines from intercontinental to peripheral attack.
Includes Backfire.
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Numbers of Soviet Ground Forces Units and
Selected Items of Equipment for General Purpose Forces
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Ground forces:
Category I8 ............
34
34
55
48
48
49
51
54
57
60
60
Category II.............
56
56
42
49
51
55
55
54
52
49
50
Developing' ..........
8
15
16
15
13
8
3
0
1
2
2
Category III ? ........
52
52
47
51
51
52
55
56
57
58
59
Total ....................
150
157
160
163
163
164
164
164
167
169
171
Naval forces:
Aircraft ....................
790
800
871
899
944
986
1,030
1,036
1,054
1,059
1,080
Major surface
combatants ..........
208
227
234
241
245
249
256
255
261
259
263
Minor surface
combatants ..........
1,640
1,629
1,579
1,531
1,523
1,494
1,403
1,336
1,294
1,290
1,278
General purpose
submarines ..
340
353
355
361
348
336
343
351
352
355
355
Tactical aircraft ........
3,195
3,303
3,390
3,513
3,654
3,878
3,927
4,030
4,121
4,389
4,688
These single-value estimates have been developed for costing purposes from the appropriate National Intelligence Estimates. Although
they fall within the ranges of likely alternative force structures presented in the National Intelligence Estimates, they do not necessarily match
any particular force. Data are expressed in midyear terms.
Divisions estimated to be maintained at nearly full strength and to have all their critical combat and support equipment.
Divisions estimated to be manned at about two-thirds wartime strength and to have all critical combat equipment. Some are deficient in
support equipment.
' Divisions used primarily during the buildup of forces along the Sino-Soviet border. They are those units that are between cadre and
reduced-strength status but in which available equipment is concentrated in one or two maneuver units to provide some immediate combat
capability.
S Divisions estimated to be manned up to one-third of wartime strength and to have all critical combat equipment but some deficiencies
in support items.
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