EASTERN EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00864A000800010040-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 3, 2008
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: May 10, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/09/03: CIA-RDP79B00864A000800010040-9
104 EASTERN EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCER OCI #0716/68
10 May 1968
Bulgarian Treatment of Czech National Day
Bulgaria has not given any clear-cut indication of its
course of action relative to the crisis in Czechoslovakia.
The congratualatory greetings from Bulgarian party and state
leaders marking Czechoslovakia's National Day on 9 May were
a shade cooler than last years. Bulgarian attendance at
the Czechoslovak National Day reception in Sofia, however,
was slightly more prestigious than in 1967. Party leader
Zhivkov probably will attempt to avoid publicly siding with
either side in order to appease the Soviets and the nationalist
faction within his own party.
Rumania's Friendship Treaties with the USSR and Bulgaria
"Agreed" texts with Moscow and Sofia reportedly have
been reached, but Bucharest has yet to achieve agreement with
Budapest--the third Commun a ital with which its friend-
ship treaties have lapsed.
_~~
Rumanian
party and state chief Ceausescu did not say when the treaties
might be signed. However, an Izvestia correspondent in
Bucharest said that it will be soon. Ceausescu also failed
to mention renewal of the Rumanian-Czechoslovak treaty which
expires this July.
Faced with the near certainty of a drastically altered
Rumanian-Czechoslovak treaty, it seems quite probable that
the Russians have agreed to Rumania's terms as a way of bowing
gracefully to Bucharest's intransigence. If the new treaty
with Moscow contains it represents
a significant Rumanian political victory, which is none the
less remarkable given Bucharest's now "semi-active" role in
the Warsaw Pact. Given the current spate of Rumanian
GROUP I
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DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
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activity toward the West, Bucharest may view signing the
treaties as a compensating move towards its allies.
Brandt Schedules Visit to Yugoslavia
West German Foreign Minister Brandt will pay an official
visit to Yugoslavia on 12-14 June. This will be the first
visit of a West German Foreign Minister to Yugoslavia. Prin-
cipal items on the agenda are European security, the large
Yugoslav trade deficit with West Germany, and the situations
25X1
25X1
in Vietnam and the Middle East.
The. Yugoslavs probably hope that Brandt will urge the
Common Market to consider reaching a trade agreement with
d
l
rea
y
Yugoslavia. Common Market tariff and trade policies a
have seriously affected exports of some Yugoslav agricultural
products.
Although neither government has named an ambassador
since their renewal of diplomatic relations last January, 25X1
the exchange may come soon. Yugoslav Assistant Foreign
Minister Radivo apparently is Belgrade's choice for 25X1
the Bonn post.
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Hungarian Economic Reform Meeting Bureaucratic Opposition
Apparartchiks facing the loss of their positions in
Hungarian central economic ministries due to the economic
reform, are reportedly opposing the reform's implementation.
this "trust" group
s appealing to tears among conservatives that the reform
signals a reversion to capitalism. These scare tactics have
forced the regime to assuage such fears with periodic warnings
against harmful--capitalistic--tendencies while still pushing
the reform. This ambivalent stand has led to excessive
wariness by managers who are afraid to use their new authority
without clearcut guidelines.
Reform planners may want to take steps to correct the
current shortcomings of the reform but in a 23 April TV
interview Premier Fock ruled out administrative tampering
for another six months or a year, after which some "help"
may be given. For the immediate future it appears that the 25X1
regime will emphasize a smooth organizational transition, and
will only gradually exnect an improvement in performance.
Czechoslovak Economic Council Calls for Five-Day Work Week
The five-day week would come into effect on 29 September
1968, if a recommendation of the economic council is adopted
by the government. The council met on 2 May and cautioned,
however, that the change should "be effected with regard to
the necessary economic conditions being created in individual
enterprises." The council also directed that the concept of
"differentiated prices" for goods and services supplied on
non-working days be considered. Presumably this means higher
prices to pay for the overtime of workers who would have
to man the shops on Saturdays and Sundays.
The council also "dealt further with the complex of
problems concerning foreign loans." This probably was in
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Approved For Release 2008/09/03: CIA-RDP79B00864A000800010040-9