EASTERN EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCER
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79B00864A000800010099-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 7, 2010
Sequence Number:
99
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 23, 1968
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/07: CIA-RDP79B00864A000800010099-5
23 February 1968
Finnish-Rumanian Party Talks Focus on Budapest Meeting
The Budapest meeting was the central theme of talks
between high-level Rumanian and Finnish Communist party
officials in Bucharest earlier this month
Among the specific points made by the Rumanians in
describing their attitude toward the conference were that
countries with more than one Communist party should be
allowed to send representatives from each, and no new
Comintern/Cominform should be set up. The Rumanians also
stressed that greater unity is the main goal of the
meeting, non-Communist parties of a non-imperialistic
oreintation should be invited, and no permanent prepara-
tory committee should be established at Budapest for a
later meeting.
COMMENT: The mere fact that the Rumanians are going
to Budapest indicates that little if any substantive signifi-
cance is likely to stem from the gathering. If, however,
Bucharest's representatives Gould vigorously propose adoption
of "the two CP's from a single country" concept, the meeting
could turn intoa real donnybrook. Inviting both Chinese and
and Soviet factions from a single country would be consistent
with the Rumanian party's "principles," but it would be dia-
metrically opposed to Moscow's fundamental reasons for
desiring such gatherings--namely to isolate further the
Chinese party.
Gomulka Switches View of Budapest Meeting
After long efforts on behalf of Communist unity to be
expressed at the Budapest meeting through discussion of
"what links our parties and not what separates them,"
GROUP I
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Gomulka appears to have realized that the conclave may
turn into a brawl which will accomplish little or nothing.
On 17 February the party's weekly mouthpiece, Polityka,
admitted that limiting the Budapest talks to issues on whT h
agreement could be reached will be "impossible," and that
"controversial problems, known to world public opinion,
should also be submitted to open discussion in a party
spirit." The article was written by chief editor Rakowski,
who is close to Gomulka. The author subsequently told the
French Ambassador in Warsaw that these words were "inspired"
by Gomulka and accurately reflect his views.
COMMENT: Rakowski's article caps other recent press
evidence of a change in Polish attitude on the prospects
of the Budapest meeting which began, significantly, with
the announcement that Bucharest would attend the conference.
Brezhnev Leaves Prague for Home
After delivering a relatively mild speech plugging thel
forthcoming Budapest meeting but skirting controversial
issues, Soviet party leader Brezhnev left Prague by air
for home on 23 February. Czechoslovak party boss Dubcek
saw him off at the airport with a group that did not include
president and former party leader Novotny.
Brezhnev left it to Polish party leader Gomulka to
press for a full discussion of all questions at the Budapest
meeting, not excluding controversial problems. In his
speech on 22 February, new party boss Dubcek stressed the
parliamentary legality of the 1948 Communist takeover in
Czechoslovakia, but raked over the coals subsequent party
leaderships. He criticized the post-Stalin party leaders
for "half-Hearted efforts... which created deficiencies whose
consequences we feel even today, and called for a "rectifi-
cation" of all mistakes "without reservation." Rumanian
party chief, Ceausescu,spoke in familiar terms, but also
urged that any forthcoming world conference of Communist
parties be o ened to all progressive groups, not me 1 to
Communists.
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COMMENT: Notably, Brezhnev departed Prague without
listening to Novotny, who as president is scheduled to
speak today. The rest of the Soviet delegation is still
there.
Yugoslav Delegates Leave for Czechoslovak
Yugoslav party presidium member Veljko Vlahovic left
for Prague on 21 February to attend the 20th anniversary
celebration of the Czechoslovak Communist regime. Vlahovic
was accompanied by central committee member Bosko Siljegovi(T.
COMMENT: Sending a trusted subordinate allows Tito
to feel-out the situation in Prague and the other East
European leaders' reactions to it without publically
appearing to drift closer to the Bloc. The presence of
Siljegovic is puzzling. He was head of the Yugoslav central
committee commission for international affairs during the
Rankovic era and has been out of the limelight for a year
and a. half.
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East German Foreign Minister Visits Cairo
The West German news agency DPA reported from Cairo
that East German Foreign Minister Otto Winzer arrived in
that city on 21 February. Winzer was welcomed by Egyptian
Foreign Minister Riad. According to the Egyptian press,
Winzer was scheduled to remain in Cairo only one day.
undoubtedly is connected with a new East German attempt to
obtain diplomatic recognition from "third-world" countries.
East German delegations are now visiting India and Syria,
The US Embassy in
Rangoon also has reported that Winzer, or a deputy, will
visit Burma.
The East Germans ovbiously hope to press the line
that the resumption of diplomatic relations between Bonn
and Belgrade means that Bonn will be unable to stop other
countries from establishing diplomatic relations with
Pankow.
NOTE: THE VIEWS EXPRESSED ABOVE REPRESENT
ONLY THE ANALYSIS OF THE EE DIVISION
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