EASTERN EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00864A001200020041-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: October 24, 1972
• Content Type: STUDY

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#199 EASTERN EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCER OCI #0994/72
24 Oct. 1972
Does the Year 1973 Foreshadow'Im roved US-Bulgarian Relations?
The year 1963 marked the high-point in US-Bulgarian relations
since the end of World War II. It is not an objective law
that history must repeat itself, but many external similarities
between 1963 and prospects for 1973 suggest that the coming year
could be a good one for relations between Sofia and Washington.
In 1963, Secretary of Commerce Hodges became the first and
only US cabinet member since well before World War II to visit
Bulgaria; a claims agreement, providing for the settlement of
claims of US nationals arising out of war damage, national-
ization of property, and financial debts, was signed; and,
Bulgarians of the rank of deputy premier and politburo member
were known to accept dinner invitations to the American Min-
ister's residence.
This relatively "golden period" of US-Bulgarian relations
accompanied, not coincidentally, a similar warming of relations
between the US and the USSR. On the upswing from the trauma
of the Cuban missile crisis, US-Russian relations in 1963
were given increased impetus by Moscow's need to buy large
amounts of American grain to compensate for a disastrous Soviet
harvest, and this warming trend was capped by signature in
August of the nuclear test ban treaty.
Some recent developments in US--Sovist ties resemble those in
1963. Tension stemming from US mining of selected North
Vietnamese ports has been overcome; another disastrous Soviet
harvest has created an even greater Russian need to buy
American grain than in 1963; and, the SALT agreements of
May 1972 are no less important than the partial test ban
treaty of 1963.
Although tangible indicators that US-Bulgarian relations
will improve greatly in 1973 are thin, there nevertheless are
some. Foremost is the fact that the influence on Bulgaria of
the Soviet example is not substantially less than it was a
decade ago. Moreover, Sofia and Washington have agreed to a
visit to the US early in 1973 by Bulgarian Deputy Premier
Popov, and he can be expected to press for a reciprocal visit
by a high-ranking US official sometime later in the year,
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In addition, the Bulgarians have entered into unusually
close cooperation (for, them). with US authorities and
agencies with respect to controlling the flow of illicit
drugs.
Opposing views in Washington and Sofia of what constitutes
improved relations may inhibit their development, however,
Given their druthers, the Bulgarians, for example, would like
to confine improved bilaterals essentially to the economic-
technical field, and this conflicts with the US view of
promoting an across-the-board improvement, A second major
impediment appears to be the conflict between the discussion
of freer movement of persons and-ideas at a CSCE and the
current Bulgarian campaign to step up efforts to combat
bourgeois influence on the cultural front,
On balance, we are inclined to believe that the Bulgarians
will not allow either of the above potential impediments to
hinder the development of relations with the US. The
Bulgarians have been responsive to apparent Soviet instructions
to smooth over the differences with the Yugoslavs, This being
the case, it seems probable that Sofia can be nudged into
pursuing a broader and more positive course in its relations
with Washington.
Yu oslavs Protest 'Emi re Violence in New Y'o'rk
The Socialist Alliance (SAWPY), Yugoslavia's largest mass
organization, yesterday announced its "profound indignation"
over Croat emigre demonstrations:in New York that reportedly
included an attack on the consul-general.
The demonstrations were held on Saturday and Sunday and
centered on the Yugoslav consulate and UN headquarters,
According to Belgrade Taman-, some' 200 emigres participated
and one demonstrator penetrated the consulate and assaulted
Consul-General Zoran Bulajic, Bulajic apparently was not
hurt but a second official was attacked on the street and
required medical attention. The emigres also burned a
Yugoslav flag. Tan u described the emigres as "Ustashi
terrorists" who were openly demanding the splitting up of
the Yugoslav federation, The demonstration was called to
protest the recent trials of Croatian intellectuals in
Zagreb.
The sharp wording of the SAWPY protest included the charge
that "terrorist attacks against Yugoslavia are tolerated by
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the US." It will almost certainly be followed by a diplomatic
demarche. Although US efforts on terrorist activity in the
international arena have drawn-appreciative:applause in
Belgrade, incidents like the demonstrations in New York
threaten to have damaging influence on bilateral relations. 25X1
'First Cracks in S'erb P'a'rtSg'?rt 'f'ox 'N'ik'e'z'o 'a'r:d 'Cori 'a'n
The provincial party of,the Vojvodina, affiliated with the
Serb party whose leadership-was attacked by Tito last week,
seems to be splitting up into factional camps. On Sunday, the
party organization of the provincial-capital in Novi Sad
issued a.stinging rebuke to both the leadership of the
provincial party and of the Serb republic party. The Novi Sad
organization charged these leaders with obstructing Tito's
party reforms and of trying to hide this opposition behind a
screen of verbal support. It also demanded that the Serb
central committee follow Tito's directions and replace the
current leadership of Marko Nikezic. Immediately following
this news release the leadership of the Vojvodina part
replied with a statement rejecting these charges as "ground-
less" and as an attempt to "disqualify morally and politically
the provincial committee and its organs as unprepared to take
responsibility."
The provincial committee's rather weak response will only
invite further-attacks and further wrangling appears inev-
itable. With Vojvodina party leader Mirko Canadanovic out
of the country, (see Intelligencer, 20 October) the brush-
fire of.factional,ism will spread quickly, Canadanovic's
leadership is also questioned by the attack of the Novi Sad
party unit,and this unexpected-turn may damage his ability
to emerge from the situation without political blemish.
In Serbia proper there is a perceptible drift toward
demanding some kind of self-criticism by Nikezic, It is,
however, unlikely that Tito would accept such a compromise
f
a
ter he has already shown his anger over Nikezic's refusal
to make self-criticism a week ago. If Nikezic should make
even partial self-criticism he would only open the door to
demands for a fuller mea cul a. There is still no word --
the date for the Serb cent committee plenum which is to
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between the two countries were formally established
New 'Ambas's'a'dor to West 'G'e'rman
The Polish Council of State on 20 October named
Waclaw Piatkowski to be Ambassador-to the Federal Republic
of Germany. The 52-year old Piatkowski is not a career
diplomat and has served most recently as head of the
Polish Foreign Trade Mission in Cologne. He has a fairly
unspectacular cur ' vitae; a grain expert, he has spent
most of his careen 7 tz Rol m~ pex, an enterprise that deals
primarily with agricultural exports-. He has served with
the trade mission in New?York and speaks English well. The
new ambassador has been described as informal, friendly and
frank, and he is a member of the party. His appointment
has been expected since mid-September when diplomatic relations
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'More P-erso'nne'1Cha'n'ges' i'n- Roma'nia'n' P'art'- Ar'e E'xpe'c't'ed
4asimm~
The recent spate-of personnel changes in the government
can be expected to lead a realignment of the- membership of
elite bodies of the party- as well (see Intellicevc'e'rs,
12 and 19 October). In view of ?often contradietoryand
inconclusive-reports about the party leadership,; this item
will discuss the timing:and&.reasons for the expected. party
shifts and speculate on likely changes,
There is no indication-of when the changes will occur,
but they almost certainly will be announced following a
plenum of the central committee-which`we?anticipate by
early November. 'By that-time, Ceausescu will have.returned
from his visits to-Belgium and'Luxembourg slated for
24-28 October, Moreover, near=ly three and' one-half. months
will have passed since the last plenum held on;the eve of
the national party conference.inmid-July.- The party shifts
are necessary, sooner rather- than later' both' toy mesh the
party and government apparati and to get the economy moving
in time to announce pre-fulfillment of the current-five-
year plan at the eleventh party congress which probably will
be held in the latter half of 1974, Furthermore, now that
Ceausescu is also personally accountable for economic
performance, (he was named chairman of the Supreme Council
for Economic-and Social Development at the party conference)
new impetus will be given to assembling a more efficient
team of economic managers,
With no new appointments-"since February 1971, an altered
and slightly expanded membership' of. the Permanent Presidium
(politburo) appears likely. More'than anything else, these
shifts probably will reflect factors such as the reported
intellectual "topping out"of individuals like Ilie Verdet
and Virgil Trofin as well as the-unrealistic optimism and
political savvy of a technical expert such as Manea Manescu.
They thus can be nudged: downward to-posts from which their
ability can be equally'well tapped,
Probable new politburo members include Yanos Fazekas (46),
an ethnic Hungarian who is' considered one, of Ceausescu's
closest advisers on internal and minority problemst
Ion Stanescu (43), the new minister of Internal Affairs in
whom Ceausescu appears to-place much confidence; and,
Cornel Burtica (41), formerly the Minister of Foreign Trade
and a loyal exponent of Ceagsescu's policy of economic
independence, Of these three men, Romania's current economic
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problems. appear to give the edge to Burtica, but Stanescu
runs a close second,
Personnel shafts can also be expected: in the secretariat.
Since January, Ceausescu haa` named' four new- secretaries. As
a result, the secretariat has become?a group with stronger
technical expertise but,weaker political ability. Among the
four remaining members, appointed between July 1965 and
August 1969, "cultural czar''Dumitru-Popescu appears the
most likely to be replaced,, Miron Costantinescu, appointed
last week to be chairman of-the Economic Council, is a likely
successor. Known as an"intellectual" and with a following
in. Romanian cultural circles, he is.also the closest.to
being a "liberal" at the national level.
Membership on the Executive Committee, however, will most
likely feel the brunt of change. With 21 full and.17
alternate members, it is the-party's largest elite agency,
and Ceausescu packed it with alternate-appointees in 1970-71.
Florian Danalache and - Dumitru- Popescu- are the full members
most likely to be dropped ?p while deputy premier and foreign
trade minister Ion Patan~is the alternate-member most likely 25X1
to be. promoted to full..member?ship, Other alternate members
ripe for promotion are.Mihai?Dalea Burtica and Constantinescu,.
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