THE SOVIET DECISION TO INTERVENE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00887A000500010020-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: August 21, 1968
• Content Type: MEMO

CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Releastir2003/05/14 : CIA-RDP79600887A000500010020-9
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
21 August 1968
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT; The Soviet Decision to Intervene
1, Between the end of the Cierna-Bratislava
meetings and yesterday's invasion nothing happened
inside Czechoslovakia to support oscow's claim
that these meetings were a great victory for Com-
munist orthodoxy, Neither was there a notable
recrudescence in Czechoslovakia of the "anti-
socialist" trends which brought on the Warsaw
meeting and its harsh ultimatum, Thus, we doubt
that a rising sense of alarm in Ioscow is the
essential explanation for Soviet intervention.
2. The Soviet politburo on its return to
Moscow did not summon the Central Committee to
report on the Cierna and Bratislava meetings, but
instead issued a communique in the name of the
entire politburo saying that those meetings were
a good piece of work. The Soviet leaders seem
shortly thereafter to have scattered for their
usual summer holidays. The Soviet press stood
down its attacks on Czechoslovakia. The appear-
ance given was that Moscow was willing at last
to give the Czechs--presunahly chastened by the
nearness of their approach to the brink--a
respite. What went on in Czechoslovakia during
the short span of time since Cierna proved
only that the Czechs had not understood Cierna
to mean that they should put their reform move-
ment into reverse,
3. It is not likely that the Soviets, even
though they have persistently underestimated
the strength of reformist spirit in Czechosivakia,
expected miracles to be done by Dubcek in three
weeks' time. Even if Dubcek had promised them,
there was no chance he could deliver. What, then,
brought the Russians, after they had decided to
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:top back at Ciernae to give the niqnal
to crush the Ceechoelo s?
4. It may he some ttme
thia ion with any as ce.
of at we knew now, the most lik
appears to be that, under the imIlsot
pressures within the leadership and o
from its anxious allies in eastern
viet decision at Cierna to give eubeek
more tine became unravelled, 71-1.
as there seems some reason to 3up7Tone--tflt the
Soviet politburo witen it went to %7ierna w dividnd
in mind, and that the standoff reazhel
rived meetly from Soviet irresolution. *Cie- fraeile
balance in the Soviet leadership eeich produce the
Cierna agreement has, in the spew of le than three
weeks, been upset in favor of thoaQ! who laAi all
along have want& the toughest kid of policy and
have made use of the time and developvent since
Cierna to undo the agreenent.
atrengt,L
5 indeed, the political lea'
have been in such precarious balance, it would
have needed a great shock to upset then, 1,iat on17 tee71
absence of solid signs that developments in Prague
were going Moscow's way. There were few of thumes
In the short time available to Dubce% hi Xfort,ti
to demonstrate that he could insure the un.Tuec.tionakl
domination of the Comeuniet party had not been ires-
sive. Czechoslvak information eedia reeained enruly
and unrepentant, There was no indication that non-
Communist political eleaenta--for example, the clue
of Committed eon-Party People and thn reviled
Socialist party--'were being forced to take cover.
Despite the renewed pledges of fidelity to CEA
given at Cierna, there continued to be eece talk
in Prague of broader economic ties with ti-, West.
6, The visits to Prague of 'Ate and Ceausescu
were all too visible reminders that the ranks of in
dependent Communist states were wwelline. An4,
finally, with preparations moving ahead ra,idly
for the party co res scheduled to open on 9 SeP-
tenher, it was becoming clear that the concrre3
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AlNNW! Waftieqii9n2goaisw 44-tauvRapastisot8rt7Acontygo1atureL9
party conuervativeng Crr.07 75 last hopo for a brall..e.
on reformism in Prague. The congr-ess
.nteant not a check on the rnrinr.f,rtlxr thr, 7::,:7,3cthr"3.1yva.k
reforu raovement, but its confirmation. .T.n acIdition,
the cost of maintaining the mobilizatio;,,t or nvv,355.,ve
intervention forces may havf7 ereted ?rev.-::pares in the
leadership to uae these forces or c1isba!:7,10. them.
7, Despite tho 331moottmess of the Soviet
tar" operation in Czechoslovakia, a rlrf?-.4:irof cycric,t
political actions suggent that thf., aecili.7%n to exe-
cute the plan of intervention cat.lt at a airi late
stage. _Among these were Dobrynints appreach to tte
President, the convening of the Centrel
in the raidat of the top leadrArns vacatio:, thr:
netts of the legal base for Soviet action, an
failure to surface quickly an alternativr lnaE1ersti.7
in Prague, Thus it ?,toull appear that Sovt ir,ter-
vention in Czechoalovakia did not follow naturall-',-
from tbe Cierna taeoting hut ropr,r3sentn, iAnt2ad,
a scrapping of the tlosition arrived at. tre.
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