THE WARSAW PACT THREAT TO NATO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00939A000600020002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 92
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 1, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP 5 FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM 84
Final Report of the Working Group
THE WARSAW PACT THREAT TO NATO
DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File
SR JS 70-3
May 1970
Copy No.
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION
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May 1970
The Warsaw Pact Threat to NATO
(NSSM -84)
Introduction
This is the final report of Working Group
5 of the Interagency Steering Committee for
National Security Study Memorandum 84. Parts
I and II, devoted primarily to Warsaw Pact
capabilities and composition, constitute a
revision of the First Phase report (SR JS
70-2) on the Warsaw Pact threat to NATO
issued by the Working Group in February 1970.
Part III, which considers contingencies in
which Pact forces might be used, was issued
as a separate report by the Working Group
in April. Part IV estimates Pact military
reactions to alternative US-NATO force struc-
tures and strategies. A summary of this
final report begins on page 5. At the end
of the report is a Statistical Annex, orig-
inally appended to the First Phase report,
containing tables on Warsaw Pact force
strengths.
Working Group 5 includes representatives
of the National Security Council Staff, the
Department of State, the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense (Systems Analysis), the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (International
Security Affairs), the Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency.
The intelligence data and estimates in this
report were provided by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency (chair), the Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research of the Department of State.
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Contents
Page
Summary 5
I. Strategy, Structure, and Posture 9
Warsaw Pact Mission 9
The Khrushchev Strategy 10
Military Posture 12
Warsaw Pact War Planning 14
Nonnuclear Capability 19
Nuclear Warfare Capability in Europe 22
Warsaw Pact Strengths 23
Warsaw Pact Weaknesses 24
Implications 27
II. Composition of the Forces 31
Ground Forces 31
Fronts 31
Armies and Corps 32
Divisions 33
Categories of Readiness 34
Division Equipment 35
Armored Vehicles 36
Artillery Support 37
Airborne Forces 38
Amphibious Forces 39
Missile Support 39
Tactical Air Support and Theater Air
Defense 40
Frontal Aviation 40
Ground Attack 42
Transport Aviation and Helicopters . 43
Air Defense 43
Service Support of Theater Forces 46
Naval Forces 48
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Contents
(continued)
Mediterranean Sea
Baltic Sea
Black Sea
Page
49
49
49
Theater Forces Facing NATO
50
Possible Variations in the War Plan ? ?
?
52
Mobilization
53
III.
Contingencies Leading to NATO - Warsaw
Pact Hostilities
55
Factors Inhibiting Soviet Initiation
of Hostilities
55
The China Factor
56
The Mediterranean - Middle East
Region
57
Possible Contingencies
57
Eastern Europe
57
Miscalculation of Effects of Tension
in Berlin
59
The Mediterranean - Middle East
Region
60
All-Out Attack in the Central Region ? ?
61
The Case of Nuclear Preemption
62
Surprise Attack With Limited Objectives
63
Capture of West Berlin
64
Invasion of Yugoslavia
64
The NATO Extremities
65
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Contents
(continued)
Page
IV. Warsaw Pact Reactions to Alternative
NATO Postures and Strategies 67
Factors Bearing on Soviet Planning for
Theater Forces 67
The Political Factor 68
The Imperial Factor 69
The Bureaucratic Factor 69
The Economic Factor 70
Reactions to Alternative US and NATO
Force Structures and Strategies 71
Continuation of Present Situation 71
A Small Cut in US Forces 72
A Larger Cut 72
Nuclear Strategy 73
NATO Time Norms 74
Soviet Attitude Toward Use of Force Under
Alternative US and NATO Force Structures
and Strategies 74
V. Statistical Annex 77
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Summary
The Soviet and other Warsaw Pact armed forces have
four basic military missions on the continent of Europe:
-- To defend the USSR against overt and
direct military threats emanating from
or through the continent of Europe
-- To bring to a favorable conclusion
military conflicts which may occur
To defend the territories of the Warsaw
Pact member states and to maintain the
Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe
-- To support Soviet political policies in
Europe.
The structure, deployment, and state of readiness
of Soviet and Pact forces indicate that their mission
does not presently include either territorial aggran-
dizement or the expansion of Soviet influence by
military aggression.
Soviet forces, military doctrine, writings, and
statements and the scenarios of military exercises
all indicate that, once hostilities were under way,
or appeared inevitable, Warsaw Pact forces would
seek to take the initiative as early as possible
launching a large scale offensive campaign which
would have as its objective the destruction of NATO's
military forces and the occupation of Western Europe.
There is general agreement, both within the US
Government and throughout the Alliance, on the main
outlines of the Warsaw Pact threat. In general the
Pact forces were designed for short duration combat
in the wake of strategic nuclear exchange. In addi-
tion to their conventional artillery and other arms,
they are equipped with a variety of nuclear-capable
systems, including rockets, missiles, and tactical
aircraft. The Soviets have about 630 strategic
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missiles and 595 medium bombers in the western USSR
whose targets are in Western Europe. In addition,
Soviet ballistic missile submarines in the Soviet
Northern Fleet are, for the most part, also targeted
against Western Europe. In recent years Soviet
statements and Pact exercises reflect a concern for
the possibility of conventional operations as well,
and some steps are being taken to improve Soviet
capabilities for nonnuclear war.
In the main area of possible conflict with NATO--
opposite the Central Region--the Pact maintains a
large combat-ready force of about 600,000 men in 52
divisions (27 Soviet, 6 East German, 12 Polish, and
7 Czechoslovak) and 11,500 tanks supported by about
2,800 tactical aircraft. The Pact employs a compre-
hensive mobilization system, under which reservists
and trucks are to be taken from the civilian economy
to bring reduced strength units up to combat strength.
Successful execution of this plan could raise Pact
strength in the Central Region up to about 1,290,000
men (60 percent of them Soviet), 20,000 tanks, 6,200
conventional artillery pieces, 3,700 combat aircraft,
and some 500 nuclear-capable tactical missile and
rocket launchers. Complete mobilization, deployment,
and integration of these forces would almost certainly
take at least three weeks. This process would generate
indications to Western intelligence, but an under-
standing of ultimate Pact intentions would probably
remain uncertain and might not provide a convincing basis
for NATO mobilization.
In any crisis period which raised the possibility
of war, the Pact would put a high premium upon com-
pleting the process of mobilization and reinforcement
before hostilities began, yet it might be willing,
under some circumstances, to attack earlier.
Some analysts believe that limitations in the Pact
logistic system, such as low ammunition supply rates
and insufficient transport, constitute significant
weaknesses. These analysts also regard the Pact as
vulnerable to an effective NATO antitank capability
and to restrictions on Soviet lines of supply. Other
analysts consider that the evidence on logistic
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weaknesses is inconclusive and that reliance on
civilian resources would not be a significant weak-
ness.
Some analysts doubt that East European forces
would prove reliable in a variety of contingencies
while others consider that the East Europeans would
be reliable in most circumstances.
We have considered a number of ways in which the
Warsaw Pact might deliberately initiate hostilities,
ranging from isolated attacks on NATO extremities
through limited aggression in the Central Region to
all-out attack on all NATO fronts. We conclude that,
under the present East-West military relationship,
the likelihood of a deliberate Pact attack is very
low. It is possible, however, that Pact-NATO hostil-
ities might develop in unintended ways, e.g., out
of widespread revolts in Eastern Europe.
In considering how the Soviets might react to
changes in NATO force structure and strategy, we
note that Soviet planning is influenced not only
by the basic military missions cited earlier, but
also by economic constraints and a certain bureau-
cratic resistance to change. In general, Soviet
planning probably would not be highly reactive to
changes on the NATO side.
If the US were to reaffirm roughly its present
deployments and NATO strategy remained unaltered,
the Pact would probably continue at the deliberate
pace of recent years with modernization programs
designed to improve both conventional and nuclear
capabilities. Withdrawals on the order of ten
percent of US forces in Europe would have a negli-
gible effect. A larger withdrawal--say on the order
of one-third--would, in the view of some analysts,
lead the Soviets to maintain or even step up the pace
of their modernization programs in order to gain a
useful military advantage. Other analysts believe
that the Soviets would probably take the opportunity
to level off or reduce these programs in order to
meet other military and civilian priorities.
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Changes in NATO strategy to emphasize theater
nuclear warfare or to reduce the 90-day norms for
conventional capabilities would reduce the require-
ments Moscow now perceives for improving Pact capa-
bilities for sustained nonnuclear combat. Other-
wise, these changes would not materially affect
Soviet force planning, which already rests on a
doctrine which assumes nuclear war in the theater.
Implementation of the force structures and stra-
tegies considered in NSSM-84 probably would not sub-
stantially alter the Soviet belief that military
adventures against or all-out attack upon NATO would
be a highly dangerous course of action. This is true
even in the case of US withdrawals down to a level
of, say, 100,000 men in Europe. This case would
still require the Soviets to reckon with a substantial
chance of nuclear retaliation. More important than
US deployments, in the USSR's calculations on this
matter, would be its interpretation of overall US
behavior, and the inferences it would draw from this
concerning US willingness to invoke its strategic
power in extreme cases.
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I. Strategy, Structure, and Posture
This section discusses the general considerations
and factors which have shaped the Soviet strategy,
military force structure, and posture in Europe and
which probably will also influence the formation of
future Soviet European strategies and forces. Impli-
cations are provided on pages 27-30.
Warsaw Pact Mission
The Soviet and other Warsaw Pact armed forces
have four basic military missions on the continent
of Europe:
To defend the USSR against overt and
direct military threats emanating
from or through the continent of
Europe
To bring to a favorable conclusion
military conflicts which may occur
To defend the territories of the War-
saw Pact member states and to main-
tain the Soviet hegemony in Eastern
Europe
-- To support Soviet political policies
in Europe.
The structure, deployment, and state of readiness
of Soviet and Pact forces indicate that their mission
does not presently include either territorial aggran-
dizement or the expansion of Soviet influence by
military aggression.
The Defense Intelligence Agency agrees
generally with the conclusion in the above
paragraph that the Warsaw Pact mission does
not now include either territorial aggran-
dizement or the expansion of Soviet influence
by military means. It is essential to note,
however, that the Soviet and Eastern European
Pact forces are capable of, and indeed de-
signed primarily for, the conduct of offensive
military operations in the Central Region of
NATO should a war occur for reasons other
than deliberate Soviet aggression.
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At the end of World War II the USSR found itself
with massive armed forces deep in Europe, with
greater opportunity for the expansion of Russian
influence there than had ever been possible under
the tsars. At the beginning of the Fifties the
Soviets had realized most of their objectives
in Eastern Europe. Prospects for the expansion
of Soviet power and influence elsewhere in Europe,
however, had greatly diminished partly because of
the nuclear monopoly held by the United States and
partly because of an increased resolve on the part
of the Western allies and the rapid recovery of
Western Europe. The main objective remained, of
course, the security of the USSR, but now this
security was more closely tied to the stability and
security of Eastern Europe.
In May 1955, West Germany joined NATO. In
response to this event, as well as to provide a
means of furthering Soviet political and military
objectives in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact came
into being on 14 May 1955. As a military alliance
the Pact provided a new means for Soviet control
and coordination of bloc military capabilities in
preparation for the execution of the new Soviet
European strategy--the Khrushchev nuclear strategy.
The Khrushchev Strategy
Around the end of the Fifties the Soviets began
to see war in Europe as nuclear from the outset. The
strategy of the Khrushchev era called for the rapid
exploitation of the initiation of hostilities to
achieve long-standing Soviet European objectives. To
this strategy it made little difference by whom or
how hostilities were initiated.
The Soviet ground and tactical air forces which
evolved in the early Sixties from this doctrine and
strategy were structured to maximize their capabilities
for general war and advance swiftly across Western
Europe in the aftermath of a nuclear holocaust. The
resulting forces had shortcomings for fighting a
protracted, large scale conventional war.
Soviet forces were structured on the concept that
a quick war obviated the need for heavy service support,
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and the nuclear nature of the war and the fluidity of
the battle required less conventional fire support from
artillery and tactical aircraft. Instead of massed
artillery and infantry, nuclear strikes were to create
gaps in NATO's defenses and destroy its reserves.
Large tank forces would then pass through these gaps
and advance rapidly through Western Europe, bypassing
or encircling any remaining NATO forces.
To fit their concepts, the Soviets accelerated
the mechanization and streamlining process under way
since World War II, discarding the infantry divisions,
which had made up the bulk of their theater forces,
and much of the massive artillery and tactical air
support. They substituted a highly mobile force
composed essentially of tanks supported by rockets
and missiles with nuclear warheads. In addition the
force had tactical aircraft with good mobility and
dispersal characteristics but small payload capacities.
By the early Sixties the reorganization was virtually
complete.
At that point the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact
allies could assemble a heavily armored force of some
20,000 tanks opposite NATO's Central Region. In
comparison with previous Soviet concepts this force
had a low infantry-to-tank ratio. The infantry that
was retained was to be mounted in armored personnel
carriers. There was little combat and logistical
support.
The Soviet concept required the motorized infantry
to keep pace with the tanks, but most of the armored
personnel carriers available were deficient in mobility
and protection for the infantry being transported, and
even these were in short supply. Artillery forces
lacked mobility, firepower, and armor for protection
in a fluid tactical situation.
The Soviets evidently had concluded that tanks were
the essential ingredient and that a relatively low infan-
try and artillery strength was acceptable. Except for
units already deployed on the frontiers with NATO, the
newly reorganized ground forces relied on mobilization
from the civilian economy for most of their cargo trucks
and much of the manpower needed to make them ready for
combat.
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Some Soviet military leaders began to question the
established theater warfare doctrine in the light of
the condition of mutual deterrence which was then
emerging and US advocacy of the doctrine of flexible
response. These Soviet military spokesmen generally
agreed that the war with NATO would not necessarily
be nuclear from the outset, but there was consider-
able disagreement over the probable duration of a
nonnuclear phase of conflict.
Beginning about 1960, the Soviets accelerated the
conversion of their East European satellites into ef-
fective military allies. The East European armed forces
--particularly those of Poland and Czechoslovakia--were
being organized and equipped to conduct semi-indepen-
dent military operations under overall Soviet control.
The Soviets probably believed that in the event of a
NATO attack these forces--being in the forward area
and capable of quick reaction--could be relied on
to fight effectively until the arrival of Soviet rein-
forcements. At the least the East Europeans, together
with the Soviet forces in the forward area, could be
counted on to take much of the edge off the initial
combat effectiveness of NATO's forces.
Thus the aim of the Soviets was to build up the
military potential of their allies and at the same
time to realize substantial peacetime economies in
their own forces. In this way they evidently expected
to ensure thel successful defense of their forward area
positions while mobilizing and deploying the large
reinforcements which they consider necessary to seize
the initiative and complete the military occupation of
Europe.
Military Posture
Soviet military actions in Europe have, to date,
been intended to preserve the status quo and test
Western will and determination. The present Warsaw
Pact force is certainly adequate to this task though
the force remains postured for the execution of its
basic military missions.
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The Soviets, however, do not have--and apparently
have not sought to posture their theater forces in a
manner to provide them with--the capability to over-
whelm NATO by attacking without prior buildup. They
have relied on strategic warning and a period of in-
creasing international tension for the time to build
up sufficient forces to neutralize NATO forces and
occupy Western Europe. They have not provided their
forces in the forward area with the kind of logistical
support necessary for a successful offensive across
Western Europe. Soviet security depends heavily on
large semiautonomous East European national armies
whose reliability is uncertain, particularly if used
as striking forces in a Soviet-led aggression.
The Defense Intelligence Agency agrees
that Pact forces currently deployed in the
forward area could not "overwhelm NATO" with-
out prior buildup. They do, however, con-
stitute a very formidable striking force.
They could be used offensively either to
gain limited objectives or to disrupt NATO
forces in the Central Region and keep them
"off balance" prior to commitment of a
larger bloc force with greater overall combat
power. Such an option would most likely
appeal to the Soviets in a crisis situation
where the advantages of taking direct action
seemed to outweigh the disadvantages of
forgoing deliberate pre-preparation of their
forces.
DIA feels that definitive information
is lacking on the order of battle and the
function of Soviet combat service support.
The extensive POL and ammunition storage
facilities throughout Eastern Europe indi-
cate that the Soviets should be able to
satisfactorily support the forces currently
deployed.
DIA further believes that the Eastern
European countries would be reliable in any
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action where NATO, in particular West Germany,
was the aggressor or in any action where the
Warsaw Pact was on the offensive, at least in
the early stages of a future conflict.
Despite the defensive nature of their overall mili-
tary posture in Europe, the Soviets' forces, military
doctrine, writings, and statements and the scenarios
of their military exercises all indicate that, once
hostilities were under way, or appeared inevitable,
the USSR would seek to take the initiative as early
as possible. Soviet forces would then launch a large
scale offensive campaign which would have as its ob-
jectives the destruction of NATO's military forces
and the occupation of Western Europe.
The Defense Intelligence Agency feels
that the Soviet posture in Eastern Europe
contains substantial offensive capabilities.
Therefore, the Soviet overall military posture
cannot be described as either offensive or
defensive.
Soviet strategic planning appears to be premised
on an estimate that the Warsaw Pact holds the advantage
in the balance of Warsaw Pact versus NATO theater force
capabilities. The Pact leaders apparently believe
that, in the event of a conflict in Europe, which may
be conventional at the outset, NATO would resort to
tactical nuclear weapons rather than suffer total
defeat. Moreover, the Soviets apparently assume
that a surprise NATO-initiated military action, while
theoretically possible, is unlikely; they assume that
a full NATO offensive against the Pact without strategic
warning is militarily and politically unlikely. The
Warsaw Pact force structure and strategy are posited
on the assumption that any major NATO military action
would be detected in time to permit reaction by Warsaw
Pact forces, perhaps including some preemptive moves.
Warsaw Pact War Planning
Consideration of the organization and deployment
of the Warsaw Pact forces, and of Warsaw Pact mili-
tary writings and exercise scenarios, leads to the
conclusion that the Soviets have developed a basic
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plan for the conduct of war against NATO. The main
variable in the execution of the plan, and the one
which would govern the configuration in which Warsaw
Pact forces would enter combat in the critical Central
Region, is the timing of the onset of hostilities.
In general, the plan calls for the organization of
five Warsaw Pact army groups--called fronts--in two
echelons* opposite NATO's Central Region. During the
first ten days after the Pact initiated its buildup,
only three fronts would actually be available for
combat while the other two were being mobilized and
moved forward from the western USSR. The three forward
fronts would include a central one made up from combat-
ready Soviet and East German forces now located in
East Germany, a southern front made up of Czechoslovak
and Soviet forces now in Czechoslovakia, and a northern
front made up initially of Polish forces. The Soviet
and East German forces are combat ready now. However,
Polish and Czechoslovak armies and fronts require
substantial mobilization.
The units of the two reinforcing fronts from the
western USSR would have to be filled out with large
numbers of civilian vehicles and reservists to achieve
combat strength. To achieve a rapid reinforcement,
Soviet plans provide for a piecemeal movement of these
units as they become available. Some of the combat
elements of the reinforcing fronts could arrive in
Poland and Czechoslovakia in about five or six days
and all of the divisions could probably arrive in
* "Echelon" has a special meaning in the Soviet view
of military operations. Soviet doctrine envisages
large groupings of troops deployed behind the front
line or first echelon units and not engaged in combat.
This second echelon would be committed only after the
first echelon forces had been substantially engaged
by the enemy. To some extent the second echelon can
be viewed as a reserve, but it is primarily a maneuvering
force, often with predetermined objectives. The Soviet
concept of echelons is applicable at all levels, including
army, front, and even theater.
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about ten days. Most of the trucks and a substantial
amount of the personnel of the service support organi-
zation at front and army level would have to be mobilized
from the Soviet economy. It is estimated that the
complete organization of these two fronts into forces
prepared to conduct a coordinated offensive would almost
certainly take at least three weeks.
When this Warsaw Pact force is assembled its five
fronts would contain about 1,290,000 men (60 percent
of them Soviet), 20,000 tanks, 6,200 conventional
artillery pieces, 3,700 combat aircraft, and 500
nuclear-capable tactical missile and rocket launchers.
By the end of the first week after a buildup had
begun the Soviets would probably be in a position--
if they chose--to begin introducing more Soviet
combat units into the northern and southern fronts.
By this time, effective Soviet command and control
could be imposed over all the fronts. Even if hostil-
ities did not begin until the Soviets' reinforcement
was completed, however, they would probably still
keep many of the East European forces in the first
echelon while retaining a large Soviet second echelon.
This would tend to ensure the East Europeans' commit-
ment to the war since the bulk of Polish, East German,
and Czechoslovak forces would be engaged while Soviet
contingents were behind them. Moreover, it would
preserve large Soviet uncommitted forces for use in
the main Warsaw Pact westward offensive.
In addition to the forces assigned opposite the
Central Region the Soviets would have a large strategic
reserve composed of forces from the Kiyev and Moscow
Military Districts. The Soviets would probably commit
these reserves should serious reverses occur in any
area but would always first view such commitment in
the light of the situation in the Central Region. In
any case, by definition the strategic reserve would be
withheld from combat at the outset of hostilities and
would be retained in a central location from which it
could be quickly deployed to the important potential
trouble spots or to exploit favorable opportunities,
especially in the Central Region. Soviet forces in
Hungary could support operations in either the central
area or in the south.
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Much less is known about Soviet planning for cam-
paigns outside the Central Region. Should the Soviets
elect to execute the above described buildup against
NATO, they would probably also mobilize their forces
opposite Scandinavia and the southern flank of NATO
for contingencies in those areas.
On the southern flank only the Bulgarians are
likely to contribute to offensive action. Supported
by the Soviet theater forces from the Odessa Military
District, they could launch an offensive against Greece
and European Turkey. The Soviet Black Sea Fleet would
be important to such an offensive. The fleet is a
balanced force designed to maintain Soviet naval
supremacy in the Black Sea and provide logistic support
for the Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterranean.
This fleet could also support land operations and
conduct amphibious assault operations in the Black
Sea. Should the Soviets fail to secure the Black Sea
exit, they would be unable to reinforce or support
the Mediterranean Squadron quickly. In any combat
situation with NATO, short of general nuclear war,
the Soviet surface forces in the Mediterranean would
lack air cover and have limited underway replenishment
facilities. They would seek to attack Western naval
forces, particularly aircraft carriers. In addition,
the Soviet threat to Western naval forces and sea lines
of communication would be enhanced by the difficulties
of detecting Soviet submarines, and by the USSR's capa-
bility of bringing more submarines into the Mediterranean
from the Atlantic.
Undoubtedly, the territories controlling the
entrances to the Baltic and Black seas are desirable
prizes in Soviet eyes. Neither, however, would be
essential to the success of the main campaign against
the Central Region. An attack on the Turkish Straits,
in particular, would tend to divert Soviet forces
which might be needed as reserves for the main campaign,
but would not be likely to draw substantial NATO forces
away from the critical Central Region. In the case of
eastern Turkey, the difficulty of mounting a campaign,
and the lack of important objectives, suggest that the
Soviets would prefer to maintain a threatening stance
there with minimum forces in order to keep Turkish
forces in place.
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The Defense Intelligence Agency feels
that an attack on the Turkish Straits would
not tend to divert Soviet forces intended for
the Central Region. The Warsaw Pact has
Bulgarian, possibly Romanian, and Soviet
forces from the Odessa Military District which
could be employed in an attack in this area.
Soviet strategic reserves exist. The Soviet
forces in Hungary and the Hungarian forces
also could be used.
Soviet naval forces in the north pose a major threat
to NATO control of the Atlantic. The Northern Fleet
is the largest Soviet fleet and the only one of the
three Soviet European fleets with unimpeded access to
the'open ocean. In times of crisis the Soviets would
seek to augment the Northern Fleet with units from
the Baltic.
Despite the difficult terrain and climate of
northern Norway, a Soviet attack there would be
militarily feasible because of NATO's limited de-
fensive capability. The main objectives of such
an attack would be to take Norway out of NATO and
preclude NATO use of Norwegian territory and, in
the event of prolonged hostilities, to provide
bases for Soviet naval and air operations.
If the Soviets planned an attack on Norway they
might violate Finnish territory as a means of strengthen-
ing and broadening the attack. However, to do so would
risk involving both Finland and Sweden and entangling
large Soviet forces in Scandinavia.
In the light of the cost weighed against the gains
to be had in Scandinavia, a more reasonable Soviet course
of action would seem to be to attempt to frighten Norway
into inaction by threats rather than attacks. In any
case, a successful campaign in the NATO Central Region
would probably put the Soviets in a position to dictate
the fate of Scandinavia without direct use of force.
The Defense Intelligence Agency feels
that Norway is the key to control of the
sea and air routes used by Soviet air and
naval forces to reach the Atlantic. Soviet
occupation of Norway would provide ice-free
naval bases for tactical operations against
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northern Europe and would jeopardize NATO's
ability to protect sea lines of communications
in the Atlantic. In the light of the advan-
tages that would accrue to the Soviets it is
probable that they would carry out such an
operation in the event of hostilities with
NATO.
The Warsaw Pact planning provides few options with
regard to the size of forces, axes of their employment,
or the area of the conflict. Specifically, any action
executed against any part of NATO for any objective runs
the risk of triggering the full NATO response against
the Warsaw Pact. In short, no matter how hostilities
begin, the Soviets would attempt to develop their
forces in accordance with the basic war plans.
Soviet and Warsaw Pact armed forces are militarily
capable of conducting operations not involving the main
force of either side. However, a decision to limit
operations would not change the requirement to stand
ready for a full scale NATO response against any or all
of the Warsaw Pact area. As a result, the basic Warsaw
Pact force levels, structures, dispositions, or plans
would not change substantially should an action occur,
be threatened, or be planned on the flanks.
Nonnuclear Capability
"Flexible response" concepts have entered Soviet
military doctrine during the past few years. Strate-
gic force advocates who in the past have warned that
any conflict with the West would inevitably and quickly
escalate into a general nuclear war are now arguing
that new conventional war options exist because of
the growing strategic nuclear capability of the USSR.
The clearest evidence that Soviet thinking has
gone beyond the talking stage and that some modifi-
cation in practice of the strict nuclear war doctrine
has already taken place comes from Warsaw Pact exer-
cises. In recent years a number of these have followed
scenarios which assumed that the war began with a NATO
conventional attack. Typically, Warsaw Pact conven-
tional forces would defeat this attack, whereupon NATO
would resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
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Then the Warsaw Pact forces, reinforced from the USSR
and using nuclear weapons, would launch a counteroffen-
sive that would overrun Europe. Earlier exercises
simply depicted an initial nuclear exchange after
which surviving Soviet forces achieved victory.
Recent changes in the structure of Soviet forces
are more tangible evidence of Soviet acceptance of
the possibility of nonnuclear war. Field artillery
in line divisions in the Group of Soviet Forces in
Germany (GSFG) has been increased. In the motorized
rifle divisions, 6 152mm howitzers were added to the
artillery regiment and 6 122mm howitzers were added
to each motorized rifle regiment--overall a 50-percent
increase in GSFG motorized rifle division artillery.
In the tank divisions of GSFG, 18 122mm howitzers were
added to the division artillery regiment and 6 122mm
howitzers were added to the rifle regiment--overall
a 65-percent increase in tank division artillery.
In both the motorized rifle and the tank divisions
the number of multiple rocket launchers was in-
creased from 12 to 18, and the FROG battalion of
each division gained one launcher, raising the
total number of divisional FROG launchers to 4.
Aside from these artillery increases, however, it
is not evident that the Soviets are attempting to re-
structure their ground forces to improve their capa-
bilities for a sustained nonnuclear war.
The Soviets have not increased their infantry
strength facing NATO. In fact, the more recent trends
in armored personnel carriers--i.e., the development
of the BTR-60 PB and the tracked infantry combat
vehicle, which carry a single infantry squad
in a low-silhouette, tracked, heavily armed, amphibious
armored vehicle?support that Soviet thinking on in-
fantry organization and tactics remains relatively
unchanged since the early Sixties. With this new
scale of equipment, infantry combat power will prob-
ably increase, but the logistical and service support
burdens imposed by these vehicles will increase as well.
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The Soviets' greatest potential weakness in pro-
longed combat is logistic support. For example,
although the Soviets have increased the number of
artillery pieces they have not increased their ammuni-
tion supply rates, which are low by US standards.
Combat-strength Soviet line divisions carry three
days' supplies for intensive combat, and Soviet field
army mobile reserves amount to about two days' addi-
tional supplies per division. Soviet combat units
then would be dependent for resupply on the rear
services of the front. Most of the trucks and a
substantial number of personnel of the rear services
organization called for in the basic plan must be
mobilized. Major elements of the rear services
were successfully mobilized and tested during the
1968 Czechoslovak crisis, although the total rear
services organization has not been comprehensively
tested.
The Defense Intelligence Agency feels
that definitive information is lacking on
the order of battle and the function of
Soviet combat service support. The extensive
POL and ammunition storage facilities through-
out Eastern Europe indicate that the Soviets
should be able to satisfactorily support the
forces currently deployed.
DIA also believes that there is insuf-
ficient substantive intelligence available
to draw the conclusion that the Soviets
"have not increased their ammunition supply
rates."
The central and inescapable characteristic of
the Soviet forces is their superiority in numbers
of tanks. Even in a nuclear war, Soviet doctrine
prescribes--and the current order of battle would
readily permit--the concentration of up to 1,500
tanks in a breakthrough zone approximately 40 kilo-
meters wide. In a nonnuclear situation, the Soviets
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might concentrate that number of tanks on even less
frontage.
This reliance on armor has resulted in a low
ratio of infantry to tanks in the Warsaw Pact forces.
In pure numbers, the Soviets and their Polish, East
German, and Czechoslovak allies could assemble some
20,000 medium and heavy tanks opposite NATO's Central
Region and back these up with about 4,000 more in
strategic reserves (in the Moscow and Kiyev military
districts). This would give them a numerical super-
iority in battle tanks over NATO on the order of 3.5
to 1. On the other hand, after reinforcement, the
Warsaw Pact forces in the Central Region and in the
strategic reserve would have only about 130,000
riflemen, which is about the same as NATO has in
the Central Region.
After being reorganized about 1960, the Soviet
Tactical Air Force emphasized qualitative improve-
ments in its air defense capabilities and put less
emphasis on the development of nonnuclear ground
attack capabilities. Most new aircraft (the MIG-21
and the SU-7) were originally designed as interceptors.
The use of these aircraft in the ground attack role
is limited by their small payload capacities (no
more than 4,000 pounds) and short combat radii.
The YAK-28 Brewer light bomber, which entered service
in the early Sixties, also has a small payload capacity
(about 3,500 pounds), and it is out of production,
with only some 180 deployed. Recently the Soviets have
increased the survivability of the tactical air forces
by constructing aircraft shelters and by adding SA-3
missiles and antiaircraft guns for airfield defense.
Nuclear Warfare Capability in Europe
The Soviets now accept the possibility that a
NATO - Warsaw Pact conflict can be fought solely with
conventional weapons. The exercise scenarios probably
reflect genuine contingency plans but the nonnuclear
phase portrayed has not involved a Warsaw Pact of
of more than a few days. The Soviets apparently
do not believe that NATO would accept total defeat
without resort to all available weapons.
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The Soviets have equipped their theater forces
with a variety of nuclear-capable weapon systems,
including rockets, missiles, and tactical aircraft.
In addition, the Soviets have about 630 strategic
missiles located in the USSR whose targets are almost
certainly in Western Europe. Soviet Long Range
Aviation contains a large force of medium range
bombers that would be used for strikes against Western
Europe. The diesel powered ballistic missile sub-
marines in the Soviet Northern Fleet are also esti-
mated to be targeted for the most part against Western
Europe. Available evidence does not indicate the
targeting, target priorities, or command and control
procedures which the Soviets would use in employing
these strategic means of attack in support of oper-
ations in Central or Eastern Europe. (See Table 14
Section V.)
Warsaw Pact Strengths
A major strength of the Warsaw Pact is its capa-
bility to rapidly concentrate large, tank-heavy forces
against NATO frontiers. In the main areas of possible
conflict with NATO--opposite the Central Region--the
Warsaw Pact maintains a large combat-ready force of
some 50 divisions with more than 11,500 tanks supported
by about 2,800 tactical aircraft.
In about three weeks the Warsaw Pact could prob-
ably build up forces totaling about 33 armies consisting
of some 144 divisions against the various NATO frontiers--
about 20 of these armies against NATO's Central Region
alone. These forces would give the Warsaw Pact a tank
superiority over NATO of about three to one.
Valuable practice and training of Pact active and
reserve personnel was provided by the 1968 invasion of
Czechoslovakia. During this operation some of the forces
from five countries were ultimately deployed. In addi-
tion frequent training exercises are conducted by compo-
nents of Pact forces in the forward areas geared to war-
time contingency plans against NATO. Multinational
Pact exercises are also conducted several times a year.
Nearly all Soviet fighter bases in Eastern Europe
have hardened shelters for all of their aircraft,
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thereby increasing their chances for survival in the
event of hostilities particularly in conventional war.
The Warsaw Pact fronts have strong organic tactical
nuclear capability. In addition, the Soviets have the
capability to support these fronts with MRBMs, IRBMs,
and other strategic weapon systems. The Soviets also
have some 250 submarines of all types for use in
support of hostilities in Europe.
Warsaw Pact Weaknesses
Despite the overall numerical superiority of the
Warsaw Pact forces available for the Central Region,
these forces have some weaknesses and potential
vulnerabilities. Except for the Soviet and East
German forces now deployed in the forward area,
Warsaw Pact forces would require large numbers of
reservists and civilian trucks to reach combat
strength. These reservists, which would make up
the bulk of the support forces as well as the
infantry, generally lacked training in their wartime
assignments prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
During the crisis, 13 Soviet divisions and some sup-
port units were built up to combat strength with
reservists. Since the Czechoslovak crisis, however,
there has been no indication of an effort to increase
or improve Soviet reservist training. The civilian
trucks lack many of the mechanical capabilities of
military trucks and are less well maintained.
The Defense Intelligence Agency believes
that the discussion given of reserve training
is highly misleading. The Soviet and East
European countries maintain very extensive
premilitary, active duty, and reserve training
programs. The great bulk of the fit young
men serve two or three years of conscript
duty in the active forces. More than half a
million such men are returned to civilian
life from the services each year. Any of
those wild had been released from service
within the past year or two would be almost
immediately effective in their military
specialities?particularly in the infantry
and support categories--upon mobilization.
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The amount of reserve refresher training
given to men out of the service varies and
probably diminishes as they grow older.
Many thousands of reserves receive some
training with the active forces each year,
however. On balance, the ready availability
of very large numbers of suitably trained
men is a Pact strength, not a weakness.
DIA further believes that the bulk of
the Pact civilian trucks are comparable in
basic characteristics to their military
counterparts.
After mobilization, the infantry strength of the
Warsaw Pact forces would be light and would include
a large proportion of reservists. More than half
the infantry in the force lacks modern amphibious
armored personnel carriers (APCs), and some divisions
would have to substitute trucks for APCs.
Soviet tube artillery is towed rather than self-
propelled; it is generally lighter in caliber than
NATO artillery and is outranged by some. Soviet
techniques for the employment of artillery are not
up to those of the US. In Soviet artillery units
there is a strong tendency to rely on rigid prior
planning, and they do not practice many of the
modern techniques for the massing of fires.
Although the Warsaw Pact would have about 2.5
times as many artillery weapons as NATO, including
roughly twice as many guns and howitzers, planned
Warsaw Pact supply rates for artillery are only a
little more than one-third of NATO rates. Taking
into account the weaknesses in Soviet artillery
tactics and gunnery techniques, and the Soviets'
low ammunition supply rates, it appears that NATO
artillery would probably be capable of delivering
a greater overall volume of accurate artillery fire
than Warsaw Pact artillery.
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The Defense Intelligence Agency does not
concur that all the views represented are
Pact weaknesses. To do so would force one
to believe that the Soviets have not given
careful thought to the manner in which they
have organized and equipped their forces for
any future combat. DIA also believes that
there is insufficient substantive intelligence
available to draw the conclusion that the
Soviets have not increased their ammunition
supply rates.
The need to sustain a force of 20,000 tanks planned
for employment in the Central Region in intensive combat
over great distances will surely tax the limited logis-
tics capability of the Pact. Warsaw Pact forces would
be vulnerable to a combination of effective antiarmor
warfare tactics, forces, and weapons and successful
interdiction of the logistic system.
The Defense Intelligence Agency believes
that the large number of tanks in the Pact
force is a strength, not a source of weak-
ness. Any logistics limitations are, in fact,
a function of the number of tanks to be em-
ployed. This would be accounted for in plan-
ning by the Soviets and it is unlikely that
they intend to employ more tanks than they
can effectively support. Further, even in
the initial phase of operations, all the tanks
will not be engaged continuously in "intensive
combat," but rather, at times, also at "average"
or even "low" combat levels. Whether or not
they range over "great distances" will depend
on the logistics support available as well as
combat success. DIA agrees that "Pact forces
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would be vulnerable to a combination of effec-
tive antiarmor warfare... and successful in-
terdiction of the logistic system," but this
is a vulnerability that is contingent upon
uncertain NATO capabilities and not a Pact
weakness.
Implications
The present posture of Warsaw Pact forces intended
for employment against NATO is essentially defensive.
This is evidenced by the structure, disposition, and
state of readiness of Pact forces both in the forward
areas and in the western USSR. However, Warsaw Pact
tactical doctrine emphasizes offensive operations and,
once hostilities began in the Central Region or appeared
inevitable, the Soviets would probably attempt to seize
the initiative as soon as possible and launch a large
scale offensive.
The Defense Intelligence Agency feels that
Warsaw Pact forces cannot be categorized as
either offensive or defensive because the
Soviet posture in Eastern Europe contains sub-
stantial offensive capabilities.
Without reinforcement, the forward elements of
the Warsaw Pact forces are not capable of overwhelming
NATO in the Central Region. To ensure success, the
Soviets would probably judge it mandatory to complete
the mobilization and assembly of the bulk of all five
fronts in the forward area before launching an attack.
This process would almost certainly take at least three
weeks and be identified by NATO.
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The Defense Intelligence Agency agrees
that "without reinforcement, the forward
elements of the Warsaw Pact are not capable
of overwhelming NATO in the Central Region,"
in the full meaning of the term "overwhelm."
The forward deployed Pact forces could,
however, launch a powerful attack, achieve
significant penetration, and maintain for-
ward tactical momentum until additional
forces were brought up. This attack could
occur with little or no prior detection
by NATO.
Additionally, the Pact could increase
the strength of the forces in the forward
area without eliciting a reaction by the
West by disguising their reinforcement
in the form of an exercise or they could
prepare forces in the western edge of the
USSR for rapid reinforcement with little
chance of detection. Nevertheless, the
Soviets could not have high confidence
that their plans would go undetected or
that they could overrun NATO without
mobilization.
In the Soviet view, the forces of the Warsaw
Pact are not intended for a surprise general offen-
sive. They are designed to resist any NATO military
initiative while being reinforced, and to counter
with a force capable of neutralizing NATO military
capabilities and securing the continent of Europe.
The Pact forces are intended to execute this mission
whatever the broader world military situation, which
may or may not include general war.
To achieve their objectives, the Soviets have a
basic war plan for the employment of Warsaw Pact
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forces against NATO. This plan provides, after mo-
bilization and reinforcement, for employing five
fronts against NATO's Central Region. This align-
ment and capabilities of the Warsaw Pact do not
exclude the possibility of Soviet military operations
in other areas. However, any such operations would
have to take into account the major threat to the
Warsaw Pact in the Central Region. This threat pre-
cludes major shifts of Pact reinforcements from their
designated areas of employment to other areas.
The Warsaw Pact has vulnerabilities, particularly
in hostilities which extend beyond the period of rela-
tively short endurance for which the Pact forces are
now configured. With its heavy dependence on tanks,
the Pact would be vulnerable to an effective NATO
antitank capability combined with restriction of
Soviet lines of supply. The present posture of the
Warsaw Pact necessitates the mobilization and movement
of large reserves over great distances before they can
be committed against NATO.
The Defense Intelligence Agency does not
believe that the capabilities of Pact forces
are of "short endurance." Rather, their
capabilities would grow steadily as they draw
upon their extensive reserves of manpower and
equipment and take advantage of their direct
overland access to the battle area.
Moreover, the configuration of the
present forces, which gives rise to the
judgment in the paragraph above, would be
drastically altered with mobilization. In
particular, the current "low" infantry-to-
tank ratio and the relatively "limited"
rear services (logistics) apparatus would
be steadily overcome as these would be
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precisely the areas of greatest emphasis for
mobilization.
DIA questions whether the "heavy dependence"
of the Pact on tanks makes it vulnerable to
antitank warfare. It certainly cannot be
presumed that the Pact would be less vul-
nerable if the attacking force contained
less armor. Additionally, DIA believes
that the degree of Pact vulnerability to
NATO antitank and interdiction efforts is
almost entirely dependent on NATO capabilities
which are not discussed in this paper.
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II. Composition of the Forces
This section discusses the organization, current
dispositions, and peacetime combat readiness of the
Warsaw Pact general purpose forces facing NATO. The
ability of the US intelligence community to estimate
the size and capability of these forces has greatly
improved over the last three years. New information
from a variety of sources and improved methodology
has enabled a comprehensive reassessment of the capa-
bilities and status of the Soviet ground and tactical
air forces which constitute the bulk of the Warsaw
Pact forces available for war in Europe.
Ground Forces
The Soviets maintain a large number of relatively
small, heavily armored divisions at various levels of
readiness. For the most part, divisions at the higher
levels of readiness are subordinated to armies (in
some cases to corps). In wartime these armies and
corps would be incorporated into the so-called fronts.
The combat power of Soviet ground forces is concen-
trated in the division to a greater extent than in
Western forces, and the higher Soviet echelons have
fewer combat and support units. In general, the
levels of service support are austere.
Fronts
There is no evidence that the Soviets consider any
of their present large theater force commands as
fronts--a term apparently reserved for wartime situ-
ations. A wartime front would consist of at least
three ground armies (and/or corps) and a tactical air
army. It might also include one or more airborne
divisions. In addition, fronts would contain such
nondivisional support as artillery divisions or bri-
gades,tacticalmissile units, air defense missile
units, engineer units, and rear services.
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The Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) is
virtually a front in being. Upon mobilization for
operations in Europe, two fronts would probably be
formed in the USSR's western military districts (MDs)
for reinforcement opposite the Central Region of NATO,
and one might be formed in the Odessa MD on the southern
flank of NATO.
In wartime, the Soviets would probably establish
theater level headquarters in areas involving more than
one front and/or elements from several types of forces--
e.g. theater forces, air defense forces, and strategic
attack forces.
Armies and Corps
It is believed that in wartime Soviet ground
forces would be deployed and fought primarily as
armies or corps. There are 19 Soviet ground armies;
it is expected that additional armies will be formed
in the Sino-Soviet border area. Most of the armies
within the USSR would require mobilization of army
level support units prior to commitment. The armies
in GSFG, however, are almost certainly combat ready
as they now stand.
Soviet armies have from 3 to 5 line divisions and
additional supporting units. These armies are prob-
ably intended for commitment with their normally
assigned division structure, but the Soviets have
demonstrated that divisions can be readily trans-
ferred among armies if necessary. Armies are nom-
inally of two types: the tank army, in which all
or a majority of the divisions are tank divisions,
and the combined-arms army, in which all or a majority
of the divisions are motorized rifle divisions. Most
armies now appear to be of the combined-arms type.
Soviet armies have rather light combat support.
Typical of army level combat support units are: an
artillery brigade (54 guns); a Scud missile brigade
(6 or 9 launchers); an air defense missile regiment;
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a signal regiment; engineer bridging and assault river
crossing units. The inclusion of such units in the
various armies apparently depends upon wartime missions
and peacetime readiness levels. For example, in GSFG
one, possibly two, of the five armies lack an artillery
brigade. The army troops of Soviet armies in the GSFG
range from 9,000 to 12,000 men.
There are a dozen or so Soviet corps headquarters.
They do not represent an intermediate echelon between
division and army headquarters. In most cases they
function as small army headquarters. They have few
nondivisional support units, sometimes none. Three
of the five divisions now deployed in Czechoslovakia
are subordinated to a corps heaquarters.
Divisions
The Soviets now have a total of at least 157 line
divisons of three different types: 97 motorized rifle,
53 tank, and 7 airborne. On the basis of the avail-
ability of forces, some 30 divisions of this total
are intended to confront NATO in the event hostilities
began before Warsaw Pact mobilization.
The Soviet motorized rifle and tank divisions are
basically designed for combat of short duration on a
nuclear battlefield. They have a very high proportion
of tanks to personnel, and when fully equipped with
vehicles they have excellent tactical mobility. To
achieve these characteristics the Soviets have sacri-
ficed staying power to some extent. The divisions
are apparently designed to fight until relieved by
fresh divisions.
East European line divisions are generally pat-
terned on the Soviet model, although there are sub-
stantial variations in some countries. In general,
East European field armies do not exist as separate
entities in peacetime, but East European ground
forces conduct army level exercises, and some front
level elements probably exist in peacetime. In
wartime, armies would be formed during mobilization
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from staff elements and units of the territorial
military commands. They would contain from 3 to
5 divisions and combat and service support units,
and would be similar to the Soviet combined-arms armies.
Categories of Readiness
Soviet ground divisions vary widely in terms of
peacetime personnel strength, levels of major items
of equipment on hand, and modernity of equipment.
They also vary as to the extent and type of training
conducted. Available evidence on Soviet divisions
provides a reasonably firm basis for estimating equip-
ment levels and the extent of training activity.
Information on personnel strengths is less complete.
It is believed, however, that there is a relationship
between equipment and personnel levels.
Despite considerable variation, Soviet divisions
fall into three general groupings consistent with the
states of readiness described in Soviet military
writings. Divisions stationed in areas where filler
personnel and equipment are not readily available,
such as those in Eastern Europe and some of those in
the Sino-Soviet border area, probably have all or
almost all of their equipment and personnel. The
seven Soviet airborne divisions are probably equipped
and manned at the same general levels. These divi-
sions are essentially combat ready as they stand.
These are designated Category I.
Also designated Category I are a number of divi-
sions located in the western USSR which can be readied
for commitment very quickly. They are not manned and
equipped at the same high levels as those described
above, but can be fleshed out with specified local
reservists and 400 to 600 civilian vehicles and be
made ready to move within a day or two, thus meeting
the criteria for a high state of readiness. These
divisions have 75 to 80 percent of their equipment on
hand. Their personnel strengths probably range around
two-thirds of the level found in divisions in the GSFG,
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but with considerable variation among divisions. Per-
sonnel strengths would tend to be higher in subordi-
nate tank units and lower in motorized rifle units.
The second major grouping consists of divisions
having about 45 to 65 percent of their equipment.
Their personnel strengths vary considerably, probably
ranging from about one-quarter to one-half of GSFG
levels. These divisions could be filled up with re-
servists, augmented with up to 1,300 civilian vehicles
and deployed within several days to a week. These are
designated Category II.
There are some Soviet divisions with even less
equipment than Category II divisions. They probably
contain about 1,000 men each, primarily an officer
cadre and enlisted caretaker elements. They appear
to be intended for later mobilization, and probably
could not be equipped like other Soviet divisions
without increased new production. These are desig-
nated Category III or cadre divisions.
Few, if any, of the East European divisions are
maintained at full strength during peacetime. The
best of these would contain 10 to 20 percent reservists
after mobilization. Some of the lower-strength and
newly activated units would require 50 to 80 percent
reservists as fillers. Like the Soviets, the East
Europeans would require significant numbers of re-
servists in order to form army and front level units.
Division Equipment
The Soviet motorized rifle division (MRD) at full
strength has about 10,000 men and about 2,450 major
items of equipment. The equipment includes 186 medium
tanks, 200 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 72
artillery pieces. The Soviet tank division at full
strength has about 8,000 men and 2,300 major items of
equipment, including 310 medium tanks, 80 APCs, and
60 artillery pieces. Soviet airborne divisions have
about 6,000 men and 1,000 major items of equipment.
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A few tank divisions have previously been carried
as "heavy tank divisions." These were smaller (lacking
a motorized rifle regiment) and contained heavy tanks
(T-10 and JS*-3). Heavy tanks are still observed in
some tank divisions, but it is not certain now whether
a "heavy tank division" exists as a separate type.
Soviet divisions inside the USSR, with the ex-
ception of those along the Sino-Soviet border, are
probably not as generously equipped with new model
equipment as! those in GSFG. There is, however, no
apparent uniform distribution of new equipment. New
models of ar#Lored vehicles have been detected in some
divisions of each category, but a Carpathian MD Cate-
gory I division which participated in the invasion of
Czechoslovakia lacked antitank guided missiles and
was short of APCs. (After it became part of the
occupation force, these deficiencies were corrected.)
Two Category! II divisions mobilized at the time of
the invasion had few or no APCs. On the other hand,
one division from the Baltic MD was fully equipped
with the newest Soviet medium tank, the T-62.
Armored Vehicles
By far the predominant feature of Soviet ground
force equipment is the tank. The Soviets would require
over 34,000 medium tanks to equip all categories of
divisions fully. Even a modest estimate of tanks not
in divisions,would raise this number to over 35,000.
Large scale and continuous peacetime tank production
would be necessary to meet these requirements and to
maintain a modernization program. It is believed
that the annual production of T-54 and T-55 model
medium tanks,through 1968 was adequate to provide a
current inventory of about 24,000 of these tanks and
to account for Soviet exports to other countries. The
newest medium tank, the T-62, has been produced at a
more moderate pace; about 6,500 are probably now in
inventory. The remaining requirement (about 4,500
tanks) appears to have been met at least to some ex-
tent by the use of older model tanks and assault guns.
No large reserves of Soviet tanks are known to exist.
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Soviet tactical doctrine calls for the mounting
of all infantry in amphibious APCs, preferably on the
basis of one per squad--this would require about 37,000
vehicles. To equip all Soviet forces with APCs on the
lesser scale evident in GSFG, the Soviets would require
an inventory of about 26,000 such vehicles. Analysis
indicates that there are about 16,000 APCs in the
Soviet inventory, fewer than half of which are new
amphibious models (BTR-50 and BTR-60). The rest are
older model BTR-152s and BTR-40s which are essentially
nonamphibious armored trucks with relatively poor
cross-country mobility. Some APCs are found in divisions
at all levels of readiness, but in general Category I
divisions in the USSR probably have fewer APCs (and
older models) than found in GSFG divisions. Many
Category II divisions probably depend primarily on
using mobilized civilian trucks for personnel carriers.
Artillery Support
A high density of tanks provides Soviet ground
forces with very heavy direct fire support. Soviet ca-
pabilities to provide continuous indirect fire support
are less impressive. One common Soviet practice de-
signed to compensate for this is the use of tanks to
provide indirect fire support from defilade positions.
The emphasis on tank fire is fully consistent with
Soviet concepts of ground force operations in the nu-
clear environment.
Recent changes in Soviet artillery strength in the
GSFG have resulted in an overall increase of 480 in
the number of guns available. In addition, there has
been a 50-percent increase in the number of multiple
rocket launchers. These increases have probably also
occurred in some of the forces along the Sino-Soviet
border, but there is no evidence of them in other
ground forces elsewhere in the USSR. These develop-
ments improve the capabilities of the ground forces
for conventional operations. All Soviet tube artillery
is towed rather than self-propelled. It is generally
lighter in caliber than NATO artillery and is out-
ranged by some.
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Soviet techniques for the employment of artillery
are not up to those of the US. There is a strong ten-
dency for Soviet artillery to rely on rigid prior
planning. The Soviets do not practice many of the
modern techniques for the massing of fires. Much
of the recent, increase in Soviet field artillery
results from increased organic artillery in motorized
infantry regiments.
Airborne Forces
The Soviets have seven airborne divisions, all under
the direct control of the Ministry of Defense. Five of
these seven divisions are available for early commitment
against NATO. These airborne divisions, which are prob-
ably combat ready, have about 6,000 men and 1,000 major
items of equipment.
There are now as many as 975 medium transports
assigned to military transport units, of which about
800 are AN-12 Cubs. Some 725 to 750 of the latter
provide the main intertheater lift for theater forces
and have as amain mission the support of airborne
troops. These could lift assault elements of two air-
borne divisions for airdrop to a radius of about 950
nautical miles. Some Cubs have improved range and
weight-carrying capabilities; 350 of these could lift
about 5,000 paratroops with supporting equipment to a
radius of about 1,500 nm, or a maximum range of 2,800 nm.
In an emergency, this lift capability could be augmented
by other military transport and by medium and long range
aircraft in the Soviet Civil Air Fleet.
Only one East European member of the Warsaw Pact--
Poland--has an airborne division. The Polish airborne
division, however, is about two-thirds the size of a
Soviet airborne division and the Poles must rely on
Soviet military air transports to lift the entire
division at one time.
Czechoslovakia has one 1,800- to 2,000-man airborne
brigade subordinate to its Ministry of Defense, plus a
separate Special Forces type airborne regiment sub-
ordinate to the Military Intelligence Section of the
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General Staff. This regiment is intended for covert
operations in enemy rear areas. Czechoslovakia has
some organic airborne transports, but relies on
Soviet transports to lift its entire brigade. Romania
has one 1,300-man Parachute Regiment; Bulgaria and
East Germany each have a single battalion of about 400
men and Hungary has an airborne training unit.
Amphibious Forces
There are currently about 14,000 men in the Soviet
naval infantry, organized into brigade-size units, with
two brigades located in the Baltic Fleet, two in the
Black Sea Fleet, two in the Pacific Fleet, and one
in the Northern Fleet. The naval infantry's missions
are apparently to assist in seizing critical beach-
heads and to conduct diversionary operations on the
seaward flank. A small force of naval infantry has
been present from time to time in the Mediterranean
since June 1967; they have conducted several landing
exercises. The current small number of landing ships
in each of the fleet areas restricts the landing force
to battalion or brigade size.
Poland also has an amphibious landing force. This
force of about 3,700 men consists of three regiments
(two operational and one training) and one medium tank
battalion, and one two-launcher FROG (free rocket
over ground) section. Poland's 22 Polnocny class
LSMs and 38 LCPs could transport about one regiment
in an assault landing.
Missile Support
The general support tactical ballistic missile
is the Scud, which is allocated to army and front
echelons of organization. It is believed there are
about 40 Scud brigades in the USSR and in the GSFG.
In the GSFG, each army is believed to have one 9-
launcher brigade. There are probably two larger
brigades (up to 12 launchers) subordinate to GSFG
Headquarters. Ground forces in the USSR probably
have about the same level of Scud support as in the
GSFG.
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Soviet divisions deployed in Eastern Europe have
FROG battalions probably with four launchers each.
Category I and II divisions within the USSR are be-
lieved to have three FROG launchers; Category III
divisions may have two launchers each.
Soviet ground commanders have long complained of
the lack of a tactical missile system with the range
and mobility suited to the needs of the front. The
Soviets have developed a missile, the SS-12, which
can meet these needs: it is estimated to be capable
of carrying a 1,500-pound warhead to a range of 500
nautical miles. There is no evidence, however, that
the SS-12 missile is deployed with the ground forces.
The SS-12 is believed to be carried by the Scale-
board transporter-erector-launcher. Scaleboard units
are probably under the control of the Strategic Rocket
Forces rather than the ground forces. It is likely,
however, that Scaleboard would be used in support of
theater operations if required. This is especially
true in the Sino-Soviet border area, where Soviet
ground forces cannot call upon the heavy missile
support from medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs)
and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs)
available in the west. There may also be some mobile
Shaddock cruise-missile units which could provide ad-
ditional front level support.
The Soviets have conventional high explosive war-
heads for Frogs and Scuds, but there is little evi-
dence indicating the numbers of such warheads available
or their tactical use. These warheads probably now
include some of the high fragmentation, improved
conventional munitions type. This type of warhead
for FROGS and Scuds would greatly improve their
effectiveness for nonnuclear operations.
Tactical Air Support and Theater Air Defense
Frontal Aviation
The mission of the Soviet Tactical Aviation--also
called "Aviation of the Front"--is to support the
theater/front commander. The functions of Tactical
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Aviation include air superiority operations, close
air support and interdiction in conjunction with
ground force operations, strikes against targets of
strategic importance to the front, and air defense
of the theater of operations. Tactical Aviation also
provides reconnaissance support and operations, and
some air transportation. The air elements to perform
these functions are organized into tactical air armies
(TAAs), which in wartime are assigned to fronts.
The 14 identified TAAs vary greatly in size and
composition. The largest is the 24th TAA, deployed
in East Germany. It is estimated to have about 730
combat aircraft, 10 percent fewer than last year.
This reduction is due to last year's withdrawal of
Brewer-equipped light bomber units to the USSR. A
new air army has probably been created in the Trans-
Baikal-Mongolia area since 1966; it now contains about
310 combat aircraft. The other air armies in the
Far East have been strengthened also. The additional
aircraft were drawn primarily from reserves.
Tactical Aviation is now composed largely of
fighter aircraft. It is estimated that there now
are about 1,600 fighters in regiments whose primary
mission is air defense and 1,100 in regiments whose
primary mission is ground attack. In addition, there
are about 390 light bombers in strike units and about
600 fighter and light bomber types in reconnaissance
and strike reconnaissance units.
There are in addition 200 to 300 older model
tactical aircraft collocated at Tactical Aviation
bases. There is some evidence indicating that ground
attack regiments have 48 fighters instead of the 36
currently estimated. If so, this would indicate that
about half of the collocated aircraft are in fact as-
signed to Tactical Aviation. The Soviets continue
to maintain a reserve of older aircraft which has been
used to equip new Tactical Aviation units along the
Sino-Soviet border and for deliveries to other nations,
particularly the Arab states. Some of these aircraft
are believed to have gone to the Soviet air training
establishment, which has been substantially increased.
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Ground Attack
There are about 1,500 fighters and light bombers
in Tactical Aviation whose primary function is to per-
form close air support, air strike, and interdiction
missions. The capabilities of this force were improved
in recent years through reequipping of fighter units
with the SU-7 Fitter and light bomber units with the
YAK-28 Brewer. However, this reequipment program
ceased a year or so ago, leaving over half the ground
attack/tactical strike force still equipped with the
obsolescent MIG-17 Frescos and IL-28 Beagles.
Both the Fresco and the Fitter were designed as
interceptors. Their performance in ground attack
roles is characterized by short combat radii and small
payloads. Their design and rugged construction, how-
ever, make them well suited for operations from unim-
proved or improvised airfields. Soviet tactical air
doctrine indicates that ground attack fighters would
be rather widely dispersed on unimproved fields and
suitable highway sections 70 to 100 kilometers behind
the front lines. Bomber and reconnaissance regiments
would apparently be deployed 200 to 300 kilometers
behind the front lines.
The Soviet nuclear stockpile includes bombs for
delivery by tactical aircraft. Soviet Tactical
Aviation can deliver nuclear bombs with both fighters
and light bombers. Ground attack fighter regiments
are trained in sophisticated bombing techniques. The
Soviets also have toxic chemical bombs available for
tactical use and some aircrews specially trained for
their delievery. There is no evidence of Soviet use
of tactical aircraft for spray dissemination of chemi-
cal warfare (CW) agents, but a capability to employ
this technique cannot be ruled out. The Soviets have
a variety of conventional munitions for delivery by
Tactical Aviation, including bombs weighing 550, 1,100,
and 2,200 pounds.
Judged in the light of equipment, training, and
normal operations, East European air forces are largely
for national air defense. Of about 2,500 combat air-
craft, almost all are interceptors. The proportion of
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new model aircraft in East European air forces has in-
creased from one-quarter last year to one-third now
through the delivery of new fighters. Almost all
aircraft delivered to the East Europeans during the
past two years have been all-weather MIG-21 Fishbed
interceptors.
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Bulgaria have ground
attack air regiments, but only the Czechs have a
significant number of new model ground attack fighters
(SU-7). The Poles have mostly older models in ground
attack roles. The Bulgarians have two regiments of
MIG-17s. All East European fighter regiments, however,
are cross-trained, probably to about the same extent as
Soviet tactical air units.
Transport Aviation and Helicopters
Soviet Tactical Aviation units provide light troop
transport and utility support to the ground forces with
about 250 light and medium transports such as Cab,
Crate, and Camp and about 850 helicopters, primarily
Hound and Hook. Most of the TAAs have one or more
regiments equipped with helicopters. Over half the
regiments have 10 to 15 heavy and 25 to 30 medium
helicopters.
The Soviets continue to demonstrate a growing
appreciation for the tactical employment of armed
helicopters, but there is no evidence that they have
developed a helicopter intended specifically for
armed missions. Light and medium helicopters have
been observed armed with a variety of weapons such as
machine guns, rockets, and antitank guided missiles.
Air Defense
Soviet theater force air defenses in Eastern Europe
are coordinated with the national air defenses of the
other Warsaw Pact countries and with the air defenses
of the USSR. Air defenses of all theater forces would
probably act in accordance with the general plans of
the Soviet Commander of Air Defense until those forces
were committed to ground operations. At that time,
control would probably be maintained by the Deputies
for Air Defense of the major force commanders.
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During the past year, the Soviets have continued
to exhibit major concern for improving their air de-
fense posture in the forward area, particularly against
low-altitude attack. The Soviets have approximately
60 radar stations in Eastern Europe, and are continuing
to deploy the tower-mounted Squat Eye radar at those
stations. This radar, first observed in 1966, is im-
proving the low-altitude surveillance and tracking ca-
pability down to 200 to 300 feet. It is possible that
where the terrain is suitable this capability is better--
perhaps as low as 100 feet. Since 1968 a track-mounted
air surveillance radar, Long Track, has also been
deployed in Eastern Europe at Soviet radar stations.
Data transmission systems for rapid reporting of
tracking information and for ground control of inter-
ceptors have probably been widely deployed with Soviet
forces in Eastern Europe.
There are about 350 East European radar stations.
These stations are equipped with the same types of
radars employed by Soviet forces. Each nation oper-
ates its own air warning and control system. It is
not known how warning and control information is co-
ordinated among the several East European systems
and those of the Soviet theater forces, but such
coordination almost certainly exists.
Since 1960 the Soviets have made a substantial
qualitative improvement in the air defense elements
of Tactical Aviation. Most of the aircraft delivered
to the force in recent years have been late model,
all-weather MIG-21 Fishbeds, which now constitute more
than 85 percent of the aircraft in air defense regi-
ments. The Fishbed, a lightweight, ruggedly designed,
Mach 2 all-weather interceptor, can also perform the
air superiority mission. This aircraft has operated
for sustained periods from unimproved airfields. It
has been produced in eight, possibly nine, variants.
The latest variant, identified in East Germany, has
improved payload capabilities and improved air intercept
radar.
As in the case of tactical air support aircraft,
Soviet tactical air defense fighters can theoretically
sustain a flying rate of four or five sorties per day.
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The principal constraint on sortie rates is pilot
fatigue and logistic support. The pilot-to-aircraft
ratio in air defense regiments is about 1.5 to 1; the
logistic support at permanent improved airfields could
support a sortie rate of 4 to 5 per day for at least
a few days. Soviet tactical air defense aircraft were
designed to operate under the austere conditions of a
battlefield environment. The sortie rates of units
operating from unimproved airfields would probably be
low.
Soviet forces in Eastern Europe have about 40
SA-2 surface-to-air missile battalions. An SA-2
regiment, which usually consists of three battalions,
is deployed with the Groups of Soviet Forces in
Poland, Hungary, and probably Czechoslovakia. In
East Germany there are 10 SA-2 regiments deployed for
defense of GSFG. In the USSR, there are probably 45
to 65 additional SA-2 battalions manned by air de-
fense troops of the ground forces. The SA-2 system
deployed with theater forces has a capability to
intercept targets at medium to high altitude at ranges
of 24 to 27 nm and some capability down to 1,000 feet.
It is used primarily for defense of relatively static
rear area installations, as it is not mobile enough
to provide continuous support to maneuvering troops.
The SA-3 has been deployed in East Europe to
provide low altitude point defense of Soviet tactical
airfields in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary. Under
favorable conditions, including optimum acquisition,
this system can intercept aircraft at about 500 feet
at a range of 2 to 7 nm. Depending on the conditions
of weather, site masking, elevation of the fire con-
trol radar, speed and reflective area of the target,
the minimum altitude could be as low as 300 feet at
ranges of 2 to 4 nm.
The Soviets are now deploying the track-mounted
SA-4 system into the theater forces. The SA-4 has
been identified at training sites in East Germany.
The SA-4 has a range of 25 to 30 nm and is believed
to be able to engage targets down to about 2,000 feet
at shorter ranges.
The Soviets rely heavily on light antiaircraft
artillery (AAA) for air defense of ground forces.
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They have introduced a new radar-controlled, quad-
mounted 23mm weapon, which is carried on a tracked
chassis that also mounts the AAA fire control radar
Gun Dish. Both the Gun Dish and the Flap Wheel
(used with 57mm and lower caliber) operate in the
X band. The older Fire Can radar is also still in
use with AAA guns.
In addition to the improvement of their active
defenses, the Soviets have, since mid-1967, engaged
in a program to improve the survivability of their
forces, especially in Eastern Europe. Revetments
and/or hard shelters have been constructed at Soviet
radar, command and control, ground and air installa-
tions to protect those resources. Camouflaging has
been identified at radar sites and airfields.
The Soviets have the capability to jam airborne
radar bombsights and to screen headquarters facilities,
troop concentrations, and other critical targets in
conjunction with air defense weapons systems opera-
tions in theE field. There is no evidence to indicate
a Soviet capability to jam terrain-following or side-
looking radar equipment. Electronic counter-counter-
measures (ECCM) capabilities probably have been
incorporated into the Gun Dish and Flap Wheel AAA
radars.
Use of electronic countermeasures (ECM) by the
Soviets to protect their tactical aircraft has been
of rather limited nature. Generally they use speci-
ally fitted ECM aircraft for protection of tactical
strike light bombers against enemy ground-based radar
and weapons; active noise jammers and chaff, including
the rocket-fired variety constitute the bulk of their
ECM equipment. The strike aircraft have ECM equipment
designed to defend against enemy fighters. This equip-
ment includes an Al radar threat-warning system and
chaff dispensers, and possibly jammers. Ground attack
fighters may have cannon shell chaff for use against
ground-based fire control radars.
Service Support of Theater Forces
The Soviet system of supply and maintenance support
was designed to support theater forces in the context
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of a brief nuclear war. Mobile stocks of conventional
ammunition and fuel at division and army level are ade-
quate for about five days of combat. Little is known
of the availability of supplies at front level. The
Soviet resupply system down to front level remains
heavily dependent on the railways. The Soviet main-
tenance system is apparently based in large part on
minimum peacetime use of essential items of equipment.
This equipment is retained as much as possible in
covered storage, with wheeled vehicles often up on
blocks, combat loaded. Unit maintenance organizations
at all levels are small. The Soviet system would
probably be adequate for a brief nuclear war, but it
appears less well suited for major conventional oper-
ations of long duration.
The rear services of the front are responsible
for the resupply of tactical air armies as well as
the ground armies. Supply levels at permanent bases
of TAAs are probably adequate to support sustained
combat by air units for about the same duration as
is the case with ground armies--i.e. about five days.
Resupply after this period would be restricted some-
what by the limited availability of transport, par-
ticularly fuel trucks and pipeline equipment, at
both front and air army levels. The extensive logis-
tical support system which would be required for sus-
tained air operations from dispersed unimproved
airfields does not appear to be available in Soviet
forces in East Germany.
The general austerity of rear service support has
been sharply criticized by Soviet logisticians over the
past several years, and some efforts have been made
to remedy the situation. The fuel supply system has
been improved through the introduction of collapsible
portable storage tanks and pipeline units. The
carrying capacity of general purpose transport has
been increased through the introduction of new heavy
duty trucks with four-wheeled trailers. The logistics
load on the railroads has been reduced somewhat by
the introduction of tank transporters, and by the
expansion of the capabilities of transport aviation.
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Naval Forces
In recent years the Soviets have made increasing
use of naval forces for political ends, most notably
in the Mediterranean. With its growing capabilities
for long-range operations, the Soviet Navy will be
more in evidence in support of specific political
objectives in areas vital to NATO interests. In
addition, Soviet naval units act as a force in being
capable of reacting to Western naval forces.
The Soviet concept of general war requires flank
support for land forces in Europe, and probably for
the seizure of the Black Sea and Baltic Sea exits.
To fulfill naval responsibilities in the defense
of the Soviet homeland, the Soviet Navy has a strong
capability in the immediate offshore areas, and is
gradually extending the distance at which it can
effectively Conduct operations. By fitting surface-to-
air missiles in its larger ships it has enhanced its
capability to operate beyond the range of shore based
air cover.
The Soviets are deeply concerned with the threat
posed by Western carrier strike forces, and are
striving to improve their capabilities in this area
by improving their early warning and reconnaissance
capabilities and by introducing new sophisticated
weapons systems in submarines and surface units. In
the Mediterranean, where US carriers are deployed so
as to be continually within strike range of the USSR,
Soviet policy is to maintain missile armed submarines
and/or surface ships within missile range of the US
ships.
The Soviets are not now capable of countering
the threat pOsed by NATO ballistic missile submarines.
However, they are placing considerable emphasis on
antisubmarine warfare.
Soviet capabilities against NATO sea lines of com-
munications are greatest in the Northeast Atlantic
and the Mediterranean and the primary threat to these
lines is posed by the Soviet submarine force. It is
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estimated that approximately one-third of the torpedo
attack and cruise missile submarines in the Northern
Fleet, could be maintained continuously on station,
although more could be at sea at any one time.
While the new Soviet ballistic missile submarines
of the Y class will be targeted against the US, older
classes of ballistic missile submarines will probably
be assigned targets in Western Europe. In addition,
cruise missile submarines could attack land targets in
Western Europe, although their primary wartime mission
is to seek out and destroy Western naval forces.
East German and Polish naval capabilities continue
to improve with the acquisition of more modern equip-
ment and the broadening of operational experience, while
those of Romania and Bulgaria have lagged behind the
other Warsaw Pact countries. Warsaw Pact interfleet
coordination has increased, and East European navies
are playing a greater role in Pact naval operations.
Mediterranean Sea
Since 1964 the Soviets have maintained naval vessels
in the Mediterranean. However, lacking adequate air
cover, the Soviet squadron is not capable of conducting
extended operations against the Western navies. At
the outset of hostilities, the Soviets would attempt
to destroy Western carrier striking forces, and seal
off the Mediterranean from naval reinforcement. Should
the Soviets succeed in providing air cover, they could
attempt to seal off the southeastern Mediterranean
basin.
Baltic Sea
Baltic Warsaw Pact naval forces, in particular the
numerous guided missile patrol boats and the amphibious
forces, pose a threat to NATO control of the Baltic
Sea outlets, and are capable of offensive operations
against NATO forces.
?
Black Sea
Soviet, Romanian, and Bulgarian naval forces are
capable of supporting land operations against the
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Turkish Straits and of conducting small-scale amphibious
landings and other operations against the Turkish Black
Sea coast.
Theater Forces Facing NATO
Soviet theater force strength in Europe is con-
centrated opposite the Central Region of NATO. In
East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, the Soviets
maintain 27 combat-ready divisions and about 1,100
combat aircraft. The East Germans, Poles, and Czechs
can provide an additional 25 full strength divisions
within a day or so of a mobilization order and 1,750
combat aircraft immediately.
The Soviets apparently consider remote the like-
lihood of a sudden outbreak of hostilities requiring
the Warsaw Pact to fight without reinforcement. They
base their planning on the assumption of a period of
pre-hostilities tension and mobilization on both
sides, and maintain a large number of divisions in
the border MDs of the USSR which can be mobilized
and readied to move westward quickly. The East
Europeans model their mobilization system after the
Soviet example.
We have good evidence
about Warsaw Pact goals for the scope and speed ot
reinforcement in Central Europe. According to this
evidence, the Warsaw Pact would seek to confront NATO
with a large force at the outset of hostilities. We
have no direct evidence as to the total size of such
a force, but on the basis of availability of forces
we believe it would probably consist of 80 to 90 divi-
sions organized into 20 or more armies and five fronts.
A major Warsaw Pact goal has been to be able to assemble
such a force and have it prepared for combat in about
two weeks after a mobilization order. The Soviets
and some of their East European allies have vigorously
attempted toE achieve this goal despite limitations
on resources available and the political struggles in
Eastern Europe. By early 1968 they had come close
to reaching that goal.
Prior to the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968,
Warsaw Pact planning probably called for the deploy-
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ment of three key first echelon fronts opposite NATO
in a matter of a few days. These fronts would have
contained 22 Soviet and 26 East European combat-ready
divisions. The central front (the main effort) con-
sisting of GSFG and some East German formations would
have been complete. The northern and southern fronts
composed primarily of Polish and Czech forces would
have lagged behind the central front in the readiness
of army and front level support because of the re-
quirement for mobilization. Within about 10 days, up
to 30 additional divisions drawn from the USSR could
have been assembled with minimum essential army and
front level support in eastern Poland and Czechoslovakia.
These forces would have constituted the two fronts of
a second strategic echelon. Tactical air reinforcement
from the western USSR would require little if any
mobilization, and could be deployed into Eastern Europe
within a matter of hours.
The situation which has evolved since the invasion
of Czechoslovakia has probably altered Warsaw Pact
reinforcement planning with respect to the Czech
front. For the near term, the Soviets probably do
not count on the Czechs to form an effective and re-
liable front, although they have not disposed their
divisions to take over Czech positions opposite NATO.
The Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia--called the
Central Group of Forces (CGF)--are not large enough
to constitute a front; in particular, army and front
level support is minimal and combat air support con-
sists of only about 85 fighters. In a sudden military
confrontation with NATO the Soviets would have to
rely on the Czechs backed up by the CGF. If the Soviets
were to anticipate a serious military confrontation
with NATO they would probably expedite the forward
movement of the front from the Carpathian MD to
reinforce or take over the southern sector.
In current circumstances, and with speed the
primary requirement, the Warsaw Pact could in about
two weeks assemble the key combat elements of five
fronts (including the Czechs) opposing NATO--three
in the first echelon and two in the second. The
complete integration of divisions into effective
armies and fronts would require more time. In a
situation where offensive capability against NATO
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(rather than maximum speed) was the prime consider-
ation, the Soviets would almost certainly take at
least three weeks to complete mobilization and forward
deployment to concentration areas in Eastern Europe.
The Warsaw Pact countries, including the USSR,
evidently intend to begin deploying the ready portions
of their fronts from the interiors of their countries
before the whole force is completely mobilized. The
leading elements of the two Soviet fronts from the
western USSR are expected to arrive in central Poland
and Czechoslovakia within three to six days after
mobilization begins. The Soviets anticipate that the
main elements of these two fronts could participate
in combat operations within two weeks after mobili-
zation is ordered.
This plan shifts part of the burden of maintaining
large combat-ready forces from the USSR to Poland and
Czechoslovakia. Of greater importance, the establish-
ment of a combat-ready Warsaw Pact force in the forward
area partially resolves the problem which has faced
the Soviets since the rearming of the West Germans
and the formation of NATO: how to provide a defense
of Central Europe with the Soviet forces there until
reinforcements could be brought up some 600 miles
from the western USSR. Reinforcement is still con-
sidered necessary to provide a force large enough
to ensure seizing the initiative from NATO and mounting
a counteroffensive.
Possible Variations in the War Plan
In Warsaw Pact exercises which have rehearsed the
war plan, the Pact's actions always appear to be reac-
tions to either an outright attack by NATO forces or
to some other NATO military actions which appear to
presage a NATO attack. The exercise scenarios usually
allow for a brief defensive phase during which the Pact
completes mobilization and reinforcement, after which
the Pact seizes the initiative and launches an offensive.
If the Soviets were to deliberately initiate a
full scale attack on NATO, they would probably make
fundamental changes in their contingency plan. In
that scheme, the East Europeans provide 60 percent
of the first echelon forces. If the Soviets were to
undertake a deliberate aggression, they would probably
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not be willing to rely on Poland and East Germany to
furnish so large a proportion of the striking force.
They would almost certainly not depend on the Czech-
oslovak Army, which was seriously demoralized by the
Soviet intervention of August 1968 and by the sub-
sequent purges and manpower reductions. Rather, the
Soviets would probably incorporate substantial Soviet
combat elements into both the Czechoslovak and Polish
fronts, and would probably impose direct Soviet command
and control over all fronts. Even if hostilities did
not begin before the Soviet reinforcement was completed,
however, they would probably keep many of the East
European forces in the first echelon while retaining a
large Soviet second echelon. This would tend to
ensure East European commitment to the war since
the bulk of Polish, East German, and Czechoslovak
forces would be engaged while Soviet contingents
were behind them.
The Soviets would have to take into account that
the massive mobilization and large troop movements
which such a scheme would necessitate prior to hos-
tilities would greatly increase the likelihood of
early detection by NATO of their reinforcement. They
would probably assume that this would increase the
risk of a preemptive NATO attack in which--if nuclear
weapons were employed--forward deployment would be
severely hampered.
The war plan outlined on pages 14 through 19,
with minor variations, is the only one practiced in
Warsaw Pact exercises. If a plan for initiating an
unprovoked attack exists, it would probably not be
rehearsed overtly. Major variations in the opera-
tional use of forces--particularly variations em-
phasizing the maximum initial use of Soviet forces--
might appear in an exercise with a disguised aggression
scenario. This has apparently not happened in any
of the exercises so far.
Mobilization
The Soviet conscription and reserve system pro-
vides more than adequate total numbers of relatively
young reservists to flesh out all divisions. However,
in the interests of speed of mobilization, the combat
units draw their reservists from the civilian popula-
tion in the immediate vicinity of their peacetime
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garrisons. These reservists are designated by name
by the voyenkomats (local military committees). As
a result, quickly mobilized Soviet units would probably
contain some enlisted reservists in older age groups.
The Soviet reserve system calls for frequent
mobilization exercises and periods of active duty
for reservists. If the practice in one Category I
division is typical, however, it appears that such
exercises are infrequent and reservist training prob-
ably consists of lectures to reserve officers. There
is some evidence that lessons learned from mobilization
for the invasion of Czechoslovakia have prompted new
emphasis on practice mobilization and reserve training.
The Soviet mobilization system can probably flesh
out all divisions except Category III within a few
days of a mobilization order and have them ready to
move. In situations where speed of reinforcement is
the overriding factor, mobilized divisions would be
deployed regardless of their equipment status.
The Soviets rely on a well organized system for
mobilizing civilian motor transport to offset the
shortage of general purpose trucks in the ground
forces. Portions of Soviet city motor pools are ear-
marked for military use. Trucks and buses manned by
reservists are formed into military transport columns
which report to nearby divisions upon mobilization,
where they are reassigned to various units. Most of
these trucks probably serve as logistic support
vehicles, but some are used in place of APCs. Army
and front level truck transport units are probably
mobilized similarly. The biggest drawback to this
system is that, on the whole, the mobilized trucks
are not well suited for military use, particularly
with regard to off-road mobility.
The Soviets also plan to draw directly from the
civilian economy other types of supporting units,
e.g., engineer construction, railroad, signal, and
medical units. They apparently do not count on quick
mobilization of new units requiring a high degree of
specialized military training, such as Tactical Avi-
ation and missile units, although there is probably
a fairly large pool of trained personnel to serve as
fillers and replacements for standing units.
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III. Contingencies Leading to NATO - Warsaw
Pact Hostilities
This section discusses contingencies in which
NATO - Warsaw Pact hostilities might arise, their
relative likelihood, and various actions the Pact
could undertake on its own initiative.
Factors Inhibiting Soviet Initiation of Hostilities
In the mind of the Communist leadership, the
preservation of the Soviet state enjoys a priority
far exceeding all other interests. During the post-
Stalin period, the successive leaderships have given
every indication of a belief that, in the nuclear
age, general war would pose the gravest risks to this
objective.
This is not to say that Soviet policy has not
been aggressive during this period, or that the USSR
has not sought to use the weight of its military
power to alter the status quo in its favor. But the
USSR has periodically been aggressive, not in the
military risks which it was willing to run, but rather
in its probing to calculate exactly what military
risks would be involved in any contemplated advance.
In West Berlin, despite Khrushchev's repeated pro-
fessions of disbelief that the US would go to war
over the city's fate, the USSR eventually backed off
from its ultimatum without putting this proposition
to the test. In the Cuban missile crisis, he retreat-
ed when he discovered that he had miscalculated and
that holding to his intended course would involve
appreciable military risks. During the six-day Arab-
Israeli war of 1967, the USSR was careful to avoid
military risks.
Barring the advent of a highly irrational leader-
ship--and unless the USSR comes to underestimate
the determination of the US to defend its interests--
this pattern of behavior will probably continue.
This presumes a continuation of an East-West stra-
tegic relationship which denies Moscow the certainty
that the USSR could escape unacceptable damage in
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general war. It also presumes that situations will
not develop which appear to the Soviet leaders to
present grave external threats to their system
The China Factor
Sino-Soviet hostility is an additional factor
which tends to reduce the likelihood of Soviet de-
liberate attack or of Soviet escalation of conflicts
which might arise by accident. Moscow is highly
sensitive to the possibility of Chinese pressures
in general and to Chinese exploitation of Soviet
troubles in Europe or, particularly, in relations with
the US.
Soviet leaders concluded in mid-1969 that, in view
of the Chinese problem, it would be best for them
to take a cautious approach in dealing with the US
and to avoid an increase in tensions in Europe. While
the degree of Sino-Soviet hostility may fluctuate
over the coming decade, a substantial and durable
improvement is unlikely. Indeed, Soviet distrust
of China will probably deepen as the Chinese acquire
nuclear delivery capabilities against the USSR.
The USSR now has about 30 divisions deployed in
the military districts bordering China, and some of
these could be moved westward to meet contingencies
involving NATO. Given the distances involved, how-
ever, and the availability of low-strength divisions
in the western USSR which could be mobilized--plus
what the USSR would probably see as an increase,
during a period of European tension or combat, in
the dangers from China against which these forces
are intended to guard--the Soviets probably would
not make such redeployments. Air units might be
transferred at some stage, particularly if combat
in the West turned out to be both intense and pro-
longed. Similarly, unless the USSR faced prolonged
ground combat with China, it would not reduce its
forces earmarked for the Central Front for the pur-
pose of reinforcing against China.
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The Mediterranean - Middle East Region
In recent years, the Soviets have expanded their
influence in the Mediterranean - Middle East region.
However, the USSR's concerns there are less important
than its vital interests in Eastern Europe, its
dispute with China, and its basic relations with
the West. The Soviet leaders wish to avoid a serious
confrontation with the West and probably consider
that preserving their position in the Mediterranean -
Middle East region would not be worth the serious
risk of nuclear war.
Possible Contingencies
The following contingencies are highly unlikely
to arise primarily for the reasons discussed above.
The ones which have the most plausibility are those
arising in circumstances which are not under complete
Soviet control.
Eastern Europe
Postwar Soviet behavior has made it clear that
the USSR is willing to use military force against
serious threats to its position in the Communist
states of Eastern Europe, as was reflected in the
so-called "Brezhnev doctrine." One way, therefore,
in which hostilities between Warsaw Pact and NATO
forces could arise is as a spillover from large-scale
revolts in Eastern Europe. Large-scale revolts are
defined as uprisings which are sustained for at least
a week, an assumption which requires that the local
East European armed forces either stand aside or
actually participate against Soviet forces. The
force of nationalism in the area, the vicissitudes
to which Communist parties are subject, and the ca-
pacity of the Soviet leaders for mismanagement are
such that revolts of this kind in one or several
East European countries must be considered among the
possibilities of the Seventies.
At the outset the USSR would make every effort
to confine the fighting within the country or countries
involved, and NATO presumably would avoid intervention.
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But if those East Europeans opposing the Soviets
came to believe that their only chance of victory
lay in involving the West in the fighting, they would
try to provoke an expansion of the conflict--even
though Western nonintervention in previous instances,
for example East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956,
and Czechoslovakia in 1968, would argue against this
tactic. The chance of expansion would be greatest
if the fighting were centered in East Germany, which
would tempt West German intervention. Further analysis,
therefore, is confined to this case.
This contingency might arise suddenly, catching
the USSR unprepared. It is more likely, however, to
be the culmination of a period of ferment and tension.
This could give the USSR time, if it chose, to mobi-
lize the forces assigned to the Central Region in
war planning.
In the contingency of large-scale revolt which,
among other things, found the East German army stand-
ing aside or opposing Soviet forces--the contingency
most likely to spill over into the West--some members
of the WorNing Group believe that the other East
European forces in the Central Region could probably
become almost totally unreliable for use against NATO.
Other members feel that in certain cases these forces
would be reliable--for example, Polish forces in
contingencies which raised the specter of East Germany's
reunification with West Germany.
The size of the force--out of the total of 53
Soviet and 33 East European divisions earmarked for
the Central Region*--which would be available for
use against NATO in these circumstances would depend
not only upon the reliability of the East Europeans,
but also on such unpredictable factors as the scale
of the revolt, the degree of real or threatened op-
position being offered by the East European forces,
* This does not include the USSR's strategic reserve
of 16 divisions and the forces in Hungary (6 Hungarian
and 4 Soviet divisions).
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the usability of Polish and Czechoslovak territory
for reinforcement from the western USSR, and the
degree of prior Soviet mobilization.
Miscalculation of Effects of Tension in Berlin
Berlin has been frequently harassed during the
entire post-blockade period without any serious mis-
calculation occurring, a fact which strongly argues
that the USSR has devised elaborate procedures com-
parable to those of the West to maintain constant
and close control over these matters. These pro-
cedures are probably sufficient to check unintended
escalation. Nevertheless, it remains possible that
major combat could develop in an unintended fashion
over Berlin (the case of a deliberate Communist take-
over of West Berlin is considered on page 64).
Although such a contingency might develop slowly,
providing considerable time for mobilization, it is
not certain that the USSR would mobilize. By defini-
tion, it would not be expecting hostilities, and it
could count on its overwhelming local superiority
in the Berlin area in case of miscalculation. Mo-
bilization might be forgone, therefore, on the grounds
that it would needlessly raise tensions and provoke
NATO mobilization. Thus a war arising from miscal-
culation over Berlin might find the Central Region
of the Warsaw Pact fully mobilized, partially mobilized,
or not mobilized.*
At the outset, the Soviets would probably try to
keep the conflict limited. So long as they did so,
they probably would not employ any East European
forces except those of East Germany. We expect that
the East German forces would be reliable at the out-
set; their ultimate reliability would depend on the
course of the battle and, in particular, on whether
they engaged West German forces.
* That is, anywhere between the present strength of
about 50 combat-ready divisions and the mobilized
strength of about 85 divisions.
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The Mediterranean - Middle East Region
The relationship of this area, and particularly
the Middle East, to the defense of NATO is complex
and not completely defined. If the Arab-Israeli
conflict escalated and came to involve the US and the
USSR, this would not be, strictly speaking, a NATO
matter (although the outcome could have significant
implications for NATO). But such a great-power in-
volvement might include naval hostilities in the
Mediterranean, and this would tend to engage NATO,
even though certain of the European members would
resist this tendency.
Both the US and the USSR are deeply involved in
the Middle East and specifically in the Arab-Israeli
dispute. Each operates naval forces in the eastern
Mediterranean where, unlike areas ashore, there is
no demarcation line tending to maintain the separation
of forces. Should large-scale Arab-Israeli hostilities
be renewed, and if they were more prolonged than on
previous occasions, both the US and the USSR might
find themselves drawn into a situation which--similar
to that which could result from large-scale revolt
in Eastern Europe or a miscalculation over Berlin--
would not be under their full control. Thus military
situations involving the US and the Soviets could
arise out of existing conditions in the Mediterranean
and represent plausible contingencies.
In the case of struggle or imminent hostilities
between rival Arab groups, Moscow might try to move
in troops, perhaps in an effort to preempt Western
intervention. At present the Soviets have a limited
capability for rapid intervention. The estimated 300
to 500 naval infantry troops with the Mediterranean
Squadron could make a token landing against little
or light opposition (but not against the defense the
Israelis could muster). The Soviets could move in
a larger force rapidly by air from the USSR, but
this would entail problems of overflight and air cover.
The Soviet leaders would be reluctant to commit
their armed forces for such operations in the Medi-
terranean area. Coups in the Middle East normally
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happen too fast for intervention by outside powers
to be decisive. Further, the Soviets do not desire
to entangle themselves in inter-Arab strife, partic-
ularly if they might end up on the losing side. How-
ever, the presence of even an inferior Soviet force
could inhibit Western freedom of action in such sit-
uations.
Although there may be intermittent acts of violence
occurring in Cyprus, it is highly unlikely that such
violence would cause the Soviets to intervene with
military air or naval forces. The continuation of
the communal talks, the desire of both communities
for peace, the bilateral efforts of Greece and Turkey
to improve their relations, plus the efforts of NATO
and the UN seem to be mitigating factors to any con-
tingency that might be exploited by the Soviets,
especially through their use of airborne or naval
forces.
If the talks for any reason are broken off, or
if they end in a clear failure leaving an unsettled
situation, it is foreseeable that pressures could
develop on both sides in favor of a new attempt to
impose a solution unilaterally. Such an attempt
would revive the danger of a Greek-Turkish war. A
problem might then be created for NATO and others
and possibly set the stage for exploitation by the
Soviets. In such circumstances, while the Soviets
would attempt to influence the outcome of the event,
they are not likely to push to the point of a probable
or inevitable confrontation with the West.
All-Out Attack in the Central Region
In Part I of this report we describe how the
Soviets plan to prepare for war in the Central Region
and review Soviet expectations of a period of ten-
sion during which mobilization would occur. This
plan calls for the assembly of three forward fronts
and two reinforcing fronts which would contain about
1,290,000 men (60 percent of them Soviet), 20,000
tanks, 6,200 conventional artillery pieces, 3,700
combat aircraft, and some 500 nuclear-capable tactical
missile and rocket launchers. Under this plan, options
for conventional and nuclear fighting are available.
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The Soviets have never undertaken full mobiliza-
Lion in peacetime, and they recognize that it would
be costly, would raise tensions, and might set in
motion a train of actions and reactions which could
increase the risks of miscalculation. Nevertheless,
it is possible that they might undertake it at some
future time if they thought that, in this way, they
could force political concessions from the West with-
out actually going to war. If in these circumstances
miscalculation did propel the two alliances into
conflict, and if no way were found to terminate hos-
tilities quickly, the Warsaw Pact plan for the conduct
of the war probably would be that described above;
any mobilization and reinforcement not completed
by this time, would be rushed to completion.
The Case of Nuclear Preemption
Because general nuclear war is highly unlikely
to occur as the result of deliberate, preplanned
Soviet initiative, Soviet nuclear preemption against
Europe is not plausible unless it is part of an es-
calatory situation in which survival of the Soviet
Union is at stake. In the circumstances of mutual
mobilization amid rising tensions, however, the USSR
might become uncertain about whether NATO was about
to go to war. This could lead the Soviet leaders
to consider the option of a nuclear preemptive attack
designed to gain the advantages of a first strike.
Soviet "preemption" in this report is defined
as an attack undertaken because of a belief that an
enemy attack threatening the existence of the USSR
has become imminent and certain. If the Soviets
came to this belief, they would have to consider
whether to strike at European NATO alone or at the
US as well. Including the US in the attack would
reduce the weight of retaliation, but the USSR could
have no hope that it would escape retaliation al-
together. It miaht see a hope that nuclear preemption
against European NATO alone would not inevitably bring
on full retaliation against the Soviet homeland.
If the Soviet leaders acted on this calculation,
the forces available for a preemptive nuclear attack
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include, besides those described above, 630 strategic
missile launchers in the western USSR, almost 600
medium bombers deployed at Long Range Air Force bases
in this region, and 16 diesel ballistic missile sub-
marines (46 launchers) in the Soviet Northern Fleet.
Surprise Attack With Limited Objectives
Using forces in being, and avoiding any preceding
period of tension, the Warsaw Pact could stage a
surprise conventional attack in the Central Region.
This could be aimed at occupying a part or all of
West Germany. A small amount of mobilization, limited
to that which the Soviets felt confident would not
be detected by NATO, might precede such an attack.
By definition, there would be no warning.
Such attacks in the Central Region would be
plausible only in special circumstances, quite dif-
ferent from those which presently obtain. If the
Soviet leaders were convinced that the US nuclear
guarantee had been so deeply eroded that the risks
of immediate or eventual nuclear war were negligible,
and if they believed that NATO had become so demoralized
that a shock of this kind would complete the disin-
tegration of the alliance, they might undertake this
course of action. Even in these circumstances, how-
ever, they might equally well forbear on the grounds
that political evolution in Western Europe was al-
ready proceeding rapidly in a direction highly favor-
able to their interests.
If they undertook such an attack, the Soviets
would probably not include East German forces among
the invaders, out of concern that pre-attack secrecy
might be compromised and that the East Germans might
prove unreliable in an offensive role against West
Germany.
If the attack were aimed at overrunning only the
northern part of West Germany, the USSR would have to
limit the size of the attacking force in order to
avoid troop movements which might compromise secrecy
and to maintain a strong posture against possible
NATO reactions. Probably the Soviets would not commit
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more than half of the 20 divisions in GSFG to an
attack limited in this fashion.
Capture of West Berlin
Drawing upon its forces already in East Germany,
the USSR could overrun West Berlin. Moving with
appropriate stealth, the Soviets could enjoy all of
the advantages of surprise in such an action.
Moscow has long had this capability but has never
chosen to exercise it. Indeed, occupation of West
Berlin has not been a goal of Soviet Berlin policy.
Rather than run the risks of war which taking West
Berlin would entail, the Soviets have preferred to
experiment from time to time with varying degrees
of pressure in an effort to divide the Federal Re-
public of Germany and the three Western Allies. The
Soviets found in pressure and harassment--and the
threat of a separate peace treaty which would turn
control of access over to the East German regime--
vehicles for playing upon Berlin's vulnerabilities
in a manner which allowed for maximum control over
the potential risks involved.
For the present, the Soviets evidently believe
that refraining from pressure on Berlin--in particular
on Allied access--avoids the kind of challenge to
which a unifying Western response would be likely.
The Soviets might at some time in the future return
to pressure tactics on Berlin--indeed, the incidents
of delay of convoys in 1963 illustrated how, even
in a period of detente, a minor access crisis could
develop rapidly. But it seems unlikely that, in
the absence of wider hostilities, the calculus of
the undesirability of direct military action to take
West Berlin would change.
Invasion of Yugoslavia
A Warsaw Pact invasion of Yugoslavia would prob-
ably produce early successes in the northern plains
and prolonged guerrilla-type warfare in the mountainous
regions. NATO might become involved.
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Such an invasion is highly unlikely at present
but might become conceivable under the following
circumstances: Yugoslav revisionism proves so at-
tractive as to cause serious strains in Eastern
Europe; Tito's death produces deep internal divisions;
the Soviets believe that significant Yugoslavian
military and political elements would collaborate
with them; or the Soviets are confident NATO will
not intervene.
The chances of detecting at least some of the
Soviet preparations appear good. The attack probably
would be preceded by a period of overt political
tension. Mobilization of the necessary forces and
their deployment to the Yugoslav border would probably
extend over several weeks. Movement into the Medi-
terranean of the additional naval forces needed to
impose an effective blockade of the Yugoslav coast
would be detected. It would be in the Yugoslav in-
terest to pass to the US indications of impending
attack. While preparations would thus be evident,
it is doubtful that precise Soviet intentions or
timing would be known in advance.
For the initial phase, the Soviets, with Bulgarian
and Hungarian participation, would probably employ
some six or eight armies containing 25 to 30 divisions
and 300,000 to 400,000 men. To assemble this force,
some Soviet forces normally earmarked for commitment
to the Central Region would have to be shifted south-
ward in numbers which would weaken Soviet reinforce-
ment capabilities opposite NATO.
The NATO Extremities
In northern Norway, Thrace, and eastern Turkey
the borders are well defined, and large military
units are not positioned directly on the borders.
Serious incidents suggesting a potential for accidental
war have not occurred in recent years, and in all
three locales accidental war appears to be a highly
unlikely contingency.
Opposite northern Norway, the Soviets maintain
one combat-ready division and could mobilize two
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more within about five days. Opposite eastern Turkey
is the Transcaucasus Military District, which contains
two combat-ready divisions and an additional seven
divisions which could be brought up to strength within
about five days. Against Thrace is the Bulgarian
army, containing five motorized rifle divisions, five
tank brigades, and three training units; the Odessa
Military District, which would provide reinforcements,
contains four divisions which could be brought up to
strength in about ten days. Further substantial
reinforcement of any of these potential theaters,
without at the same time weakening Warsaw Pact capa-
bilities in the Central Region, would require the
mobilization of low-strength Category III divisions
from interior military districts of the USSR. Some
members of the Working Group believe that the forces
in the Moscow and Kiyev military districts--one
Category I and 15 Category II divisions--would be
available for these contingencies, while other mem-
bers believe that the USSR would judge it necessary,
in these circumstances, to retain them for possible
use in the Central Region.
For substantially the same reasons as apply to
the case of limited surprise attack in the Central
Region, deliberate Warsaw Pact attacks in these
areas, in the absence of hostilities in the Central
Region, appear to be highly unlikely contingencies.
The USSR would recognize that such attacks could set
in motion a train of events which would seriously
increase the chances of nuclear war. The advantages
of conquering eastern Turkey are, from the Soviet
standpoint, obscure and probably not worth much, if
any, increase in risks. Northern Norway and Thrace
have strategic importance, but for this very reason
the risks incurred by an invasion in these areas
would be even higher.
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IV. Warsaw Pact Reactions to Alternative
NATO Postures and Strategies
This section discusses the possible reactions
of Soviet military planners to various assumptions
about US and NATO force structures and strategies
and postulates the ways the USSR might alter its
military forces in response to NATO changes.
Factors Bearing on Soviet Planning for Theater Forces*
A number of factors shape Soviet planning of
Warsaw Pact theater forces, which are an integrated
set of strategic and general purpose forces.
Pact forces as a whole are intended to be
capable of defending the area against
NATO forces.
They are also intended to bring to a favor-
able conclusion, if possible, any military
conflict which may occur.
Soviet forces in particular are also intended
to maintain the Soviet political hold on the
other states in the alliance.
By virtue of the military threat which they
pose, these forces are intended to support
the expansion of Soviet political influence
in Western Europe.
Economic constraints limit the size of Soviet
theater forces opposite NATO, which must
compete for resources not only with civilian
needs, but with other military requirements
such as strategic forces and the buildup in
the Far East.
*Because the USSR is dominant in the Warsaw Pact,
overall Pact planning is discussed in terms of Soviet
calculations and decisions.
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Soviet policy toward these forces has long
been marked by prudence, caution, and
bureaucratic resistance to change.
The military factors are discussed at length
in Parts I and II of this report. This section
considers the other factors in Soviet military
planning.
The Political Factor
The pressure exerted on Western Europe by the
weight of Warsaw Pact forces is a gross pressure.
Defense ministries in the NATO countries are con-
cerned with particular aspects of Warsaw Pact capa-
bilities and vulnerabilities, but these have no
real effect on the overall political pressure which
these forces exert in Western Europe by virtue, not
only of their size, but of the reminders furnished
by periodic exercises. With hundreds of strategic
nuclear missiles deployed against them, Western
Europeans are not likely to become more or less
resistant to Soviet demands in response to changes
in such matters as ground force equipment or reorgani-
zations of divisional structure on the enemy side.
On the other hand, the Soviets do have the option
of making large-scale unilateral withdrawals in their
forces in Eastern Europe as part of a vigorous effort
to promote detente. This tactic might commend itself
to Moscow on the grounds that it would undermine the
sense of threat which holds NATO together, encourage
cuts in West European defense budgets, and promote
large-scale US withdrawals in turn. The USSR would
recognize that, in the event of a crisis, it would
enjoy an advantage in returning forces to the area.
There are a number of disadvantages, however, to
the USSR in such a move. Several of them, such as
concern for stability in Eastern Europe and inertia
and vested interests within the Soviet bureaucracy,
are discussed below. In addition, it is uncharac-
teristic of Soviet policy to make a major concession
which could not be reversed without some cost, in
hopes of precipitating a greater concession from the
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opponent. The Soviet tendency is to hold what one
has and demand what the enemy has. For these reasons,
the USSR is not likely to make unilateral withdrawals
on any significant scale. If they did adopt this
kind of tactic, it would most likely be on a small
scale, as in 1964 when they made token reductions
in the GSFG.
The Imperial Factor
What the Soviets might regard as their military
requirement for preserving their position in Eastern
Europe has never been determined, apart from the re-
quirements posed by the confrontation with NATO.
Soviet rule in Eastern Europe in the Seventies is
likely to become harder rather than easier as national
self-confidence and national discontents both grow.
If this does not happen, however, and if East-West
relations develop in a way which diminishes the re-
quirement for forward deployments against NATO, the
USSR might believe that it could maintain the poli-
tical integrity of the Warsaw Pact in peacetime with
forces significantly less than the current levels in
Eastern Europe.*
The Bureaucratic Factor
The Soviet Union is a highly bureaucratized
structure, and those who wish to advance within it
find it best to practice caution, prudence, and
adherence to formalized procedures rather than
initiative and imagination. The military is not
exempt from this tradition, particularly in the
field of theater forces, where the changeover of
*Some notion of what the Soviets might consider in
this vein can be gotten from historical data. The
USSR in earlier years used to propose reductions of
foreign forces in Germany by one-third. More recently,
the Soviets tolerated a temporary drawdown from the
GSFG during the Czechoslovak crisis. Eight divisions
were dispatched to Czechoslovakia, but some four others
were brought in as replacements.
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generations since World War II has been slower than
in other industrialized countries. This factor
suggests that substantial changes in force planning
are not easy to coordinate through the Soviet bureau-
cracy and that the Soviet defense establishment is
not well suited to quick reactions to external changes.
The Economic Factor
It is clear that the Soviet economy has been ex-
periencing increasing difficulties in recent years.
It is also clear that the present leadership is even
less willing than Khrushchev was to deny military
requests for expenditures. In fact, this is among
the factors contributing to the USSR's current eco-
nomic problems.
Estimates of total Soviet spending on defense
and space show a 25 percent rise in the last five
years--from 17.6 billion rubles in 1965 to over 22
billion 1970.* Expenditures for the general purpose
forces, the largest major force element in money
terms, have been rising more slowly, increasing 7
percent in the same period to about 6 billion rubles
in 1970. Soviet general purpose forces opposite
NATO now account for roughly two-thirds of total
general purpose force spending. This share is de-
clining slowly as the buildup in the Far East pro-
ceeds.
Increased resources for general purpose forces
will be made available by the overall growth of the
economy, and possibly by savings derived from a
strategic arms control agreement as well. On the
other hand, the civilian economy will be a major
claimant for higher allocations and, even within
the general purpose forces, those facing China
will continue to compete with those facing NATO.
1-ncludes all outlays for personnel and other
operating costs; investment for all hardware and
facilities; military research, development, testing,
and evaluation; and all space programs.
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Under present circumstances, the Soviets probably
plan for no more than a continued gradual rise in
spending for the forces facing NATO.
The foregoing discussion indicates that the
size and structure of NATO forces are, for Soviet
planners, only one element in a rather complex
equation. By the same token, any changes on the
MATO side will be only one factor in Soviet con-
sideration of possible changes in the size and
structure of the Warsaw Pact. The following sec-
tions discuss the ways and extent to which the USSR
might alter these forces in response to NATO changes
and how such NATO changes might affect Soviet con-
siderations about the actual use of military force.
Reactions to Alternative US and NATO Force Structures
and Strategies
Continuation of Present Situation
There is little reliable evidence about Soviet
policy decisions for the future of Warsaw Pact forces,
and current problems concerning China and East European
reliability add to theuncertainties. There are no in-
dications, however, that major changes in doctrine or
strength are impending. If they perceive substantially
the same threat from NATO as before, the Soviets
would be expected to continue the major trends of
recent years--stability in the overall size of forces
facing NATO, coupled with improvement of both conven-
tional and nuclear capabilities. Given probable
continued constraints on large expenditure increases
in this area, equipment programs are likely to proceed
at the deliberate pace of recent years. For example:
-- About one-third of the Soviets' ground forces
and two-thirds of their tactical air forces were
reequipped during the past ten years.
Increases in the equipment levels have occurred
through organizational changes in recent years
and have included a 50-percent increase in con-
ventional artillery pieces and multiple rocket
launchers and a one-third increase in nuclear-
capable tactical rockets in the Soviet divisions
in East Germany and in a few divisions in the
USSR.
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Logistic capabilities have been propor-
tionally increased to the extent that the
previously established supply rate can be
maintained for the expanded artillery force.
The Soviets will probably continue their equip-
ment modernization over the next decade. The in-
creases in artillery and multiple rocket launchers
will probably be extended to all first-line divisions
in the USSR, .and the logistic needs generated by
these increases can be expected to be met through
reequipment cif transportation units. Although some
Soviet divisions will receive a new infantry combat
vehicle, they probably will not completely meet their
requirements in APCs. In addition, a fighter with
significantly improved ground attack capabilities
will probably be added to the tactical air inventory.
Soviet tactical aviation will decrease in numbers
over the next ten years, although its capabilities
will improve .as new equipment is acquired.
A Small Cut in US Forces
In the case of a reduction of US forces in
Europe on the order of 10 percent, the Soviets prob-
ably would not believe that the situation had changed
sufficiently to require them to alter their own
force planning. Out of prudence, they would be
prone to credit Western statements about maintaining
the efficien0y of the force and about capabilities
for rapid reinforcement from the US mainland.
A Larger Cut
A greater decrease in US deployments in Europe--
on the order of one-third--would have more signifi-
cance for Soviet planners. The Soviets would see
a diminution in NATO capabilities, the more so if
the reduction were not accompanied by substantial
improvements in US capabilities for return to the
theater. Their reaction would also be influenced,
however, according to whether West Germany also
reduced its forces.
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The USSR would perceive in this situation two
different opportunities--to substantially enhance
the relative military position of the Warsaw Pact,
or to make some reduction in their own military
effort.
Some analysts believe that they would choose
the former course, maintaining or even increasing
the pace of their modernization program with the
intention of gaining a military advantage which
would be useful in peacetime as well as important
in wartime.
Other analysts believe that, in this circum-
stance of a diminished NATO threat, competing
military and civilian priorities would lead the
Soviets to level off or even reduce their expen-
ditures on Central Region forces.
All agree that, if the Soviets chose this
latter course, they would be concerned that early
or large withdrawals would arouse unhealthy expec-
tations and aspirations in Eastern Europe, and
that Moscow would therefore proceed in a cautious,
step-by-step fashion. Ultimately, Warsaw Pact
withdrawals accomplished in this manner would prob-
ably be less than proportional to the US withdrawals.
Nuclear Strategy
The Soviets would probably see in any of the
deeper cuts an implicit reversal in NATO's strategic
thinking--that is, a veering away from conventional
options and toward greater and earlier reliance on
nuclear weapons. This would be true even in the
case of a relatively small (125,000 men) US ground
force which was explicitly designed to improve con-
ventional capabilities. It would be most clearly
perceived in the case of a very small US ground force
(50,000 men, for example) whose function would be
largely custody of nuclear weapons.
Renuclearization of NATO strategy should not
materially affect Soviet force structure. Soviet
forces are now structured in accordance with a
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stategic doctrine that assumes nuclear war in the
theater. It would reduce the requirements Moscow
now perceives for improving the capabilities of its
forces for sustained nonnuclear combat.
NATO Time Norms
Adjustment in the 90-day norm for NATO capa-
bilities for conventional operations probably would
not mean much to the Soviets. In conjunction with
other changes, the Soviets might see it as additional
evidence of renuclearization of NATO strategy. As
such, it would carry the implication for Soviet
force planning discussed in the preceding paragraph.
Soviet Attitude Toward Use of Force Under Alternative
US and NATO Force Structures and Strategies
The Soviet attitude toward the various military
contingencies is discussed in Part III of this report
in the light, not of present NATO deployments, but
of the alternative US and NATO force structures and
strategies hypothesized in the report of Working
Group 1.
It is concluded that, considering the force
structures and strategies alone, these alternatives
would not substantially alter the Soviet belief that
military adventures against or all-out attack upon
NATO is a highly dangerous course of action. Even
with doubts about the will of the US to use the
strategic power which would be occasioned by reduc-
tions down to a level of, for example, 100,000 men
in Europe, the Soviets would still be required to
reckon with a substantial chance of nuclear retali-
ation. Thus deliberate initiation of war in Europe
would remain an unattractive course of action.
An extremely important factor in the Soviets'
calculations is their estimate of US willingness
to meet the risks and costs of fulfilling US com-
mitments in extreme cases. In estimating this will-
ingness, the Soviets will view US deployments in
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Europe and stated NATO strategy as only one factor--
and not the largest--in the total equation. They
will also draw inferences from the general US stance,
the attitudes and moods which led to adoption of the
alternative posture, and the degree to which US
conduct lends substance to its formal commitments.
If the US and NATO force structure and strategies
remain unchanged, but US behavior convinces the
Soviets that the US has in fact become unwilling
to stand by its commitments when put to the test,
they would conclude that the risks associated with
any given course of aggressive action had declined.
Conversely, a US and NATO posture which had signifi-
cantly reduced military capability would not produce
such a change in Soviet policy if Moscow believed
that the US remained willing to meet the risks and
costs of fulfilling its commitments.
In conclusion, Soviet military response to
alternative US and NATO force structures and
strategies is less a function of these structures
and strategies than of broader Soviet judgments
derived from overall US behavior, in which US de-
ployment in Europe is but one factor.
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V. Statistical Annex
This section contains the following tables on
Warsaw Pact force strengths:
Page
1. Distribution of Soviet Ground
Divisions, by Location and Type 79
2. Estimated Numbers of Soviet Tactical
Aircraft in Operational Units, by
Location and Type, and Projections
for 1970 and 1971 80
3. Estimated Numbers of Soviet Tactical
Aircraft in Operational Units, by
Mission and Type
4. Estimated Numbers of Soviet Ships and
Submarines in Western Fleets, by
Type and Fleet
81
82
5. Estimated Strength and Readiness of
East European Ground Divisions 83
6. Estimated Numbers of Operational East
European Combat Aircraft, by Location
and Type, and Projections for 1970
and 1971
84
7. Estimated Number of East European
Naval Vessels, by Type and Location . . 85
8. Warsaw Pact Naval Aircraft, by Type
and Location 86
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9. Warsaw Pact General Purpose Forces
Available for Early Commitment in
Central Europe 87
10. Estimated Mobilization and Reinforcement
Capability of Warsaw Pact Forces
Opposite NATO
88
11. Soviet Strategic Attack Forces
Opposite NATO 90
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Table 1
Distribution of Soviet Ground Divisions, by Location and Type
Category I Category II Category III Developing Total
MRD TR ABN Total MRD TK Total MRD TK Total MRD TR Total MRD TK ABN Total
East Germany. . 10 10 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 0 20
Poland 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
Hungary 2 2 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 4
Czechoslovakia. 3 2 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 5
Baltic MD . . . 0 1(1) 1 2(1) 3 2 5 1-3 0 1-3 0 0 0 4-6 3 1 8-10
Belorussian MD. 1(1) 0 1 2(1) 1 8 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 1 11
Carpathian MD 2(2) 2(2) 0 4(4) 5 1 6 1 0-1 1-2 0 0 0 8 3-4 0 11-12 CD
Kiyev MD . . 0 0 0 0 3 7 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 0 10
Cr) Moscow MD . . 0 0 1 1 2 3 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 1 6 tt
tt I Odessa MD . . 0 0 0 0 3 1 4 2 0 2 0 0 0 5 1 0 6 C.)
C.) -....1 Leningrad MD 2(2) 0 1 3(2) 2 1 3 4 0 4 0 0 0 8 1 1 10
Pj
P:i UD North Caucasus MD
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5-6 0 5-6 0 0 0 5-6 0 0 5-6
Transcaucasus MD
1(1) 1(1) 1 3(2)
7 0 7
2 0 2 0 0 0
10
1
1 12 til
tll I Ural MD 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 3
l'
Volga MD
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 3
Turkestan MD. . .
1(1) 0
1 2(1)
5 1 6
2
0
2
3 0 3
11
1
1 13
Siberian MD . . . 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 3
Trans-Baikal MD . 1 4 0 5 1 0 1 2 0 2 0-1 0 0-1 4-5 4 0 8-9
Far East MD . . . 3 2 1 6 4 1 5 1-2 0 1-2 2-3 1 3-4 10-12 4 1 15-17
Mongolia 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 2
Totals 27(7) 26(4) 7 60(11) 37 26 63 27-31 0-1 27-32 6-8 1 7-9 97-103 53-54 7 157-164
Note: Category headings represent levels of combat readiness, described on pages 29 and 30. Abbreviations for types of
divisions are as follows: motorized rifle (MRD); tank (T10; and airborne (ABN). Numbers in parentheses represent Category I
divisions which require some mobilization. The status of divisions in the Turkestan, Siberian, Trans-Baikal, and Far East
military districts and in Mongolia along the Sino-Soviet border is uncertain; the figures shown above may understate their
combat strength.
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Table 2
Estimated Numbers of Soviet Tactical Aircraft in Operational Units, by Location and
Type,
MIG-17
"Fre8to
MIG-19
"Farmer
and Projections
MIG-21
Fishbed YAK-28p
-D/F/B. Firebar
for 1970 and 1971
SU-7 IL-28
Fitter Beagle
YAK-28
Brewer, B, C
YAK-27/28
Mangrove,
Brawer_D
q .Total
East Germany
87
12
333
23
157
66
48
726
Poland
82
123
--
37
10
--
30
282
Hungary
127
37
52
12
--
228
Czechoslovakia.
--
86
--
--
--
86
Baltic MD
49
--
90
--
40
96
275
Belorussian MD.
99
12
74
37
32
--
--
254
Carpathian MD
89
37
74
37
32
32
32
333
Moscow MD
--
--
74
37
--
--
32
143
Leningrad MD
37
16
37
44
--
134
Kiyev MD
--
74
--
--
--
74
Odessa MD
12
111
37
25
--
32
217
Transcaucasus MD
--
111
37
32
32
--
212
Turkestan MD
90
90
--
20
--
200
Far East MD
37
130
37
32
236
Trans-Baikal MD
222
16
--
65
8
311
October 1969
804
61
1,529
23
490
450
172
182
3,711
Mid-1970
825-775
25-0
1,550-1,650
0-25
475-500
450-425
150-200
175-225
3,650-3,800
Mid-1971
800-725
-0-
1,550-1,700
0-25
475-500
425-390
150-200
200-250
3,600-3,800
b
Note: Excluded are some 1,000-1,100 older model aircraft in reserve, and an additional 1,500 combat-type aircraft in
training establishments. There are also some 200-300 older model aircraft collocated with tactical units. The majority
of these may be operationally assigned to TAF ground attack units.
a. Brewer D is used for reconnaissance only, and has no combat capability. For this reason it is included with the
YAK-27 Mangrove totals rather than with the Brewer B and C light bomber variants of the YAK-28.
b. This total includes an allowance for 0-10 Foxbat which may enter inventory in 1971.
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Table 3
Estimated Numbers of Soviet Tactical Aircraft in Operational Units,
oo
hd
C)
hri
0-3
1
co
1
Mission
Total
MIG-17
By Mission and Type
MIG-19 MIG-21 SU-7
YAK-28p
IL-28
YAK-28
YAK-27/28
Air defense
Ground attack
Light bomber
Reconnaissance and
reconnaissance strike
Total
1,619
1,095
389
608
151
605
--
48
61
1,384
--
145
--
490
--
23
--
--
217
233
--
172
182
3,711
804
61
1,529
490
23
450
172
182
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Table 4
Estimated Numbers of Soviet Ships and Submarines
In Western Fleets, by Type and Fleet
Type
Northern
Baltic
Black Sea
Cruise missile submarines
Nuclear (6-8 launchers)
14
0
0
Diesel (most with 4 launchers)
13
2
5
Ballistic missile submarines
Nuclear
18
0
0
Diesel
15
0
1
Attack submarines
Nuclear
20
0
0
Long-range diesel
34
8
0
Medium-range diesel
50
21
27
Short-range diesel
0
6
5
Unknown
A class
1
0
0
Total
165
37
38
Operational surface ships
SAM/SSM light cruisers
3
2
2
SAM light cruisers
0
0
1
Helicopter ships
0
0
2
SSM destroyers
0
2
4
SAM destroyers
5
4
12
Cruisers
1
4
3
Destroyers
7
8
14
Escorts
30
28
26 a
Total
46
48
64
Reserve surface ships
Cruisers 1 1 1
Destroyers 4 7 4
Escorts 1 4 3
Total 6 12 8
a. Includes three in the Caspian Sea.
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Table 5
Estimated Strength and Readiness of
East European Ground Divisions
Total
Strength Divisions
Readily
Available
Low
Strength
MRD TK
ABN
ASLT
MRD TK
East Germany. .
. . 90,000 6
4 2
--
Poland
200,000 15
5 5
1
1
3
Czechoslovakia.
. . 154,000 10
4 3
1 2
Hungary
90,000 6
3 1
1 1
Romania
170,000 9
5 2
2
Bulgaria
113,000 13*
5 5
3 0
?
817,000 59
26 18
1
1
10 3
Total
* These totaLs
count five Bulgarian
tank brigades
and
three
training
units as divisions. The tank brigades are about one-third the size
of a Soviet tank division.
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Table 6
Estimated Numbers of Operational East European Combat Aircraft! By Location and Type.
and Projections for 1970 and 1971
MIG-21 MIG-21
Fishbed SU-7 Fishbed MIG-19 MIG-17 IL-28
D/F Fitter C/E Farmer Fresco Beagle Total
Bulgaria. . . .
.
25
15
75
180
10
305
Czechoslovakia.
115
85
50
70
210
25
555
East Germany. .
205
40
10
50
--
305
Hungary
45
60
10
30
145
Poland
165
20
20
15
605
60
885
Romania
70
40
20
135
10
275
October 1969. .
?
?
625
105
225
200
1,210
105
2,470
Mid-1970
'630-725
120-150
210-220
160-190
1,075-1,200
95-100
2,290-2,585
Mid-1971
675-775
120-175
190-210
130-150
1,000-1,100
80-90
2,195-2,500
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Table 7
Estimated Number of East European Naval
Vessels, by Type and Location
Destroyer types
Submarines
Guided missile patrol boats
Motor torpedo boats . . . .
Baltic Sea
Black Sea
East
Germany Poland Bulgaria Romania
3
--
12
66
3
5
12
28
2
2
8
5
13
Submarine chasers . . . .
.
26
8(18)a
8
3
Miscellaneous patrol boats
59
--(28)a
3
Fleet minesweepers ? ?
.
19
24
2
4
Small minesweepers ? ? ?
?
37
35
18
28
Amphibious ships
6
22
--
--
Amphibious craft
12
23
11
8
Total
240
160(46)
51
64
a. Figures in parentheses are augmenting coast guard
units, which now operate in close coordination with the
Polish Navy.
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Table 8
Warsaw Pact Naval Aircraft,
Missile and bomber force
by Type and Location
Soviet
Polish
Naval
Aviation
Northern
Fleet
Baltic
Fleet
Black Sea
Fleet
TU-16 Badger
107
78,
80
Reconnaissance and
miscellaneous aircraft
TU-95 Bear
26
TU-22 Blinder
31
31
TU-16 Badger
24
5
24
IL-28 Beagle
60
10
52
MI-4 Hound
6
ASW aircraft
IL-?May ? ? . .
15
BE-12 Mail
16
26
BE-6 Madge
10
8
5
KA-25 Hormone
8
--
47
MI-4 Hound
30
25
40
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Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79600939A000600020002-9
Table 9
Warsaw Pact General Purpose Forces Available
For Early Commitment in Central Europe
Estimated Wartime Strength
C.213
()
P7i
il
t
I
CO
,j
I
Currently
Available
Forces
Armies
Divisions
Men
Tanks
Aircraft
Cl)
Ground Attack
and Reconnais-
sance a
Air
Defense b
Combined
Arms
Tank
Tactical
Air
GSFG and East German Army
Czechoslovak Front
Carpathian Front d
Polish Front
Northern Group of Forces in Poland
Belorussian Front
Baltic MD
Total
5
3
2-3
3
--
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
26
12 c
15
15 e
2
11 f
5 f
405,000
180,000
230,000
215,000
35,000
165,000
60,000
6,500
3,000
3,400
2,800
600
2,800
1,000
400
260
210
260
170
150
200
640
300
200
620
110
110
70
15-16
5
7
86
1,290,000
20,100
1,650
2,050
a. Includes fighter-bombers, light bombers, and aircraft with a reconnaissance mission.
b. Fighters having a primary mission of air defense which are in Soviet tactical air armies would probably operate
primarily in support of Soviet ground forces. Air defense units of the East European members of the Warsaw Pact
are responsible primarily for air defense of national territory, but would probably also fly missions in support
of battlefield operations.
c. Table 5 shows 10 Czech divisions. 'the Czechs plan to
field two additional divisions 7.r wartime.
d. Includes the Central Group of Forces of Czechoslovakia, which approximates a field army.
e. Includes an airborne division and an amphibious assault division.
f. Includes airborne division centrally controlled by Moscow.
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Approved For Release 29t26TCIA-RDP79B00939A000600020002-9
Table 10
Estimated Mobilization and Reinforcement Capability
Of Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO
Region and
Force M+5 a M+10 b M+21 c
North d
Armies
Divisions
Men
Tanks
Aircraft
Tube artillery
Multiple rocket
0
1
10,000
185
134
48
1
3
40,000
555
134
324
1
3
40,000
555
134
324
1
3
40,000
555
134
324
launchers
12
36
36
36
Heavy mortars
(over 82mm)
45
135
135
135
Frog launchers
3
9
9
9
Scud launchers
0
18-27
18-27
18-27
South e
Armies
0
3
4
4
Divisions f
10
13
17
17
Men
57,500
96,000
169,000
169,000
Tanks
1,260
1,560
2,425
2,425
Aircraft
300
517
517
517
Tube artillery
340
687
970
970
Multiple rocket
launchers
90
126
174
174
Heavy mortars
(over 82mm)
200
308
480
480
Frog launchers
20-30
20-30
32-42
32-42
Scud launchers
0
18-27
42-63
42-63
East g
Armies h
0
1
3
3
Divisions
2
9
9
9
Men
18,000
98,000
113,000
113,000
Tanks
495
1,790
1,790
1,790
Aircraft
212
212
212
212
Tube artillery
84
474
582
582
Multiple rocket
launchers
24
108
108
108
Heavy mortars
(over 82mm)
60
375
375
375
Frog launchers
6
27
27
27
Scud launchers
0
12-18
18-27
18-27
Central i
Armies h
10
14
21
21(25)
Divisions
38
58
85
86(112),
Men
506,000
768,000
1,209,000
1,290,000(1,465,000)
Tanks
9,155
13,980
20,100
20,100(27,400)
Aircraft
1,672
2,707
3,700
3,700(3,777)
Tube Artillery
2,796
4,188
5,670
6,156(7,434Y
Multiple rocket
launchers
648
932
1,256
1,256(1.580)
Heavy mortars
(over 82mm)
1,059
1,416
2,211
2,211(2.886)
Frog launchers
143
223
331
331(422)
Scud launchers
87
114
153-168
171-195(204-240)
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Tabulation Notes to Table 10
Note: There are five Soviet airborne divisions in the regions
confronting NATO. These divisions are directly subordinate
to the Defense Ministry and are not counted in this tabulation.
a. Approximate end of first phase of reinforcement, i.e. when
forward forces are in area of operations and deployable.
b. Approximate end of next significant reinforcement phase,
i.e. when one or more additional ground or air armies
are mobilized and generally in operations area.
c. Approximate end of main Warsaw Pact reinforcement phase,
i.e. when additional fronts in their entirety are
generally in the intended area of operations and the
special and strategic reserves are in place.
d. These forces include units of the Leningrad Military
District in and near northern Norway.
e. These forces include Bulgarian forces and troops from
the Odessa Military District.
These totals count five Bulgarian tank brigades and
three training units as divisions. The tank brigades
are about one-third the size of a Soviet tank division.
f.
g. The forces in this region are all presently located
in the Transcaucasus Military District.
h. These totals include a corps headquarters. Corps do
not represent an intermediate echelon between divi-
sion and army headquarters; in most cases they func-
tion as small army headquarters.
i. These forces include Soviet forces in East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Carpathian, Belorussian,
and Ba"tic military districts. Also included are the
Czechoslovak and Polish national forces (except the
airborne and assault landing divisions). Totals in
parentheses include the contingency and strategic reserve
forces--the Hungarian national forces and the Soviet
Southern Group of Forces in Hungary and the armies from
the Kiyev and Moscow MDs. Soviet forces in Hungary and
the Hungarians could also be used to reinforce against
the Southern Region. The aircraft totals exclude 465
Polish aircraft assigned to national air defense. The
all-weather interceptors in the Hungarian Air Force--55
aircraft--are also excluded.
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Table 11
Soviet Strategic Attack Forces Opposite NATO a
Missile Force
Number of
Land-based ballistic missiles Launchers
Intermediate range ballistic
missiles (SS-5) 80
Medium range ballistic
missiles (SS-4) 510
Variable range ballistic
missiles (SS-11) b 40
Total land-based launchers 630
Ballistic missile submarines (diesel)
G Class (14) c 42
Z Conversion (2) 4
Total sea-based launchers 46
Bomber Force
Medium bombers of Long Range Aviation
TU-22 Blinder
TU-16 Badger
Aircraft
175
420
Total bomber force 595
a. Includes all elements of the Soviet Strategic at-
tack forces which are considered to be intended pri-
marily for peripheral operations, and which are nor-
mally based within striking distance of Western Europe.
Some of these forces also are capable of strikes
against North America, but this is not believed to be
their primary mission. All data are approximate.
b. Recently, the Soviets deployed a variable range
ballistic missile, which is believed to be basically
the SS-11 ICBM. The SS-11 has been fired at ranges
as short as 500 nautical miles and is capable of
ranges up to 5,500 nautical miles.
c. Two of these G class submarines are undergoing
modification and are not active.
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