CIA COMMENT RE JIC 641/4. 'MAGNITUDE AND IMMINENCE OF SOVIET AIR THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES' (29 OCTOBER 1953)
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79B00970A000100010018-3
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 31, 1998
Sequence Number:
18
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 6, 1954
Content Type:
REPORT
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71M*
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CIA C 54tailti
AND Manic_ sivIET AIR VIE*
To Tm Witcro ::.;TArkst,
(29 ostabilr i)53)
The following comet: a la n preptred within t.1'
12f1-0
4frj
the light of the fact that thoJ tC a?er has been *ed an a basis
for presentation to the C9 o India:Ile the relationship between
the JIC paper ard extnuor sai-401-ka IntellLenee Estimatee on the
nave eubjeete. Since the JIC pep= hu not been circulated outside
e JCS no attempt has teen retie to ccor&mate tteee .,orments with
the other agencies reprerented on the Intelligence AdvLsor7 Conmittee.
GE'',WAM CCWEXTS
10 JIG 642/4 covert cent1on8 o 3ovtt capabilities and
intentions recently considered In NIE-(25, hrim.95, and
SEa36/1.* The JIC paper runs tc the 314 05 1957, beyond the
period covered by any of the Lbr170 estimates. With respect to Soviet
capabilities, the JIC co,ellusions vellifivd in Enclorare "BN) are in
general accord with the esti= ten. However. after du* allowance
for the difference in time paid3, JIC paper dspa,rts frost
existing National Intelligence i'.aticates in the analysis and conclusions
concerning Soviet intentions (par gra* 8-10 of the Conclusions amt
supporting Enclosure HA").
)(doviet Bloc Capabili*les t:ro l95, dated 16 June 193
1E40 *Soviet Bloc Cepabilltta- nrow, August 1Z.3
WIE-95. "Probable Soviet Bloc S 31 of Ac 955", dated
25 September 3353
SE-36/1. "soviet Capabilities for Attack on the TS through idd.-1955
dated 3 Aur-Aet 1953
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2. In discussing the "Irmineroe of the Threat," the JIC
paper appears to be considerleg only, the ohanees of the Soviets
deciding* with something like malice aforethought in the legal sense,
to initiate general war by an air attack on the U,63. In order to
assess the likelihood of air at aek for planning purposes, it is
surely essential to consider rot ners:4 air attack in itself, but
the likelihood of general war ceWing about in any say -- for it must
be acsumed that in any genera) itfar thq ;3oviet would attack the
U.S. by air at a very early stal.-0.
3. If, then* the problem
war, the JIG analysis appears defecti7e
by-whieh this could happen* ranOy wgirsiet desperation or Soviet
judgmant*0 National Intellirenco Est:slates have consistently stated
two others, neither of stich apTear to fall within the JICIs (or the
ordinary) meaning of "desperation". These are Soviet over-reaching
ike
in pursuit of some local advartas and* last but not least* just plain
alsealculation. This, the. $11--.4 have stressed the continuing chance
that "a series of actions. and counteractions* initiated by either
side* would lead to general war even though not intended by either
side to have that offect."*
*NIS45* para. 3. We note tVit nncloaure of the Ar-Z- paper* para-
graph 21* does refer to the avenusa to sari in much the same
terms as WISts. However, tht paragraph is unrelated to the conclusions
stated in main paragraphs 840, Which refer for their baok..up to
NmeLosure 00 rather than 2nc1osure 480. The two enelosures -
appear to have been prepared etthout reference to sat, other. In .
arty event these points e*Ille be stated in main condlusions* to
avoid misunderstanding.
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I. This difference in annlrie le not merely e difference
of method, bet importantly affeet the :one of the conelYsions.
If the intelligeroe community ?ect 9e2, aefied to project its present
estimates of Soviet intentions throln the end of 17, .t is unlikely
that the projection would differ either with the conclusion (JIC,
para. 10) that it is "more likely" i.e. that the *lances are
greater than 50% -- that Soviet "judgment" willbe.agaiest general
eery or with the oenolision rarti* 9) that we cermet MOW
forests anything within this rerinn that is "likely" to induce !30.ariet
"desperation." But, for a fair total picture, the additional .02...11
avenues to general war must be etted, and the werdine if the final
conclusion must be Shaded (if up7y to leunter the human inclinatien
to infer "it will not happen' from "it is not likely to happen").
To illustrate the difference, ard 7,As irpact upon the reader, we !ave.,
In Annex A hereto, plaeed the ne am/elusions alongside the key
conclusions of the recent It MAIMBAb UM tLat tee wording of t'le
NIE gives a much fairer and more esefel picture of the uncertainties
of the problem, encertaintiee Weich would multiply in *cope and importtnee
as the period of projection ie extended to a full four years
SPEC= COMMPTS
5. We will not attempt to peen out all the "possible" eays
by ehich general war eight eave within thie period, and Whith &veld
compel a Shading in the enclIzsions of any dieouselon 4` the eUbject.
Sons of the most serime posslIllitis3 voted bet
a. under the beadinr of 'a 'series erections and .0untere
actio leading to general war nthovq#1 not intended by either side
to have that effect," the pre'ent siturtion in Indochina Is highly
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susceptible to such a se roma zgpeare aosmerCat less so at
the moment but the chances of ectier by Rho", or of liter action.
by stepped-up North Korean force- are certainly aubstantial, looked
at over a four-'yr period.
b. Under the se of evtnts
*deep tion," the U.S. ring cf air bies a
power are of more than proeee
nda eoneern to the Soviets
Induct such a feeline.? within thie time.. Moreover, we!ave consist
estimated that1 if 1Pe t Cermary 'erre integrated with the
West and sUbstantially reermec, eemlin might -- or even would
probably regazd thic ac 4 threat to 3oviet seturity requiring
drastic action."* At this woesv
Weet Germany seems remo
but the Chances of the prospect ngLng in four years are sebetantiel,
in light of the gigantic strfiese reds by Wet Germany !Tr the similar
period. since Adenauer was fLA cOt3d in the fall of 1949.
0. It 4h01,14 be noted i-) at t4e abov? examples of possible
avenues to war necessarily aspire that Soviet palt . iv affected,
In 90210 degree at least ,by lectern 001rses of action and by
d elopments which - altheugh ihey pay not directly threaten the )eart
of Soviet power, nonetheless ommee 5eviet ereative or approach
warmansp9-07-11171177m9 (20 Oot_her 1/53) it was ?stated theta
*The importance attadhed by the Soviet rulers to West
German rearmament is suehip however, that thq mi4lt react
to it by measurers which woeld enhance the Oak of an Feet-
West clash in this area iitareany".' (para. 24)
And in NIK.681 (22 Mey 1953), oerreet estimate of Soviet intenUonn
in Germany* it is Atted (para. 10) thets "there *vibe no doubt
that the Kremlin regards bit Cereney as petentielly the most power-
ful state in Western Armes and as potentially the most dangerous,
both to the semlisation of $o7iet aggressive plane and to the
security of the Bloc." Oho estieate roes on to egy that throuvil
m1deI954, the Kremlin is likely to regard German develownts as
not yet dangerous and as offerine chalices for Soviet political warfare.)
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,
n ly
ICI crf-Pc-1-
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Soviet territory. There is ;C:VAK. inplication in the orpaper tbt
the Kremlin makes decisions an 1,110 use of militery mean. without
regard to such factors. Such an ImplLeation is not supported in
National Intelligence Fatieates, ani able keener' clearly rejects it
as a aeneral'proposition.
6. Nothing in the foreweiha e=acnts IA intended to imply tnat
we regard general war -- and rev:altifia; air attack -- aa "likelYft
(better than 50% chance) aithin Tia period. Nereover, existing
NIEes by implications end our own views, are in *Isar disagreement
with the view of the Deputy Airector for Intelligences the Joint
Staff, that the only unoertairtyi ale of timing, and that Soviet
attack sooner or later ir inevitable. (JIC Enclosure p* 7.)
7. On the subsidiary point A' -hat degree of threat would
induce Soviet 'desperation,' re Aute the Offerance itt view between
the Director of Intelligence, :rorces ard the Nreotor of
Nays]. Intelliaence. On the ore lards D/MAF says that mSoviet
desperation can result from ary evynt that so challenges the
Communist program or the Soviet reetaa az to indicate the possibility
of their failure. If by "tillrre lu loart neroly a lack of
success in attaining Comm/at ajtat:7.ves, we de not believe that
this describes a situation in atria+ the Kremlin would be likely to
launch an air attack on the United LIVitoa. D/NI, however, says
that Soviet desperation Pwila re:mit only from a conviction that
Western strength and attiona ftne a grave end imminent threat to
(sovietj s.curtty.W We agrees and have so stated in NBI-45, that
such a conviction might lead the Kremlin to initiate general war.
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