CIA COMMENT RE JIC 641/4. 'MAGNITUDE AND IMMINENCE OF SOVIET AIR THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES' (29 OCTOBER 1953)

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CIA-RDP79B00970A000100010018-3
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RIFPUB
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T
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5
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December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 31, 1998
Sequence Number: 
18
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Publication Date: 
January 6, 1954
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REPORT
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71M* Approved For ReLease 2001/ 8 0 : - 79B00970A020100010018-3 CIA C 54tailti AND Manic_ sivIET AIR VIE* To Tm Witcro ::.;TArkst, (29 ostabilr i)53) The following comet: a la n preptred within t.1' 12f1-0 4frj the light of the fact that thoJ tC a?er has been *ed an a basis for presentation to the C9 o India:Ile the relationship between the JIC paper ard extnuor sai-401-ka IntellLenee Estimatee on the nave eubjeete. Since the JIC pep= hu not been circulated outside e JCS no attempt has teen retie to ccor&mate tteee .,orments with the other agencies reprerented on the Intelligence AdvLsor7 Conmittee. GE'',WAM CCWEXTS 10 JIG 642/4 covert cent1on8 o 3ovtt capabilities and intentions recently considered In NIE-(25, hrim.95, and SEa36/1.* The JIC paper runs tc the 314 05 1957, beyond the period covered by any of the Lbr170 estimates. With respect to Soviet capabilities, the JIC co,ellusions vellifivd in Enclorare "BN) are in general accord with the esti= ten. However. after du* allowance for the difference in time paid3, JIC paper dspa,rts frost existing National Intelligence i'.aticates in the analysis and conclusions concerning Soviet intentions (par gra* 8-10 of the Conclusions amt supporting Enclosure HA"). )(doviet Bloc Capabili*les t:ro l95, dated 16 June 193 1E40 *Soviet Bloc Cepabilltta- nrow, August 1Z.3 WIE-95. "Probable Soviet Bloc S 31 of Ac 955", dated 25 September 3353 SE-36/1. "soviet Capabilities for Attack on the TS through idd.-1955 dated 3 Aur-Aet 1953 Approved For Release ?nreflittFk? (),-unP7RB00970A000100010018-3 417(r.itlelb, Approved For Release 200'1/0 8 : C1A-RDP79B00970A090100010018-3 2. In discussing the "Irmineroe of the Threat," the JIC paper appears to be considerleg only, the ohanees of the Soviets deciding* with something like malice aforethought in the legal sense, to initiate general war by an air attack on the U,63. In order to assess the likelihood of air at aek for planning purposes, it is surely essential to consider rot ners:4 air attack in itself, but the likelihood of general war ceWing about in any say -- for it must be acsumed that in any genera) itfar thq ;3oviet would attack the U.S. by air at a very early stal.-0. 3. If, then* the problem war, the JIG analysis appears defecti7e by-whieh this could happen* ranOy wgirsiet desperation or Soviet judgmant*0 National Intellirenco Est:slates have consistently stated two others, neither of stich apTear to fall within the JICIs (or the ordinary) meaning of "desperation". These are Soviet over-reaching ike in pursuit of some local advartas and* last but not least* just plain alsealculation. This, the. $11--.4 have stressed the continuing chance that "a series of actions. and counteractions* initiated by either side* would lead to general war even though not intended by either side to have that offect."* *NIS45* para. 3. We note tVit nncloaure of the Ar-Z- paper* para- graph 21* does refer to the avenusa to sari in much the same terms as WISts. However, tht paragraph is unrelated to the conclusions stated in main paragraphs 840, Which refer for their baok..up to NmeLosure 00 rather than 2nc1osure 480. The two enelosures - appear to have been prepared etthout reference to sat, other. In . arty event these points e*Ille be stated in main condlusions* to avoid misunderstanding. Approved For Relea ,Selle061/414.914=B00970A000100010018-3 TCA Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79B00970,A000100010018-3 I. This difference in annlrie le not merely e difference of method, bet importantly affeet the :one of the conelYsions. If the intelligeroe community ?ect 9e2, aefied to project its present estimates of Soviet intentions throln the end of 17, .t is unlikely that the projection would differ either with the conclusion (JIC, para. 10) that it is "more likely" i.e. that the *lances are greater than 50% -- that Soviet "judgment" willbe.agaiest general eery or with the oenolision rarti* 9) that we cermet MOW forests anything within this rerinn that is "likely" to induce !30.ariet "desperation." But, for a fair total picture, the additional .02...11 avenues to general war must be etted, and the werdine if the final conclusion must be Shaded (if up7y to leunter the human inclinatien to infer "it will not happen' from "it is not likely to happen"). To illustrate the difference, ard 7,As irpact upon the reader, we !ave., In Annex A hereto, plaeed the ne am/elusions alongside the key conclusions of the recent It MAIMBAb UM tLat tee wording of t'le NIE gives a much fairer and more esefel picture of the uncertainties of the problem, encertaintiee Weich would multiply in *cope and importtnee as the period of projection ie extended to a full four years SPEC= COMMPTS 5. We will not attempt to peen out all the "possible" eays by ehich general war eight eave within thie period, and Whith &veld compel a Shading in the enclIzsions of any dieouselon 4` the eUbject. Sons of the most serime posslIllitis3 voted bet a. under the beadinr of 'a 'series erections and .0untere actio leading to general war nthovq#1 not intended by either side to have that effect," the pre'ent siturtion in Indochina Is highly Approved For Release 2001/08/084; 94;RDP79B00970A000100010018-3 TOP Svdi Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79600970A000100010018-3 susceptible to such a se roma zgpeare aosmerCat less so at the moment but the chances of ectier by Rho", or of liter action. by stepped-up North Korean force- are certainly aubstantial, looked at over a four-'yr period. b. Under the se of evtnts *deep tion," the U.S. ring cf air bies a power are of more than proeee nda eoneern to the Soviets Induct such a feeline.? within thie time.. Moreover, we!ave consist estimated that1 if 1Pe t Cermary 'erre integrated with the West and sUbstantially reermec, eemlin might -- or even would probably regazd thic ac 4 threat to 3oviet seturity requiring drastic action."* At this woesv Weet Germany seems remo but the Chances of the prospect ngLng in four years are sebetantiel, in light of the gigantic strfiese reds by Wet Germany !Tr the similar period. since Adenauer was fLA cOt3d in the fall of 1949. 0. It 4h01,14 be noted i-) at t4e abov? examples of possible avenues to war necessarily aspire that Soviet palt . iv affected, In 90210 degree at least ,by lectern 001rses of action and by d elopments which - altheugh ihey pay not directly threaten the )eart of Soviet power, nonetheless ommee 5eviet ereative or approach warmansp9-07-11171177m9 (20 Oot_her 1/53) it was ?stated theta *The importance attadhed by the Soviet rulers to West German rearmament is suehip however, that thq mi4lt react to it by measurers which woeld enhance the Oak of an Feet- West clash in this area iitareany".' (para. 24) And in NIK.681 (22 Mey 1953), oerreet estimate of Soviet intenUonn in Germany* it is Atted (para. 10) thets "there *vibe no doubt that the Kremlin regards bit Cereney as petentielly the most power- ful state in Western Armes and as potentially the most dangerous, both to the semlisation of $o7iet aggressive plane and to the security of the Bloc." Oho estieate roes on to egy that throuvil m1deI954, the Kremlin is likely to regard German develownts as not yet dangerous and as offerine chalices for Soviet political warfare.) Approved For Release 2001/08/08.: Ele-RDP791300970A000100010018-3 , n ly ICI crf-Pc-1- Approved For Release 2001/08f08". CIA-RiT9B00970A000100010018-3 Soviet territory. There is ;C:VAK. inplication in the orpaper tbt the Kremlin makes decisions an 1,110 use of militery mean. without regard to such factors. Such an ImplLeation is not supported in National Intelligence Fatieates, ani able keener' clearly rejects it as a aeneral'proposition. 6. Nothing in the foreweiha e=acnts IA intended to imply tnat we regard general war -- and rev:altifia; air attack -- aa "likelYft (better than 50% chance) aithin Tia period. Nereover, existing NIEes by implications end our own views, are in *Isar disagreement with the view of the Deputy Airector for Intelligences the Joint Staff, that the only unoertairtyi ale of timing, and that Soviet attack sooner or later ir inevitable. (JIC Enclosure p* 7.) 7. On the subsidiary point A' -hat degree of threat would induce Soviet 'desperation,' re Aute the Offerance itt view between the Director of Intelligence, :rorces ard the Nreotor of Nays]. Intelliaence. On the ore lards D/MAF says that mSoviet desperation can result from ary evynt that so challenges the Communist program or the Soviet reetaa az to indicate the possibility of their failure. If by "tillrre lu loart neroly a lack of success in attaining Comm/at ajtat:7.ves, we de not believe that this describes a situation in atria+ the Kremlin would be likely to launch an air attack on the United LIVitoa. D/NI, however, says that Soviet desperation Pwila re:mit only from a conviction that Western strength and attiona ftne a grave end imminent threat to (sovietj s.curtty.W We agrees and have so stated in NBI-45, that such a conviction might lead the Kremlin to initiate general war. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :'CIA-RDP79B00970A000100010018-3