COMMENT ON THE (Sanitized) REPORT (SRE PLANS AND POLICY STAFF)

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79B00970A000100010129-0
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
6
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 7, 1998
Sequence Number: 
129
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 7, 1953
Content Type: 
MF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79B00970A000100010129-0.pdf371.25 KB
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Approved For Release 29 1/Q8 14-RDP79B00970A000100 10129-0 ) CW 7J Memorandum for 'Kr. Dulles 25X1A9a Subjects Comment on the ~ tspcrt 049 Plans and Policy Staff) I have shown the report to, and discussed it with,- the European man on the O/ staff. These comments are v in large part from his ideas, and tackle two aepocts of the report, namely (1) its basic policy recommendations; (2) its implications for CTA operations and intelligence gatheriang. Basic Policg Recommendations 1. Them report is ee centially.? a series of broad policy recommendations for the Ua to follow in Weatarn Europe over the next fens years. Stressing that the i39 is the driving force behind the development of european strength, it proposes that the US should: at Seek to stren en the.lt..lasiti by reinfooink t e sense of con p ppose support European integration to the extent consisteti strengthening the City as a whole, but avoid rrerasures which might lead to a i uropsuz "'hird acrce"j urge irore posi- tive measures to reduce Comunznist strength in France and Italy, especially through buildap of free trade unions; reerise and intensify our information and ?V programs; modify our East- West trade policies to permit greater trade, as more: consistent with "Trade not Aid", but retain bar goes on items of direct strategic importance; minimise detailed interference in Euro- pean internal affairs; align non-H40 uropean countries more closely with the Atlantic Comm ity, though not nee scarily through NATO {e.g., encourage c entual Spanish ad lion, but keep separate arrangements with 'fu. oslavia ). b. Revise basic NATO etrat$gy, since the present force plane are capa Is of xt European politico- economic capabilities are insufficient to meat current mili- tary goals, so a new defense co nce?t must be devised; new weapons may provide an answer; revision of U1 defense program toward emphasis on a strategic atom bomber force and local Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA~RDP79B00970A000100010129-0 Approved For air defenses and away from ground forces indicates this trend; in any case, the European view, right or wrongs r re-evaluation of NATO plans, and the US should be including acs o overall payments ba de Arid especially dollar balance wi.titout further US ,rants; (2 ) Ausi,ria, etc. d. Continue the build-UP Of NATO OCMMIC at agrees to support such a program it must be carefull prepared by the Europeans themselves; it must be truly 'Raropoan", not national in character; this is urfIi}zeiy before next year, so OBE' should continue at 153 levels for another year. Such aid plus US expenditures in xarope should be enough to rbplace any further straight economic aid, emcee?. for specific areas like peneablee and nest be larger than nog, called for under EDC plans. US forces will probably have to be retained in rope for many years. c. Aid in the establi.shrsent of a ;metro can ?rodt.etion asee, so Migned ME the Europeans can main t ired, take the lead. A West Gsraan defense contribution Europe. Some devaluation of Earopean currencies toward non-discriminatory trade in the free world. hie re- quires both US and . uropeen action! Europe must improve its competitive position; US aust reduce trade barriers -and expand US investment in underdeveloped areas, including Southern Approved For Release 206i/08 Approved For Release 2 41`/08#8` CIA- DP79B00970A000100010129-0 in urging "Positive Measures (2) `urthsr oral , cation (:pp. 19, 111-29 rt.), man support r does not say how such renif'ieation could be brought about without the use of armed fort* -'not merely guerilla warfare), or how the other NATO members would be brought to accept it even as a NATO of 3eettv*. (He co ssdes they would initially be strongly opposed.) Certainly ovist policy in Last U~zy during 1952 ;gas given every indica- tion of Soviet intent to consolidate its hold there, in response to the sig .ng or AIX: (a fortiar surely to Oerman membership in hATO). Iforeeore>r, while+ Wont &; erxan sentiment for reunification in unquestionably a trofg now, query how it would f: in the lon ; run against the apparent cartaint; that att7ts to get back even the Eastern Zone would wan war. Thus, it some dmbtful whether more than the present 03 policy of verbal Indorsement only o." reuni?,"ic*-tion is in fact peso far to hold the West Germans in line with the West. as being the best first step toward freeing tit^s Satel- lites, we wonder whether Albania, in a sraa'll. way, and Austria,' in a somewhat larger one, would not bu better entering wedges than Ur man unifi.eattca,* iF A possible line of action toward PtLuetria is spelled out in more Mr b . y detail in the attached appeniii, written Approved For Release 2 79 B0097OA000100010129-0 Approved For Rele 70AW0100010129-0 Parts Relating DirecL41 to CA 2. The report contains (p. IV-18) an urgent plea for the best possible intelligence on Soviet intentions and calls for a greatly intensified US and allied effort in this direction. It stresses the need for as such advance warning of hostilities as possible, because of its bearing on the mvbilis*tic of equate defense forces. In its own, estimate of Soviet intentions (Part I), the report is generally in agreement with our basic estizcates. 3. Particular stress is placed on measures to i,aprove Western European morale and to develop a greater sense of con= purpose with the US, The report urges using all available _means for this purpose, 4, Considerable enphasie is placed on weakening Soviet caps- bilities by undermining their control of Eastern Europe (pp. ?I, 1-5), especially through the re-unification of Oermsny. Aside from this, the report suggests that ffers the most likely possibilities, and suggests that ' ovist rear of deviationism indicates their vulnerability in this respect. - 4 - 25X1X4 25X1X4 Approved For Release2"ka8tO& =TDP79B00970A000100010129-0 Approved For Release 00010129-0 25X1A9a A POSSIBLE LINE OF ACTION IN AUSTRIA ( fir 1. A good ease can be made that more attention should be paid to Austria as a key area where the Vest can push back the Iron C a, an. Austria eight be said to rank second only to Albania as a major target for us. The difference is that Albania would require clandestine operations? but Austria might be freed by political and psychological pressures alone. 2. The recent UN debates showed the weakness of the Soviet moral and propaganda position an an Austrian treaty. Use in con- trast, have an unassailable position that can be far morh effec- tively exploited, We have already in the *long" and *short" treaties demonstrated our own willingness to get out. We might gt further and otter a simple simultaneous withdrawal, thus putting the Kremlin on an even worse spot. 3. It is conceivable that an elaborate campaign of diplomatic and'PW pressures designed to expose the weak Soviet position on . Austria could provide the necessary added push to lead the USSR to get out. The objective would be to make Soviet refusal of an Austrian treaty the prime symbol of Krenlin unwillingness to demon- strate its peaceful intentions concretely. It is hard to believe that the USSR has any vital interests in Austria that it would be unwilling to lose. The last mine years of Soviet policy toward Austria indicate that the USSA has never a*de up its mi nod whether tern Austria should be incorporated ( like East OeatmwV) into the Soviet bloc. In tact the Arenlin"e policy has been inexplicably mild. We thought at one time (I believe, I 1949) that the USSR was actually going to agree to an Austrian treaty. We were wrong, but on the other hand the USSR has even Aces given no indication that it has decided to hold on permanently to its fine. 4. Admittedly, there are disadvantages to pressing Austrian case. It mitt lead the aJ R to decide the other way, and actually take steps to divide Austria and convert Vienna into another Berlin. Second, the USSR nsyf view Austria as abargaining counter and offer to give it up only as a id pro lino, for Western concessions on 3erman issues, thus roopenirag he rmcm :question. However, these risks are probably acceptable, first because Austria is at present divided anayway, and second because we need not fear a reopening of German issues (once 3DC is ratified) since the Approved For Release 200 /$0?:Fi79B00970A000100010129-0 Approved For Releas$ CA-RDP79B00970A000100010129-0 90 Soviet position is infinitely worse thsn ours. .11nal,7,y, =3ess we scan press the Austrian isms to a conclusion, the pas sage of r convert a temporary situation into a permanent one, and our abances of winning a bloodless victory Kill be lost for saris' years to come. Approved For Release 201 11/O8/O8 GIA iRibP79B00970A000100010129-0