COMMENT ON THE (Sanitized) REPORT (SRE PLANS AND POLICY STAFF)
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79B00970A000100010129-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 7, 1998
Sequence Number:
129
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 7, 1953
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP79B00970A000100010129-0.pdf | 371.25 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 29 1/Q8 14-RDP79B00970A000100 10129-0 ) CW
7J
Memorandum for 'Kr. Dulles
25X1A9a
Subjects Comment on the ~ tspcrt 049 Plans and Policy Staff)
I have shown the report to, and discussed it with,-
the European man on the O/ staff. These comments are
v in large part from his ideas, and tackle two aepocts of
the report, namely (1) its basic policy recommendations; (2) its
implications for CTA operations and intelligence gatheriang.
Basic Policg Recommendations
1. Them report is ee centially.? a series of broad policy
recommendations for the Ua to follow in Weatarn Europe over the
next fens years. Stressing that the i39 is the driving force behind
the development of european strength, it proposes that the US
should:
at Seek to stren en the.lt..lasiti
by reinfooink t e sense of con p ppose
support European integration to the extent consisteti
strengthening the City as a whole, but avoid rrerasures
which might lead to a i uropsuz "'hird acrce"j urge irore posi-
tive measures to reduce Comunznist strength in France and Italy,
especially through buildap of free trade unions; reerise and
intensify our information and ?V programs; modify our East-
West trade policies to permit greater trade, as more: consistent
with "Trade not Aid", but retain bar goes on items of direct
strategic importance; minimise detailed interference in Euro-
pean internal affairs; align non-H40 uropean countries more
closely with the Atlantic Comm ity, though not nee scarily
through NATO {e.g., encourage c entual Spanish ad lion, but
keep separate arrangements with 'fu. oslavia ).
b. Revise basic NATO etrat$gy, since the present force
plane are capa Is of xt European politico-
economic capabilities are insufficient to meat current mili-
tary goals, so a new defense co nce?t must be devised; new
weapons may provide an answer; revision of U1 defense program
toward emphasis on a strategic atom bomber force and local
Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA~RDP79B00970A000100010129-0
Approved For
air defenses and away from ground forces indicates this trend;
in any case, the European view, right or wrongs r
re-evaluation of NATO plans, and the US should be
including acs o overall payments ba de Arid
especially dollar balance wi.titout further US ,rants; (2 )
Ausi,ria, etc.
d. Continue the build-UP Of NATO OCMMIC at
agrees to support such a program it must be carefull prepared
by the Europeans themselves; it must be truly 'Raropoan", not
national in character; this is urfIi}zeiy before next year, so
OBE' should continue at 153 levels for another year. Such aid
plus US expenditures in xarope should be enough to rbplace any
further straight economic aid, emcee?. for specific areas like
peneablee and nest be larger than nog, called for under EDC
plans. US forces will probably have to be retained in rope
for many years.
c. Aid in the establi.shrsent of a ;metro can ?rodt.etion
asee, so Migned ME the Europeans can main t ired,
take the lead. A West Gsraan defense contribution
Europe. Some devaluation of Earopean currencies
toward non-discriminatory trade in the free world. hie re-
quires both US and . uropeen action! Europe must improve its
competitive position; US aust reduce trade barriers -and expand
US investment in underdeveloped areas, including Southern
Approved For Release 206i/08
Approved For Release 2 41`/08#8` CIA- DP79B00970A000100010129-0
in urging "Positive Measures
(2) `urthsr oral
,
cation (:pp. 19, 111-29 rt.),
man
support r
does not say how such renif'ieation could be brought about
without the use of armed fort* -'not merely guerilla
warfare), or how the other NATO members would be brought
to accept it even as a NATO of 3eettv*. (He co ssdes they
would initially be strongly opposed.) Certainly ovist
policy in Last U~zy during 1952 ;gas given every indica-
tion of Soviet intent to consolidate its hold there, in
response to the sig .ng or AIX: (a fortiar surely to
Oerman membership in hATO). Iforeeore>r, while+ Wont &; erxan
sentiment for reunification in unquestionably a trofg now,
query how it would f: in the lon ; run against the
apparent cartaint; that att7ts to get back even the
Eastern Zone would wan war. Thus, it some dmbtful
whether more than the present 03 policy of verbal
Indorsement only o." reuni?,"ic*-tion is in fact peso far
to hold the West Germans in line with the West.
as being the best first step toward freeing tit^s Satel-
lites, we wonder whether Albania, in a sraa'll. way, and
Austria,' in a somewhat larger one, would not bu better
entering wedges than Ur man unifi.eattca,*
iF A possible line of action toward PtLuetria is spelled out in more
Mr
b
.
y
detail in the attached appeniii, written
Approved For Release 2
79 B0097OA000100010129-0
Approved For Rele 70AW0100010129-0
Parts Relating DirecL41 to CA
2. The report contains (p. IV-18) an urgent plea for the
best possible intelligence on Soviet intentions and calls for a
greatly intensified US and allied effort in this direction. It
stresses the need for as such advance warning of hostilities as
possible, because of its bearing on the mvbilis*tic of equate
defense forces. In its own, estimate of Soviet intentions (Part I),
the report is generally in agreement with our basic estizcates.
3. Particular stress is placed on measures to i,aprove
Western European morale and to develop a greater sense of con=
purpose with the US, The report urges using all available _means
for this purpose,
4, Considerable enphasie is placed on weakening Soviet caps-
bilities by undermining their control of Eastern Europe (pp. ?I,
1-5), especially through the re-unification of Oermsny. Aside
from this, the report suggests that ffers
the most likely possibilities, and suggests that ' ovist rear of
deviationism indicates their vulnerability in this respect.
- 4 -
25X1X4
25X1X4
Approved For Release2"ka8tO& =TDP79B00970A000100010129-0
Approved For Release 00010129-0
25X1A9a
A POSSIBLE LINE OF ACTION IN AUSTRIA ( fir
1. A good ease can be made that more attention should be paid
to Austria as a key area where the Vest can push back the Iron
C a, an. Austria eight be said to rank second only to Albania as
a major target for us. The difference is that Albania would require
clandestine operations? but Austria might be freed by political and
psychological pressures alone.
2. The recent UN debates showed the weakness of the Soviet
moral and propaganda position an an Austrian treaty. Use in con-
trast, have an unassailable position that can be far morh effec-
tively exploited, We have already in the *long" and *short" treaties
demonstrated our own willingness to get out. We might gt further
and otter a simple simultaneous withdrawal, thus putting the Kremlin
on an even worse spot.
3. It is conceivable that an elaborate campaign of diplomatic
and'PW pressures designed to expose the weak Soviet position on .
Austria could provide the necessary added push to lead the USSR to
get out. The objective would be to make Soviet refusal of an
Austrian treaty the prime symbol of Krenlin unwillingness to demon-
strate its peaceful intentions concretely. It is hard to believe
that the USSR has any vital interests in Austria that it would be
unwilling to lose. The last mine years of Soviet policy toward
Austria indicate that the USSA has never a*de up its mi nod whether
tern Austria should be incorporated ( like East OeatmwV) into
the Soviet bloc. In tact the Arenlin"e policy has been
inexplicably mild. We thought at one time (I believe, I 1949)
that the USSR was actually going to agree to an Austrian treaty.
We were wrong, but on the other hand the USSR has even Aces given
no indication that it has decided to hold on permanently to its
fine.
4. Admittedly, there are disadvantages to pressing
Austrian case. It mitt lead the aJ R to decide the other way,
and actually take steps to divide Austria and convert Vienna into
another Berlin. Second, the USSR nsyf view Austria as abargaining
counter and offer to give it up only as a id pro lino, for Western
concessions on 3erman issues, thus roopenirag he rmcm :question.
However, these risks are probably acceptable, first because Austria
is at present divided anayway, and second because we need not fear
a reopening of German issues (once 3DC is ratified) since the
Approved For Release 200 /$0?:Fi79B00970A000100010129-0
Approved For Releas$
CA-RDP79B00970A000100010129-0
90
Soviet position is infinitely worse thsn ours. .11nal,7,y, =3ess
we scan press the Austrian isms to a conclusion, the pas sage of
r convert a temporary situation into a permanent one, and
our abances of winning a bloodless victory Kill be lost for saris'
years to come.
Approved For Release 201 11/O8/O8 GIA iRibP79B00970A000100010129-0