SUMMARY EVALUATION OF THE NET CAPABILITY OF THE USSR, AS OF MID-1952, TO INJURE THE CONTINENTAL US

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00970A000100050038-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: September 25, 1952
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP79B0097OA000100050038-7
NFORMATION
25 September 1952
25X1A9a
Memorandum fo
Subject: Summary Evaluation of the Net Capability of the USSR, as of
Mid-1952, to Injure the Continental US
1. With apologies for coming in so late in the day.. I nonethe-
less am troubled enough by the wording of this paper to offer these
comments for what they are worth,
2. Page 2, paragraphs 3 c) - 3 f)s These paragraphs have to be
read with great care to separate the various pointss, and even after
such careful reading one is still left a little confused. The basic
problem seems to be clarifying what are apparently postulates of target
selection. Thus c) would be "if targets are selected with the sole
objective of neutralizing the ability. . . ." d) would become if
targets are selected to neutralize US atomic counter attack . ."
e) and f) are if targets are selected with the objective of inflict-
ing maximum damage on over-all US armament production and military
power . . . ." Then all four paragraphs would come under a single
basic paragraph reading perhaps as follows:
"c) The nature of the damage that could be inflicted by
Soviet surprise atomic air attack would vary according to the
objectives governing the selection of targets*"
Then,, the present a), d), and a combined e) - f) would act as sub-
paraglraphs to the basic conclusion. Surely this would make your
conclusions schematically much clearer.
3. Page 2, paragraphs 3 c ) - 3 f) ,s Subsidiary to the above
general criticism are the followings
(a) Subparagraph 3 c) refers to the "probable Soviet stock-
pile",) while e) gives the 100 figure as a possibility and f) says
the actual figure is "probably appreciably less". These three
different references are bound to confuse the reader not familiar
with the existing estimate. Would it not be better to set forth
the precise estimate as a preliminary statement of the discus-
sion of the nature of the damage?
.w?:. ,... r.[ r ..r . lnn;ratest
a
4is . Efi f3 lust be
t8 't t3 ta. X31.: C81a~Ne
Approved For Release 1999/09/ I OA000100050038-7
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP79B00970A000100050038-7
(b) In subparagraph 3 c) the referent of "substantial
achievement of these ends" is unclear, and it is possible for
the reader to think that the words refer to US abilities. Why
not replace these words by "such neutralization"?
(c) In the same subparagraph 3 c), the quick reader fails
to see at once the connection between the stated purpose and a
high delivery capability. If all four subparagraphs are not
pegged to target selection, how about adding before "delivery
capabilities" the following: "the probable targets selected
would be such that".
4. Page paragraph 5: This paragraph could be read to mean
that the mere launching of attacks "to prevent . . . and to neutralize
. . ." would accomplish objective It d). Surely the most that is meant
is that if the attacks were sufficient to achieve these objectives,
objective 4 d), in the Kremlin's judFent, would be likely to follow.
Sut, if this is indeed what is meant, there is a serious confusion and
ambiguity in the light of later statements that attacks could not
"prevent retaliatory action" although they might "reduce the ability
of the US to sustain large military operations". ast both objectives
be successfully attained before 14 d) is achieved? And, incidentally,
is the last sentence intended to apply to the consequences of an
attack directed generally against US armament production and military
power ( a target selection basis apparently distinguished from those
named in the first sentence of paragraph 5 in aragraphs 3 c) - 3 f),
and in the later paragraphs 6 b) (1) - 6 b) (3). As paragraph 5
stands, I must say I find it wholly confusing and also at cross pur-
poses with paragraph 6 b) (fit) on page 7.
5. Page 7 are rah 6 b) (3): This is. substantially the same
as subparagraph 3 0).t and the comments in paragraph 3 above would apply.
6. One final substantive point. The only reference to the intro-
duction of atom bombs in merchant ships appears to be in paragraph
9 c), dealing with sabotage. Without quibbling as to whether such
introduction really properly belongs under this heading, I am startled
at the conclusion that counter measures are probably adequate. Has
there been a considered rejection or change in. the statement made in
paragraph 48 of SE..lls, that "the USSR must be considered capable of
utilizing a merchant ship for delivering an atomic weapon into a key
US harbor with a relatively good chance of escaping detection"?
WPB:mgr
Approved For Release 1999/OSVWi ? 00970A000100050038-7