CIA Comments on the Israeli Air Campaign: 5-10 June 1967

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79B00972A000100060002-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
12
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 14, 1999
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 14, 1967
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79B00972A000100060002-3.pdf764.88 KB
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Approved For Release.2J O S BC! IA 7 72AQOO100060002-3 NO FOR "'T DISSEM go jbg I Igrao.31 i x -30J o 6 -20 AMMt .96'7 TOP SECRET RUFF TRUIE TCS-7)83/67a Approve`, hWWAlease 2000/08/:~ 7 ,A000100060002-3 Approved For ReleasI 'NO FOR 100972A000100060002-3 T T I5 IA 2MIGEN' The following information is in response to a request from Mr. Robert Yalta, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional and Resource Analysis, for additional data on the Israeli air cam- paign of 5-10 June 1967. His specific requirements are underlined and followed by our sc ents. A table showing damage to the Arab airfields is appended. 1. t o ia. a. afar: t a kgfo-re attack. The number of Arab aircraft at each field immediately before the Israeli attack is unknown. b. d o la s de and 25X1 D 25X1 C op_iQA tai d wigItU gas or &' weeks. The attached table summarizes the numbers of Arab 25X1 D aircraft destroyed at each field that at least 30 and probably around 60 Arab aircraft were Given these 7.imits, 256 aircraft are counted as destroyed. This represents almost 57 percent of the 452 aircraft the Israelis claim to have destroyed. If we take into account downed in air-to:-air cobat, some 63-70 percent of the .Israe ,n be accounted for. An additional consideration is 25X1 D ome Arab airfields - probably about six or seven TOP SECRET ROFF TRINE TCS-7483/67a r "I :7j Approved ttriReIease 20 Mv Cl UM00972A000100060002-3 Approved For ReleaslQ04 : i-R 9B009 A000100060002-3 25X1 D FORUM: !! EM 25X1 D ?he time needed to repair damaged aircraft is mown. We have report that an of early August about 100 LIAR aircraft had been, or som would be, repaired and returned to service. ore, to say how many aircraft were for practical purposes destroyed and how many were left repairable. a. 21bugg at oh fis 25X1 C 25X1 D (2) The defenses at each field varied. Most seem to have had some kind of AAA, and most Israeli losses can be attri-. bated to it. Reports vary as to the effeeotiv , f Arab air defense. Some say that most Israeli aircraft were hate some as Tcs..71+83/67a fi ' ~,'0 x 6~, Approved For~ tRase43632000/08/ i' A000100060002-3 ffeotive altitude of the A:..2. TOP StGKt-'-, -t.-% al Is fired something tike half a dozen s Israeli plane was downed IV a , For the most part, the Israeli 25X1 C T "T RUFF IRA Approved For Release0K9 : CIA-RDP79B009.Z2A000100060002-3 F IS Rumors persist that the Egyptians built acme underground hangars, using straight stretches of road for air strips, that the Israelis neutralized these stretches of road. We have 'ormationn to confirm or negate these rumors, but they appear .bie. d. Hm-ber of aair-oraft a ie alloca:k2d !a each a&rfj&ld_ The Israelis used varying numbers of aircraft In their attacks. general, they struck in flights of four aircraft at a time. 25X1 C We have eyewitness reports of two aattaacka, the ones on Damascus and Amman. tnsaeaua=s, was hit by four flights of four aircraft each over a two-hour period. The number of aircraft attacking Amman is a town; individual attacks were made by flights of four aircraft. It appears that the Israelis attacked each field only as often as necessary until they were satisfied that the field was out of ccaiaaion or all the aircraft on it destroyed. MlftE o Ian eli. aircraft lost, by airfield. The Israelis lost about 46 aircraft during the war. One of these was a Noratlas destroyed by strafing in one of the very few Arab a.ttaeks on an Israeli airfield. We don't know which airfield this was. Two Mirages and one Vaautour were lost in the second attack on H-3 in Iraq. These planes were downed by Iraqi aircraft while on bombing runs. These are the only lasses for which the place and cause are known. 5X 1 C f. Number of Raesgo per beragI4 as - ft. This tactic appears to have applied only to attacks on airfields but even then it was not followed in all instances, since we know from the attack on Damascus that rockets were used on some second passes and at least two airfields were apparently not boar' TOP SECRET RUFF TRINE 25X1 C Approved For?RjR? 2000/0899 F. K AM A000100060002-3 _yi ate. Approved For Rele0 9 ?49- No B0097? 2A000100060002-3 a used and. to eaten ounted foa tied n. 25X1 D Only conventional immitions were used. Those included bombs, rockets, and cannon. Napalm was apparently not used against airfields. The damage to aircraft can be attributed largely, if not ti e~y, to 30 mm cannon using arm=-Piero Incendiary a ition. Such a> nmition was used In the attack on 25X1 D Liberty and would be the moat logical choice for attacking d. The actual mechanism of destruction was fuel tanks; most of the Arab aircraft were apparently fueled and armed. The - damage to runways could have been caused by ordinary HE bombs. Much has been made of secret weapons and new types of bombs, but the available evidence show t no evidence of them. Acourtcy the bombing of runways may have been the secret. 25X1 D or retro-rooket to kill forward speed after release and ;van into the runway by rockets attached to the rear. one tog was intended to penetrate the runway before exploding. The other exploded on the surface, and its fragments were supposed 5X1 C o pit the surface enough to render the runway unusable. 'OP SECRET fE TAE 7483/67a Approved- f Rflkease 2000/08/29 IA k 8009 2 AO0O1 -0U0 0d 2-3 Two types of now bombs have been mentioned. Both are for law-level,, high-speed delivery. They use either a SECRET ROFF IRK Approved For Release 2OO0/08/29 : CIA-RDP79B009Z2A000100060002-3 in 25X1 D 25X1 C a British aviation magazine, the runway at Jebel Libni. was pictured two shallow bomb craters very close together which the magazine were multiple kills of aircraft both on the 25X1 C ground and in the air. On the ground the multiples were caused both by closely parked aircraft being set afire by adjacent aircraft which were struck by strafing passes, and by Bevel aircraft being struck on the same strafing run. There apparently were several multiple kills in aerial combat during the war. This can be attri- buted both to the skill of Israeli pilots and the incomtence of !iab Pilots. 2. of the war. ted to a new tie of Israeli bomb. estimated. Various estimates place the rate at about fo grtiea flown bx lasraeli Air Foroe a. The numbs' of sorties the Israeli Air For rs per day per operational aircraft. With a total 25X1 C Dry of about 2.40 aircraft, the Israeli Air Force could have own 900 to 1800 sorties per day, at least In the first day or two The high sortie Mwsllent maintenance from 93 to..100 percent of available aircraft. probably many others as short as half an h (2) Short missions, many no longer than an hour and NL - 67a ..? TOPy Hutt Approved For Release 2000/08/29 :Ep j 0.f~D0100060002-3 25X1 D 25X1 C Approved For Release O D 2-3 NO FOREIGN Dt SE1 (3) Very short turn-araund timesii, pro' motes, perhaps lass in scene oases. 25X1 C (4) Apparently excellent pro-p1 vm . The fact that most miss ions wei own in day- light, giving ground caws the whole night for maintenance and repairs. 25X1 C b. geaggt: gDak hourss. Israeli pilots reportedly fly more hours per month than those of any other air force. Regular IAF pilots fly a day, presumably five days per week. This would make monthly indi- vidual flying hours range around 30-40 hours. Zxtet of Mintezai oa etanddc u of maintenance in the IAA' is extremely high. of reserve pilots meant that many practice ded. If there was a stand n# it was most likely 4 Juno and the night of 4-5 June. sasttties . The extent of any maintenance stsnddt t prior to 5 own. It probably was not great for two reasons. First d aircraft n say very little about the allocation of aircraft by and mission. On 5 Jui very few aircraft were hold in reserve or air defense. General S.L.A. Marshall states that 12 aircraft were held on the morning of 5 June, when eight were sent up in tsponse to Arab attacks. It is quits' possible that there was not even this, .oh of a reserve and that every flyable aircraft was sent to attack A ab airfields. The aircraft left behind probably we those that could not be made flyable in time. -6+ ELK. Hitt 1I Approved F~brt~lge 2000/ BEP0p97~A,0Q01 b0060002-3 - theallocation of Ea ,gli ALMS inven o 25X1 C 25X1 C RFF INt Approved For Release T /CRT 097.2A000100060002-3 25X1 C sualtise, and materiel losses due to air action can d in rough terms. The total number of killed in action may aaount to some 20,000. Air action probably accounted for very few of those or wounded in a etion . 25X1 C Several factors indicate that the 10 may have had rela- ly good success against tanks. These include the IA `se control e air, the open desert terrain, and the Arabs' habit of carrying wel loads on their tanks. At the same time,, a tank is unlikely to be destroyed unless it is hit with bombs or rockets, although it may be disabled by machineguns and cannon. Also the Korean mar experience indicates that it is extremely difficult for an aircraft to destroy a tank. On balance, It is likely that the bulk of the Arab armor that was destroyed fell to Israeli ground forces, especially tank forces whose primary mission is to counter hostile armor.. N thelesa. the Iii' probably contributed substantially and was 25X1 D aponsible for the damage wee a% zas Nvca lop Approved FO Release 2000/ 1kg9' - j` MB0097,2A000100060002-3 25X1 C 25X1 D Approved For ReleasIOS : WJEF lift cfF1 00972A000100060002-3 d tAe. Israeli+s use in. c1 see a 1 Iirl~ I^P~II 25X1 C The munitions used in close support were 7.62 mm guns,, 20 mm and 30 mm cannon of various types includin, ry, 82 mm rockets, and bombs. Napalm was used to concentrated targets. 6. y, :to .1 doted in aerial combat. The Israelis claim they did tweet 5 and 10 June swathing like 30-60 Arab a: oee a single aircraft in. aerial combat. (No Arab has eve: 25X1 C dcnm an Israeli in air-to-air combat.) 7. rdM 32 X2&- W 2U a Information on the daily support given by the Imo' to parti, cular units is unavailable. 25X1 C Initially, the Mitla Pass was an all-LA? show, and the IAF appears to have done nearly all the damage. The Israeli ground forces, which did not reach Mitla until the evening of 7 June, pretty much oenfined themselves to blocking foot troops trying to retreat through the pass. 9. 2W 2a air 2z gmmd forces des&= 1k b Jordan I ver-1 is t# Asa n tofthatroll in the Zaattlea at MitlA Plea? We do not know who destroyed the bridges over the Jordan. uniZg b b the t e't-d MUMS? lo. Dia the W. TIP SEtir CRET RUFF TRINE Appro edtP& elease 2000/08/ : iA000100060002-3 au ort? Approved For Release J0/4 : C 00972A000100060002-3 Nn F 1 If UI 25X1 C era t tactics if their cr ter air strikes failed? We do not know what Israel would have done if the counter air strikes had failed. Certainly there were plans taking that possibility into account. If the IAF had been forced to fight a relatively undamaged foe,. it would have taken longer to establish air superiority, but them was never any doubt in the Israelis' minds as to the eventual outcome. .An agreed community estimate before the war was that it would take the IAA' from 24 to 48 hours to establish control of the air without a preemptive strike on Arab airbasee. 25X1 C 25X1 C . d Ill use =wh ara.tr4ht? . We would like to add a comment on the Ierae 25X1 C concept of their air offensive. They obviously anticipated a short war and had limited objectives. This conclusion is based on. the they did not try to attack either the Arab air forces' "TOP Sall Rt F 101 LIM QREIGl 011 L" Appro dFPRelease 20001 MY : CIA-RDP79BO097.2A000100G60002-3 ~CRET RUFF TRINE Approved For Release 2~R0/29 ? 009Z2A000100060002-3 or basic illations such as repair shops or depo e sole focus of the initial attack was the neutralization of Arab air forces by destroying either their aircraft or their runways. later? after air superiority had been gained, other installations such as radars and SAM sites were attacked to give the IA? freedom f movement ever the battlegrounds. This 3.9.mited concept of operations has matte it possible for the Azbs,: especially the UAR, to reconstitute their air forces by patching runways and taking delivery of new aircraft. Morale factors aside, the only limit on the Arabs attaining their prewar level of air oapabi3lby is the speed with which new aircraft are delivered, obvious that greater efforts would have been %sio structure of the air forces and personnel tended to carry the war into Egypt proper or if Israel had had any doubts as to its ability to swiftly defeat the Arab amiss on the grid. TOP kca" RUFF TRIBE Nil Fa 45 Approved ftlgase 2000/08/29: CIA-RDP79.BOOQ972A000-100?60002-3 25X1 D Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79B00972A000100060002-3 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79B00972A000100060002-3