Proposed Study on the Structure of Soviet Industry with Reference to the Production of Weapons

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00972A000100080010-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 1998
• Sequence Number: 10
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM 'OR: Mr. Archibald Alexander, Assistant Director, Economics
Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
SUBJECT: Proposed Study on the Structure of Soviet Industry with
Reference to the Production of Weapons
REFERENCE: ACDA/E Draft Study Proposal of November 12, 1963, same
Subject
1. The referenced study proposal covers two topics: (a) a detailed
study on all Soviet plants involved in the production of weapons and the
structural relationships among them, and (b) a means for estimating the
impact of limitations on Soviet weapons production. In our view, this
later topic suggests a requirements for something akin to an input-output
table which would permit the tracing of the effects of the reduction of
weapons production. This letter deals only with the first of these topics;
the ramification of the second is still being discussed in CIA.
25X1A9a
2. As a result of your discussions of 15 January with
and other CIA personnel, we understand that the emphasis for intelligence
support has shifted. Instead of the detailed study of the structure of
the Soviet weapons industries, ACDA now wants to know whether we could
evaluate the accuracy of a Soviet declaration( nade under a proposed agree-
ment) which lists weapons plants, especially those involved in the production
of strategic offensive and defensive systems.
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3. There is no question that we in the US intelligence community
are currently in the best position of any organization in the West to
evaluate the accuracy of such a Soviet declaration. The degree of our
confidence, however, varies considerably depending on the weapons
concerned. Generally, we have high confidence in our evaluation of
facilities capable of producing strategic aircraft and submarines. We
have considerable knowledge of many plants that have produced a wide
variety of ground force equipment, although we may not know whether these
plants are currently engaged in such production.
'I. Our knowledge concerning Soviet facilities for the production of
missile systems is far more limited. There are a number of facilities
which are suspected of being involved in the production of missiles. A
few of these are almost certainly involved in the production of strategic
missiles. The role of the remainder of the suspect missile facilities is
much less certain. In some cases, we have considerable confidence that a
facility is involved in the production of missiles, but we cannot deter-
mine whether the plant is producing rocket engines, or assembling the
entire missile, or both. In other cases, we can only suspect'that the
plant may be involved in some undetermined production for the missile
program. Furthermore, it is probable that there are other missile assembly
or rocket plants engine plants in the USSR which we do not now suspect.
5. The determination of the location of Soviet missile plants and
their rates of production has been one of the highest priority intelligence
objectives for about ten years. Every effort has been made to improve our
knowledge in this field. Although progress has been made, the basic
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difficulty remaining is our inability to collect the basic pertinent
data on these production facilities.
6. Even where there is considerable uncertainty about the role of
certain industrial facilities and direct information is currently lack-
ing, the intelligence community can evaluate Soviet declarations. In
this respect the following quote from the Intelligence Study Group Report
of July,1962 (Appendix II, page 5) is still highly pertinent:
"It should be said first that intelligence will almost
certainly not be without resources for evaluating a declara-
tion in a general way. Intelligence analysts have developed
background and a body of experience from which Soviet
declarations can be judged. Analysts have a "sense" or "feel,"
which, together with such specific knowledge as they may
possess, would enable them to say, for example, that the Soviet
declaration is highly suspicious, that it is not consistent
with,other information, that it is on its face reasonable, etc.
Such things could be said when intelligence could not determine
conclusively that the declaration, was true or false, or that speci-
fic portions of it were true or false."
6. With respect to contractual support from firms outside the
Government, we can anticipate no need for such support at this time.
Should some problems arise when declarations are made which require
judgments of specialists outside the Government, the intelligence
community has a large number of knowledgeable consultants who can be
lled upon on short notice to provide such assistance.
7. In short, we are prepared to accept the responsibility for
evaluating Soviet declarations which list weapon plants. We will discuss
the second task -- that of estimating the impact on the Soviet economy
of limitations on weapons production -- with either you or your staff in
the near future.
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