DRAFT U.S. POSITION PAPER ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSERVATION POSTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00972A000100090006-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 83
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 1998
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Rel?ase,1999/09/08: C - B00972A0(01,0090006-6
This document consists of
_ .-- of
ages, No.
copies, Series B.
DRAFT U.S. POSITION PAPER
ON
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSERVATION POSTS
. The Problem
The U.S. Treaty Outline of April 18, 1962, contains in
Stage I, section E02, a reference to the establishment of
observation posts as one of a group of measures to reduce the
risk of war in the context of general. and complete disarmament.
This paper sets forth the United States position on the establish-
ment of observation posts as one of the separable, initial
measures that could be taken prior to agreement on Stage I.
(It supersedes those portions of DMP!ft17/1 of April 11, 1962,
which deal with observation posts.)
II. Recommendations
1. The U.S. Delegation should reiterate that it favors
the establishment of observation posts (OP) in certain parts of
Europe, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. as a separable, initial measure
that could be of value in enhancing military security, strength-
ening international confidence and facilitating progress toward
future arms control and disarmament measures. Any OP system
established prior to Stage I. of an agreement on general and
complete disarmament should be experimental, and subject to
periodic review.
2. Following the determination of a favorable consensus
in the North Atlantic Council, the U?S, Delegation should
initiate discussions with the U,S..S,R, on an OP system having
the scope, capabilities and characteristics set forth below.
To enable each NATO member to safeguard its national interests
and to participate directly in the negotiations at the appro-
priate time, the NAC will be kept closely informed of the
course of negoti,ati_ons
GROUP 3
Downgraded at 1.2-year
intervals; not
automatically declassified.
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3. To .-.void creating a false sense of security, the U.S.
should insi t on a system of demonstrable practical value for
these threats with which it deals, rejecting any system lacking
military ut:iliry or one intended merely as a symbolic gesture
to serve primarily political ends. The limitations of the
proposed system should be noted frankly in both private and
public comment.
4o The JOSa should oppose any OP arrangements that would
enhance the sL.tus of the GDR., formally equate NATO and the
Warsaw Pact.,', or serve Le consolidate the status quo in Central
Europe, Rat-'her., the. 1_'.S. should, as appropriate, stress its
view th :-t by enh yncing milit.,.ry security in Europe, an OP
system of the ki~..d discussed below should facilitate progress
toward the reunification of Germany.
5 While cc :~t.inuing to oppose a link of the kind the
Soviets h e proposed to troop reductions and denuclearization
in Gernmiy, the u,S0. should seek cc avoid having the negotia-
tions break prernturely on this issue. Instead the U.S. should
probe for c' 2firm:itti,-)n of v;3ric; us informal indications that the
Sovie s m=5 be willing to m'ak.e substantial modifications in
their prcypc: sed 1 i.-k.ag ,
I3.I~ Sum;r~ ry C'cwg lusiops
An OP sgreemer of the kind that might be negotiable with
the L'OS.SOR'. pred:icra.bl.e, a potential
utggra ~':r could tike c7.iv,'~.nt g'. of predicted cloud ctiover to
.sewher.e in Europe,
w r ? cur ~ irat hi .-tile ac t:iC)V4(-
a tee is *'o rno nit r force 1ev 1s~ This can be acne on an
'I
lrtt.w~rrr.i,.t ?F basis.
further from tht_l p lirt_ Of cc;.4fac-t.E the main task of air surveil-
with t:he eed for w4arx?ing of hostile action by
troops ..l rk?atdly r:? . r t h ' . c' i nt of con t::a c t the U.S. should be
F: r lp;ns
r~itli the SovierY. ...,...~
From the I'Sununary of Past Dise.ission cf O "serviticn Po`r,s""
attached as Annex F, It will be sk:en that, So,. let proposals for
"ground Control posts"" have. teen 63'::.hJe?c.m.: F:o ~u.ns.iderabLe varia-
tion since first advanced in 19 `r5 o fheogh set: forth with
varying nuances and lately with hint's of possible modification,
the one constant theme has been that OP must be. i i uked to
disarmament measures and specifically toy reduction:~ of foreign
forces in, and the I'denu:-Learizaticn"" of.~, Gerrrranyo The impli=,
cations of this approach must be seen in Oie L fight. of the. con-
tinued Soviet interest i.n a German peace treaty, a no?n-aggression
pact and other measures to cc"ns~l iii:;.te the Lit u.c- qury, in Central
Europe (while changing that of Ber`f.in) 0
In short.,, the Soviets hive n",t:' in the past shown mach
interest in. discuss i.ng the mi.lita'ry uti.lIty of c,unrrol. posts
pq.E se and have not viewed r hem ,is an arran.gemeenr t.u be super
Imposed on the existing pc~li tic al,~m l it ry sit xatiOn in EuroPeo
Rather, they appear to have cons i de.r`ed them a s part of a
process leading uLLimately to a tran.sforrrrat ion of pre-enr:
security arrangement S in Europe into scarnet h Lng :approaching a
tacitly, if not overtly, cooperative syst:em2 with substantially
reduced forces on both sides of the dividing l ineo Such an
arrangement would in turn appear to imply some common un.der-
standing regarding Germany, although pres:rmably this would
remain. onst/atedo
So long as the Soviets persist in l ink`: ng OP with measures
having such political connotations, we ~hc. rlcl o.-)n[.inue to
reject the l.inkago and there would be l i t t l e pro spe,_t of a
fruitful. negotiation. There .are indict io,ns2. however:, that
they may be prepared to modify the l ink o 1f so this may per-
mi.t. a useful discussion. which, for the first L.irne, could focus
on the mil i tary ut i i.t:y of an OP sys tem0
If the Soviets in Pict on an immediate link t.;) at. least
nominal, troop withd rawa l s 2 we cc _-!d .re.s?poond by p~A.nt:ing ou t- that
US troop redeployments now in process will result. in a reduce icon
of some US troops in Europe f roar the lr Lgh. point of
the build-up since i9600 We hould suggest that it is now the
turn of the USSR to make equivalent uni later l wi t i7drawa is from
Germany and/or Eascern Europe,
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It i jka - t, po'~~ -;A6 1e th?t r_ economit? con sider-lti,ln~, Ind tho
rrril:r.,try prt -I:Ve genes r:ed by the di,:`putte with Ch;n.i rrtav Art..
dui-o the S, , ac F s :_c, consider. the establishment ,f OP
of fact r '` r. t irg the future withdrawal. of some Sov" et ror,p
from Central Eu_rrope0 It. is also possible shat: they rn.jy ;n lrr te,
abandon eh ,ir. proposed links alt?uget.her as they have in con ie, -4rn
with at her neg,)t=.i..;A.1~arr_s when ready to achieve an IgrJe&ifle r.(.
"h L, would not imply that the Soviets had ab-i?Zdoned the
poll r.ica 1 oh joc; tivies which they now appear to pursued So 1,-:rig
as we make i i clear zhhat. we are not prepared to aCCepL1 an OP
system Lacking mi 1it.arv utility and justified primrri ly on
poll t .i.c:at. g(ocrndb however, this need not tnhrbi t -Art OP nego)ti
ationo Moret_av;er~ we need not allow them b) est;ab1L-h the pcsl.'iz.i~al
framework for the di.scussionso We should, as appropriate, -et.
re-
forth our view th_it: our OP proposal would fac i l..i gate One
un.i fi~.at:.i_nn of C'>ermjnv by strengthening European tiec-r i t.v an.d
thereby treat ing a better atmosphere for a just mars `,--. cif the
German pr,:) h
The ornplexI z_les of a mil it'ar?i ly useful OP cv trim are
such that i l.a.ng h.y E rtes of d.isciassion, would he req ' .tFd
merely fac see it chore any prospect. f,rr .an ag-eemrri,l'hi.,
sugge:=t.s the de~~r,.rhi.Lity of a deliberate -approach t,.~ they
Sovrteit~ with r nr~ ri mz m of fanfa ?e, and with puhi.i.c re,_~ti~;^.i?_t'i~ n of t, he dfii 1 tie; standing in the. way of agr`eement It
will he imp r rnt to avoid bringing the neg"t to as head
p'x^rriat relye Hither, we shcurd seek to lei+'.!- thhe
fo d`l??ciis 1csn ;-=ii; 9c+ng as possible tc, enable bath ~Ide- Lo
into account. In
t.?ake .h n.g`ir g 1 r ;rrr -~t.ank es : the end r r
ar ti n ri iy .1 1.sa- .,_I ~t raid i.n the ',ase at t hE E. -_ han t_rel tV
wherein the Sov ct-7 L_-in t',e brought to accept. an arrd k n .a
baskk : w~h.Ls:h, ern#. i i n.+)w:, they have rejected
V1., M ra i f''rrz Nei otiaLionS
Feliawing an m lt"r,al presentat1en of the hr-c:,,311 STS pt-it
i.r1 the. ENDC we L*h~~i:IId =eek Lo arrange for ,) merEo der i'o led d
ss1z