CIA RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS RELATED TO WESTERN PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN BASE STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00972A000100180027-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: November 17, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

.Approved For Rel a a 2000/09 bWi
No Foreign
64)P79B00972Ac00 Jp18QQ -3
CIA RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS RELATED TO
WESTERN PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN
BASE STUDY
Approved For Release 2000/08 B00972A000100180027-3
No Foreign Dissem
 r
W CA 1W Q
Approved For Reese 2000/08 - DP79BOQ 2A000100180027-3
Page
Soviet Efforts in New Ship Technology--
Propulsion and Hull Forms . . . . 1
Soviet Merchant Ship Technology. .
Satellite Communications . . .
CPR Industrial Projections . . .
Satellite Surveillance.
Approved For Release 2000/08 P791300972A000100180027-3
 Approved For Re}se 2000/tDP79B0Q,,2A000100180027-3
Soviet Efforts in New Ship Technology--
Propulsion and Hull Forms
Can it be foreseen when or if the USSR might develop
80-100 knot merchant ships or naval vessels?
1. There is considerable evidence that. the
Soviets have an energetic research and development
program directed toward achieving high speeds in
oceangoing marine vehicles. This program is under
way in the Ministry of Shipbuilding and was fairly
well organized by 1964. Some of the research effort
of the Soviets' foremost aeronautical research center
has been tapped to solve the aero-hydrodynamic
problems involved.
2. The Soviet approach is quite similar to
that of the West and calls for continuation of
hydrofoil and air cushion vehicle development,
coupled with an attempt to introduce new forms
using the ram-wing and wing-in-ground-effect con-
cepts. The Soviet output of theoretical papers
is impressive in quantity, but not in quality.
3. Authoritative Soviet naval officers are
aware of the naval missions that vehicles of the
hydrofoil, air cushion, and ram-wing type could
carry out. The leading Soviet naval seaplane
designer advocated as early as 1963 the con-
struction of 1,000-ton seaplanes to fill the
"speed gap" in marine transportation.
4. Hydrofoil craft adequate for river service
first appeared in 1957, and by 1965 nine civil
types having gross weights up to 120 tons and one
naval coastal patrol type of about 50 tons had
reached operational status. Two different proto-
types of air cushion vehicles that appeared in
1962 have been followed by two further models,
one of which appears to have the interest of the
Soviet Navy. These do not appear to be equal to
Western types in performance, however.
Approved For Release 2000/0 P79B00972A000100180027-3
 -Approved For Re ea a 2000/ DP79B0A000100180027-3
5. In the summer of 1967 a vehicle 300 feet
long having a large, low-aspect area wing and a
large aerodynamic empennage was seen in the Caspian
Sea, apparently being readied for underway trials.
This vehicle could be an advanced marine craft of
the ram-wing, wing-in-ground-effect, or low-flying-
seaplane type. This vehicle may represent an
attempt to beat the West in achieving an operational
model of a very large and very high speed marine
vehicle.
6. In sum, we estimate that sometime during
1970-80 the USSR will probably develop merchant
and naval vessels capable of speeds of 100 knots
or more. These would of course be of the nondis-
placement types referred to above. Assuming the
solution of problems connected with stability,
control, and powering, we would expect a few
vehicles to be available by 1975.
Approved For Release 2000/08/ P79B00972A000100180027-3
 Approved For Relesa a 2000/)11 DP79B0EA000100180027-3
Soviet Merchant Ship Technology
What will be the status of automation in ship oper-
ations, loading and unloading, containerization
by 1980?
1, In quality and extent of application of
mechanization and automation of merchant ship
operations, the USSR probably is on a par with
all but the most progressive of the leading mari-
time nations. The most modern fleets have ships
whose control equipment is more advanced and more
sophisticated than that aboard any Soviet merchant
ships currently operating on the high seas.
2. Soviet emphasis in this field is about the
same as that of other maritime nations--mechanization
and centralization of the reporting and recording
of performance data on steam and diesel power plants,
mechanization of navigational computations, and
installation of remote control devices for oper-
ation of the power plant from the bridge. These
developments reflect progress toward automation,
rather than pure automation of ship operations.
3. The USSR is engaged in considerable re-
search on ship automation. For a number of years,
the Soviets have been using a Caspian. Sea tanker,
Inzhener Pustoshkin, as a floating test bed, for
experiments in shipboard automation. The greatest
emphasis, as in the free world, has been on auto-
mation of control over the operation of main and
auxiliary engines. Equipment installed in this
ship has made possible a reduction in the size of
its crew from 33 to 23 men. No significant re-
ductions resulting from automation have yet occurred
aboard any of the ships of the operating fleet.
4. During the period 1970-80, the USSR. pre-
sumably will attempt to keep pace with other
leading maritime nations in the automation of ship
o Lions. Some of the ships acquired by the
Sovie rchant fleet during this period will
have ex ive automation and by the end of the
period suc ships should make up a substantial
part of the fleet.
Approved For Release 2000/0 DP79B00972A0001001800'27-3
 Approved For Re ea a 2000/ - DP79B0Q 2A000100180027-3
5. Most of the modern dry cargo ships in the
Soviet merchant fleet are general purpose vessels,
capable of carrying grain on one leg of a voyage
and returning with general cargo. The cargo
handling gear on these ships is as good as that
on comparable Western ships. Many of the more
progressive Western dry cargo fleets include dry
cargo ships designed for specific trade routes or
the movement of particular classes of cargo. All
of these ships are better equipped than the general
purpose Soviet ships for the loading and unloading
of the types of cargo they are intended to carry.
The specialized vessels include container ships,
ships with heavy lift booms with capacities between
150 and 300 tons, ships with side openings for
forklift trucks and elevators for speedy handling
of general cargo, and roll-on/roll-off ships for
wheeled vehicles.
6. The Soviets are now building roll-on/roll-off
type ships. To date, all units have gone to the
navy, and none has yet been delivered to the merchant
fleet. There is no indication of any Soviet intention
to acquire ships with specialized cargo handling
equipment comparable to that on the western ships
mentioned above during the current five-year plan
period, which ends in 1970. Soviet acquisition of
such ships during 1971-80 would most likely be a
function of need rather than of ability to make or
purchase them.
7. For many years the USSR has carried small
quanitities of cargo in containers on conventional
dry cargo ships. These containers have been small
(up to five tons) and designed primarily for rail
use. The USSR has no seagoing ships designed for
the movement of containers and no plans to build
any through the end of 1970. The Soviets are
developing a series of 10- and 20-ton containers
th ill meet the requirements of the International
Stan zation Organization. They plan to equip
Lening Riga, and Odessa--ports that are important
in Soviet ade with Western Europe--with container-
handling equipment. At the same time, plans are
under way to adapt several ships for the transport
of containers between Riga and Rotterdam. Whether
the USSR acquires container ships during the period
1971-80 will depend largely on the number of.trade
routes on which there are significant movements of
general cargo in both directions--a prerequisite
for profitable container operations.
Approved For Release 2000/08/2 ? ~?^P79B00972A000100180027-3
 -Approved For Re ea a 2000/0 79BOA000100180027-3
Satellite Communications
What is the likelihood that the Soviet Union will
have the capability to incapacitate or seriously
degrade communications based entirely on satellite
relay, by 1980?
The USSR has the capability, at present, to
incapacitate or seriously degrade communications
relayed by the communication satellites being'used
by the US. Despite future sophistication of com-
munication satellite technology there seems to be
no cogent reason why the Soviets should not continue
to enjoy this capability.
Approved For Release 2000/0 P79B00972A000100180027-3
 -Approved For Re a 2000/0 P79BOQ A000100180027-3
CPR Industrial Projections
What are the projections of Chinese industrial
capacities and capabilities to 1980 and their
related military limitations and implications?
1. The ambitions which have produced the ad-
vanced weapons program in Communist China will
almost certainly remain to some degree during the
period of this projection, as will the competition
with the USSR in the Communist world and the hostility
toward the US. These factors will continue strongly
to affect the allocation of resources, at some ex-
pense to measures required to achieve sustained
economic growth. There are important limitations,
however, as to how far and how long the regime can
go on neglecting development of the general in-
dustrial base.
2. The underlying assumptions for this in-
dustrial projection are as follows:
a. Development and production of military
hardware will continue to be heavily favored in the
allocation of resources.
b. A large increase in the already sub-
stantial proportion of the scarce industrial and
technological resources now devoted to military
purposes would severely cramp the growth of the
economy, which in turn would severely cramp future
weapons development.
c. Consequently, for the entire period
through 1980 the Chinese cannot sustain an expansion
in production of military hardware much in excess
of the growth in heavy industrial production.
3. Assuming that political turmoil such as
that of the past year does not recur and that food
G.Tis~es will not develop to the extent that it will
rROM-MM necessary to divert a large portion of
Chin e resources to the improvement of agricultural
output, industrial production in the period through
1980 may grow at an average annual rate of five to
Approved For Release 2000/0RDP79B00972A000100180027-3
 Approved For Reba a 2000/0 P79BO 9(7 A0001 00180027-3
six percent. This rate of growth is less than
that in 1963-66 because the capacity idled by the
collapse of the Leap Forward was largely taken up
by the end of 1966; thus future growth in industry
will depend primarily on additions to plant capacity.
If Chinese industry does grow at an annual rate of
five to six percent, the productive capacity of
industry in 1980 will be roughly double the level
of 1966.
4. Within industry, the various sectors are
likely to continue to grow at different rates. Heavy
industrial, production may grow at seven to eight
percent per year, in which case in 1980 it would
be two and a half to three times the level of 1966.
Output in the military and related industries will
probably grow at the same pace or only slightly
faster. Notable gains in productive capabilities
will be made in such priority segments of industry
as military machine building, electronic equipment,
petrochemicals, and special metals, but a substantial
part of industry--particularly the plants producing
consumer goods--will still be plagued with outdated
equipment and technology.
Approved For Release 2000/0 'DP79BOO972AOOO1OO18OO27-3
 -Approved For Rela a 2000/Mff@*S*DP79B0( 97 A000100180027-3
Satellite Surveillance
What is the likelihood of the development by the
Soviets of an all-weather satellite ship sur-
veillance system by 1980 or soon thereafter?
The USSR has tested nearly all of the components
required to develop a satellite ship surveillance
system. Whether the Soviets develop such a system
in the 1970's depends on what they consider the
threat to be. It presently appears that the threat
will be primarily from submarines. Since satellites
do not appear to be able to detect submarines, we
estimate that the USSR will not develop such a
system in this time period.
Approved For Release 2000/ DP79B00972A000100180027-3
 -Approved For Relgape 2000/ DP79B0Q, AOOO1OO18OO27-3
Estimate One
What are the possible political and economic
strategies of the USSR and CPR in the Afro-
Asian area in 1970-80?
1. The USSR and China are expected to expand
their economic offensive in the Afro-Asian area,
as elsewhere in the less developed world, during
the period 1970-80. (For the present purpose, the
Afro-Asian area is defined to include only countries
bordering on or in the Western Pacific and Indian
oceans.) The motives for this effort are the
familiar ones of enhancing political influence
and national security and weakening Western positions.
To this end, they are interested in broadening their
foreign economic relationships, creating situations
of economic dependence on them, promoting the spread
of socialist institutions, and gaining adherents for
their political and economic policies.
2. The Afro-Asian area obviously has considerable
strategic interest for both the USSR and China.
Its proximity probably leads them to regard the
Afro-Asian area as one in which their influence
should be greater than it is. Both countries
probably feel that certain countries in the area
are, or could be made, fertile grounds for efforts
to promote Communist ideology and foreign policy.
Both countries have obvious reasons for wishing
to enlarge their influence in such populous countries
as India and Indonesia. So long as the ideological
and political divisions continue between the USSR
and China, each will be interested in building up
its presence and influence in the countries of the
area at the expense of the other.
3. The USSR can be expected to intensify its
efforts to develop economic relations with Afro-
sian countries. The Soviet economy has the capa-
ity to support a larger aid program at present
th 'it is supporting, and this capability will
increase greatly by 1980. Soviet aid extensions
and deliveries will not necessarily increase
correspondingly, however. By the 1970's, the
Approved For Release 2000/0 P79BOO972AOOO1OO18OO27-3
 Approved For Relsa a 2000/0 P79B0QA000100180027-3
Soviet leadership may have some second thoughts about
the political value of the program. A reappraisal
of the program may also be prompted by growing
popular opposition.to it.
4. The Soviet approach to aid commitments
seems to be largely opportunistic, reflecting
sophisticated long-term views of the political
advantages to be gained. Additional commitments
thus are likely to be inhibited very little by the
present political complexion of the recipient. The
size of Soviet aid commitments during 1970-80
probably will in some instances be limited not
by the ability and willingness of the USSR to
provide aid but by the ability of the recipient
to absorb it efficiently and the recipients' con-
cern not to become overly dependent on the USSR.
5. In the past, the Afro-Asian countries have
received about one-third of Soviet aid extensions.
This proportion probably will at least be maintained
during 1970-80 and may well rise to something like
one-half. New commitments of Soviet aid to Afro-
Asian countries could easily average $400 million
to $500 million annually during 1970-80. The value
of economic aid deliveries should be substantially
larger than the recent annual average of some
$140 million.
6. The USSR probably will make further sub-
stantial aid commitments--possibly well in excess
of $1 billion--to India in support of the two five-
year plans scheduled to be initiated during 1970-80.
The Soviet government also has given informal
assurances of aid to Pakistan's economic develop-
ment program for 1970-75 and to Iran for assistance
beyond the period covered by existing agreements.
or countries that have received Soviet aid in
t. ast--Indonesia, Ceylon, Burma, Cambodia,
SoMA, 'aKenya, Tanzania--probably will be recipients
of her assistance. The USSR probably will be
esplly alert to opportunities to build up
Soviet influence in Indonesia and in such western-
oriented countries as Thailand and the Philippines.
- 10 -
Approved For Release 2000/0RI~-Q r~-ROP79B00972A000100180027-3
 Approved For ReIe a 2000/0 P79B0(U7,2A000100180027-3
7. Soviet aid activity will continue to provide
opportunities for the introduction into the Afro-
Asian countries of Soviet goods, technicians, designs,
and techniques. It will stimulate trade both directly
(through the obligation to repay credits in goods)
and indirectly (through increased contact and closer
relations). Additional trade will be stimulated by
repayment of credits for military aid. Soviet trade
with the Afro-Asian countries reached about $600
million in 1965, or 20 percent more than in 1962
and eight times as much as in 1955. This trade can
be expected to continue increasing at a moderate
rate during 1970-80. As in the past, trade with
India probably will account for much of the rise
in Soviet trade with the Afro-Asian countries.
8. Although China's future is clouded by the
current political and economic disturbances, a
program of aid and trade seems likely to occupy
a prominent place in its relations with Afro-Asian
countries during 1970-80. Chinese efforts probably
will be much smaller than the Soviet program, however.
China will continue to have only a fraction of the
USSR's economic capability to support aid programs
and develop trade with the Afro-Asian countries.
China's great concern with Communist ideology might
prompt it to be more selective than the USSR in its
choice of aid clients.
9. China's extensions of economic aid of $500
million to the Afro-Asian countries since 1956
represent about one-half of total Chinese extensions.
Of this total, roughly 60 percent remains to be
delivered. The Chinese effort has been focused on
Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, and--more recently--
Pakistan. Except for Pakistan, there is a virtual
hiatus in its programs in all of these countries
because of political reverses or deteriorating
relations. Resolution of internal Chinese political
problems should, however, eventually permit the
nese aid program to regain its earlier momentum
en to expand to new levels during 1970-80.
Approved For Release 2000/0P -QQUWWlP79B00972A000100180027-3
 -Approved For Reke 2000/0 P79B0QW7 AOOO1OO18OO27-3
Estimate Two
What are the possible maritime objectives and
activities of the Soviet Union for the period
1970-80, particularly with reference to the
Indian Ocean and Western Pacific?
1. Soviet maritime objectives provide for
increased activity for. both the Soviet merchant
fleet and the fishing fleet in the Indian Ocean
and Western Pacific during the period 1970-80.
Soviet plan data indicate that the Soviet merchant
fleet will more than double in tonnage between 1970
and 1980. Because Soviet foreign trade is planned
to increase at a significantly faster rate, the
relative share of Soviet seaborne trade carried
by the USSR's own ships in 1980 probably will not
be any greater than the 50 percent carried in 1966.
The tabulation below presents official plan goals
for the fleet and its performance in 1970, the
final year of the current five-year plan, and
tentative plan goals for 1980.
Year
Fleet Size
31 December
(million DWT)
Cargo Turnover
(billion
ton-miles)
Cargo Volume
(million
metric tons)
1966
9
240
130
1970
Plan
13
38Q
190
1980
Plan
27
570
380
2. The USSR has not indicated what geographic
areas will receive the impact of increased merchant
fleet activities. If present trends continue,
Soviet merchant ships in the following trades
should be increasingly active in the Indian Ocean
and Western Pacific: grain from the west coast
of Canada to the Soviet Far East; coal and wood
from the Soviet Far East to Japan; general cargo
from the Black Sea to Indonesia, Ceylon, India,
and North Vietnam; pig iron from the Black Sea to
Japan; petroleum from the Black Sea to India,
Ceylon, Burma, Japan, and North Vietnam; and wood,
cellulose, and paper from Sakhalin to Cuba, India,
and Europe.
- 12 -
Approved For Release 2000/08
P79BOO972AOOO1OO18OO27-3
AWAMW
 -Approved For Rel a 2000/0 P79B00, ,2A000100180027-3
3. The USSR also will continue to expand its
fishing activities rapidly in the decade 1970-80.
The increased catch of fish will permit a rise in
domestic consumption and expansion of exports. Also
the USSR is likely to benefit from aid to fishing
industries of developing countries.
4. The USSR is one of the leading fishing
countries in the world, ranking only below Peru,
Japan, and possibly Communist China. In the past
16 years the Soviet fish catch (live weight) more
than tripled from 1.8 million metric tons in 1950
to 6.0 million metric tons in 1966. During this
period the USSR was able to reverse its position
as a net importer of fish while increasing the
consumption of fish from 7.0 kilograms per capita
in 1950 to 12.9 kilograms in 1966.
5. The current level of the Soviet fishing
industry has been achieved by building the largest
and most modern fishing fleet in the world and by
aggressively moving into the major international
fisheries. The Soviet fishing fleet in 1964
numbered some 20,000 vessels of about 4 million
gross register tons and 3.5 million horsepower.
Several hundred large refrigerated trawlers and
base ships that can operate thousands of miles
from home ports form the backbone of this fleet.
6. The Soviets plan to increase their fish
catch by 1970 to 9 million metric tons or about
50 percent above the 1966 level. To meet this
goal they plan to add about 1,500 ships to their
fishing fleet, concentrating on ships capable of
operating continuously at sea for three to four
months. Port facilities are being improved, and
an extensive research program to discover new
fishing areas and to develop new fishing gear
and techniques is in effect.
7. The Soviet position in world fishing
should have improved further by 1980. In the
1970-80 period, the Soviets probably will continue
their aggressive campaign to play a leading and
dominant role in international fishing.
?-?i. eries in the Pacific and Indian oceans,
Approved For Release 2000/0 DP79B00972A000100180027-3
 Approved For Reese 2000/0 P79BOOAOOO1OO18OO27-3
especially the former, are expected to provide an
ever growing share of the Soviet fish catch. In
1965 the Pacific Ocean provided about 1.8 million
metric tons or 32 percent of the Soviet fish catch
and is expected to provide about 3 million tons or
33 percent of the catch by 1970. More than 100
large trawlers--about double the present number--
are to be operating out of Soviet Far East ports.
Large fishing ports are under construction at
Petropavlovsk, Nakhodka, Vladivostok, and
Kamchatka to provide processing and servicing
facilities, which currently are bottlenecks to
expansion. Fishing activities are to be greatly
extended into tropical and subtropical waters.
8. The Indian Ocean, where the USSR began
fishing operations only in the early 1960's,
currently is of little importance to Soviet
fishing. The catch in 1965 was a mere 65,000
tons, and the 1970 plan calls for only 190,000
tons or 2 percent of the total planned catch.
The Soviets, however, apparently consider the
Indian Ocean to be a potentially lucrative fishing
area. A considerable research effort is being
devoted to the Indian Ocean to discover and develop
new fishing grounds. Furthermore, the Soviets have
initiated fishing agreements with a number of
countries having access to the waters of the
Indian Ocean, including Ceylon, Egypt, Somalia,
and India. These agreements generally give the
Soviets permission to carry out feasibility studies,
and, in some cases, to build fishing port facilities,
which will provide the Soviets with nearby bases to
exploit any potential discoveries. Currently,
Soviet trawlers in the Indian Ocean must be sup-
ported from distant bases in the Black Sea or the
Soviet Far East.
- 14 -
Approved For Release 2000/0%29. QA 11 P79BOO972AO00100180027-3