Addendum to CIA Response to Questions Related to Western Pacific and Indian Ocean Base Study Chinese Communist Influence in the Area

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00972A000100180031-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 31
• Content Type: REPORT

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Addendum to
CIA Response to Questions Related to
Western Pacific and Indian Ocean Base Study
Chinese Communist Influence in the Area
What are the estimated maritime objectives, capabilities (in-
cluding naval) and activities of the CPR in this area for the
1970-1980 period?
1. CPR naval and maritime activities in the western
Pacific beyond Chinese coastal waters will increase consider-
ably in the period from the present low level while Indian
Ocean activities will remain limited. The naval. and fishing
fleets will probably extend their areas of normal operations
beyond territorial waters into the China Seas, and Chinese
s
merchant ships will carry a grving share of the country's
trade with its Pacific and Indian Ocean trading partners. China
will continue to view the security of the mainland as the
paramount consideration in any outlook through 1.980, and in-
creases in Chinese naval activity will continue to reflect a
defensive strategy.
2. Through the 1970's, the Chinese Communists will prob-
ably continue their naval development along well, established
lines. Emphasis will continue to be placed on providing the
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Chinese Communist Navy (CCN) with modern conventional
weapon systems in order to improve its capability to con-
trol and defend coastal waters. About half-dozen missile
submarines will probably be deployed by 1980, however,
giving the navy an offensive capability against Far Eastern
targets. China will probably have its one G-class missile
submarine operational with missiles about 1970, and five
more may be built and commissioned in the next ten years.
G-class submarines can give effective coverage to targets in
Asia and the Western Pacific.
3. To accomplish its defensive mission, the Chinese
Communist Navy is developing a coastal defense force which
includes patrol ships and a fairly modern submarine fleet
capable of out-of-area operations. However, even though
China's coastal defense capability has been increasing through
the addition of ships the navy's ability to conduct extended
and out-of-area operations remains largely untested. There-
fore, until at least 1970, the CCN is expected to remain a
"close-in" coastal defense force exerting little influence
outside Chinese territorial waters.
4. Beginning in the early 1970's the CCN can be expected
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to increase operations and to establish regular naval patrols
beyond its immediate coastal waters. The increase in naval
activity and influence in the East and South China Seas will
probably be restricted to within several hundred miles of
the China coast, and operations east of the China Seas, if
any, will be infrequent and unusual exceptions to routine
operations.
5. China will probably be able to exert only a negligible
naval influence with conventional forces in the Indian Ocean
unless considerable logistic support and operating bases were
provided by a country in the area: Possible activity in this
area includes missile range support and naval. visits to
Indian Ocean ports for political purposes.
6. Although Communist China's plan goals are unavailable
in the fields of trade and merchant shipping for 1968-1980,
present trends indicate that China's trade with key countries
adjacent to the western Pacific and Indian Ocean will increase
at moderate rates in the short run, at least. China's mer-
chant fleet will probably grow at a faster rate than its
foreign trade. Consequently, an increasing share of China's
trade will be carried in its own ships. Despite restraints on
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the growth of China's foreign trade, the growth that does
occur will lead to increased movements of Chinese Communist
cargoes and ships through the western Pacific and Indian
Ocean.
7. If present relationships and trends continue, China's
main trading partners in the western Pacific will be Japan,
USSR, Hong Kong, Australia, North Korea, and North Vietnam.
China's chief imports from these countries include wheat,
rubber, timber, fertilizer, cement, coal, industrial equipment,
and chemicals. Her exports to the area include textiles, salt,
foodstuffs, coal, and construction equipment. In the Indian
Ocean (where China's total trade is about one quarter of the
value of its trade with western Pacific nations) China's
major trading partners are Malaysia, Singapore, Pakistan,
Iraq, and Tanzania. Its exports to this area include food,
textiles, coal, and construction materials; its imports include
cotton, rubber, and sisal.
8. There are no Chinese Communist fishing fleet opera-
tions in the Indian Ocean at the present time. The lack
of Chinese fishing ports or port rights on the Indian Ocean
and the absence of modern, refrigerated fishing vessels
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precludes such operations. CPR fishing operations in the
Indian Ocean are not likely to be undertaken before 1980
because of current underutilization of fishing grounds
adjacent to the Chinese mainland. The fishing grounds
within 20 miles of the 8,700 miles of coastline comprise
almost 24 percent of the total fishing grounds of the world.
At the end of 1962 (latest information available) only 10
percent of the total number of ports and bays suitable for
fishing operations were being used for such operations. The
most likely direction of expansion of the Chinese Communist
fishing fleet operations, therefore, is in the continental
shelf areas. It is doubtful that Communist China would have
the capability or need to engage in long-range fishing in
the Indian Ocean through 1980.
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