Dear Bob;

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00972A000100190015-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: February 26, 1963
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 C1A 79B00972A000100190015-5
DRAFT CO Q
2 6 FEB 1963
Your letter concerning the intelligence estimates on Soviet
ground forces raises some very serious points about their relia-
bility, consistency and ranges of uncertainty. I agree that we
need a new and thorough study to evaluate all available information
and to produce estimates which better reflect the ranges of uncer-
tainty concerning the aspects of Soviet ground forces specified in
your letter.
I understand that you have sent a memorandum to the Chairman
of Joint Chiefs of Staff requesting much the same type of study;
this was forwarded to DIA for implementation. I have discussed
this matter with General Carroll and General Collins, and we propose
that the two studies be merged. A member of my staff has discussed
this proposal with Dr. Enthoven of your office who has agreed in
principle.
If you agree, we propose to handle the problem as follows:
1. Establish a'CIA/DIA task force under CIA direction,
2. This task force will review all pertinent evidence
and prepare a thorough and objective study on. manpower,
equipment, and the qualitative aspects of Soviet ground forces.
I plan to ask the Board of National Estimates to review this
study, and of course General Carroll and I will review it.
3. Wherever possible, the ranges of uncertainty will be
treated explicitly according to the definitiveness and the
reliability of the evidence.
4. A preliminary report will be forwarded to you in
July, and at this point we will decide on the type of long
run program that will best serve to improve our estimates
in this field.
We would like to take advantage of your offer of assistance.
The participation of one or two qualified people from your staff
as observers could aid us in interpreting your requirements. for
information and in obtaining US cost data for comparative purposes.
They could also help you in evaluating the results of the study.
Assuming that the arrangements outlined above meet with your
approval, General Carroll and I will initiate the study. Please
nominate one or two members of your staff as observers for this
project.
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I would like to comment on some of the substantive statements
in your letter. In evaluating Soviet military forces there is
the danger of inferring that the Soviets have the same doctrine on
organization and employment of forces as the US. Even in 1960,
the combat tasks envisioned by the US and the USSR for their ground
divisions resulted in different organizational and deployment
postures; recent changes appear to have increased these differences.
For example, Soviet divisional strengths are far below those of
either the US pentomic or ROAD divisions. It is now estimated that
there are about half as many men in a typical combat ready Soviet
tank division as there are in a typical US armored division. Other
significant differences exist in procurement policy, logistic support,
and mobilization concepts.
In reply to your request for information on how.the Soviets are
allocating their military expenditures, I have attached to this letter
a recent CIA study prepared in support of NIE 11-4+-63 which is
currently in process. This study includes estimates of expenditures
by :mission and category in terms which are as comparable to those of
the US as Soviet organization and data limitations permit. There is
also an extensive. section on the similarities and differences in the
scope of US accounts and those used in the study. The study covers
the period 1958 through 1967; however, the estimates for the future
have a very wide range of uncertainty. The Agency has made similar
studies annually for more than five years, and although the full
details of such studies have not been included in National. Intelli-
gence Estimates, they have been used to assess the economic feasibility
of estimated Soviet military programs. It was the long history of
experience in this field which permitted the Agency to contribute
the "costing" aspect of the work of the CIA-DIA Joint Analysis Group
mentioned in your letter. Furthermore, another Estimate (NIE 11-5-63),
currently in process, will examine the problems facing the Soviet
economy including the broader aspects of military and space programs.
Sincerely,
Honorable Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.
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