REAPPRAISAL OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00972A000100190029-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2001
• Sequence Number: 29
• Content Type: REPORT

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REAPPRAISAL OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES
THE PROBLEM
1. To review the pertinent intelligence studies and the
all-source evidence'pertaining to the manpower, equipment,
costs, and the qualitative aspects of the Soviet ground forces,
to prepare a thorough re-evaluation with special emphasis on
the ranges of uncertainty associated with our estimates of
these forces for the Mid-1963 time period, and to establish
recommendations for new priorities in collection and processing
as. appropriate.
SCOPE
2. This.study is to be limited to the Soviet ground forces,
that is, the counterpart of the US General Purpose Forces,
Army. Tactical missile units integral to the ground forces
will be included, but Tactical Air Forces and Army Aviation
are to be excluded.
TIME SPAN
3. The time period to be examined includes, insofar as
necessary, the past decade because:
Secretary McNamara's staff has asked for an expendi-
tures series covering the period back to 1950 - the years
immediately prior (1948-49) are necessary to obtain a good
fix on 1950. The Secretary's staff is interested in probable
Soviet responses to alternate US courses of action and whether
or not such responses are within Soviet economic capabilities.
Historical changes in the size and composition of.Soviet-
ground forces are among the key ingredients for the deter
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b. SecDef also requires a review and an understanding
of the kinds, quality, and patterns of evidence on the Soviet
ground forces within the recent past.
c. A review of the recent development of the.Soviet
ground forces is needed to understand the present stage of
organizational and technical development.
DIRECTION AND RESPONSIBILITY
~!. The study is to be conducted by a panel of CIA/DIA.
personnel under the co-chairmenship of the senior CIA member
and the senior DIA member. The responsibility of the panel
will be:
a. To prepare the interim report and final study based
on all-source contributions as indicated in paragraph 8, and
in so doing to effect the following.
b. To hear detailed briefings by CIA, DIA, NSA, etc. on
the evidence and examine the,evidence as necessary.
c. To evaluate the evidence as it pertains to the
objectives of this study.
d. To-examine the impact of alternative assumptions in
key instances.
e. To evaluate the effect-of new or incompletely ex-
ploited intelligence information on the ranges of uncertainty.
f. To offer continuing guidance and counsel to CIA and DIA
analysts and give briefings when requested.
5. CIA and DIA components will be assigned responsibility for
supporting the study within their prime areas of competence
(See outline, paragraph 8.} The OSD staf ho-are made
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available to the project will function as observers. In this
.role they will assist in the provision of comparative and
analogous cost and other US information, will assist in align-
ing the OSD requirements and'the objectives of the project, and
will keep the OSD staff and the project panel abreast; of
significant developments relating to the project.
6. The questions which have prompted this re-evaluation cover
all aspects of the ground forces, but can be incorporated
within the general sub-headings: A. Organization and Posture,
B. Equipment Production and Inventories, and C. Costs. Much
of the breadth of the subject, the material to be examined,
and the judgments asked for are likely to require an extended
period of study. Thus, the request for a preliminary report
in August, 1963 necessitates setting limited objectives for
that time.
7. The remaining four months in which the panel will. be pre-
paring its final report will provide time to concentrate on
exploitation of new evidence relating to the subject of the
August report and to complete the re-appraisal of (a) combat
support and rear area units; (b) mobilization; (c) doctrine
and strategy; and (d) implications for the future.
8. The following outline provides the framework of the
August 1963 interim report. Preliminary all-source contribu-
tions are to be submitted to the Panel by the agency indicated
by 1 July 1963. A similar outline subsequently will be pre-
pared for the final comprehensive report to be completed 1
December 1963.
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Organization and Posture of Soviet Active Line Divisions
1. Command and Control
Historical Developments (CIA/DIA).
Types (DIA)
Strengths (DIA)
Costs (CIA)
Ranges of Uncertainty and Methodology (CIA/DIA)
Validity Considerations and Alternative
Possibilities (CIA/DIA)
2. Tactical Units
Historical Developments (CIA/DIA)
Types (DIA)
Strengths (DIA)
Costs (CIA)
Ranges of Uncertainty and Methodology (CIA/DIA)
Validity Considerations and Alternative
Possibilities (CIA/DIA)
Effectiveness
Readiness (DIA)
Deployment (DIA)
Staying Power (DIA)
Trends (CIA/DIA)
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