INTERIM REPORT OF THE CIA/DIA PANEL ON THE SOVIET GROUND FORCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00972A000100190037-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: September 3, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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DIA DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE 3 SEP 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
THROUGH: Acting Deputy Director (Intelligence)
SUBJECT: Interim Report of the CIA/DIA Panel on the
Soviet Ground Force
REFERENCE; DCI Letter to Secretary McNamara, Subject: CIk/DIA
Study of the Soviet Ground Force, 8 April. 1963
1. This memorandum contains background information and
recommends certain actions in paragraph 5 which you should take
at the earliest possible time. Paragraph 6 presents a proposal
for your consideration. The attached envelope contains the
following papers pertinent to this memorandum:
a. a folder of background correspondence,
b. the interim report of the CIA/DIA Panel, and
c. a draft of a letter to Secretary McNamara,
proposed for your signature, transmitting
the interim report.
2. In reply to Secretary McNamara's request of 13 February,
you sent him the referenced letter which stated that a CIA/DIA
Panel had been set up to study the Soviet ground force and that
an interim report would be sent to him in August. Your letter
also stated that you would decide on "the type of long run pro-
gram that will best serve to improve our estimates in this field."
3. After considerable fruitless negotiation with DIA, the
CIA/DIA Panel started operating productively in June; since that
time, DIA co-operation has been exemplary. The Panel has now
finished its interim report which covers two of the seven ques-
tions which concerned the Secretary. (Considerable background
work has already been started on some of the other questions.)
The interim report is the result of an exhaustive, objective and
DIA REVIEW COMPLETED
downgrading and I
deciassitI tie,,
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thorough study and is endorsed by both the DIA and CIA members
of the Panel. commented on an earlier
draft, and those comments wiic a Panel considered pertinent
have been incorporated.
4. A comparison of the estimates in the most recent
National Intelligence Estimate dealing with the Soviet ground
force (NIE 11-14-62) and the assessments presented in the interim
report of the Panel shows no major inconsistencies; however, the
NIE numbers are generally higher and imply greater precision than
seems justified by the Panel's review of the evidence. The attached
table presents some comparisons between the NIE and the Panel's
interim report.
5. It is recommended that you approve this interim report
of the Panel and send it with the proposed transmittal letter to
Secretary McNamara. The principal conclusions and a general
understanding of the interim report can be obtained by reading
the first five pages and scanning page 14, 24-29, and 59-63.
Before transmitting the interim report, it would be appropriate
for you to tell General Carroll that you are sending it to the
Secretary and inquire about the General's reaction. I under-
stand that (DIA co-chairman of the Panel) had a
three-hour discussion on this matter with General Carroll who
feels that the interim report should be forwarded to the Secretary
as the tentative conclusions of CIA/DIA Panel but that the final
report (expected early next year) should represent the agreed
views of both CIA and DIA (not just the Panel's) with any disagree-
ments noted.
6. Because certain important inadequacies of the evidence
on the Soviet ground force were found in the course of the Panel's
work, it is recommended that you consider setting up a group
from within the intelligence community to determine what should
be done about these inadequacies. (This problem should not delay
the forwarding of the interim report to Secretary McNamara.)
7. The following findings as to the adequacy of the evi-
dence should be noted:
25X1
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a. The evidence available on those aspects of the
problem considered in the interim report is not adequate
for narrow-range, high-confidence, quantitative assessments.
c. Based on a preliminary review, the CIA members of
the Panel feel (though this is not stated in the interim
report) that the evidence presently available will yield
very little about the inventories or production of ground
force equipment. The information currently available on
this subject is generally old and very fragmentary. On
many items which are sure to have accounted for a major
portion of the Soviet expenditures on land armaments (such
as ammunition), there appears to be no direct evidence on
which to base reasonable assessments.
8. Some of the inadequacies of evidence probably can be
overcome by new collection programs and higher priorities for
processing information; however, it is unlikely that; any projects
which can now be undertaken will yield the evidence necessary
for producing the kinds of assessments on important aspects of
the Soviet ground force that are desired by policy planners.
In order to check this pessimistic view, it is suggested that
you consider setting up a group of collectors, processors and
estimators to:
a. determine the kinds of information that are needed;
b. determine how much of this information additional
collection, processing and analysis can produce;
and
c. assess whether the costs involved are worth the
improvements in assessments which are likely
to result.
CIA Member, CIA/DIA Panel
Attachment:
Table
Enclegure s :
As stated above
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Comparison of Selected Estimates on the Soviet Ground Force in NIE 1l-14--62 and
Assessments in the CIA/DIA Panel Interim Report
u-14-62* Panel Report
Number of Soviet Line Divisions
At Various Strengths
Most Probable
145
115-135
Range
120-150
100-150
At Combat Strength
Total
80
58-T5
Eastern Europe and Western USSR
49
45-55
C~ Number of Military Personnel
!] }may(
}.o .. .. L..1
Total (mill ion y~) nearly 2
Portion in Line Divisions over half half or less
* of 1 October 15W.-
As of first half of 1963.
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