CIA Requirements for Initial Debriefing of Pueblo Crew

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00972A000100260009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 1998
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: September 11, 1968
• Content Type: MF

Approved For (ease 2000 r 1*-RDP79 O972A000100260009-4
NO 04
11 September 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT CIA Requirements for Initia:L Debriefing
of Pueblo Crew
c. Prisoner handling, iAtiU' g degree of
preplanning evident, attempt- o induce defec-
tions and methods of extracting confessions, and
exposure to outside materials--letters, radio,
press--during confinement; changes in location
or degree of security;
d. Indications of uncertainty in crisis
management during the period after the seizure;
Approved For Release 2000/08/
6P791300972A000100260009-4
~-:]
1. You asked the DDI what CIA's interests would
be during the early stages of the debriefing of the
Pueblo crew. The views of officers in the Offices of
Current Intelligence, Strategic Research, and National
Estimates, the Information Requirements Staff, and the
Directorate of Plans were solicited in drawing up the
questions below, which are illustrative of the general
areas into which they are grouped. Other questions are
probably best handled during the continuing debriefing,
along with following up on the key areas highlighted
below.
a. Pueblo seizure and crisis: The events
leading to the seizure, and the immediate cir-
cumstances surrounding the taking of the ship--
including hints of foreknowledge--as a gauge of
North Korean reactions to future reconnaissance
efforts;
. Any indication of North Korean expecta-
tati s of and preparations for US counteraction,
including retrieving the crew and ship or a re-
taliatory strike;
 Approved For R&Lvase 2000/OBSe EATRDP79BQ,Q,972A000100260009-4
Nu 1'~j.
e. Intelligence exploitation: The positive
intelligence material and collection information
captured or otherwise obtained, to measure
North Korean appreciation of current US capabili-
ties;
f. North Korean interest in and knowledge of
US collection activities as evidenced by the in-
terrogations;
g. Inferences as to the capabilities of the
North Korean cryptologic service derived from the
.questions posed or the knowledgeability of the
interrogators;
h. Identification of the interrogators, in-
cluding their organizational affiliation and rank;
i. Major interrogation subjects, including
any emphasis on US politics and domestic situa-
tions;
k. Foreign assistance: Participation of
Soviet, Chinese Communist, or other personnel
in debriefings, examination of equipment, or
exploitation of documents, as a gauge of
North Korean cooperation with the USSR and China
and the resultant intelligence damage;
1. Disposition of captured documents or
equipment, including shipment to the USSR or
Communist China;
M. Other matters: Disposition of any
crew members not returned; and
n
tended disposition of the ship.
N-
25X1A9a
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Distribution:
Orig. 2 -- Addressee 1 -- Ch/IRS
2 --DDI~~ p
2 w.. DfOSR
1 -> RAD
1--RAYC
1
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1
Ch/FE Div. -2- 25X1A9a
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