Methodological Development

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00972A000100410013-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 1998
• Sequence Number: 13
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Re1'ase 2000/05%23 : CIA-RDP79B0bf72AOOO1OO41OO13-2
Methodological Development
The objective of the planned effort in this area is to de-
velop an analytical framework for obtaining a better understand-
ing of the Soviet defense decision-making process by drawing on
the existing body of economic and other behaviorial science the-
ory, and the tools of mathematics. Existing intelligence can
then be tested in an attempt to identify consistent patterns and
explanations of past behavior. If this effort is successful, it
will provide a more reliable and explicit means for predicting
future Soviet defense programs.
Ors approach is to examine past Soviet defense programs a-
gainst the background of the strategic decision theory developed
primarily by Schelling. This approach draws heavily on the econ-
omic theory of rational choice and the tools of mathematical anal-
ysis. OSD (Systems Analysis) has experimented with this approach but apparently in only a general and limited way -- and identified
a number of Soviet programs that appear to have been "irrational"
in terms of the analytical framework. Some additional independent
testing of this approach by OSR, however, is probably desirable.
A second approach that has promise is one that has been sug-
gested by a panel of OSD consultants. This approach is based on
organization theory. It postulates that decisions are determined
not so much by "rational economic choice" as by the functioning of
a large complex bureaucracy.
A third approach is a relatively straight-forward statistical
analysis designed to identify parameters which seem to function as
decision criteria -- e.g., budgetary limits.
The problem of matching the relevent analytic framework to
pertinent and available intelligence data is complex and difficult.
These suggested approaches probably will produce at best only
slight incremental improvements in understanding Soviet actions
and formulating intelligence estimates. Initial projects of lim-
ited scope and objective can be specifically designed to test the
feasibility and potential of a methodology.
A manpower effort of about one man-year using several analysts
with complementary analytic skills and intelligence backgrounds
over a period of (six) months should provide enough experience to
evaluate progress toward the initial limited goals, and provide a
basis for planning more specific research programs for the future.
Approved For Release 20001 Q20 DP79BOO972AOOO1OO41OO13-2