KEY STATEMENTS OF SECRETARY LAIRD IN TESTIMONY BEFORE THRE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 20 FEBRUARY 1969
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79B00972A000100440003-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 24, 1998
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 20, 1960
Content Type:
MEMO
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CIA-RDP79B00972A000100440003-0.pdf | 70.23 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 20071021?~3, CIA,RQP7,, .B9.QC)72A000100440003-0
will . r
25 February 1969
SUBJECT: Key Statements of Secretary Laird in
Testimony before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, 20 February 1969
1. ABM--The slowdown at Moscow is the result
of R&D testing (p. 229). The Soviets are testing a
sophisticated new system (p. 165), also described
as an upgraded system (p. 229).
2. The Chinese--will fire a test ICBM within
18 months and have a capability by 1975 of having
20-30 ICBMs that could hit us (p. 166).
3. FOBS--A new FOBS is being deployed at this
time (p. 167).
4. Tallinn System--Not sure that this can be
used as an ABM as presently deployed, but we know it
is not hard to convert from an offensive (sic) to a
defensive system (p. 261).
5. Expenditures--The Soviets are outspending us
in strategic defense and having been doing so for the
past 24 months, and are outspending in offensive
weapons by 3 to 2--this involves all the more effort
since Soviet GNP about half of ours (p. 196). The
strategic defense spending ratio was 3 to 1 excluding
R&D and would be higher if defensive space applications
R&D were included (pp. 229-230).
the-last 24 months.
6. Intelligence--Not as sure as I'd like to be
about force levels in the USSR. Knows they have more.
ICBMs under construction and in being than the US has
(p. 198).
7. Committee members made numerous quotes from
the Clifford testimony in an effort to get the Secretary
to agree that the Soviets were just trying to catch up
and that the Moscow system was not very effective. The
Secretary's response was generally in the vein that the
Soviets are accelerating the arms race, particularly over
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