THIS RESPONDS TO THE REQUEST FOR EXTRAPOLATED DATA ON SOVIET FORCES
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79B00972A000100440007-6
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 24, 1998
Sequence Number:
7
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 22, 1969
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP79B00972A000100440007-6.pdf | 128.4 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2007/02/ at' -~79B00972A000100440007-6
2'2 April 1969
1. This responds to the request for extra-
polated data on Soviet forces for the 1974-75
period, assuming sustained high rates of expansion
of major military missions.
2. The data are illustrative of levels that
could be reached if the Soviets were willing to
devote the resources to them and accept the penal-
ties this would entail in other sectors of the
economy.
3. These are not intelligence projections
which involve balanced judgments on Soviet capabi
lities, requirements and intentions, but simple
extrapolations of probable capabilities to continue
to deploy more of the kinds of forces now in exist-
ence or now being built. If the Soviets were to
exploit their capabilities to the fullest, were not
concerned with stimulating US counteraction, and
were willing to depress economic growth and living
standards, forces of this order probably would be
feasible.
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C -W
1 APR 1.969
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Strategic Offense
Heavy Bombers/Tankers
1969
1974
Bear
105
200
Bison
80
70
Total
185
270
The figures for 1974 include the possibility of
deployment of a new Bear with a new ASM in the 1970-71
time period, and low attrition rates for the Bison
aircraft. Currently, the Soviets have no heavy bombers
in production.
1969 1974
Total Operational Launchers 1056 2500(rounded)
The figure for 1974 assumes that the SS-9 will
continue to be deployed at a rate of six new groups
(or 36 launchers) per year and the SS-11.at a rate
of 15 new groups (150 launchers) per year, and includes
current projections for deployment of the SS-13 in both
the hard and mobile configuration. The total also
assumes retention of all SS-7/SS-8 launchers.
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1) Z)
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%We I
SSBNs/SLBMs
1969
1974
Submarines*
H Class (3 launchers per boat)
9
9
Y Class (16 launchers per boat)
7
46
Total SSBN
16
55
Launch Tubes*
1969
1974
H Class
30
30
Y Class
112
736
142
766
Y-Class submarines are currently being produced
at a rate of6-8per year. H--Class boats are not in
production, but the Soviets are expected to retain
all units thzough 1977.
*The figures represent total units in inventory. Boats
on-line are generally about 80-85 percent of the total,
and the Soviets are currently given the capability for
maintaining about 30 percent of their force on-station.
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0! j p 2 1 APR 1969
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lowe 1%0
Conventional Forces
Ground Forces 1969 1974
1.5 million 1.8 million
Manpower
The 1974 figures assume that the estimated rates
of increase for 1968 and 1969 (generated in response
primarily to China border problems and instability in
the East European Satellites) continue through 1974.
Tactical Air Forces 1969 1974
The 1974 figure assumes that phase-out of the
older model aircraft now in the order-of-battle is
halted. It also assumes that aircraft now believed
to be in the last year or two of production continue
in production through 1974.
Approved For Release 20071 791300972A000100440007-6