DEFENSE DEPARTMENT 'WHITE PAPER' ON THE SAFEGUARD ABM SYSTEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00972A000100440014-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: June 20, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

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20 June 1969
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Defense Department "White Paper" on the
Safeguard ABM System
1. The White Paper is an unclassified version
of Secretary Laird's testimony before two sub-
committees of the House Committee on Appropriations
on 22 May 1969. At the start of the briefing,
Mr. Laird promised to go "as far as we, possibly
can within the limits of security" to make the
briefing available to the public.
2. The Secretary first addresses the nature
of the threat facing the United States over the
next five to ten years. After prefacing his
remarks with the observation that it takes only
18 to 24 months to build an ICBM silo, he inserts
the appropriate reminder that intelligence pro-
jections beyond that point necessarily involve
a large measure of judgment rather than hard
evidence. The remainder of this section of his
briefing consists of a mixture of information
from relevant NIEs, data from other intelligence
sources, and the Secretary's own observations.
The distinctions between these three categories
of information are not always made clear to the
reader, however.
3. On page 9, for example, after reporting
that the more than 230 SS.--9s which are now
operational or under construction could be
fitted with three 5-megaton reentry vehicles
each capable of attacking a different Minuteman
silo (a possibility recognized in the Memorandum
to Holders of 11-8-68), Laird inserts his own
observation that a force of 420 such missiles
(24 higher than the high side of the NIPP)
probably could destroy 95 percent of the Minute-
man force. Again, toward the bottom of page 9
after stating that the intelligence community
estimates that the Soviets can produce eight
Y-class submarines per year, Laird expresses
his own belief that this production rate may
increase significantly as the Soviets gain more
production experience.
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4. Earlier in the paper (middle of page 8),
after erroneously reporting that the intelligence
estimates prepared last fall predicted that the
buildup of Soviet ICBM forces would level off
after reaching rough numerical parity with the
US, Laird inserts the observation that the
Soviets could have 2,500 ICBMs in service by
the mid-1970s if they continue deploying them
at 1967-68 rates.
.5. On page eight, Mr. Laird selects the
high side of the NIPP range in reporting that
the Soviets probably will have about 400 large,
SS-9 type missiles operational by the mid-1970s,
and at the top a page 11, the Secretary attributes
a more significant "loiter" capability to the
ABMs being tested in the USSR than we are aware
of.
6. The Secretary's reporting on the Chinese
strategic threat sticks more closely to agreed
national intelligence. The paragraph on page 13
which deals with the status of the Chinese
ICBM program, for example, is a virtual quote
of paragraphs 42, 43, and 45 of SNIE 13-8-69
dated 27 February 1969.
7. The remainder of the paper deals with
the alternatives to Safeguard; the purposes,
status, description, cost and effectiveness
of the system; and the foreign policy considerations
which affected the decision to deploy it. Aside
from the points raised in paragraphs 4 and 5 above,
the threat assessment portion of the paper
contains a' generally accurate but selective
presentation of intelligence relating to the ABM
problem.
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