Camparisons of US and Soviet Expenditures for Selected Defense Programs

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00972A000100510009-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 1998
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For RelWa 2000/05/23 CIA-RDP79B00972A0UQi100510009-6
Attachment
Comparisons of US and Soviet Expenditures
for Selected Defense Programs
Statistical Note
Comparison. of any economic measures between
countries presents difficult conceptual problems
because of the use of different currencies and the
differences in structures and orientations of the
economies involved. This is especially true in com-
paring defense expenditures of the US and USSR
because of the great disparity between the nnatuxe
of the two economics and a general scarcity of reliable
data for the defense area. As a result.such comparisons
should be viewed more as reasonable approximations than
as precise measures.
Reliable data on US defense spending on a mission
basis are not available for the period prior to FY 1962.
Adjustments were made to the official US data contained
in the Department of Defense Five-Year Defense Program
(dated 1 April 1968--Top Secret) to obtain as much
comparability as possible with the CIA estimates of
Soviet defense spending expressed in dollars. The
data on US defense spending contained in this attach-
-ment, therefore, do not agree precisely with the data
contained in the DoD document.
S seed Responses
question 1: For how long has the Soviet Union out-
spent the United States in the area of strategic
offensive forces? In what years, in the past two
decades, has the United States outspent the Soviet
Union?
Response: Data for making the necessary comparisons
are not available for the period before FY 1962.
For the entire period 1962--69, the cumulative spending
of the two countries on strategic offensive forces
is roughly equal at between 45 and 50 billion dollars.
The timing of expenditures, however, is quite different.
TS 199034
Copy
Approved For Release 2000/05/2 3 ` Cn-uri a 972A000100510009-6
 Approved For Relpva5, a 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79B00972A0Qpi100510009-6
For each year in the 1962--64 period, US spending
exceeded Soviet spending by a substantial margin.
For the three-year period as a whole, US spending
was about 23 billion dollars and Soviet spending
about 16 billion dollars. In 1965, spending levels
were about equal and since 1965 Soviet spending has
been higher than US spending. For the 1965-69
period, Soviet spending is about 30 billion dollars
and US spending about 25 billion dollars.
The difference in timing of expenditures is
a reflection of the difference in timing of major
strategic offensive programs. By 1965, the major
phases of deployment of Titan, Minuteman, and
Polaris systems were essentially complete while
the deployments of the counterpart Soviet systems--
SS-9, SS-11, and Y-Class submarine--were in their
early stages. Spending for these programs in 1967
and 1968 was largely responsible for a ratio of
Soviet to US spending of about 3 to 2 in these
years.
question 2: What weapons do the Soviets include in
strategic offensive forces? In particular, do they
include medium or intermediate range ballistic
missiles?
esponse: The estimates of Soviet expenditures for
strategic offensive forces include outlays for all
elements of Soviet Long Range Aviation (heavy and
medium bombers) , all. elements of Soviet Strategic
Rocket Forces (ICBMs and MR-IRBMs), and the ballistic
missile submarine element of the Soviet Navy.
It is known that the Soviet concept of
strategic offensive forces includes their Long
Range Aviation and Strategic Rocket Force organizations.
It is not known whether or not they include the ballistic
missile submarines subordinate to the Soviet Navy.
Question 3: For how long has the Soviet Union. out-
spent the United States in the field of strategic
defense? What has been the ratio over the past
decade?
TS 199034
-2-
Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79BOO912A000100510009-6
 Approved For RelWe 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP79B00972A0 00510009-6
Response: The USSR has spent far more for strategic
defense than the US in every year during the 1962-69
period. In cumulative terms, the USSR has spent
the equivalent of more than 40 billion dollars--
some 2.7 times as much as the US. The Soviets
face a large and varied threat; they have a much
larger land mass to defend than the US; and they
have potential adversaries in much. closer proximity
to their borders.
The USSR has spent more money on both
SAMs (19 billion dollars) and continual modernization
programs for interceptor aircraft and control and
warning (20 billion dollars) than the US has on its
total strategic defense force (15 billion dollars).
Neither country.has undertaken, as yet, any extensive
outlays for deployment of ABM and antisatellite
systems.
Question 4: What; weapons systems compose strategic
defense and what has been the ratio of Soviet to
US spending over the past five years for each
(e.g., ABM systems and interceptor aircraft) ?
Response: The estimates of Soviet expenditures
for strategic defensive forces include outlays for
all elements of the Soviet Air Defense Forces (PVO)
organization. Included are surface-to-air missiles,
interceptor aircraft, the control and warning system,
and ABM and antisatellite systems.
For the five-year period, 1965-69, spending
by the USSR for surface-to-air missile systems is
nearly 9 times as high as that for the US. Inter-
ceptor aircraft expenditures for the USSR are some
3 times as high, and spending for ABM and anti-
satellite systems by the USSR are about 1 1/2 times
that of the US. Soviet spending for control and
warning, consisting primarily of operating costs, is
some 20 percent greater than US spending.
Question 5: Against what threat do Soviet strategic
defense forces defend? Do US strategic defense forces
defend?
Response: The Soviets have deployed radars, inter-
ceptor aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)
in great numbers throughout the USSR. These forces
were developed to counter US and allied bomber forces,
TS 199034
Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIQRWR7QR 009&72A000100510009-6
 Approved For Relews 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79B00972AOOW0510009-6
but can be used against air attack from any nation
including China. Soviet air defense systems can
engage small., highspeed air-to-surface missiles as
well as large subsonic bombers.
The Soviets are deploying an ABM system
around Moscow which evidently is designed to provide
some limited capability for defending the Soviet
capital against ICBMs from the US. There is no
evidence that the Soviets are planning ballistic
missile defenses against China, although there are
some early warning facilities that will. cover that
sector.
Note: We believe that it would be
more appropriate for the Department of Defense
to address the second half of this question.
Question 6: How do Soviet and US expenditures
for military RDT&E compare for the past five
years?
Response - : For the 1965-69 period, US spending
for RDT&E is about 50 billion dollars, and Soviet
spending for the same period is about 40 billion
dollars. During this period., however, the level
of US spending has been fairly constant while
the Soviet level has grown by about 3 billion
dollars to almost equal the US level of about
10 billion dollars a year.
Although current information will not
permit estimates of Soviet RDT&E expenditures on an
individual weapon basis, it is believed that the
majority of their expenditures are for strategic
offensive and defensive weapons.
TSO 199034
Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79B00972A0001005100 9-6
-4-
 ed For R le~' 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79B00972A009r,140510009-6
t rlNOCV N -1
Cn
7 N NOr-i00 ? C)
tD
rn ~
r-i r-'3 Co t9 C) Ln 0 H H
Cn . . . .
Cn d' d'r-irINCD N
U)
4?tr
0 1
-P N
?ri lO
Q)
Appro
d'1 r1 t0OMr-1
N NOriO0
N MON Or-H
Ln cpr4rlN0
C" NOrIOO
t 'i+lOLnNi
tt) LC) r-i H N O
r-H MNN r-IN
o LnLnl0Nr-i VJ
d' ri N
O OCOLnH/O
N rl9NC)H
'd' r-i H
O Cnco c LO CC)
Ln CaOMNr-IO
N
M t` MOOM M
rl l0 d' 00 N r-i Co
M N r-I M
H M C)1 M 1- )t) r
M l 0 r-I M O O Co
'.0 MLnN MM 61
Ln drM st'l0O O
c r-I N LO I- N
L n N 0 0 0 0
C) r-ICO OCD M
4: 100C4 1M0
co CO co W M N
4 r- OOO0
10 LC)OHNO
d' l0N t9r-IH
~M H 0000
l0 Co W l0 lO M
lO L1)O4N O
s
x'10000
Cr 0C)U 'N
Ln LnOrHN0
ri 00w ?NN
Ln H 0000
C) 1.DON tl)ON
In 4 o r??I N 0
Q) Q)
-N 4J
t]l r) t31 rl
t~i H 4J ri
Q) Q) ?ri 4-I r-I CU Q) ?r1 cH r-i
b Q)
to u) )~ co Q) ti) O N rf) )~ Cd a)
1 4~ 44 4a r~ S-4 ?4J I U
Q) Q) rd O (d ?ri Cd Q) Q) rd U rd ?ri Cd
4-I 4-I ~4 M U) rd Qa cH 4-4 ~A U) U7 rO 04
4-4 Q) rl ~~ ?r1 CA 4i Q) r1 -H In
O ) ra a' Cll 4-) r1 0 r~j rz FG Q) 4-) H
U U r-I P m Ci U U ?i 4.4 U) 4 Li S44
?r1 ?H O N >i H cd H ?H O Q) >r H cc
tT t } l 4-) Cn '.M iJ 1:7) is r'4 ?4-1 C!) '.?S
0) Q) 4J ?ri 0) Q) .4J cI
4J 4J L K' W -1
-I-) W ~ F
Cd Cd O ?r1 t ) a ?ri Cd rd O ?H FL f)a
d For Relea~e 20)A105/2-2 CIAFRDP79B00972A00j100510.0(J*
ca M m (n ca
W r?1
i -ri
C-4 >1
r-1 'J 3.4
rd -I-) (1)
?4J ?ri ,-t;
O rCi ?4-)
Q) (1) rd
P 4-) rd
rd .H Q)
4J +) rO
Cd U) >~