PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF JOINT CIA-DIZ STUDY OF SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00972A000100570020-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2001
• Sequence Number: 20
• Content Type: STUDY

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/19: CIA-RDP79B00972A000100570020-7
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PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF JOINT CIA--DIA STUDY
OF SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE
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ing some shelters, probably blast resistant facilities,
for workers who will remain in evacuated areas. We
cannot now judge how extensive this program is.
There are also about 90 million potential fallout
shelter spaces in Soviet basements. The basement space
offers protection from fallout radiation that is ade-
quate according to US standards, but would provide
little or no blast protection.
FEEDING EVACUEES: The Soviets would have adequate
food resources to sustain evacuees in most areas over
a short term (1-2 weeks), and probably for a longer
period (3 months-1 year), depending on damage to
The food distribution system,
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however, would be severely strained. Excessive queuing
and crowding would occur as urban residents sought to
procure the rations they are required to bring for the
initial 2-3 days of evacuation. Lack of cupboard space
and refrigeration facilities in Soviet homes precludes
maintenance of a sizeable food stock from which emer-
gency rations could be drawn. For a period of about
two weeks following a: nuclear attack, radioactive
fallout would complicate deliveries of food from re-
serves.
Food supplies generally available in the area
of four of the five cities examined would be suffi-
cient to sustain evacuees for about a year. In areas
such as Tashkent, however, where agriculture is de-
voted largely to cotton production or other industrial
crops, there is no evidence of substantial stockpiles
of grain that would be needed for a prolonged evacu-
ation.
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/19: CIA-RDP79B00972A000100570020-7
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COSTING: Data on Soviet civil defense expenditures
are fragmentary but reflect what the Soviets are
probably spending for civil defense training, publi-
cations, communications systems, and warehousing.
CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING: A Trey part of the Soviet civil
defense effort is training. Selected personnel are
groomed for roles as commanders, specialists, and
instructors in the civil defense system. The general
population is instructed in weapons effects, and in
evacuation, post nuclear attack recovery, and shelter
construction techniques. The Soviets have conducted
six nationwide compulsory training programs since 1955.
The programs have ranged from 15 to 22 hours in length.
The current program was initiated in January 1967 and
appears to be an improvement over the others. There
is a greater emphasis on supplementing civil defense
lectures with practical exercises, and the training
has been extended into the school system.
URBAN AREA EVACUATION POSSIBILITIES: There is a sub-
sta tial body oC i.nformation concerning Soviet evacu-
ation planning and limited drills, which has been
studied in detail and used as a partial basis for
analyzing the evacuation possibilities for ten Soviet
cities selected for this study. Hypothetical evacu-
ation plans for the ten cities have been prepared
by DIA/CIA utilizing all feasible routes and modes
of transport, and relocating the urban populations
to contiguous suburban and rural areas.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/19: CIA-RDP79B00972A000100570020-7