COMMENTS ON NORAD PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00972A000100580002-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 26, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/02/24 : CIA-R -6
1. National estimates thru 1962 did significantly
underestimate the future heavy bomber forces. Since 1963,
however, the record is not bad; in the last few years it
is good:
Estimate for Mid-68
Current best (TF/A) 200
NIE 11-8-68 195-205
11-8-67 195-210
11-8-66 185-210
11-8-65 n/a
11-8-64 160-195
11-8-63 140-185
2. The LRA Badger decline has not been at a steady
rate. Approximate numbers taken out of LRA by year are
as follows (mid-years, number dropped in preceding 12
months):
3. The fact that LRA Badger were transferred to the
SNAF works against the NORAD position, not for it. Many
of the aircraft transferred were tankers -- the very
tankers that would be needed to support LRA Badger opera-
tions against the US.
4. The record of the national estimates concerning
Badger deployment has not been good. The NORAD paper,
however, neglects to mention that one of the main reasons
that Badger has been underestimated is that the Blinder
and its ASM have been overestimated.
-,J LUUL I
Approved For Release 2007/02/24 : CIA-RDP79B00972A000100580002-6
 Estimates for Mid-1968
Badger
Blinder Total IOC for ASM
NIE
11-8-68
570-590
145-165
715-755
1967
11-8-67
525-575
150-175
675-750
1967
11-8-66
450-550
150-180
600-730
1966/67
11-8-65
n/a
n/a
n/a
1966
11-8-64
300-390
180-280
480-670
1965
11-8-63
300-400
200-325
500-725
1964
Note that the high sides of the estimates from
11-8-63 thru 11-8-67 all provide a more potent medium
bomber force because of the number of Blinder estimated.
5. Current NIE's use the term "virtually all," allowing
for the possibility that a few heavy bombers might be
diverted to support the SNAF. This possibility received
even more attention a few years back.
6. It should be noted that even the heavy bombers
would require aerial refueling and/or Arctic staging in
order to cover many US targets.
7. The national estimates that the medium bomber no
longer plays a major role in intercontinental attack were
based on observed trends in the training, equipment, and
deployment of these forces. Projections of declining
numbers of medium bombers were based on actual reductions
in these forces (see para 2, above), and evidence of
limited deployment of the new medium (Blinder). The
growth of the ICBM forces was considered to be further
evidence of a declining requirement, but it certainly
was not the basis for a "contention that the medium bomber
forces would be phased out."
8. The NORAD study assumes that the Soviets make a
pre-emptive attack on the US using counterforce targeting;
desired amounts of damage are specified. The study con-
cludes that the desired amount of damage (as specified by
NORAD) cannot be obtained without the use of medium bombers,
and that this proves that the medium bomber is a necessary
element of a Soviet attack on the NORAD-defended area.
The weakness of this line of reasoning is apparent. The
amount of damage desired (as specified by NORAD) is not
defined -- it appears to be nothing less than the destruction
or negation of US retaliatory forces.
Approved For Release 2007/02/24 : CIA-RDP79B00&9 00 2-6
 Approved For Release 2007/02/24 : CIA-RDP79B00972A000100580002-6
i
s ME I
9. Nearly half of the aircraft in the tactical air
forces have a primary mission of air defense. The tactical
strike capability is the weakest element of these forces --
there are only about 360 light bombers, for example -- and
it is highly unlikely that 467 TAF aircraft (23% of 2,900)
would be assigned strategic targets),
10. The paper has made the point that the addition of
medium bombers to an attack on the US would substantially
increase the level of damage inflicted. It is said that
the Soviets "...have only 1,550 weapons to deal with 1,910
targets, 1,300 of them hard." NORAD then suggests that this
situation can be fixed by the use of some 140 mediums.
Even with two weapons per aircraft this would provide only
"1,830 weapons to deal with 1,910 targets, 1,300 of which
are hard."
11. For many targets the mediums would need refueling
as well as Arctic staging.
12. The projected level of Arctic staging is far above
normal levels and would be considered highly unusual and
significant activity and would indeed arouse suspicion.
13. The deployment of 125 mediums to the Chukotsk
Peninsula would be about a five-fold increase over normal
maximum deployment levels. There are only about 140 medium
bombers assigned to the Far East Long Range Air Army and
about 40% of these are based in Central Siberia over 2,000
miles from the Chukotsk Peninsula.
14. The staging of "all available medium bomber tankers"
to the Kola Peninsula would involve some peculiar shifts in
the LRA bomber forces. Available evidence indicates that
LRA has few medium tankers (many were transferred to the
SNAF in the early 1960's), and the only medium bomber unit
that still engages in aerial refueling on a continuing basis
is located in the Far East. The NORAD plan presumably
requires this unit to move to the Kola Peninsula while some
aircraft from the Western USSR move to the Far East.
15. There is no evidence that any LRA Blinder have
ever been deployed to any Arctic staging base, much less
to Magadan which '_s not normally used by LRA bombers. The
choice of this airfield is puzzling in any case, since
Blinders operating against Alaska from here would be near
the limits of their combat radius.
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16. NORAD's pattern of staging for the Soviet medium
bomber force is completely at odds with the normal disposi-
tion of these forces. The paper stages 125 mediums thru
the Eastern Arctic and 40 mediums plus tankers thru the
Western Arctic. The LRA medium bomber force, however, is
deployed so that there are about 140 mediums in Central
Siberia and the Far East, and about 600 mediums in the
Western USSR.
17. The suggestion that 200 mediums might be staged
thru the Chukotsk Peninsula is absurd. See paras 13 and
16, above.
18. There are many targets for LRA mediums outside of
the US. The fact that there appears to be an overwhelming
concentration of these forces in Western USSR (i.e., directed
against Western Europe) should not be surprising, because
this is where the Soviets have always concentrated their
forces. The LRA mediums could provide much of the strike
capability missing from the TActical Air Forces, and there
is, in fact, documentary evidence of the assignment of LRA
19. Note that NORAD's assumptions have now become the
Soviet objectives.
20. The suggestion made here and earlier that the
Soviets have more confidence in bombers than in missiles
is not convincing. As a matter of fact, the last time
LRA was "tested in a wartime environment" was at the begin-
ning of World War II, when it failed to accomplish its
strategic objectives and was reassigned to secondary
supporting roles.
21. The paper presents a hypothetical plan for the
use of the LRA medium bombers. It does not attempt to
discuss any of the intelligence information bearing on this
subject, presumably because all of this information indicates
that the LRA medium does not play a major role in Soviet
plans for intercontinental attack.