THE MILITARY POSTURE OF THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00972A000100580012-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 1998
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: April 29, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

.Approved' For Release 2007/02/24 : CIA-RD -
Soviet military policy is focussed on three goals:
to overcome the US advantage in strategic offensive
capabilities, to improve defensive forcesas a deterrent
against the US, and to upgrade Soviet capabilities for
waging war short of an all-out nuclear exchange. Under-
lying these military goals is the Kremlin's desire to
enhance its ability to act with confidence and flexibi-
lity in world affairs.
In this respect, Soviet conventional military forces
have been engaged in military operations twice in the
past year. Large ground and air forces were used for the
Czech intervention in 1968 and several divisions remained
in Czechoslovakia. The clashes between Soviet and Chinese
troops along the Ussuri River last month will reaffirm to
the Soviet leadership the necessity of continuing to rein-
force Soviet military capabilities along the border with
Communist China.
Strategic Offense
The Soviet inventory of operational land-based inter-
continental missiles will reach a par--in numbers of
operational launchers--with the US force of 1054 ICBMs in
1969.
The latest Soviet ICBM systems have been deployed in
the fashion of US Minuteman missiles--in hardened and widely
dispersed single silos, each presenting a separate aiming
point for an attacking force.
In addition to these measures to reduce the vulnerabi-
lity of their ICBMs, the Soviets are engaged in active
research and development to make other qualitative improve-
ments, such as a program to develop a multiple warhead
delivery system on one of their ICBMs.
They also continue to work on an. experimental weapon
system which has come to be labeled a fractional-orbit
bombardment system (FOBS). It is, in effect, an extended-
range ICBM which flies on a lower trajectory than a normal
Approved For Release 2007/02/24 : CIA-RDP79B00972A000100580012-5
 Approved'For Release 2007/02/24: CIA-R
v v
ICBM and thus would be more difficult for US radars to
detect and track. It might also be fired southward
from the USSR, approaching the US from the south and
avoiding US northward-facing early warning radars.
The potential of the FOBS' low trajectory is
offset in part by the system's smaller payload and
lower accuracy compared to an ICBM. Thus it does not
appear suitable as a weapon for attacking US missile
sites or other hardened installations. The Soviets
may view it as being effective in a surprise attack on
soft targets or as a counter ABM weapon. No FOBS are
as yet believed to be deployed.
In contrast to the ICBM developments, the Soviet
force of about 700 medium-range and intermediate-range
missile sites has remained virtually unchanged since
1963. Most of these sites are located in the western
USSR, where they could launch missiles against any
targets in Western Europe.
The lack of change in the MRBM/IRBM force may be
due to the development of a mobile strategic missile.
The Soviets have claimed to have such a missile, and
they have publicly displayed tracked transporter-launchers
for this type of system in Moscow parades for the past
several years. They have also paraded a two-stage solid-
propellant missile which could be used for this purpose.
As their strategic missile forces have grown, the
Soviets have allowed their inventory of long-range bombers
to decline slightly. They now have some 150 heavy bombers
supplemented by about 50 tankers for aerial refueling.
Their medium bomber force, composed of twin-jet aircraft,
has declined to somewhat less than 800. Soviet medium
bombers are believed to be targeted against the NATO
countries and other areas of the periphery of the Soviet
Union.
In an effort to extend their operational usefulness,
many of the bombers, both heavies and mediums, have been
modified to carry air-to-surface missiles. In addition,
some of the older medium bombers have been replaced by a
newer model with a supersonic dash capability.
No replacement has appeared for the four-jet Bison
and four-turboprop Boar heavy bombers. A delta-wing
heavy bomber which was first seen in 1961 never progressed
beyond the prototype stage.
Approved For Release 2007/02/24 : CIA-RDP79B00972A000100580012-5
 ..Approved For Release 2007/02/24 : CIA-
Defense against strategic attack continues to hold
its traditionally high priority in Soviet military plan-
ning. New antiaircraft systems are being introduced, and
an anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) system is being installed
for the defense of Moscow.
The Moscow ABM system has been in development for
more than ten years. Construction of launch sites and
attendant radars began about six years ago and has pro-
ceeded irregularly since then. There have been signs that
the Soviets are not going to deploy as many ABM launchers
as they originally intended. The missile for the Moscow
ABM system, the Galosh, was first seen in November 1964
when it was paraded, enclosed in its canister, through
Red Square in Moscow. The system apparently now has a
limited operational capability, but the slow pace of
development and the fact that it has not been deployed at
other cities probably indicates that Soviet officials have
reservations about its effectiveness.
Meanwhile, the Soviets are still highly concerned about
the threat from manned bombers and air-launched missiles.
During the last few years they have upgraded their fighter-
interceptor defenses by introducing new aircraft with
better performance and armament. Their current inventory
probably numbers about 3500 interceptors. In 1963 they
began deploying a new defensive missile system, sometimes
referred to as the Tallinn system, in many areas of the
Soviet Union for defense against aircraft and air-to-surface
missiles.
The Tallinn deployment is superimposed on a large net-
work of sites for the older and shorter-range SA-2 air
defense missile system. The SA-2 parallels the US Nike-
Ajax in design and performance. In addition, the Soviets
are deploying mobile surface-to-air missile systems to pro-
vide improved tactical defense against attacking aircraft.
In 1963, Admiral Gorshkov assumed command of the Soviet
Navy with an order that ships would put to sea. Since then,
the navy has developed from a water-borne adjunct of the
ground force into a significant maritime power, operating
with increasing frequency in distant waters.
Approved For Release 2007/02/24 : CIA-RDP79B00972A000100580012-5
 ..Appr6ved For Release 2007/02/24 : CIA-RDP79PL-g79AnnnlnfSRnnl7-5
v w
The Soviet Navy began continuous deployments in
the Mediterranean some four years ago. Since the Arab-
Israeli war of June 1967, a flotilla including nuclear
submarines and missile-armed surface ships has been
operating in these waters with deployment reaching as
many as 50 combatant and support ships including submarines.
Soviet warships are also active in the Indian Ocean now.
All of the major surface ships built since 1960
have been armed with surface-to-air or surface-to-surface
missiles. Over 20 major surface ships and nearly 50
submarines are equipped with long-range anti-ship cruise
missiles. The Soviets have also deployed about 100 Osa-
and Komar-class patrol boats armed with a short-range
missile similar to the one which the Egpytians used to
sink the Israeli destroyer Eilat.
The current inventory of surface ships consists of
some 22 cruisers, 80.destroyers, 25 guided-missile
destroyers, and some 2300 ships such as other patrol
boats, auxiliaries, support ships, minesweepers, coastal
escorts, and intelligence collectors.
The Soviets are also building several new classes
of ships intended to help them catch up with US naval
capabilities. Two large helicopter cruisers launched
in the past two years will be used for anti-submarine
operations.
While the submarine fleet has declined slightly
in numbers in recent years--to some 380 in 1969--its
effectiveness is being improved by the addition of new
types of torpedo-attack and ballistic-missile submarines.
The new Soviet Polaris-type submarine can fire 16
ballistic missiles to a range of 1,500 miles. Several
units of this class are already operational and production
has reached 6 to 8 each year.
About 40 older ballistic-missile submarines carry
an average of three launchers each. They are believed
to be targeted against European and Asian targets. Only
10 of these are nuclear powered.
The Soviets now have about 44 submarines equipped
with cruise missiles with a range of about 300 miles.
 Approved For Release 2007/02/24: CIA-9DP79B00972A000100580012-5
These submarines are believed to be intended to attack
naval and merchant vessels. Some 300 other submarines
are configured for torpedo-attack missions or used for
training.
The Soviet Navy also has a land-based air force and
a small force of marines. The Naval Air Force has in-
creased slightly in the last few years and currently
has about 500 bombers and 370 other aircraft for trans-
port, reconnaissance, and antisubmarine warfare. The
aircraft are all land-based, primarily on the European
coastline of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Navy has no
aircraft carriers.'
Increased Soviet interest in amphibious landing
operations became obvious in 1967 with the introduction
of tank landing ships, some of which have been deployed
to the Mediterranean since June 1967. The small force
of Soviet marines, however, is believed to number only
about 6000 men.
Ground Forces
The Soviet Army is estimated to number about two
million men, organized into 140 divisions. Most of
these divisions are far below full combat strength but
many of them could be brought up to strength rapidly.
Moreover, each division is about Half the size of a US
division. About half of them are stationed in the
Western USSR and Eastern Europe opposite NATO.
The evolution of Soviet ground forces over the past
several years has been characterized by emphasis on
mobility and short-term striking power at the expense
of many of the support elements needed for extended
combat. There are indications of a debate in Soviet
military circles over the desirability of matching NATO's
concept of flexible response and the possibility of
non-nuclear warfare, but so far the Soviet ground forces
have not shown signs of preparation for this type of
strategy.
Soviet capability for airlifting troops and equip-
ment has been enhanced by the introduction of the new
AN-22 heavy assault transport, which the Soviets un-
veiled at the 1967 Paris air show. The Soviets claim
that this aircraft can carry 88 tons of cargo to a
Approved For Release 2007/02/24 : CIA-RDP79B00972A000100580012-5
 Approved For Release 2007/02/24 : CIA-RD
w
distance of 2,800 nautical miles non-stop. The current
Soviet air transport force has about 1500 short and
medium range aircraft. In addition a large part of the
Soviet inventory of some 1500 helicopters supports the
ground forces.
The display of new aircraft in the Moscow Air Show
of 1967 revealed the extent of Soviet efforts to upgrade
their tactical air strike and interceptor capabilities.
Ten new or modified fighters were demonstrated, including
two with variable-sweep wings. Several were clearly
experimental. and will not be produced in quantity. Others
may be produced for Soviet air defense and tactical
fighter units. Four new vertical take-off and landing
aircraft were displayed, reflecting Soviet interest in
dispersing fighters away from improved airfields.
The number of aircraft in Soviet tactical air units
has remained relatively stable in recent years.