Comparison of US and USSR Civil Defense Programs

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00972A000100610011-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 1998
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: November 13, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

Mae
13 November 1969
1. Any overall comparison of the present Soviet
civil defense program and programs proposed for the
US is complicated by the different emphases the two
governments place on various aspects of their programs.
Most of the US programs concentrate on shelter con-
struction. The Soviet program emphasizes compulsory
public training, massive urban evacuation, the use
of inherent or improvised fallout shelter for evacuees,
and limited blast shelter construction for those re-
maining in cities. Except in the most general sense,
the Soviet program is not directly comparable with
any single US alternative, for it relies extensively
on a public training effort significantly larger than
any proposed for the US.
2. Because multiple criteria exist for con-
structing alternatives and for assessing the effec-
tiveness of any single combination of tactics and
hardware, a more complex comparison of Soviet and
US programs was conducted. The Soviet program has
 been described in terms of some of the parameters
listed in the draft report plus others which charac-
terize the Soviet approach. The attached table
summarizes the comparison.
3. Goals: In terms of basic goals, the Soviet
program is most like US Posture 3, which is designed
to provide limited protection for the entire populace.
The Soviet objective is similar, but the means by which
the USSR seeks to achieve it are somewhat different.
The US would attempt to protect its population by pro-
viding well in advance, a large number of shelters--
both inherent shelters as well as slanted construction.
The Soviet Union, in contrast, intends to make up for
a shortage of inherent protective space by training
its citizens, most of whom will be evacuated, to
improvise their own fallout shelters at the time they
are needed. The Soviets also seek to reduce the num-
ber of potential casualties by informing the general
populace--through compulsory indoctrination--of the
destructive effects of modern weapons and of the pro-
tective characteristics of various structures.
4. Systems: The combination of proposed US
tactics and hardware which is most comparable to
present Soviet programs is Posture 3C, which calls
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 for evacuation of the urban population to stocked,
inherent fallout shelters. Here again, however, the
Soviet program differs in one major aspect. Although
the Soviets have emphasized evacuation techniques,
adequate shelter facilities of the type envisioned
by the US are not available.
5. Shelters: The US has many more inherent
shelters than the USSR, and for quite some time it
has been building structures providing much more
natural fallout protection than is common in Soviet
buildings. The Soviets are building many industrial
and multi-storied residential structures without even
providing basements. We believe that while a rela-
tively small number of blast shelters are available
for essential personnel and activities, most Soviet
fallout shelters are the inherent type.
6. After World War II and especially during
the Fifties, the Soviet government advocated the
construction of basement shelters in new apartment
housing. Consequently, the type of Soviet shelter
is most compatible with US Posture 2B, which calls
for adequately-stocked inherent bas>,ment shelters.
As the table indicates, however, these are pro-
portionately fewer shelter spaces available in
 the USSR than are to be provided under any of the
US programs. Furthermore, the Soviets apparently
have not undertaken a large-scale program to stock
their shelters with even a minimum of essential
equipment and supplies. In fact, the populace is
advised to purchase a few days' food supplies and
keep them on hand for emergency use.
7. Communications and Warning: The Soviets
have several communications systems to support civil
defense, but their entire national communications
and warning system is probably inferior to ours.
8. Administration and Training: The massive
Soviet training effort, designed to give about 20
hours of instruction to over 10 million persons every
year, is significantly larger than that envisioned
under any of the US alternatives. The Soviets also
maintain a substantially larger number of adminis-
trative personnel, in part because of the size of
the training program. There are about 25,000-30,000
full- and part-time Soviet personnel engaged in admin-
istrative and support activities, whereas the US
strength, presently about 7,000 full- and part-time
employees, probably would not be more than about
15,000 under any of the postulated future programs.
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 9. Expenditures. Annual Soviet expenditures
for civil defense cannot be estimated precisely. We
judge that they are in excess of 150 million rubles
but that they are less than two or three times that
amount. In these broad terms civil defense repre-
sents about one to two percent of total Soviet defense
spending. Using total cost as the basis for compari-
son, the Soviet program is most like US Posture 4,
which calls for an annual outlay of $200 million to
$1.6 billion--between about three-tenths of one per-
cent and two percent of total US defense expenditures.
The problem of translating the cost of any Soviet
program into US dollars is made even more difficult
in the case of civil defense programs by the fact
that the Soviet program involves nationwide compul-
sory training. The Soviet training program probably
costs only about 100 million rubles per year, because
training is compulsory and the trainees are not com-
pensated. An equivalent US program under which
trainees might receive some payment could cost as
much as $1.2 billion per year.
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